Page |1
EASTERN BROADCASTING CORP (DYRE) V.
DANS JR. [137 SCRA 628; L-59329; 19 JUL
1985]
Facts: A petition was filed to reopen the
Radio Station DYRE. DYRE was “summarily
closed” on grounds of national security. The
radio station was allegedly used to incite
people to sedition. Petitioner, DYRE
contends that they were denied due
process. There was no hearing to establish
factual evidence for the closure.
Furthermore, the closure of the radio
station violates freedom of expression.
Before the court could even promulgate a
decision upon the Issue raised, Petitioner,
through its president Mr. Rene Espina, filed
a motion to withdraw the petition. The
rights of the station were sold to a new
owner, Manuel Pastrana; who is no longer
interested in pursuing the case. Despite the
case becoming moot and academic,
(because there are no longer interested
parties, thus the dismissal of the case) the
Supreme Court still finds that there is need
to pass a “RESOLUTION” for the guidance of
inferior courts and administrative tribunals
in matters as this case.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not due process was
exercised in the case of DYRE.
(2) Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a
violation of the Constitutional Right of
Freedom of Expression.
Held: The court finds that the closure of the
Radio Station in 1980 as null and void. The
absence of a hearing is a violation of
Constitutional Rights. The primary
requirements in administrative proceedings
are laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v.
Court of Industrial Relation (69 Phil.635).
The Ang Tibay Doctrine should be followed
before any broadcast station may be closed.
The Ang Tibay Doctrine provides the
following requirements:
(1) The right to hearing, includes the right
to present one’s case and submit evidence
presented.
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence
presented
(3) The decision must have something to
support itself.
(4) Evidence must be substantial
(reasonable evidence that is adequate to
support conclusion)
(5) Decision must be based on the evidence
presented at hearing
(6) The tribunal body must act on its own
independent consideration of law and facts
and not simply accept subordinate’s views
(7) Court must render decision in such a
manner that the proceeding can know the
various issued involved and reasons for
decisions rendered.
The court stresses that while there is no
controlling and precise definition of Due
Process, it gives an unavoidable standard
that government actions must conform in
order that deprivation of life, liberty and
property is valid.
The closure of the radio station is like wise a
violation of the constitutional right of
freedom of speech and expression. The
court stresses that all forms of media,
whether print or broadcast are entitled to
this constitutional right. Although the
government still has the right to be
protected against broadcasts which incite
the listeners to violently overthrow it. The

test for the limitation of freedom of
expression is the “clear and present
danger” rule. If in the circumstances that
the media is used in such nature as to
create this danger that will bring in such
evils, then the law has the right to prevent
it. However, Radio and television may not
be used to organize a rebellion or signal a
start of widespread uprising. The freedom
to comment on public affairs is essential to
the vitality of a representative democracy.
The people continues to have the right to
be informed on public affairs and broadcast
media continues to have the pervasive
influence to the people being the most
accessible form of media. Therefore,
broadcast stations deserve the the special
protection given to all forms of media by
the due process and freedom of expression
clauses of the Constitution.
CHAVEZ VS PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION
ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
Facts: Francisco Chavez, invoking his
constitutional right to information and the
correlative duty of the state to disclose
publicly all its transactions involving
national interest, demands that the
Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) be required to make
public any and all negotiations and
agreements pertaining to PCGG’s task of
recovering the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth.
He claims that any compromise on the
alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves
an issue of ³paramount public interest´
since it has a “debilitating effect on the
country’s economy” that would be greatly
prejudicial to the national interest of the
Filipino people. Hence, the people in
general have a right to know the
Page |2
transactions or deals being contrived and
effected by the government.
Issue: W/N the Supreme Court could
require the PCGG to disclose to the public
the details of any agreement, perfected or
not, with the Marcoses, regarding their ill-
gotten wealth.
Ruling: YES. It is incumbent upon the PCGG
and its officers, as well as other government
representatives, to disclose sufficient public
information on any proposed settlement
they have decided to take up with the
ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten
wealth. Such information, though, must
pertain to definite propositions of the
government, not necessarily to intra-agency
or inter-agency communications during the
stage when common assertions are still in
the process of being formulated or are in
the “exploratory” stage. There is a need, of
course, to observe the same restrictions on
disclosure of information in general, such as
on matters involving national security,
diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence
and other classified information.
There is no doubt that the recovery of the
Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth is a matter of
public concern and imbued with public
interest. Ill-gotten wealth, by its very
nature, assumes a public character. Based
on Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, and 14, “ill-
gotten wealth” refers to assets and
properties purportedly acquired, directly or
indirectly, by former President Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives and close
associates through or as a result of their
improper or illegal use of government funds
or properties; or their having taken undue
advantage of their public office; or their use
of powers, influences or relationships,
resulting in their unjust enrichment and

causing grave damage and prejudice to the
Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines. Clearly, the assets and
properties referred to supposedly
originated from the government itself. To
all intents and purposes, therefore, they
belong to the people. As such, upon
reconveyance they will be returned to the
public treasury, subject only to the
satisfaction of positive claims of certain
persons as may be adjudged by competent
courts. Another declared overriding
consideration for the expeditious recovery
of ill-gotten wealth is that it may be used
for national economic recovery.
Agreements entered into by the PCGG with
the Marcoses declared null and void for
being contrary to law and the Constitution.
PCGG directed to disclose to the public the
terms of any proposed compromise
settlement, as well as the final agreement,
relating to such alleged ill-gotten wealth.
Javier vs COMELEC
Facts: Evelio Javier and Arturo Pacificador
were candidates in Antique for the
Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984
elections. Javier appeared to enjoy more
popular support but the latter had the
advantage of being the nominee of the KBL
with all its perquisites of power. On the eve
of the elections, some of Javier’s followers
were ambushed and killed, allegedly by
Pacificador’s men.
Javier, after the elections, went to the
COMELEC to question the canvass of the
election returns. He charged that the
elections were marred by “massive
terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying,
fraud, tampering and falsification of
election returns under duress, threat and
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intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes
perpetrated by the armed men of
Pacificador.” The Second Division of the
COMELEC, of which one of Pacificador’s
former law partners was a Member,
directed the provincial board of canvassers
of Antique to proceed with the canvass but
to suspend the proclamation of the winning
candidate until further orders.
Subsequently, the same Second Division
ordered the board to immediately convene
and to proclaim the winner without
prejudice to the outcome of the case before
the Commission. On certiorari before the
Supreme Court, the proclamation by the
canvassers was set aside as premature,
having been made before the lapse of the
five-day period of appeal, which Javier had
seasonably made. The Second Division
finally promulgated the decision dismissing
the complaints of Javier and proclaiming
Pacificador as the elected assemblyman of
Antique.
Javier then appealed to the Supreme Court,
with a prayer to annul the decision
proclaiming Pacificador as the winner. In
1986, while the case was pending, Javier
was gunned down in broad daylight. The
EDSA Revolution subsequently toppled the
Marcos regime, which brought about the
abolition of the Batasang Pambansa.
Issue: W/N Javier’s petition should be
dismissed for being moot and academic in
the light of supervening events.
Ruling: NO. Several lives have been lost in
connection with this case, including that of
petitioner Javier’s himself. Pacificador is
now in hiding. The purity of suffrage has
been defiled and the popular will scorned
through a confabulation of those in
authority. The Supreme Court cannot keep

silent in the face of these terrible facts.
Were it not for the supervening events that
have legally rendered it moot and
academic, this petition would have been
granted and the contested decision of the
COMELEC set aside as being violative of the
Constitution.
Issue: How was Javier denied due process?
Ruling: Commissioner Opinion, one of the
Second Division Commissioners, ignored
due process of law when he did not inhibit
himself from the proceedings on the ground
that he was formerly Pacificador’s law
partner. For refusing to do so, he divested
the Second Division of the necessary vote
for the questioned decision, assuming it
could act, and rendered the proceeding null
and void.
People v Basay G.R. No. 86941
Facts: The spouses Zosimo and Beatrice
Toting, together with one of their
daughters, Bombie, were hacked inside
their home. In order to conceal the crime,
the perpetrators also burned the said
house. Because of the fire, the spouses’
other daughter, Manolita, was burned to
death, while one of their sons, Manolo,
suffered second and third degree burns.
Bombie survived the hacking and the
burning and was found alive around forty
meters away from the dead bodies of her
family members almost two days after the
crime was committed. Upon being found,
Bombie allegedly related to the authorities
that Jaime Ramirez and Teodoro Basay
killed their parents and burned their house.
She died a day later while confined in the
hospital.
After Bombie told the authorities who the
perpetrators were, they went to Jaime’s
Page |4
house, and Jaime, upon seeing the police,
tried to run. He was then turned over to the
Pamplona police station and brought to the
chamber of Judge Teopisto Calumpang,
accompanied by Elpedio Catacutan, a
barrister and a COMELEC registrar of the
place, who acted as Jaime’s counsel. An
affidavit, referred to as Jaime’s extrajudicial
confession, was produced before the Judge,
previously typed by a police investigating
officer. The Judge then made the court
interpreter translate the allegations of the
sworn statement into the local dialect for
Jaime, who did not understand English.
Afterwards, Jaime and Catacutan signed the
document in the presence of the Judge.
After Teodoro was also apprehended by the
police, he and Jaime allegedly executed a
Joint Waiver wherein it was stated that for
their safety and security, they voluntarily
decided to be detained and that they killed
the spouses and thereafter burned the
spouses’ house which resulted in the death
of one and hospitalization of two Toting
children.
During the trial, Jaime testified that he did
not read the document that he signed
before Judge Calumpang because he did not
know how to read. He also did not
understand when it was read to him
because it was in English. He also stated
that Catacutan was not his lawyer and that
he did not know him, but only saw him for
the first time in the Pamplona Municipal
Hall while the latter was going upstairs.
The trial court disregarded the joint waiver
insofar as it tended to incriminate the
accused and because when they signed the
same, they were not represented by
counsel, in violation of their rights as
provided in Section 12, Article III of the

1987 Constitution. There being no other
evidence against Teodoro, the court
acquitted him. However, it admitted in
evidence Jaime’s extrajudicial confession,
considered as part of the res gestae the
statement given by Bombie identifying
Jaime and Teodoro as the perpetrators of
the crime, and considered as flight-which is
indicative of guilt-Jaime’s running away
when he saw the law enforcers. It further
ruled that Jaime signed the extrajudicial
confession voluntarily and in the presence
of counsel so it is therefore admissible
against him.
Jaime neither filed a notice of appeal, nor
orally manifested his intention to appeal.
However, the lower court transmitted the
records of the case to the Supreme Court
because in view of the penalty imposed-life
imprisonment-the lower court raticionated
that such decision is subject for automatic
review by the Supreme Court. Although
erroneous, the Supreme Court nonetheless
accepted the appeal in the interest of
justice.
Issue: W/N the trial court erred in finding
Jaime guilty on the basis of the alleged
extrajudicial confession, the statement of
Bombie Toting, and his presumed guilt
because of his alleged flight.
Ruling: YES. The confession, which is
indisputably an uncounselled confession or
admission, is inadmissible as evidence.
A close scrutiny of the questioned
extrajudicial confession reveals all possible
violations of Jaime’s right to remain silent,
to counsel, and to be informed of such
rights, and of the safeguards prescribed by
the Supreme Court for the holding of
Page |5
custodial investigations. These violations
are:
(a) The interrogation was conducted and
the confession was written in English,
a language that Jaime, a farmer in a
remote barangay of Pamplona,
cannot speak and does not
understand; he only finished Grade II.
There is no evidence to show that the
interrogator, who was not even
presented as a witness and remains
unidentified, translated the questions
and the answers into a dialect known
and fairly understood by Jaime.
(b) Jaime was not told that he could
retain a counsel of choice and that if
he cannot afford to do so, he could
be provided with one.
(c) He did not sign any waiver of his
right to remain silent and to counsel.
(d) He was not assisted by any counsel
during the investigation. Instead, a
certain Elpedio Catacutan, who
claimed to have appeared for him as
a “friend-counsel,” was present only
at the time that Jaime was brought to
the office of Judge Catacutan for the
preparation of the jurat.
(e) Assuming that Catacutan may have
been summoned to act as Jaime’s
counsel, he was, nevertheless, not
present during the custodial
interrogation which, by the way, was
conducted a week before he was
made to appear before Judge
Calumpang. Catacutan’s presence
before the Judge did not change the
situation. As the Supreme Court
stated in People v. Burgos, the
securing of the counsel to help the
accused when the latter subscribed
under oath to his statement at the
 Page |6

Fiscal’s Office was too late and had create an impression of voluntariness
no palliative effect; it did not cure the or even understanding on the part of
absence of counsel at the time of the the accused. The showing of a
custodial investigation when the spontaneous, free, and
extrajudicial statement was being unconstrained giving up of a right is
taken. missing.
(f) Furthermore, Catacutan is not a
lawyer; according to the trial court,
As for Bombie’s alleged statement given to
he is a barrister. In fact, he candidly
the authorities identifying Jaime and
admitted that he is not a lawyer but
Teodoro as the perpetrators of the heinous
that he obtained a law degree from
crime, it should also not have been
Siliman University in 1959.
admitted. In the first place, the trial court
Unfortunately, however, he failed in
itself ruled that Bombie was not a
three Bar Examinations.
competent witness. The Supreme Court
(g) There is no showing that the so-called
agrees with such a conclusion, not
extrajudicial confession, which is in
necessarily because she was only 6 years
English, was correctly explained and
old, but because her condition at the time
translated to Jaime by Judge
she supposedly gave her statement made it
Calumpang. Although the latter
impossible for her to have communicated
claimed in his testimony on direct
effectively. She was taken from the crime
examination that he translated the
scene two days after the commission of the
same in the local dialect to Jaime
crime, and died the day after. The doctor
before the latter affixed his signature
who first attended to her when she arrived
thereto, Catacutan categorically
at the hospital was not presented as a
declared that it was the interpreter,
witness. On the other hand, the doctor who
one Pedro Rodriguez, who translated
attended to her before she died testified
it to Jaime.
that when he last saw Bombie alive, she
(h) Finally, the kind of “advice” proffered
could not talk. It was this inability to talk
by the unidentified interrogator
which led the trial court to express its
belongs to that stereotyped class-a
doubts on the veracity of the child’s
long question by the investigator
statement. Although persons of tender age
informing Jaime of his right followed
are prone to tell the truth, however, the
by a mono syllabic answer-which the
Court must be cautious in appreciating said
Supreme Court has condemned for
testimony where the person had a serious
being unsatisfactory. The investigator
wound and had not eaten for one day and
gave his advice perfunctorily or in a
one night. There is no evidence to show
pro-forma manner, obviously to pay
that Bombie told the doctor as to who were
mere lip service to the prescribed
the perpetrators of the crime; neither did
norms. This stereotyped advice has
she tell her own brother, Zosimo Jr. that it
assumed the nature of a “legal form”
was Jaime and Teodoro who killed their
or model. Its tired, punctilious, fixed
parents and her brother and sister and
and artificially stately style does not
burned their house. The Court cannot
 Page |7

understand why the law enforcer who PEOPLE VS. BOLANOS [211 SCRA 262; G.R.
talked to her did not ask her questions NO. 101808; 3 JUL 1992]
concerning the commission of the crime by
Facts: Ramon Bolanos was tried for the
the accused. Neither did they take her
murder of Oscar Pagdalian. He was
statement from her on her way to the
convicted by the lower court based on the
hospital or at the hospital. Had her
testimonies of the apprehending
statement been made to the doctor or to
policemen, who stated that when they
the barangay captain or to any reputable
boarded Bolanos and his companion,
member of the community where the
Claudio Magtibay, on the police vehicle,
incident happened, the Court will have put
Bolanos allegedly admitted that he killed
weight and consider her statement as a
Pagdalian because he was abusive. The
dying declaration. Persons in authority are
penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed
prone to fabricate or misrepresent the facts
upon him. A manifestation was filed by the
to serve their own purpose. The Court
Solicitor General’s Office, with the position
therefore has to be cautious when these
that the lower court erred in admitting as
peace officers testify in Court. In the second
evidence the extrajudicial confession of
place, as a result of the foregoing, the trial
Bolanos while on board the police patrol
court completely disregarded Bombie’s so-
jeep, for it was done in violation of Bolanos
called statement as against Teodoro. The
constitutional right to be informed, to
Supreme Court sees neither rhyme nor
remain silent, and to have a counsel of his
reason for the trial court’s admission of the
choice, while under police custody.
same as against Jaime. Finally, while it may
be true that Jaime ran away when he first Issue: W/N Bolanos’ confession is
saw the armed law officers, he did so admissible.
merely out of fear of them. This act should
Ruling: NO. Being already under custodial
not be considered as the flight which is
investigation while on board the police
indicative of guilt. Jaime had not left his
patrol jeep on the way to the Police Station
house or barangay since the day the crime
where formal investigation may have been
was committed. If he were indeed one of
conducted, Bolanos should have been
the perpetrators and had the intention to
informed of his constitutional rights under
flee in order to avoid arrest, he should have
Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
vanished sooner and should not have
Constitution. Considering the clear
remained in his house. Besides, if his
requirements of the Constitution with
running away could be construed as flight, it
respect to the manner by which confession
could only be considered as circumstantial
can be admissible in evidence, and the
evidence. Such evidence would still be
glaring fact that the alleged confession
insufficient for a conviction.
obtained while on board the police vehicle
Hence, Jaime’s guilt was not established was the only reason for the conviction,
with moral certainty. He should be besides Bolanos’ conviction was not proved
acquitted. beyond reasonable doubt, the Supreme
Court has no recourse but to reverse the
 Page |8

subject judgment under review. Bolanos is Issue: W/N the confession of Ramos to the
acquitted. police officers of the commission of the
offense charged is admissible as evidence
People vs. Ramos, 39 SCRA 236
against him.
Facts: Malcon Olevere was stopped and
Ruling: NO. Ramos only finished Grade VI,
frisked by police officers when they saw him
which means that he is not adequately
acting suspiciously during one evening, and
educated to understand fairly and fully the
found in his possession dried marijuana
significance of his constitutional rights to
leaves. Olevere was then placed under
silence and to counsel. As mandated, it is
arrest. During investigation, Olevere
not enough that the police investigator
declared that he bought the recovered
merely informs him of his constitutional
marijuana leaves from Rogelio Ramos, alias
rights to silence and to counsel, and then
“Balanchoy.” The following day, a police
taking his statements down, the
team was accompanied by Olevere to the
interrogating officer must have patience in
residence of Ramos, and Ramos was
explaining these rights to him. The records
arrested and immediately brought to the
do not reveal that these requirements have
Drugs Enforcement Section Western Police
been fully complied with, nor was there any
Department Headquarters for investigation.
showing that Ramos has been represented
During the custodial investigation, Olevere
by counsel during custodial investigation. In
executed a written sworn statement
consonance with Section 20 of the Bill of
implicating Ramos as the source of the
Rights which states that “any confession
marijuana leaves. Ramos, after having been
obtained in violation of this section shall be
duly apprised of his constitutional rights,
inadmissible in evidence,” the Supreme
verbally admitted before the police officers
Court holds that Ramos verbal admissions
the commission of the offense charged. He
during custodial investigation may not be
likewise admitted that he sold the
taken in evidence against him.
marijuana leaves to Olevere for P10.00. He
pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. Issue: W/N the constitutional right of
Documentary evidence, as well as the Ramos to meet the witness against him face
policemen who took down Olevere’s sworn to face and to cross-examine him has been
statement and arrested Ramos, and a violated by the non-presentation of Olevere
forensic chemist who affirmed that the in court.
leaves confiscated from Olevere are
Ruling: YES. The lower court erred in
positive for marijuana were presented.
admitting as evidence the written sworn
Olevere was not. After the trial, the Court of
affidavit of Olevere, who executed the
First Instance of Manila found Ramos guilty
written sworn statement declaring that
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
Ramos sold to him the marijuana leaves for
charged in view of the verbal admission
P10.00. This piece of evidence is a mere
Ramos himself gave and the evidence
scrap of paper because Olevere was not
offered and admitted in court. The case was
produced in court for cross-examination. An
raised to the Supreme Court on automatic
affidavit being taken ex- parte is often
review.
incomplete and inaccurate. Such kind of
 Page |9

evidence is considered hearsay. For the the court gathered enough information to
court to admit the sworn statement of free all the accused except him, who was
Olevere without giving the adverse party found to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt
the right to cross-examine him would easily of the crime of qualified theft. Chavez
facilitate the fabrication of evidence and appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA
the perpetration of fraud. The dismissed the appeal on procedural
inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is grounds. Chavez appealed to the Supreme
based, not only on the lack of opportunity Court.
on the part of the adverse party to cross-
Issue: W/N Chavez’ right against self-
examine the affiant, but also on the
incrimination was violated when he was
commonly known fact that, generally, an
compelled to testify against himself in open
affidavit is not prepared by the affiant
court.
himself but by another who uses his own
language in writing the affiant’s statements Ruling: YES. Chavez was forced to testify to
which may either be omitted or incriminate himself, in full breach of his
misunderstood by the one writing them. constitutional right to remain silent. When
the Judge of the trial court emphatically
Since Olevere was not presented as a
stated that Chavez’ counsel cannot object
witness, the testimonies offered by the
to Chavez being called to the witness stand,
witnesses for the prosecution are regarded
Chavez had to take the stand. He was thus
as hearsay, insofar as they impute to Ramos
peremptorily asked to create evidence
the commission of the offense charged.
against himself. The Judge’s statement that
Chavez vs. Court of Appeals Chavez’ counsel could not object to have
the latter called on the witness stand
Facts: Roger Chavez, along with eight
wielded authority. By those words, Chavez
others, were accused of stealing a
was enveloped by a coercive force; they
Thunderbird car. Upon arraignment, all of
deprived him of his will to resist; they
the accused except those three who have
foreclosed choice; the realities of human
not been identified nor apprehended,
nature tell us that as he took his oath to tell
pleaded not guilty. The trial began with the
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but
prosecution spontaneously calling Roger
the truth, no genuine consent underlay
Chavez to the witness stand as an ordinary
submission to take the witness stand.
witness, without previously informing
Constitutionally sound consent was absent.
Chavez’ counsel, Atty. Carbon. Atty. Carbon
The decision convicting him was clearly of
vehemently objected, to no avail. The Judge
the view that the case for the People was
called Chavez to the witness stand, stating
built primarily around the admissions of
that it is the right of the prosecution to ask
Chavez himself. The trial court described
anybody to act as witness on the witness
Chavez as the “star witness for the
stand including the accused, and that the
prosecution.”
defense counsel could not object to have
the accused called on the witness stand. Issue: W/N Chavez waived his right against
There, Chavez was subjected to direct self-incrimination when he answered the
examination. After Chavez’ examination,
 P a g e | 10

questions and did not invoke the said right ordered discharged from custody, unless he
upon taking the witness stand. is held, kept in custody, or detained for any
cause or reason other than the said
Ruling: NO. It cannot be said that he has
judgment.
waived his right. He did not volunteer to
take the stand and in his own defense; he BELTRAN VS. SAMSON [53 PHIL 570; G.R.
did not offer himself as a witness; on the NO. 32025; 23 SEPT 1929]
contrary, he claimed the right upon being
Facts: Beltran, as a defendant for the crime
called to testify. If he answered the
of Falsification, refused to write a sample of
questions in spite of his fear of being
his handwriting as ordered by the
accused of perjury or being put under
respondent Judge. The petitioner in this
contempt, this circumstance cannot be
case contended that such order would be a
counted against him. His testimony is not of
violation of his constitutional right against
his own choice. To him it was a case of
self-incrimination because such
compelled submission. He was a cowed
examination would give the prosecution
participant in proceedings before a judge
evidence against him, which the latter
who possessed the power to put him under
should have gotten in the first place. He
contempt had he chosen to remain silent.
also argued that such an act will make him
Nor could he escape testifying. The court
furnish evidence against himself.
made it abundantly clear that his testimony
atleast on direct examination would be Issue: Whether or not the writing from the
taken right then and there on the first day fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the
of the trial. It matters not, after all efforts to purpose of comparing the latter's
stave off his taking the stand became handwriting and determining whether he
fruitless, no objections to questions wrote certain documents supposed to be
propounded to him were made. Here falsified, constitutes evidence against
involved is not a mere question of self- himself within the scope and meaning of
incrimination. It is a defendant’s the constitutional provision under
constitutional immunity from being called examination.
to testify against himself. And the objection
Held: The court ordered the respondents
made at the beginning is a continuing one.
and those under their orders desist and
There is therefore no waiver of the
abstain absolutely and forever from
privilege, because a waiver, to be effective,
compelling the petitioner to take down
must be certain and unequivocal, and
dictation in his handwriting for the purpose
intelligently, understandably, and willingly
of submitting the latter for comparison.
made; such waiver following only where
Writing is something more than moving the
liberty of choice has been fully accorded.
body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is
The defense of waiver, therefore, cannot
not a purely mechanical act, because it
stand. If, by his own admission, the
requires the application of intelligence and
defendant proved his guilt, still, his original
attention; and in the case at bar writing
claim remains valid. For the privilege
means that the petitioner herein is to
against self-incrimination is a rampart that
furnish a means to determine whether or
gives protection-even to the guilty. Chavez

not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the
respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that
it is more serious, we believe the present
case is similar to that of producing
documents or chattels in one's possession.
We say that, for the purposes of the
constitutional privilege, there is a similarity
between one who is compelled to produce
a document, and one who is compelled to
furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in
both cases, the witness is required to
furnish evidence against himself. It cannot
be contended in the present case that if
permission to obtain a specimen of the
petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the
crime would go unpunished. Considering
the circumstance that the petitioner is a
municipal treasurer, it should not be a
difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained
genuine specimens of his handwriting. But
even supposing it is impossible to obtain
specimen or specimens without resorting to
the means complained herein, that is no
reason for trampling upon a personal right
guaranteed by the constitution. It might be
true that in some cases criminals may
succeed in evading the hand of justice, but
such cases are accidental and do not
constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege.
This constitutional privilege exists for the
protection of innocent persons.
People vs Austria
Facts: Tomas Azuela was found stabbed to
death, with his skull fractured, on a
sugarcane field in Negros Occidental. It was
later on learned that he was carrying the
payroll and P771.40 intended as wages for
the laborers of Hacienda Austria, where he
worked as an overseer, and the payroll and
the money were missing.
P a g e | 11
In connection with his death, four suspects
were picked up by the police. One was
Pablo Austria, the last person who was seen
with Tomas. The others were implicated
based on the sworn statement of Pablo-
Eduardo, Pablo’s son; Jaime de la Torre; and
Leopoldo Abanilla. A complaint of robbery
with homicide was then filed against them.
All of them pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The prosecution witnesses stated that
Tomas was last seen alive with Pablo. A
blood stained hoe was found in Jaime’s
home. Upon examination, the blood from
the crime scene and the blood from the hoe
were found to be from the same blood
group. Eduardo was only implicated based
on his father’s sworn statement.
Both Jaime and Pablo claim that they were
manhandled by the police. On cross-
examination, the interrogating officer
admitted that he did not apprise both of
their rights to remain silent and to counsel
as he was merely conducting an informal
interview. The trial court convicted Jaime,
Pablo, and Eduardo. During the pendency of
the appeal, Pablo died of undetermined
cause while Jaime died of hypertension in
the New Bilibid Prisons Hospital.
Issue: W/N Eduardo’s guilt had been
established beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling: NO. Conviction should be made on
the basis of a strong, clear, and compelling
evidence. Of course, this is not to say that
conviction cannot be had simply because
the evidence is circumstantial. However, in
this case, the evidence of the prosecution
against Eduardo Austria is merely
circumstantial. They do not prove an
unbroken link of events that could give rise
to a reasonable and fair conclusion that

Eduardo committed the imputed offense.
The only evidence against him is that he
was seen at about 1:00 in the afternoon of
9 August 1975 along the road to Hacienda
Austria. This evidence, even if tied up with
the testimony of Illuminada that Eduardo
harbored ill-feelings against Tomas because
the former was dismissed from the
hacienda by the latter does not establish or
support an inference, much less a
conclusion, that he participated in the
commission of the offense charged.
Eduardo’s conviction on an inference based
on another inference cannot be maintained.
To overcome the presumption of
innocence, proof beyond reasonable doubt
is needed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REY SUNGA,
et al.
Facts: Upon the discovery of the mutilated
body of a high-school girl at a coffee
plantation, an Information was filed before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for Rape with
Homicide against several suspects including
Rey Sunga, Ramil Lansang, Inocencio
Pascua, Jr., and Lito Octac as principals, and
Locil Cui alias Ginalyn Cuyos as accomplice.
Rey Sunga et al. filed with the RTC a petition
for bail underscoring the weakness of the
prosecution‘s evidence, there being no
direct evidence against them. In the same
proceeding, a motion was granted to
discharge Locil to become a state witness
while deferring the resolution of the bail
petition.
Through the testimony of Locil, the RTC
reached to a decision convicting Sunga and
Lansang as principals of the crime of Rape
with Homicide and sentenced each to suffer
P a g e | 12
the penalty of death, and Pascua as
principal in the crime of Rape.
Issue: Whether the guilt of Sunga et al. has
been proven beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged
Held: The testimony of a self-confessed
accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the
blame to or implicating his co-accused
cannot, by itself and without corroboration,
be regarded as proof to a moral certainty
that the latter committed or participated in
the commission of the crime. The testimony
must be substantially corroborated in its
material points by unimpeachable
testimony and strong circumstances and
must be to such an extent that its
trustworthiness becomes manifest.
As an exception to the general rule on the
requirement of corroboration of the
testimony of an accomplice or co-
conspirator-turned state witness, her
testimony may, even if uncorroborated, be
sufficient as when it is shown to be sincere
in itself because it is given unhesitatingly
and in a straightforward manner and full of
details which, by their nature, could not
have been the result of deliberate
afterthought.
The Court is not in fact prepared to accord
Locil credibly as a witness. Who can trust
one who, in her early teens, gets pregnant,
flees home and stays in a boarding house
albeit she has no visible means of income to
pay therefor, and carries an alias name to
evade being traced by her mother and
aunt?
Evidence to be believed should not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness but should also be credible in itself
such as the common experience and

observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances.
The observations pertaining to both the
weak, incomprehensible voice with which
Locil gave her testimony, the improbability
with which she was precisely made by
appellants to be a witness to their crime,
and the failure of her description of
Pascua‘s eyes to match the latter‘s actual
physical feature cannot but engender
serious doubts as to the reliability of her
testimony against all appellants. The Court
thus finds her uncorroborated account to
have failed the jurisprudentially established
touchstone for its credibility and sufficiency,
that of straightforwardness and
deliberateness, as evidence to warrant
appellants‘ conviction.
De la Camara vs. Enage
Facts: Ricardo de la Camara, the Municipal
Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, was
arrested and detained at the Provincial Jail
of Agusan for his alleged participation in the
killing of fourteen and the wounding of
twelve other laborers of the Tirador Logging
Company. He, along with his co-accused
Nambinalot Tagunan and Fortunato Galgo,
was accused of multiple frustrated murder
and multiple murder. De la Camara filed an
application for bail, premised on the
assertion that there was no evidence to link
him with the crime. The judge, Hon. Manuel
Enage, fixed the amount of his bail at
P1,195,200.00-P840,000.00 for the
information charging multiple murder and
P355,200.00for the offense of multiple
frustrated murder. The Secretary of Justice,
upon being informed of this order, sent a
telegram to the Judge stating that the bond
“is excessive” and suggesting that a
P40,000.00 bond, either in cash or property,
P a g e | 13
would be reasonable. However, the Judge
remained adamant.
De la Camara appealed by way of certiorari
to the Supreme Court, assailing the
constitutionality of the amount of the bail
fixed as repugnant to the constitutional
mandate prohibiting excessive bail.
However, de la Camara escaped from prison
during the pendency of the appeal, thus
rendering the case moot and academic.
Issue: Was the amount for bail fixed by the
judge excessive, and should the amount
therefore be reduced?
Ruling: YES. No attempt at rationalization
can give the color of validity to the
challenged order. The order fixing the
amount of bail at P840,000.00 for the
information charging multiple murder,
there being fourteen victims, and the sum
of P355,200.00 for the information charging
multiple frustrated murder, there being
twelve victims, is clearly violative of the
constitutional provision against excessive
bail. Under the circumstances, there being
only two offenses charged, the amount
required as bail could not possibly exceed
P50,000.00 for the information for murder
andP25,000.00 for the other information
for frustrated murder. Nor should it be
ignored that the Department of Justice did
recommend the total sum of P40,000.00 for
the two offenses.
Issue: Has the case against De la Camara
been rendered moot and academic by his
escape from prison?
Ruling: YES. De la Camara’s escape cannot
be condoned. That is why he is not entitled
to the relief prayed for. However, in the
guidance of lower court judges, it is deemed
advisable for the Supreme Court to set forth

anew the controlling and authoritative
doctrines that should be observed in fixing
the amount of the bail sought in order that
full respect be accorded to such a
constitutional right. The fact that this case is
moot and academic should not preclude the
Supreme Court from setting forth in
language clear and unmistakable, the
obligation of fidelity on the part of lower
court judges to the unequivocal command
of the Constitution that excessive bail shall
not be required.
What should be observed in fixing the
amount of bail?
1. Before conviction, every person is
bailable except if charged with capital
offenses when the evidence of guilt is
strong. Such a right flows from the
presumption of innocence in favor of
every accused who should not be
subjected to the loss of freedom as
thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Thereby a
regime of liberty is honored in the
observance and not in the breach. It
is not beyond the realm of
probability, however, that a person
charged with a crime, especially so
where his defense is weak, would just
simply make himself scarce and thus
frustrate the hearing of his case. A
bail is intended as a guarantee that
such an intent would be thwarted. It
is a mode short of confinement which
would, with reasonable certainty,
insure the attendance of the accused
for the subsequent trial. Nor is there
anything unreasonable in denying
this right to one charged with a
capital offense when evidence of guilt
P a g e | 14
is strong, as the likelihood is, rather
than await the outcome of the
proceeding against him with a death
sentence, an ever-present threat,
temptation to flee the jurisdiction
would be too great to be resisted.
2. Where, however, the right to bail
exists, it should not be rendered
nugatory by requiring a sum that is
excessive. So the Constitution
commands. It is understandable why.
If there were no such prohibition, the
right to bail becomes meaningless.
3. Guidelines in the fixing of the amount
of bail, according to Villaseñor v.
Abano:
(1) Ability of the accused to give
bail;(2) Nature of the offense;(3)
Penalty for the offense charged;(4)
Character and reputation of the
accused;(5) Health of the accused;(6)
Character and strength of the
evidence;(7) Probability of the
accused appearing in trial;(8)
Forfeiture of other bonds;(9)
Whether the accused was a fugitive
from justice when arrested; and(10) If
the accused is under bond for
appearance at trial in other cases.
PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [211 SCRA
241; G.R. NO. 101724; 3 JUL 1992]
Facts: Two letter complaints were filed with
the Tanod bayan by Teofilo Gelacio on
October 28,1986 and December 9, 1986, a
political leader of Governor Valentina Plaza,
wife of Congressman Democrito Plaza of
Agusan del Sur, shortly after private
respondent had replaced Mrs. Plaza as
OIC/provincial Governor of Agusan del Sur
on March 1986 The complaint questioned
the issuance to Governor Paredes, when he

was still the provincial attorney in 1976 of a
free patent title for a lot in the Rosario
public land subdivision in San Francisco,
Agusan del Sur. He misrepresented to a
Lands Inspector of the Bureau of Lands that
the lands subject herein are disposable
lands, thereby inducing said inspector to
recommend approval of his application for
free patent. On August 10, 1989 an
information for violation of RA 3019 Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was then
filed in the Sandiganbayan after an ex parte
preliminary investigation. A motion to
quash the information was filed by the
private respondent contending among
others that he is charged for an offence
which has prescribed. Said motion was
granted. The crime was committed on
January 21, 1976, period of prescription
was 10 years, therefore it has prescribed in
1986. Now the motion to quash was being
assailed.
Issue: Whether or Not the motion to quash
validly granted.
Held: Yes. RA 3019, being a special law the
computation of the period for the
prescription of the crime is governed by
Sec. 29 of Act No. 3326, which begins to run
from the day of the commission of the
crime and not the discovery of it.
Additionally, BP 195 which was approved on
March 16, 1982, amending Sec. 11 of RA
3019 by increasing ten to fifteen years of
the period for the prescription or
extinguishment of a violation of RA 3019
may not be given retroactive application to
the crime which was committed by Paredes,
as it is prejudicial to the accused. To apply
BP 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post
facto law1 for it would alter his situation to
his disadvantage by making him criminally
P a g e | 15
liable for a crime that had already been
extinguished under the law existing when it
was committed.
GUANZON VS. DE VILLA [181 SCRA 623;
G.R. 80508; 30 JAN 1990]
Facts: Pursuant to the “Areal Target
Zonings” or “Saturation Drives” conducted
by the military and police in Metro Manila,
41 residents and taxpayers from Metro
Manila filed a petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction, maintaining that
they have a common or general interest in
the preservation of the rule of law,
protection of their human rights, and the
reign of peace and order in their
communities. According to them, the said
saturation drives were conducted in critical
areas pinpointed by the military and police
as places where the subversives are hiding.
The arrests range from 7 to 1,500; and the
petitioners claim that they follow a
common pattern of human rights abuses,
such as:
1. Having no specific target in mind, in
the dead of the night or early
morning hours, police and military
units without any search warrant or
warrant of arrest cordon an area of
more than one residence and
sometimes whole barangay or areas
of barangay in Metro Manila. Most of
them are in civilian clothes and
without nameplates or identification
cards.
2. The raiders rudely rouse residents
from their sleep by banging on the
walls and windows of their homes,
shouting, kicking their doors open
(destroying some in the process), and
then ordering the residents within to

come out of their respective
residences.
3. The residents at the point of high-
powered guns are herded like cows,
the men are ordered to strip down to
their briefs and examined for tattoo
marks and other imagined marks.
4. While the examination of the bodies
of the men are being conducted by
the raiders, some of the members of
the raiding team force their way into
each and every house within the
cordoned off area and then proceed
to conduct a search of the said
houses without civilian witnesses
from the neighborhood.
5. In many instances, many residents
have complained that the raiders
ransack their homes, tossing about
the residents’ belongings without
total regard for their value. In several
instances, walls are destroyed,
ceilings are damaged in the raiders’
illegal effort to ³fish´ for incriminating
evidence.
6. Some victims of these illegal
operations have complained with
increasing frequency that their
money and valuables have
disappeared after the said
operations.
7. All men and some women who
respond to these illegal and
unwelcome intrusions are arrested
on the spot and hauled off to waiting
vehicles that take them to detention
centers where they are interrogated
and “verified.” These arrests are all
conducted without any warrants of
arrest duly issued by a judge, nor
under the conditions that will
authorize warrantless arrest. Some
P a g e | 16
hooded men are used to finger point
suspected subversives.
8. In some instances, arrested persons
are released after the expiration of
the period wherein they can be
legally detained without any charge
at all. In other instances, some
arrested persons are released
without charge after a few days of
arbitrary detention.
9. The raiders almost always brandish
their weapons and point them at the
residents during these illegal
operations.
10.Many have also reported incidents of
“on-the-spot beatings,” maulings and
maltreatment.
11.Those who are detained for further
“verification” by the raiders are
subjected to mental and physical
torture to extract confessions and
tactical information.
Issue: W/N the saturation drives
conducted by the authorities should be
enjoined by the courts.
Ruling: NO. The Court believes it highly
probable that some violations were
actually committed. However, the
remedy is not to stop all police actions,
including the essential and legitimate
ones. There is nothing wrong in police
making their presence visibly felt in
troubled areas. Police cannot respond to
riots or violent demonstrations if they do
not move in sufficient numbers. A show
of force is sometimes necessary as long
as the rights of people are protected and
not violated. A blanket prohibition such
as that sought by the petitioners would
limit all police actions to one on one
confrontations where search warrants

and warrants of arrests against specific
individuals are easily procured. Anarchy
may reign if the military and police
decide to sit down in their offices
because all concerted drives where a
show of force is present are totally
prohibited.
The remedy, moreover, is not an original
action for prohibition brought through a
taxpayers’ suit. Where not one victim
complains and not one violator is
properly charged, the problem is not
initially for the Supreme Court. It is
basically one for the executive
departments and for trial courts. Well
meaning citizens with only second-hand
knowledge of the events cannot keep on
indiscriminately tossing problems of the
executive, the military, and the police to
the Supreme Court as if we are the
repository of all remedies for all evils.
The rules of constitutional litigation have
been evolved for an orderly procedure in
the vindication of rights. They should be
followed. If our police makers sustain
the contention of the military and the
police that occasional saturation drives
are essential to maintain the stability of
government and to insure peace and
order, clear policy guidelines on the
behavior of soldiers and policemen must
not only be evolved, they should also be
enforced. A method of pinpointing
human rights abuses and identifying
violators is necessary. Thus, the problem
is appropriate for the Commission of
Human Rights. A high level conference
should bring together the heads of the
Department of Justice, Department of
National Defense, and the operating
heads of affected agencies and
P a g e | 17
institutions to devise procedures for the
prevention of abuses.
Under the circumstances of this
taxpayers’ suit, there is no erring soldier
or policeman whom we can order
prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts
ascertained through an orderly
procedure, no permanent relief can be
given at this time. Further investigation
of the petitioners’ charges and a hard
look by administration officials at the
policy implications of the prayed for
blanket prohibition are also warranted.
In the meantime and in the face of a
prima facie showing that some abuses
were probably committed and could be
committed during future police actions,
the Court has to temporarily restrain the
alleged banging on walls, the kicking in
of doors, the herding of half-naked men
to assembly areas for examination of
tattoo marks, the violation of residences
even if these are humble shanties of
squatters, and the other alleged acts
which are shocking to the conscience.
Petition remanded to the Regional Trial
Courts of Manila, Malabon, and Pasay
City, so that the petitioners may present
evidence supporting their allegations
and where specific erring parties may be
pinpointed and prosecuted.
Ople vs. Torres
Facts: Administrative Order No. 308,
entitled “Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference
System” was issued by President Fidel V.
Ramos on 12 December 1996. Senator Blas
F. Ople submitted a petition to the Court,
assailing the Order on two constitutional
grounds: (1) It is a usurpation of the power

of Congress to legislate; and (2) It
impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s
protected zone of privacy.
Issue: W/N AO 308 violates the citizens’
right to privacy.
Ruling: YES. The right to privacy is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution, hence, it is the burden of the
Government to show that AO 308 is
justified by some compelling state interest
and that it is narrowly drawn. AO 308is
predicated on two considerations: (1) the
need to provide our citizens and foreigners
with the facility to conveniently transact
business with basic services and social
security providers and other government
instrumentalities and (2) the need to
reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent
transactions and misrepresentations by
persons seeking basic services. It is
debatable whether these interests are
compelling enough to warrant the issuance
of AO 308. But what is not arguable is the
broadness, the vagueness, the over breadth
of AO 308 which if implemented will put
our people’s right to privacy in clear and
present danger.
AO 308, furthermore, falls short of assuring
that personal information which will be
gathered about our people will only be
processed for unequivocally specified
purposes. The lack of proper safeguards in
this regard of AO 308 may interfere with
the individual’s liberty of abode and travel
by enabling authorities to track down his
movement; it may also enable unscrupulous
persons to access confidential information
and circumvent the right against self-
incrimination; it may pave the way for
“fishing expeditions” by government
authorities and evade the right against
P a g e | 18
unreasonable searches and seizures. The
possibilities of abuse and misuse of the
PRN, biometrics, and computer technology
are accentuated when we consider that the
individual lacks control over what can be
read or placed on his ID, much less verify
the correctness of the data encoded. They
threaten the very abuses that the Bill of
Rights seeks to prevent.
Issue: W/N the individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy with regard to the
national ID and the use of biometrics
technology.
Ruling: NO. The use of biometrics and
computer technology in AO 308 does not
assure the individual of a reasonable
expectation of privacy. As technology
advances, the level of reasonably expected
privacy decreases. The measure of
protection granted by the reasonable
expectation diminishes as relevant
technology becomes more widely accepted.
The security of the computer data file
depends not only on the physical
inaccessibility of the file but also on the
advances in hardware and software
computer technology. AO 308 is so widely
drawn that a minimum standard for a
reasonable expectation of privacy,
regardless of technology used, cannot be
inferred from its provisions.
The ability of a sophisticated data center to
generate a comprehensive cradle-to-grave
dossier on an individual and transmit it over
a national network is one of the most
graphic threats of the computer revolution.
The computer is capable of producing a
comprehensive dossier on individuals out of
information given at different times and for
varied purposes. It can continue adding to
the stored data and keeping the
 P a g e | 19

information up to date. Retrieval of stored intellect and spirit which the Constitution
data is simple. When information of a protect against official control.
privileged character finds its way into the
computer, it can be extracted together with Issue:
other data on the subject. Once extracted, Whether or not school children who are
the information is putty in the hands of any members or a religious sect may be
person. The end of privacy begins. expelled from school for disobedience of
R.A. No. 1265 and Department Order No. 8
AO 308 declared null and void for being
unconstitutional.
Held:
EBRALINAG v. THE DIVISION No. Religious freedom is a fundamental
SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU right which is entitled to the highest priority
and the amplest protection among human
Facts: The petitioners in both (consolidated)
rights, for it involves the relationship of
cases were expelled from their classes by
man to his Creator
the public school authorities in Cebu for
refusing to salute the flag, sing the national
The sole justification for a prior restraint or
anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as
limitation on the exercise of religious
required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act
freedom is the existence of a grave and
making flag ceremony compulsory in all
present danger of a character both grave
educational institutions) of July 11, 1955 ,
and imminent, of a serious evil to public
and by Department Order No. 8 (Rules and
safety, public morals, public health or any
Regulations for Conducting the Flag
other legitimate public interest, that the
Ceremony in All Educational Institutions)
State has a right (and duty) to prevent."
dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of
Absent such a threat to public safety, the
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)
expulsion of the petitioners from the
making the flag ceremony compulsory in all
schools is not justified. (Teehankee)
educational institutions.

The petitioners further contend that while

Jehovah's Witnesses admitted that they
they do not take part in the compulsory flag
taught their children not to salute the flag,
ceremony, they do not engage in "external
sing the national anthem, and recite the
acts" or behavior that would offend their
patriotic pledge for they believe that those
countrymen who believe in expressing their
are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion"
love of country through the observance of
which they "cannot conscientiously give to
the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at
anyone or anything except God". They
attention during the flag ceremony to show
consider the flag as an image or idol
their respect for the right of those who
representing the State. They think the
choose to participate in the solemn
action of the local authorities in compelling
proceedings. Since they do not engage in
the flag salute and pledge transcends
disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for
constitutional limitations on the State's
their expulsion.
power and invades the sphere of the
 P a g e | 20

The Court is not persuaded that by and to make such education accessible to
exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from all (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).
saluting the flag, singing the national
anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge,
this religious group which admittedly
comprises a "small portion of the school
population" will shake up our part of the
globe and suddenly produce a nation
"untaught and uninculcated in and
unimbued with reverence for the flag,
patriotism, love of country and admiration
for national heroes" . What the petitioners
seek only is exemption from the flag
ceremony, not exclusion from the public
schools where they may study the
Constitution, the democratic way of life and
form of government, and learn not only the
arts, sciences, Philippine history and culture
but also receive training for a vocation of
profession and be taught the virtues of
"patriotism, respect for human rights,
appreciation for national heroes, the rights
and duties of citizenship, and moral and
spiritual values (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987
Constitution) as part of the curricular.
Expelling or banning the petitioners from
Philippine schools will bring about the very
situation that this Court had feared in
Gerona. Forcing a small religious group,
through the iron hand of the law, to
participate in a ceremony that violates their
religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to
love of country or respect for dully
constituted authorities.

Also, the expulsion of members of

Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools
where they are enrolled violates their right
as Philippine citizens, under the 1987
Constitution, to "protect and promote the
right of all citizens to quality education . . .