Co Ownership Decedent

ART. 1619.
Legal redemption is the right to be subrogated, upon the same

terms and conditions stipulated in the contract, in the place of one
who acquires a thing by purchase or dation in payment, or by any
other transaction whereby ownership is transmitted by onerous title.
.R. No. 101522 May 28, 1993
LEONARDO MARIANO, AVELINA TIGUE, LAZARO MARIANO, MERCEDES SAN PEDRO, DIONISIA M. AQUINO, and JOSE N.T.
AQUINO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, (Sixteenth Division), GRACE GOSIENGFIAO, assisted by her husband GERMAN GALCOS;
ESTER GOSIENGFIAO, assisted by her husband AMADOR BITONA; FRANCISCO GOSIENGFIAO, JR., NORMA
GOSIENGFIAO, and PINKY ROSE GUENO, respondents.
The Baristers Law Office for petitioners.
Simeon T. Agustin for private respondents.
NOCON, J.:
Before Us is a petition foe review of the decision, dated May 13, 1991 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 13122,
entitled Grace Gosiengfiao, et al. v. Leonardo Mariano v. Amparo Gosiengfiao 1 raising as issue the distinction between Article
1088 and Article 1620 of the Civil Code.
2 3
The Court of Appeals summarized the facts as follows:
It appears on record that the decedent Francisco Gosiengfiao is the registered owner of a residential lot
located at Ugac Sur, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, particularly described as follows, to wit:
"The eastern portion of Lot 1351, Tuguegarao Cadastre, and after its segregation now
designated as Lot 1351-A, Plan PSD-67391, with an area of 1,1346 square meters."
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2416 recorded in the Register of Deeds of Cagayan.
The lot in question was mortgaged by the decedent to the Rural Bank of Tuguegarao (designated as
Mortgagee bank, for brevity) on several occasions before the last, being on March 9, 1956 and 29, 1958.
On August 15, 1958, Francisco Gosiengfiao died intestate survived by his heirs, namely: Third-Party
Defendants: wife Antonia and Children Amparo, Carlos, Severino and herein plaintiffs-appellants Grace,
Emma, Ester, Francisco, Jr., Norma, Lina (represented by daughter Pinky Rose), and Jacinto.
The loan being unpaid, the lot in dispute was foreclosed by the mortgagee bank and in the foreclosure sale
held on December 27, 1963, the same was awarded to the mortgagee bank as the highest bidder.
On February 7, 1964, third-party defendant Amparo Gosiengfiao-Ibarra redeemed the property by paying the
amount of P1,347.89 and the balance of P423.35 was paid on December 28, 1964 to the mortgagee bank.
On September 10, 1965, Antonia Gosiengfiao on her behalf and that of her minor children Emma, Lina, Norma
together with Carlos and Severino executed a "Deed of Assignment of the Right of Redemption" in favor of
Amparo G. Ibarra appearing in the notarial register of Pedro (Laggui) as Doc. No. 257, Page No. 6, Book No.
8, Series of 1965.
On August 15, 1966, Amparo Gosiengfiao sold the entire property to defendant Leonardo Mariano who
subsequently established residence on the lot subject of this controversy. It appears in the Deed of Sale dated
August 15, 1966 that Amparo, Antonia, Carlos and Severino were signatories thereto.
Sometime in 1982, plaintiff-appellant Grace Gosiengfiao learned of the sale of said property by the third-party
defendants. She went to the Barangay Captain and asked for a confrontation with defendants Leonardo and
Avelina Mariano to present her claim to said property.
On November 27, 1982, no settlement having been reached by the parties, the Barangay captain issued a
certificate to file action.
On December 8, 1982, defendant Leonardo Mariano sold the same property to his children Lazaro F. Mariano
and Dionicia M. Aquino as evidenced by a Deed of Sale notarized by Hilarion L. Aquino as Doc. No. 143, Page
No. 19, Book No. V, Series of 1982.
On December 21, 1982, plaintiffs Grace Gosiengfiao, et al. filed a complaint for "recovery of possession and
legal redemption with damages" against defendants Leonardo and Avelina Mariano. Plaintiffs alleged in their
complaint that as co-heirs and co-owners of the lot in question, they have the right to recover their respective
shares in the same, and property as they did not sell the same, and the right of redemption with regard to the
shares of other co-owners sold to the defendants.
Defendants in their answer alleged that the plaintiffs has (sic) no cause of action against them as the money
used to redeem lot in question was solely from the personal funds of third-party defendant Amparo
Gosiengfiao-Ibarra, who consequently became the sole owner of the said property and thus validly sold the
entire property to the defendants, and the fact that defendants had already sold the said property to the
children, Lazaro Mariano and Dionicia M. Aquino. Defendants further contend that even granting that the
plaintiffs are co-owners with the third-party defendants, their right of redemption had already been barred by
the Statute of Limitations under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, if not by laches. 4
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan, Branch I, rendered a decision dated September 16, 1986, dismissing the
complaint and stating that respondents have no right of ownership or possession over the lot in question. The trial court further said
that when the subject property foreclosed and sold at public auction, the rights of the heirs were reduced to a mere right of
redemption. And when Amparo G. Ibarra redeemed the lot from the Rural Bank on her own behalf and with her own money she
became the sole owner of the property. Respondents' having failed to redeem the property from the bank or from Amparo G. Ibarra,
lost whatever rights the might have on the property. 5
The Court of Appeals in its questioned decision reversed and set aside the ruling of the trial court and declared herein respondents as
co-owners of the property in the question. The Court of Appeals said:
The whole controversy in the case at bar revolves on the question of "whether or not a co-owner who redeems
the whole property with her own personal funds becomes the sole owner of said property and terminates the
existing state of co-ownership."
Admittedly, as the property in question was mortgaged by the decedent, a co-ownership existed among the
heirs during the period given by law to redeem the foreclosed property. Redemption of the whole property by a
co-owner does not vest in him sole ownership over said property but will inure to the benefit of all co-owners.
In other words, it will not end to the existing state of co-ownership. Redemption is not a mode of terminating a
co-ownership.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, it is undisputed and supported by records, that third-party defendant Amparo G. Ibarra
redeemed the propety in dispute within the one year redemption period. Her redemption of the property, even
granting that the money used was from her own personal funds did not make her the exclusive owner of the
mortgaged property owned in common but inured to the benefit of all co-owners. It would have been otherwise
if third-party defendant Amparo G. Ibarra purchased the said property from the mortgagee bank (highest,
bidder in the foreclosure sale) after the redemption period had already expired and after the mortgagee bank
6
had consolidated it title in which case there would no longer be any co-ownership to speak of .
The decision of the Court of Appeals is supported by a long line of case law which states that a redemption by a co-owner within the
7
period prescribed by law inures to the benefit of all the other co-owners.
The main argument of petitioners in the case at bar is that the Court of Appeals incorrectly applied Article 1620 of the Civil Code,
instead of Article 1088 of the same code which governs legal redemption by co-heirs since the lot in question, which forms part of the
intestate estate of the late Francisco Gosiengfiao, was never the subject of partition or distribution among the heirs, thus, private
respondents and third-party defendants had not ceased to be co-heirs.
On that premise, petitioners further contend that the right of legal redemption was not timely exercised by the private respondents,
since Article 1088 prescribes that the same must be done within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of
the sale by the vendor.
According to Tolentino, the fine distinction between Article 1088 and Article 1620 is that when the sale consists of an interest in some
particular property or properties of the inheritance, the right redemption that arises in favor of the other co-heirs is that recognized in
Article 1620. On the other hand, if the sale is the hereditary right itself, fully or in part, in the abstract sense, without specifying any
particular object, the right recognized in Article 1088 exists.
8
Petitioners allege that upon the facts and circumstances of the present case, respondents failed to exercise their right of legal
redemption during the period provided by law, citing as authority the case of Conejero, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al. wherein the
9
Court adopted the principle that the giving of a copy of a deed is equivalent to the notice as required by law in legal redemption.
We do not dispute the principle laid down in the Conejero case. However, the facts in the said case are not four square with the facts
of the present case. In Conejero, redemptioner Enrique Conejero was shown and given a copy of the deed of sale of the subject
property. The Court in that case stated that the furnishing of a copy of the deed was equivalent to the giving of a written notice
required by law. 11
The records of the present petition, however, show no written notice of the sale being given whatsoever to private respondents.
Although, petitioners allege that sometime on October 31, 1982 private respondent, Grace Gosiengfiao was given a copy of the
questioned deed of sale and shown a copy of the document at the Office of the Barangay Captain sometime November 18, 1982, this
was not supported by the evidence presented. On the contrary, respondent, Grace Gosiengfiao, in her testimony, declared as follows:
Q. When you went back to the residence of Atty. Pedro Laggui were you able to see
him?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. When you saw him, what did you tell?
A. I asked him about the Deed of Sale which Mrs. Aquino had told me and he also
showed me a Deed of Sale. I went over the Deed of Sale and I asked Atty. Laggui
about this and he mentioned here about the names of the legal heirs. I asked why my
name is not included and I was never informed in writing because I would like to claim
and he told me to better consult my own attorney.
Q. And did you go?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. What kind of copy or document is that?
A. It is a deed of sale signed by my mother, sister Amparo and my brothers.
Q. If shown to you the copy of the Deed of Sale will you be able to identify it?
A. Yes, sir. 11
Thereafter, Grace Gosiengfiao explicitly stated that she was never given a copy of the said Deed of Sale.
Q. Where did Don Mariano, Dr. Mariano and you see each other?
A. In the house of Brgy. Captain Antonio Bassig.
Q. What transpired in the house of the Brgy. Captain when you saw each other there?
A. Brgy. Captain Bassig informed my intention of claiming the lot and I also informed
him about the Deed of Sale that was not signed by me since it is mine it is already sold
and I was informed in writing about it. I am a legal heir and I have also the right to
claim.
Q. And what was the reply of Don Mariano and Dr. Mariano to the information given to
them by Brgy. Captain Bassig regarding your claim?
A. He insisted that the lot is already his because of the Deed of Sale. I asked for the
exact copy so that I could show to him that I did not sign and he said he does not have
a copy. 12
The above testimony was never refuted by Dr. Mariano who was present before Brgy. Captain Bassig.
The requirement of a written notice has long been settled as early as in the case of Castillo v. Samonte, where this Court quoted the
13
ruling in Hernaez v. Hernaez, 32 Phil., 214, thus:
Both the letter and spirit of the New Civil Code argue against any attempt to widen the scope of the notice
specified in Article 1088 by including therein any other kind of notice, such as verbal or by registration. If the
intention of the law had been to include verbal notice or any other means of information as sufficient to give the
effect of this notice, then there would have been no necessity or reasons to specify in Article 1088 of the New
Civil Code that the said notice be made in writing for, under the old law, a verbal notice or information was
sufficient.
14
Moreover, petitioners themselves adopted in their argument respondents' allegation In their complaint that sometime on October, 1982
they sought the redemption of the property from spouses Leonardo Mariano and Avelina Tigue, by tendering the repurchase money of
P12,000.00, which the spouses rejected. Consequently, private respondents exercised their right of redemption at the first
15
opportunity they have by tendering the repurchase price to petitioners. The complaint they filed, before the Barangay Captain and
then to the Regional Trial Court was necessary to assert their rights. As we learned in the case of Castillo, supra:
It would seem clear from the above that the reimbursement to the purchaser within the period of one month
from the notice in writing is a requisite or condition precedent to the exercise of the right of legal redemption;
the bringing of an action in court is the remedy to enforce that right in case the purchaser refuses the
redemption. The first must be done within the month-period; the second within the prescriptive period provided
in the Statute of Limitation.16
The ruling in Castillo v. Samonte; supra, was reiterated in the case of Garcia v. Calaliman, where We also discussed the reason for
the requirement of the written notice. We said:
Consistent with aforesaid ruling, in the interpretation of a related provision (Article 1623 of the New Civil Code)
this Court had stressed that written notice is indispensable, actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some
other manners by the redemptioner, notwithstanding. He or she is still entitled to written notice, as exacted by
the code to remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet and doubt that the
alienation is not definitive. The law not having provided for any alternative, the method of notifications remains
exclusive, though the Code does not prescribe any particular form of written notice nor any distinctive method
written notification of redemption (Conejero et al. v. Court of Appeals et al., 16 SCRA 775 [1966];
Etcuban v. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 507 [1987]; Cabrera v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 75069, April 15,
1988). (Emphasis ours)
17
We likewise do not find merit in petitioners' position that private respondents could not have validly effected redemption due to their
failure to consign in court the full redemption price after tender thereof was rejected by the petitioners. Consignation is not necessary,
because the tender of payment was not made to discharge an obligation, but to enforce or exercise a right. It has been previously held
that consignation is not required to preserve the right of repurchase as a mere tender of payment is enough on time as a basis for an
action to compel the vendee a retroto resell the property; no subsequent consignation was necessary to entitle private respondents to
such
reconveyance. 18
Premises considered, respondents have not lost their right to redeem, for in the absence of a written notification of the sale by the
vendors, the 30-day period has not even begun to run.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Nocon, JJ., concur.
# Footnotes
1 Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr., ponente, Justices Ricardo J. Francisco and Consuelo Ynares-Santiago
concurring.
2 Article 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of
the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale,
provided they so within the period of the month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the
vendor.
3 Article 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other
co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the
redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do so in proportion to
the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in common.
4 Decision, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 71-73.
5 Rollo pp. 67-68.
6 Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 74-75.
7 Annie Tan v. C.A., G.R. No. 79899, 172 SCRA 660 (1989); Adille v. C.A., G.R. No. 44546, 157 SCRA 445
(1988); De Guzman v. C.A., G.R. No. 47378, 148 SCRA 75 (1987).
8 Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, pp. 607-
608, citing Manresa at p. 777.
9 16 SCRA 775 (1966).
10 Id., at pp. 779-780.
11 TSN, October 9, 1984, pp. 11-12.

12 Id., at pp. 14-15.
13 106 Phil. 1023 (1960).
14 Id., at 1028.
15 Amended Complaint; par. 15-16, Rollo p. 34.
16 Ibid., at 1029.
17 Garcia v. Calaliman, G.R. No. 26855, 172 SCRA 201 (1989).
18 Francisco v. Bautista, G.R. No. 44167, 192 SCRA 388 (1991).
Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, G.R. No 176556

Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C.
QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO,
PETCHIE C. QUIAO, represented by Promulgated:
their mother RITA QUIAO, July 4, 2012
Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--x
DECISION
REYES, J.:
The family is the basic and the most important institution of

society. It is in the family where children are born and molded either to
become useful citizens of the country or troublemakers in the
community. Thus, we are saddened when parents have to separate and
fight over properties, without regard to the message they send to their
children.Notwithstanding this, we must not shirk from our obligation to
rule on this case involving legal separation escalating to questions on
dissolution and partition of properties.
The Case
This case comes before us via Petition for Review

on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner seeks
that we vacate and set aside the Order [2]dated January 8, 2007 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Butuan City. In lieu of the said
order, we are asked to issue a Resolution defining the net profits subject
of the forfeiture as a result of the decree of legal separation in accordance
with the provision of Article 102(4) of the Family Code, or alternatively,
in accordance with the provisions of Article 176 of the Civil Code.
Antecedent Facts
On October 26, 2000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed

a complaint for legal separation against herein petitioner Brigido B.
Quiao (Brigido).[3] Subsequently, the RTC rendered a Decision[4] dated
October 10, 2005, the dispositive portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing considerations,

judgment is hereby rendered declaring the legal separation of plaintiff
Rita C. Quiao and defendant-respondent Brigido B. Quiao pursuant to
Article 55.
As such, the herein parties shall be entitled to live separately

from each other, but the marriage bond shall not be severed.
Except for Letecia C. Quiao who is of legal age, the three

minor children, namely, Kitchie, Lotis and Petchie, all surnamed Quiao
shall remain under the custody of the plaintiff who is the innocent
spouse.
Further, except for the personal and real properties already

foreclosed by the RCBC, all the remaining properties, namely:
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;

2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located
in Tungao, Butuan City;
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares
located in Manila de Bugabos, Butuan City;
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in
Tungao, Butuan City;
8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City;
shall be divided equally between herein [respondents] and [petitioner]

subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of
the unpaid conjugal liabilities of [P]45,740.00.
[Petitioners] share, however, of the net profits earned by the

conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children.
He is further ordered to reimburse [respondents] the sum of

[P]19,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses of
[P]5,000.00[.]
SO ORDERED.[5]
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within

the period provided for under Section 17(a) and (b) of the Rule on Legal
Separation.[6]
On December 12, 2005, the respondents filed a motion for

execution[7] which the trial court granted in its Order dated December 16,
2005, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, finding the motion to be well taken, the same is

hereby granted. Let a writ of execution be issued for the immediate
enforcement of the Judgment.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Subsequently, on February 10, 2006, the RTC issued a Writ of

Execution[9] which reads as follows:
NOW THEREFORE, that of the goods and chattels of the

[petitioner] BRIGIDO B. QUIAO you cause to be made the sums
stated in the afore-quoted DECISION [sic], together with your lawful
fees in the service of this Writ, all in the Philippine Currency.
But if sufficient personal property cannot be found whereof to

satisfy this execution and your lawful fees, then we command you that
of the lands and buildings of the said [petitioner], you make the said
sums in the manner required by law. You are enjoined to strictly
observed Section 9, Rule 39, Rule [sic] of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
You are hereby ordered to make a return of the said

proceedings immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part
or in full in consonance with Section 14, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended.[10]
On July 6, 2006, the writ was partially executed with the petitioner
paying the respondents the amount of P46,870.00, representing the
following payments:
(a) P22,870.00 as petitioner's share of the payment of the conjugal

share;
(b) P19,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(c) P5,000.00 as litigation expenses.[11]
On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the

promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a
Motion for Clarification,[12] asking the RTC to define the term Net Profits
Earned.
To resolve the petitioner's Motion for Clarification, the RTC issued

an Order[13] dated August 31, 2006, which held that the phrase NET
PROFIT EARNED denotes the remainder of the properties of the parties
after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the
debts.[14] The Order further held that after determining the remainder of
the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children
because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the
net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the
Family Code.[15] The dispositive portion of the Order states:
WHEREFORE, there is no blatant disparity when the sheriff

intends to forfeit all the remaining properties after deducting the
payments of the debts for only separate properties of the defendant-
respondent shall be delivered to him which he has none.
The Sheriff is herein directed to proceed with the execution of

the Decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[16]
Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration[17] on September 8, 2006. Consequently, the
RTC issued another Order[18]dated November 8, 2006, holding that
although the Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and
executory, it may still consider the Motion for Clarification because the
petitioner simply wanted to clarify the meaning of net profit earned.
[19]
Furthermore, the same Order held:
ALL TOLD, the Court Order dated August 31, 2006 is hereby
ordered set aside. NET PROFIT EARNED, which is subject of
forfeiture in favor of [the] parties' common children, is ordered to be
computed in accordance [with] par. 4 of Article 102 of the Family
Code.[20]
On November 21, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for

Reconsideration,[21] praying for the correction and reversal of the Order
dated November 8, 2006. Thereafter, on January 8, 2007,[22] the trial court
had changed its ruling again and granted the respondents' Motion for
Reconsideration whereby the Order dated November 8, 2006 was set
aside to reinstate the Order dated August 31, 2006.
Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed on
February 27, 2007 this instant Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, raising the following:
Issues
IS THE DISSOLUTION AND THE CONSEQUENT

LIQUIDATION OF THE COMMON PROPERTIES OF
THE HUSBAND AND WIFE BY VIRTUE OF THE
DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION GOVERNED BY
ARTICLE 125 (SIC) OF THE FAMILY CODE?
II
WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE NET PROFITS

EARNED BY THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP FOR
PURPOSES OF EFFECTING THE FORFEITURE
AUTHORIZED UNDER ARTICLE 63 OF THE FAMILY
CODE?
III
WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE PROPERTY RELATIONS

BETWEEN THE HUSBAND AND WIFE WHO GOT
MARRIED IN 1977? CAN THE FAMILY CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT
FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THE NET PROFITS
SUBJECT OF FORFEITURE AS A RESULT OF THE
DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION WITHOUT
IMPAIRING VESTED RIGHTS ALREADY ACQUIRED
UNDER THE CIVIL CODE?
IV
WHAT PROPERTIES SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THE

FORFEITURE OF THE SHARE OF THE GUILTY
SPOUSE IN THE NET CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP AS A
RESULT OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE DECREE OF
LEGAL SEPARATION?[23]
Our Ruling
While the petitioner has raised a number of issues on the

applicability of certain laws, we are well-aware that the respondents have
called our attention to the fact that the Decision dated October 10, 2005
has attained finality when the Motion for Clarification was filed. [24] Thus,
we are constrained to resolve first the issue of the finality of the Decision
dated October 10, 2005 and subsequently discuss the matters that we can
clarify.
The Decision dated October 10,

2005 has become final and
executory at the time the Motion
for Clarification was filed on
July 7, 2006.
Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be

taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final
order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within
thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new

trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a
motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[25] we clarified that to standardize

the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, we held that it would be practical to
allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in
the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new
trial or motion for reconsideration.[26]
In Neypes, we explained that the "fresh period rule" shall also

apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to
the RTCs; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of
Appeals (CA); Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA
and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. We
also said, The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period
uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for
new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final
order or resolution.[27] In other words, a party litigant may file his notice
of appeal within a fresh 15-day period from his receipt of the trial court's
decision or final order denying his motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Failure to avail of the fresh 15-day period from the
denial of the motion for reconsideration makes the decision or final order
in question final and executory.
In the case at bar, the trial court rendered its Decision on October
10, 2005. The petitioner neither filed a motion for reconsideration nor a
notice of appeal. On December 16, 2005, or after 67 days had lapsed, the
trial court issued an order granting the respondent's motion for execution;
and on February 10, 2006, or after 123 days had lapsed, the trial court
issued a writ of execution. Finally, when the writ had already been
partially executed, the petitioner, on July 7, 2006 or after 270 days had
lapsed, filed his Motion for Clarification on the definition of the net
profits earned. From the foregoing, the petitioner had clearly slept on his
right to question the RTCs Decision dated October 10, 2005. For 270
days, the petitioner never raised a single issue until the decision had
already been partially executed. Thus at the time the petitioner filed his
motion for clarification, the trial courts decision has become final and
executory. A judgment becomes final and executory when the
reglementary period to appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within
such period. Consequently, no court, not even this Court, can arrogate
unto itself appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify a judgment
that became final.[28]
The petitioner argues that the decision he is questioning is a void

judgment. Being such, the petitioner's thesis is that it can still be
disturbed even after 270 days had lapsed from the issuance of the
decision to the filing of the motion for clarification. He said that a void
judgment is no judgment at all. It never attains finality and cannot be a
source of any right nor any obligation.[29] But what precisely is a void
judgment in our jurisdiction? When does a judgment becomes void?
A judgment is null and void when the court which rendered it had
no power to grant the relief or no jurisdiction over the subject matter or
over the parties or both.[30] In other words, a court, which does not have
the power to decide a case or that has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter or the parties, will issue a void judgment or a coram non judice.[31]
The questioned judgment does not fall within the purview of a void
judgment. For sure, the trial court has jurisdiction over a case involving
legal separation. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8369 confers upon an RTC,
designated as the Family Court of a city, the exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide, among others, complaints or petitions
relating to marital status and property relations of the husband and wife or
those living together.[32] The Rule on Legal Separation[33] provides that the
petition [for legal separation] shall be filed in the Family Court of the
province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing
for at least six months prior to the date of filing or in the case of a non-
resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the
election of the petitioner.[34] In the instant case, herein respondent Rita is
found to reside in Tungao, Butuan City for more than six months prior to
the date of filing of the petition; thus, the RTC, clearly has jurisdiction
over the respondent's petition below.Furthermore, the RTC also acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of both parties, considering that summons
and a copy of the complaint with its annexes were served upon the herein
petitioner on December 14, 2000 and that the herein petitioner filed his
Answer to the Complaint on January 9, 2001. [35] Thus, without doubt, the
RTC, which has rendered the questioned judgment, has jurisdiction over
the complaint and the persons of the parties.
From the aforecited facts, the questioned October 10, 2005

judgment of the trial court is clearly not void ab initio, since it was
rendered within the ambit of the court's jurisdiction. Being such, the same
cannot anymore be disturbed, even if the modification is meant to correct
what may be considered an erroneous conclusion of fact or law. [36]In fact,
we have ruled that for [as] long as the public respondent acted with
jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will
amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be
reviewed or corrected only by appeal.[37] Granting without admitting that
the RTC's judgment dated October 10, 2005 was erroneous, the
petitioner's remedy should be an appeal filed within the reglementary
period. Unfortunately, the petitioner failed to do this. He has already lost
the chance to question the trial court's decision, which has become
immutable and unalterable. What we can only do is to clarify the very
question raised below and nothing more.
For our convenience, the following matters cannot anymore be

disturbed since the October 10, 2005 judgment has already become
immutable and unalterable, to wit:
(a) The finding that the petitioner is the offending spouse since he
cohabited with a woman who is not his wife;[38]
(b) The trial court's grant of the petition for legal separation of
respondent Rita;[39]
(c) The dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership;[40]
(d) The forfeiture of the petitioner's right to any share of the net
profits earned by the conjugal partnership;[41]
(e) The award to the innocent spouse of the minor children's

custody;[42]
(f) The disqualification of the offending spouse from inheriting

from the innocent spouse by intestate succession;[43]
(g) The revocation of provisions in favor of the offending spouse

made in the will of the innocent spouse;[44]
(h) The holding that the property relation of the parties is conjugal
partnership of gains and pursuant to Article 116 of the Family Code, all
properties acquired during the marriage, whether acquired by one or both
spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved;[45]
(i) The finding that the spouses acquired their real and personal
properties while they were living together;[46]
(j) The list of properties which Rizal Commercial Banking

Corporation (RCBC) foreclosed;[47]
(k) The list of the remaining properties of the couple which must be
dissolved and liquidated and the fact that respondent Rita was the one
who took charge of the administration of these properties;[48]
(l) The holding that the conjugal partnership shall be liable to

matters included under Article 121 of the Family Code and the conjugal
liabilities totaling P503,862.10 shall be charged to the income generated
by these properties;[49]
(m) The fact that the trial court had no way of knowing whether the
petitioner had separate properties which can satisfy his share for the
support of the family;[50]
(n) The holding that the applicable law in this case is Article
129(7);[51]
(o) The ruling that the remaining properties not subject to any
encumbrance shall therefore be divided equally between the petitioner
and the respondent without prejudice to the children's legitime;[52]
(p) The holding that the petitioner's share of the net profits earned
by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children;
[53]
and
(q) The order to the petitioner to reimburse the respondents the sum
of P19,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses of P5,000.00.[54]
After discussing lengthily the immutability of the Decision dated

October 10, 2005, we will discuss the following issues for the
enlightenment of the parties and the public at large.
Article 129 of the Family Code

applies to the present case since
the parties' property relation is
governed by the system of
relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied
Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly
argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under
the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as
a result of legal separation.
Offhand, the trial court's Decision dated October 10, 2005 held that
Article 129(7) of the Family Code applies in this case. We agree with the
trial court's holding.
First, let us determine what governs the couple's property

relation. From the record, we can deduce that the petitioner and the
respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of
the exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of
the Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did not agree on a marriage
settlement, the property relations between the petitioner and the
respondent is the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of
gains.[55] Article 119 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements

agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon
complete separation of property, or upon any other regime.In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system
of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established
in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and
wife.
Thus, from the foregoing facts and law, it is clear that what governs
the property relations of the petitioner and of the respondent is conjugal
partnership of gains. And under this property relation, the husband and
the wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and
the income from their work or industry. [56] The husband and wife also
own in common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains.[57]
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the
respondent's marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the
same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned
is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the
Family Code. The latter provision is applicable because according to
Article 256 of the Family Code [t]his Code shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other law.[58]
Now, the petitioner asks: Was his vested right over half of the
common properties of the conjugal partnership violated when the trial
court forfeited them in favor of his children pursuant to Articles 63(2) and
129 of the Family Code?
We respond in the negative.
Indeed, the petitioner claims that his vested rights have been
impaired, arguing: As earlier adverted to, the petitioner acquired vested
rights over half of the conjugal properties, the same being owned in
common by the spouses. If the provisions of the Family Code are to be
given retroactive application to the point of authorizing the forfeiture of
the petitioner's share in the net remainder of the conjugal partnership
properties, the same impairs his rights acquired prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code.[59] In other words, the petitioner is saying that since the
property relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of
Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner
acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal
Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which
provides: All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in
common by the husband and wife.[60] Thus, since he is one of the owners
of the properties covered by the conjugal partnership of gains, he has a
vested right over half of the said properties, even after the promulgation
of the Family Code; and he insisted that no provision under the Family
Code may deprive him of this vested right by virtue of Article 256 of the
Family Code which prohibits retroactive application of the Family Code
when it will prejudice a person's vested right.
However, the petitioner's claim of vested right is not one which is

written on stone. In Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[61] we define and
explained vested right in the following manner:
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do

not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder, or to the
exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and
perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. The term vested
right expresses the concept of present fixed interest which, in right
reason and natural justice, should be protected against arbitrary State
action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free
society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot
deny.
To be vested, a right must have become a titlelegal or

equitableto the present or future enjoyment of property.[62] (Citations
omitted)
In our en banc Resolution dated October 18, 2005 for ABAKADA

Guro Party List Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon. Executive
Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita,[63] we also explained:
The concept of vested right is a consequence of

the constitutional guaranty of due process that expresses a present
fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected
against arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or equitable title
to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new
obligations created after the right has become vested.Rights are
considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest,
absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable.
[64]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived
of his vested right, he may lose the same if there is due process and such
deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due
process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her
complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. [65] In fact,
in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the
community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as
circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of
all the community properties of the parties.[66] Second, when the Decision
dated October 10, 2005 was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned
the trial court's ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as net profits,
pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. [67] Thus, the petitioner
cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.
Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the

petitioner's vested right is one founded, not only in the provisions of the
Family Code, but in Article 176 of the Civil Code. This provision is like
Articles 63 and 129 of the Family Code on the forfeiture of the guilty
spouse's share in the conjugal partnership profits. The said provision says:
Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall
forfeit his or her share of the conjugal partnership profits, which shall
be awarded to the children of both, and the children of the guilty
spouse had by a prior marriage. However, if the conjugal partnership
property came mostly or entirely from the work or industry, or from
the wages and salaries, or from the fruits of the separate property of the
guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall not apply.
In case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be

entitled to all the net profits.
From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no

basis considering that even under Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share
of the conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he is the guilty
party in a legal separation case. Thus, after trial and after the petitioner
was given the chance to present his evidence, the petitioner's vested right
claim may in fact be set aside under the Civil Code since the trial court
found him the guilty party.
More, in Abalos v. Dr. Macatangay, Jr.,[68] we reiterated our long-

standing ruling that:
[P]rior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of

each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy,
which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not
ripen into title until it appears that there are assets in the community as
a result of the liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is
limited to the net remainder or remanente liquido (haber ganancial)
resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its
dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the
conjugal assets does not vest until the
dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after
dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after
settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can
be divided between the spouses or their respective heirs. [69] (Citations
omitted)
Finally, as earlier discussed, the trial court has already decided in

its Decision dated October 10, 2005 that the applicable law in this case is
Article 129(7) of the Family Code. [70] The petitioner did not file a motion
for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. Thus, the petitioner is now
precluded from questioning the trial court's decision since it has become
final and executory. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability of a
final judgment prevents us from disturbing the Decision dated October
10, 2005 because final and executory decisions can no longer be reviewed
nor reversed by this Court.[71]
From the above discussions, Article 129 of the Family Code clearly
applies to the present case since the parties' property relation is governed
by the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains and
since the trial court's Decision has attained finality and immutability.
The net profits of the conjugal

partnership of gains are all the
fruits of the separate properties
of the spouses and the products
of their labor and industry.
The petitioner inquires from us the meaning of net profits earned

by the conjugal partnership for purposes of effecting the forfeiture
authorized under Article 63 of the Family Code. He insists that since
there is no other provision under the Family Code, which defines net
profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation, then
Article 102 of the Family Code applies.
What does Article 102 of the Family Code say? Is the computation
of net profits earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with
the computation of net profits earned in the absolute community?
Now, we clarify.
First and foremost, we must distinguish between the applicable law

as to the property relations between the parties and the applicable law as
to the definition of net profits. As earlier discussed, Article 129 of the
Family Code applies as to the property relations of the parties. In other
words, the computation and the succession of events will follow the
provisions under Article 129 of the said Code. Moreover, as to the
definition of net profits, we cannot but refer to Article 102(4) of the
Family Code, since it expressly provides that for purposes of computing
the net profits subject to forfeiture under Article 43, No. (2) and Article
63, No. (2), Article 102(4) applies. In this provision, net profits shall be
the increase in value between the market value of the community
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market
value at the time of its dissolution. [72] Thus, without any iota of doubt,
Article 102(4) applies to both the dissolution of the absolute community
regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and to the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code. Where
lies the difference? As earlier shown, the difference lies in the processes
used under the dissolution of the absolute community regime under
Article 102 of the Family Code, and in the processes used under the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the
Family Code.
Let us now discuss the difference in the processes between the

absolute community regime and the conjugal partnership regime.
On Absolute Community Regime:
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the

husband and the wife becomes joint owners of all the properties of the
marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and
those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article
92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple's properties.
And when the couple's marriage or community is dissolved, that common
mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or
in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value
each one may have originally owned.[73]
Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of

marriage, an inventory is prepared, listing separately all the properties of
the absolute community and the exclusive properties of each; then the
debts and obligations of the absolute community are paid out of the
absolute community's assets and if the community's properties are
insufficient, the separate properties of each of the couple will be
solidarily liable for the unpaid balance. Whatever is left of the separate
properties will be delivered to each of them. The net remainder of the
absolute community is its net assets, which shall be divided between the
husband and the wife; and for purposes of computing the net profits
subject to forfeiture, said profits shall be the increase in value between
the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration
of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.[74]
Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the net profits requires
that we first find the market value of the properties at the time of the
community's dissolution. From the totality of the market value of all the
properties, we subtract the debts and obligations of the absolute
community and this result to the net assets or net remainder of the
properties of the absolute community, from which we deduct the market
value of the properties at the time of marriage, which then results to the
net profits.[75]
Granting without admitting that Article 102 applies to the instant

case, let us see what will happen if we apply Article 102:
(a) According to the trial court's finding of facts, both husband and
wife have no separate properties, thus, the remaining properties in the list
above are all part of the absolute community. And its market value at the
time of the dissolution of the absolute community constitutes the market
value at dissolution.
(b) Thus, when the petitioner and the respondent finally were
legally separated, all the properties which remained will be liable for the
debts and obligations of the community. Such debts and obligations will
be subtracted from the market value at dissolution.
(c) What remains after the debts and obligations have been paid
from the total assets of the absolute community constitutes the net
remainder or net asset. And from such net asset/remainder of the
petitioner and respondent's remaining properties, the market value at the
time of marriage will be subtracted and the resulting totality constitutes
the net profits.
(d) Since both husband and wife have no separate

properties, and nothing would be returned to each of them, what will be
divided equally between them is simply the net profits. However, in the
Decision dated October 10, 2005, the trial court forfeited the half-share of
the petitioner in favor of his children. Thus, if we use Article 102 in the
instant case (which should not be the case), nothing is left to the
petitioner since both parties entered into their marriage without bringing
with them any property.
On Conjugal Partnership Regime:
Before we go into our disquisition on the Conjugal Partnership

Regime, we make it clear that Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies
in the instant case for purposes only of defining net profit. As earlier
explained, the definition of net profits in Article 102(4) of the Family
Code applies to both the absolute community regime and conjugal
partnership regime as provided for under Article 63, No. (2) of the Family
Code, relative to the provisions on Legal Separation.
Now, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership
of gains under Article 142 of the Civil Code, the husband and the wife
place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and income
from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of
the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.[76] From the
foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and
debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those
debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete
separation of capitals.[77]
Considering that the couple's marriage has been dissolved under

the Family Code, Article 129 of the same Code applies in the liquidation
of the couple's properties in the event that the conjugal partnership of
gains is dissolved, to wit:
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership

regime, the following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the

properties of the conjugal partnership and the exclusive properties of
each spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment

of personal debts and obligations of either spouse shall be credited to
the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her
exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or for the value of his or
her exclusive property, the ownership of which has been vested by law
in the conjugal partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall

be paid out of the conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of said
assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with
their separate properties, in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph (2) of Article 121.
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses
shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever

source, the loss or deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the
family, belonging to either spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall
be paid to said spouse from the conjugal funds, if any.
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties
shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between
husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed
upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntary
waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be

delivered upon the partition in accordance with Article 51.
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and

the lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by
the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the
common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven
years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has
decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall
decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children.
In the normal course of events, the following are the steps in the
liquidation of the properties of the spouses:
(a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made,

separately listing the couple's conjugal properties and their separate
properties.[78] In the instant case, the trial court found that the couple
has no separate properties when they married.[79] Rather, the trial court
identified the following conjugal properties, to wit:
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in

6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in

Manila de Bugabos, Butuan City;
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in

8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City.[80]

(b) Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal
partnership during the marriage is returned in equal amount to the assets
of the conjugal partnership;[81]and if the community is enriched at the
expense of the separate properties of either spouse, a restitution of the
value of such properties to their respective owners shall be made.[82]
(c) Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the

debts of the conjugal partnership; while the debts and obligation of each
of the spouses shall be paid from their respective separate properties. But
if the conjugal partnership is not sufficient to pay all its debts and
obligations, the spouses with their separate properties shall be solidarily
liable.[83]
(d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive properties of

the husband and of the wife shall be returned to each of them. [84] In the
instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the
spouses have no separate properties, [85] there is nothing to return to
any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of the
conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed
properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their
respective heirs.[86] However, since the trial court found the petitioner the
guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is
forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the
Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community
regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal
partnership regime, because there is no separate property which may
be accounted for in the guilty party's favor.
In the discussions above, we have seen that in both instances, the

petitioner is not entitled to any property at all. Thus, we cannot but
uphold the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the trial court. However,
we must clarify, as we already did above, the Order dated January 8,
2007.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of Butuan City is AFFIRMED. Acting on
the Motion for Clarification dated July 7, 2006 in the Regional Trial
Court, the Order dated January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court is
hereby CLARIFIED in accordance with the above discussions.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice
C E R T I FI CAT I O N
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
[1]
Rollo, pp. 7-35.
[2]
Penned by Judge Eduardo S. Casals; id. at 115-122.
[3]
Id. at 36.
[4]
Id. at 36-57.
[5]
Id. at 56-57.
[6]
A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC.
[7]
Rollo, p. 185.
[8]
Id. at 59.
[9]
Id. at 58-59.
[10]
Id. at 59.
[11]
Id. at 60.
[12]
Id. at 61-69.
[13]
Id. at 70-76.
[14]
Id. at 75.
[15]
Id. at 74-75.
[16]
Id. at 75-76.
[17]
Id. at 77-86.
[18]
Id. at 87-91.
[19]
Id. at 90.
[20]
Id. at 91.
[21]
Id. at 92-97.
[22]
Id. at 115-122.
[23]
Id. at 18.
[24]
Id. at 143-146.
[25]
506 Phil. 613, 629 (2005).
[26]
Id. at 626.
[27]
Id. at 627.
[28]
PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., v. Milan, G.R. No. 151215, April 5, 2010, 617 SCRA 258.
[29]
Rollo, p. 166.
[30]
See Moreno, Federico B., Philippine Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., 1988, p. 998.
[31]
People v. Judge Navarro, 159 Phil. 863, 874 (1975).
[32]
R.A. No. 8369, Section 5(d).
[33]
A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC.
[34]
Id. at Section 2(c).
[35]
Rollo, p. 38.
[36]
Sps. Edillo v. Sps. Dulpina, G.R. No. 188360, January 21, 2010, 610 SCRA 590, 601-602.
[37]
Lim v. Judge Vianzon, 529 Phil. 472, 483-484 (2006); See also Herrera v. Barretto and Joaquin, 25
Phil. 245, 256 (1913), citing Miller v. Rowan, 251 Ill., 344.
[38]
Rollo, pp. 50-51.
[39]
Id. at 51.
[40]
Id.
[41]
Id. at 51-52.
[42]
Id. at 52 and 56.
[43]
Id. at 52.
[44]
Id.
[45]
Id.
[46]
Id.
[47]
Id. at 52-53.
[48]
Id. at 53.
[49]
Id. at 53-54.
[50]
Id. at 55.
[51]
Id.
[52]
Id. at 56.
[53]
Id. at 57.
[54]
Id.
[55]
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Art. 119.
[56]
Id. at Art. 142.
[57]
Id. at Art. 143.
[58]
FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Art. 256.
[59]
Rollo, p. 29.
[60]
[61]
G.R. No. 172027, July 29, 2010, 626 SCRA 180, 201.
[62]
Id. at 199.
[63]
The Court consolidated the following cases: ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer Samson S.
Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, G.R. No. 168056; Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 168207; Association of
Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al. v. Cesar V. Purisima, et al., G.R. No. 168461; Francis Joseph G.
Escudero v. Cesar V. Purisima, et al, G.R. No. 168463; and Bataan Governor Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. v.
Hon. Eduardo R. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 168730.
[64]
Id.
[65]
Rollo, p. 37.
[66]
Id. at 39.
[67]
Id. at 55-57.
[68]
482 Phil. 877-894 (2004).
[69]
Id. at 890-891.
[70]
Rollo, p. 55.
[71]
Malayan Employees Association-FFW v. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 181357, February
2, 2010, 611 SCRA 392, 399; Catmon Sales Int'l. Corp. v. Atty. Yngson, Jr., G.R. No. 179761, January
15, 2010, 610 SCRA 236, 245.
[72]
FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Art. 102(4).
[73]
Id. at Art. 91; See also Tolentino, Arturo, M., COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON
THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES: VOLUME ONE WITH THE FAMILY CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, 379 (1990).
[74]
FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Art. 102.
[75]
Tolentino, Arturo, M., COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES: VOLUME ONE WITH THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 401-402
(1990).
[76]
[77]
THE PHILIPPINES: VOLUME ONE, 365 (1974).
[78]
THE PHILIPPINES: VOLUME ONE WITH THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
472 (1990).
[79]
Rollo, p. 55.
[80]
Id. at 56-57.
[81]
[82]
Id. at Art. 129(3).
[83]
Id. at Art. 129(4).
[84]
Id. at Art. 129(5).
[85]
Rollo, p. 55.
[86]
Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
SPS. AMBROSIO G.R. No. 171209
DECALENG (substituted by his
heirs)[1] and JULIA WANAY
DECALENG,
Petitioners,
- versus -
BISHOP OF THE MISSIONARY

DISTRICT OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS OF
PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL
CHURCH IN THE UNITED
STATES OF
AMERICA, otherwise known
as THE PHILIPPINE
EPISCOPAL
CHURCH, represented by RT.
REV. ROBERT LEE O.
LONGID, BISHOP OF THE
EPISCOPAL DIOCESE OF
NORTHERN
PHILIPPINES, and REV. HENRY UDK-13672
HAKCHOLNA,
Respondents.
x-----------------------x
PATRICIO OBONAN BANIAGA,
MARIA BAYANG,
MAGDALENA RIMANDO,
PRISCA BACAGAN, MALIDOM
BAGNI, MONICO BACAGAN,
PATRICK BAWING, JAMES
OMAWENG, CADAWENG
LOPEZ, JUDITH MILLER,
AGNES BADONGEN, TOBYED
SOLANG, ADELA ANGWAY,
ROSE BAYAO, THOMAS
KIWANG, JULIA DECALENG,
LUIS GANGA, CHRISTINA
GIAKAW, GUITELEN OLAT,
DOMINGA
MAGUEN, MARIANO
GUITELEN, THERESA SALAO,
FELIPE MANODON, JOHN
BATNAG, BIAG TAMBIAC,
SAGOLO PADANG,
CADIOGAN TOLEYAN, BETTY
BINAYONG, EDUARDO
GUITELEN, PABLO AGPAD,
ESTEBAN CAPUYAN, PURITA Present:
ANGWAY, POLAT BOSAING,
EDUARDO LIZARDO, VELASCO, JR.,*
DILIGEN ALIBAN, MARY B. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,**
TUDLONG, PAIT CAPUYAN, Acting Chairperson,
HERMINIA BACAGAN, DEL CASTILLO,
SEVERINO DAGACAN, VILLARAMA, JR., and
MARTHA BACAGAN, PERLAS-BERNABE,*** JJ.
MICHAEL SAUYEN,
PASITENG GAYAGAY, HAZEL
S. FAGYAN, ARCHIE S.
SUMEDCA, ELIZA BAGINWET,
AND BONIFACIO LOPEZ,
Petitioners, Promulgated:
- versus -
June 27, 2012
PHILIPPINE EPISCOPAL
CHURCH, represented by RT.
REV. ROBERT O. LONGID,
Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-x
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Pending action before the Court is G.R. No. 171209, a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision[2] dated August 26, 2005 and Resolution[3] dated January 18,
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49978.
The Bishop of the Missionary District of the Philippine Islands of
the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America,
otherwise known as the Philippine Episcopal Church (PEC), is a religious
corporation duly organized and registered under the laws of the Republic
of the Philippines, performing mission work in over 500 communities
throughout the country. The PEC was previously comprised of five
dioceses, namely: Episcopal Diocese of Northern Philippines (EDNP),
Episcopal Diocese of Northern Luzon, Episcopal Diocese of North
Central Philippines, Episcopal Diocese of Central Philippines, and
Episcopal Diocese of Southern Philippines. PEC-EDNP, which has
canonical jurisdiction over the provinces of Mountain Province, Ifugao,
Isabela, Quirino, Aurora, and Quezon, exercises missionary, pastoral, and
administrative oversight of St. Mary the Virgin Parish in the municipality
of Sagada, Mountain Province.[4]
On February 18, 1992, PEC-EDNP filed before the Regional Trial

Court (RTC) of Bontoc, Mountain Province, Branch 36, a Complaint
for Accion Reinvindicatoria and Accion Publiciana against Ambrosio
Decaleng and Fabian Lopez (Lopez), docketed as Civil Case No. 797.
PEC-EDNP alleged that it is the owner of two parcels of land in

the Municipality of Sagada, located in areas commonly known as Ken-
geka and Ken-gedeng.
According to PEC-EDNP, the Ken-geka property is covered by

Certificate of Title No. 1[5] of the Register of Deeds of Mountain
Province, issued on February 18, 1915, in the name of The Domestic and
Foreign Missionary Society of the Protestant Episcopal Church in
the United States (U.S. Episcopal Church). According to Certificate of
Title No. 1, the U.S. Episcopal Church acquired the Ken-geka property by
virtue of a sales patent issued by the Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands also on February 18, 1915, in accordance with Section 122 of Act
No. 496,[6] otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. The Ken-geka
property has an area of 34 hectares, 24 ares, and 60 centares, with the
following technical description:
Beginning at point marked 1 on plan Pi-115, N. 68 o 48W. 339.1 m. from Pulpit, a Mon. 7 cm.
marked B. L. cross at top of limestone cliff, thence N. 79 o O6E. 484.Om. to point 2; S. 6o21E. 651.0m. to
point 3; S. 72o 55W. 609.6m. to point 4; N. 15o 15E, 369.9m to point 5; N. 4o 59W. 153.1m. to point 6; N.
51o 11W. 87.9m to point 7; N. 6o 37E. 171.0m. to point 1, point of beginning.
Bounded on all sides by public lands. Bearings true. Variation 0o 25E. points referred to marked
on plan Pi-115. Surveyed March 18-19, 1907. Approved November 27, 1907. Containing an area of thirty-
four hectares, twenty-four ares, and sixty centares x x x. [7]
PEC-EDNP asserted that the U.S. Episcopal Church donated the Ken-
geka property, among other real properties, to the PEC by virtue of a
Deed of Donation[8] executed on April 24, 1974. Around the second
quarter of 1989, Ambrosio Decaleng entered and cultivated a portion of
about 1,635 square meters of the Ken-geka property despite the
protestations of PEC-EDNP representatives.[9]
The Ken-gedeng property is described in the complaint as:

A certain parcel of land situated at sitio Poblacion, Sagada, Mt. Province, bounded on the North
by Tomas Muting & Kapiz Bacolong; South by Mission Compound, East by Bartolome Gambican; and on
the West by Nicolas Imperial and Lizardo Adriano with an area of 20[,]692 sq. meters more or less and
declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 6306 in the name of the Domestic and Foreign
Missionary Society of the Protestant Church of the United States of America.[10]
It is more particularly identified as Lot 3 in Survey Plan PSU-118424, to

wit:
Beginning at a point marked 1 on plan, being N. 18 deg. 19E., 11477.37 m. from B.L.L.M. 1, Mpal. Dist.
of Bauko, Mt. Procvince;
thence N. 65 deg. 01 E., 101.21 m. to point 2;

thence S. 54 deg. 10 E., 86.03 m. to point 5;
thence S. 79 deg. 06 W., 304.36 m. to the point of
beginning, containing an area of TWENTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED NINETY-TWO SQUARE

METERS (20,692 sq. m.) more or less.
Bounded on the NE., by property of Bartolome Gambican; on the SE., by property of The Domestic and
Foreign Missionary Society of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America; on the S.,
by property of Nicolas Imperial & Adriano Lizardo (joint owners); and on the NW., by properties of
Nicolas Imperial & Adriano Lizardo (joint owners) and Tomas Moting, Kapiz, Baculong, Bayang, Apaling
& Benito Gawaeng (joint owners).
All points referred to are indicated on the plan and marked on the ground as follows: points 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
and 7, by P.L.S. cyl. Conc. Mons; and point 6, by X on stone mon.[11]
PEC-EDNP averred that it and its predecessors-in-interest occupied

the Ken-gedeng property openly, adversely, continuously, and notoriously
in en concepto de dueo since the American Missionaries arrived in the
Mountain Province in 1901. PEC-EDNP and its predecessors-in-interest
have introduced valuable improvements on the Ken-gedeng property
through the years. The Ken-gedeng property was surveyed on August 22,
1947 and said survey was approved by the Director of Lands on June 15,
1948. During the first quarter of 1987, Ambrosio Decaleng illegally and
forcibly entered two portions of the Ken-gedeng property, one measuring
1,650 square meters (Portion 1) and the other 419.50 square meters
(Portion 2). Ambrosio Decaleng, despite the vehement objections and
conciliatory attitude of PEC-EDNP, cut several matured pine trees within
the aforementioned portions of the Ken-gedeng property, removed the
fence and two monuments found therein, and cultivated and planted the
same with plants of economic value. Ambrosio Decaleng made matters
worse by selling Portion 2 of the Ken-gedeng property to Fabian
Lopez. Lopez went ahead and purchased Portion 2 despite the warning of
PEC-EDNP.[12]
PEC-EDNP contended that Ambrosio Decaleng and Lopez refused to
vacate the portions of Ken-geka and Ken-gedeng properties that they are
occupying. Ambrosio Decaleng and Lopez claimed to be the owners of
said portions, but PEC-EDNP maintained that such claim is illegal and
baseless in fact and in law. PEC-EDNP likewise challenged the sale of
Portion 2 of Ken-gedeng by Ambrosio Decaleng to Lopez for being
unlawful and void.
PEC-EDNP thus prayed of the RTC to render judgment:

A) To declare the [PEC-EDNP] as the true and real owner of the aforesaid properties
and for [Ambrosio Decaleng and Lopez] to perpetually desist from claiming ownership over the respective
portion being occupied by them;
B) To order [Ambrosio Decaleng and Lopez] to refrain from entering the property of
[PEC-EDNP] subject of this case;
C) To order [Ambrosio Decaleng and Lopez] to vacate the premises of the subject
portions of the aforedescribed land being illegally occupied by them;
D) To order [Ambrosio Decaleng and Lopez] to pay the [PEC-EDNP] the amount
of P20,000.00 as actual damages, P15,000.00 as attorneys fee, plus P500.00 as appearance pay of counsel
every time this case is called for hearing and P10,000.00 as necessary expenses of litigation;
E) To issue a temporary restraining order directing [Ambrosio Decaleng and Lopez] to

desist from continuing to expand their aforesaid illegal occupation and to unlawfully enter the property
subject of this case and thereafter to make it permanent; and
F) To sentence [Ambrosio Decaleng and Lopez] to pay the cost of the suit;
G) Finally [PEC-EDNP] prays for such other measures of reliefs and remedies just and
equitable in the premises.[13]
Before Ambrosio Decaleng and Lopez could file their answer to

the complaint of PEC-EDNP, the RTC issued an Order[14] dated March 20,
1992, suspending further proceedings in Civil Case No. 797 until the
parties have conducted a relocation survey of the properties in question,
as agreed upon in open court. The RTC issued another Order[15] of even
date requesting the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office-Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-
DENR), Sabangan, Mountain Province, to provide said trial court with a
Geodetic Engineer to help in the re-survey of the area subject of the case.
Ambrosio Decaleng and Lopez filed their Answer [16] on April 27,
1992. They stated in their Answer that Certificate of Title No. 1 was
inaccurate and depicted a parcel of land much bigger than that generally
believed to be owned by PEC-EDNP; that the properties occupied by
Ambrosio Decaleng were outside the properties of PEC-EDNP; that
Ambrosio Decaleng received the property in Ken-geka, and his wife,
Julia Wanay Decaleng, received the property in Ken-gedeng, from their
parents as their inheritance on the occasion of their marriage in
accordance with the local custom of ay-yeng or liw-liwa; that Ambrosio
Decaleng and Julia Wanay Decaleng (spouses Decaleng) and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the subject properties
continuously, actually, notoriously, publicly, adversely, and in the concept
of an owner, since time immemorial, or at least, certainly for more than
50 years; that the spouses Decaleng had been in peaceful and undisturbed
possession of the subject properties until PEC-EDNP surreptitiously
moved the existing perimeter fence and encroached upon 240 square
meters of their properties; and that Lopez was a mere tenant of the
spouses Decaleng who worked on Portion 2 of the Ken-gedeng
property. Consequently, Ambrosio Decaleng and Lopez sought the
dismissal of the complaint of PEC-EDNP and the payment by PEC-
EDNP in their favor of P50,000.00 as reimbursement of litigation
expenses and attorneys fees, P100,000.00 as moral damages,
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The relocation survey ordered by the RTC was conducted

on September 17, 1992.
On February 12, 1993, PEC-EDNP filed a Motion to Admit

Amended Complaint alleging:
1. That when defendant Ambrosio Decaleng filed his answer,

he alleged that subject portions of the properties are owned by his wife,
Julia Wanay Decaleng;
2. That after the verification survey was conducted on

September 17, 1992, it came to the knowledge of [PEC-EDNP] that
other parties are making adverse claim of ownership over subject
properties; as in fact, some of them requested the surveyor hired by
[Ambrosio Decaleng and Lopez] to survey portions of the properties
owned by [PEC-EDNP] which they respectively claim to be owned by
them.[17]
The RTC admitted the amended complaint of PEC-EDNP in the

[18]
Order dated February 16, 1993. As a result, Julia Wanay Decaleng,
Florentina Madadsec (Madadsec), Dominga D. Maguen (Maguen), and
Patrick Bawing (Bawing) were impleaded as additional defendants and
summoned to answer the amended complaint.[19]
The spouses Decaleng and Lopez jointly filed their Answer to

Amended Complaint[20] on March 1, 1993, essentially reiterating the
allegations in the earlier Answer filed by Ambrosio Decaleng and Lopez,
but increasing their claim for reimbursement of litigation expenses
to P85,000.00. Maguen filed her Answer to Summons/Complaint[21] on
March 2, 1993, in which she wrote that she was not interested to appear
before the RTC for her deceased father, Kapis, from whom she inherited
one of the lots that bound the PEC-EDNP property; and that PEC-EDNP
should have pursued its complaint a long time ago when the concerned
boundary owners were still alive. Madadsec and Bawing did not submit
any answer but the RTC, in an Order [22] dated April 27, 1993, denied the
Motion to Declare Defendants in Default[23] filed by PEC-EDNP and
ruled that the Answer to Amended Complaint of spouses Decaleng and
Lopez shall be deemed to also be the answer of Madadsec and Bawing.
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision [24] on January 20,
1995 finding that:
The documentary and testimonial evidence as a whole, adduced

by the [PEC-EDNP] on whose side the onus probandi lies, do not
adequately and reliably support by greater weight of credibility, the
[proponents] causes of action, vis--vis, the counter-vailing proof
proffered by the defensive party (Article 434, New Civil Code; Rule
131, Sec. 1 and Rule 133, Sec. 1, Revised Rules on Evidence).
De consequente, the plaintiff Church is determined not the owner of those three (3) parcels of
land situated at Sitio Ken-geka and Sitio Ken-gedeng, Sagada, Mt. Province identified as the bone of
contention in this suit. And that said Church has no right of possession of the subject parcels better than
that of the defendants who are the present de facto possessors (Art. 433 and Art. 541, NCC). Corollarily,
the former can neither recover ownership, which said right it never had from the very beginning, of the lots
in question from the latter; nor possessions thereof, by the same token, either as an element of, or
independent of ownership (Art. 428, Par. 2, NCC; Tuazon v. Jaime, CA-GR 26538-R, Feb.16, 1963; Lopez
v. Franco, 26-786-R, May 27, 1961).
Re that 1,635 square meters lot at Ken-geka (Exhs. C-1 and C-2), the mere supposed xerox
copy of a reputed OCT No. 1 purportedly including the portion within its borders, allegedly registered in
the name of the plaintiff Church (Exh. A), does not reasonably confirm the fact of its absolute ownership
of the said portion (Reyes vs Borbon, 50 Phil. 79). Neither does the purported xerox copy of a putative
deed of donation (Exh. B), sans the original, substantially show that said plaintiff acquired dominion over
that particular parcel in issue via gratuitous grant as a mode of acquiring ownership (Art. 712, Par. 2, NCC;
Paras, Civil Code, Vol. II, 1981 Ed., (b) p. 92). By itself, the plaintiffs survey plans of the premises
coupled with its unpaid tax declarations (Exhs. BB, CC, E, F and G) is insufficient and inc[onc]lusive to
prove ownership ad/or possession of the proponent of the subject area (Acua vs City of Manila, [9] Phil.
225; Dadivas vs Bunayon, 54 Phil. 632). While it appears that the Church is the possessor for almost a
century of the greater part of that tract of land embraced in its survey plan of P1-115 (Exh. C), it cannot be
deemed to be in constructive possession of that portion now in question, considering that said plaintiff
never materially occupied or exercised control over the same and that it has been in the adverse possession
of the Decalengs for quite sometime (Art. 531, NCC; Rosales vs Director of Lands, 51 Phil 502). In effect,
dominion over the portion have not passed to the plaintiff by operation of law by virtue of long and actual
possession as a title or a mode of acquiring ownership (Art. 712, Par. 2, NCC; Nolan v. Jalandoni, 23 Phil.
299).
Anent those two (2) separate parcels at Ken-gedeng (Exhs. D-2, D-3, D-4, D-5), the survey
plans and tax declarations in the name of the plaintiff and predecessors in interest (Exhs. X, DD, G, H, I)
do not by themselves confer dominion of the proponent over the afore-mentioned parcels, albeit the same
are included within the coverage of the documents. To be sure, the Church is the exclusive and continuous
possessor, probably since 1902, of the south-eastern portion of the surveyed area where its building are
erected and the surroundings thereof improved (Exhs. X, X-1 to X-6). This fact in conjunction with its said
survey plans and tax declarations may prove ownership of the plaintiff of the premises mentioned (Alamo
vs Ignacio, L-16434, Feb. 28, 1962). It cannot however be presumed, much less adjudged that the Church
has constructive possession of the subject two separate parcels absent any showing that it materially
occupied, and exercised control over said parcels at any given time in the same manner as it developed the
rest of the portions within the plans and tax declarations. Not to mention the fact that the former lots have
been all along in the adverse possession of the defendants. Hence, by law, the plaintiff Church did not
acquire ownership and/or possession of those disputed lots at Ken-gedeng.
Penultimately, the counterclaim for damages interposed by the defensive party is denied for
lack of merit and on the principle that no penalty should be attached on the right to litigate (Art. 2217,
NCC; Ramos vs. Ramos, 61 SCRA 284)[25]
The fallo of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in accordance with the
prayer of the defendants, viz:
I. Dismissing the instant suit;
II. Ordering the plaintiff to pay attorneys fees and litigation expense in the
reasonable sum of P120,000.00; and to pay the costs.[26]
The PEC-ENDP filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the

aforementioned Decision on February 21, 1995 but the RTC denied said
motion in an Order[27] dated May 11, 1995.
PEC-EDNP filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals which was

docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 49978.
While the case was pending before the Court of Appeals, Atty. Paul
P. Sagayo, Jr. (Sagayo) and Atty. Floyd P. Lalwet (Lalwet) entered their
appearance as counsels for PEC-EDNP on March 28, 1996. In the Notice
of Appearance[28] and subsequent pleadings[29] filed by Attys. Sagayo and
Lalwet, they included the following names as defendants: Simeon
Dapliyan (Dapliyan), Gayagay,[30] Nicolas Imperial (Imperial), Juana
Ullocan (Ullocan), and Mary Tudlong (Tudlong).
The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision on August 26, 2005,

overturning the appealed RTC Decision because it was based on
misplaced premises and contrary to law and jurisprudence. The Court of
Appeals declared PEC-EDNP the true and real owner of the Ken-geka
and Ken-gedeng properties.
The dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment dated January 20, 1995 of the

Regional Trial Court, Branch
16, Mountain Province is REVERSED and another one
is ENTERED, as follows:
(1) Declaring the plaintiff as the true and real owner of the
properties subject of this controversy, namely, the parcel of land
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1 and Lot 3 covered by
Survey Plan PSU-118424; and
(2) Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming under

them to vacate the premises and surrender the peaceful possession
thereof to the plaintiff or its duly authorized representative; and to
refrain from further encroaching upon the plaintiffs properties.
Costs to be paid by the defendants.[31]
Spouses Decaleng and Lopez timely filed a Motion for

Reconsideration of the foregoing Decision but it was denied by the
appellate court in a Resolution[32] datedJanuary 18, 2006. The spouses
Decaleng (sans Lopez) then sought recourse before this Court via the
instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 171209.
Meanwhile, in a letter[33] dated February 12, 2006, addressed to

then Supreme Court Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, through Assistant
Court Administrator and Chief Public Information Officer Ismael G.
Khan, Jr., Dapliyan, Gayagay, Imperial, Ullocan, and Tudlong questioned
the Court of Appeals Decision dated August 26, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No.
49978, specifically, their inclusion as party defendants in said case; and
prayed that the same Decision be considered null and void. [34] In addition,
a Petition (Re: Our lots in Sagada, Mountain Province, Philippines,
subject matter of CA- G.R. CV No. 49978, entitled Philippine Episcopal
Church represented by Rt. Rev. Robert O. Longid vs. Spouses Ambrosio
Decaleng and Julia Wanay Decaleng, et al.) dated February 24, 2006,
signed by 40 residents of Sagada,[35] Mountain Province, including Julia
Wanay Decaleng, Maguen, Bawing, Gayagay, and Tudlong, likewise
challenged the Decision dated August 26, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 49978 for awarding to PEC-EDNP their ancestral
properties.[36] The letter dated February 12, 2006 and Petition dated
February 24, 2006 were jointly docketed as UDK-13672 as they lack (1)
proof of service and affidavit of service; (2) verification and certification
on non-forum shopping; and (3) payment of docket fees.
In a Resolution[37] dated July 17, 2006, the Court resolved to

consolidate UDK-13672 with G.R. No. 171209 considering that both
cases assail the same Court of Appeals Decision; that Julia Wanay
Decaleng is one of the signatories in UDK-13672 and at the same time,
one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 171209; and five of the signatories of
the Petition dated February 24, 2006 in UDK-13672 were defendants-
appellees in the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals.
However, in a Resolution[38] dated September 11, 2006, the Court

already resolved to note without action the letter dated February 12,
2006 and Petition dated February 24, 2006 in UDK-13672.
Therefore, only the spouses Decalengs Petition in G.R. No. 171209

is still pending action by this Court.
In their Petition, the spouses Decaleng made the following

assignment of errors:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY

ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE SUPPOSED ORIGINAL
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 1, NOTWITHSTANDING THE
FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT IT DOES NOT EXIST
AND IS, AT BEST, FICTITIOUS;

ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT HAS ESTABLISHED
ITS OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OVER THE LOTS IN
DISPUTE, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL
COURT THAT SAID LOTS WERE POSSESSED AND OCCUPIED
BY THE PETITIONERS AND THEIR PREDECESSORS IN
INTEREST;

ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN
CARINO VS. INSULAR GOVERNMENT, 41 PHIL 935, AND
OTHER RELATED CASES IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONERS.[39]
Prefatorily, it is already a well-established rule that the Court, in

the exercise of its power of review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, is
not a trier of facts and does not normally embark on a re-examination of
the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the
case, considering that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive and binding on the Court.[40] This rule, however, admits of
exceptions as recognized by jurisprudence, to wit:
(1) [W]hen the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,

surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in
making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the
case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant
and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court;
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised
on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence
on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.[41]
The case at bar falls under one of the exceptions, as the factual
conclusions of the RTC and the Court of Appeals are in conflict with each
other. Thus, the Court must necessarily return to the evidence on record
and make its own evaluation thereof.
An accion reinvindicatoria is an action to recover ownership over

real property.[42] Article 434 of the New Civil Code provides that to
successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real
property, the person who claims a better right to it must prove two
things: first, the identity of the land claimed by describing the location,
area, and boundaries thereof; and second, his title thereto.[43]
The Court finds that PEC-EDNP was able to successfully prove

both requisites by preponderance of evidence, both documentary and
testimonial.
The identity of the properties over which PEC-EDNP asserts

ownership is well-established. The Ken-geka property is covered by
Certificate of Title No. 1, while the Ken-gedeng property is identified as
Lot 3 of Survey Plan PSU-118424. The location, area, and boundaries of
said properties were verified by relocation surveys conducted in 1947,
[44]
1968,[45] 1987,[46] 1991[47] and 1993.[48]
PEC-EDNP likewise proved its title to the Ken-geka and Ken-gedeng

properties. The Ken-geka property was registered in the name of the U.S.
Episcopal Church under Certificate of Title No. 1 issued on February 18,
1915. It was conveyed by the U.S. Episcopal Church to PEC through a
Deed of Donation dated April 24, 1974. It was declared by the U.S.
Episcopal Church and PEC-EDNP for real property tax purposes under
Tax Declaration Nos. 6307, 14326, and A-11179. [49] Although not yet
covered by any certificate of title, the Ken-gedeng property had been
occupied under claim of title (en concepto de dueo) by PEC-EDNP and
its predecessor-in-interest, the U.S. Episcopal Church, since the latters
arrival in 1901. It was declared by the U.S. Episcopal Church and PEC-
EDNP for real property tax purposes under Tax Declaration Nos. 14325
and 6306.[50] PEC-EDNPs officers, priests, and employees, as well as the
Sagada residents testified as to actual possession by PEC-EDNP of the
Ken-geka and Ken-gedeng properties by the introduction of
improvements such as permanent buildings, pine trees, fruit trees, and
vegetable gardens thereon.
The Court quotes with approval the following observations of the

Court of Appeals in its Decision dated August 26, 2005:
The plaintiff established its ownership and possession of the

contested lots through the various documents under and in the name of
its predecessor-in-interest, the [U.S. Episcopal Church], specifically:
deed of donation; approved plat of sales survey; and the approved
survey plan and owners copies of Tax Declaration Nos. 6307, 14326,
A-11179, 14325 and 6306. In contrast, the defendants mainly relied on
the supposed non-existence of OCT No. 1 that rested solely on the
certification of Atty. Dulay-Papa of the Registry of Deeds-Mountain
Province.
We consider the testimonial and documentary evidence of the

plaintiff sufficient, clear and competent in establishing its absolute
ownership and actual possession of the disputed areas which were
within its properties. The survey plans, prepared upon the request of
the plaintiff, were approved by the Director of Lands, which, standing
alone, might not be conclusive proofs of ownership, but were already
proof that the plaintiff had taken steps to assert and protect its
ownership and possession of the premises. Being public documents,
such survey plans were entitled to great weight and credence as
evidence of the facts which gave rise to their execution. Moreover, the
plaintiffs tax declarations, although not proof of ownership, were
strong evidence of ownership for being coupled with possession for a
period sufficient for prescription. In sum, the plaintiffs documentary
evidence was overwhelming.
The plaintiffs testimonial evidence was equally formidable,

because it was provided by witnesses who were very knowledgeable
and reliable. Fr. Arthur Bosaing had resided in the property for almost
26 years, such that his testimony that the disputed parcels were inside
the mission lot where a building and other improvements of the
plaintiff were found might not be disputed. Retired Bishop Robert Lee
O. Longid attested that he and his father had lived from 1928 to 1931
in a building called the Fox House, which was located near the portion
being claimed by the Decalengs. Even defendant Julia Decaleng
admitted on cross-examination that there was a building owned by the
plaintiff in one of the disputed lots. She was referring to the plaintiffs
building known as Doctors Quarters which was then occupied by Fr.
Bosaing.
It is apt to observe that actual possession of an owner did not

need to be the actual and physical possession and occupation of every
inch or portion of the property. That is an impossibility. Constructive
possession is sufficient, for, according to Ramos v. Director of Lands:
The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith; and he has had
open, peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of the property,
sufficient to apprise the community and the world that the land was for
his enjoyment. (See Arts. 446, 448, Civil Code.) Possession in the eyes
of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every
square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession. x
x x[51]
The spouses Decaleng attempt to raise doubts as to the title of PEC-

EDNP over the Ken-geka property by insisting that (1) PEC-EDNP failed
to present the original copies of Certificate of Title No. 1 and the Deed of
Donation dated April 24, 1974 during the trial before the RTC; and (2)
Certificate of Title No. 1 does not exist based on the Certification dated
July 20, 1992 of Register of Deeds Angela Dailay-Papa (Dailay-Papa) of
the Mountain Province.
It is worthy to point out that PEC-EDNP presented and marked the

photocopies of Certificate of Title No. 1 and the Deed of Donation
dated April 24, 1974 in the course of the testimony of Rev. Henry
Hakcholna on June 10, 1993 before the RTC. Even though the defense
counsel stated for the record the defenses position that Certificate of Title
No. 1 is non-existent, he did not make any objection to the presentation
and marking of the photocopies of Certificate of Title No. 1 and the Deed
of Donation dated April 24, 1974 by PEC-EDNP, and even admitted that
said photocopies appear to be faithful reproductions of the purported
original documents.[52]
Relevant herein is the pronouncement of the Court in Caraan v.

Court of Appeals,[53] wherein it accepted in evidence a mere photocopy of
the document:
Petitioners asseveration that TCT No. RT-71061 (214949)

should not have been admitted into evidence because private
respondents merely presented the photocopy thereof is also
unmeritorious. Private respondents presented the original of TCT No.
RT-71061 (214949) in open court during the hearing held on April 13,
1994. x x x.
xxxx
Furthermore, no objection was raised by counsel for petitioners

in their written opposition/comment to private respondents' offer of
evidence regarding the fact that what was marked and submitted to the
court was the photocopy. In Blas vs. Angeles-Hutalla, the Court held
thus:
The established doctrine is that when a party

failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the
time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall
be considered as waived. In Tison v. Court of Appeals,
the Supreme Court set out the applicable principle in the
following terms:
[F]or while the documentary

evidence submitted by petitioners do not
strictly conform to the rules on their
admissibility, we are, however, of the
considered opinion that the same may be
admitted by reason of private
respondent's failure to interpose any
timely objection thereto at the time they
were being offered in evidence. It is
elementary that an objection shall be
made at the time when an alleged
inadmissible document is offered in
evidence, otherwise, the objection shall
be treated as waived, since the right to
object is merely a privilege which the
party may waive.
As explained in Abrenica vs.

Gonda, et al., it has been repeatedly laid
down as a rule of evidence that a protest
or objection against the admission of any
evidence must be made at the proper
time, otherwise, it will be deemed to
have been waived. The proper time is
when from the question addressed to the
witness, or from the answer thereto, or
from the presentation of the proof, the
inadmissibility of the evidence is, or may
be inferred.
Thus, a failure to except to the
evidence because it does not conform
with the statute is a waiver of the
provisions of the law. . . .
Hence, considering the fact that counsel for petitioners

admitted that the photocopy of TCT No. RT-71061 (214949) is a
faithful reproduction of the original thereof, stipulated with private
respondents' counsel that what will be marked and submitted to the
trial court as Exhibit A is the photocopy, and the lack of objection on
such ground which is then deemed a waiver thereof, the admission into
evidence of the photocopy of TCT No. RT-71061 was absolutely
correct.[54]
Also instructive on this point is Quebral v. Court of Appeals,

[55]
where the Court ruled that:
Even if it were true that Exhibit K consisted of a mere

photocopy and not the original of the petitioners letter, petitioner
nevertheless failed to make timely objection thereto. As to when an
objection to a document must be made, the Court ruled in Interpacific
Transit, Inc. v. Aviles [186 SCRA 385 (June 6, 1990)]:
Objection to the documentary evidence must be

made at the time it is formally offered, not earlier. The
identification of the document before it is marked as an
exhibit does not constitute the formal offer of the
document as evidence for the party presenting it.
Objection to the identification and marking of the
document is not equivalent to objection to the document
when it is formally offered in evidence. What really
matters is the objection to the document at the time it is
formally offered as an exhibit.
In the case at bench, no such timely objection was ever made.

Consequently, the evidence not objected to became property of the
case, and all the parties to the case are considered amenable to any
favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the evidence. x x x.[56]
In any case, PEC-EDNP subsequently submitted to the RTC its

original copies of Certificate of Title No. 1 and Deed of Donation
dated April 24, 1974, together with its Motion for Reconsideration of the
RTC Decision dated January 20, 1995.
As for the spouses Decalengs contention that Certificate of Title
No. 1 does not exist, the Court fully agrees with the Court of Appeals that
the same constitutes a collateral attack of Certificate of Title No. 1.
It is a hornbook principle that a certificate of title serves as
evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein.[57] In order to establish a system of
registration by which recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and
imprescriptible, the legislature passed Act No. 496, which took effect
on February 1, 1903. Act No. 496 placed all registered lands in
the Philippines under the Torrens system. The Torrens system requires the
government to issue a certificate of title stating that the person named in
the title is the owner of the property described therein, subject to liens and
encumbrances annotated on the title or reserved by law. The certificate of
title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land
are quieted upon issuance of the certificate. Presidential Decree No. 1529,
known as the Property Registration Decree, enacted on June 11, 1978,
amended and updated Act No. 496.[58]
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides:
Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. A

certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be
altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.
A Torrens title cannot be attacked collaterally, and the issue on its

validity can be raised only in an action expressly instituted for that
purpose.[59] A collateral attack is made when, in another action to obtain a
different relief, the certificate of title is assailed as an incident in said
action.[60]
In this case, the original complaint filed by PEC-EDNP before the

RTC is for accion publiciana and accion reinvindicatoria (for recovery of
possession and ownership) of the Ken-geka and Ken-gedeng
properties. In said complaint, PEC-EDNP alleged ownership of the Ken-
geka property as evidenced by Certificate of Title No. 1. In their defense,
the spouses Decaleng raised issues as to the validity of Certificate of Title
No. 1 (by asserting in their Answer that Certificate of Title No. 1 covered
an area much larger than that actually owned by PEC-EDNP), and as to
the existence of Certificate of Title No. 1 (by presenting Mountain
Province Register of Deeds Dailay-Papas certification that Certificate of
Title No. 1 does not appear in the record of registered
titles). Nevertheless, the spouses Decaleng only sought the dismissal of
the complaint of PEC-EDNP, plus the grant of their counterclaim for the
payment of moral damages, exemplary damages, litigation expenses, and
attorneys fees; and they conspicuously did not pray for the annulment or
cancellation of Certificate of Title No. 1. Evidently, the spouses
Decalengs attack on the validity, as well as the existence of Certificate of
Title No. 1 is only incidental to their defense against the accion
publiciana and accion reinvindicatoria instituted by PEC-EDNP, hence,
merely collateral.
The spouses Decaleng, in an effort to skirt the prohibition against

collateral attack of certificates of title, argue that they are not attacking
the validity of Certificate of Title No. 1, but, rather, the existence of such
a certificate. The Court notes that the spouses Decaleng did not only put
in issue the purported non-existence of Certificate of Title No. 1, but also
questioned the validity of the certificate itself.
The Court stresses that PEC-EDNP submitted to the RTC the

owners duplicate certificate of Certificate of Title No. 1, which can be
used in evidence before Philippine courts in the same way as the original
certificates in the registration book. Section 47 of Act No. 496 clearly
states:
SEC. 47. The original certificate in the registration book, any

copy thereof duly certified under the signature of the clerk, or of the
register of deeds of the province or city where the land is situated, and
the seal of the court, and also the owners duplicate certificate, shall be
received as evidence in all the courts of the Philippine Islands and shall
be conclusive as to all matters contained therein except as far as
otherwise provided in this Act.
Moreover, Mountain Province Register of Deeds Dailay-Papas

certification to the effect that Certificate of Title No. 1 does not appear in
the record of registered titles does not necessarily mean that such
certificate has never been issued. As the Court held in Chan v. Court of
Appeals[61]:
Petitioners submission that OCT 2553 is not in the records of

the Registry of Deeds concerned and the xerox copy of subject title
exhibited before the trial court was not a genuine and faithful
reproduction of the original copy of said certificate of title does not
merit serious consideration. The mere fact that the Registry of Deeds
of the Province of Rizal does not have the original of a certificate
of title does not necessarily mean that such title never existed
because the same could have been lost, stolen, or removed from
where said title was kept. To show that no record of the original
certificate of title in question existed requires a preponderance of proof
petitioners failed to adduce.[62] (Emphasis supplied.)
In fact, in the present case, the Records Management Division
Chief Jose C. Mariano, for the Director of Lands, wrote a letter dated
August 31, 1993 addressed to the counsel for PEC-EDNP, giving the
reason for the lack of records on the sales patent for the Ken-geka
property and Certificate of Title No. 1 issued to the U.S. Episcopal
Church:
In reply to your letter dated August 25, 1993, we regret to inform you
that we have no reconstituted records of pre-war sales application of
the Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society of the Protestant
Episcopal Church in the United States of America, which the basis of
the issuance of alleged Sales Patent No. 14 on February 18, 1915. It
may be informed further that all our pre-war records were burned
and/or destroyed when the Oriente Building where the Bureau of
Lands was then housed was razed by fire during the liberation
of Manila.[63] (Emphasis supplied.)
In contrast, the spouses Decaleng were unable to present

convincing evidence to establish their rights of possession and ownership
over the disputed properties superior to those of PEC-EDNP. The spouses
Decaleng could not even establish the identity of the properties they
claim to own. Although the spouses Decaleng were able to give the
purported area measurements of said properties, they could not give the
exact location and boundaries thereof. Assuming as true that the spouses
Decaleng received properties from their parents as part of the ay-
yeng or liw-liwa custom, there is no showing that such properties thus
given to them are actually the same as the ones they are now occupying.
The spouses Decaleng were similarly vague as to the basis of their

title. The evidence for the spouses Decaleng do not establish how their
predecessors-in-interest acquired the disputed properties and how long
they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
same.
While the spouses Decaleng testified that they inherited the

properties in Ken-geka and Ken-gedeng from their parents who, in turn,
inherited the same from their own parents, there still remains the question
as to how the spouses Decalengs predecessors-in-interest originally came
into possession of the subject properties.
In their Answer before the RTC, the spouses Decaleng alleged
possession of their properties from time immemorial or, at least, certainly
for more than 50 years. These two allegations actually proffer two
different bases for title: the first refers to a native title acquired through
ancient possession of the land, which means that the land never became
public land at all; while the second denotes an imperfect title acquired
through the occupation of agricultural public land for the requisite
period. The evidence submitted by the spouses Decaleng did not support
either allegation.
In Cario v. Insular Government,[64] the United States Supreme

Court granted an Igorots application for registration of a piece of land in
Benguet based on the latters possession of the land from time
immemorial, ratiocinating thus:
It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back
as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals
under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been
held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to
have been public land. Certainly in a case like this, if there is doubt or
ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the
benefit of the doubt. x x x.
If the applicants case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not

discover such clear proof that it was bad by that law as to satisfy us
that he does not own the land. To begin with, the older decrees and
laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate
pretty clearly that the natives were recognized as owning some lands,
irrespective of any royal grant. In other words, Spain did not assume to
convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers or
even into tenants at will. For instance, Book 4, title 12, Law 14 of
the Recopilacin de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary conclusion
in Valenton vs. Murciano, 3 Philippine, 537, while it commands
viceroys and others, when it seems proper, to call for the exhibition of
grants, directs them to confirm those who hold by good grants or justa
prescripcin. It is true that it begins by the characteristic assertion of
feudal overlordship and the origin of all titles in the King or his
predecessors. That was theory and discourse. The fact was that titles
were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers
of Spain beyond this recognition in their books.
Prescription is mentioned again in the royal cedula of October 15,

1754, cited in 3 Philippine, 546; Where such possessors shall not be
able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that
ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription. It may be that this
means possession from before 1700; but at all events, the principle is
admitted. As prescription, even against Crown lands, was recognized
by the laws of Spain we see no sufficient reason for hesitating to admit
that it was recognized in the Philippines in regard to lands over
which Spain had only a paper sovereignty.[65]
From the testimonies of the spouses Decaleng and their witnesses,

the Court can glean actual possession of the properties in Ken-geka and
Ken-gedeng by the spouses Decaleng and their predecessors-in-interest
only as far back as the 1920s. [66] This hardly constitutes possession since
time immemorial judging by the standard set by the Court in Oh Cho v.
Director of Lands[67]:
The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may
be confirmed under the Land Registration Act. He failed to show that
he or any of his predecessors in interest had acquired the lot from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, under the laws, orders and
decrees promulgated by the Spanish Government in the Philippines, or
by possessory information under the Mortgage Law (section 19, Act
496). All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to
the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession
of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time
immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption
that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it
had been a private property even before the Spanish
conquest. (Carino vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; 53 Law. ed.,
594.) The applicant does not come under the exception, for the
earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest
began in 1880.[68] (Emphases supplied.)
Neither can the spouses Decaleng claim imperfect title to the

properties in Ken-geka and Ken-gedeng for such can only be acquired by
possession of lands of the public domain for the period required by law.
[69]
Because the spouses Decaleng failed to provide and prove the
necessary details on how and when their predecessors-in-interest came to
possess the disputed properties, there is no way for the Court to determine
whether or not said properties were still part of the public domain when
occupied by the spouses Decalengs predecessors-in-interest. As the Court
previously found herein, the Ken-geka property was already covered by a
Certificate of Title issued in the name of the U.S. Episcopal Church (the
predecessor-in-interest of PEC-EDNP) on February 18, 1915 and the
Ken-gedeng property had been in the possession under claim of title by
the U.S. Episcopal Church ever since its arrival in the Mountain Province
in 1901.
WHEREFORE, the Petition of the spouses Decaleng in G.R. No.

171209 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision
dated August 26, 2005 and Resolution dated January 18, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49978 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, First Division
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, First Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Acting Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
[1]
Per January 25, 1994 Order of the RTC, Bontoc, Mt. Province. The heirs are the children of spouses
Ambrosio Decaleng and Julia Wanay Decaleng, namely: Mercedez D. Fonite, Elizabeth D.
Tzoganatous, Esther D. Tongbaban, Nora D. Sumcad, Mary D. Capuyan, Nellie D. Dagacan,
Mariano Decaleng, and Beverly D. Bawing. (Records, p. 190.)
*
Per Raffle dated March 12, 2012.
**
Per Special Order No. 1226 dated May 30, 2012.
***
Per Special Order No. 1227 dated May 30, 2012.
[2]
Rollo (G.R. No. 171209), pp. 54-74; penned by Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member
of this Court) with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Celia C. Librea-Leagogo,
concurring.
[3]
Id. at 93-95.
[4]
Id. at 280.
[5]
Records, p. 7; Annex A.
[6]
SEC. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the
United States or to the Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or
conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith
under the operation of this Act and shall become registered lands. It shall be the duty of the
official issuing the instrument of alienation, grant, or conveyance in behalf of the Government
to cause such instrument, before its delivery to the grantee, to be filed with the register of
deeds for the province where the land lies and to be there registered like other deeds and
conveyances, whereupon a certificate shall be entered as in other cases of registered land, and
an owners duplicate certificate issued to the grantee. The deed, grant, or instrument of
conveyance from the Government to the grantee shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind
the land, but shall operate as a contract between the Government and the grantee and as
evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration. The act of
registration shall be the operative act to convey and affect the lands, and in all cases under this
Act registration shall be made in the office of the register of deeds for the province where the
land lies. The fees for registration shall be paid by the grantee. After due registration and issue
of the certificate and owners duplicate such land shall be registered land for all purposes under
this Act.
[7]
Records, p. 9; Annex B.
[8]
Id. at 8-13.
[9]
Id. at 2.
[10]
Id. at 3.
[11]
Id. at 103.
[12]
Id. at 3-4.
[13]
Id. at 5-6.
[14]
Id. at 26.
[15]
Id. at 27.
[16]
Id. at 33-38.
[17]
Id. at 81.
[18]
Id. at 105.
[19]
Id. at 106.
[20]
Id. at 110-117.
[21]
Id. at 118.
[22]
Id. at 146-147.
[23]
Id. at 121.
[24]
Id. at 241-256.
[25]
Id. at 254-256.
[26]
Id. at 256.
[27]
Id. at 285.
[28]
CA rollo, pp. 12-13.
[29]
Id. at 14-61, 62-64, and 66-68.
[30]
One name only.
[31]
Rollo (G.R. No. 171209), p. 73.
[32]
Id. at 93-95.
[33]
They were those who were included as defendants-appellants when the case was on appeal before
the Court of Appeals.
[34]
Rollo (UDK-13672), pp. 8-9.
[35]
Although 46 petitioners were named in the Petition, only 40 actually signed the same.
[36]
Rollo (UDK-13672), pp. 4-5.
[37]
Id. at 49.
[38]
Id. at 51.
[39]
Rollo (G.R. No. 171209), pp. 5-36.
[40]
Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., 525 Phil. 436 (2006).
[41]
Id. at 459.
[42]
Evadel Realty and Development Corporation v. Spouses Soriano, 409 Phil. 450, 461 (2001).
[43]
Spouses Hutchison v. Buscas, 498 Phil. 276, 262 (2005).
[44]
Records, p. 16; Annex E.
[45]
Id. at 15; Annex D.
[46]
Testimony of Lorenzo Agagen; TSN, January 12, 1993, pp. 3-7.
[47]
Testimony of Paul Sapaen; TSN, November 9, 1992, p. 28.
[48]
Testimony of Fred Yamashita; TSN, April 29, 1993, pp. 22-23.
[49]
Records, pp. 125-127; Exhibits E, F and G.
[50]
Id. at 128-129; Exhibits H and I.
[51]
Rollo (G.R. No. 171209), pp. 68-70.
[52]
TSN, June 10, 1993, pp. 5-6.
[53]
511 Phil. 162 (2005).
[54]
Id. at 172-173.
[55]
322 Phil. 387 (1996).
[56]
Id. at 401.
[57]
Caraan v. Court of Appeals, supra note 53 at 169-170.
[58]
Collado v. Court of Appeals, 439 Phil. 149, 168 (2002).
[59]
Datu Kiram Sampaco v. Hadji Serad Mingca Lantud, G.R. No. 163551, July 18, 2011, 654 SCRA
36, 54-55.
[60]
S.J. Vda. de Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 721, 732 (2001).
[61]
359 Phil. 242 (1998).
[62]
Id. at 257.
[63]
Records, p. 152.
[64]
41 Phil. 935 (1909).
[65]
Id. at 941-942.
[66]
A rough determination based on the ages of the witnesses (who were around 70-80 years old when
they took the witness stand before the RTC in 1993-1994) and their testimonies that they
actually saw the parents of the spouses Decaleng working on the properties.
[67]
75 Phil. 890 (1946).
[68]
Id. at 892.
[69]
Imperfect or incomplete titles to public agricultural lands may be confirmed by judicial legalization
or by administrative legalization (free patent). (Sec. 11 [Commonwealth Act No. 141,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act].)
Sec. 44 of the Public Land Act provides:
Sec. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more
than twelve (12) hectares and who, for at least thirty (30) years prior to the
effectivity of this amendatory Act, has continuously occupied and cultivated,
either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest a tract or tracts of
agricultural public land subject to disposition, who shall have paid the real
estate tax thereon while the same has not been occupied by any person shall
be entitled, under the provisions of this Chapter, to have a free patent issued
to him for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twelve (12)
hectares. (As amended by RA No. 782, and by RA No. 6940, approved
March 28, 1990.)
A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and
cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract
or tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be
entitled to the right granted in the preceding paragraph of this
section: Provided, That at the time he files his free patent application he is
not the owner of any real property secured or disposable under this
provision of the Public Land Law. (As amended by Rep. Act No. 3872,
approved June 18, 1964.) Emphasis supplied.)
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, reads:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or
an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073).
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12,
1945, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves
or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of alienable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of ownership shall be
entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
G.R. No. L-44546 January 29, 1988
RUSTICO ADILLE, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, EMETERIA ASEJO, TEODORICA ASEJO, DOMINGO ASEJO, JOSEFA ASEJO and
SANTIAGO ASEJO, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
In issue herein are property and property rights, a familiar subject of controversy and a wellspring of enormous conflict that
has led not only to protracted legal entanglements but to even more bitter consequences, like strained relationships and even
the forfeiture of lives. It is a question that likewise reflects a tragic commentary on prevailing social and cultural values and
institutions, where, as one observer notes, wealth and its accumulation are the basis of self-fulfillment and where property is
held as sacred as life itself. "It is in the defense of his property," says this modern thinker, that one "will mobilize his deepest
protective devices, and anybody that threatens his possessions will arouse his most passionate enmity." 1
The task of this Court, however, is not to judge the wisdom of values; the burden of reconstructing the social order is shouldered by
the political leadership-and the people themselves.
The parties have come to this Court for relief and accordingly, our responsibility is to give them that relief pursuant to the decree of
law.
The antecedent facts are quoted from the decision appealed from:
2
xxx xxx xxx
... [T]he land in question Lot 14694 of Cadastral Survey of Albay located in Legaspi City with an area of some
11,325 sq. m. originally belonged to one Felisa Alzul as her own private property; she married twice in her
lifetime; the first, with one Bernabe Adille, with whom she had as an only child, herein defendant Rustico Adille;
in her second marriage with one Procopio Asejo, her children were herein plaintiffs, — now, sometime in 1939,
said Felisa sold the property in pacto de retro to certain 3rd persons, period of repurchase being 3 years, but
she died in 1942 without being able to redeem and after her death, but during the period of redemption, herein
defendant repurchased, by himself alone, and after that, he executed a deed of extra-judicial partition
representing himself to be the only heir and child of his mother Felisa with the consequence that he was able
to secure title in his name alone also, so that OCT. No. 21137 in the name of his mother was transferred to his
name, that was in 1955; that was why after some efforts of compromise had failed, his half-brothers and
sisters, herein plaintiffs, filed present case for partition with accounting on the position that he was only a
trustee on an implied trust when he redeemed,-and this is the evidence, but as it also turned out that one of
plaintiffs, Emeteria Asejo was occupying a portion, defendant counterclaimed for her to vacate that, —
Well then, after hearing the evidence, trial Judge sustained defendant in his position that he was and became
absolute owner, he was not a trustee, and therefore, dismissed case and also condemned plaintiff occupant,
Emeteria to vacate; it is because of this that plaintiffs have come here and contend that trial court erred in:
I. ... declaring the defendant absolute owner of the property;
II. ... not ordering the partition of the property; and
III. ... ordering one of the plaintiffs who is in possession of the portion of the property to vacate the land, p. 1
Appellant's brief.
which can be reduced to simple question of whether or not on the basis of evidence and law, judgment appealed from should be
maintained. 3
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent Court of appeals reversed the trial Court, and ruled for the plaintiffs-appellants, the private respondents herein. The
4
petitioner now appeals, by way of certiorari, from the Court's decision.
We required the private respondents to file a comment and thereafter, having given due course to the petition, directed the parties to
file their briefs. Only the petitioner, however, filed a brief, and the private respondents having failed to file one, we declared the case
submitted for decision.
The petition raises a purely legal issue: May a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership over the property held in common?
Essentially, it is the petitioner's contention that the property subject of dispute devolved upon him upon the failure of his co-heirs to join
him in its redemption within the period required by law. He relies on the provisions of Article 1515 of the old Civil Article 1613 of the
present Code, giving the vendee a retro the right to demand redemption of the entire property.
There is no merit in this petition.
The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with aspect to his share alone. While the records show that the petitioner
5
redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor, that did not make him the owner of all of it. In other words, it
did not put to end the existing state of co-ownership.
Necessary expenses may be incurred by one co-owner, subject to his right to collect reimbursement from the remaining co-
owners. There is no doubt that redemption of property entails a necessary expense. Under the Civil Code:
6
ART. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to contribute to the expenses of
preservation of the thing or right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt himself
from this obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of the
expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the co-ownership.
The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership. While a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code,
"may not be compelled to consent to a partial redemption," the redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality
does not vest in him ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the
property and consolidate title thereto in his name. But the provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire
7
property. It does not provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership.
Neither does the fact that the petitioner had succeeded in securing title over the parcel in his name terminate the existing co-
ownership. While his half-brothers and sisters are, as we said, liable to him for reimbursement as and for their shares in redemption
expenses, he cannot claim exclusive right to the property owned in common. Registration of property is not a means of acquiring
ownership. It operates as a mere notice of existing title, that is, if there is one.
The petitioner must then be said to be a trustee of the property on behalf of the private respondents. The Civil Code states:
ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
We agree with the respondent Court of Appeals that fraud attended the registration of the property. The petitioner's pretension that he
was the sole heir to the land in the affidavit of extrajudicial settlement he executed preliminary to the registration thereof betrays a
clear effort on his part to defraud his brothers and sisters and to exercise sole dominion over the property. The aforequoted provision
therefore applies.
It is the view of the respondent Court that the petitioner, in taking over the property, did so either on behalf of his co-heirs, in which
event, he had constituted himself a negotiorum gestor under Article 2144 of the Civil Code, or for his exclusive benefit, in which case,
he is guilty of fraud, and must act as trustee, the private respondents being the beneficiaries, under the Article 1456. The evidence, of
course, points to the second alternative the petitioner having asserted claims of exclusive ownership over the property and having
acted in fraud of his co-heirs. He cannot therefore be said to have assume the mere management of the property abandoned by his
co-heirs, the situation Article 2144 of the Code contemplates. In any case, as the respondent Court itself affirms, the result would be
the same whether it is one or the other. The petitioner would remain liable to the Private respondents, his co-heirs.
This Court is not unaware of the well-established principle that prescription bars any demand on property (owned in common) held by
another (co-owner) following the required number of years. In that event, the party in possession acquires title to the property and the
state of co-ownership is ended . In the case at bar, the property was registered in 1955 by the petitioner, solely in his name, while the
8
claim of the private respondents was presented in 1974. Has prescription then, set in?
We hold in the negative. Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation
(of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2)
such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive, and (4) he
has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the period required by law. 9
The instant case shows that the petitioner had not complied with these requisites. We are not convinced that he had repudiated the
co-ownership; on the contrary, he had deliberately kept the private respondents in the dark by feigning sole heirship over the estate
under dispute. He cannot therefore be said to have "made known" his efforts to deny the co-ownership. Moreover, one of the private
respondents, Emeteria Asejo, is occupying a portion of the land up to the present, yet, the petitioner has not taken pains to eject her
therefrom. As a matter of fact, he sought to recover possession of that portion Emeteria is occupying only as a counterclaim, and only
after the private respondents had first sought judicial relief.
It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, but it has likewise been our holding that the Torrens
10
title does not furnish a shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that the act of registration is equivalent to notice of
11
repudiation, assuming there was one, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration operates as a universal notice of title.
For the same reason, we cannot dismiss the private respondents' claims commenced in 1974 over the estate registered in 1955.
While actions to enforce a constructive trust prescribes in ten years, reckoned from the date of the registration of the property, we,
12 13
as we said, are not prepared to count the period from such a date in this case. We note the petitioner's sub rosa efforts to get hold of
the property exclusively for himself beginning with his fraudulent misrepresentation in his unilateral affidavit of extrajudicial settlement
that he is "the only heir and child of his mother Feliza with the consequence that he was able to secure title in his name
also." Accordingly, we hold that the right of the private respondents commenced from the time they actually discovered the
14
petitioner's act of defraudation. According to the respondent Court of Appeals, they "came to know [of it] apparently only during the
15
progress of the litigation." Hence, prescription is not a bar.

16
Moreover, and as a rule, prescription is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer
otherwise it is deemed waived, and here, the petitioner never raised that defense. There are recognized exceptions to this rule, but
17 18
the petitioner has not shown why they apply.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error committed by the respondent Court of Appeals, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
sought to be reviewed is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED,
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 GREENE, FELIX, THE ENEMY 234 (1971).
2 Gatmaitan, Magno, Acting Pres. J.; Domondon, Sixto and Reyes, Samuel, JJ., Concurring.
3 Rollo, 14-15.
4 Solidum, Arsenic, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Albay Civil Case no, 5029.
5 CIVIL CODE, art. 1612; CIVIL CODE (1889), art. 1514.
6 Supra, art. 489.
7 Supra, art. 1607.
8 The modes of terminating a co-ownership other than by prescription are partition (CIVIL CODE, arts. 494;
1079, 1082), merger or consolidation, and loss of the thing (3 Manresa 486).
9 Santos v. Heirs of Crisostomo, 41 Phil. 3342 (1921); Bargayo v. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857 (1920).
10 Pres. Decree No. 1529, sec. 31.
11 Amerol v. Bagumbaran, G.R. No. 33261, September 30, 1987.
12 Supra.
13 Gerona v. De Guzman, No. L-19060, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 153 (1964).
14 Rollo, id., 14,
15 Gerona v. De Guzman, supra.
16 Rollo, id., 18.
17 RULES OF COURT, Rule 9, sec. 2. A party need not plead the statute of limitations in a responsive
pleading (or motion to dismiss) where the complaint itself shows that the claims have prescribed [Ferrer v.
Ericta, No. L-41767, August 23, 1978, 84 SCRA 705 (1978)]. Likewise, it has been held that where the
defendant had no way of knowing that the claim advanced by the plaintiff had prescribed, his failure to invoke
the statute (in his answer or motion to dismiss) does not constitute a waiver of such a defense [Guanzo v.
Ramirez, 32 Phil. 492 (1914)]. In another case, we said that prescription need not be pleaded specifically in an
answer where the evidence itself shows that prescription bars the plaintiff's claims [Philippine National Bank v.
Perez, No. L-20412, February 28, 1966, 16 SCRA 270 (1966); see also Chua Lanko v. Dioso, 97 [Phil. 821
(1955); Philippine National Bank v. Pacific Commission House, No. L-22675, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 766
(1969)].
18 Rollo, id., 18.
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ART. 1619.

Legal redemption is the right to be subrogated, upon the same

.R. No. 101522 May 28, 1993

The Baristers Law Office for petitioners.

Simeon T. Agustin for private respondents.

The Court of Appeals summarized the facts as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

Q. When you saw him, what did you tell?

Q. And did you go?

Q. What kind of copy or document is that?

A. It is a deed of sale signed by my mother, sister Amparo and my brothers.

A. In the house of Brgy. Captain Antonio Bassig.

ruling in Hernaez v. Hernaez, 32 Phil., 214, thus:

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Nocon, JJ., concur.

4 Decision, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 71-73.

5 Rollo pp. 67-68.

6 Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 74-75.

9 16 SCRA 775 (1966).

10 Id., at pp. 779-780.

11 TSN, October 9, 1984, pp. 11-12.

13 106 Phil. 1023 (1960).

15 Amended Complaint; par. 15-16, Rollo p. 34.

17 Garcia v. Calaliman, G.R. No. 26855, 172 SCRA 201 (1989).

18 Francisco v. Bautista, G.R. No. 44167, 192 SCRA 388 (1991).

Republic of the Philippines

BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, G.R. No 176556

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

The family is the basic and the most important institution of

This case comes before us via Petition for Review

On October 26, 2000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed

WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing considerations,

As such, the herein parties shall be entitled to live separately

Except for Letecia C. Quiao who is of legal age, the three

Further, except for the personal and real properties already

1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;

shall be divided equally between herein [respondents] and [petitioner]

[Petitioners] share, however, of the net profits earned by the

He is further ordered to reimburse [respondents] the sum of

Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within

On December 12, 2005, the respondents filed a motion for

Wherefore, finding the motion to be well taken, the same is

Subsequently, on February 10, 2006, the RTC issued a Writ of

NOW THEREFORE, that of the goods and chattels of the

But if sufficient personal property cannot be found whereof to

You are hereby ordered to make a return of the said

(a) P22,870.00 as petitioner's share of the payment of the conjugal

On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the

To resolve the petitioner's Motion for Clarification, the RTC issued

WHEREFORE, there is no blatant disparity when the sheriff

The Sheriff is herein directed to proceed with the execution of

On November 21, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for

IS THE DISSOLUTION AND THE CONSEQUENT

WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE NET PROFITS

WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE PROPERTY RELATIONS

WHAT PROPERTIES SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THE

While the petitioner has raised a number of issues on the

The Decision dated October 10,

Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new

In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[25] we clarified that to standardize

In Neypes, we explained that the "fresh period rule" shall also

The petitioner argues that the decision he is questioning is a void

From the aforecited facts, the questioned October 10, 2005