IMSON, KAMILLE VICENTE

2A
JUDGE OSCAR B. PIMENTEL
SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
CASE DIGESTS

INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW (ACT 4103)

1. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TORIBIO C. TABANAO
G.R. No. L-17233 September 29, 1962
FACTS:
Appellant Toribio C. Tabanao was charged with malversation of public funds in Criminal Case
No. V-5773 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The information alleges:
That on or about the 23rd day of August, 1956 and sometime prior thereto, in the municipality of
Moalboal, province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of Court, the above-named
accused, then employed as Clerk-Book-keeper of the Office of Municipal Treasurer of said
municipality and as such had among his official duties the collection taxes and other public
properties and issuing official receipts for said collection and hence accountable for public funds
in possession, with deliberate intent of gain and taking advantage of his position, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate for his own use and benefit the amount of Two
Thousand Three Hundred Seventy-Six Pesos and forty three centavos (P2,376.43),which was then
in his possession, to the damage and prejudice of the government of the amount aforestated.
Arraigned on March 3, 1960, the defendant-appellant, assisted by his counsel, pleaded guilty to
the charge. Upon the basis of his plea, the trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
charged and appreciating his plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance, without any aggravating
circumstance to offset it, forthwith sentence him to suffer the penalty above stated. No indemnity
was decreed because the defendant had previously fully imbursed the amount misappropriated. (p.
2-3, t.s.n.)
In his brief, appellant claims that after the liberation his son developed an illness due to the war;
that it extreme necessity due to the illness of his son that drove him to commit the offense charged;
that the amount taken on several occasions to finance the lingering illness of his son; that the
assistant provincial fiscal had commended to the trial judge that in addition to plea of guilty, his
poverty be considered also is as another mitigating circumstance. These statements were object to
by the Solicitor General on the ground that they not are not supported by the record.
Appellant argues that under par. 2 of Art. 217 of Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act 1060, the penalty for malversation of an amount of more than P200 but not more than P6,000
is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, or from 4
years, 2 months, and 1 day to 10 years; that the fiscal having recommended to the trial judge that
appellant's extreme poverty be considered as another mitigating circumstance, appellant should be
credited with two (2) mitigating circumstances and consequently, the penalty imposable upon him
should be prision correccional in its minimum, which is from 6 months and 1 day to 2 years and
2 months, and that applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the sentence would only be for an
indeterminate penalty ranging from the maximum of arresto mayor to the minimum of prision
correccional, or 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months.

RULING:
The penalty for the offense charged in this case is not prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its medium period, as the appellant argues, but prison mayor in its minimum
and medium period, as provided for in Rep. Act 1060, amending Art. 217 of the Revised Penal
Code. The penalty lower by one degree of this penalty isprision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and taking into consideration the
mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, the minimum of the penalty is from 2 years, 4 months
and 1 day to 6 years of prision correccional, while the maximum is from 6 years and 1 day to 7
years and 4 months of mayor.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides:
SECTION 1. — Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised
Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed under the rules of the said code, and Code, and to a minimum which
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense;
...
The penalty prescribed for the offense charged in the case at bar is prision mayor in its minimum
and medium periods, or from 6 years, 1 day to 10 years. In view of the presence of one mitigating
circumstance and no aggravating, the proper penalty imposable is the minimum of the penalty
prescribed, which is from 6 years, 1 day to 7 years, and 4 months of prision mayor. One degree
lower to that penalty prescribed by the Code is prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods, or 2 years, 4 months, 1 day to 6 years. The penalty imposed by the trial court as minimum
is 3 years. This is within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that scribed by the Code;
the 7 years maximum is also within the range of the penalty properly imposable under the
circumstances.
It is also argued that extreme poverty should be considered as an additional mitigating
circumstance, for reason the penalty could be lowered by two degrees cause of two mitigating
circumstances, namely plea guilty and poverty. The mitigating circumstance of poverty was
neither admitted by the prosecution nor by the judge. According to the record, of the P2,376.43
misappropriated, only P50.00 was used for the illness of appellant's son. Furthermore, appellant
may not claim poverty for he was a clerk receiving salary. Poverty is a condition worse than that
of a poor person. (Webster's International Dictionary) He may have been poor, but with his salary
as clerk he certainly was not in a condition of poverty. The claim of an additional mitigating
circumstance can not, therefore, be justified.

PROBATION LAW (P.D. 968)

COLINARES vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 182748 December 13, 2011
FACTS:
Complainant Rufino P. Buena (Rufino) testified that at around 7:00 in the evening on June 25,
2000, he and Jesus Paulite (Jesus) went out to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. On their way, Jesus
took a leak by the roadside with Rufino waiting nearby. From nowhere, Arnel Colinares (Arnel)
sneaked behind and struck Rufino twice on the head with a huge stone, about 15 ½ inches in
diameter. Rufino fell unconscious as Jesus fled.
Ananias Jallores (Ananias) testified that he was walking home when he saw Rufino lying by the
roadside. Ananias tried to help but someone struck him with something hard on the right temple,
knocking him out. He later learned that Arnel had hit him. Paciano Alano (Paciano) testified that
he saw the whole incident since he happened to be smoking outside his house. He sought the help
of a barangay tanod and they brought Rufino to the hospital.
Dr. Albert Belleza issued a Medico-Legal Certificate showing that Rufino suffered two lacerated
wounds on the forehead, along the hairline area. The doctor testified that these injuries were serious
and potentially fatal but Rufino chose to go home after initial treatment.
The defense presented Arnel and Diomedes Paulite (Diomedes). Arnel claimed selfdefense. He
testified that he was on his way home that evening when he met Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias who
were all quite drunk. Arnel asked Rufino where he supposed the Mayor of Tigaon was but, rather
than reply, Rufino pushed him, causing his fall. Jesus and Ananias then boxed Arnel several times
on the back. Rufino tried to stab Arnel but missed. The latter picked up a stone and, defending
himself, struck Rufino on the head with it. When Ananias saw this, he charged towards Arnel and
tried to stab him with a gaff. Arnel was able to avoid the attack and hit Ananias with the same
stone. Arnel then fled and hid in his sister’s house. On September 4, 2000, he voluntarily
surrendered.
Diomedes testified that he, Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attended a pre-wedding party on the night
of the incident. His three companions were all drunk. On his way home, Diomedes saw the three
engaged in heated argument with Arnel.
Crime charged: frustrated homicide
RTC: guilty of homicide
CA: Arnel, invoking self-defense and, alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser crime of
attempted homicide with the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him, the CA entirely
affirmed the RTC decision.
NOTE: Arnel taking the position that he should be entitled to apply for probation in case the Court
metes out a new penalty on him that makes his offense probationable. The language and spirit of
the Probation Law warrants such a stand. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that
under the Probation Law no application for probation can be entertained once the accused has
perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Arnel acted in self-defense when he struck Rufino on the head with a stone (NO)
2) Assuming he did not act in self-defense, whether or not Arnel is guilty of frustrated homicide
(NO, attempted homicide only)
3) Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower offense and a reduced
probationable penalty, whether or not he may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the
trial court (YES)
RULING:
1) Arnel claims that Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attacked him first and that he merely acted in self-
defense when he hit Rufino back with a stone.
If the victim did not commit unlawful aggression against the accused, the latter has nothing to
prevent or repel and the other two requisites of self-defense would have no basis for being
appreciated. Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or an
imminent danger of such attack. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not enough. The
victim must attack the accused with actual physical force or with a weapon.
Here, the lower courts found that Arnel failed to prove the element of unlawful aggression. He
alone testified that Jesus and Ananias rained fist blows on him and that Rufino and Ananias tried
to stab him. No one corroborated Arnel’s testimony that it was Rufino who started it. Arnel’s only
other witness, Diomedes, merely testified that he saw those involved having a heated argument in
the middle of the street. Arnel did not submit any medical certificate to prove his point that he
suffered injuries in the hands of Rufino and his companions.
2) The Court finds Arnel liable only for attempted, not frustrated, homicide.
The main element of attempted or frustrated homicide is the accused’s intent to take his victim’s
life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible doubt
regarding homicidal intent. And the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other things, the
means the offender used and the nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim.
The Court is inclined, however, to hold Arnel guilty only of attempted, not frustrated, homicide.
In Palaganas vs. People, it was ruled that when the accused intended to kill his victim, as shown
by his use of a deadly weapon and the wounds he inflicted, but the victim did not die because of
timely medical assistance, the crime is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide. If the victim’s
wounds are not fatal, the crime is only attempted murder or attempted homicide.
Taken in its entirety, there is a dearth of medical evidence on record to support the prosecution’s
claim that Rufino would have died without timely medical intervention. Thus, the Court finds
Arnel liable only for attempted homicide and entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.
3) Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from
the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide.
But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and holds that the
maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment of four months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum.
With this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon
remand of the case to the RTC.
Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere privilege granted by the state
only to qualified convicted offenders. Section 4 of the Probation Law (P.D. 968) provides: "That
no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the
appeal from the judgment of conviction." Since Arnel appealed his conviction for frustrated
homicide, he should be deemed permanently disqualified from applying for probation.
But, firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel has the
right to such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is the right to apply for that
privilege. The Court finds that his maximum jail term should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the
Court allows him to apply for probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial
judge to decide whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into account the full
circumstances of his case.
Secondly, it is true that under the Probation Law the accused who appeals "from the judgment of
conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens,
two judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated
homicide by the Regional Trial Court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide
by the Supreme Court.
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for probation
would dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco vs. Court of Appeals that the probation law
requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of
probation. But there is a huge difference between Francisco and this case.
In Francisco, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati found the accused guilty of grave
oral defamation and sentenced him to a prison term of one year and one day to one year and eight
months of prision correccional, a clearly probationable penalty. Probation was his to ask! Still, he
chose to appeal, seeking an acquittal, hence clearly waiving his right to apply for probation. When
the acquittal did not come, he wanted probation. The Court would not of course let him. It served
him right that he wanted to save his cake and eat it too. He certainly could not have both appeal
and probation.
The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an accused must not have appealed
his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. This requirement "outlaws the element of
speculation on the part of the accused—to wager on the result of his appeal—that when his
conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of
his sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an ‘escape hatch’ thus rendering nugatory
the appellate court’s affirmance of his conviction."
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for
probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. He was not in a position to say,
"By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court
imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek
probation under this Court’s greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in
Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have
the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.
Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of the penalty imposed on him.
He claimed that the evidence at best warranted his conviction only for attempted, not frustrated,
homicide, which crime called for a probationable penalty. In a way, therefore, Arnel sought from
the beginning to bring down the penalty to the level where the law would allow him to apply for
probation.
In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of
attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable
penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct
offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would
have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of
his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such
philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. As
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law must not be
regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only where it clearly appears he comes
within its letter; to do so would be to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law
should be applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its
beneficent purpose.
One of those who dissent from this decision points out that allowing Arnel to apply for probation
after he appealed from the trial court’s judgment of conviction would not be consistent with the
provision of Section 2 that the Probation Law should be interpreted to "provide an opportunity for
the reformation of a penitent offender." An accused like Arnel who appeals from a judgment
convicting him, it is claimed, shows no penitence.
This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct judgment of conviction. Here,
however, it convicted Arnel of the wrong crime, frustrated homicide, which carried a penalty in
excess of 6 years. How can the Court expect him to feel penitent over a crime, which as the Court
now finds, he did not commit? He only committed attempted homicide with its maximum penalty
of 2 years and 4 months.
Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under the reduced penalty, it
would be sending him straight behind bars. It would be robbing him of the chance to instead
undergo reformation as a penitent offender, defeating the very purpose of the Probation Law.

2. SUYAN vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 189644 July 2, 2014

FACTS:
Information was filed against petitioner, charging him with violation of Section 16, Article III of
R.A. No. 6425 (Possession and Use of Dangerous Drugs). During arraignment, he pleaded guilty
to the charge. The RTC thereafter proceeded with trial.
Petitioner was convicted of the crime, for which he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6)
years of prision correccional and to pay the costs. On even date, he filed his application for
probation.
RTC issued a Probation Order covering a period of six (6) years. While on probation, petitioner
was arrested on two occasions for violating Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425. Two separate
Informations were filed against him.
Atty. Navarro, then the Chief Probation and Parole Officer, filed a Motion to Revoke Probation.
Atty. Navarro alleged that petitioner has been apprehended twice for drug possession while on
probation. The former further alleged that petitioner was considered a recidivist, whose
commission of other offenses while on probation was a serious violation of the terms thereof. Atty.
Navarro also pointed out that petitioner was no longer in a position to comply with the conditions
of the latter’s probation, in view of his incarceration.
RTC issued an order revoking the probation of petitioner and directing him to serve the sentence
imposed upon him. It denied his Motion for Reconsideration.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Rule 65 Petition with the CA, wherein he assailed the revocation of
his probation. He argued that he was denied due process as he was not furnished with a copy of
the Motion to Revoke; and when the motion was heard, he was not represented by his counsel of
record.
The CA granted the Rule 65 Petition by annulling and set aside RTC’s revocation of petitioner’s
probation. The CA ruled that the trial court had not complied with the Probation Law and the
procedural requisites for the revocation of probation under the Revised Rules on Probation
Methods and Procedures, enumerated as follows:
1) No fact-finding investigation of the alleged violations was conducted by the Probation Officer.
2) The Probation Office should have reported to respondent court the result of said investigation,
if any, upon its completion.
3) There was no Violation Report under P.A. Form No. 8, the contents of which are enumerated
under Section 38 of the Revised Rules on Probation Methods and Procedures.
4) No warrant of arrest was issued by respondent court after considering the nature and seriousness
of the alleged violations based on the report, if any.
5) The petitioner should have been brought to respondent court for a hearing of the violations
charged, during which petitioner – with the right to counsel – should have been informed of the
violations charged and allowed to adduce evidence in his favor.

The CA ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings, for the purpose of
affording petitioner his right to due process pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 968, and the
Revised Rules on Probation Methods and Procedures.
In compliance with the CA Decision, the RTC conducted a hearing on the Motion to Revoke. A
Violation Report was filed by the Dagupan City Parole and Probation Office recommending the
revocation of probation. The Violation Report provides in part:
At the outset of his probation period, probationer showed manifested negative attitude by
incurring absences and not attending rehabilitation activities despite constant follow-up by
his supervising officers. He continued with his illegal drug activities despite counselling
and warning from this Office.
Obviously, probationer has failed to recognize the value of freedom and second chance
accorded him by the Honorable Court, his conduct and attitude bespeaks of his deviant
character, hence he is unworthy to continuously enjoy the privilege of probation.
The RTC issued an Order revoking the probation. It ruled that it had granted petitioner due process
by affording him the full opportunity to contest the Motion to Revoke; but that instead of rebutting
the Violation Report, he merely questioned the absence of a violation report when his probation
was first revoked. The RTC further held that there was positive testimony and documentary
evidence showing that petitioner had indeed violated the conditions of his probation. He never
rebutted the fact of his commission of another offense and conviction therefor while on probation.
He filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied.
The CA denied his appeal. With regard to the procedural issues discussed in the assailed Decision,
it ruled that petitioner was afforded due process. A full-blown trial was conducted precisely to
allow him to refute the allegations made in the Motion to Revoke. It added that the procedural
infirmities in the Motion to Revoke were cured when the RTC conducted a hearing in accordance
with the directive laid down in the first CA Case.
With regard to the substantive issue of revocation, the CA ruled that, for having been apprehended
twice for the commission of two offenses similar in nature, petitioner violated one of the conditions
prescribed in the Probation Order. He even admitted to having served out his sentence for those
offenses.
Defense
Aggrieved yet again, petitioner filed an appeal with this Court. On procedural grounds, he alleges
that there was no fact-finding investigation of the alleged violations conducted by the probation
officer, and thus no results were furnished him. Likewise, no warrant of arrest was issued by the
RTC. Neither was he afforded any opportunity to adduce evidence in his favor with the assistance
of counsel.
On substantive grounds, petitioner alleges that he already showed repentance after his conviction.
In his first case, he readily admitted his accountability by pleading guilty to the charge. Thus, he
was convicted and he subsequently applied for probation. He further alleges that, of the two cases
filed against him, one was ordered dismissed; he has already served his sentence for the other.
Since then, no derogatory information has been received either by the probation office or the trial
court. Petitioner points out that he has already reformed his ways and is thus entitled to the grace
of law. He contends that the CA should have ordered him to resume his probation pursuant to the
Positivist Theory adopted in our criminal justice system.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the probation was validly revoked (YES)
RULING:
The probation of petitioner was validly revoked.
On the procedural grounds, the Court does not subscribe to petitioner’s contention that his right to
due process was violated after the RTC had already conducted a full-blown trial on the Motion to
Revoke, in compliance with the directive of the CA. Based on record, he had ample opportunity
to refute the allegations contained in the Violation Report.
On substantive grounds, the Court believes that there was sufficient justification for the revocation
of his probation.
Petitioner does not deny the fact that he has been convicted, and that he has served out his sentence
for another offense while on probation. Consequently, his commission of another offense is a direct
violation of Condition No. 9 of his Probation Order, and the effects are clearly outlined in Section
11 of the Probation Law.
Section 11 of the Probation Law provides that the commission of another offense shall
render the probation order ineffective. Section 11 states:
SECTION 11. Effectivity of Probation Order. - A probation order shall take effect upon its
issuance, at which time the court shall inform the offender of the consequences thereof and
explain that upon his failure to comply with any of the conditions prescribed in the said
order or his commission of another offense, he shall serve the penalty imposed for the
offense under which he was placed on probation.
As probation is a mere discretionary grant, petitioner was bound to observe full obedience to the
terms and conditions pertaining to the probation order or run the risk of revocation of this privilege.
Regrettably, petitioner wasted the opportunity granted him by the RTC to remain outside prison
bars, and must now suffer the consequences of his violation. The Court's discretion to grant
probation is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society and only incidentally for
the benefit of the accused. Having the power to grant probation, it follows that the trial court also
has the power to order its revocation in a proper case and under appropriate circumstances.

ANTI-FENCING LAW (PD 1612)

1. ONG vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 190475 April 10, 2013
FACTS:
Prosecution's Version
Private complainant (Azajar) was the owner of 44 Firestone truck tires, described as T494 1100
by 20 by 14. He acquired the same from Philtread Corporation. The said acquisition was evidenced
by Sales Invoice No. 4565 and an Inventory List acknowledging receipt of the tires specifically
described by their serial numbers. Private complainant marked the tires using a piece of chalk
before storing them inside the warehouse.
Private complainant learned from Jose Cabal, caretaker of the warehouse, that all 38 truck tires (6
out of 44 tires were sold prior the robbery) were stolen from the warehouse, the gate of which was
forcibly opened. Private complainant, together with caretaker Cabal, reported the robbery to the
Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio.
Pending the police investigation, private complainant canvassed from numerous business
establishments in an attempt to locate the stolen tires. Private complainant chanced upon Jong's
Marketing, a store selling tires owned and operated by appellant. Private complainant inquired if
appellant was selling any Model T494 1100 by 20 by 14 ply Firestone tires, to which the latter
replied in the affirmative. Appellant brought out a tire fitting the description, which private
complainant recognized as one of the tires stolen from his warehouse, based on the chalk marking
and the serial number thereon. Private complainant asked appellant if he had any more of such
tires in stock, which was again answered in the affirmative. Private complainant then left the store
and reported the matter to the Chief of the Southern Police District. A buy-bust operation was
conducted and the police were able to confiscate thirteen (13) tires. The tires were confirmed by
private complainant as stolen from his warehouse.
Accused's Version/Defense
Accused Ong alleged that he had been engaged in the business of buying and selling tires for 24
years and denied that he had any knowledge that he was selling stolen tires in Jong Marketing. He
further averred that a certain Ramon Go offered to sell 13 Firestone truck tires for P3,500 each
(total of P45,500) for which he was issued a Sales Invoice with the letterhead Gold Link Hardware
& General Merchandise (Gold Link). He argued that the sales invoice issued by Go is proof of a
legitimate transaction and may be raised as a defense in the charge of fencing.
Crime charged: violation of the Anti-Fencing Law
RTC: found that the prosecution had sufficiently established that all thirteen (13) tires found in the
possession of Ong constituted a prima facie evidence of fencing. Having failed to overcome the
presumption by mere denials, he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D.
1612 (Anti-Fencing Law).
CA: affirmed
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of violation of P.D. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law) (YES)
RULING:
YES, the accused is guilty of violating P.D. 1612.
Fencing is defined in Section 2(a) of P.D. 1612 as the “act of any person who, with intent to gain
for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or
shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he
knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery
or theft.”
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: 1) a crime of robbery or theft has
been committed; 2) the accused, who is not a principal or on accomplice in the commission of the
crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or
buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; 3) the accused knew or should
have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and 4) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain
for oneself or for another.
All the elements of the crime of fencing are present in this case.
First, the private complainant and the caretaker testified that the crime of robbery had been
committed. The private complainant was able to prove ownership of the tires through Sales Invoice
No. 456511 and an Inventory List. Witnesses for the prosecution likewise testified that robbery
was reported as evidenced by their Sinumpaang Salaysay.
Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the robbery, he never
denied the fact that 13 tires of Azajar were caught in his possession. The Court finds that the serial
numbers of stolen tires corresponds to those found in Ong’s possession. Ong likewise admitted
that he bought the said tires from Go of Gold Link where he was issued Sales Invoice No. 980.
Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of
value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The words “should
know” denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the
fact in performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such
fact exists. Ong, who was in the business of buy and sell of tires for the past twenty-four (24) years,
ought to have known the ordinary course of business in purchasing from an unknown seller.
Admittedly, Go approached Ong and offered to sell the thirteen (13) tires and he did not even ask
for proof of ownership of the tires. His experience from the business should have given him doubt
as to the legitimate ownership of the tires considering that it was his first time to transact with Go
and the manner it was sold is as if Go was just peddling the thirteen (13) tires in the streets.
In Dela Torre vs. COMELEC, it was held that:
Circumstances normally exist to forewarn, for instance, a reasonably vigilant buyer that the object
of the sale may have been derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft. Such circumstances
include the time and place of the sale, both of which may not be in accord with the usual practices
of commerce. The nature and condition of the goods sold, and the fact that the seller is not regularly
engaged in the business of selling goods may likewise suggest the illegality of their source, and
therefore should caution the buyer. This justifies the presumption found in Section 5 of P.D. 1612
that “mere possession of any goods, object or anything of value which has been the subject of
robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing” — a presumption that is, according
to the Court, “reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the established
fact of . . . possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.”
Moreover, Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling second hand tires. Section 6 of P.D.
1612 requires stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buying and selling of any good,
article, item, object or anything else of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof
to secure the necessary clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated National
Police in the town or city where that store, establishment or entity is located before offering the
item for sale to the public. In fact, Ong has practiced the procedure of obtaining clearances from
the police station for some used tires he wanted to resell but, in this particular transaction, he was
remiss in his duty as a diligent businessman who should have exercised prudence.
The issuance of a sales invoice or receipt is proof of a legitimate transaction and may be raised as
a defense in the charge of fencing; however, that defense is disputable. In this case, the prosecution
was able to prove that Gold Link and the address were fictitious. Ong failed to prove the legitimacy
of the transaction. Thus, he was unable to rebut the prima facie presumption under Section 5 of
P.D. 1612.
Finally, there was evident intent to gain for considering that during the buy-bust operation, Ong
was actually caught selling the stolen tires in his store.
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of fencing from
evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value, which
has been the subject of robbery or theft.
2. PEOPLE vs. DIMAT
G.R. No. 181184 January 25, 2012
FACTS:
On December, 2000, Delgado’s wife, Sonia, bought from accused Dimat a 1997 Nissan Safari
bearing plate number WAH-569 for P850,000.00. The deed of sale gave the vehicle’s engine
number as TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553.
On March 7, 2001, PO Ramirez and fellow officers of the Traffic Management Group (TMG)
spotted the Nissan Safari on E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City, bearing a suspicious plate
number. After stopping and inspecting the vehicle, they discovered that its engine number was
actually TD42-119136 and its chassis number CRGY60-YO3111. They also found the particular
Nissan Safari on their list of stolen vehicles. They brought it to their Camp Crame office and there
further learned that it had been stolen from its registered owner, Jose Mantequilla. Mantequilla
affirmed that he owned a 1997 Nissan Safari that carried plate number JHM818, which he
mortgaged to Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation. The vehicle was carnapped on May 25,
1998 at Robinsons Galleria’s parking area. He reported the carnapping to the TMG.
Dimat claimed that he did not know Mantequilla. He bought the 1997 Nissan Safari in good faith
and for value from a certain Manuel Tolentino under a deed of sale that gave its engine number as
TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553. Dimat later sold the vehicle to
Delgado. He also claimed that, although the Nissan Safari he sold to Delgado and the one which
the police officers took into custody had the same plate number, they were not actually the same
vehicle.
Crime charged: violation of Anti-Fencing Law
RTC: guilty
CA: affirmed
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused is guilty of fencing (YES)
Defenses
1) that the Nissan Safari he bought from Tolentino and later sold to Delgado had engine number
TD42-126134 and chassis number CRGY60-YO3553 as evidenced by the deeds of sale covering
those transactions; the Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla, on the other hand, had engine
number TD42-119136 and chassis number CRGY60-YO3111 2) lack of criminal intent
RULING:
YES, accused is guilty of fencing.
The elements of fencing are: 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the accused, who took
no part in the robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or
disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object taken during that robbery
or theft; 3) the accused knows or should have known that the thing derived from that crime; and
4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another.

Dimat’s defense is flawed. First, the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from him, when stopped on the
road and inspected by the police, turned out to have the engine and chassis numbers of the Nissan
Safari stolen from Mantequilla. This means that the deeds of sale did not reflect the correct
numbers of the vehicle’s engine and chassis. Second, P.D. 1612 is a special law and, therefore,
its violation is regarded as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof of criminal intent.
Evidently, Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not properly documented. He said
that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration and official receipt. But this certainly
could not be true because, the vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had no documents to
show. That Tolentino was unable to make good on his promise to produce new documents
undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit source. Still, Dimat
sold the same to Sonia Delgado who apparently made no effort to check the papers covering her
purchase. That she might herself be liable for fencing is of no moment since she did not stand
accused in the case.

OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE (P.D. 1829)

1. ENRILE VS. JUDGE AMIN
FACTS:
SAn Information was filed against Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile as having committed REBELLION
COMPLEXED WITH MURDER. Another (separate) Information was filed against Enrile for
violation of PD No. 1829. The second Information was filed because Enrile allegedly harbored
and concealed in his house Ex. Lt. Col Gregorio Honasan, who was suspected of having committed
a crime.
Allegations:
a) rebellion case: Fugitive Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan and some 100 rebel soldiers
attended the mass and birthday party held at the residence of the petitioner in the
evening of December 1, 1989. On or about 6:30 p.m., 1 December, 1989, Col. Gregorio
"Gringo" Honasan conferred with accused Senator Juan Ponce Enrile accompanied by
about 100 fully armed rebel soldiers wearing white armed patches. (Based on this, the
prosecution concluded that Enrile and Honasan were co-conspirators in the failed
December coup.)
b) PD No. 1829 case: Petitioner entertained and accommodated Col. Honasan by giving
him food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house.
On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to hold in abeyance the issuance of
a warrant of arrest pending personal determination by the court of probable cause, and (b) to
dismiss the case and expunge the information from the record.
On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing judge of respondent Judge
Omar Amin, DENIED Senator Enrile's Omnibus motion. Enrile filed a Motion for Reconsideration
and to Quash/Dismiss but this was also denied.
Enrile appealed to the SC on certiorari. Among his arguments were:
a) The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col. Honasan in a supposed
meeting on 1 December 1989 is ABSORBED IN, OR IS A COMPONENT ELEMENT
OF, the "complexed" rebellion presently charged against Sen. Enrile as alleged co-
conspirator of Col. Honasan on the basis of the same meeting on 1 December 1989;
b) The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be only one prosecution for all
the component acts of rebellion;
Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829.
ARGUMENT: PD No. 1829 involves a special law while rebellion is based on the Revised
Penal Code or a general law.

ISSUE:
W/N Enrile could be separately charged for violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion
case earlier filed against him.

RULING:
NO. The violation of PD No. 1829 is ABSORBED in the crime of rebellion.
The SC cited People v. Hernandez in stating the long-standing proscription against splitting the
component offenses of rebellion and subjecting them to separate prosecutions.
If a person can not be charged with the complex crime of rebellion for the greater penalty to be
applied, neither can he be charged separately for two (2) different offenses where one is a
constitutive or component element or committed in furtherance of rebellion.
As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the rebellion charge constitute or include
the very incident which gave rise to the charge of the violation under Presidential Decree No. 1829.
Under the Department of Justice resolution there is only one crime of rebellion complexed with
murder and multiple frustrated murder but there could be 101 separate and independent
prosecutions for harboring and concealing" Honasan and 100 other armed rebels under PD No.
1829. The splitting of component elements is readily apparent.
Necessarily, being in conspiracy with Honasan, petitioners alleged act of harboring or concealing
was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus constitute a component
thereof. it was motivated by the single intent or resolution to commit the crime of rebellion. As
held in People v. Hernandez, supra:
“In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as
such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive
factor is the intent or motive.”
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast movement of men and a
complex net of intrigues and plots. Jurisprudence tells us that acts committed in furtherance of the
rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion.
In this case, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component or
ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot therefore be made
the basis of a separate charge.
Re: argument of Judge Amin that PD No. 1829 is a special law and rebellion is under RPC/general
law: All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere
components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of
rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves.
Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in the crime of rebellion.
These common crimes refer to all acts of violence such as murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping etc.
as provided in the Revised Penal Code. The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however,
constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to
common crimes but also to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the
political offense.
The prosecution must make up its mind whether to charge Senator Ponce Enrile with rebellion
alone or to drop the rebellion case and charge him with murder and multiple frustrated murder and
also violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot complex the rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder.
As earlier mentioned, the intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not
charged with rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is
a friend and former associate, the motive for the act is completely different. But if the act is
committed with political or social motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion, then it should be
deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion instead of being punished separately.

DISPOSITIVE:
- Petition GRANTED. Information is QUASHED.