Rice University

Sidney's Definition of Poetry

Author(s): Virginia Riley Hyman
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900, Vol. 10, No. 1, The English Renaissance
(Winter, 1970), pp. 49-62
Published by: Rice University
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/449695 .
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 Sidney's ofPoetry
Definition
VIRGINIA RILEY HYMAN

Before arrivingat his own definitionof poetryas "that feigningnota-

ble images of virtues,vices,or what else," Sidney summarizesmany other
theoriesof the nature and functionof poetry.Contraryto previous criti-
cal assumptions,these theoriesare not simplyrhetoricalembellishments,
but are an integral part of his own definition.Ranging over the whole
corpus of literarytheory,he continuallyselects those elementsnecessary
for his own position and rejects or ignores the rest. His definitionis,
therefore,not only a description,but, correspondingto the older mean-
ing of the term, "a setting of boundaries," "a delimiting."Just as, in
the exordium,he makes his aim seem modestand rational by contrasting
it with Pugliano's exaggerated praise of horses, so in the narration he
cites othertheoriesof the nature and functionof poetryto indicate his
own more rational and modestclaim. By using what is necessaryfor his
definitionand avoidingthe pitfalls implicitin the more ambitiousclaims
for poetry,Sidneyproceedsin an ever-narrowingarc until he arrives at
the single point of his own definition.The poet, he believes, creates
"images of virtues and vices" to stimulate men to "right action." By
tracingthe series of steps by whichhe arrives at this conclusion,we can
see that his "definition"is the sum of the other theories reduced to
their ethical and rational level.

SCHOLARSHIPHAS amply shown Sidney's

Apologyfor Poetryto be a compendiumof ancientand con-
temporarypoetictheory.The fullestand mostrecentaccount
of the intellectualsources for Sidney's ideas can be foundin
GeoffreyShepherd'sintroductionto An Apologyfor Poetry
(London, Nelson, 1965). But, as Shepherdhas pointed out,
while Sidney has taken all knowledgeof critical theoryfor
his province,his handlingof these materials is singular. It
is, therefore,perhaps time to move froma recoveryof Sid-
ney's sourcesto an analysisof the use he makes of them.For
while manytheoriesare called upon,few are chosen,and it
is this act of absorbingand rejectingwhich constitutesthe
dynamicunityof the essay. While it is beyondthe scope of
this paper to deal with all the elementsin the essay, an
analysis of its firstpart should perhaps suggesta methodof
approach for the remainder.For it may be more readily
granted that the practical criticismin the second half is
based upon Sidney's definitionof poetry.It is the purpose
of this paper to show how this definition,which followsthe
exordiumand narration,is arrived at, and how these first
two parts,ratherthanbeingmerelyrhetoricalembellishments,
60 SIDNEY'S DEFINITION OF POETRY

are integrallyrelated to it. Thus it will be shown that Sid-

ney's definitionof poetryis not onlya descriptionof its na-
ture and function,but, in the older sense of the word, a
settingof boundaries,a delimiting.It is this settinglimits
to the natureand functionof poetrywhichmay accountfor
the essay's singularcharacter.'
Sidney's openingmock encomiumand his final peroration
seem to be made of the same "poetical sinewes" by which
he judges poetry.That is, theyseem to containthe elements
of his central argument.In the beginningSidney's Chria
tells how John Pietro Pugliano praised horsemanshipand
horses by such "strongaffectionand weak arguments"that,
Sidney confesses,had he not been a "piece of a logician"
himself,he would have wishedhimselfa horse. He then sets
himselfto defendthat poetrywhich was once held in high
esteembut which has now fallen to being "a laughing-stock
of children,"and asks pardon if he defendsher "with more
good will than good reasons," for he is followingthe steps
of his master. Already two points which Sidney will deal
with later have been established.First, Pugliano's praise of
horses is based upon their usefulnessto the state. Second,
his claims are so exaggeratedand emotionalas to renderthe
entireargumentabsurd. In contrastto Pugliano, Sidney sets
himselfup as a humblerand more rational defenderof that
poetrywhichwas once held in highestesteembut whichhas
now sunk so low. In like manner, Sidney concludes his
Apologyby citingthe variousexaggeratedclaims othershave
made for poetry,but this summaryis made in such a mock-
ing tone that it renderssuch praise of the divine nature of
poetryabsurd. There is, then,both at the beginningand end
of the Apologya strongcontrastbetweenthe emotionaland
the rational,the exaggeratedand the modest,the high and
the low, the bestial and the divine, which establishes the
middletone which the body of the essay will take. Because
Sidneyhas establishedhis own characteras moremodestand
rationalthan Pugliano's,he has led the readerto expectnot a
panegyricbut a reasoneddefense.And because he has intro-

'In his introductionto the Apology,Shepherdclearly indicates Sidney's

knowledgeof and interestin Ramism,and asserts that this influenceis
pervasive.It may well be that in settinglimitsto the nature and func-
tion of poetry,Sidney is followingthe Ramist attemptto assign to each
sphere of knowledgeonly what properlybelongedto it. All references
to the text of the Apologywill be to Shepherd'sedition.
 VIRGINIA RILEY HYMAN 51

duced the conceptsof the virtuesand usefulnessof horses,

and concludedwiththe divineaspects of poetry,he has estab-
lished the two poles withinwhich his argumentwill range.
The narration,in contrastto Pugliano's subject of horses,
deals with the divine aspect of poetry,and, in turn,will be
followedby "a more ordinaryopening."But withinthe nar-
ration is the same broad sweep. Ranging froma description
of the first poets as civilizersand seers, it moves to more
contemporary descriptionsof the poet's God-likenaturein his
abilityto createand by such creationto movemento political
action.But the range narrowsas the argumentmovestoward
the "more ordinaryopening."The "more ordinaryopening"
begins: "Poesy thereforeis an arte of imitation,for so
Aristotletermethit. . ." (p. 101). As C. S. Lewis remarks,
"the exact relationbetweenSidney's account of the poet as
maker or irovqrffs and the 'more ordinaryopening' of him
as imitatoris not at once apparent."2What is clear is that
Sidney has once again emergedas the rational arguer, hav-
ing taken into accountthe various exaggeratedclaims made
for poetryin the past and in the present.And just as we
have seen the elementsin the exordiumreappear in the nar-
rative, so we find that the elementsof the narrative re-
appear in the definition.It is, indeed,upon these wide-rang-
ing elementsin the narrativethat the definitionrests. Thus
it will be necessaryto examine in more detail the elements
in the narrationin order to make the relationbetweenthe
"firstaccountof the poet as makerand the later one of him
as imitator"apparent.
The narration,which begins by giving examples of the
esteem in which poetrywas once held as being "the first
light-giverto ignorance" and as receiving its power from
divine inspiration,moves to a discussionof the positionof
poetryin the world of science. Of all the scientists,the poet
alone is free, "disdainingto be tied to any such subjection
[to nature] . . . so as he goeth hand in hand with Nature,
not enclosed within the narrow warrant of her gifts, but
freely ranging only within the zodiack of his own wit"
(p. 100). Contrastingthe generatingpower of nature with
that of the poet,Sidneyhas the latteremergesuperior: "Her
world is brazen, the poets only deliver a golden" (p. 100).
But he drops this comparisonand immediatelyconcludes,

'English Literaturein the SixteenthCentury(Oxford,1954), p. 344.

 52 SIDNEY'S DEFINITION OF POETRY

"But let these things alone and go to man. . . ." After describ-
ing how the poetcreatesthe ideal man,superiorto that which
naturemakes,and equal in generatingforceby making"many
Cyruses,"he recognizesthe impertinence of such claims and
concludes,"But these argumentswill by few be understood
and by fewergranted" (p. 101).
What can be clearly seen is the narrowingscope of the
argument.Movingfroma descriptionof poets as purveyors
of all knowledgeand receiversof divine inspiration,to the
poet rangingwithinthe "zodiack of his own wit" and pur-
veyingonlya certainkindof knowledge,the ideal, and within
the ideal only that which relates to man, Sidney has taken
a series of steps which he reviews by his classificationsin
the "more ordinaryopening"which immediatelyfollows.Di-
vidingpoets into three kinds,the divine ("imitatingthe ex-
cellenceof God"), the philosophical,and the "right"poets,he
states that he will deal onlywith the last. For it is theywho
"to imitateborrownothingof what is, hath been,or shall be;
but range,onlyreinedwithlearneddiscretioninto the divine
considerationof what may be, and shouldbe" (p. 102). That
Sidneyhimselfis consciouslyavoidinga defenseof the exalt-
ed nature of poetryis made clear in his later summaryof
his arguments."[Plato] attributethunto Poesy more then
myselfdo, namely,to be a very inspiringof a divine force,
far above man's wit. . ." (p. 130).
If, as Irene Samuels has plausibly suggested,the entire
Defense is a replyto Plato's banishmentof poets fromthe
Republic,Sidney's establishingof himselfas a rational man
and his limitingpoetryto its moral and social functionscan
be understood.3But if this is so, why has he includedother
theoriesthat as a rational man he can neitheraffirmnor
deny? The answer which this paper will suggest is that
Sidney's descriptionof the poet as "maker" countersPlato's
charges that poetic images are imitationsat a third remove
fromreality.For, by the time Sidneygives his definitionof
poetryas "feigningnotableimages of vices and virtues,"the
words "feigning" and "images" have lost their pejorative
sense and have taken on favorableconnotations.
In rejecting the non-rationalaspect of poetry Sidney is
followingthe dualism set up by Plato and adopted by sub-

II. Samuels, "The Influenceof Plato on Sir Phillip Sidney's Defense of

Poetry,"MLQ, I (1940), 389.
 VIRGINIA RILEY HYMAN 53

sequent medievalthinkers.Plato had insisted that only the

rational faculty could achieve knowledge of immaterial
reality,and that aspects of the materialworld,having their
place as images withinthe irrationalpart of the soul, were
to be controlledby reason. Subsequentthinkerssuch as the
Stoics and Churchfathersadopted this view and developed
the theoryof facultypsychology,in which reason controlled
the imaging and rememberingfunctionsof the mind. Thus,
in rejectingthe irrationalaspect of poetry,Sidney was ally-
ing himselfwith a strong and conservativetradition.
There was, however,as M. H. Abrams has pointed out,
anothertraditionevolvingfrom Plato along differentlines
and achievingrenewedemphasisin sixteenthcenturypoetic
criticism.4Beginningas an attemptto relate the sense im-
pressionsto the ideal world and to reconcilePlato's reality
to Christianity'sGod, it evolved into a justificationfor a
supra-rationalpower in man's mind.It is this Plotiniantra-
dition,accordingto C. S. Lewis, fromwhichSidneyultimately
drew his "Aristotlean"definitionof poetryas the "feigning
notable images of vertues, vices, or what else. . ." (p. 343).
For such a theoryjustified the "feigningof images" as a
God-likeaction and providedthese images with a power to
move men to perfection.Characteristically,Sidney selected
certain elementsfrom this theory and rejected others. In
order to understandwhat aspects Sidney adopted and to
differentiatethem fromwhat he rejected it will be neces-
sary to describethis traditionin some detail.
Accordingto M. C. Bundy,Plato himselfin his later works
suppliedthe solutionto the problemof the dualism between
sense impressionsand ideas that he had set up in his earlier
dialogues.5Basing his theoryof Plato's evolutionas a phi-
losopher on an earlier study, Bundy sees the later works,
especiallythe Timaeusand thePhaedrus,as a later,and there-
fore higher, evolutionof Plato's thought.6Earlier, in the
Symposium,Plato had statedthat Truthand Beauty,because
universal,could not be capturedby images. In the Republic
he asserts that a phantasmis a shadow or impressionin the

'M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp (Oxford UniversityPress,

1953). Citations here are fromNorton Edition, 1958, p. 42.
'M. C. Bundy,The Theoryof the Imagination in Classical and Medieval
Thought (Universityof Illinois, 1927), pp. 19-59.
W. Lutoslawski, The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic (London,
1897), ch. 2.
64 SIDNEY'S DEFINITION OF POETRY

mindwhichis relatedto the lower part of man's nature,his

appetitesand feelings,and is, therefore,inferiorto the ideas
of reason. Later, in Book VI, he describes two kinds of
images, one acceptable,the other not. The first kind, what
we would terma mathematicalsymbol,is acceptablebecause
it is an aid to reason. The second kind,the phantasm,is like
a reflectionin water or a mirror,and has its place in the
irrationalpart of the soul. In the Philebus he introducesa
third kind of image, used later by Aristotleand the Stoics,
the memoryimage,whichis usefulas a guide to moralaction.
In thePhaedrus,however,this memoryimage is re-introduced
as the sourceof our knowledgeof heavenlybeautyand as the
spur to motivateus to seek its source in the divine.7Bundy
finds anotheraspect of the mysticalfacultyin the Timaeus.
Plato refersto visions receivedby men in dreams. Ignoring
Plato's importantprovisionthat such visions have validity
only when interpretedin a waking state by reason, Bundy
finds in this passage Plato's endorsementof the validityof
powers beyondthe powers of reason. Of far greater import
philosophically,however,is Plato's descriptionof the creation
of the worldas a series of degeneratingmentalforms.While
Bundy traces the historyof the ideas of the Phaedrus and
the Timaeus as they appear in fragmentaryform fromthe
early ChristianwritersthroughSt. Thomas,findingthe first
clear synthesisemergingin Dante, more recent scholarship
has shown that the fully developed concept which appears
in Dante had a much earlier origin.
In The Medieval Cultural Tradition in Dante's Comedy,
Mazzeo asserts that the fullydevelopedconceptappeared in
the works of Pseudo-Dionysus,the Areopagite,in A.D. 500.
In addition, he asserts that "whatever cultural unity the
medievalculturepossessed was largely derivedfromthe in-

7Althoughthe passage may seem persuasive,one must take into account

the contextin which it appears. It will be recalled that the speech is
addressedto Eros in penance for a previousplayfulspeech of Socrates.
It is followedby a closelyreasonedanalysis on the principlesof truthin
rhetoric.Socrates himselfcalls his narrative "a tolerablycredibleand
possibly true though partly erring myth" (p. 311). Elsewhere he as-
serts that "the compositionwas mostlyplayful" (p. 315). It is not sur-
prising,therefore,that this passage has been ignored as a serious at-
temptto re-instateimages above the role to which Plato had formerly
assigned them or to raise the role of the passions above the level of
reason. Citations to the "Phaedrus" are from The Works of Plato,
trans. B. Jowett(Modern Library, 1928).
 VIRGINIA RILEY HYMAN 55

fluenceof Dionysus."8And since Sidneymakes two allusions,

rare in English criticismat that time, to Dante, the first
citinghim as one of the Italian poets who aspired to make
poetrya "Treasure house of Science" (152) and the second
in the final mockingparagraph,it is perhaps importantto
see boththetheoryand the use to whichDante put the theory.
Dionysus sees all thingsas emanationsfromthe One in a
descendingorder of light.Each of God's creationsis a finite
mirrorimage of him (an eikona). Along with this descend-
ing order from God throughhis creatures is an ascending
order back to God. Those creatures (men) who receive the
perfectimage of God (agalma) becomespotlessmirrorscap-
able of receivingrays fromthe primal fire. Afterreceiving
this divinelight,the perfectedman can re-ascendthe ladder
of images to achieve union with the Divine, while freely
transmitting his light to creatureslower on the scale of be-
ing. Mazzeo sees this ordering hierarchy as resembling
"nothingso much as a spiritualPlatonic Republic" (p. 28).
Both the advantages and disadvantagesof this conceptto
poetic theoryare obvious and can be seen most clearly in
Dante. As a pilgrimmoving throughHell, Purgatory,and
Heaven, Dante is led by a series of steps with the help of
Vergil,Reason, fromthe world of sense impressionsto un-
derstandingand thencethroughlove of Beatrice to a divine
vision. But at this point, even Bundy admits, the poet can
go no farther.He cannot describethe vision except by call-
ing it "light." Dante's example clearly indicates the limits
of this kind of vision in terms of poetic practice.Although
as a perfectedman he can achieve a vision of divine beauty
and truth,as a poet he is incapable of portrayingit and
therebymovingothers.Such a poetic conceptioncan go no
further;rather it can degenerateinto poetic cliches calling
upon aid fromthe Holy Spirit to redressthe poet's own in-
sufficiency. CourtlandBaker has shownthis to be a common
practicein ChristianpoetryafterDante.9Whilesuch a mysti-
cal visionis properforthesaint,it is improperforthe "right"
poet, for it is too secret, mysterious,and subjective to be
communicated.

8J.A. Mazzeo, Medieval Cultural Traditionin Dante's Comedy (Cornell,

1960), pp. 13-14.
'Courtland Baker, "Certain Religious Elements in the Doctrine of the
Inspired Poet," ELH, VI (1939), 329-338.
 56 SIDNEY'S DEFINITION OF POETRY

Equally incommunicable is the lyric poet's love of divine

beauty. Notablyabsent fromthis sectionwhich attemptsto
cast poetryin the most favorable light, referenceto lyric
poetryappears later in the refutation.There Sidney asserts
that lyricpoetrywhichattemptsto reveal the poet's love of
divine beautylacks energia [sic]; it is simplyunconvincing.
Indeed, he asserts, "if I were a mistress [their writings]
would never persuade me theywere in love" (p. 137). But
while the lyricpoet is incapable of describingdivine beauty
and thus movingthe reader to the love of God, he is all too
capable of movinghim to the love of "this too much loved
earth." Reference to this power of the poet to describe
natural beautydoes appear brieflyin the narrativebut it is
quickly passed over. The reason for this abrupt dismissal
appears later in the refutation.There, Sidney has granted
his objectors'chiefargument.With playfulregrethe grants,
for argument'ssake, "love of beauty to be a beastly fault"
and agrees that it is in this area that poetryis most often
abused. Improperuse of "phantastikeimages" "doth infect
the fancy with unworthyobjects" and "please(s) an ill-
pleased eye with wanton shows of better hidden matters"
(p. 125).
But if the naturalworld is not to be idealized by the poet,
why is it broughtinto the narrationat all? And why is the
idea expressedwithsuch great charmthat it seemsto emerge
as a climaxto the narrationand stand as the best-remembered
and most oftenquoted passage of the entireessay: "Nature
never set forththe earth in so rich tapestryas divers poets
have done; neitherwithpleasant rivers,fruitfultrees,sweet-
smellingflowers,nor whatsoeverelse may make the too much
loved earth morelovely.Her world is brazen,the poets only
delivera golden" (p. 100). Part of the power of the passage
can be accountedfor by its brevity:the entirepassage con-
sists of onlytwo sentencesimmediately followedby a marked
shift of emphasis. "But let these things alone and go to
man... ." Whatfollowsis a descriptionof the powerof poetry
to create excellentmen. The shift from the emphasis on
beautyto the emphasison goodnessis abrupt and final. Sid-
ney makes no furtherreferenceto the idealized world of
nature in the narration.If the referenceto beauty has been
only a glancingone, one must again ask why the reference
is made at all.
 VIRGINIA RILEY HYMAN 57

The purpose of the passage is, in part, rhetorical.The

beauty of this passage concerningnature idealized casts its
glow onto the next passage concerninghumanityidealized.
The delightwe feel fromthe first allows us to accept more
readily the moral nature of the second. But the passage is
not only meantfor delight.Rather,it exemplifiesthe nature
of the "right" poet. Following a passage dealing with the
poet's superiorityover otherscientistsin being able to range
freely"withinthe zodiac of his own wit,"it asserts the poet's
superiorityover nature as well. Finding withinhis own wit
the ideal formsof nature,the poet can delivera goldenworld.
But, whilethe poet has the freedomand the powerto deliver
this goldenworld,he must restrainhimselffromabusing it.
For if we rememberthe Neoplatonicscale of being, we re-
call that these ideal formsof nature are lowerthan the ideal
formsof man. They are not only lower,but they are more
dangerousto man than meresense impressions.As the reader
of this passage feels,such a goldenworldcan create a bower
of bliss which denies and paralyzes action. These are, for
all their beauty,"phantasticimages" which can "infectthe
fancy" and draw man away from rational and responsible
action. In doing so, they abuse man's nature, as the poet
who uses images in this way abuses poetry.The "rightpoet"
employs"images of virtues,vices" to move men to perfect
their nature: he creates, as Sidney asserts in the second
passage, the ideal Cyrusto make manyCyruses.By referring
to the poet's abilityto create a goldenworld of nature,Sid-
ney illustratesthe poet's power to move men on this level.
By his sudden shiftfromthis goldenworld of nature to the
worldof men,he exemplifiesthe properaction of the "right"
poet. As a poet, perhaps Sidney could not foregothe temp-
tationto reveal the poet's power to create a goldenworld of
nature. As a rhetoricianhe mightuse such a passage as a
test of his own powersto persuade.As a theoreticianhe uses
Neoplatonismwhere it serves his purpose.But as a rational
defenderof poetry,he quicklyturns fromthe temptationto
dwell withinthis ideal world of nature and returnsto the
real world of men.
But if Sidney rejects the poet's role in leading men to a
vision of divine truthor ideal beauty beyondthis world,he
grantshim a thirdpossibilityof greatervalue: The poet can
teach the love of virtue.And since the onlyknowledgeneces-
 58 SIDNEY'S DEFINITION OF POETRY

sary for man is the knowledgeof the good, "the endingend

of all earthlylearningbeing virtuousaction" (p. 104), the
poet's role in "feigningnotable images of virtues,vices" is
the essentialone. Thus to the Plotiniantraditionexemplified
in the Divine Comedy,Sidney has set limits.Acceptingthe
beliefthat man can be led by love to a higherlevel through
the ideal, he limits the ideal to "images of virtues,vices,"
and its powerto draw us only"to as higha perfectionas our
degeneratesouls, made worse by their clayey lodgings,can
be capable of" (p. 104). The poet can teach the love of vir-
tue, but again this virtue is of a particular nature. For
while the Dantean conceptis concernedwith individualsal-
vationin anotherlife,Sidney'sis concernedwiththe citizen's
rightaction in this. The poet is concernedwith "the knowl-
edge of a man's self, in the ethic and politic consideration,
withthe end of well doingand not of well knowingonly.. .'
(p. 104). By comparingthe poet who has this kind of skill
with the skill of the saddler,the horseman,and the soldier,
Sidney is emphasizingthe poet's usefulnessto the Republic.
By naminghimprinceover philosophersor historians,he has
indeedassigned him a high position,but the techniquesthat
have led himto thisstatementare, as he had promisedearlier,
in direct contrastto those which had led Pugliano's to his.
For whilePuglianohad attemptedto achievestatusforhorse-
manshipand horsesthroughelaborationsand additions,Sid-
ney has achievedstatus for poetryby subtractionsand dimi-
nutions.
But if Sidneyimposedlimitationsupon the Plotinianview
as exemplifiedin Dante, Dante's poem indicatedthe severe
restrictionsmedievalChristianityimposeduponthe poet. For
the Christianpoet,God is not only the source and goal, but
the onlyartist.If we read his book of Nature and the Bible,
we have no need forotherartiststo teach us the way. Mazzeo
quotes St. Thomas Aquinas's dictum that creation is the
proper act of God alone as characteristicof the medieval
view (p. 159). The artist was "auctour" or preserverof re-
ceivedtruth.As such,his "creation"was belowthat of God's
and nature's. This attitude is not very far from Plato's
charge that the poet's imitationis at three removesfrom
reality.This concept,along with the Platonic and Christian
suspicion concerningsense impressions,left little room for
the poet's "feigning."In the sixteenthcentury,however,as
 VIRGINIA RILEY HYMAN 59

M. H. Abrams has pointedout, Italian critics began using

Plotinian theories to justify their own visions and their
proper role (p. 42). Rather than seeing in the Plotinian
theorya means towardmysticalvision for the spiritualman,
they found in it a justificationfor the vision of the poet.
Plotinus had justified the idea in the poet's mind as an
image of the idea in the mind of God.
Still the arts are not to be slightedon the groundthat
they create by imitation of natural objects; for . . . we
mustrecognizethat theygive no bare reproduction of
the thing seen but go back to the Ideas fromwhich
Nature itselfderives,and furthermore, that much of
theirworkis all theirown; theyare holdersof beauty
and add where nature is lacking. Thus Pheidias
wroughtthe Zeus upon no model among things of
sense but by apprehendingwhat formZeus musttake
if he chose to becomemanifestto sight.10
If reality is mental and creation a series of degenerating
mentalformsendingin matter,each lowerformimagingthe
essence of the one above it, then man's mind,capable of see-
ing the essence of all formsin created nature,is closest to
God's. It is, literally,the image of God's. The poet's activity,
as well as his vision,is God-like.For the poet not only sees,
but, like God, creates images of his own ideas. The images
projectedby the poet, having less matterand more essence,
are, indeed,superiorto the images in nature. The poet, like
God, creates an orderedworld of images, and these images,

t?Enneads,trans. Stephen MacKenna (London, 1926) V.vii, i. This cita-

tion is quoted by Abrams, p. 42. Abrams also cites a similar passage
fromCicero. It may be argued that Sidney was using the passage from
Cicero ratherthan that fromPlotinus. This may very well be, but such
an argumentdoes not denythe general prevalenceof these ideas in the
sixteenthcentury.Indeed, one critic has asserted that Sidney used the
NeoplatonistFicino's translation and commentarieson Plato. Thus it
may be that in this case Sidney's passage is derivedmore directlyfrom
Cicero, as his emphasis on the ability of the images to move the audi-
ence may be close to the ideas of otherrhetoricianssuch as Quintillian,
his discussion of the "ethick and Politicke consideration" closer to
Aristotle, and his very definitionof poetry parallel to Minturno's
statement,"aut vitia aut virtutes effingunt."Accordingto Shepherd,
"the definitionsare rich in associations. Nearly every phrase could
form a text on which to hang an historical discourse drawing on
literary theory and practice for centuries. A writer who used such
phrases had his head full of theory and of interpretationswhose
originswere submergedby repetition"(p. 47). What is being shown in
this paper is why some ideas are used among those that were available
and whysome are modifiedor omitted.
 60 SIDNEY'S DEFINITION OF POETRY

abstractedfrom their material aspect, have greater power

to reveal the essence of Divine Truththan the images (sense
impressions)derivedfromnature.Thus,"feigning"becomesa
God-likeaction,for it imitatesthe creationof God. And since
the purpose of all creatures is to move toward their true
essence,thensuch an imitationof God's creativeact is man's
highestoccupation."'
Such a justificationcan be seen in a quotationby Scaliger:
"Poetry excells all other arts in that . . . the poet represents
anothernature and varied fortunes,and in so doing,makes
himself,as it were, anotherGod."12Sidney's commentsseem
to parallel those of Scaliger:
Onlythepoet,disdainingto be tied to any such subjec-
tion [to nature] liftedup with the vigor of his owne
invention,dothgrowein effectintoanothernature,in
makingthingseitherbetterthenNaturebringethforth,
or, quite anewe, . . . so as he goethhand in hand with
Nature, not inclosed within the narrow warrant of
her gifts,but freelyrangingonly withinthe zodiack
ofhis ownewit. (100)
But this statement,while similar to Scaliger's, makes one
importantomission:while Scaliger says that the poet "makes
himselfanother God," Sidney avoids such a statement,and
seems to go out of his way to suggest his alliance with Na-
ture, ratherthan with God. Indeed, he goes out of his way
to insistuponthesuperiorityof God: "Neitherlet it be deem-
ed too saucie a comparisonto balance the highestpoint of
man's wit withthe efficacyof Nature; but rathergive right
honor to the heavenly Maker of that maker, who, having
made man to His owne likeness,set him beyondand over
all the works of that second nature. . ." (p. 101). While he
is willing to grant man's superiorityto nature, Sidney is

"Shepherd goes furtherin indicatinganotherexpressionof Renaissance

Neoplatonismin the theories of the manneristpainters, Lommazo and
Zuccaro. He quotes Zuccaro's descriptionof the role of the Idea in the
workof the artist (p. 65-66) and points out its resemblanceto Sidney's
passage. While he does not indicate the abruptnesswith which Sidney
dismissesthis idea, he does say that Sidney does not follow the pure
aestheticism to which this theory led Minturno and Castlevetro.
Throughoutthe introduction,Shepherd stresses Sidney's emphasis on
the rational activityof the poet and the moral and didactic nature of
poetry.
'Scaliger, Poetices libri septem (4th ed. 1607). This trans. taken from
Abrams, p. 273.
 VIRGINIA RILEY HYMAN 61

unwillingto compareman's creativitywithGod's. Thus,while

both Scaliger's and Sidney's views are in sharp contrastto
those of the middleages, Sidney does not take the final step
that Scaliger does. While he adopts the Scaligerian emphasis
on the poet's relianceon his own powers,he rejects the im-
plicationthat the poet is, therefore,God-like.For such an
implicationis not only blasphemous,but leads to the same
kindof exclusivenessfor poetryas the Plotinianconceptthat
Dante had employed.For just as the ascent up the ladder of
becomingleads to a worship of an ineffablevision of the
lightof God, so the ascent up the ladder of the poet's world
leads back toward the idea within the poet's mind. In in-
sistingon the poet's similarityto natureratherthan to God,
Sidneycan breakthis reciprocalaction.For Sidney,the poet's
ideas, like those of nature,are generative.His images, like
Yeats's "images thatyet / Fresh images beget,"are propelled
into the worldof action. His images are real and useful,for
they "beget many Cyruses."The poet's audience will be led
to imitate the ideal he has created: they will be propelled
outwardto their own kind of imitationand creationrather
than backwardtowardcontemplation of the ideas in the poet's
mind.
But again Sidneymustleave this analogybeforehis reader
becomesaware of its implications.For the poet, while God-
like in creatingimages whichlead men to love virtue,is also
leading theminto action and away fromdirectcontactwith
the Divine idea. Nor is it withoutsignificancethat the poet
creates Cyruses,pagan militaryleaders,not Christiansaints.
What, in conclusion,Sidney has drawn fromsixteenth-cen-
tury aesthetic theory is the notion that the poet has the
ability to create images from ideas within his own mind;
what he rejects is the exclusive and God-likenature of the
poet. This process of acceptance and rejection parallels his
handling of the earlier Plotinian theoryas exemplifiedin
Dante. From the latter he accepted the ability of the poet's
imagesto movemento virtuousaction; he rejectedthe supra-
rational abilityof the poet to describethe union with divine
Beautyand Truthand thusthe need for a divineintermediary
or forstates of mindsuperiorto those of reason. If one were
to formulatethe differencebetweenthe entire Neoplatonist
notionand that of Sidney,one mighttake the great medieval
ladder Mazzeo describes, with its upward and downward
62 SIDNEY'S DEFINITION OF POETRY

motion,and place it horizontally.Thus the poet,ratherthan

lookingupward for inspiration,mightlook backwardto the
experienceof the ancients,withinto his own powers of ab-
stractingand his own knowledgeof the Good, and outward,
laterally,in projectingthese images toward what is possible
in his fellowmen.
Thus, by a series of hardlydiscerniblesteps, throughthe
processof inclusionand exclusion,balancingthe exaggerated
against the absurd,weighingthe old theoriesagainst the new,
the emotionalagainst the supra-rational,movinghis sweep in
ever-narrowingarcs, Sidney has arrived at his definition:
"[Poetry] is that feigningnotable images of virtues,vices,
or what else," and then adds the Horatian definitionas his
amplification.By skillfuluse of his sources he has changed
the connotationsof these words so that theymightpersuade
a Plato to restorepoetryto an honoredplace in the Republic.
If, by his insistenceon its purelymoral and social value, he
has not succeededin restoringpoetry"to the highestestima-
tion of learning" in which it was once held, he has saved
it fromits presentlow repute.If he has not admittedit into
the sphere of the divine,he has enteredit into the world of
men. By the abstractingand judging action of reason he has
arrived at a viable definitionof what poetryought to be.
The "good will" upon which his reasons are based and the
art by whichhe handlesthe argumentsgive life to the theory
by exemplifyingthe active role of the poet in "well doing,
and not well knowingonly."

RUTGERSUNIVERSITY