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allowable standards or modified or nullified by a competent court.

The Court found


Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) vs. CA
that the Order and Writ of Execution issued by petitioner Board were entirely within
[G.R. No. 93891 March 11, 1991] its lawful authority Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and
Facts: Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation is involved in bleaching, rinsing regulations in situations like in this case. The relevant pollution control statute and
and dyeing textiles with untreated wastewater whichwere being discharged directly implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that
into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River. On September 22, 1988, pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and
petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board issued an ex parte comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly
designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the
Order based on 2 findings made on Solar Textile Finishing Corportion’s plant,
ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of
directing Solar immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution
protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of
source installations as they were clearly in violation of Section 8 of Presidential
police power. Hence, the trial court did not err when it dismissed Solar's petition for
Decree No. 984 (Pollution Control Law) and Section 103 of its Implementing Rules
certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial court to the
and Regulations and the 1982 Effluent Regulations. Solar then filed a motion
Court of Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal. The Court gave due course on the
for reconsideration which was granted by the Pollution Adjudication Board for a
Petition for Review and the Decision of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution were
temporary operation. However, Solar went to the RTC for certiorari and preliminary
set aside. The Order of petitioner Board and the Writ of Execution, as well as the
injunction against the Board but the same was dismissed. On appeal, the CA reversed
decision of the trial court were reinstated, without prejudice to the right of Solar
the Order of dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case for further
to contest the correctness of the basis of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution at
proceedings. Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal
a public hearing before the Board
authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations of an establishment
when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents IMBONG VS OCHOA
or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board). Solar, on the other hand, contends that
under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of
effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and
welfare, or to animal and plant life" and argued that there were no findings that MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners, vs.
Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a threat HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
.ISSUE: Whether or not the Pollution Adjudication Board has legal authority to issue
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
the Order and Writ of Execution against Solar Textile Finishing Corporation.
Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department
RULING: YES. Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner Board to issue ex of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
parte cease and desist orders under the following circumstances:
Facts:
Public Hearing. . . .Provided , That whenever the Commission finds prima facie
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
evidence that the discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to life, public
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December
health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life, or exceeds the allowable
21, 2012.
standards set by the Commission, the Commissioner may issue an ex-parte order
directing the discontinuance of the same or the temporary suspension or cessation of Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of
operation of the establishment or person generating such sewage or wastes without the said Act. The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the
the necessity of a prior public hearing. following grounds:

The said ex-parte order shall be immediately executory and shall remain in force until SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
said establishment or person prevents or abates the said pollution within the  The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
 The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against PROCEDURAL
hazardous products. Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial
 The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. review is limited by four exacting requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or
 The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of
 The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
 The RH Law violates the right to free speech. constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
 The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of
Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or
the Constitution.
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
 The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. It
the Constitution
must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There
PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through
controversy. a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law
 Power of Judicial Review would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual
 Actual Case or Controversy case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
 Facial Challenge
challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite
 Locus Standi
that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a
 Declaratory Relief
court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
 One Subject/One Title Rule
immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He
Issue/s: must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some
 SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES: Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive direct injury as a result of the act complained of
Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the: Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is
 Right to life one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected
 Right to health speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious
 Freedom of religion and right to free speech freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble,
 Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy) and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental
 Freedom of expression and academic freedom right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but
 Due process clause component rights of the right to one’s freedom of expression, as they are modes
 Equal protection clause which one’s thoughts are externalized.
 Prohibition against involuntary servitude Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial
 PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
review over the controversy. result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome
o Actual Case or Controversy of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the
o Facial Challenge presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
o Locus Standi difficult constitutional questions.
o Declaratory Relief
Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule on
o One Subject/One Title Rule
standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs
Discussions: like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires,
such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.” meaning of “conception” according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is
One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not require the Congress that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception
begins at fertilization.
to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully
index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the
sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the moment of “fertilization” and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon
general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be
and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and
technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or impede legislation.” The one female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be
subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be “so deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn
of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either
child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The
in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and
embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section
scope of the act.”
4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the
law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and
office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.
Modern view: Under this view, the court in passing upon the question of
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the
constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the
meaning of abortifacient by using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients
Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties only those that “primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
just as if such statute had no existence. But certain legal effects of the statute prior
mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted
to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for partial
in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval
unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to retain the valid portion(s),
of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
usually shown by the presence of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the
portion can stand independently as law. same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also
Ruling/s: uses the term “primarily”, must be struck down.
SUBSTANTIAL The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place,
the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives
Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins
are made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law,
is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without
proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members could the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will
express their own views on this matter. procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that
the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered
“mandatory” only after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and
from conception.”
approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal,
non-abortificient and effective”.
The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or Health Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their
participation in support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an
standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. However, the actual case be filed before it.
Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education
Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health
The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon education.
the policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of
other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the
parents in the development of their children with the use of the term “primary”. The
Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion,
right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.
and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population
control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR
contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners. supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral
development of their children.
Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the
consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other
intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional interest groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said
safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the
a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of definitions of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.
responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to
The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to
participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect
Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a “public health service provider”. The
them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger
“private health care institution” cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous
the institutions of marriage and the family.
to “private health care service provider.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is
The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of
already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family
information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by
and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: “The natural and
religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving
the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.”
RH information and procedures.
In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the
written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section
parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill
procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs
is involved is “non-surgical procedures.” and services on reproductive health.
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is
planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11,
their minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs
reject the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life- of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall
threatening procedures. endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.
The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since
mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering
from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also
prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
to the poor. Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary,
ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education
program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that
of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental
to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has
authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH
The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health
care service providers to render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple
expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court
to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably
as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been
imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control
transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section
17 only encourages private and non-government RH service providers to render pro Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an “as-applied
bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi
otherwise. requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a
beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi
is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion,
PROCEDURAL waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens,
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have
the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act.
implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that the Court
a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar.
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence
also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute. on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the
practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to
the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their
threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate,
benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter now. rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just
generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While the Court has withheld consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original
the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive
to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual
is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive health”
jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the overriding
objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of 6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5
Section 2 of the RH Law: .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation
of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights,
the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes 7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering
reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious
and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier
Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible “primarily” in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and,
parenthood” which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating
human development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the
assailed legislation. Chavez v. Pea and Amari
Fact:
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas
with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
of Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corportion of the Philippines
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require (CDCP).
private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084,
and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life- tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation
which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects
suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.
consent from their parents or guardian/s; By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA.
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section It was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register
5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the
refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive FREEDOM ISLANDS.
health regardless of his or her religious beliefs. Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-
Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they
hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to
allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement,
under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously known as the “mother
consent of the spouse; of all scams”).
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of
limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures. preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President Estrada’s
admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the
5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or
contract is null and void.
refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same Issue:
facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the
beliefs;
stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of ARANDA V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
the 1987 Constitution
G.R. No. 172331
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint
FACTS:
venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Held:  Subject of a petition for original registration before the RTC is a parcel of
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution: land situated in San Andres, Malvar, Batangas with an area of 9,103 square
meters and designated as Lot 3730, Psc 47, Malvar Cadastre.
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now  ICTSI Warehousing, Inc. originally filed The petition represented by its
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public Chairman, Enrique K. Razon, Jr.
domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or  OSG filed its opposition on grounds that the land applied for is part of the
transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these public domain and the applicant has not acquired a registrable title.
lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987
 ICTSI-WI sought leave of court to amend the application citing the reasons:
Constitution and existing laws.
1. petition was not accompanied by a certification of non-forum
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural shopping;
resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open 2. the statement of technical description was based merely on the
to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can boundaries set forth in the tax declaration; and
make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these 3. due to a technicality, the sale between the vendor and applicant
submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public corporation cannot push through and consequently the tax declaration
domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their is still in the name of vendor Ramon Aranda and the land cannot be
present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside transferred and declared in the name of ICTSI-WI.
the commerce of man.  RTC admitted the Amended Application for Registration of Title this time
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, filed in the name of Ramon Aranda.
ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for  Petitioner prayed that should the Land Registration Act be not applicable to
being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits this case, he invokes the liberal provisions of Section 48 of Commonwealth
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Act No. 141, as amended, having been in continuous possession of the
subject land in the concept of owner, publicly, openly and adversely for
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 more than thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the application.
hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being  petitioners sister Merlita A. Enriquez testified that in 1965 her father
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the Anatalio Aranda donated the subject land to his brother, as evidenced by
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. documents Pagpapatunay ng Pagkakaloob ng Lupa executed on June 7,
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the 2000. As to the donation made by his father to his brother Ramon, she
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer recalled there was such a document but it was eaten by rats.
needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the  Luis Olan, testified that his father Lucio Olan originally owned the land. They
public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the had open, peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of the land in the
1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of concept of owner until his father sold the land in 1946 to Anatalio
alienable land of the public domain. Aranda. The children of Anatalio then took over in tilling the land, planting
it with rice and corn and adding a few coconut trees. He does not have any
copy of the document of sale because his mother gave it to Anatalio.
 RTC granted the application and ordering the issuance of a decree of
registration in favor of petitioner.
 CA held that petitioners evidence does not satisfactorily establish the
character and duration of possession required by law, as petitioner failed to
prove specific acts showing the nature of the possession by his
predecessors-in-interest. The CA also did not give evidentiary weight to the situated at Barangay San Andres, Malvar, Batangas containing an
documents Pagpapatunay ng Pagkakaloob ng Lupa and Pagpapatunay ng area of NINE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED THREE AND FORTY SEVEN
Bilihang Lampasan ng Lupa, both prepared only in the year 2000 when the (9,103.47) SQUARE METERS and shown at the reverse side hereof
application for registration was filed, as factual proof of ownership by the has been verified to be within the ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE
parties to the compromise agreement. ZONE under Project No. 39, Land Classification Map No. 3601
ISSUE: WON the deeds of confirmation of the 1946 sale in favor of Anatalio Aranda certified on 22 December 1997 except for twenty meters strip of
and the 1965 donation to petitioner are competent proof of transfer of ownership land along the creek bounding on the northeastern portion which
is to be maintained as streambank protection.
HELD: The Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529) provides for original
registration of land in an ordinary registration proceeding. Under Section x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
14(1)[14] thereof, a petition may be granted upon compliance with the following Petitioner has not explained the discrepancies in the dates of
requisites: (a) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the classification[20] mentioned in the foregoing government
public domain; (b) that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in- certifications. Consequently, the status of the land applied for as alienable and
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and disposable was not clearly established.
occupation; and (c) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier. We also agree with the CA that petitioners evidence failed to show that he possessed
the property in the manner and for the duration required by law.
Under the Regalian doctrine which is embodied in Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the Petitioner presented tax declarations and the deeds of confirmation of the 1946 sale
source of any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly from the original owner (Lucio Olan) to Anatalio Aranda and the 1965 donation made
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Unless public land is by the latter in favor of petitioner. But as found by the CA, the history of the land
shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it shows that it was declared for taxation purposes for the first time only in 1981. On
remains part of the inalienable public domain. To overcome this presumption, the other hand, the Certification issued by the Municipal Treasurer of Malvar stated
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application that petitioner, who supposedly received the property from his father in 1965, had
is alienable or disposable.[15] been paying the corresponding taxes for said land for more than five consecutive
years including the current year [1999], or beginning 1994 only or just three years
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, before the filing of the application for original registration. While, as a rule, tax
an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of
a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; ownership, nevertheless they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner,
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
statute.[16] The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that actual or constructive possession they constitute at least proof that the holder has a
the lands applied for are alienable and disposable.[17] claim of title over the property.[21]
In this case, the Assistant Regional Executive Director For Operations-Mainland Petitioner likewise failed to prove the alleged possession of his predecessors-in-
Provinces of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), in interest. His witness Luis Olan testified that he had been visiting the land along with
compliance with the directive of the trial court, issued a certification stating that the his father Lucio since he was 6 years old (he was 70 years old at the time he testified),
subject property falls within the Alienable and Disposable Land, Project No. 22-A of or as early as 1936. Yet, there was no evidence that Lucio Olan declared the property
Lipa, Batangas per LC Map 718 certified on March 26, 1928.[18] However, in the for tax purposes at anytime before he sold it to Anatalio Aranda. There is also no
Certification[19] dated January 14, 2000 issued by the DENR CENR Officer showing that Anatalio Aranda declared the property in his name from the time he
of Batangas City, Pancrasio M. Alcantara, which was submitted in evidence by the bought it from Lucio Olan. And even assuming that Lucio actually planted rice and
petitioner, it states that: corn on the land, such statement is not sufficient to establish possession in the
This is to certify that based on projection from the concept of owner as contemplated by law. Mere casual cultivation of the land does
technical reference map of this Office, Lot No. 3730, Ap-04-009883,
not amount to exclusive and notorious possession that would give rise to Held:
ownership.[22] Specific acts of dominion must be clearly shown by the applicant. Applicant’s registration of title for said parcels of land will not prosper because the
We have held that a person who seeks the registration of title to a piece of land on said land is a public forest lands. Forest lands unless declassified and released by
the basis of possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest must prove his positive act of the Government so that they may form part of the disposable and
claim by clear and convincing evidence, i.e., he must prove his title and should not agricultural lands of the public domain, are not capable of private appropriation.
rely on the absence or weakness of the evidence of the oppositors.[23] Furthermore, Forests, in the context of both Public Land act and the Constitution classifying lands
of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national
the court has the bounden duty, even in the absence of any opposition, to require
parks do not necessarily refer to a large tract of woodland or an expanse covered by
the petitioner to show, by a preponderance of evidence and by positive and absolute
dense growth of trees and underbrush. Here, respondent never presented the
proof, so far as possible, that he is the owner in fee simple of the lands which he is required certification from the proper government agency or official proclamation
attempting to register.[24] Since petitioner failed to meet the quantum of proof reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and disposable. For unclassified land,
required by law, the CA was correct in reversing the trial court and dismissing his as here, cannot be acquired by adverse occupation thereof in the concept of owner,
application for judicial confirmation of title. however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.
WHEREFORE, the present petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision MUSTANG LUMBER vs. COURT OF APPEALS
dated July 26, 2005 and Resolution dated April 11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 73067 are AFFIRMED and UPHELD. Facts:

With costs against the petitioner. Petitioner was duly registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest
Development. The Special Actions and Investigation Division of the DENR were
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CELESTINA NAGUIAT informed that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside
(GR.NO. 134209, Jan. 24, 2006) the lumberyard of the petitioner. The SAID organized a team of foresters and
policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance. In the course thereof, the team
Facts:
members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck loaded with
This is an application for registration of title to four parcels of land by Celestina lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could
Nuguiat located at Botolan, Zambales. Applicant(respondent) alleges that she is the not produce the required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the
owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from the LID truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound. The team
Corporation which likewise acquired the same from Demetria Calderon, Josefina was not able to gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of the owner. The
Moraga, and Fausto Monje and their predecessor
team was able to secure a search warrant. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that
– date from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and
in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than 30 years. The Republic slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of
filed an opposition to the application on the ground that neither the applicant nor lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa. On 4 April 1990,
her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard and placed under
possession and occupation of the lands in question since June12, 1945 or prior administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber
thereto; that the monuments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do not with a total volume of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bonafide acquisition of the lands upon demand the corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally
applied for, and that the parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the lumber to
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation. prove the legitimacy of their source and origin. Parenthetically, it may be stated that
under an administrative seizure the owner retains the physical possession of the
Issue :Whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status of fores seized articles. Only an inventory of the articles is taken and signed by the owner or
tor other inalienable lands of the public domain and the applicants registration of his representative. The owner is prohibited from disposing them until further orders.
title will prosper. On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to the Chief of SAID Robles
requesting an extension of fifteen days to produce the required documents covering
the seized articles because some of them, particularly the certificate of lumber origin, confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck. Private respondents brought the
were allegedly in the Province of Quirino. Robles denied the petition. Subsequently, case to the DENR Secretary. Pending appeal, private respondents filed a replevin case
the Sec. of DENR Factoran issued an order confiscating the woods seized in the truck before the RTC against petitioner Layugan and Baggayan. RTC granted the same.
of the petitioner as well as those found in their lumberyard. Petitioners moved to dismiss the case contending, inter alia, that private respondents
had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial
Issue: court denied their motion. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners
Whether or not that a lumber cannot be considered a timber and that petitioner aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the
should not be held for illegal logging. truck was under administrative seizure proceedings.

Held:
ISSUE: Whether or not the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine.
The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as an affirmance
of the respondent Judge's conclusion that lumber is excluded from the coverage of
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and thus possession thereof without the HELD: The Court held in the negative. The Court has consistently held that before a
required legal documents is not a crime. On the contrary, the SC rules that such party is allowed to seek the intervention of thecourt, it is a pre-condition that
possession is penalized in the said section because lumber is included in the term he should have availed of all the means of administrative processed afforded him.
timber. The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. Hence, if a remedywithin the administrative machinery can still be resorted to
While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first
"Processing plant," which reads: Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine before court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court’
or combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action.
materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wall bond, block board, paper board, pulp, The doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity
paper or other finished wood products. This simply means that lumber is a processed and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is
log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its disregarded (1) when there is violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is
ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal
International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppels on the part of
the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when
prepared for the market." Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled
the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President
that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a
bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion
statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And
of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to
insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate
processed timber. remedy and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention. A suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the petitioners for the
PAAT V. CA
subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in
GR No. 111107, 10 January 1997 pursuant to Sections 68-A of OD 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for
FACTS lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents’ failure to exhaust
administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower
The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ
personnel while on its way to Bulacan because the driver could not produce the ordering the return of the truck.
required documents for the forest product found concealed in the truck. Petitioner
Jovito Layugan,CENRO ordered the confiscation of the truck and required the owner
to explain. Private respondents failed to submit required explanation. The DENR
Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained Layugan’s action for
Secretary of DENR vs Yap the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the
GR No. 167707; Oct 8, 2008 inalienable public domain.

FACTS: PALOMO v. CA
This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) G.R. No. 95608 January 21, 1997
affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo Aklan, which granted the
petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al,
FACTS:
and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes.
Diego Palomo is the owner of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive Order
On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay No. 40. On 1916, he ordered the registration of these lands and donated the same to
Island as a tourist zone and marine reserve. Claiming that Proc. No. 1801 precluded his heirs, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two months before his death in April 1937.
them from filing an application for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey
Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the
of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants filed a petition for declaratory
Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court
relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan. of First Instance of Albay on May 1970. The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 sometime in October 1953.
countering that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It Sometime in July 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47
formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which was not available converting the area embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring
for disposition pursuant to section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code. National Park," under the control, management, protection and administration of the
defunct Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division of the Bureau of Forest
ISSUE: Development. The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of the
Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed public domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition under the
provisions of the Public Land Law nor registerable under the Land Registration Act.
agricultural land, therefore making these lands alienable.
The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property, paid real estate
HELD: taxes thereon and introduced improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and
No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the coconuts. On April 8, 1971, petitioner Carmen de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio
Palomo and Trinidad Pascual mortgaged the parcels of land to guarantee a loan of
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action,
investigative reports of the Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or
statute. ISSUE:
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with Whether or not forest land may be owned by private persons.
the presumption of state ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that
there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,
declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other HELD:
purposes. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in
confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
domain. It is in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned
that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged by private persons. It is not registerable and possession thereof, no matter how
with the conservation of such patrimony. lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are considered disposable and alienable. There is no question that the lots here forming
presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from part of the forest zone were not alienable lands of the public domain. As to the
forfeiture of improvements introduced by petitioners, the fact that the government
failed to oppose the registration of the lots in question is no justification for Joya, et al. vs. PCGG
petitioners to plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lots.
GR No. 96541. August 24, 1993
Cruz vs Secretary of DENR Ponente: Bellosillo, J.
GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
FACTS: Facts: Mateo Caparas, then Chairman of the PCGG, through the authority granted by
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus then Pres. Aquino, signed a Consignment Agreement allowing Christie’s of New York
as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of to auction off Old Masters Paintings and the 18th and 19th century silverware alleged
Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of Pres. Marcos, his relatives, and cronies, for and
1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail in behalf of RP. 35 petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and
certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order sought to
unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well enjoin PCGG from proceeding with the auction sale which nevertheless proceeded
as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine on schedule. Petitioners claim that, as Filipino citizens, taxpayers, and artists deeply
embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. concerned with the preservation and protection of the country’s artistic wealth and
that the paintings and silverware are public properties collectively owned by them
ISSUE:
and the people in general to view and enjoy as great works of art alleging that they
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution? have been deprived of their right to public property without due process of law, they
HELD: have the legal personality to restrain the respondents who are acting contrary to their
public duty to conserve the artistic creations as mandated by Sec. 14-18 of Art. XIV of
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA,
the Constitution and RA 4846.
there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural
resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the
ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the Issue: Whether the petition complies with the legal requisites for the Court to
ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as exercise its power of judicial review over this case.
owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the
small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their
large scale development and exploitation. Held: NO. Petitioners failed to show that they have the legal standing, i.e. a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that they have sustained or would sustain
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the
direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged, because
public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which
they are not the legal owners of the artworks/silverwares or that the valued pieces
is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the
have become publicly owned since such artworks are in fact owned by the
State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their
Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, a non-profit, non-stock corporation
ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to
established to promote non-Philippine arts and the silverwares were in fact gifts to
alienate the same.
the Marcos couple on their silver wedding anniversary. The mandamus suit cannot
prosper because what the petitioners seek is the enjoining of an official act because
it is constitutionally infirmed not because they are after the fulfilment of a positive
duty required of the respondent public officials which is the only ground for a writ of
mandamus to be issued. The taxpayers’ suit cannot prosper as well since the items
in question were acquired from private sources and not with public money.
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual controversy belong to the LESSOR upon the lease agreement’s
– one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims expiration/termination – construction of hotel commenced w/in 1
susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based year and finished w/in 5 years upon date of said agreement’s
on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A approval
case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, such as this  Defendant failed /refused to construct said hotel
case. Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin the respondents o Par 3. LESEE shall pay annual rent of P250K s.t. necessary rental
from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date which had long adjustments
past, the issues raised have become moot and academic. Nevertheless, the Court has  Defendant reneged on its rental obligation for 7 years
the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of o Par 4. LESEE shall pay the realty tax due on the land including
an actual case or legal standing when paramount public interest is involved. However, improvements, govt license, permits, fees and other prescribed
there is no such justification in this petition. charges + hotel’s operation, construction and modifications
 Defendant failed to pay the aggregate tax liability
Petition dismissed.
amounting to P3.8M
ARMY AND NAVY CLUB V. CA  Plaintiff repeatedly demanded defendant to comply with its contractual
obligations, but the latter remained unfazed and still failed to perform such
City of Manila owns a parcel of land, including the Army and Navy Club
obligations
Building built on it. The defendant is occupying the said area by virtue of a
 ^As a result, plaintiff rescinded their Contract of Lease and demanded
Contract of Lease. It violated the provisions by not complying with its defendant to vacate, but the latter refused to do so
contractual obligations (reneged on rental obligations, payment of taxes,
Progress of the case:
etc.) despite plaintiff’s repeated demands. This led to the rescission of the
contract and the defendant being ousted from the premises. Defendant  Petitioner (Corporation) filed a Motion for Leave to File & for Admission of
invokes that the building has been declared a national historical landmark in Amended Answer allegedly asserting special and affirmative defenses
an attempt to thwart the legal action against them. The SC ruled that even  The City of Manila filed a Motion for Summary Judgement on the ground
that there exists no genuine triable issue in the case
assuming that the said declaration is valid, it does not grant possessory rights
 The MTC denied petitioner’s motion for lack of merit, ordering it to vacate
over the property to the petitioner nor to the National Historical Commission.
the Army & Navy Building, pay the costs of the suit and pay rental arrearages
Moreover, the historical significance of the Club shall not be affected given with legal interest
that petitioner’s eviction from the premises is warranted for having violated  The RTC affirmed the MTC’s summary judgement
the terms and conditions of the lease contract.  CA dismissed the appeal and denied the motion for recon; it likewise denied
FACTS: the City of Manila’s motion for issuance of writ of exec pending appeal
 Petitioner filed the instant petition raising the ff. issues
The complaint alleged the ff.:
ISSUES:
 Plaintiff: City of Manila (municipal corporation) organized and existing under
RA409 represented by incumbent Manila City Mayor Gemiliano Lopez, Jr.;  W/n CA gravely erred in upholding City of Manila (the ouster) of petitioner
owner of Army and Navy Club of Manila from the disputed premises w/c is a clear transgression of the formal
 Defendant: corporation with offices occupying the Army and Navy Club declaration of the site as a historical landmark
Building by virtue of a Contract of Lease (Lessee – defendant; Lessor –  W/n CA erred in not holding that petitioner was denied due process by the
plaintiff) rendition of summary judgement against it
 Defendant violated certain provisions of the Contract of Lease: HELD: There is no merit in the petition
o Par 1. The LESSEE shall construct at its own expense a P50M
(/above) modern multi-storied hotel, which shall automatically First Issue – NO
 For petitioner’s violation of the lease contract and after several demands,  The CA did not err in not admitting the petitioner’s Amended Answer
the City of Manila had no other recourse but to file the action for illegal because the defenses were entirely in contradiction to its original answer
detainer and demand petitioner’s eviction (based on the provisions of the o It initially admitted in the orig. answer that the City of Manila is the
New Civil Code) subject property’s registered owner and that it (petitioner) is
 While the declaration that it (Army&Navy Club) is a historical landmark is merely a lessor
not objectionable, the recognition is specious o Petitioner cannot deny the respondent’s ownership of the leased
o Fr. Bernas as amicus curiae in Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS: The premises when the situation calls for it by taking an inconsistent
country’s artistic and historic wealth is therefore a proper subject position
for the exercise of police power:”. . . which the State may regulate.”
This is a function of the legislature. And once regulation comes in,
due process also comes into play. When the classification of
property into historical treasures or landmarks will involve the
imposition of limits on ownership, the Bill of Rights demands that
it be done with due process both substantive and procedural. In
recognition of this constitutional principle, the State in fact has
promulgated laws, both general and special, on the subject. x x x
R.A. 4846 amended by P.D. No. 374 is the Act that prescribes the
manner of classifying historical and cultural properties
 There is no showing that PD374 has been complied with. Thus, the
petitioner’s defense regarding the property being a historical landmark was
merely an attempt to thwart legal action against it
 Such certification (of being a historical landmark) does not authorize the
petitioner to claim ownership/right over said property; nor is the National
Historical Commission allowed to vest such right to the petitioner
 M ,knkm,nhghuhuuh
Second Issue – NO
 There is clearly no substantial triable issue because its defenses stated
below are not substantial issues of fact – they do not alter/affect the
ejectment suit; thus, a summary judgement is proper
o A summary judgement is one granted by the court upon a party’s
motion for an expeditious settlement of the case (bec. there are
NO important questions/issues of facts involved except as to
amount of damages)
o Petitioner’s defenses/arguments: (1) Failure to fulfill the
obligations was due to the 1984 economic recession due to Ninoy
Aquino’s assassination; (2) argument with regard to the Club being
declared a historical landmark
 Petitioner does not deny the existence of the lease contract and its failure
to comply with the said contract’s terms & conditions

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