Sexto Empírico

Ir a la navegación Ir a la búsqueda

Sexto Empírico.

Sexto Empírico (en latín, Sextus Empiricus; ca. 160 - ca. 210),1
médico y filósofo griego, es uno de los más importantes representantes
del escepticismo pirroniano y fuente de la mayoría de datos referentes a esta
corriente filosófica.

Índice
[ocultar]

 1Biografía
 2Influencia posterior
 3Véase también
 4Referencias
 5Bibliografía
 6Enlaces externos

Biografía
No se sabe de dónde era originario, aunque vivió en Atenas, Alejandría y Roma.
Recibió el sobrenombre de «Empírico» por sus concepciones filosóficas pero,
especialmente, por su práctica médica. Sus escritos, muy influidos por los
de Pirrón y Enesidemo, están dirigidos en contra de la defensa dogmática de la
pretensión de conocer la verdad absoluta, tanto en la moral como en las ciencias.
En sus Esbozos pirrónicos (gr.: Πυῤῥώνειοι ὑποτύπωσεις Pyrrhōneioi
hypotypōseis) define el escepticismo de la manera siguiente: «El escepticismo es
la facultad de oponer de todas las maneras posibles las representaciones sensibles
o fenómenosy las concepciones inteligibles o noúmenos; y de ahí llegamos, por
el equilibrio de las cosas y de las razones opuestas (isostenía), primero a la
suspensión del juicio (epoché) y, después, a la imperturbabilidad (ataraxía)».

Defiende una posición relativista y fenomenista desde una posición escéptica

antimetafísica y empirista. Según él, hay cosas, pero lo único que podemos saber
y decir de ellas es de qué manera nos afectan, no lo que son en sí mismas. No
obstante, su epoché no es tan radical como la de Pirrón. Defiende también una
ética del sentido común y, aunque como pirroniano acepta la indiferencia
(adiaphora) respecto de todas las soluciones morales, reivindica también la
importancia de lo empírico, razón por la cual defiende que la vida práctica debe
regirse por cuatro guías: la experiencia de la vida, las indicaciones que la
naturaleza nos da a través de los sentidos, las necesidades del cuerpo y las reglas
de las artes. Hace una crítica del silogismo, al que considera un círculo vicioso, y
pone en entredicho la noción de signo, especialmente tal como lo entendían los
estoicos. Critica la teología estoica señalando las contradicciones de la noción
estoica de divinidad. Para los estoicos todo cuanto existe es corpóreo, por tanto,
señala Sexto, también lo ha de ser la divinidad. Pero un cuerpo puede ser simple
o compuesto. Si es compuesto puede descomponerse y, por tanto, es mortal. Si es
simple, es uno de los elementos: tierra, aire, agua o fuego y, entonces, es inerte e
inanimado. De ahí se sigue que la divinidad, o bien es mortal, o bien es
inanimada, lo cual es, en ambos casos, absurdo. Además de este argumento,
Sexto Empírico atacaba la noción de divinidad apelando a otros razonamientos.
En todos ellos reforzaba la idea escéptica de la necesidad de la epoché o
suspensión del juicio. Además, atacó también la noción de causa.
Adversus mathematicos.

En general, su obra es importante por cuanto es una de las fuentes del

conocimiento del pensamiento antiguo. Concretamente, su Adversus
mathematicos aporta datos importantes para el conocimiento de la historia de
la astronomía, la gramática y la ciencia antigua, así como de la teología estoica.

Sus obras principales conservadas son, pues, la ya citada Esbozos

pirrónicos y Contra los matemáticos o Contra los profesores (Adversus
mathematicos, hoc est, adversus eos qui profitentur disciplinas),
tradicionalmente dividida en dos partes, con título latino: Adversus
mathematicos —también—, libros I–VI, y Adversus dogmaticos, libros VII–XI
(si bien esta división no es segura, ni puede establecerse si en realidad
pertenecían a la misma obra o se conservan siquiera completas).

Influencia posterior
Una influyente traducción latina de los Esbozos fue publicada por Henricus
Stephanus en Ginebra en 1562, seguida por una traducción completa de la obra
por Gentian Hervet en 1569.2 Petrus y Jacobus Chouet publicaron el texto griego
por primera vez en 1621. Stephanus no lo incluyó junto con su traducción al latín
ni en la edición de 1562 ni en la de 1569, ni se publicó en la reedición de esta
última en 1619. Los Esbozos fueron muy leídos en Europa durante los siglos
XVI, XVII y XVIII, y tuvieron un profundo impacto en autores
como Montaigne, Hume y Hegel.
Véase también
 Problema de la inducción

Referencias
1. Antonio Gallego Cao y Teresa Muñoz Diego (2002). «Introducción». Esbozos Pirrónicos.
Gredos. ISBN 84-249-2666-8.
2. Richard Popkin (editor), History of Western Philosophy (1998) p. 330.

Bibliografía
 Sexto Empírico. Contra los profesores. Obra completa. Madrid: Editorial
Gredos. ISBN 9788424918651.

1. Volumen I: Contra los profesores: libros I–VI. 1997. ISBN 9788424918668.

2. Volumen II: Contra los dogmáticos: libros VII–XI. 2012. ISBN 978-84-249-
3629-7.

 – (1993). Esbozos pirrónicos. Madrid: Editorial Gredos. ISBN

9788424916138.

Sobre Sexto Empírico

 Ernst Cassirer (1985). El problema del conocimiento I. (Das

Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenchaft der neuren Zeit, I).
México, FCE.
 Richard H. Popkin (1983). Historia del Escepticismo desde Erasmo hasta
Espinoza. (The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza.). Mexico,
FCE. ISBN 968-16-1247-7.

Enlaces externos
 Wikimedia Commons alberga una categoría multimedia sobre Sexto
Empírico.

 Sexto Empírico: Esbozos pirrónicos (Πυῤῥώνειοι ὑποτύπωσεις).

 Textos griego y francés en el sitio de Philippe Remacle (1944 -
2011): ed. de 1725, en Ámsterdam.

 Sexto Empírico: Contra los matemáticos.

 VI: Contra los músicos.
 Texto francés, con anotaciones en este idioma, en el mismo
sitio: trad. de Charles-Émile Ruelle; ed. de Firmin Didot,
París, 1898.
Sextus Empiricus
Sauter à la navigation Sauter à la recherche

Sextus Empiricus

Biographie
Vers 160
Naissance

Vers 210
Décès
Alexandrie

Nom dans la langue

Σέξτος Εμπειρικό ς
maternelle

Époque Empire romain, époque hellénistique

Activités Médecin, philosophe, écrivain

Autres informations
Pyrrhonisme (en)
Mouvement

Maître Hérodote de Tarse (d)

Sextus Empiricus (Σέξτος Εμπειρικός) est
un philosophe sceptique et médecin de l'école de médecine antique
dite « empirique »Note 1, qui fut actif vers 190. Il écrivait en grec, mais nous ne
savons ni où il naquit (peut-être à Mytilène) ni où il fut professeur, et ignorons
donc pratiquement tout de sa vie ; paradoxalement, nous avons de lui une
importante quantité de textes philosophiques bien conservés (dont le contenu
autobiographique est quasi-nul), ce qui fait de lui sans équivoque le principal
auteur sceptique de l'antiquité, ainsi qu'une source majeure sur les philosophes
plus anciens que lui dont les œuvres ne nous sont pas parvenues. Selon Diogène
Laërce, il fut chef de l'école sceptique en succédant à Ménodote de Nicomédie et
son successeur fut Saturninus (mais ce dernier n'est mentionné par aucune autre
source).

Sommaire
[masquer]

 1Philosophie
 2Les dix modes de suspension du jugement
 3Œuvres
 4Bibliographie
 4.1Texte grec et traduction anglaise
 4.2Traductions en français
 4.3Sources
 4.4Études
 5Notes
 6Références
 7Liens externes

Philosophie
De façon générale, Sextus Empiricus s'oppose à tous les dogmatismes (stoïcien,
épicurien, aristotélicien...) mais aussi au « scepticisme » faillibiliste de
la Nouvelle Académie, qu'il ne considère pas comme un réel scepticisme
(contrairement au sien propre). Alors que les premiers affirment avoir trouvé la
vérité et que les seconds affirment qu'elle est insaisissable, le sceptique
pyrrhonien est celui qui "continue la recherche"1, au lieu de s'arrêter à l'une de ces
conclusions ou à n'importe quelle autre.

Sextus Empiricus expose la philosophie sceptique héritée de PyrrhonNote 2, se

plaçant en cela dans la même école qu'Énésidème et Agrippa, dont il complète
amplement les travaux, tout en se référant parfois à eux. Il veut atteindre la
suspension du jugement (épochè) et la tranquillité de l'âmeNote 3 (ataraxia)2 en
acceptant les phénomènes comme ils se présentent à lui. En effet, il ne s'agit pas
de rejeter les phénomènes mais de rejeter « ce qui est dit des phénomènes »3,
c'est-à-dire l'interprétation qu'on donne d'eux et le jugement ainsi porté sur la
réalité. Ce choix de suivre les phénomènes empêche le scepticisme de Sextus
d'être vulnérable à l'argument de l'apraxie (dont la formulation la plus connue est
celle du stoïcien Chrysippe). Le phénomène constitue un critère d'action suffisant
pour mener sa vie. Cela lui permet de proposer un conventionnalisme que l'on
peut trouver déjà chez Pyrrhon (qui était prêtre alors qu'il doutait de l'existence
des dieux) et dont s'inspireront Montaigne et à travers lui Pascal ; c'est d'une
façon très similaire que le scepticisme de philosophes contemporains
comme Wittgenstein et Willard Van Orman Quine mène à une forme
de pragmatisme.

Sextus Empiricus propose donc un scepticisme à l'opposé de celui que l'on peut
trouver chez les néo-académiciens, notamment Arcésilas de Pitane et Carnéade.
Il condamne aussi bien que le dogmatisme leur méta-dogmatisme négatif
(résultant de l'affirmation de l'impossibilité de connaître et d'affirmer,
contradictoire parce qu'elle est une affirmation). Au contraire, Sextus Empiricus
n'affirme rien, si ce n'est les phénomènes, c'est-à-dire les impressions, sans que
celles-ci impliquent quoi que ce soit sur les qualités ou même l'existence d'un
éventuel objet réel les ayant causées ; mais postuler l'existence d'un objet réel ou
la vérité d'un système métaphysique n'est pas nécessaire pour agir : les
impressions suffisent.

Les dix modes de suspension du jugement

Sextus Empiricus compte dix "arguments" "par lesquels, semble-t-il, on est
conduit à la suspension du jugement4

 1) "la variété des animaux". "L'eau de mer est désagréable et même

toxique aux humains qui la boivent, alors que pour les poissons elle est
agréable et potable."
 2) "la différence entre les humains". "Ainsi, ceux qui souffrent d'un ictère
disent que sont jaunes les choses qui nous apparaissent blanches."
 3) "les différentes constitutions des organes des sens". "Les sens ne sont
pas d'accord entre eux, c'est obvie. Ainsi, les tableaux présentent à la vue
des creux et des reliefs, alors que ce n'est pas le cas pour le toucher...
C'est pourquoi nous ne serons pas en mesure de dire ce que chacune de
 ces choses est de par sa nature, mais il sera possible de dire chaque fois
ce qu'elle paraît être."
 4) "les circonstances extérieures". "Le même air semble froid aux
vieillards et tempéré à ceux qui sont dans la force de l'âge."
 5) "les positions, les distances et les lieux". "La même rame paraît brisée
dans la mer et droite en dehors."
 6) "les mélanges". "Aucun des objets ne nous tombe sous le sens par lui-
même, mais toujours avec quelque chose... Le corps plongé dans l'eau est
léger, alors que dans l'air il est lourd."
 7) "la quantité et la constitution des objets". "Le vin bu avec modération
nous fortifie, mais pris en trop grande quantité il affaiblit le corps."
 8) "le relatif". "Puisque toutes choses sont relatives, nous suspendrons
notre assentiment sur la question de savoir lesquelles sont absolument et
par nature... Par rapport à ce qui juge, chaque chose est relative en
apparence à tel animal, à tel humain, à tel sens, et aussi à telle
circonstance..."
 9) "le caractère continu ou rare des rencontres". "On estime que ce qui
est rare a de la valeur."
 10) "les modes de vie, les coutumes, les lois, les croyances aux mythes et
les suppositions dogmatiques". "Le dixième mode est le plus approprié
aux questions éthiques." "Une loi est une convention écrite parmi les
membres d'une communauté politique ; celui qui la transgresse est puni."
"Les Indiens s'accouplent avec des femmes en public, alors que la plupart
des autres peuples pensent que cela est honteux."

Œuvres
Il nous reste trois œuvres de Sextus :

 Esquisses pyrrhoniennes, parfois intitulé Hypotyposes

pyrrhoniennes (Πυῤῥώνειοι ὑποτυπώσεις ou Pyrrhōneioi hypotypōseis) (3
Livres) [1]

 Contre les professeurs (Pros mathêmatikous / Adversus Mathematicos :

contre les savants) :
 Contre les grammairiens (Livre I)
 Contre les rhéteurs (Livre II)
 Contre les géomètres (Livre III)
 Contre les arithméticiens (Livre IV)
  Contre les astrologues (Livre V)
 Contre les musiciens (Livre VI)

 Contre les dogmatiques :

 Contre les logiciens (Livres I-II ou Contre les professeurs livres VII-
VIII)
 Contre les physiciens (aussi intitulé Livres III-IV ou Contre les
professeurs livres IX-X)
 Contre les moralistes (aussi intitulé Livre V ou Contre les
professeurs livre XI)

D'après Pierre Pellegrin, « Ce sont ces six écritsNote 4 qui sont proprement
regroupés sous le nom de Contre les professeurs (Pros mathêmatikous, ou, selon
le calque latin souvent utilisé, Adversus Mathematicos), et il faut sans doute
regretter que la mauvaise habitude ait été prise de citer sous le titre de Adversus
Mathematicos ces six traités suivis de cinq livres : Contre les logiciens (en deux
livres), Contre les physiciens (en deux livres) et Contre les moralistes (en un
livre). Ces trois derniers ont aussi reçu l'appellation plus propre de Contre les
dogmatiques. »5

Bibliographie
Texte grec et traduction anglaise

 Sextus Empiricus, éd. R. G. Bury, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University

Press, 1933-1949
 Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 1933, 560 p.
 Against the Logicians, 1935, 496 p.
 Against the Physicists, Against the Ethicists, 1936, 560 p.
 Against the Professors, 1949, 416 p.

Traductions en français

 Contre les professeurs (bilingue grec-français) Paris, Seuil 2002, traduction

de C. Dalimier, D. et J. Delattre, et B. Pérez, sous la direction de Pierre
Pellegrin.
 Esquisses pyrrhoniennes (ISBN 2020262983) Paris, Seuil 1997, traduction de
Pierre Pellegrin.
 Hypotyposes pyrrhoniennes (ISBN 2700734556) Traduction de Huart (1725).
Sources
Sur les autres projets Wikimedia :
 Sextus Empiricus, sur Wikisource

 Diogène Laërce, Vies, doctrines et sentences des philosophes

illustres [détail des éditions] [lire en ligne], Livre IX.
 Sexti Empirici Adversus mathematicos, hoc est, adversus eos qui
profitentur disciplinas, Gentiano Herveto Aurelio interprete, Parisiis, M.
Javenem, 1569 (Vicifons).
 Sextus Empiricus, Esquisses pyrrhoniennes et Contre les professeurs.

Études

 Victor Brochard, Les sceptiques grecs, (1887), réédition Paris, Librairie

générale française, 2002.
 Lorenzo Corti, Scepticisme et langage, Paris, Vrin, 2009.
 Karel Janacek, Sexti Empirici indices, Firenze, Olschki, 2000.
 Brigitte Pérez-Jean, « L’analogie technique dans la critériologie de Sextus
Empiricus », dans Ars et Ratio, sciences, arts et métiers dans la
philosophie hellénistique et romaine, Latomus, n°273, 2003, pp. 259-273.
 Werner Heintz, Studien Zu Sextus Empiricus, Halle, M. Niemeyer, 1932 ;
réédition Hildesheim : Gerstenberg Verlag, 1972.

Notes
1. Ce fait est étonnant et suscite des débats chez les spécialistes, pour la simple raison que Sextus
Empiricus lui-même affirme une école concurrente, l'école dite « méthodiste », plus proche de la
façon de penser du scepticisme.
2. La philosophie réelle de Pyrrhon est sujette à débat chez les spécialistes, en grande partie parce
qu'il n'a jamais rien écrit et que les informations que nous avons sur elle sont ambiguës. Sextus
Empiricus considère Pyrrhon comme le fondateur de son scepticisme et s'en inspire souvent
(jusque dans le titre de son œuvre principale), mais cela ne suffit pas pour dire que ses idées
proviennent réellement de Pyrrhon. Par exemple, Marcel Conche estime, dans Pyrrhon ou
l'apparence, que Sextus Empiricus n'a compris ni Pyrrhon ni Énésidème.
3. Plus exactement, il affirme que la tranquillité de l'âme est une conséquence accidentelle (mais sans
doute bienvenue) de la pratique sceptique, et non l'un des objectifs conscients de celle-ci.
4. Contre les grammairiens, Contre les rhéteurs, Contre les géomètres, Contre les
arithméticiens, Contre les astrologues, Contre les musiciens.

Références
1. Esquisses Pyrrhonienne, Livre I, 1.
2. Esquisses Pyrrhoniennes, Livre I, 4.
 3. Esquisses Pyrrhoniennes, Livre I, 10.
4. Sextus Empiricus, Esquisses pyrrhoniennes, I, 31-163, trad. : Long et Sedley, Les philosophies
hellénistiques, Garnier-Flammarion, 2001, p. 70-87.
5. Pierre Pellegrin, Contre les professeurs, Éditions du Seuil, 2002, p. 9.

Liens externes
 Esquisses pyrrhoniennes
 Contre les musiciens (Livre VI)
 Sextus Empiricus par Benjamin Morison dans la Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy
Sextus Empiricus
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Jump to navigation Jump to search

Sextus Empiricus

Born c. 160 CE

Died c. 210 (aged 49–50) CE

possibly in Alexandria or Rome

Era Ancient philosophy

Region Western philosophy

School Pyrrhonism, Empiric school

Influences

Influenced
Sextus Empiricus (Greek: Σέξτος Ἐμπειρικός; c. 160 – c. 210 CE, n.b., dates
uncertain), was a physician and philosopher, who likely lived
in Alexandria, Rome, or Athens. His philosophical work is the most complete
surviving account of ancient Greek and Roman Pyrrhonism.

In his medical work, as reflected by his name, tradition maintains that he

belonged to the empiric school in which Pyrrhonism was popular. However, at
least twice in his writings, Sextus seems to place himself closer to the methodic
school. He may have been the same person as Sextus of Chaeronea.

Contents
[hide]

 1Writings
 2Philosophy
 3The ten modes of Pyrrhonism
 4Legacy
 5See also
 6Notes
 7References
 8Literature
 8.1Translations
 8.2Selected bibliography
 9External links

Writings
Sextus Empiricus's three surviving works are the Outlines of
Pyrrhonism (Πυῤῥώνειοι ὑποτυπώσεις, Pyrrhōneioi hypotypōseis, thus
commonly abbreviated PH), and two distinct works preserved under the same
title, Against the Mathematicians (Adversus Mathematicos), one of which is
probably incomplete as there are references in the text to parts that are not in the
surviving text.

The first six books of Against the Mathematicians (Πρὸς μαθηματικούς, Pros
mathematikous) are commonly known as Against the Professors, and each book
also has a traditional title:[2]
 Book Traditional title Original title

I Against the Grammarians Πρὸς γραμματικούς / Pros grammatikous

II Against the Rhetoricians Πρὸς ῥητορικούς / Pros rhetorikous

III Against the Geometers Πρὸς γεωμετρικούς / Pros geometrikous

IV Against the Arithmeticians Πρὸς ἀριθμητικούς / Pros arithmetikous

V Against the Astrologers Πρὸς ἀστρολόγους / Pros astrologous

VI Against the Musicians Πρὸς μουσικούς / Pros mousikous

Against the Mathematicians I–VI is sometimes distinguished from Against the

Mathematicians VII–XI by using an other title, Against the Dogmatists ( Πρὸς
δογματικούς, Pros dogmatikous) and then the remaining books are numbered as
I–II, III–IV, and V, despite the fact that it is also commonly inferred that the
beginning of such a separate work is missing and it is not known how many
books might have preceded the extant books. The supposed general title of this
work is Skeptical Treatises' (Σκεπτικὰ Ὑπομνήματα /Skeptika Hypomnēmata).[3]

VII–VIII Against the Logicians Πρὸς λογικούς / Pros logikous

IX–X Against the Physicists Πρὸς φυσικούς / Pros Physikous

XI Against the Ethicists Πρὸς ἠθικούς / Pros Ethikous

Note that none of these titles except Against the Mathematicians and Outlines of
Pyrrhonism, are found in the manuscripts.

Philosophy
Sextus Empiricus raised concerns which applied to all types of knowledge. He
doubted the validity of induction[4] long before its best known critic David Hume,
and raised the regress argument against all forms of reasoning:

Those who claim for themselves to judge the truth are bound to possess a
criterion of truth. This criterion, then, either is without a judge's approval or has
been approved. But if it is without approval, whence comes it that it is
truthworthy? For no matter of dispute is to be trusted without judging. And, if it
has been approved, that which approves it, in turn, either has been approved or
has not been approved, and so on ad infinitum.[5]

Because of these and other barriers to acquiring true beliefs, Sextus Empiricus
advises[6] that we should suspend judgment about virtually all beliefs; that is to
say, we should neither affirm any belief as true nor deny any belief as false. This
view is known as Pyrrhonian skepticism, as distinguished from Academic
skepticism, as practiced by Carneades, which, according to Sextus, denies
knowledge altogether. Sextus did not deny the possibility of knowledge. He
criticizes the Academic skeptic's claim that nothing is knowable as being an
affirmative belief. Instead, Sextus advocates simply giving up belief; in other
words, suspending judgment about whether or not anything is knowable.[7] Only
by suspending judgment can we attain a state of ataraxia (roughly, 'peace of
mind'). Sextus did not think such a general suspension of judgment to be
impractical, since we may live without any beliefs, acting by habit.

Sextus allowed that we might affirm claims about our experience (e.g., reports
about our feelings or sensations). That is, for some claim X that I feel or
perceive, it could be true to say "it seems to me now that X." However, he
pointed out that this does not imply any objective knowledge of external reality.
Though I might know that the honey I eat at a certain moment tastes sweet to me,
this is merely a subjective judgment, and as such may not tell me anything true
about the honey itself.

Interpretations of Sextus's philosophy along the above lines have been advocated
by scholars such as Myles Burnyeat,[8] Jonathan Barnes,[9] and Benson Mates.[10]

Michael Frede, however, defends a different interpretation,[11] according to which

Sextus does allow beliefs, so long as they are not derived by reason, philosophy
or speculation; a skeptic may, for example, accept common opinions in the
skeptic's society. The important difference between the skeptic and the dogmatist
is that the skeptic does not hold his beliefs as a result of rigorous philosophical
investigation. In Against the Ethicists, Sextus in fact directly says that "the
Skeptic does not conduct his life according to philosophical theory (so far as
regards this he is inactive), but as regards the non-philosophical regulation of life
he is capable of desiring some things and avoiding others." (XI, 165). Thus, on
this interpretation (and as per Sextus' own words), the skeptic may well entertain
the belief that God does or does not exist or that virtue is good. But he will not
believe that such claims are true on the basis of reasons since, as far as the
skeptic is aware, no reason for assenting to such claims has yet been shown to be
"any more" credible than the reasons for their denial. (XIX)

It must also be remembered that by "dogma" Sextus means "assent to something

non-evident [ἄδηλος, adēlos]" (PH I, 16). And by "non-evident" he means things
which lie beyond appearances (and thus beyond proof or disproof), such as the
existence and/or nature of causality, time, motion, or even proof itself. Thus, the
skeptic will, for example, believe the proposition that "Dion is in the room" if
sense-data and ordinary reasoning led to the emergence of such a belief. On the
other hand, if he were to "strongly" assert that Dion was "really" in the room,
then he may be met with opposing arguments of equal psychological force
against the self-same proposition and experience mental disquietude as a result.
Thus, the Pyrrhonian does not assent to the proposition "Dion is in the room" in a
dogmatic way as that would purport to describe a non-evident reality which lies
beyond the "appearance" [φαινόμενον, phainomenon] of Dion being in the room.
The Skeptic simply goes along with the appearance just as "a child is persuaded
by...his teacher." (PH I, 229). It is for this reason then that Sextus says the
Skeptic lives undogmatically in accordance with appearances and also according
to a "fourfold regimine of life" which includes the guidance of nature,
compulsion of pathe (feelings), laws and customs, and instruction in arts and
crafts. The Skeptic follows this course of life while suspending judgment
concerning the ultimate truth of the non-evident matters debated in philosophy
and the sciences (PH I, 17). Thus, the Pyrrhonian Skeptic is one who believes
possibly many things, but yet does not dogmatize about those beliefs since he
finds no ultimate justification for them. Thus, the Pyrrhonian
achieves ataraxia not by casting certain judgments about appearances but rather
through his refined ability to "oppose appearances to judgments" such that he is
"brought firstly to a state of mental suspense and next to a state of
'unperturbedness' or 'quietude.'" (IV, 8)

Because of the high degree of similarity between the surviving works of Sextus
Empiricus and those of the Buddhist philosopher, Nagarjuna[12] Thomas
McEvilley suspects that Nagarjuna and Sextus Empiricus were referencing some
of the same earlier Pyrrhonist texts in developing their works.[13]

The ten modes of Pyrrhonism

Pyrrhonism is more a mental attitude or therapy than a theory. It involves setting
things in opposition and owing to the equipollence of the objects and reasons,
one suspends judgement. "We oppose either appearances to appearances or
objects of thought to objects of thought or alternando."[14] The ten modes induce
suspension of judgement and in turn a state of mental suspense followed
by ataraxia. If ever one is in a position in which they are unable to refute a
theory, Pyrrhonists reply "Just as, before the birth of the founder of the School to
which you belong, the theory it holds was not as yet apparent as a sound theory,
although it was really in existence, so likewise it is possible that the opposite
theory to that which you now propound is already really existent, though not yet
apparent to us, so that we ought not as yet to yield assent to this theory which at
the moment seems to be valid."[15] These ten modes or tropes were originally
listed by Aenesidemus.

1. "The same impressions are not produced by the same objects owing to
the differences in animals."[16]
2. The same impressions are not produced by the same objects owing to the
differences among human beings.[17]
3. The same impressions are not produced by the same objects owing to the
differences among the senses.[18]
4. Owing to the "circumstances, conditions or dispositions," the same
objects appear different. The same temperature, as established by
instrument, feels very different after an extended period of cold winter
weather (it feels warm) than after mild weather in the autumn (it feels
cold). Time appears slow when young and fast as aging proceeds. Honey
tastes sweet to most but bitter to someone with jaundice. A person with
influenza will feel cold and shiver even though he is hot with a fever.[19]
5. "Based on positions, distances, and locations; for owing to each of these
the same objects appear different." The same tower appears rectangular
at close distance and round from far away. The moon looks like a perfect
sphere to the human eye, yet cratered from the view of a telescope.[20]
6. “We deduce that since no object strikes us entirely by itself, but along
with something else, it may perhaps be possible to say what the mixture
compounded out of the external object and the thing perceived with it is
 like, but we would not be able to say what the external object is like by
itself."[21]
7. "Based, as we said, on the quantity and constitution of the underlying
objects, meaning generally by "constitution" the manner of composition."
So, for example, goat horn appears black when intact and appears white
when ground up. Snow appears white when frozen and translucent as a
liquid.[22]
8. "Since all things appear relative, we will suspend judgement about what
things exist absolutely and really existent.[23] Do things which exist
"differentially" as opposed to those things that have a distinct existence
of their own, differ from relative things or not? If they do not differ, then
they too are relative; but if they differ, then, since everything which
differs is relative to something..., things which exist absolutely are
relative."[24]
9. "Based on constancy or rarity of occurrence." The sun is more amazing
than a comet, but because we see and feel the warmth of the sun daily
and the comet rarely, the latter commands our attention.[25]
10. "There is a Tenth Mode, which is mainly concerned with Ethics, being
based on rules of conduct, habits, laws, legendary beliefs, and dogmatic
conceptions."[26]

Superordinate to these ten modes stand three other modes:

 I: that based on the subject who judges (modes 1, 2, 3 & 4).

 II: that based on the object judged (modes 7 & 10).
 III: that based on both subject who judges and object judged (modes 5, 6,
8 & 9)

Superordinate to these three modes is the mode of relation.[27]

Legacy
An influential Latin translation of Sextus's Outlines was published by Henricus
Stephanus in Geneva in 1562,[28] and this was followed by a complete Latin
Sextus with Gentian Hervet as translator in 1569.[29] Petrus and Jacobus Chouet
published the Greek text for the first time in 1621. Stephanus did not publish it
with his Latin translation either in 1562 or in 1569, nor was it published in the
reprint of the latter in 1619.
Sextus's Outlines were widely read in Europe during the 16th, 17th and 18th
centuries, and had a profound effect on Michel de Montaigne, David Hume,
and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, among many others. Another source for the
circulation of Sextus's ideas was Pierre Bayle's Dictionary. The legacy of
Pyrrhonism is described in Richard Popkin's The History of Skepticism from
Erasmus to Descartes and High Road to Pyrrhonism. The transmission of
Sextus's manuscripts through antiquity and the Middle Ages is reconstructed
by Luciano Floridi's Sextus Empiricus, The Recovery and Transmission of
Pyrrhonism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). Since the Renaissance
French philosophy has been continuously influenced by Sextus: Montaigne in the
16th century, Descartes, Blaise Pascal, Pierre-Daniel Huet and François de La
Mothe Le Vayer in the 17th century, many of the "Philosophes," and in recent
times controversial figures such as Michel Onfray, in a direct line of filiation
between Sextus' radical skepticism and secular or even radical atheism.[30]

Sextus is the earliest known source for the proverb "Slowly grinds the mill of the
gods, but it grinds fine", alluded to in Longfellow's poem "Retribution".[31]

See also
 Pyrrhonism
 Problem of induction
 Philosophical skepticism
 Skepticism
 Protagoras
 Sextus of Chaeronea
 Dissoi Logoi

Notes
1. Berry, Jessica (2011). Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition. Oxford University
Press. p. 230. ISBN 978-0-19-536842-0.
2. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. "Sextus Empiricus". Retrieved 29 May 2015.
3. Sara Ahbel-Rappe, Rachana Kamtekar (2009). A Companion to Socrates.
4. Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Pyrrhonism trans. R.G. Bury (Loeb edn) (London: W.
Heinemann, 1933), p. 283.
5. Sextus Empiricus. Against the Logicians trans. R.G. Bury (Loeb edn) (London: W.
Heinemann, 1935) p. 179
6. The extent to which a skeptic can hold beliefs as well as the kinds of beliefs a skeptic can
have is a matter of scholarly dispute.
7. See PH I.3, I.8, I.198; cf. J. Barnes, "Introduction", xix ff., in Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of
Scepticism. Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes (transl.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2000).
8. Burnyeat, M., "Can The Sceptic Live His Scepticism" in Myles Burnyeat and Michael Frede
(ed.), The Original Sceptics: A Controversy (Hackett, 1997): 25–57. Cf. Burnyeat, M., "The
Sceptic in His Place and Time", ibid., 92–126.
9. Barnes, J., "The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist" in Myles Burnyeat and Michael Frede (ed.), The
Original Sceptics: A Controversy (Hackett, 1997): 58–91.
10. Mates, B. The Skeptic Way (Oxford UP, 1996).
11. Frede, M., "The Sceptic's Beliefs" in Myles Burnyeat and Michael Frede (ed.), The Original
Sceptics: A Controversy (Hackett, 1997): 1–24. Cf. Frede, M., "The Skeptic's Two Kinds of
Assent and the Question of the Possibility of Knowledge", ibid., 127–152.
12. Adrian Kuzminski, Pyrrhonism: How the Ancient Greeks Reinvented Buddhism 2008
13. Thomas McEvilley, The Shape of Ancient Thought 2002 pp499-505
14. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Trans. R.G. Bury, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1933, p. 23
15. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Translated by R.G. Bury, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1933, p. 23
16. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Trans. R.G. Bury, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1933, p. 27
17. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Trans. R.G. Bury, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1933, p. 47
18. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Trans. R.G. Bury, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1933, p. 55
19. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Trans. R.G. Bury, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1933, p.61
20. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Trans. R.G. Bury, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1933, p.69
21. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Trans. R.G. Bury, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1933, p.73
22. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Trans. R.G. Bury, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1933, p.77
23. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Trans. R.G. Bury, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1933, p. 79
24. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Trans. R.G. Bury, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1933, p. 81
25. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Trans. R.G. Bury, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1933, p. 83
26. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Trans. R.G. Bury, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1933, p. 85
27. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Trans. R.G. Bury, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1933, pp. 25–27
28. Bican Şahin, [Toleration: The Liberal Virtue], Lexington Books, 2010, p. 18.
29. Richard Popkin (editor), History of Western Philosophy (1998) p. 330.
30. Recent Greek-French edition of Sextus's works by Pierre Pellegrin, with an upbeat
commentary. Paris: Seuil-Points, 2002.
 31. D.L. Blank, trans., Sextus Empiricus: Against the Grammarians (Adversus Mathematicos I),
p. 311, ISBN 0-19-824470-3

References
 This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public
domain: Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Sextus Empiricus". Encyclopædia
Britannica. 24 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 751.

Literature
Translations
Old complete translation in four volumes

 Sextus Empiricus, Sextus Empiricus I: Outlines of Pyrrhonism. R.G.

Bury (trans.) (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1933/2000). ISBN 0-674-99301-2
 Sextus Empiricus, Sextus Empiricus II: Against the Logicians. R.G. Bury
(trans.) (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1935/1997). ISBN 0-674-99321-7
 Sextus Empiricus, Sextus Empiricus III: Against the Physicists, Against the
Ethicists. R.G. Bury (trans.) Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1936/1997. ISBN 0-674-99344-6
 Sextus Empiricus, Sextus Empiricus IV: Against the Professors. R.G. Bury
(trans.) (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1949/2000). ISBN 0-674-99420-5

New partial translations

 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Grammarians (Adversos Mathematicos I).

David Blank (trans.) Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. ISBN 0-19-824470-3
 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians. (Adversus Mathematicos VII and
VIII). Richard Bett (trans.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2005. ISBN 0-521-53195-0
 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Physicists (Adversus Mathematicos IX and
X). Richard Bett (trans.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2012. ISBN 0-521-51391-X
 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Ethicists (Adversus Mathematicos XI).
Richard Bett (trans.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000). ISBN 0-19-825097-5
  Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism. Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes
(trans.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed. 2000). ISBN 0-
521-77809-3
 Sextus Empiricus, The Skeptic Way: Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of
Pyrrhonism. Benson Mates (trans.) Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1996. ISBN 0-19-509213-9
 Sextus Empiricus, Selections from the Major Writings on Skepticism Man
and God. Sanford G. Etheridge (trans.) Indianapolis: Hackett,
1985. ISBN 0-87220-006-X

French translations

 Sextus Empiricus, Contre les Professeurs (the first six treatises), Greek text
and French Translation, under the editorship of Pierre Pellegrin (Paris:
Seuil-Points, 2002). ISBN 2-02-048521-4
 Sextus Empirucis, Esquisses Pyrrhoniennes, Greek text and French
Translation, under the editorship of Pierre Pellegrin (Paris: Seuil-Points,
1997).

Old edition

 Sexti Empirici Adversus mathematicos, hoc est, adversus eos qui

profitentur disciplinas, Gentiano Herveto Aurelio interprete, Parisiis, M.
Javenem, 1569 (Vicifons).

Selected bibliography

 Annas, Julia and Barnes, Jonathan, The Modes of Scepticism: Ancient

Texts and Modern Interpretations, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1985. ISBN 0-521-27644-6
 Bailey, Alan, Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean scepticism, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002. ISBN 0-19-823852-5
 Bett, Richard, Pyrrho, His Antecedents, and His Legacy, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000. ISBN 0-19-925661-6
 Breker, Christian, Einführender Kommentar zu Sextus Empiricus'
"Grundriss der pyrrhonischen Skepsis", Mainz, 2011: electr. publication,
University of Mainz. available online (comment on Sextus Empiricus’
“Outlines of Pyrrhonism" in German language)
 Brennan, Tad, Ethics and Epistemology in Sextus Empiricus, London:
Garland, 1999. ISBN 0-8153-3659-4
  Brochard, Victor, Les Sceptiques grecs (1887) reprint Paris: Librairie
générale française, 2002.
 Burnyeat, Myles and Frede, Michael The Original Sceptics: A Controversy,
Hackett: Indianapolis, 1997. ISBN 0-87220-347-6
 Floridi, Luciano, Sextus Empiricus: the Transmission and Recovery of
Pyrrhonism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. ISBN 0-19-514671-9
 Hankinson, R.J., The Sceptics, London: Routledge, 1998. ISBN 0-415-
18446-0
 Hookway, C., Scepticism, London: Routledge, 1992. ISBN 0-415-08764-3
 Jourdain, Charles, Sextus Empiricus et la philosophie scholastique, Paris:
Paul Dupont, 1858.
 Janáček, Karel, Sexti Empirici indices, Firenze: Olschki, 2000.
 Janáček, Karel, Studien zu Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius und zur
pyrrhonischen Skepsis. Hrsg. v. Jan Janda / Filip Karfík (= Beiträge zur
Altertumskunde; Bd. 249), Berlin: de Gruyter 2008.
 Mates, Benson, The Skeptic Way: Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of
Pyrrhonism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
 Pappenheim Eugen, Lebensverhältnisse des Sextus Empiricus, Berlin,
Nauck, 1875.
 Perin, Casey, The Demands of Reason: An Essay on Pyrrhonian Scepticism,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
 Popkin, Richard, The History of Scepticism: From Savonarola to Bayle,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. ISBN 0-19-510768-3
 Vazquez, Daniel, Reason in Check: the Skepticism of Sextus
Empiricus, Hermathena, 186, 2009, pp. 43–57.

External links
 Works written by or about Sextus Empiricus at Wikisource
 Excerpts from the "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" by Sextus Empiricus
 Morison, Benjamin. "Sextus Empiricus". In Zalta, Edward N. Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
 Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism (at Project Gutenberg; includes
translation of first book of the Pyrrhonic Sketches)
 The complete works of Sextus Empiricus in Greek (at Google Books).
 Sexti Empirici opera recensuit Hermannus Mutschmann, voll. 2, Lipsiae in
aedibus B. G. Teubneri, 1912.