FERNANDEZ VS.

STO TOMAS

FACTS: Fernandez was serving as Director of the OPIA while de Lima was serving as Director of the
OPR, both at the Central Office of the Civil Service Commission. While petitioners were so serving,
Resolution No. 94-3710 signed by public respondents Patricia A.. Sto. Tomas and Ramon Ereneta, Jr.,
Chairman and Commissioner, respectively, of the Commission, was issued on 7 June 1994.

Re-arranged some of the administrative units within the Commission and, among other things, merged
three (3) of them (OCSS, OPIA and OPR) to form a new grouping called the "Research and Development
Office (RDO)."

Renamed some of the Offices of the Commission,

Re-allocated certain functions moving some functions from one Office to another; This re-allocation or re-
assignment of some functions carried with it the transfer of the budget earmarked for such function to the
Office where the function was transferred. Moreover, the personnel, records, fixtures and equipment that
were devoted to the carrying out of such functions were moved to the Offices to where the functions were
transferred.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the CSC had legal authority to issue Resolution No. 94-3710 to the extent it
merged the OCSS, OPIA and the OPR, to form the RDO and

(2) Whether or not Resolution No. 94-3710 violated petitioners' constitutional right to security of tenure.

Petitioners argue that Resolution No. 94-3710 effected the "abolition" of public offices, something which
may be done only by the same legislative authority which had created those public offices in the first
place.

RULING: (1) The Court is unable, in the circumstances of this case, to accept this argument. The term
"public office" is frequently used to refer to the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by
which, for a given period either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by that
individual for the benefit of the public. We consider that Resolution No. 94-3710 has not abolished any
public office as that term is used in the law of public officers. It is essential to note that none of the
"changes in organization" introduced by Resolution No. 94-3710 carried with it or necessarily involved
the termination of the relationship of public employment between the Commission and any of its officers
and employees.

The legislative authority had expressly authorized the Commission to carry out "changes in the
organization," as the need for such changes arises

(2) We turn to the second claim of petitioners that their right to security of tenure was breached by the
respondents in promulgating Resolution No. 94-3710 and ordering petitioners' assignment to the
Commission's Regional Offices in Regions III and V. Section 2(3) of Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution
declared that "no officer or employee of the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause
provided by law." Petitioners in effect contend that they were unlawfully removed from their positions in
the OPIA and OPR by the implementation of Resolution No. 94-3710 and that they cannot, without their
consent, be moved out to the Regional Offices of the Commission.

We note, firstly, that appointments to the staff of the Commission are not appointments to a specified
public office but rather appointments to particular positions or ranks. Thus, a person may be appointed to
the position of Director III or Director IV; or to the position of Attorney IV or Attorney V; or to the position of
Records Officer I or Records Officer II; and so forth. In the instant case, petitioners were each appointed
to the position of Director IV, without specification of any particular office or station. The same is true with
respect to the other persons holding the same position or rank of Director IV of the Commission.

It follows that the reassignment of petitioners Fernandez and de Lima from their previous positions in
OPIA and OPR to the Commission's Regional Offices in Regions V and III had been effected with express
statutory authority and did not constitute removals without lawful cause. It also follows that such re-
assignment did not involve any violation of the constitutional right of petitioners to security of tenure
considering that they retained their positions of Director IV and would continue to enjoy the same rank,
status and salary at their new assigned stations which they had enjoyed at the Head Office of the
Commission in Metropolitan Manila. Petitioners had not, in other words, acquired a vested right to serve
at the Commission's Head Office.

LIM VS. ARCE

FACTS: A sworn letter-complaint was filed by Conchita Lim-Arce against her husband Alejandro S. Arce
and Carmen A. Barbasa, both employed as a Deputy Sheriff and Staff Assistant 1 at the Regional Trial
Court for immorality --- having an illicit affair.

It appears that respondent Arce filed an application for his early retirement and which was approved by
the Court. Upon the recommendation of the Court Administrator, the Court dismissed the complaint for
being moot and academic in its resolution dated July 4, 1990, it appearing that respondent had already
retired from the service on April 20, 1989, with the approval of the Court, and that the complaint was filed
on April 21, 1989.

RULING:

Time and again we have stressed adherence to the principle that public office is a public trust. All
government officials and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives. This constitutional mandate should always be in the minds of all public servants to guide them in
their actions during their entire tenure in the government service. The good of the service and the degree
of morality which every official and employee in the public service must observe, if respect and
confidence are to be maintained by the Government in the enforcement of the law, demand that no
untoward conduct on his part, affecting morality, integrity and efficiency while holding office should be left
without proper and commensurate sanction, all attendant circumstances taken into account.

COMELEC VS. CRUZ

FACTS: Challenged the Constitutionality of Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9164 (entitled An Act
Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, amending RA No. 7160, as
amended, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991):

1. The term limit of Barangay officials should be applied prospectively and not retroactively.
2. Implementation of paragraph 2 Section 2 of RA No. 9164 would be a violation of the equal
protection of the law.
3. Barangay officials have always been apolitical.

RULING: Congress Plenary Power to Legislate Term Limits for Barangay Officials and Judicial
Power
 Congress has plenary authority under the Constitution to determine by legislation not only the
duration of the term of barangay officials, but also the application to them of a consecutive term
limit. Congress invariably exercised this authority when it enacted no less than six (6) barangay-related
laws since 1987.

Through all these statutory changes, Congress had determined at its discretion both the length of
the term of office of barangay officials and their term limitation. Given the textually demonstrable
commitment by the 1987 Constitution to Congress of the authority to determine the term duration
and limition of barangay officials under the Constitution, we consider it established that whatever
Congress, in its wisdom, decides on these matters are political questions beyond the pale of judicial
scrutiny,] subject only to the certiorari jurisdiction of the courts provided under Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution and to the judicial authority to invalidate any law contrary to the Constitution.

Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government; it is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.

CASTRO VS. COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioner was proclaimed Mayor of Gloria, Oriental Mindoro during the May 8, 1995 elections. In
the same elections, private respondent was proclaimed Vice-Mayor of the same municipality.

On May 19, 1995, petitioners rival candidate, the late Nicolas M. Jamilla, filed an election protest before
the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro. During the pendency of said contest, Jamilla
died. Four days after such death or on December 19, 1995, the trial court dismissed the election protest
ruling as it did that [a]s this case is personal, the death of the protestant extinguishes the case itself. The
issue or issues brought out in this protest have become moot and academic.

ISSUE: Is said contest a personal action extinguished upon the death of the real party in interest? If not,
what is the mandatory period within which to effectuate the substitution of parties?

RULING: NO.

It is true that a public office is personal to the public officer and is not a property transmissible to his heirs
upon death. Thus, applying the doctrine of actio personalis moritur cum persona, upon the death of the
incumbent, no heir of his may be allowed to continue holding his office in his place.

But while the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is
not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would
oust the court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings.

An election contest, after all, involves not merely conflicting private aspirations but is imbued with
paramount public interests.

LUMIQUED VS. EXEVEA

Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the DAR until President Fidel V. Ramos dismissed him
from that position pursuant to Administrative Order No. 52. In view of Lumiqued’s death, his heirs
instituted this petition for certiorari and mandamus, questioning such order.

The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by DAR-CAR Regional Cashier and private
respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with the Board of Discipline of the DAR.
On May 12, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos himself issued Administrative Order No. 52 (A.O. No.
52), 16 finding Lumiqued administratively liable for dishonesty in the alteration of fifteen gasoline receipts,
and dismissing him from the service, with forfeiture of his retirement and other benefits. Thus:
That the receipts were merely turned over to him by his drivers and that the auditor and accountant of the
DAR-CAR should be the ones to be held liable is untenable. The receipts in question were signed by
respondent for the purpose of attesting that those receipts were validly issued by the commercial
establishments and were properly disbursed and used in the official business for which it was intended.
This Office is not about to shift the blame for all these to the drivers employed by the DAR-CAR as
respondent would want us to do.

The Court held that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guarantee of due
process of law for it is a public trust or agency. This jurisprudential pronouncement has been enshrined in
the 1987 Constitution under Article XI, Section 1, on accountability of public officers, as follows:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.
When the dispute concerns one’s constitutional right to security of tenure, however, public office is
deemed analogous to property in a limited sense; hence, the right to due process could rightfully be
invoked. Nonetheless, the right to security of tenure is not absolute. Of equal weight is the countervailing
mandate of the Constitution that all public officers and employees must serve with responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency. In this case, it has been clearly shown that Lumiqued did not live up to this
constitutional precept.
The committee’s findings pinning culpability for the charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct upon
Lumiqued were not, as shown above, fraught with procedural mischief. Its conclusions were founded on
the evidence presented and evaluated as facts. Well-settled in our jurisdiction is the doctrine that findings
of fact of administrative agencies must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial
evidence, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or preponderant. 49 The quantum of proof necessary
for a finding of guilt in administrative cases is only substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

LAUREL VS. DISIERTO

Facts: Petitioner Vice-President Salvador Laurel was appointed as the head of the National Centennial
Commission, a body constituted for the preparation of the National Centennial celebration in 1998. He
was subsequently appointed as the Chairman of ExpoCorp., and was one of the nine (9) incorporators. A
controversy erupted on the alleged anomalies with the bidding contracts to some entities and the
petitioner was implicated. By virtue of an investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, the
petitioner was indicted for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019). The
petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman, which
was denied. He further filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied, hence this petition for
certiorari.

The petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and contended that he is not a public officer
since ExpoCorp is a private corporation.

Issue: W/N the petitioner is a public officer

Yes, the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case of the petitioner since he is a public officer. The NCC
is an office performing executive functions since one of its mandate is to implement national policies.
Moreover, the said office was established by virtue of an executive order. It is clear that the NCC
performs sovereign functions, hence it is a public office. Since petitioner is chair of the NCC, he is
therefore a public officer. The fact that the NCC was characterized by EO 128 as an 'ad-hoc body' make it
less of a public office. Finally, the fact that the petitioner did not receive any compensation during his
tenure is of no consequence since such is merely an incidence and forms no part of the office.

FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC

FACTS: Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed office in
due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo
on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.

Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he was naturalized
as American citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos during the Martial Law era.

ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.

RULING: No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among
other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage
under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by
actively participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws
of the United States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was between him and the
US. If he really wanted to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as
amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress,
by naturalization, or by repatriation.

FLORES VS. DRILON

FACTS: The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of
Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA), is challenged with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order. Said provision provides the President the power to appoint an administrator of the
SBMA provided that in the first year of its operation, the Olongapo mayor shall be appointed as chairman
and chief of executive of the Subic Authority. Petitioners maintain that such infringes to the constitutional
provision of Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "no elective official shall be
eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure,"
The petitioners also contend that Congress encroaches upon the discretionary power of the President to
appoint.

ISSUE: Whether or not said provision of the RA 7227 violates the constitutional prescription against
appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts.

RULING: The court held the Constitution seeks to prevent a public officer to hold multiple functions since
they are accorded with a public office that is a full time job to let them function without the distraction of
other governmental duties.

The Congress gives the President the appointing authority which it cannot limit by providing the condition
that in the first year of the operation the Mayor of Olongapo City shall assume the Chairmanship. The
court points out that the appointing authority the congress gives to the President is no power at all as it
curtails the right of the President to exercise discretion of whom to appoint by limiting his choice.
NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION VS COA
FACTS: Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created in 1994 by then
President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The NAC is tasked to receive, process and
review amnesty applications. It is composed of 7 members: a Chairperson, three regular members
appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local
Government as ex officio members.

After personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex officio members turned over said
responsibility to their representatives who were paid honoraria. However, in 1997, NAC resident auditor
Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment of honoraria to these representatives pursuant to COA
Memorandum No. 97-038.

Meanwhile, in 1999, the NAC passed Administrative Order No. 2 (the new Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Proclamation No. 347), which was approved by then President Joseph Estrada. Section 1,
Rule II thereof provides that ex officio members may designate their representatives to the Commission.
Said Representatives shall be entitled to per diems, allowances, bonuses and other benefits as may be
authorized by law.

Petitioner invoked Administrative Order No. 2 in assailing before the COA the rulings of the resident
auditor and the National Government Audit Office disallowing payment of honoraria to the ex officio
members' representatives, to no avail.

ISSUES: Are the representatives de facto officers and as such are entitled to allowances?

HELD: No. The representatives cannot be considered de facto officers because they were not appointed
but were merely designated to act as such. Furthermore, they are not entitled to something their own
principals are prohibited from receiving.

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS: In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed
members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government
offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil
Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of
EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article
7 of the Constitution

CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution“, the only
exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the
Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3,
par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council
by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.

HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-
President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple
offices or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as
above clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members
(then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for
all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the
constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof.

In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet
members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not
more than 2 positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to
hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the
1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution
itself.

MONROY VS. CA

Roberto Monroy was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas, Rizal, when on September 15,1961, his certificate
of candidacy as representative of the first district of Rizal in theforthcoming elections was filed with the
Comelec. Three days later, or on September 18,1961, Monroy filed a letter withdrawing said certificate of
candidacy. The Comelec approvedthe withdrawal. But on September 21, 1961, Felipe del Rosario, then
the vice-mayor of Navotas, took his oath of office as municipal mayor on the theory that petitioner
hadforfeited the said office upon his filing of the certificate of candidacy in question.

ISSUE: WON Petitioner is deemed a de facto officer from the moment he assumed Del Rosario’s
entitlement to the office of Municipal Mayor, and thus, not required to reimburse salaries to the latter.

HELD: Yes and it is the general rule that the rightful incumbent of a specific lawful office may recoverfrom
an officer de facto the salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure thoughhe
entered into the office with goodfaith and under color of title, which applies to this case. A de factoofficer,
not having a good title, takes the salaries at risk and must account to the de jure officer forwhatever
amount of salary he received during the period of his wrongful retention of the public office.