B.

WARRANTLESS SEARCHES

JERRY VALEROSO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESSeptember : Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and
3, 2009G.R. No. 164815STATEMENT OF THE CASE: ammunition valid.

A petition for review on certiorari involving the decision of the Hon. Court
of Appeals which affirmed that of the RTC of Quezon City in finding the
petitioner-accused Jerry Valerosoliable of illegal possession of firearm. RULING

FACTS OF THE CASE: : WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the February 22, 2008 Decision
and June 30, 2008Resolution are RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Sr.
Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition Insp. Jerry Valeroso is hereby ACQUITTED of illegalpossession of firearm
underP.D. 1866 and was found liable as charged before the RTC of Quezon and ammunition.
City.On July 10, 1996, the Central District Command served a duly issued
warrant of arrest to Sr.Insp. Jerry Valeroso in a case of kidnapping for RATIONALE/REASON:
ransom. Valeroso was found and arrested in INP CentralStation in Culiat,
From the foregoing narration of facts, we can readily conclude that the
Quezon City where he was about to board a tricycle. He was bodily
arrestingofficers served the warrant of arrest without any resistance from
searched and afterwhich a firearm with live ammunition was found tucked
Valeroso. They placed himimmediately under their control by pulling him
in his waist. The subject firearm was laterverified by the Firearms and
out of the bed, and bringing him out of the room with hishands tied. To be
Explosive Division at Camp Crame and was confirmed and revealed to
sure, the cabinet which, according to Valeroso, was locked, could no longer
havenot been issued to the petitioner but to another person.The defense on
beconsidered as an "area within his immediate control" because there was
the other hand contended that Valeroso was arrested and searched in
no way for him to take anyweapon or to destroy any evidence that could
theboarding house of his children in New Era Quezon City. He was
be used against him
aroused from his slumber when fourheavily armed men in civilian clothes
bolted the room. The pointed their guns on him and pulled him outof the
room as the raiding team went back inside, searched and ransacked the
room. Moments later anoperative came out of the room exclaiming that he
has found a gun inside. Adrian Yuson, an occupant tothe adjacent room
testified for the defense. SPO3 Timbol, Jr. testified that the firearm with
liveammunition was issued to Jerry Valeroso by virtue of a Memorandum
Receipt.The petitioner was found guilty as charged by the RTC. On appeal,
the appellate court affirmedthe same. Hence this petition. Petitioner raised
the issue of legalilty of the search and the admissibility

and validity of the evidence obtained as the same was the “fruit of the
poisonous tree”. Rodel Luz y Ong, petitioner, vs. People of the Philippines, respondent.

ISSUE Facts:
 B. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES

On March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, PO2 Emmanuel and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief
L. Alteza, who was then assigned as a traffic enforcer saw the accused, who and impression that submission is necessary. There being no valid arrest,
was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal. The
Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a
him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in
requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet while driving said motor “plain view;” (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless
vehicle, invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place search; (v) customs search; (vi) a “stop and frisk” search; and (vii) exigent
is almost in front of the said sub-station. He was alerted of the accused’s and emergency circumstances. None of the above-mentioned instances,
uneasy movement and thus asked to take out the contents of the pocket of especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged
and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a
nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size,
including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss
knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it;
that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and
something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled out
the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4)
plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2)
contained suspected shabu.

Issue:

Whether or not the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a

routine traffic stop can be considered a formal arrest.

Ruling:

There was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for
committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this
reason, arrested. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that
he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is
effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that
person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest.
Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or
physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough
that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other,
Teofilo Martinez vs. People of the Philippines Case Digest
FACTS:
Teofilo Martinez, herein petitioner, was accused of homicide. Before the
Regional Trial Court, petitioner filed a motion to be allowed to litigate as
pauper. However, this was denied by the trial court and prompted petitioner
to go to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for certiorari. Petitioner
 B. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES

alleged that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed orders
Later on, petitioner also filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to litigate
as pauper attaching thereto affidavits by himself and two disinterested
persons of his eligibility to avail this privilege. The appellate court
subsequently issued a resolution denying the motion and directing the
petitioner to pay the proper docketing fees within five (5) days from notice.
Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but this was also
denied by the appellate court. Petitioner then filed a manifestation through
his counsel that he was transmitting the docket fees required "under protest"
and that the money was advanced by his counsel. The transmittal was
evidenced by two (2) postal money orders attached to the motion to litigate
as pauper.
A perusal of the records shows that petitioner complied with all the
evidentiary requirements for prosecuting a motion to appear in court
as pauper. The affidavits executed by himself and two other
disinterested persons were enough to convince the court that petitioner
is qualified to litigate as indigent.
The assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals were set aside for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the
case is remanded for appropriate action to the Court of Appeals which
is further ordered to allow the petitioner to litigate as pauper and to
return to him the docket fees he paid.

In the assailed resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the
ground that petitioner failed to pay the required docket fees. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration citing his compliance with the required docket
fee. In the second assailed resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the latest
motion on the ground that it was short of 150.00.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of

discretion in denying petitioner's motion to appeal as pauper litigant?
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO SALANGUIT y
RULING: KO

In the case at bar, the Supreme Court applied the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure. The Court held that a motion to litigate as indigent can be
made even before the appellate courts, either for the prosecution of
appeals, in petitions for review or in special civil actions. It maintained
that the interpretation of the present rules is more in keeping with the
Bill of Rights, which decrees that "free access to the courts and quasi-
judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any
person by reason of poverty."
FACTS:
A search warrant was shown to the accused-appellant and the police
operatives started searching the house. They found heat-sealed transparent
plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also
containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves
which appeared to be marijuana. A receipt of the items seized was prepared,
but the accused-appellant refused to sign it. Charges against Roberto
Salanguit y Ko for violations of Republic Act (RA) 6425, i.e. for possession
 B. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES

of shabu and marijuana, (Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358, after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1
respectively) were filed, and after hearing, the trial court convicted him in Badua in his deposition, was invalid. Thus, the Court affirmed the decision
Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358 for violation of Section 16 as to Criminal Case Q-95-64357 only.
and 8, respectively.

The accused-appellant contended that the evidence against him was

inadmissible because the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid.

ISSUES:

Whether the warrant was invalid for failure of providing evidence to

support the seizure of “drug paraphernalia”, and whether the marijuana may
be included as evidence in light of the “plain view doctrine.”

HELD:

Yes. The warrant authorized the seizure of “undetermined quantity of shabu

and drug paraphernalia.” Evidence was presented showing probable cause
of the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The fact that
there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of
drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant
is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact
seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search
Caballes vs Court of Appeals
warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as
it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the (January 15, 2002)
seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was
presented showing probable cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect Ponente:Puno
to the seizure of shabu from Salanguit’s residence, Search Warrant 160 was
properly issued, such warrant being founded on probable cause personally Nature:
determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. With respect to, and in light of the “plain view doctrine,” the police Facts:
failed to allege the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior
to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it While on a routine patrol in Brgy Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, Sgt.
was recovered on Salanguit’s person or in an area within his immediate Victorino Nocejo and Pat. Alex deCastro spotted a passenger jeep unusually
control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted covered with
 B. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
kakawati
leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded withsmuggled goods, the
two officers flagged down the vehicle. Being the driver of the jeep, Caballes
was asked by theofficers as to what was loaded in the jeep, to which he did
not respond, appearing pale and nervous. The officerschecked the cargo and
discovered bundles of galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by
National PowerCorporation. Caballes and the vehicle with the high-voltage
wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station, wherehe was
imprisoned for 7 days. The trial court found Caballes guilty of the crime of
Theft of property. Upon appeal, the Court fo Aooeaksmaffirmed the trial
court·s judgment of conviction.
Issue:
WON the evidence taken from the warrantless search is admissible against
Caballes
Held:
No; the evidence are not admissible in evidence.
Ratio:
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is
not absolute, but admits of certainexceptions. The situation in the case at
bar does not fall under any of the accepted exceptions.1.
Search of a moving vehicle
( ito yung sense ng case talaga)
The rules governing searches and seizures of moving vehicles have been
liberalized for the purposes of practicality. Obtaining a warrant for
a moving vehicle is particularly difficult for want of a specific descriptionof
the place, things, and persons to be searches. Also, it is not practicable to
secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Still, however, theremust
be probable cause to conduct such warrantless search.One form of search of
moving vehicles is the ´stop-and-searchµ without warrant at checkpoints,
which hasbeen declared as not illegal per se, for as long as it is warranted
by the exigencies of public order and conductedin a way least intrusive to
motorists. A checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it may
involve anextensive search.Routine inspections are not regarded as violative
of an individual·s right against unreasonable search. Thecircumstances in
this case, however, do not constitute a routine inspection. They had to reach
inside the vehicle, lift the leaves and look inside the sacks before they were
able to see the cable wires. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an
extensive search, such a search would be constitutionally permissible only if
the officers have probable cause to believe that either the motorist is a law-
offender or they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to
a crime in the vehicle to be searched. In this case, theofficers flagged down
the jeep because they became suspicious when they saw that the back of the
vehicle wascovered with kakawati leaves, which, to them, was unusual and
uncommon. The Court believes that the factthat the vehicle looked
suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be covered in
kakawati leavesdoes not constitute probable cause to justify a search
without a warrant. In addition, there was no tip orconfidential information
that could have backed up their search, as jurisprudence is replete with
cases wheretipped information has become sufficient to constitute probable
cause.2.
Plain view doctrineIt is clear from the records that the cable wires were not
exposed to sight because they were placed in sacks andcovered with leaves.
They had no clue as to what was underneath the leaves. Object was not in
plain view which could have justified mere seizure without further
search.3.
 B. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES

Consented search At most, there was only implied acquiescence, a mere

passive conformity, which is no consent at all within thepurview of the
constitutional guarantee. Evidence is lacking that Caballes intentionally
surrendered his rightagainst unreasonable searches.

TERRY VS OHIO

Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, John W. Terry (the “Petitioner”), was
stopped and searched by an officer after the officer observed the Petitioner
seemingly casing a store for a potential robbery. The officer approached the
Petitioner for questioning and decided to search him first.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. An officer may perform a search for weapons

without a warrant, even without probable cause, when the officer reasonably
believes that the person may be armed and dangerous.

Facts. The officer noticed the Petitioner talking with another individual on a
street corner while repeatedly walking up and down the same street. The
men would periodically peer into a store window and then talk some more.
The men also spoke to a third man whom they eventually followed up the
street. The officer believed that the Petitioner and the other men were
“casing” a store for a potential robbery. The officer decided to approach the
men for questioning, and given the nature of the behavior the officer
decided to perform a quick search of the men before questioning. A quick
frisking of the Petitioner produced a concealed weapon and the Petitioner
 B. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES

was charged with carrying a concealed weapon.

Issue. Whether a search for weapons without probable cause for arrest is an
unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution (“Constitution”)?

Held. The Supreme Court of the United States (“Supreme Court”) held that
it is a reasonable search when an officer performs a quick seizure and a
limited search for weapons on a person that the officer reasonably believes
could be armed. A typical beat officer would be unduly burdened by being
prohibited from searching individuals that the officer suspects to be armed.
PAPA v. MAGO
Dissent. Justice William Douglas (“J. Douglas”) dissented, reasoning that
G.R. No. L-27360/February 28, 1968/EN BANCOriginal action in the
the majority’s holding would grant powers to officers to authorize a search
SC for prohibition and certiorari
and seizure that even a magistrate would not possess.
, praying for the annulment of the order issued by respondent
Concurrence. judgeParties:Petitioners:Ricardo G. Papa (Chief of Police of Manila), Juan
Justice John Harlan (“J. Harlan”) agreed with the majority, but he Ponce Enrile (Commissioner of Customs), Pedro Pacis(Collector of
emphasized an additional necessity of the reasonableness of the stop to Customs of the Port of Manila), Martin Alagao (Patrolman, head of counter-
investigate the crime. intelligence of theManila Police Department)Respondents:Remedios
Justice Byron White (“J. White”) agreed with the majority, but he MagoHilarion Jarencio (Presiding Judge of Br. 23, CFI of Manila)J.
emphasized that the particular facts of the case, that there was suspicion of a ZaldivarNovember 4, 1966 – having received information the day before
violent act, merit the forcible stop and frisk. that a certain shipment of misdeclared andundervalued personal effects
would be released from the customs zone of the port of Manila, Alagao
and aduly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs conducted surveillance
Discussion. The facts of the case are important to understand the Supreme
of two trucks allegedly carrying thegoods. When the trucks left the customs
Court’s willingness to allow the search. The suspicious activity was a
zone, elements of the counter-intelligence unit intercepted them inErmita.
violent crime, armed robbery, and if the officer’s suspicions were correct
The trucks and the nine bales of goods they carried were seized on
then he would be in a dangerous position to approach the men for
instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation those claiming
questioning without searching them. The officer also did not detain the men
ownership showed the policemen a “Statement of Receipts of Duties
for a long period of time to constitute an arrest without probable cause.
Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501” issued by the Bureau of
Customs in the name of oneBienvenido Naguit.

Mago filed with the CFI of Manila a Petition for Mandamus

 B. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
with restraining order or preliminary injunction, alleging that she was the
owner of the goods seized, which were purchased from Sta. MonicaGrocery
in San Fernando, Pampanga. She hired the trucks owned by Lanopa (who
filed with her) to bringthe goods to her residence in Sampaloc, Manila. She
complained that the goods were seized without a warrant, and that they
were not subject to seizure under Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs
Code even if they were misdeclared and undervalued because she had
bought them without knowing they had beenimported illegally. They asked
that the police not open the bales, the goods be returned, and for moral
andexemplary damages.November 10, 1966 – Judge issued an order
restraining the police from opening the nine bales in question, but by then
some had already been opened. Five days later Mago filed an amended
petition including asparty defendants Pedro Pacis and Martin
Alagao.December 23, 1966 – Mago filed a motion to release the goods,
alleging that since the inventory ordered by the court of the goods seized
did not show any article of prohibited importation, the same should be
releasedupon her posting of the appropriate bond. The petitioners in the
instant case filed their opposition, allegingthat the court had no jurisdiction
over the case and thus no jurisdiction to order the release (case
under jurisdiction of CTA), and as the goods were not declared they were
subject to forfeiture.
March 7, 1967 – assailed Order issued by Jarencio, authorized release under
bond of goods seized and held by petitioners in connection with the
enforcement of the Tariff and Customs Code. The bond of P40,000.00 was
filed five days later. On the same day, Papa filed on his own behalf a
motion for reconsideration on theground that the Manila Police Department
had been directed by the Collector of Customs to hold the goodspending
termination of the seizure proceedings. Without waiting for
the court’s action on the MR, petitioners filed the present action. Arguments
of Petitioners (that seem important)(1) CFI had no jurisdiction over the
case(2) Mago had no cause of action in the civil case filed with the CFI due
to her failure to exhaust alladministrative remedies before invoking judicial
intervention Arguments of Respondents(1) It was within the jurisdiction of
the lower court presided by respondent Judge to hear and decide CivilCase
No. 67496 and to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967, because said
Civil Case No. 67496 wasinstituted long before seizure, and identification
proceedings against the nine bales of goods in question were instituted by
the Collector of Customs(2) Petitioners could no longer go after the goods
in question after the corresponding duties and taxes had been paid and said
goods had left the customs premises and were no longer within the control
of the Bureauof Customs
IMPORANT ISSUE
(there’s another involving illegal search and seizure)
:
WON the judge acted with jurisdiction in issuing the Order releasing the
goods in question
HELD: NO.
Petition granted, case filed by Mago dismissed.The Bureau of Customs has
the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others, to(1) assess and collect
all lawful revenues from imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges,
fines andpenalties, accruing under the tariff and customs laws(2) prevent
and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the customs; and(3) to
enforce tariff and customs laws.The goods in question were imported from
Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of DutiesCollected on
Informal Entry".
As long as the importation has not been terminated the
importedgoods remain under the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of customs. Importation is deemedterminated only upon the payment of the
duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles,or secured to be paid, at the
port of entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have beengranted.
The payment of the duties, taxes, fees and other charges must be in full.The
record shows, by comparing the articles and duties stated in the aforesaid
"Statementand Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" with the
manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor General wherein it is stated that
 B. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
the estimated duties, taxes and other chargeson the goods subject of this
case amounted to P95,772.00
as evidenced by the report of theappraiser of the Bureau of Customs,
that the duties, taxes and other charges had not been paid infull.
Furthermore
, a comparison of the goods on which duties had been assessed, as shown in
the
"Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" and the
"compliance" itemizing the articlesfound in the bales upon examination
and inventory, shows that
the quantity of the goods wasunderdeclared, presumably to avoid the
payment of duties thereon.
(e.g. 40 pieces of ladies’sweaters assessed in the Statement when there
actually
42 dozen
; 100 watch bands were assessed but
2,209dozen, etc.)
The articles contained in the nine bales in question, were, therefore, subject
to forfeitureunder Section 2530, pars. e and m, (1), (3), (4), and (5) of the
Tariff and Customs Code. The Court had held before (and did again in this
case) thatmerchandise, the importation of which is effected contrary to law,
is subject to forfeiture,and that goods released contrary to law are subject to
seizureand forfeiture.Even if it be granted arguendo, that after the goods in
question had been brought out of the customs areathe Bureau of Customs
had lost jurisdiction over the same, nevertheless, when said goods were
interceptedat the Agrifina Circle on November 4, 1966 by members of the
Manila Police Department, acting
underdirections and orders of their Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, who had been fo
rmally deputized by theCommissioner of Customs,the Bureau of Customs
had regained jurisdiction and custody of the goods.
Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes upon the Collector of
Customs the duty to hold possession of all imported articles upon which
duties, taxes, and other charges havenot been paid or secured to be paid, and
to dispose of the same according to law. The goodsin question, therefore,
were under the custody and at the disposal of the Bureau of Customsat the
time the petition for
mandamus was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila onNovember
9, 1966. The Court of First Instance of Manila, therefore, could not
exercise jurisdiction over said goods even if the warrant of seizure and
detention of the goods for thepurposes of the seizure and forfeiture
proceedings had not yet been issued by the Collectorof Customs.
The Court reiterated its ruling in
De Joya v. Lantin:
The owner of seized goods may set up defenses beforethe Commissioner of
Customs during the proceedings following seizure. From his decision
appeal may bemade to the Court of Tax Appeals. To permit recourse to the
Court of First Instance in cases of seizure of imported goods would in effect
render ineffective the power of the Customs authorities under the Tariff
andCustoms Code and deprive the Court of Tax Appeals of one of its
exclusive appellate jurisdictions.
Republic Acts 1937 and 1125 vest jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture
proceedings exclusively uponthe Bureau of Customs and the Court of Tax
Appeals. Such law being special in nature, whilethe Judiciary Act defining
the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance is a general legislation,not to
mention that the former are later enactments, the Court of First Instance
should yieldto the jurisdiction of the Customs
authorities.The Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imp
 B. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
orted goods, for thepurposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the
moment the goods are actually in itspossession or control, even if no
warrant of seizure or detention had previously been
issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture
proceedings. In thepresent case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the
goods in question on November 4,1966, and so from that date the Bureau of
Customs acquired jurisdiction over the goods forthe purposes of the
enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of theregular
courts. Much less then would the Court of First Instance of Manila have
jurisdictionover the goods in question after the Collector of Customs had
issued the warrant of seizureand detention on January 12, 1967.
Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, itfollows that the Court of
First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questionedorder of
March 7, 1967 releasing said goods.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Sanchez,
Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
(UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner
Vs.
LEILA REYES JOHNSON, respondent
[GR 138881, 18 December 2000]
FACTS:
Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58 years old, a
widow, and a resident of Ocean Side, California, U.S.A. She is a former
Filipino citizen who was naturalized as an American on 16 June 1968 and
had since been working as a registered nurse, taking care of geriatric
patients and those with Alzheimer's disease, in convalescent homes in the
United States. On 16 June 1998, she arrived in the Philippines to visit her
son's family in Calamba, Laguna. She was due to fly back to the United
States on July 26. On July 25, she checked in at the Philippine Village Hotel
to avoid the traffic on the way to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA) and checked out at 5:30 p.m. the next day, 26 June 1998. At around
7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at Gate
16 of the NAIA departure area. Her duty was to frisk departing passengers,
employees, and crew and check for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs,
contraband goods, and explosives. When she frisked Johnson, a departing
passenger bound for the United States via Continental Airlines CS-912, she
felt something hard on the latter's abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs.
Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just
undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied
with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior, SPO4
Reynaldo Embile, saying "Sir, hindi po ako naniniwalang panty lang po
iyon." She was directed to take Johnson to the nearest women's room for
inspection. Ramirez took Johnson to the rest room, accompanied by SPO1
Rizalina Bernal. Embile stayed outside. Inside the women's room, Johnson
was asked again by Ramirez what the hard object on her stomach was and
Johnson gave the same answer she had previously given. Ramirez then
asked her "to bring out the thing under her girdle." Johnson brought out
 B. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES

three plastic packs, which Ramirez then turned over to Embile, outside the by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting
women's room. The confiscated packs contained a total of 580.2 grams of a a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
substance which was fount by NBI Chemist George de Lara to be prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu." Embile took Johnson and the security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and
plastic packs to the 1st Regional Aviation and Security Office (1st RASO) terrorism has come increased security at the nation's airports. Passengers
at the arrival area of the NAIA, where Johnson's passport and ticket were attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their
taken and her luggage opened. Pictures were taken and her personal carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-
belongings were itemized. Johnson was charged for the possession of 3 ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious
plastic bages of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are.
weighing a total of 580.2 grams; a violation of §16 of RA 6425 (Dangerous There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their
Drugs Act), as amended by RA 7659. On 14 May 1999, the Regional Trial minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the
Court, Branch 110, Pasay City, found Johnson guilty and sentenced her to reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices
and the costs of the suit. Johnson appealed. in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited
materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These
ISSUE: announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine
Whether the extensive search made on Johnson at the airport violates her
airport procedures. The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having
right against unreasonable search and seizure.
thus been obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible
RULING: in evidence against Johnson. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although
likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the
The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never discovery and recovery of "shabu" in her person in flagrante delicto.
placed under custodial investigation but was validly arrested without
warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of tie 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure which provides that "A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) when in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an offense has in fact just been
committed and person to be arrested has committed it; and xxx." The
circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused falls in either paragraph
(a) or (b) of the Rule above cited, hence the allegation that she has been
subjected to custodial investigation is far from being accurate. The
methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at
the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security
procedures. Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause
 B. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES

These consolidated petitions challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 36 of

R.A. 9165, the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it
requires mandatory drug testing of (1) candidates for public office; (2)
students of secondary and tertiary schools; (3) officers and employees of
public and private offices; and (4) persons charged before the prosecutor’s
office of a crime with an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less
than 6 years and 1 day.

The challenged section reads:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. Authorized drug testing shall be done
by any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing
laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality
of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two
(2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive
result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will
confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to
undergo drug testing:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. Students of secondary and

Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870 (and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as
other consolidated petitions), November 3, 2008 contained in the school's student handbook and with notice to the parents,
undergo a random drug testing x x x;
DECISION
(En Banc) (d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. Officers and
employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall
VELASCO, J.: be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company's
work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the
I. THE FACTS
workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous
drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for
 B. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the
Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
xxx xxx xxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal
offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six
(6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the
national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test
Sec. 36(g) is implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 6486.
II. THE ISSUES
1. Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily,
can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for
senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution?
2. Are paragraphs (c), (d), and (f) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional?
III. THE RULING
[The Court GRANTED the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declared Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL. It alsoPARTIALLY GRANTED the
petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec.
36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec.
36(f)UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Court thus permanently enjoined all the
concerned agencies from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165.]
1. YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator; NO, Congress
CANNOT enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator
in addition to those laid down by the Constitution.
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on
candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on
nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the
qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1)
citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency.
Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need
not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and
elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or
otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard,
evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge
the Constitution
Pimentel’s contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165
should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional.
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed
COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements
enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec.
36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-
drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of
candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be
voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC
resolution completes the chain with the proviso that “[n]o person elected to
any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has
undergone mandatory drug test.” Viewed, therefore, in its proper context,
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add
another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum,
requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set
up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is
really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot
assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.
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2. NO, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 are NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; YES, paragraphs (f) thereof is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
As to paragraph (c), covering students of secondary and tertiary schools
Citing the U.S. cases of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton and Board of
Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie
County, et al. v. Earls, et al., the Court deduced and applied the following
principles: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with
respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights
than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their
parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a
duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their students and may adopt
such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and
(4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission
that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia, supra, and Board of Education, supra, the Court is of
the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional.
Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a
condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and
regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enrol is not absolute; it is
subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.
As to paragraph (d), covering officers and employees of public and private
offices
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched
and as has been held, “reasonableness” is the touchstone of the validity of a
government search or intrusion. And whether a search at issue hews to the
reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the government-
mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the
promotion of some compelling state interest. In the criminal context,
reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be personally
determined by a judge. Given that the drug-testing policy for employees—
and students for that matter—under RA 9165 is in the nature of
administrative search needing what was referred to in Vernonia as “swift
and informal disciplinary procedures,” the probable-cause standard is not
required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on
the reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in question.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of
the privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search
within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this
case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the
privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing
requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent
circumscribed by the company's work policies, the collective bargaining
agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and
the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in
the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment
is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has
been upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized
by the challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the
search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is
the enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly
focused"?
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA
9165 and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain
provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation that would
unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a humiliating
experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is
under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject
of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The
goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and
who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself
prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the
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employees concerned shall be subjected to “random drug test as contained
in the company’s work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing
the risk in the work place.”
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions
calculated to protect as much as possible the employee's privacy and
dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure
shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the
confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the
trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration lies in
the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals in access-
controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to
safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of
custody. In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides that access to the
drug results shall be on the “need to know” basis; that the “drug test result
and the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted
practices to protect the confidentiality of the test results.” Notably, RA
9165 does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting
agencies any information or evidence relating to the violation of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the
operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the
employees’ privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards,
particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively
minimal.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of
privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to
be met by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to
properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that
the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the
case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and
employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed
by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to
promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. And if RA 9165
passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason
that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional
command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to
serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.
As to paragraph (f), covering persons charged before the prosecutor’s office
with a crime with an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than 6
years and 1 day
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court
finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused
of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates
primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they
seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons
to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and
public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random,
and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug
test policy and requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before
the public prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with 6 years
and 1 day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug
testing are “randomness” and “suspicionless.” In the case of persons
charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug
testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and
being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a
criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond
suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged,
they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus
charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor’s office and
peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not
necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to
privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant
attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary
to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate
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a person’s right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the

Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to
incriminate themselves.