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1. Introduction
Reuben Louis Goodstein studied mathematics at Cambridge from
1931 until 1935.1 His work on ordinal notation systems of transfinite
ordinal numbers, under the supervision of John Littlewood, is at the
basis of the result that bears his name, “Goodstein’s theorem”.2 He was
also one of Littlewood’s students that attended Wittgenstein’s lectures.
Although there is no reason to believe that Wittgenstein was particu-
larly close to Goodstein, it seems that he nevertheless held him in some
degree of esteem. Indeed, when Wittgenstein cancelled his lectures in
1933 and chose instead to dictate The Blue Book to a selected group of
students, which included Goodstein, alongside Alice Ambrose,
Margaret Masterman and two further mathematics students,
H. S. M. Coxeter and Francis Skinner. Goodstein and Skinner had
been close friends since their schooldays at St. Paul’s, London.3 This
may explain why upon Skinner’s death in 1941, Wittgenstein mailed to
Goodstein a number of important manuscripts that had been until then
in Skinner’s possession, including a set of revisions to The Brown
Book.4
1
On Goodstein’s life, see Rose 1988.
2
See Goodstein 1944. Goodstein’s theorem is a purely number-theoretic statement
using implicitly the fact that all strictly decreasing sequences of transfinite ordinal
notational systems up to ε0 are finite. Its importance was only recognized when
Laurence Kirby and Jeff Paris showed that it provides a concrete example of
Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, i.e., a true number-theoretic statement which
not provable within first-order Peano Arithmetic (Kirby & Paris 1982).
3
See Monk 1990, 336.
4
These manuscripts resurfaced in 2002, and are now housed at Trinity College.
For detailed information about their content, see Gibson 2010.
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Aside from his theorem, Goodstein is also known for his contribu-
tion to the foundations of mathematics, with studies of recursive arith-
metic and analysis,6 and one of his important but lesser-known
contributions in this context is his introduction in 1945 of a rule of
uniqueness of a function defined by recursion. This rule allows one to
dispense with the principle of mathematical induction for primitive
recursive arithmetic. We show that Goodstein owed this idea to
Wittgenstein, who introduced it in his MS 113, in May 1932, and
then lectured about it a few days later, in front of Goodstein. After
a brief explanation of the meaning and purpose of this rule in the next
section, we ask in Section 3 why Wittgenstein needed it, and in
Section 4 explain the reasoning that led him to it. In Section 5, we
discuss the light these developments shed on broader, related philoso-
phical issues, and we conclude with some remarks on the middle
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics. We limit our discussion
throughout to the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, at the
expense of a detailed presentation of the mathematical logic involved,
skipping unnecessary routine details. Our presentation is thus infor-
mal, but minimal knowledge of logic and algebra is unavoidably pre-
supposed. There are, alas, historical issues that we could not get into;
5
Robin Gandy, who got his first appointment at Leicester in the 1950s thanks to
Goodstein, told one of us in conversation that Goodstein kept referring
frequently to Wittgenstein in his lectures as well as in conversation.
6
See Goodstein 1957 and Goodstein 1961.
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uðxÞ ¼ vðxÞ
..
.
uð0Þ ¼ vð0Þ uðx þ 1Þ ¼ vðx þ 1Þ (IR)
uðxÞ ¼ vðxÞ
11 12
Hilbert & Bernays 1934, 286. Hilbert & Bernays 1934, 264/265.
13
See Okada 2007, 123.
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With arbitrary terms u(x), v(x), w(x, y) and S the successor function,
the rule can be stated thus:18
uð0Þ ¼ vð0Þ u SðxÞ ¼ w x; uðxÞ v SðxÞ ¼ w x; vðxÞ
(UR)
uðxÞ ¼ vðxÞ
14
Goodstein presented his equation calculus in, e.g., Goodstein 1954; 1965,
63–72; 1971, chap. 7.
15
Curry 1941, 2.74.
16
Goodstein 1945. Although published in 1945, Goodstein’s paper was in fact
written in the late 1930s and submitted in 1941. These developments are thus
nearly simultaneous, albeit independent.
17
We modified the symbol for implication.
18
Omitting parameter variables again for reasons of simplicity.
19
See Theorems 2.8 & 3.7–3.81 in Recursive Number Theory (Goodstein 1957,
55 & 66–67).
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20
For example, see Lambek 1988, and the discussion in Okada & Scott 1999.
21
Goodstein 1972, 280.
22
With the exception of von Plato 2014, previous discussion of this topic is solely
by the present authors. The first mentions of Wittgenstein as the source of
Goodstein’s uniqueness rule, other than Goodstein himself, are in Marion 1995,
155, Marion 1998, 107, and Okada 2007.
23
See Marion 1998, chap. 8.
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30
John King’s account of Wittgenstein’s lectures gives support to this claim:
“W[ittgenstein]’s room was square, with the window on the left side of the wall
which faced you as you entered. He sat near the window, with the light coming
over his left shoulder, at a small collapsible card-table, on which there was
a large ledger-like book which he used for his own writing” (LWL, xiii).
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31
We are following here Potter 2000, 184.
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Ω’°x¼Def x
Ω’Sn x¼Def Ω’ðΩ’n xÞ
Numbers are thus defined as indices or “exponents” (6.021) of the
repeated applications of an operation. We thus get what appears to be
an iteration scheme:
[Ω’°x, Ω’nx, Ω’n+1x]
And the natural numbers are defined as follows:
x ¼ Ω°x
Ω’x ¼ Ω1 x
Ω’Ω’x ¼ Ω2 x
…
These form in turn the natural number series at 6.31:
[0, ξ, ξ+1]
which is again recognizably construed in terms of the aforementioned
“general term”, or, in a later variant:32
| 1, ξ, ξ+1|
Wittgenstein also sketches a proof of “2×2=4” at 6.241, from which
one recovers addition and multiplication as calculations on this
series:33
Ωmþn x¼Def Ωm ðΩn xÞ
Ωmn x¼Def ðΩn Þm x
We can thus minimally claim that Wittgenstein aimed at a definition of
the natural numbers as recursive data types upon which one makes
calculations (addition and multiplication).
It is worth noting that the “general form of truth-function” at six,
which was notoriously abandoned already in 1929, is also modelled on
the “general term” of 5.2522. But objections to it do not readily
translate into objections to the “general term” and its use 6.31.
Wittgenstein must have thought so, given that he went on thinking
32
See, e.g., BT, 469, PG, 431–433, quoted later.
33
Again, following Potter 2000, 184. Only the rule for multiplication is given by
Wittgenstein in his proof of ‘2×2=4’ at TLP 6.241. The other is easily
conjectured.
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for years afterwards in terms of the latter, including when framing the
uniqueness rule.
It is also tempting to try and read more into these skeletal indica-
tions, e.g., by drawing parallels between Wittgenstein’s definition of
natural numbers as “exponents” and “Church numerals”.34 He
defines indeed calculation in a manner more reminiscent of pattern-
based λ-calculus than primitive recursion. But we saw that such
parallels are limited, and Wittgenstein did not provide any general
scheme for defining primitive recursive functions. In absence of any
proper recursion scheme, his definition of natural numbers remains
at best “philosophical”. Therefore, as far as “foundations” are
concerned, he achieved little, barely sketching an account for num-
ber theory taking as primitive not the notion of “class” or “set”, but
the successor function. Still, one should bear in mind that substitu-
tion is the only method for computation of both λ-terms and primi-
tive recursive function terms: his claim about substitution in 6.24
applies to both.
Another lacuna is the lack of an account of proofs, given that there is
not even reference to mathematical induction in the Tractatus.
Wittgenstein knew only of (ISO), but could not even avail himself of
the first-order axiom schema (IS), because of its “logical” nature: it was
in his attempt to overcome this problem that he came up with the idea
of a uniqueness rule.
34
For Church numerals, see Church 1941, chap. 2, and for this claim, see Hancock
& Martin-Löf 1975, 9–10, Frascolla 1997, 357 and Marion 1998, 11.
35
The earliest discussion of Skolem’s proof occurs in 1929, at MS 105, pp. 73 ff.
reprised in PR, § 153. Remarks on Skolem’s proof in manuscripts written since
1929 were for the most part collected in 1930 in chapter XIV of Philosophical
Remarks (PR, §§163–169).
36
The first discussion of Skolem’s proof in Wittgenstein’s lectures was on May 19,
1930. See M, May 19, 1930, Lecture 4, 4:64–4:66. Cf. PO, 301–302, LWL,
18–19.
37
We label the law (A) following PG, 397; BT, 445.
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a+(b+c)=(a+b)+c (A)
It is likely that the analysis of it he gave in a lecture in May 1932 was
what he was looking for.38
Skolem’s proof exemplifies (IR). Given the primitive recursive defini-
tion of addition, for which the sum of a and b + 1 is equal to the number
following a + b:
a þ 0 ¼ a;
a þ ðb þ 1Þ ¼ ða þ bÞ þ 1;
Skolem proves the associative law as follows.39
The base case c=1 holds in virtue of the aforementioned definition.
For the induction step, Skolem supposes that A “holds for a certain c”
(Skolem 1967b, 305) (Skolem 1970, 155), and arbitrary a and b, so
that we have the assumption that:
a+(b+c)=(a+b)+c
From which one gets the step to c+1 as follows. First, by definition we
get:
a+(b+(c+1))=a+((b+c)+1)
Again by definition the right-hand side transforms into:
(a+(b+c))+1
By the assumption into:
((a+b)+c)+1
And finally, again by definition, we get:
a+(b+c+1))=(a+b)+(c+1)
Thus, if (A) holds for c, then it holds for c+1, this being an instance of
the step from u(x) = v(x) to u(x+1) = v(x+1) in (IR).
In his manuscript as well as in his lecture of May 20, 1932,40
Wittgenstein’s reasoning is easy to follow. He first rewrote Skolem’s
inductive step as follows:
38
M, May 19, 1932, 6b:14 ff, pp. 162 ff.
39
The following is a slightly modified version of Skolem’s proof in 1967b,
305–306 and 1970, 155–156.
40
M, May 20, 1932, 6b:16, p. 162.
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ð1Þa þ ðb þ 1Þ ¼ ða þ bÞ þ 1
ð2Þa þ ðb þ ðc þ 1ÞÞ ¼ ða þ ðb þ cÞ þ 1Þ ¼ ða þ ðb þ cÞÞ þ 1
ð3Þða þ bÞ þ ðc þ 1Þ ¼ ðða þ bÞ þ cÞ þ 1
We indicated with bold characters the key idea behind “unique-
ness”. Indeed, one can see here that “(a+b)+(c+1)” is the same
function “+1” of “((a+b)+c)” as “(a+(b+(c+1)))” is of “(a+(b+c))”.
Wittgenstein then suggests that one captures this idea by writing (1)
as:
φ(1)=ψ(1)
then (2) as:
φ(c+1)=F(φ(c))
and (3) as:
ψ(c+1)=F(ψ(c)).
So, for 1 φ(1) will return the same value as ψ(1) and, when c grows
by one, φ(c) and ψ(c) will return their value in the same way, and
so forth. The affinity with mathematical induction should now be
obvious.
When Wittgenstein writes in his manuscript:41
9
α φð1Þ¼ψð1Þ = Δ
β φðcþ1Þ¼FðφðcÞÞ φðcÞ¼ψðcÞ;
;
γ ψðcþ1Þ¼FðψðcÞÞ
the brace should be taken to mean that “Δ follows from α, β, γ”, and it
could be rewritten in the form of (UR) as:
φð1Þ¼ψð1Þ φðx þ 1Þ¼FðφðxÞÞ ψðx þ 1Þ¼FðψðxÞÞ
(UR’)
φðxÞ¼ψðxÞ
41
MS 113, 237–238; PG, 397; BT, 445.
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5. A Possible Misunderstanding
If we were to stop here, we would have succeeded in showing that
Goodstein got the idea of the uniqueness rule from Wittgenstein, who
had been looking for it in order to fulfil a lacuna in his treatment of
arithmetic in the Tractatus. But this is not the end of the story. Indeed,
in a passage of MS113 written on May 17, 1932, whose content does
not appear in Moore’s lecture notes for May 20, Wittgenstein had the
following comment about the idea that he has shown that “Δ follows
from α, β, γ”:
If three equations of the form α, β, γ are proved, we say “the equation Δ is
proved for all cardinal numbers”. This is a definition of this latter form of
expression in terms of the first. It shows that we aren’t using the word
“prove” in the second case in the same way as in the first. In any case, it is
misleading to say that we have proved the equation Δ or A. Perhaps it is better
to say that we have proved its generality, though that too is misleading in
other respects. (MS 113, 237–238; BT, 445; PG,397)
42
See also PG, 410; BT, 455 and PG 422; BT, 462.
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point.) We cannot hope fully to clarify this matter here, but we would
like to suggest one possible explanation.43
Before doing this, however, we would like to make a brief point
concerning Cora Diamond’s “resolute” reading of the Tractatus.
The passages just quoted are clear evidence that Wittgenstein is still
thinking in terms of the “saying-showing” distinction (TLP, 4.1212).
Indeed, remarks of this sort abound. For example, here:
An algebraic proposition always gains only arithmetical significance if you
replace the letters in it by numerals, and then always only particular arith-
metical significance.
Its generality doesn’t lie in itself, but in the possibility of its correct
application. And for that it has to keep on having recourse to the induction.
That is it does not assert its generality, it does not express it; the generality
is, rather, shown in the formal relation to the substitution, which proves to be
a term of the inductive series. (PR,§ 168)
The gist here is that a “recursive proof” can at best only show general-
ity and, while one may assert it using a quantified statement, “for
all . . . ”, this would be going beyond what the proof shows, it would
not respect the particular “grammar” of the language in which proof
is written. Goodstein did not ignore this point, since he expressed it in
the last sentence of his 1945 paper:
Generality in the calculus may be exhibited without use of variable signs, the
generality of the theorem showing itself in the generality of the proof, but
a calculus which contains no variable signs can only show generality, not
express it. (Goodstein 1945, 434)
45
This is one of the notorious consequences of the “resolute” reading.
To paraphrase Diamond 1991, 181–182, this reading would amount to the
claim that it is not Wittgenstein’s view that there are arithmetical features that
cannot be put into words but show themselves. We provide here textual evidence
to the contrary.
46
For a similar point, see Marion 2011, 156–157.
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47
Translation modified. See also an earlier passage in MS 113, 122v; May 17,
1932. BT, 481: PG, 449. The idea that a proof such as Skolem’s establishes
a connection between the language of algebra and the language of number-
theoretic equations already occurs in Wittgenstein’s earliest discussion of
Skolem’s proof (MS 105, 83).
48
Okada 2007, 127. 49 See Marion 1998, 98.
50
See Hilbert & Bernays 1934, 298–299.
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51
For this point, see Potter 2011, 135–136.
52
The remarks about ‘surveyability’ from 1938–1939 illustrate this point, since
they are supposedly emblematic of the ‘later philosophy of mathematics’ but
turn out to embody arguments already laid out as early as 1929. See Marion
2011.
53
For example, the very interesting remarks on Turing Machines in 1947,
discussed in Floyd 2012.
54
See Marion 1998, chap. 4.
55
This collaborative work was supported by MEXT KAKENHI grant number
23120002, JSPS KAKENHI grant number JP26284005, JP17H02265, and the
Next Generation Research Project Promotion Program of Keio University.
Earlier versions of this paper were presented by Mathieu Marion at the
CEPERC, Université de Provence Aix-Marseille 1, in December 2010, at the
Institut d’histoire et de philosophie des sciences et des techniques, Paris,
in March 2011, at the Philosophy of Mathematics Seminar at University of
Oxford in May 2011 and at the international colloquium ‘The Legacy of
Goodstein. His Centennial and the Wittgenstein Connection’, University of
Leicester, in December 2012, as well as by Mitsuhiro Okada at a logic workshop
at University Lyon-3 in May 2013. For comments on earlier versions, we would
like to thank Gabriella Crocco, Daniel Isaacson, Per Martin-Löf, David Stern,
Timothy Williamson, Richard Zach and, especially, Jan von Plato, to whom we
are particularly indebted for information about Bernays and his correspondence
with Goodstein.