A.C. No.

10689

ROMEO A. ALMARIO ... Complainant VS

ATTY. DOMINICA LLERA-AGNO ... Respondent

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J:

This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint1 filed by complainant Romeo A. Almario
(complainant) before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) seeking to disbar Atty. Dominica L. Agno (respondent lawyer), for notarizing a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) without the personal appearance of one of the affiants therein.

Factual Background

On July 5, 2006, a Complaint for Judicial Partition with Delivery of Certificate of Title, docketed
as Civil Case No. 061154162 (civil case), was instituted before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila by the herein complainant against therein defendants Angelita A. Barrameda and
several other persons. It was therein alleged that complainant is the sole surviving registered
owner of a parcel of land situated at No. 973 Del Pan Street, San Antonio, Tondo, Manila,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 244909, and that the defendants therein are
co-owners of that parcel of land by virtue of intestate succession.

Relative to the said civil case, herein respondent lawyer, as counsel for therein defendants,
notarized and acknowledged a SPA which reads:

SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

WE, x x x the HEIRS OF THE LATE VICTORIA ALMARIO, to wit: RONALD A.

GATDULA, of legal age, Filipino, married, and a resident of 973 Del Pan St., Tondo, Manila
and FRANCISCA A. MALLARI, of the same address, do hereby appoint, name and constitute
also MA. LOURDES ALMARIO P. PEDIA, above named, to do the following acts and things:

1. To act as our representative and agent in administering our property x x x located at District of
Tondo, City of Manila consisting of SEVENTY EIGHT SQUARE METERS AND SIXTY FIVE
DECIMETERS (78.65) Square meters, covered by TCT No. T-244909 of the [Register] of Deeds
of the City of Manila;

xxx
HEREBY GIVING AND GRANTING unto our said attorney-in-fact full power and authority,
whatsoever requisite to be done in or about the premises, as fully as we might or could lawfully
do if personally present and hereby ratifying and confirming all that our said attorney shall do or
cause to be done by virtue of these presents until revoked in writing by me.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have signed this instrument on the 26[th] day of July 2006 at
Muntinlupa City.

xxx

HEIRS OF THE LATE VICTORIA A. ALMARIO:

(Signed) (Signed)

RONALD A. GATDULA FRANCISCA A. MALLARI

xxx

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES) SS.

CITY OF MUNTINLUPA )

BEFORE ME, a notary public for the City of Muntinlupa, personally appeared the following
persons on the 26[th] day of July 2006:

x x x
Ronald A. Gatdula with CTC No. 16785315 issued at Manila on 1-19-06 Francisca Mallari with
CTC No. 16785314 issued at Manila on 1-19-06 known to me and to me known to be the same
persons who executed the foregoing Special Power of Attorney, consisting of three (3) pages
including this page where the acknowledgement is written, signed by the parties and their
instrumental witnesses and they acknowledged to me that the same is their own true act and
deed.

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL.

(Signed)

DOMINICA L. AGNO

Notary Public

Until 31 Dec 2006

 PTR No. 0007769

Muntinlupa City

06 January 2006

IBP Life Roll 00577

Doc. No. 193

Page No. 55

Book No. 11

Series of 2006

It is complainant’s contention: (1) that the said SPA was falsified because one of the affiants
therein, Francisca A. Mallari (Mallari),4 could not possibly have executed the same because she
was in Japan at the time the SPA was executed, as certified to5 by the Bureau of Immigration
(BI); (2) that this SPA was used in the said civil case to perpetrate fraud and deception against
complainant resulting in the filing of Criminal Case No. 452612-CR, for violation of Article 172
of the Revised Penal Code (Use of Falsified Document) against Ma. Lourdes Almario Pedia,
(Pedia), the attorney-in-fact mentioned in the SPA; (3) that respondent lawyer notarized the SPA
although Mallari did not personally appear before her; (4) that in the process of notarizing the
SPA, respondent lawyer also accepted a Community Tax Certificate (CTC), which is no longer
considered a competent evidence of identity pursuant to the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice; and
(5) that, therefore, respondent lawyer violated Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which state -

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.

Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man’s cause.

xxx

CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

In her Answer,6 respondent lawyer prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and offered the
following arguments:

1) On July 12, 2006, Pedia sent the SPA to Mallari in Japan and it was brought back to the
Philippines on July 25, 2006 by Mallari’s son, Roman Mallari-Vestido;

2) The SPA was notarized on July 26, 2006 for reasons of expediency, because therein
defendants were pressed for time in filing their Answer in the civil case, and that in any event,
Mallari undertook to have the SPA acknowledged before the Philippine Consulate in Tokyo,
Japan on August 28, 2006, (thereby giving it retroactive effect). Respondent lawyer claimed that
the aforementioned circumstances showed that she acted in good faith in notarizing the SPA;

3) Mallari was able to acknowledge the SPA with red ribbon7 before the Philippine Consulate in
Tokyo, Japan on August 28, 2006;

4) Neither fraud nor deception was perpetrated as the parties in the said civil case executed a
Compromise Agreement,8 which was approved by the RTC;9

5) Contrary to complainant’s claim, CTCs are still presently accepted as proof of personal
identification in cases where no other proof of personal identification is available; and,

6) That, if at all, it was complainant himself who defrauded the RTC when he stated in his
verified complaint that Mallari is a resident of No. 973 Del Pan St., San Antonio, Tondo, Manila,
even though he knew that Mallari was in Japan at the time of filing of the civil case.

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner

In a Report and Recommendation,10 the Investigating Commissioner found respondent lawyer

liable for violation of Section 12 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and recommended that
she be suspended for six months as notary public.

According to the Investigating Commissioner, it was evident that respondent lawyer notarized
the SPA despite knowing that Mallari, one of the affiants therein, did not personally appear
before her.

Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors

On April 16, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a Resolution 11 adopting the
findings and approving the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Respondent lawyer filed a verified Motion for Reconsideration,12 which was denied by the IBP
Board of Governors in a Resolution13 dated May 3, 2014.

Hence, the instant Petition for Review.

Respondent lawyer admits the infraction imputed against her, and simply pleads that the penalty
recommended by the IBP be reduced or lowered. She argues that: (1) this is her first offense
since she was first commissioned as a notary public in 1973; (2) the case involved only one
document; (3) the notarization was done in good faith; (4) the civil case wherein the questioned
SPA was used ended in a Compromise Agreement; and finally (5) she is already 71 years old and
is truly sorry for what she had done, and promises to be more circumspect in the performance of
her duties as a notary public.14

In his Comment15 to the Petition, complainant insists that respondent lawyer must be disciplined
accordingly and that suspension is the appropriate penalty for such infraction.

The sole issue that this Court must thus address is the appropriate penalty to be meted out against
respondent lawyer.

Our Ruling

The importance of the affiant’s personal appearance when a document is notarized is

underscored by Section 1, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice which states:

SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. - ‘Acknowledgment’ refers to an act in which an individual on a

single occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an integrally complete
instrument or document;

(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and

(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document was
voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in the instrument or document, declares that he
has executed the instrument or document as his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in
a particular representative capacity, that he has the authority to sign in that capacity. (Emphasis
supplied)

Furthermore, Section 2(b), Rule IV of the same Rules provides that:

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument
or document -
(1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization; and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules. (Emphasis supplied)

These provisions mandate the notary public to require the physical or personal presence of the
person/s who executed a document, before notarizing the same, In other words, a document
should not be notarized unless the person/s who is/are executing it is/are personally or physically
present before the notary public. The personal and physical presence of the parties to the deed is
necessary to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature/s of the affiant/s
therein and the due execution of the document.

Notaries public are absolutely prohibited or forbidden from notarizing a fictitious or spurious
document. They are the law’s vanguards and sentinels against illegal deeds. The confidence of
the public in the integrity of notarial acts would be undermined and impaired if notaries public
do not observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties spelled
out in the notarial law.

This Court, in Ferguson v. Arty. Ramos,16 held that “notarization is not an empty, meaningless
and routinary act[; i]t is imbued with public interest x xx.”

In cognate or similar cases,17 this Court likewise held that a notary public must not notarize a
document unless the persons who signed it are the very same persons who executed the same,
and personally appeared before him to attest to the truth of the contents thereof. The purpose of
this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the
acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party’s free and voluntary act and
deed.

In the present case, the SPA in question was notarized by respondent lawyer despite the absence
of Mallari, one of the affiants therein. Mallari could not have personally appeared before
respondent lawyer in Muntinlupa City, Philippines where the SPA was notarized on July 26,
2006 because Mallari was in Japan at that time, as certified to by the Bureau of Immigration.

It goes without saying that it was respondent lawyer’s bounden duty, as a lawyer and notary
public, to obey the laws of the land and to promote respect for legal processes. Respondent
lawyer may only forsake this duty at the risk of forfeiting her membership in the Philippine Bar
and the revocation of her license as a notary public. Considering however, the circumstances
attendant upon this case, we resolve to reduce or lower the recommended penalty oil respondent
lawyer.
The Court opts to suspend respondent lawyer as a notary public for two months, instead of six
months as the IBP had recommended. We are impelled by the following reasons for taking this
course of action: first, the apparent absence of bad faith in her notarizing the SPA in question;
second, the civil case wherein the flawed SPA was used ended up in a judicial Compromise
Agreement; and finally, this is her first administrative case since she was commissioned as a
Notary Public in 1973. In addition, respondent lawyer invites our attention to the fact that she is
already in the twilight years of her life.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Dominica L. Agno is hereby SUSPENDED as Notary

Public for the aforesaid infraction for two months and WARNED that the commission of a
similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to Atty.
Agno's personal record. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 11111

In Re: G.R. No. 157659 “ELIGIO P. MALLARI v. GOVERNMENT SERVICE

INSURANCE SYSTEM and the PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF PAMPANGA.”
DECISION

JARDELEZA, J:

This is an administrative case involving a member of the bar. In our Decision in G.R. No.
157659 entitled Eligio P. Mallari v. Government Service Insurance System and the Provincial
Sheriff of Pampanga1 promulgated on January 25, 2010, this Court directed the Committee on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP-CBD) to investigate respondent
Atty. Eligio P. Mallari (respondent) for what appear to be: (1) his deliberate disregard of the
Rules of Court and jurisprudence pertinent to the issuance and implementation of the writ of
possession under Act No. 3135,2 as amended; and (2) his witting violations of the Lawyer’s Oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).3

The facts leading to this disciplinary action, as found by this Court in G.R. No. 157659, are as
follows:

In 1968, respondent obtained two loans from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
in the total amount of P34,000. These loans were secured by mortgages over two parcels of land
registered under his and his wife’s names. Eventually, respondent was unable to meet his
obligations to the GSIS, which prompted the latter to remind him to settle his account.4

On March 21, 1984, the GSIS applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage due to
respondent’s failure to settle his account. Respondent, however, was able to stall this by
requesting for a final computation of his outstanding account and persuading the Sheriff to hold
the publication of the foreclosure notice in abeyance. On December 13, 1984, the GSIS
responded to his request and rendered a detailed explanation of the account. On May 30, 1985, it
sent another updated statement of account. For failing to settle his account, the GSIS finally
commenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on respondent’s mortgaged properties on July
21, 1986.5

On August 22, 1986, respondent filed a complaint for injunction with application for preliminary
injunction against the GSIS and the Provincial Sheriff of Pampanga in Branch 44 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), in San Fernando, Pampanga. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 7802.6 The
RTC ultimately decided Civil Case No. 7802 in his favor. Upon appeal by the GSIS, the CA
reversed the RTC on March 27, 1996. This Court, in G.R. No. 124468, denied respondent’s
petition for review on certiorari on September 16, 1996, as well as his motion for
reconsideration on January 15, 1997. As a result, the CA Decision dated March 27, 1996 became
final and executory, rendering unassailable the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale held on
September 22, 1986, and the issuance of titles in the name of the GSIS.7

On September 2, 1999, the GSIS filed an ex parte motion for execution and/or a writ of
possession. The RTC issued a writ of execution cum writ of possession on October 21,1999,
ordering the Sheriff to place the GSIS in possession of the properties.8 The Sheriff failed to serve
the writ, however, partly because of respondent’s request for an extension of time within which
to vacate the properties. Respondent, however, instead filed a motion for reconsideration and/or
to quash the writ of execution on March 27, 2000.9

Respondent also filed a case for consignation with a prayer for writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order against the GSIS and the provincial Sheriff in the RTC in San
Fernando, Pampanga. This case, docketed as Civil Case No. 12053,10 was dismissed by the RTC
on November 10, 2000 on the ground of res judicata, impelling respondent to appeal the
dismissal to the CA.11

Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 7802, respondent filed: (1) a motion dated April 5, 2000 to hold
the GSIS, et al. in contempt of court for painting the fence of the properties during the pendency
of his motion for reconsideration and/or to quash the writ of execution; and (2) a motion dated
April 17, 2000 to hold the GSIS and its local manager Amulfo B. Cardenas in contempt of court
for ordering the electric company to cut off electric services to the properties during the
pendency of his motion for reconsideration and/or quash the writ of execution.12

Eventually, Civil Case No. 7802 was re-assigned to Branch 48, whose Presiding Judge denied
the motions for contempt of court on July 30, 2001 and directed the Branch Clerk of Court to
cause the re-implementation of the writ of execution cum writ of possession dated October 21,
1999. Respondent sought reconsideration but this was denied on February 11, 2002.13

Respondent assailed the orders denying his motions for contempt, the order causing the re-
implementation of the writ of execution cum writ of possession, and the denial of his motion for
reconsideration with the CA. The CA, however, denied his petition for certiorari.14

Respondent brought the matter before us in G.R. No. 157659, where we affirmed the CA’s
Decision. We held that the issuance of the writ of possession in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale
is purely ministerial.15 We further stressed that respondent, as a lawyer, should have known that,
as a non-redeeming mortgagor, he had no more right to challenge the issuance of the writ of
execution cum writ of possession upon the ex parte application of the GSIS, especially after the
consolidation of ownership of the properties in the GSIS.16 Thus, his actions can only be tainted
by bad faith.17 This Court further agreed with the CA’s observation that the petition before it is
“part of the dilatory tactics x x x to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in Civil
Case No. 7802 which has already been resolved with finality by no less than the highest tribunal
of the land.”18 Thus, we deemed it proper to direct the IBP-CBD to conduct an investigation on
respondent, the pertinent portion of which we quote:

The Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is directed to
investigate the petitioner for what appear to be (a) his deliberate disregard of the Rules of
Court and jurisprudence pertinent to the issuance and implementation of the writ of possession
under Act No. 3135, as amended; and (b) his witting violations of the Lawyer’s Oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

SO ORDERED.19 (Italics in the original.)

On February 17, 2010, the IBP-CBD notified respondent of the Decision in G.R. No. 157659 and
required him to file his verified answer.20

In the meantime, respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the Decision in G.R. No. 157659
was denied with finality by this Court on April 28, 2010.21

In his answer to the disbarment complaint,22 respondent claims that he did not deliberately
disregard the Rules of Court and jurisprudence relative to the issuance and implementation of the
writ of possession, as well as the Lawyer’s Oath and the CPR.23 He maintains that he is still the
owner of the unlawfully foreclosed properties because: (1) the GSIS’ action for mortgage has
prescribed since more than 10 years had lapsed since the contracting of the obligations; 24 (2) he
still has in his favor the one year right of redemption, to be counted from February 22, 1997, the
finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 7802;25 (3) he preserved his right of redemption by
effecting a valid tender of payment and consignation to the GSIS on May 28, 1997; 26 and (4) due
to GSIS’ refusal to receive his payment, he filed the case for consignation (Civil Case No.
12053) on March 27, 2000.27 Hence, respondent concludes that, as owner of the properties, he
has the right to exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal and may use such reasonably
necessary force as allowed under Article 429 of the Civil Code.28 In any case, he asserts that all
the pleadings in this case were signed by his lawyer, Atty. Andres Ocampo, except for two: (1)
reply to GSIS dated September 11, 2003; and (2) petition for review in G.R. No. 157659.29

The IBP-CBD, in their Report and Recommendation,30 found that the means employed by
respondent are dilatory moves to delay the execution of the judgment in favor of the GSIS. In the
process, he violated his Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.3, Canon 10 of the CPR. The IBP-CBD thus
recommended that respondent be meted a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for at
least one year.31
In its Resolution No. XX-2013-513,32 the IBP Board of Governors adopted the findings and
recommendation of IBP Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero. It also denied respondent’s
subsequent motion for reconsideration in Resolution No. XXI-2015-368.33

These Resolutions, together with the records of the case, were transmitted to this Court for final
action, pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 12(b).34

We adopt the findings of the IBP Board of Governors on respondent’s unethical conduct, but
modify the penalty in accord with recent jurisprudence.

A lawyer must never be blinded by the cause of his client at the expense of justice, even if the
latter turned out to be himself. He must never overlook that as officer of the court, he is primarily
called upon to assist in the administration of justice.35 Often designated as vanguards of our legal
system, lawyers are called upon to protect and uphold truth and the rule of law.36 They are
obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.37

In this case, the judgment in favor of the GSIS concerning the validity of the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings had long became final and executory in G.R. No. 124468. Despite this,
respondent, with the single purpose of delaying the execution of the judgment by the winning
party, took the following series of actions which effectively obstructed the execution of a final
and executory judgment: (1) he caused the Sheriff to fail in his service of the writ of possession
upon his representation that the GSIS had agreed to his request for extension of time to vacate
the premises; yet, he did not vacate the premises and instead filed a motion for reconsideration
and/or to quash the writ of execution; (2) he commenced a second case against the GSIS and the
Provincial Sheriff before the RTC in San Fernando, Pampanga for consignation coupled with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, knowing fully well
that his right to redeem has expired; and (3) he went on to file a motion for contempt against the
GSIS, et al. for painting the fence of the property, and for ordering the electric company to cut
off electric service, despite knowledge that the GSIS’ ownership over the properties has been
upheld.

This Court, unable to turn a blind eye to the maneuverings employed by respondent, previously
observed:

Verily, the petitioner wittingly adopted his afore-described worthless and vexatious legal
maneuvers for no other purpose except to delay the full enforcement of the writ of possession,
despite knowing, being himself a lawyer, that as a non-redeeming mortgagor he could no longer
impugn both the extrajudicial foreclosure and the ex parte issuance of the writ of execution
cum writ of possession; and that the enforcement of the duly-issued writ of possession could not
be delayed. He thus deliberately abused court procedures and processes, in order to enable
himself to obstruct and stifle the fair and quick administration of justice in favor of mortgagee
and purchaser GSIS.

His conduct contravened Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, by
which he was enjoined as a lawyer to “observe the rules of procedure and x x x not [to] misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice.” By his dilatory moves, he further breached and dishonored
his Lawyer’s Oath, particularly:

x x x I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor
give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to my clients x x x

We stress that the petitioner’s being the party litigant himself did not give him the license to
resort to dilatory moves. His zeal to defend whatever rights he then believed he had and to
promote his perceived remaining interests in the property already lawful transferred to GSIS
should not exceed the bounds of the law, for he remained at all times an officer of the Court
burdened to conduct himself “with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients.” His
true obligation as a lawyer should not be warped by any misplaced sense of his rights and
interests as a litigant, because he was, above all, bound not to unduly delay a case, not to impede
the execution of a judgment, and not to misuse Court processes. Consequently, he must be made
to account for his misconduct as a lawyer.38 (Italics in the original, citations omitted.)

Notably, when asked to answer the administrative charges against him, respondent does not
lament the actions he has taken. Rather, he justifies them by insisting that this Court has erred in
its decisions in G.R. No. 124468 and G.R. No. 157659-decisions which have long attained
finality. He again bombards the Court with arguments against the validity of the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings in this disciplinary case knowing fully well, he being a member of the
bar, that final and executory decisions may no longer be disturbed. The same holds true with
regard to respondent’s reliance on Article 429 of the Civil Code. His refuge, if at all, under the
article is tainted with bad faith since he knew that the issue on ownership of the properties has
long been settled in G.R. No. 124468. Such action on his part only affirms his misplaced
zealousness and malicious intent to reopen the case in the hopes of gaining a favorable judgment.
He demonstrates his propensity to abuse and misuse court processes to the detriment of the
winning party and ultimately, the administration of justice. As such, he violated Canon 10 and
Rule 10.03 of the CPR:

Canon 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

xxx
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat
the ends of justice.

Respondent owes good faith, fairness and candor to the court. By arguing a case that has already
been rejected repeatedly, he abused his right of recourse to the courts.39 His acts of not
conducting himself “to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the
courts” constitute serious transgression of his professional oath.

Moreover, the filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of the
doctrine of res judicata, runs contrary to Canon 1240 of the CPR, which requires a lawyer to
exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice.41Respondent’s act of filing Civil Case No. 12053 (which was dismissed by the RTC on
the ground of res judicata) further indicates his proclivity to muddle the issues of the case in
order to delay the execution of judgment in Civil Case No. 7802. By his conduct, respondent
violated not only the lawyer’s mandate “to delay no man for money or malice”, but also Rules
12.02 and 12.04 of the CPR:

Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.

xxx

Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or
misuse Court processes.

Respondent must be reminded that he is not merely the litigant in his case. He is also his own
counsel and an officer of the court with a duty to the truth and the administration of justice:

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, but not at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice. The filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the court’s
processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of
justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to state, the lawyer who files such
multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final and executory
judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing any better)
or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and
to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and
honor.42 (Citation omitted.)

Respondent cannot escape liability by claiming that it was his counsel, Atty. Ocampo, who
signed most of the pleadings. We note that respondent admits that he filed the petition for review
in G.R. No. 157659 before us. By doing so, he ratified the previous actions taken by his counsel.
For otherwise, if he did not in fact sanction these deeds, he would not have elevated before us the
denial of the motions for contempt, the order causing the re-implementation of the writ of
execution cum writ of possession, and the denial of his motion for reconsideration. This behavior
on his part reveals that the actions undertaken by his counsel were under his strict instructions, or
at the very least, with his consent. For having done so, respondent also breached his oath as an
officer of this Court not only by filing groundless suits, but also by instructing another member
of the bar to do so.

In sum, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP-CBD holding respondent guilty of violating the
Lawyer’s Oath; Canons 10 and 12; and Rules 10.03, 12.02, and 12.04 of the CPR. However, we
deem it proper to increase the penalty of suspension from the practice of law from one (1) year to
two (2) years.43

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Eligio P. Mallari is hereby

found GUILTY of violating the Lawyer’s Oath; Canons 10 and 12; and Rules 10.03, 12.02, and
12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby suspended from the practice of
law for a period of two (2) years effective upon receipt of a copy of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
 Tomas P. Tan, Jr. VS Atty. Haide V. Gumba

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Tomas P.

Tan, Jr. against respondent Atty. Haide B. Vista-Gumba for gross unethical conduct.

The facts are as follows.

Complainant, a self-made businessman with a tailoring shop in Naga City, filed a verified
Complaint[1] against respondent, also a resident of Naga City, before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP)-Camarines Sur Chapter. Pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph 3,[2]Rule 139-B of
the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, the said Chapter forwarded the complaint to the IBP
Board of Governors for proper disposition.

Complainant narrated that sometime in August 2000, respondent asked to be lent

₱350,000.00. Respondent assured him that she would pay the principal plus 12% interest
per annum after one year. She likewise offered by way of security a 105-square-meter parcel of
land located in Naga City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2055[3] and
registered in her fathers name.Respondent showed complainant a Special Power of
Attorney[4] (SPA) executed by respondents parents, and verbally assured complainant that she
was authorized to sell or encumber the entire property. Complainant consulted one Atty. Raquel
Payte and was assured that the documents provided by respondent were valid. Thus, complainant
agreed to lend money to respondent. With the help of Atty. Payte, respondent executed in
complainants favor an open Deed of Absolute Sale over the said parcel of land, attaching thereto
the SPA. Complainant was made to believe that if respondent fails to pay the full amount of the
loan with interest on due date, the deed of sale may be registered. Accordingly, he gave the
amount of ₱350,000.00 to respondent.

Respondent, however, defaulted on her loan obligation and failed to pay the same despite
complainants repeated demands. Left with no recourse, complainant went to the Register of
Deeds to register the sale, only to find out that respondent deceived him since the SPA did not
give respondent the power to sell the property but only empowered respondent to mortgage the
property solely to banks. Complainant manifested that he had lent money before to other people
albeit for insignificant amounts, but this was the first time that he extended a loan to a lawyer
and it bore disastrous results. He submitted that respondent committed fraud and deceit or
conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.
 Upon being ordered by the IBP to answer the above allegations, respondent filed a
Motion for Extension of Time to File a Responsive Pleading[5] but no answer or comment was
ever filed by her before the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). Likewise, the IBP-CBD
allowed respondent to answer the Amended Complaint subsequently filed by complainant but
she did not file any answer thereto.[6] She also chose not to attend the mandatory conference
hearings set on July 18, 2006, June 13, 2007 and January 25, 2008 despite due notice. Thus, she
was deemed to have waived her right to participate in the proceedings.

On February 9, 2009, IBP Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. rendered his

report[7] finding respondent guilty of violating Canon 1, [8] Rule 1.01[9] and Canon 7[10] of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and recommending that she be suspended from the practice of law
for one year. Commissioner De La Rama opined that while respondent appears to be a co-owner of
the property as evidenced by an annotation on the back of TCT No. 2055 showing that half of the
property has been sold to her, it was evident that she employed deceit and dishonest means to make
complainant believe, by virtue of the SPA, that she was duly authorized to sell the entire property.

On August 28, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. in its Resolution No. XIX-2010-446:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED

and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents violation
of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and for her failure to submit verified Answer and did not even participate in the
mandatory conference, Atty. Haide V. Gumba is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for one (1) year. [11]

We agree with the findings and conclusion of the IBP, but find that a reduction of the
recommended penalty is called for, pursuant to the principle that the appropriate penalty for an
errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding
facts.[12]

Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer may be disciplined for
misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his
conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or
whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.[13] Verily, Canon 7 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity
and integrity of the legal profession. Lawyers are similarly required, under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the same Code, not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.

Here, respondents actions clearly show that she deceived complainant into lending money
to her through the use of documents and false representations and taking advantage of her
education and complainants ignorance in legal matters. As manifested by complainant, he would
have never granted the loan to respondent were it not for respondents misrepresentation that she
was authorized to sell the property and if respondent had not led him to believe that he could
register the open deed of sale if she fails to pay the loan.[14] By her misdeed, respondent has
eroded not only complainants perception of the legal profession but the publics perception as
well. Her actions constitute gross misconduct for which she may be disciplined, following
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, which provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds

therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

xxxx

We further note that after filing a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Responsive
Pleading, respondent wantonly disregarded the lawful orders of the IBP-CBD to file her answer
and to appear for the mandatory conferences despite due notice.Respondent should bear in mind
that she must acknowledge the orders of the IBP-CBD in deference to its authority over her as a
member of the IBP.[15]

Complainant now asks that respondent be disbarred. We find, however, that suspension
from the practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent. It is worth stressing that the power
to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty only in a
clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court and a member of the bar. Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end
desired, disbarment should not be decreed.[16] In this case, the Court finds the penalty of
suspension more appropriate but finds the recommended penalty of suspension for one year too
severe. Considering the circumstances of this case, the Court believes that a suspension of six
months is sufficient. After all, suspension is not primarily intended as a punishment, but as a
means to protect the public and the legal profession.[17]

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Haide B. Vista-Gumba is found administratively liable

for grave misconduct. She is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS,
effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt
with more severely.

Let notice of this Resolution be spread in respondents record as an attorney in this Court,
and notice thereof be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 5473

GENE M. DOMINGO … Complainant VS

ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR … Respondent

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

A disbarred lawyer who is found to have committed an offense that constitutes another ground
prior to his eventual disbarment may be heavily fined therefor. The Court does not lose its
exclusive jurisdiction over his other disbarrable act or actuation committed while he was still a
member of the Law Profession.

The Case

Before this Court is the complaint for disbarment instituted by Gene Domingo (complainant)
against Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. (respondent),1 alleging that the latter deliberately and
feloniously induced and persuaded the former into releasing almost half a million pesos on the
false pretense of having performed and accomplished legal services for him.

Antecedents

The complainant is an American citizen of Filipino descent. During a visit to the Philippines in
2000, he sought the services of a lawyer to handle the cases to be filed against his cousin
Melchor Arruiza and to work on the settlement of the estate of his late mother Judith Arruiza.2 In
April 2000, petitioner met respondent, a lawyer recommended by a friend. Petitioner informed
respondent about his need for the services of a lawyer for the rescission of Melchor Arruiza's
adoption and for the settlement of his mother’s estate.3

The complainant alleged that the respondent represented to him that he would take on the cases
in behalf of the law firm of Agabin Verzola Hermoso Layaoen & De Castro, where he worked as
an associate. He assured petitioner that the law firm was able and willing to act as his legal
counsel in the cases he intended to institute against his adopted brother, and to undertake the
transfer of his mother’s properties to his and his children’s names.4 Trusting the representations
of respondent, the complainant agreed to engage respondent and his law firm, and paid the initial
amount of P80,000.00.

Being based in the United States of America, the complainant maintained constant
communication with respondent often through electronic mail (e-mail) and sometimes by
telephone to get updates on the cases. The complainant alleged that based on his
correspondences with respondent, the latter made several misrepresentations, as follows:
[a)] He [had] filed the annulment of adoption of Melchor Arruiza in Abra, stating that the
hearing would commence by the end of May 2000; and that the trial had been brought to
completion;

[b)] He was processing the transfer of the titles of the properties [in the names of petitioner and
his children;]

[c)] He processed the cancellation of the adverse claim of Melchor Arruiza annotated on the two
titles of the properties, claiming that he was there at the Land Registration Authority in Quezon
City for the final approval of the cancellation;

[d)] He was processing the payment of taxes and other fees on the properties to be transferred,
including capital gains tax, transfer tax, registration fees and documentary stamp tax;

[e)] That he was negotiating with the Bureau of Internal Revenue to reduce the tax from
P80,000.00 to P10,000.00;

[f)] That the new titles in the names of petitioner’s children would be ready by July 20, 2000;

[g)] That the new titles in the children’s names were issued;

[h)] That Melchor Arruiza opposed the cancellation of the adoption, and boasted that he knew
many big time politicians in Abra who would help him;

[i)] That the Judge x x x handling the case for the cancellation of the adoption [would] rule in
petitioner’s favor only if he would give to the Judge 10% of the value of the property in Better
Living Subdivision, Paranaque City;

[j)] That the Judge agreed on x x x P200,000.00 but he (respondent) needed an additional
P50,000.00 “for the boys” in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court;

[k)] That the Judge [already wrote] a decision in petitioner’s favor, but [for his protection
insisted upon a kaliwaan of the copy of the decision and the payment;]

[l)] That the Judge received the money and [already promulgated the] decision in petitioner’s
favor;

[m)] That said decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals and eventually to the Supreme
Court where respondent was working doubly hard to influence [a favourable] outcome;

[n)] That the Supreme Court had to meet en banc on the decision of the Abra Regional Trial
Court (RTC) Judge in petitioner’s favor; and
[o)] That in consideration of all the above transactions, he (respondent) needed money [totalling]
P433,002.61 [as payment to the Judge, BIR and related agencies, actual expenses and legal fees],
[but requested] the payment in staggered amounts and on different dates.5

Based on the respondent’s representation as to how justice was achieved in the Philippines, the
complainant was constrained to give to the respondent the requested amounts in the belief that he
had no choice.6 The complainant would repeatedly request the original or at the very least copies
of the decisions and the titles by e-mail, facsimile (fax) or courier service, but respondent
repeatedly failed to comply with the requests, giving various reasons or excuses. The respondent
even volunteered to meet with the complainant in the United States of America to personally
deliver the promised documents. The respondent never went to the United States of America to
meet with the complainant. He also did not turn over the requested documents to the latter. Even
worse, the respondent ultimately tried to avoid the complainant by cutting off communications
between them.

Given the respondent’s evasion, the complainant decided to write the law firm of Agabin
Verzola Hermoso Layaoen & De Castro to inform them of the fraudulent actions of the
respondent.7 The complainant was surprised to be informed by the law firm that he had never
been its client.8 The law firm also told him that the respondent had been forced to resign from the
law office because of numerous complaints about his performance as a lawyer.9

Hence, the complainant terminated the services of the respondent for refusal to respond and to
surrender the alleged documents in his possession. He engaged the services of another law firm
to verify the status of the cases allegedly brought by respondent in petitioner’s behalf. The new
law firm secured a certification from the RTC of Abra to the effect that no case against Melchor
Arruiza had been filed. The complainant also discovered that none of the representations of the
respondent, as enumerated above, had come to pass because all of such representations were
sham and intended to induce him to remit almost half a million pesos to the respondent.10

On July 24, 2001, the complainant filed his complaint for disbarment in this the Court accusing
the respondent of committing acts in violation of Canons 1, 2, 13, 15 & 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.11

On August 22, 2001, the Court required the respondent to comment.12

In his comment dated October 21, 2001,13 the respondent denied the accusations, and countered
as follows:

a) Petitioner wanted to have the adoption of Melchor D. Arruiza by his late mother Judith D.
Arruiza granted by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Dolores-San Juan in the
Province of Abra annulled because he had not been informed about the adoption which affected
his inheritance, particularly with respect to the two parcels of land located in Paranaque City.
Petitioner related to respondent why he (petitioner) filed the action for annulment of adoption in
the RTC in Paranaque City, but Branch 258 of the RTC dismissed the petition on January 19,
2000 for lack of jurisdiction over the case;

b) Following the dismissal of the case, petitioner desperately wanted to revive it in the RTC in
Abra. Petitioner also wanted the annotation of rights, title and interest of Melchor Arruiza as a
legally adopted son of his late mother on the two titles cancelled, and to have the properties
transferred in the names of petitioner’s children;

c) Respondent explained to petitioner that it would be very hard to revive the case because the
order of adoption issued on May 25, 1979 had long become final and executory;

d) It would also be inconvenient for petitioner to pursue the cancellation case considering that he
was a permanent resident of the United States of America and the need for his personal presence
at the RTC in Abra to testify against his adopted brother;

e) Respondent further told petitioner that his law firm at the time did not allow its members to
handle personal cases, especially if the cases were filed in far flung provinces; and that the
particular case of annulment of the judgment of adoption, being a special proceeding, would take
years to finish inasmuch as the losing party would likely elevate the matter up to the Supreme
Court and would be very costly in terms of expenses and attorney’s fees;

f) Respondent claimed that petitioner still profusely pleaded with him to pursue the case no
matter how much it would cost him, as long as his adopted brother was prevented from inheriting
from the estate of his mother;

g) Respondent tried to talk some sense into petitioner, particularly that it was only just and fair
that his adopted brother would inherit from their mother, but petitioner could not be swayed;

h) Even though respondent sensed the greediness, wickedness and scheming design of petitioner,
he still accepted the engagement to handle the case of annulment of the judgment of adoption, as
well as to have the annotations at the back of the titles cancelled and eventually have the
properties transferred in the names of petitioner’s children;

i) Respondent proposed that petitioner pay P500,000.00, more or less, as the total package of
expenses and attorney’s fees; petitioner agreed to the proposal and promised to remit the amount
by installment upon his return to the United States of America, and to send the special power of
attorney authorizing respondent to bring the case against Melchor Arruiza;
j) As a means of protecting the interest of petitioner, respondent offered to issue a check for
P500,000.00 as a security for the amount to be remitted by petitioner from his United States of
America account; his offer of the check was to give a sign of his good faith, because his primary
aim was to provide the best and effective legal services petitioner needed under the
circumstances;

k) Respondent then prepared an affidavit of self-adjudication for petitioner respecting the two
properties registered in the name of petitioner’s late mother; he caused the publication of the
affidavit in a tabloid;

l) Respondent informed petitioner that there was no way for him to win the annulment case
unless he personally appeared and testified against his adopted brother, but petitioner said that he
could not personally testify because he feared for his life due to Abra being an NPA-infested
area;

m) On August 27, 2001, respondent went on and filed the complaint for annulment of the
adoption in the RTC in Abra, docketed as Civil Case No. 1989, even without any firm assurance
from petitioner that he would personally appear in court;

n) After the filing of the case, petitioner started making unreasonable demands, like having an
immediate decision from the RTC in Abra in his favor, the cancellation of the adverse claim of
his adopted brother on the titles of the properties, and transferring the titles in the names of
petitioner’s three children;

o) Respondent tried to explain to petitioner that his demands were impossible to meet because
civil and special proceedings cases take years to finish inasmuch as the aggrieved parties would
elevate the cases up to the Supreme Court; and that the cancellation of the adverse claim would
depend on the outcome of the case they filed, but his refusal to appear and testify was still a
problem;

p) Petitioner still adamantly insisted that respondent comply with his demands, or else he would
sue him if he did not.14

On November 26, 2001, the Court referred the complaint for disbarment and the comment to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation or
decision.15

The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP conducted hearings. The case was then
submitted for resolution after the complainant and the respondent submitted their manifestation
and reply/ counter manifestation, respectively.
 The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation dated September 6, 2002,16 the IBP-CBD found the respondent
guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility with respect to negligence in the
performance of his duties towards his client, and recommended the penalty of reprimand with a
stem warning that a repetition of the offense would warrant a more severe penalty. It ruled that
the proceeding before it was basically a disciplinary proceeding; that it could only decide on the
fitness of respondent to continue in the practice of law;17 that it could not go beyond the
sanctions that could be imposed under the Rules of Court; that it had the power to require the
restitution of the client’s money as part of the penalty; that it could only order the restitution of
whatever amount that was given by petitioner to respondent but not other monetary claims of
petitioner like travel and plane fare and litigation expenses, which were properly within the
jurisdiction of other authorities;18 and that, accordingly, it ordered respondent to immediately
deliver to petitioner the amount of P513,000.00, plus interest computed at the legal rate.

In Resolution No. XV-2002-597 passed on October 19, 2002,19 the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation dated September 6, 2002 of the
Investigating Commissioner.

On January 14, 2003, the complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration,20 praying that
Resolution No. XV-2002-597 be reconsidered and set aside, and that the appropriate penalty of
disbarment, or, at the very least, suspension be imposed on the respondent.

On January 25, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed and adopted Resolution No. XV-2003-
4921 denying the complainant’s Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that the Board had no
jurisdiction to consider and resolve the matter by virtue of its having already been endorsed to
the Court.

Meanwhile, on January 29, 2003, the Court issued a resolution: (1) noting the resolution of the
IBP-CBD reprimanding the respondent; and (2) directing him to inform the IBP of his
compliance with the resolution.22

After the IBP denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, the complainant filed his petition
dated March 6, 2003.23

On April 3, 2003, the respondent filed his Manifestation and Motion praying that the resolution
of the IBP Board of Governors be reconsidered and set aside.24

On April 30, 2003, the Court noted the IBP’s denial of the complainant’s Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of jurisdiction, and the respondent’s Manifestation and Motion; and
took cognizance of the March 6, 2003 petition of the complainant, and required the respondent to
file his Comment.25

On October 20, 2003, the Court took note of the respondent’s Comment with Motion for
Reconsideration, and required the complainant to file his Reply.26 After requesting an extension
of time to file his Reply, the complainant filed his Reply on December 8, 2003.27

Ruling of the Court

In its findings, the IBP concluded that the respondent was guilty of negligence in the
performance of his duties to his client, and recommended that: (a) he be reprimanded with a stem
warning that any repetition of his conduct would be dealt with more severely; and (b) he be
ordered to return the sums of money totalling P513,000.00 he had received from the
complainant.

After reviewing the established circumstances of the case, the Court accepts the findings against
the respondent but modifies the recommended penalty considering that his violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility constituted deliberate defraudation of the client instead of mere
negligence.

Firstly, the respondent misled the complainant into thinking that it would be his law firm that
was to take on the case. Secondly, despite the fact that he had intimated to the complainant that it
would be highly unlikely to still have the adoption decree nullified due to the decree having long
become final and executory, he nonetheless accepted the case. Thirdly, he told the complainant
that he had already instituted the action for the annulment of the adoption despite not having yet
done so. Fourthly, he kept on demanding more money from the complainant although the case
was not actually even moving forward. Fifthly, he continued to make up excuses in order to
avoid having to furnish to the complainant the requested copies of court documents that, in the
first place, he could not produce. And, lastly, he claimed that he intended to return the money to
the complainant but instead sent the latter a stale check.

All these acts, whether taken singly or together, manifested the respondent’s dishonesty and
deceit towards the complainant, his client, in patent violation of Rule 1.0128 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

We note that the respondent filed the case for the annulment of the adoption decree only on
August 27, 200129 after the complainant had sent him the demand letter dated April 10,
2001.30Such filing was already during the pendency of the administrative investigation of the
complaint against him in the IBP. Had the complainant not threatened to charge him
administratively, he would not have filed the petition for annulment of the adoption at all.
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

The Court has consistently held, in respect of this Rule, that the mere failure of the lawyer to
perform the obligations due to the client is considered per se a violation.31

Despite the fact that the complainant engaged his services and advanced sums of money to cover
the court fees and related expenses to be incurred along the way, the respondent did not file the
petition for annulment. His conduct was reprehensible because it amounted to dishonesty and
plain deceit. His filing of the petition for annulment later on did not mitigate his sin because he
did so only because he had meanwhile received the complainant’s demand letter that contained
the threat of filing administrative charges against him. Moreover, he repeatedly did not inform
the complainant on the actual status of the petition although the latter regularly sought to be
updated. Instead, the respondent kept on making up excuses and conjured up pretenses to make it
appear that the case was moving along. His conduct of accepting money for his legal services in
handling the annulment of the adoption decree, and of failing to render the contracted legal
services violated Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.32 Also, the highly
fiduciary and confidential relation of attorney and client required that he as the lawyer should
promptly account for all the funds received from, or held by him for, the complainant as the
client.33

Furthermore, the respondent did not abide by the mandate of Canon 15 that required members of
the Legal Profession to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all their dealings and transactions
with their clients.

In their conversations, the respondent told the complainant that the judge handling the case
would rule in their favor only if he would be given 10% of the value of the property at Better
Living Subdivision, Paranaque, and that the handling judge consequently agreed on the fee of
P200,000.00 but needed an additional P50,000.00 “for the boys” in the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court. In doing so, the respondent committed calumny, and thereby violated Rules
15.06 and 15.07 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

Rule 15.06 - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official,
tribunal or legislative body.

Rule 15.07 - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and principles of
fairness.
Members of the Bench are tasked with ensuring that the ends of justice are served. Such negative
imputations against them and the collegial bodies of the Judiciary on the part of the respondent
tended to erode the trust and confidence of the people in our judicial system. The Court should
not take such conduct of the respondent lightly considering that the image of the Judiciary was
thereby diminished in the eyes of the public; hence, the Court must severely reprove the
respondent.

The respondent’s commission of various offenses constituting professional misconduct only

demonstrated his unworthiness to remain as a member of the Legal Profession. He ought to be
disbarred for such offenses upon this complaint alone. A review of his record as an admitted
member of the Bar shows, however, that in Que v. Revilla, Jr.,34 the Court had disbarred him
from the Legal Profession upon finding him guilty of violations of the Lawyers Oath; Canon 8;
Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court. In view of his prior disbarment, we can no longer impose the appropriate penalty of
disbarment as deserved because we do not have double or multiple disbarments in this
jurisdiction.35

In the meanwhile, on February 15, 2016, the respondent filed a so-called Most Respectful Motion
to Dismiss36 in which he adverted to the earlier submission through his Manifestation filed on
April 24, 201537 of the copy of the amicable settlement he had concluded with the complainant
to the effect that, among others, he had already paid back to the latter, through his lawyer (Atty.
Hope Ruiz Valenzuela), the amount of P650,000.00 “as full and complete settlement of the
Complainant’s claims against the Respondent.” He thereby sought the dismissal of the complaint
out of “justice and fairness.”

In the resolution promulgated on September 22, 2015, the Court merely noted without action
the Manifestation dated April 21, 2015.38

The Most Respectful Motion to Dismiss on the ground of the amicable settlement between the
parties cannot be granted. Although the amicable settlement obliterated the legal obligation to
return to the complainant the amounts obtained by deceit, the respondent was not entitled to
demand the dismissal of the charges against him for that reason. He ought to have known that his
professional responsibilities as an attorney were distinct from his other responsibilities. To be
clear, the primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and
discipline the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by
protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the
legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their Lawyer’s Oath has proven them unfit to
continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the Bar.39
Moreover, the practice of law is a privilege heavily burdened with conditions.40 Every attorney is
a vanguard of our legal system, and, as such, is expected to maintain not only legal proficiency
but also a very high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing in order that the
people’s faith and confidence in the legal system are ensured.41 He must then conduct himself,
whether in dealing with his clients or with the public at large, as to be beyond reproach at all
times.42 Any violation of the high moral standards of the Legal Profession justifies the
imposition on the attorney of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and
disbarment.43 Verily, the respondent’s deceitful conduct as an attorney rendered him directly
answerable to the Court on ethical, professional and legal grounds despite the fact that he and the
complainant had amicably settled any differences they had that might have compelled the
complainant to bring the complaint against him.

In fine, the gravity of the respondent’s professional misconduct and deceit should fully warrant
his being permanently barred from reinstatement to the ranks of the Philippine Bar and from
having his name restored in the Roll of Attorneys.

However, circumstances attendant in his case should be considered and appreciated in mitigating
the penalty to be imposed.44

The first of such circumstances related to the context of the engagement between the parties.
Upon reflecting on the adverse effects on his inheritance from his late mother of his cousin’s
adoption by her, the complainant had engaged the respondent’s legal services and representation
for the purpose of nullifying or undoing the adoption. At the outset, the respondent was candid in
explaining to the complainant that the prosecution of the case would be complicated mainly
because the adoption had been decreed in 1979 yet, and also because the complainant, as a
permanent resident of the United States of America, would be thereby encountering difficulties
and high costs, aside from untold inconvenience due to his physical presence in the country
being needed every now and then.45 The respondent’s candid explanations notwithstanding, the
complainant persisted in pursuing the case, impelling the respondent to take on the engagement.

Another circumstance is that the respondent had already returned to the complainant the amount
of P650,000.00 the former had received from the latter on account of the professional
engagement. The returned amount was in full and complete settlement of the latter’s
claims.46Judicial precedents exist in which the Court treated the return in full of the money the
respondent attorneys had received from their complaining clients as mitigating circumstances
that lowered the penalties imposed.47 For sure, the voluntary restitution by the respondent herein
of the amount received in the course of the professional engagement, even if it would not lift the
sanction meted on him, manifested remorse of a degree on his part for his wrongdoing, and was
mitigating in his favor.
And, thirdly, the Court cannot but note the respondent’s several pleas for judicial clemency to
seek his reinstatement in the ranks of the Philippine Bar.48 He has backed up his pleas by
adverting to his personal travails since his disbarment. He claims, too, that his health has been
failing of late considering that he had been diagnosed to be suffering from chronic kidney
disease, stage five, and has been undergoing dialysis three times a week.49 His advancing age and
the fragile state of his health may also be considered as a mitigating factor.50 In addition, it is
noteworthy that he has been devoting some time to Christian and charity pursuits, like serving
with humility as a Lay Minister at St. Peter Church in Quezon City and as a regular lecturer on
the Legal Aspects of Marriage.51

Pleas for judicial clemency reflected further remorse and repentance on the part of the
respondent.52 His pleas appear to be sincere and heartfelt. In human experience, remorse and
repentance, if coupled with sincerity, have always been regarded as the auspicious start of
forgiving on the part of the offended, and may eventually win even an absolution for the
remorseful. The Court will not be the last to forgive though it may not forget.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, perpetual disqualification from being reinstated will be
too grave a penalty in light of the objective of imposing heavy penalties like disbarment to
correct the offenders.53 The penalty ought to be tempered to enable his eventual reinstatement at
some point in the future. Verily, permanently barring the respondent from reinstatement in the
Roll of Attorneys by virtue of this disbarrable offense will deprive him the chance to return to his
former life as an attorney.

To start the respondent on the long road to reinstatement, we fine him in the amount of
P100,000.00, a figure believed to be a fair index of the gravity of his misdeeds. Less than such
amount might undeservedly diminish the gravity of his misdeeds. At this juncture, it is relevant
to note that he committed the offense complained of herein before the Court disbarred him in
A.C. 7054. Meting the stiff fine despite his disbarment is a way for the Court to assert its
authority and competence to discipline all acts and actuations committed by the members of the
Legal Profession. The Court will not waver in doing so.

But the fine comes with the stem warning to the respondent that he must hereafter genuinely
affirm his remorse and start to demonstrate his readiness and capacity to live up once again to the
exacting standards of conduct demanded of every member of the Bar in good standing and of
every officer of the Court;55 otherwise, he would be sanctioned with greater severity.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND DECLARES ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA, JR.
GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rules 15.06 and 15.07 of Canon 15, and Rule 18.03
of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, but, in view of his continuing
disbarment, hereby METES the penalty of FINE of P100,000.00.

This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to: (a) the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their information and guidance; (b) the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and (c) the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to the
respondent’s personal record as a member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 9512

ROBERTO P. MABINI … Complainant VS

ATTY. VITTO A. KINTANAR … Respondent

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J:

Before the Court is an administrative Complaint1 filed by Roberto P. Mabini (complainant)

against Atty. Vitto A. Kintanar (respondent) for misconduct on the sole ground that he notarized
a document executed by his wife, Evangeline C. Kintanar (Evangeline).

Factual Antecedents

In his Position Paper,2 complainant stated, that sometime in November 2003, Regina Alamares
(Regina) approached him and his wife, Mercedes M. Mabini (Mercedes), to sell her 3,317-square
meter realty located in Daraga, Albay. Said property was identified as Lot No, 1959, and covered
by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 251 (1904). Regina made known to complainant and
Mercedes that said title was lost but its duplicate certificate may be secured from the Register of
Deeds (RD). Complainant and Mercedes nonetheless bought the property. Later, complainant
filed a petition for issuance of second owner’s duplicate copy of OCT 251 (1904), which the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted. On March 2, 2005, the RD of Albay issued Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-133716 covering the property in the names of complainant and
Mercedes over the property.

Complainant further averred that, in March 2012, however, respondent’s wife, Evangeline, filed
a complaint against him (complainant), among other persons, for reconveyance, annulment of
title, damages with prayer for preliminary injunction or restraining order before the RTC of
Legaspi City. Attached to said complaint was an Affidavit of Lost Owner’s Duplicate Copy of
Title3 executed by Evangeline and notarized by respondent on April 25, 2002, and registered in
his notarial book under Doc. No. 172, Page No. 35, Book No. 33, Series of 2002.

According to complainant, respondent knew that he (respondent) was not authorized to notarize a
document of his wife, or any of his relative within the fourth civil degree, whether by affinity or
consanguinity; thus, for having done so, respondent committed misconduct as a lawyer/ Notary
Public.

For his part, respondent countered that the subject Affidavit purportedly executed by his wife
appeared to have been notarized on April 25, 2002; as such, it was governed by Revised
Administrative Code of 1917, which did not prohibit a Notary Public from notarizing a
document executed by one's spouse. He likewise stated that, granting for argument’s sake that he
indeed notarized said Affidavit, he did not violate the law as the document involved was a mere
affidavit, not a bilateral document or contract.4

Because of his demise on July 24, 2013, complainant’s spouse, Mercedes, substituted him as
complainant in the case.5 On October 26, 2013, Mercedes died. Her and complainant’s
children6substituted her in the case.7

Report and Recommendation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

On August 25, 2015, Commissioner Almira A. Abella-Orfanel (Investigating Commissioner)

found respondent guilty of misconduct and recommended his suspension from the practice of
law for six months.8 She opined that relatives by affinity are relatives by virtue of marriage. She
stressed that “[i]f the law prohibits notarization of acts done by relatives by affinity, it is but
logical that the law also prohibit[s] the notarization of the root cause of such relationship, the
spouse. Without the spouse, said prohibition will not exist.”9 She added that since the law treats
spouses as one upon their marriage, it follows that the notarization of the spouse’s act is
disallowed considering that a person cannot notarize his or her own act.

Notice of Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG)

In its Resolution No. XXII-2015-98, the IBP-BOG resolved to modify the recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner in that respondent was imposed a stiffer penalty of six months’
suspension from the practice of law; immediate revocation of his commission as Notary Public;
and, a two-year disqualification as Notary Public.

Issue

Whether respondent committed misconduct by notarizing his wife’s affidavit of loss in 2002.

Our Ruling

It is a truism that the duties performed by a Notary Public are not just plain ministerial acts. They
are so impressed with public interest and dictated by public policy. Such is the case since
notarization makes a private document into a public one; and as a public document, it enjoys full
credit on its face.10 However, a lawyer cannot be held liable for a violation of his duties as
Notary Public when the law in effect at the time of his complained act does not provide any
prohibition to the same, as in the case at bench.

In Heirs of Pedro Alilano v. Atty. Examen,11 the Court explicitly decreed that the Spanish
Notarial Law of 1889 was repealed by the 1917 Revised Administrative Code. It added that it
was only in 2004 that the Court passed the Revised Rules on Notarial Practice, to wit:
Prior to 1917, governing law for notaries public in the Philippines was the Spanish Notarial Law
of 1889. However, the law governing Notarial Practice is changed with the passage of the
January 3, 1916 Revised Administrative Code, which took effect in 1917. In 2004, the Revised
Rules on Notarial Practice was passed by the Supreme Court.

In Kapunan, et al v. Casilan and Court of Appeals, the Court had the opportunity to state that
enactment of the Revised Administrative Code repealed the Spanish Notarial Law of 1889. x x
x12

In said case, respondent Atty. Examen was charged with violating the Notarial Law when he
notarized in 1984 the absolute deed of sale executed by his brother and the latter’s wife. The
Court held that Atty. Examen was competent to notarize said document because the Revised
Administrative Code did not prohibit a Notary Public from notarizing any document of a
relative.13

Moreover, in Aznar Brothers Realty Co. v. Court of Appeals,14 the Court reiterated that indeed
the Spanish Notarial Law of 1889 was repealed by the Revised Administrative Code and its
Chapter 11 governed notarial practice at the time the subject deed therein was notarized in
1964.15

Too, in Ylaya v. Atty. Gacott,16 the Court made an express pronouncement that the subject
documents therein notarized in 2000 and 2001 were not covered by the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice, viz.:

We note that the respondent has not squarely addressed the issue of his relationship with
Reynold, whom the complainant alleges to be the respondent’s uncle because Reynold is married
to the respondent's maternal aunt. However, this is of no moment as the respondent cannot be
held liable for violating Section 3 (c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC because the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001 and the MOA dated April 19, 2000 were notarized by the
respondent prior to the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC on July 6, 2004. The notarial law in
force in the years 2000-2001 was Chapter 11 of Act No. 2711 (the Revised Administrative Code
of 1917) which did not contain the present prohibition against notarizing documents where the
parties are related to the notary public within the 4th civil degree, by affinity or consanguinity.
Thus, we must likewise dismiss the charge for violation of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.17

Considering the foregoing, there is indeed no basis to hold respondent liable for misconduct for
notarizing his wife’s Affidavit in 2002.

To recall, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of misconduct because he notarized the
affidavit of his wife on April 25, 2002. Nevertheless, at the time of such notarization, it was the
1917 Revised Administrative Code that covered notarial practice. As elucidated
in Alilano and Ylaya, during the effectivity of said Code, a Notary Public was not disallowed
from notarizing a document executed by a relative. Neither was there a prohibition for a Notary
Public to notarize a document executed by his or her spouse.

As discussed, the 1917 Revised Administrative Code repealed the Spanish Notarial Law. In turn,
the provisions anent notarial practice embodied in the Revised Administrative Code were
superseded by the passage of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. This only means that any
prohibition enumerated in the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice does not cover the acts made by a
Notary Public earlier, including those executed in 2002.

All told, the Court holds that respondent did not violate any of his duties as Notary Public when
he notarized the affidavit of his wife on April 25, 2002.

WHEREFORE, the Complaint against Atty. Vitto A. Kintanar is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 11871

POTENCIANO R. MALVAR, Complainant

vs.
ATTY. FREDDIE B. FEIR, Respondent

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a Petition for Disbarment filed by petitioner Potenciano R. Malvar against Atty. Freddie
B. Feir for violation of Canori 19, Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Lawyer's Oath.1

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On February 13, 2015, petitioner Potenciano R. Malvar filed a complaint for disbarment against
respondent Atty. Freddie B. Feir alleging that on December 17, 2014 and January 22, 2015, he
received threatening letters from Feir stating that should he fail to pay the sum of Pl8,000,000.00
to his client, Rogelio M. Amurao, a criminal complaint for Falsification of Public Documents
and Estafa, a civil complaint for Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title, and an
administrative complaint for the revocation of his license as a physician would be filed against
him.2 According to Mal var, Feir's demands were tantamount to blackmail or extortion due to the
fact that F eir tried to obtain something of value by means of threats of filing complaints.3 Said
acts are in violation of the Lawyer's Oath which provides that: "I will do no falsehood, nor
consent to the. doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same."4 In support of his
complaint, Mal var submitted the following affidavits executed by: (1) his staff stating that said
staff witnessed Amurao deliver to the office a Deed of Absolute Sale signed by Amurao, Noemi
Amurao, Teodorico Toribio, and Fatima Toribio;5 and (2) Amurao himself stating that he is one
of the sellers indicated in the Deed of Absolute Sale, that the signature appearing thereon is his,
and that he personally witnessed Noemi Amurao, Teodorico Toribio, and Fatima Toribio sign
said document.6

For his part, Feir countered that the said letters merely demanded Malvar to explain how certain
parcels of land Malvar was purchasing from his client, Amurao, were already registered in
Malvar's name when Amurao had never executed a Deed of Absolute Sale transferring the same.
Feir narrated that sometime in 2008, Amurao was tasked by his co-owners, spouses Teodorico
Toribio and Fatima Toribio, to sell their properties consisting of three. (3) parcels of land located
in Antipolo City for ₱21,200,000.00. The buyer of said properties was Malvar, who initially paid
the sum of ₱3,200,000.00 with a promise to pay the remainder of the purchase price after
verification of the authenticity of the owner's title to the properties. For this purpose, Malvar
borrowed the original copies of said titles from Amurao. Malvar, however, failed to return the
same despite several demands. To his surprise, Amurao later on learned that the subject
properties were already transferred in Malvar's name despite the fact that he never executed the
necessary Deed of Absolute Sale nor received the balance of the purchase price. Upon further
verification, Amurao discovered that there exists a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the sale of
the subject properties in favor of Malvar exhibiting not only the signatures of Amurao and
Teodorico but also the signature of Fatima, who had long been dead.7 But when asked, Malvar
could not proffer any explanation as to the existence of the suspicious Deed of Absolute Sale or
the fact that the subject properties were already in his name. It is for this reason that Amurao
consulted Feir on his legal remedies as regards his recovery of the subject properties and/or
collection of the remaining balance of the purchase price. Clearly, therefore, Malvar's complaint
seeking his disbarment appears only to harass and intimidate Feir. The threat to sue Malvar based
on the facts presented to Feir as a lawyer was not groundless as Amurao stands to lose his
property while· Malvar enriches himself at Amurao's expense.8 Interestingly, moreover, it was
pointed out that the purported Affidavit executed by Amurao must be a forgery in view of the
fact that he never executed any such document and that his supposed Senior Citizen
Identification Number indicated in the Acknowledgment thereof was left blank.9

After a careful review and evaluation of the case, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Feir
for lack of merit on February 23, 2016.10On November 5, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors
passed a Resolution11 adopting and approving the recommended dismissal of the complaint, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT the findings of fact and recommendation of the Investigating

Commissioner dismissing the complaint.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings and recommendations of the IBP.

An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an
attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27,12 Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court.13

Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall represent his
client with zeal within the bounds of the law." Moreover, Rule 19.01 thereof states that "a lawyer
shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not
present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an
improper advantage in any case or proceeding." Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or
threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his
client designed to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own
cases against the lawyer's client.14

In the instant case, Malvar claims that Feir sent him the demand letters in order to interpose
threats that should he fail to pay the sum of ₱18,000,000.00, Feir will file criminal, civil, and
administrative complaints which were, in truth, unfounded for being based neither on valid nor
relevant facts and law. Such demands, according to Malvar, are tantamount to blackmail or
extortion.
The Court, however, does not find merit in Malvar's contention. Blackmail is defined as "the
extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation or exposure or opposition in the public
prints, x x x obtaining of value from a person as a condition of refraining from making an
accusation against him, or disclosing some secret calculated to operate to his prejudice." In
common parlance and in general acceptation, it is equivalent to and synonymous with extortion,
the exaction of money either for the performance of a duty, the prevention of an injury, or the
exercise of an influence. Not infrequently, it is extorted by threats, or by operating on the fears or
the credulity, or by promises to conceal or offers to expose the weaknesses, the follies, or the
crime of the victim.15

In the instant case, it is undisputed that Malvar is the buyer of the properties subject herein and
that Amurao, Feir’s client, is one of the owners of the same. It is also undisputed that said subject
properties are already registered under Malvar’s name. But according to Amurao, he has yet to
receive the remaining balance of its purchase price. To the Court, this fact alone is enough reason
for Amurao to seek the legal advice of Feir and for Feir to send the demand letters to Malvar. As
the IBP held, these demand letters were based on a legitimate cause or issue, which is the alleged
failure of Malvar to pay the full amount of the consideration in the sale transaction as well as the
alleged falsified Deed of Sale used to transfer ownership over the lots subject of the instant
case.16 Whether the Deed of Sale used in transferring the properties in the name of Malvar was,
indeed, forged and falsified is another matter for as far as the instant complaint for disbarment is
concerned, Feir was simply acting in compliance with his lawyer's oath to protect and preserve
the rights of his client.

It bears stressing, moreover, that the monetary consideration Feir was demanding from Malvar in
the amount of ₱18,000,000.00 cannot be considered as the subject of blackmail or extortion.
Feir’s demand for said amount is not an exaction of money for the exercise of an influence but is
actually a legitimate claim for the remaining balance subject of a legitimate sale transaction.
Contrary to Malvar’s claims, there is nothing in the demand letters to show that the same was
maliciously made with intent to extort money from him since it was based on a valid and
justifiable cause. Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in this
jurisdiction. It is usually done by a lawyer pursuant to the principal-agent relationship that he has
with his client, the principal. Thus, in the performance of his role as agent, the lawyer may be
tasked to enforce his client's claim and to take all the steps necessary to collect it, such as writing
a letter of demand requiring payment within a specified period.17

In the absence, therefore, of any evidence preponderant to prove that Feir committed acts
constituting grounds for disbarment, such as the violation of Canon 19, Rule 19.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath, Malvar’s claims must necessarily fail.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court DISMISSES the Petition for

Disbarment against Atty. Freddie Feir for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 9119

EUGENIO E. CORTEZ VS
ATTY. HERNANDO P. CORTES

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

The instant controversy arose from a Complaint-Affidavit1 filed by complainant Eugenio E.

Cortez2 against respondent Atty. Hernando P. Cortes (Atty. Cortes) for grave misconduct, and
violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code for Professional Responsibility.

Complainant alleged that he engaged the services of Atty. Cortes as his counsel in an illegal
dismissal case against Philippine Explosives Corporation (PEC). He further alleged that he and
Atty. Cortes had a handshake agreement on a 12% contingency fee as and by way of attorney's
fees.3

Atty. Cortes prosecuted his claims for illegal dismissal which was decided in favor of
complainant. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commissions ordering PEC to pay complaint the total amount of One million One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱1, 100,000) m three staggered payments. PEC then issued City Bank Check
No. 1000003986 dated March 31, 2005 in the amount of Five Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱550,000), Check No. 1000003988 in the amount of Two Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand
Pesos (₱275,000) dated April 15, 2005, and Check No. 1000003989 also in the amount of Two
Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (₱275,000) dated April 30, 2005, all payable in the name
of complainant.4

Complainant narrated that after the maturity of the first check, he went to China Bank, Southmall
Las Pinas with Atty. Cortes and his wife to open an account to deposit the said check. Atty.
Cortes asked complainant to wait outside the bank while he personally, for and in his behalf,
facilitated the opening of the account. After thirty minutes, he was asked to go inside and sign a
joint savings account with Atty. Cortes.5

On April 7, 2005, complainant alleged that when he was about to withdraw the amount of the
initial check deposited, Atty. Cortes arrived with his wife and ordered the bank teller to hold off
the transaction. When complainant asked why he did that, Atty. Cortes answered that 50% of the
total awarded claims belongs to him as attorney's fees. When complainant questioned him, Atty.
Cortes became hysterical and imposingly maintained that 50% of the total awarded claims
belongs to him.6

Complainant then tried to pacify Atty. Cortes and his wife and offered to pay ₱200,000, and
when Atty. Cortes rejected it, he offered the third check amounting to ₱275,000, but Atty. Cortes
still insisted on the 50% of the total award. Complainant was then forced to endorse the second
and third checks to Atty. Cortes, after which he was able to withdraw the proceeds of the first
check. With the help of the lawyers in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), complainant
was able to have the drawer of the checks cancel one of the checks endorsed to Atty. Cortes
before he was able to encash the same.

Atty. Cortes, in his Answer, admitted that his services were engaged by complainant to pursue
the labor claims. He, however, denied that they agreed on a 12% contingency fee by way of
attorney's fees.7

Atty. Cortes claimed that complainant is a relative of his, but considering that the case was to be
filed in Pampanga and he resided in Las Piñas, he would only accept the case on a fifty-fifty
sharing arrangement.8

Atty. Cortes alleged that the checks were issued pursuant to the preexecution agreement reached
by the parties at the office of Labor Arbiter Herminio V. Suelo. He and complainant agreed that
the amount of the first check be divided fifty-fifty, the whole of the second check would be the
complainant's, and the third check would be his.9

Atty. Cortes further alleged that he had to assist complainant in the opening of an account to
deposit the checks. Atty. Cortes had to convince the bank manager to accept the checks issued in
the name of Eugene E. Cortez despite the fact that complainant's ID's are all in the name of
Eugenio E. Cortez.10 He claimed that anyone in his place would have demanded for the holding
off of the transaction because of the base ingratitude, patent deception and treachery of
complainant.11

Atty. Cortes posited that the check forms part and parcel of the judgment award to which he had
a lien corresponding to his attorney's fees and complainant should have at least invited him to
witness the "harvest of the fruits."12

Atty. Cortes insisted that the alleged 12% agreement is false, being merely a concoction of
Gomplainant’s fertile and unstable mind. He also pointed out that the fifty-fifty sharing
arrangement is not unconscionably high because the complainant was given the option to hire
other lawyers, but still he engaged his services.13

After hearing and submission of position papers, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, in a
Report and Recommendation dated April 11, 2007, recommended the six-month suspension of
Atty. Cortes. It ruled that a contingent fee arrangement should generally be in writing, and that
contingent fees depend upon an express contract without which the lawyer can only recover on
the basis of quantum meruit. It also pointed out that the Labor Code establishes a limit as to the
amount of attorney's fees that a lawyer may collect or charge his client in labor cases.

The report and recommendation was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in an
August 17, 2007 Resolution:

R E S O L U T I O N NO. XVIII-2007-74

CBD Case No. 05-1482

Eugenio E. Cortez vs.
Atty. Hernando P. Cortes

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for violation of A1iicle 11 (b) of the
Labor Code, Atty. Hernando P. Cortes is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six
(6) months and Ordered to Return to complainant whatever amount he received in excess of the
10% allowable attorney's fees in labor case (sic).

TOMAS N. PRADO
National Secretary14

A motion for reconsideration15 was filed by Atty. Cortes, which was denied by the IBP Board of
Governors.16

The issue, plainly, is whether or not the acts complained of constitute misconduct on the part of
Atty. Cortes, which would subject him to disciplinary action.

We rule in the affirmative.

We have held that a contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction. It is generally
recognized as valid and binding, but must be laid down in, an express contract.17 The case
of Rayos v. Atty. Hernandez18 discussed the same succinctly, thus:

A contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction and is generally recognized as

valid and binding but must be laid down in an express contract. The amount of contingent
fee agreed upon by the parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal
services only if the suit or litigation prospers. A much higher compensation is allowed as
contingent fee in consideration of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails.
Contracts of this nature are permitted because they redound to the benefit of the poor client and
the lawyer especially in cases where the client has meritorious cause of action, but no means
with which to pay for legal services unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a contract for a
contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds of the litigation. Oftentimes, the contingent fee
arrangement is the only means by which the poor and helpless can seek redress for injuries
sustained and have their rights vindicated.19 (Emphasis Ours)

In this case, We note that the parties did not have an express contract as regards the payment of
fees. Complainant alleges that the contingency fee was fixed at 12% via a handshake agreement,
while Atty. Cortes counters that the agreement was 50%.

The IBP Commission on Discipline pointed out that since what respondent handled was merely a
labor case, his attorney's foes should not exceed 10%, the rate allowed under Article 111 20 of the
Labor Code.
Although we agree that the 50% contingency fee was excessive, We do not agree that the 10%
limitation as provided in Article 111 is automatically applicable.

The case of Masmud v. NLRC (First Division), et al., 21 discussed the matter of application of
Article 111 of the Labor Code on attorney's fees:

There are two concepts of attorney's fees. In the ordinary sense, attorney's fees represent the
reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services rendered to the
latter. On the other hand, in its extraordinary concept, attorney's fees may be awarded by
the court as indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing
party, such that, in any of the cases provided by law where such award can be made, e.g., those
authorized in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, the amount is payable not to the lawyer but to the
client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional
compensation or as part thereof.

xxxx

Contrary to Evangelina’s proposition, Article 111 of the Labor Code deals with the
extraordinary concept of attorneys fees.1âwphi1 It regulates the amount recoverable as
attorney's fees in the nature of damages sustained by and awarded to the prevailing party.
It may not be used as the standard in fixing the amount payable to the lawyer by his client
for the legal services he rendered.22 (Emphasis Ours)

It would then appear that the contingency fees that Atty. Cortes required is in the ordinary sense
as it represents reasonable compensation for legal services he rendered for complainant.
Necessarily, the 10% limitation of the Labor Code would not be applicable. Beyond the limit
fixed by Article 111, such as between the lawyer and the client, the attorney's fees may exceed
10% on the basis of quantum meriut.23 We, however, are hard-pressed to accept the justification
of the 50% contingency fee that Atty. Cortes is insisting on for being exorbitant.

Generally, the amount of attorney's fees due is that stipulated in the retainer Agreement which is
conclusive as to the amount of the lawyers compensation.1âwphi1 In the absence thereof, the
amount of attorney's fees is fixed on the basis of quantum meruit, i.e., the reasonable worth of
the attorneys services.24 Courts may ascertain also if the attorney's fees are found to be excessive,
what is reasonable under the circumstances. In no case, however, must a lawyer be allowed to
recover more than what is reasonable, pursuant to Section 24, Rule 13825 of the Rules of Court.26

Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "A lawyer shall charge only fair
and reasonable fees." Rule 20.01 of the same canon enumerates the following factors which
should guide a lawyer in determining his fees:

(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;

(b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;

(c) The importance of the subject matter;

(d) The skill demanded;

(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;

(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to
which he belongs;

(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the
service;

(h) The contingency or' certainty of compensation;

(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and

(j)The professional standing of the lawyer.

Here, as set out by Atty. Cortes himself, the complainant's case was merely grounded on
complainant's alleged absence without leave for the second time and challenging the plant
manager, the complainant's immediate superior, to a fist fight. He also claimed that the travel
from his home in Las Piñas City to San Fernando, Pampanga was costly and was an ordeal. We
likewise note that Atty. Cortes admitted that complainant was a close kin of his, and that
complainant appealed to his services because, since his separation from work, he had no visible
means of income and had so many mouths to feed. These circumstances cited by Atty. Cortes to
justify the fees; to Our mind, does not exculpate Atty. Cortes, but in fact, makes Us question all
the more, the reasonableness of it.

We believe and so hold that the contingent fee here claimed by Atty. Cortes was, under the facts
obtaining in this case, grossly excessive and unconscionable. The issues involved could hardly
be said to be novel and Atty. Cortes in fact already knew that complainant was already hard up.
We have held that lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not
merchants.27 Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits. 28 The returns it
births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile
pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from governmental interference, is impressed
with a public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation.29

Here, considering that complainant was amenable to a 12% contingency fee, and which we
likewise deem to be the reasonable worth of the attorney's services rendered by Atty. Cortes
under the circumstances, Atty. Cortes is hereby adjudged to return to complainant the amount he
received in excess of 12% of the total award. If the Law has to remain an honorable profession
and has to attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and
principles but should also, by their lives, accord continuing fidelity to such tenets and
principles.30

We, however, find that the recommended suspension of six months is too harsh and considering
that Atty. Cortes is nearing ninety years old and that there was no question that Atty. Cortes was
able to get a favorable outcome, a reduction of the suspension is proper. We then reduce and
sanction Atty. Cortes to a three-month suspension from the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Hernando P. Cortes is

found GUILTY of violation of Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months, and is ordered to return to
complainant Eugenio E. Cortez the amount he received in excess of the 12% allowable attorney's
fees.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 6174
LYDIA CASTRO-JUSTO VS
ATTY. RODOLFO T. GALING
DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before us for consideration is Resolution No. XVIII-2007-196[1] of the Board of Governors,

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), relative to the complaint[2] for disbarment filed by Lydia
Castro-Justo against Atty. Rodolfo T. Galing.

Complainant Justo alleged that sometime in April 2003, she engaged the services of respondent
Atty. Galing in connection with dishonored checks issued by Manila City Councilor Arlene W.
Koa (Ms. Koa). After she paid his professional fees, the respondent drafted and sent a letter to
Ms. Koa demanding payment of the checks.[3] Respondent advised complainant to wait for the
lapse of the period indicated in the demand letter before filing her complaint.

On 10 July 2003, complainant filed a criminal complaint against Ms. Koa for estafa and violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.[4]

On 27 July 2003, she received a copy of a Motion for Consolidation[5] filed by respondent for
and on behalf of Ms. Koa, the accused in the criminal cases, and the latters daughter Karen
Torralba (Ms. Torralba). Further, on 8 August 2003, respondent appeared as counsel for Ms. Koa
before the prosecutor of Manila.

Complainant submits that by representing conflicting interests, respondent violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

In his Comment,[6] respondent denied the allegations against him. He admitted that he drafted a
demand letter for complainant but argued that it was made only in deference to their long
standing friendship and not by reason of a professional engagement as professed by
complainant. He denied receiving any professional fee for the services he rendered. It was
allegedly their understanding that complainant would have to retain the services of another
lawyer. He alleged that complainant, based on that agreement, engaged the services of Atty.
Manuel A. Ao.
To bolster this claim, respondent pointed out that the complaint filed by complainant against Ms.
Koa for estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was based not on the demand letter he drafted but on
the demand letter prepared by Atty. Manuel A. Ao.

Respondent contended that he is a close friend of the opposing parties in the criminal cases. He
further contended that complainant Justo and Ms. Koa are likewise long time friends, as in fact,
they are comares for more than 30 years since complainant is the godmother of Ms.
Torralba.[7] Respondent claimed that it is in this light that he accommodated Ms. Koa and her
daughters request that they be represented by him in the cases filed against them by complainant
and complainants daughter. He maintained that the filing of the Motion for Consolidation which
is a non-adversarial pleading does not evidence the existence of a lawyer-client relationship
between him and Ms. Koa and Ms. Torralba. Likewise, his appearance in the joint proceedings
should only be construed as an effort on his part to assume the role of a moderator or arbiter of
the parties.

He insisted that his actions were merely motivated by an intention to help the parties achieve an
out of court settlement and possible reconciliation. He reported that his efforts proved fruitful
insofar as he had caused Ms. Koa to pay complainant the amount of P50,000.00 in settlement of
one of the two checks subject of I.S. No. 03G-19484-86.

Respondent averred that the failure of Ms. Koa and Ms. Torralba to make good the other checks
caused a lot of consternation on the part of complainant. This allegedly led her to vent her ire on
respondent and file the instant administrative case for conflict of interest.

In a resolution dated 19 October 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved
with modification the findings of its Investigating Commissioner. They found respondent guilty
of violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by representing
conflicting interests and for his daring audacity and for the pronounced malignancy of his act. It
was recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.[8]

We agree with the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,[9] as adopted
by the Board of Governors of the IBP.

It was established that in April 2003, respondent was approached by complainant regarding the
dishonored checks issued by Manila City Councilor Koa.
It was also established that on 25 July 2003, a Motion for Consolidation was filed by respondent
in I.S. No. 03G-19484-86 entitled Lydia Justo vs. Arlene Koa and I.S. No. 03G-19582-84
entitled Lani C. Justo vs. Karen Torralba. Respondent stated that the movants in these cases are
mother and daughter while complainants are likewise mother and daughter and that these cases
arose out from the same transaction. Thus, movants and complainants will be adducing the same
sets of evidence and witnesses.

Respondent argued that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and complainant
because there was no professional fee paid for the services he rendered. Moreover, he argued that
he drafted the demand letter only as a personal favor to complainant who is a close friend.

We are not persuaded. A lawyer-client relationship can exist notwithstanding the close friendship
between complainant and respondent. The relationship was established the moment complainant
sought legal advice from respondent regarding the dishonored checks. By drafting the demand
letter respondent further affirmed such relationship. The fact that the demand letter was not
utilized in the criminal complaint filed and that respondent was not eventually engaged by
complainant to represent her in the criminal cases is of no moment. As observed by the
Investigating Commissioner, by referring to complainant Justo as my client in the demand letter
sent to the defaulting debtor[10], respondent admitted the existence of the lawyer-client
relationship. Such admission effectively estopped him from claiming otherwise.
Likewise, the non-payment of professional fee will not exculpate respondent from
liability. Absence of monetary consideration does not exempt lawyers from complying with the
prohibition against pursuing cases with conflicting interests. The prohibition attaches from the
moment the attorney-client relationship is established and extends beyond the duration of the
professional relationship.[11]We held in Burbe v. Atty. Magulta[12] that it is not necessary that any
retainer be paid, promised or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not
afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought.[13]

Under Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, [a] lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts. Respondent was therefore bound to refrain from representing parties with
conflicting interests in a controversy. By doing so, without showing any proof that he had
obtained the written consent of the conflicting parties, respondent should be sanctioned.
The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is founded on principles of public policy
and good taste.[14] In the course of the lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns of the facts
connected with the clients case, including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of
the relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.[15]

It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of
justice.[16]

The case of Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat[17] is instructive on this concept, thus:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two

or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is
the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the
other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by
him when he argues for the other client.[18] This rule covers not only cases in
which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which
no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.[19]Also, there is conflict of
interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform
an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he
represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use
against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection.[20] Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his
duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.[21]

The excuse proffered by respondent that it was not him but Atty. Ao who was eventually
engaged by complainant will not exonerate him from the clear violation of Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. The take- over of a clients cause of action by another
lawyer does not give the former lawyer the right to represent the opposing party. It is not only
malpractice but also constitutes a violation of the confidence resulting from the attorney-client
relationship.

Considering that this is respondents first infraction, the disbarment sought in the complaint is
deemed to be too severe. As recommended by the Board of Governors of the IBP, the suspension
from the practice of law for one (1) year is warranted.
Accordingly, the Court resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Rodolfo T. Galing from the practice of law
for one (1) year, with a WARNINGthat a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a
more severe penalty. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar
Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The
Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to append a copy of this Decision to respondents record
as member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 3745

CYNTHIA B. ROSACIA VS
ATTY. BENJAMIN B. BULALACAO

RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:

Complainant Cynthia B. Rosacia, president of Tacma, Phils., Inc., a duly registered corporation,
filed a complaint for disbarment dated October 25, 1991, against herein respondent Atty.
Benjamin B. Bulalacao. Acting on the complaint, the Court in a resolution dated February 24,
1992, resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez, the IBP investigating
commissioner, found that respondent breached his oath of office and accordingly recommended
respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months.1 In a resolution dated July
30, 1994, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the commissioner's report
and recommendation.2

As found by the IBP, the undisputed facts are as follows:

On June 1, 1990, by virtue of a written Agreement (Exh. "3-a"), respondent Atty.

Benjamin B. Bulalacao was hired as retained counsel of a corporation by the
name of Tacma Phils., Inc.

On October 31, 1990, the lawyer-client relationship between the respondent and
Tacma Phils., Inc. was severed as shown by another agreement of even date (Exh.
"3-b").

On July, 1991, or after almost nine (9) months from the date respondent's retainer
agreement with Tacma, Phils., Inc. was terminated, several employees of the
corporation consulted the respondent for the purpose of filing an action for illegal
dismissal. Thereafter, he agreed to handle the case for the said employees as
against Tacma, Phils., Inc. by filing a complaint before the National Labor
Relations Commission, and appearing in their behalf.3

The sole issue to be addressed is whether or not respondent breached his oath of office for
representing the employees of his former client, Tacma, Phils., Inc., after the termination of their
attorney-client relationship. We agree with the findings of the IBP that respondent breached his
oath of office. Respondent does not now dispute this. In fact, in his motion for reconsideration,
respondent admitted that he "did commit an act bordering on grave misconduct, if not outright
violation of his attorney's oath".4 However, respondent is pleading for the Court's compassion
and leniency to reduce the IBP recommended three months suspension to either fine or
admonition with the following proffered grounds: that he is relatively new in the profession
having been admitted to the Philippine Bar on April 10, 1990 at the age of 46 when the
complained conduct was committed on August 1991; that he is of humble beginnings and his
suspension will deprive his family of its only source of livelihood he being the sole bread winner
in the family; that he has fully realized his mistake and the gravity of his offense for which he is
fully repentant; that he has severed his attorney-client relationship with the employees of Tacma,
Phils., Inc. by inhibiting himself and withdrawing his appearance as counsel in the labor case
against Tacma, Phils., Inc.; and that he pledges not to commit the same mistake and to
henceforth strictly adhere to the professional standards set forth by the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The Court reiterates that an attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he
has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated as it is not
good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other person against his former
client under the pretext that the case is distinct from, and independent of the former case.5 It
behooves respondent not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of
justice.6 The relation of attorney and client is one of confidence and trust in the highest
degree.7 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he ought to be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.8 An attorney not only becomes familiar with all the facts
connected with his client's cause, but also learns from his client the weak and strong points of the
case. No opportunity must be given attorneys to take advantage of the secrets of clients obtained
while the confidential relation of attorney and client exists. Otherwise, the legal profession will
suffer by the loss of the confidence of the people.9

Respondent's plea for leniency cannot be granted. We note that respondent is new in the
profession as he was just admitted to the Philippine Bar on April 10, 1990, when the breach of
his oath of office occurred more than a year after. Having just hurdled the bar examinations
which included an examination in legal ethics, surely the precepts of the Code of Professional
Responsibility to keep inviolate the client's trust and confidence even after the attorney-client
relation is terminated 10 must have been still fresh in his mind. A lawyer starting to establish his
stature in the legal profession must start right and dutifully abide by the norms of conduct of the
profession. This will ineluctably redound to his benefit and to the upliftment of the legal
profession as well.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three
months. Let this resolution be attached to respondent's record in the Office of the Bar Confidant
and copies thereof furnished to all courts and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
 PCGG VS SANDIGANBAYAN

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on one
hand, the efforts of the Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service and on the
other, its effect on the right of government to recruit competent counsel to defend its interests.
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties.
GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation
causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with the Central Bank.[1]It was later
found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various loans to directors, officers,
stockholders and related interests totaling P172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as
doubtful and P0.505 million as uncollectible.[2] As a bailout, the Central Bank extended
emergency loans to GENBANK which reached a total of P310 million.[3] Despite the mega
loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central
Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with
safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its
liquidation.[4] A public bidding of GENBANKs assets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977,
wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid.[5] Subsequently, former Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for
the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANKs liquidation as mandated by Section
29 of Republic Act No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first
acts of President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand
Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed
with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and
damages against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P.
Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong,
Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel
Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B.
Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing
and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc.,
Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings
and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp.,
Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc.,
Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively
referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R.
Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.[6] In connection
therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by
the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with
former President Marcos.
 Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition
and injunction to nullify, among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG.[7] After
the filing of the parties comments, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayanfor proper
disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases,
respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as
counsel for respondents Tan, et al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil
Case Nos. 0005[8] and 0096-0099.[9] The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then
Solicitor General[10] and counsel to Central Bank, actively intervened in the liquidation of
GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied
Banking Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly intervened in the acquisition of
GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General,
he advised the Central Banks officials on the procedure to bring about GENBANKs liquidation
and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in the
liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) of Manila and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify
invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03prohibits former
government lawyers from accepting engagement or employment in connection with any matter
in which he had intervened while in said service.
On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution denying PCGGs motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No.
0005.[11] It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between
respondent Mendozas former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as
counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position adverse
to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General.[12] It further
ruled that respondent Mendozas appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond
the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to
be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a former public official or
employee from practicing his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used
to be with within one year from his resignation, retirement or separation from public
office.[13] The PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling.[14]
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from
the Sandiganbayans Second Division to the Fifth Division.[15] In its resolution dated July 11,
2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGGs motion to disqualify
respondent Mendoza.[16] It adopted the resolution of its Second Division dated April 22, 1991,
and observed that the arguments were the same in substance as the motion to disqualify filed in
Civil Case No. 0005. The PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied
in its resolution dated December 5, 2001.[17]
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001
and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition
for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[18] The PCGG
alleged that the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility prohibits a former government lawyer from accepting employment in
connection with any matter in which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-
bound; 3) that Central Bank could not waive the objection to respondent Mendozas appearance
on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil Case No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res
judicata does not apply.[19]
The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of the
import and impact of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession
and the government, we shall cut our way and forthwith resolve the substantive issue.

Substantive Issue

The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to
respondent Mendoza. Again, the prohibition states: A lawyer shall not, after leaving government
service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in the said service.

I.A. The history of Rule 6.03

A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive
in England and other parts of Europe. The early statements of standards did not resemble
modern codes of conduct. They were not detailed or collected in one source but surprisingly
were comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the standards was directed towards the
litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and fairness in litigation as
superior to any obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation duties were at times
intricate, including specific pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of falsehoods
and a duty to explore settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties --
competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality, reasonable fees and service to the poor --
originated in the litigation context, but ultimately had broader application to all aspects of a
lawyer's practice.
The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did not
differ markedly from those in England. The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial
oversight, and procedural rules to govern attorney behavior. The difference from England was in
the pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation. The standards set in England varied over
time, but the variation in early America was far greater. The American regulation fluctuated
within a single colony and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had the effect of
setting some standards of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the
substantive standards. Only three of the traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as
pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial and post-revolutionary period: the duties of
litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees.[20]
 The nineteenth century has been termed the dark ages of legal ethics in the United States.
By mid-century, American legal reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David
Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly influential New York Field Code, introduced a new set of
uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This concise statement of eight statutory duties
became law in several states in the second half of the nineteenth century. At the same time, legal
educators, such as David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were
working to flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal
ethics in unprecedented detail and thus brought a new level of understanding to a lawyer's duties.
A number of mid-nineteenth century laws and statutes, other than the Field Code, governed
lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations e.g., the do no falsehood oath and the
deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states. Procedural law continued to directly, or indirectly,
limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of agency recognized basic duties of
competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client property. Evidence law started to recognize with
less equivocation the attorney-client privilege and its underlying theory of confidentiality. Thus,
all of the core duties, with the likely exception of service to the poor, had some basis in formal
law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-revolutionary periods, these standards were isolated
and did not provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The reformers, by contrast,
were more comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered a
new era in American legal ethics.[21]
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide
lawyers in their practice the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed
ethical standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They combined the two primary sources of
ethical guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the academic discourses, the bar association
codes gave detail to the statutory statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike the academic
lectures, however, the bar association codes retained some of the official imprimatur of the
statutes and oaths. Over time, the bar association codes became extremely popular that states
adopted them as binding rules of law. Critical to the development of the new codes was the re-
emergence of bar associations themselves. Local bar associations formed sporadically during the
colonial period, but they disbanded by the early nineteenth century. In the late nineteenth
century, bar associations began to form again, picking up where their colonial predecessors had
left off. Many of the new bar associations, most notably the Alabama State Bar Association and
the American Bar Association, assumed on the task of drafting substantive standards of conduct
for their members.[22]
In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of
ethics. The 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states codes, and it was the
foundation for the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics.[23]
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to
attain the full measure of public respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year,
the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics.[24]
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the
canons. Among their concerns was the revolving door or the process by which lawyers and
others temporarily enter government service from private life and then leave it for large fees in
private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in
government service.[25] These concerns were classified as adverse-interest
conflicts and congruent-interest conflicts. Adverse-interest conflicts exist where the matter in
which the former government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially
related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and the interests
of the current and former are adverse.[26] On the other hand, congruent-interest representation
conflicts are unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former government
lawyers.[27] For several years, the ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through new
canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended one
canon and added thirteen new canons.[28] To deal with problems peculiar to former government
lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which disqualified them both for adverse-interest conflicts and
congruent-interest representation conflicts.[29] The rationale for disqualification is rooted in a
concern that the government lawyers largely discretionary actions would be influenced by the
temptation to take action on behalf of the government client that later could be to the advantage
of parties who might later become private practice clients.[30] Canon 36provides, viz.:

36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which
he has previously acted in a judicial capacity.

A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not,
after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter he has investigated
or passed upon while in such office or employ.

Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added
Canons 46 and 47 in 1933 and 1937, respectively.[31]
In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.[32]
By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA
Canons needed more meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked
for the creation of a committee to study the adequacy and effectiveness of the ABA Canons. The
committee recommended that the canons needed substantial revision, in part because the ABA
Canons failed to distinguish between the inspirational and the proscriptive and were thus
unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal profession in the United States likewise observed
that Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary
disqualification of lawyers for negligible participation in matters during their employment with
the government.
The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code
of Professional Responsibility.[33] The basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional
Responsibility were supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules of conduct
to which the lawyer must adhere.[34] In the case of Canon 9, DR 9-101(b)[35] became the
applicable supplementary norm. The drafting committee reformulated the canons into the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates
approved the Model Code.[36]
 Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and
indefinite standards set forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
as a whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA adopted new Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility. The Model Rules used the restatement format, where the conduct standards were
set-out in rules, with comments following each rule. The new format was intended to give better
guidance and clarity for enforcement because the only enforceable standards were the black
letter Rules. The Model Rules eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the emphasis
on narrative discussion, by placing comments after the rules and limiting comment discussion to
the content of the black letter rules. The Model Rules made a number of substantive
improvements particularly with regard to conflicts of interests.[37] In particular, the ABA did
away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of the concept of impropriety on the
subjective views of anxious clients as well as the norms indefinite nature.[38]
In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a
proposed Code of Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court for
approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions, and practices of the bar
and to conform with new realities. On June 21, 1988, this Court promulgated the Code of
Professional Responsibility.[39] Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility deals
particularly with former government lawyers, and provides, viz.:

Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of
paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive
phrase investigated and passed upon with the word intervened. It is, therefore, properly
applicable to both adverse-interest conflicts and congruent-interest conflicts.
The case at bar does not involve the adverse interest aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent
Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in
Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and
Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of
whether there exists a congruent-interest conflict sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza
from representing respondents Tan, et al.

I.B. The congruent interest aspect of Rule 6.03

The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of matter referred to
in the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of the intervention made by the former
government lawyer on the matter. The American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342,
defined matter as any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct
involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing
or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law.
Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the matter which was the subject of intervention by
respondent Mendoza while he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of
respondent Mendoza as constituting the matter where he intervened as a Solicitor
General, viz:[40]

The PCGGs Case for Atty. Mendozas Disqualification

The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division)
in issuing the assailed Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the
motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that
Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the closure of GENBANK by
advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the
petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.

As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain
key officials of the Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then
Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C.
Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then Asistant to the
Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of Department of Commercial and Savings
Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference
with the Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with the
liquidation of GENBANK. The pertinent portion of the said memorandum states:

Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised
that the following procedure should be taken:

1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that

studies and evaluation had been made since the last examination of the bank as of
August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank can not be reorganized or placed in
a condition so that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its
depositors and creditors and the general public.

2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of
the bank and indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.

3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing
decision to liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary
Board.

4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting
the proceedings which had been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the
liquidation of Genbank.

The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where
it was shown that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to
GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with the court the petition for assistance in the banks
liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:
The Board decided as follows:

...

E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the

subject memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings
Bank dated March 29, 1977, together with copies of:

1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination

Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated March 25, 1977, containing a report
on the current situation of Genbank;

2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co.,
dated March 23, 1977;

3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings

Bank, to the Monetary Board, dated March 24, 1977, submitting, pursuant
to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a repot on
the state of insolvency of Genbank, together with its attachments; and

4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor

General for his use in then CFI-praying the assistance of the Court in the
liquidation of Genbank.

Beyond doubt, therefore, the matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General
involved in the case at bar is advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said banks
liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila. In fine, the
Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to
liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of matter under Rule 6.03. The procedure
of liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:

The provision reads in part:

SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. Whenever, upon examination by the head
of the appropriate supervising or examining department or his examiners or agents into
the condition of any bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or
that its continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or
creditors, it shall be the duty of the department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to
inform the Monetary Board of the facts, and the Board may, upon finding the statements
of the department head to be true, forbid the institution to do business in the Philippines
and shall designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of recognized
competence in banking or finance, as receiver to immediately take charge of its assets
and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and gather all the assets and
administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary
for these purposes including, but not limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing
mortgages in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing
quasi-banking functions.

...

If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the
bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is
insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the
general public, it shall, if the public interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the
manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the
Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings
which have been taken and praying the assistance of the court in the liquidation of such
institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate
disputed claims against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-
banking functions and enforce individual liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is
necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and to implement the liquidation plan
approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the
Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as liquidator
who shall take over the functions of the receiver previously appointed by the Monetary
Board under this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient speed, convert the
assets of the banking institution or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-
banking functions to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors
and other parties for the purpose of paying the debts of such institution and he may, in
the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in the appropriate court to collect
and recover accounts and assets of such institution.

The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the
Monetary Board under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act
shall be final and executory, and can be set aside by the court only if there is convincing
proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or
injunction shall be issued by the court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing
its actions under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless
there is convincing proof that the action of the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and
made in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court
in which the action is pending a bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an
amount to be fixed by the court. The restraining order or injunction shall be refused or,
if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond, which shall be
in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of
the bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the damages which the
petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The
provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable and not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall govern the issuance and dissolution
of the restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section.
 Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or
non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to pay its
liabilities as they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of business. Provided,
however, That this shall not include the inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent
bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions caused by
extraordinary demands induced by financial panic commonly evidenced by a run on the
bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions in the
banking or financial community.

The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the

appointment of a receiver under this Section shall be vested exclusively with the
Monetary Board, the provision of any law, general or special, to the contrary
notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)

We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate
GENBANK is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the
drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or
briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the
term matter and cannot disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent
Mendoza falls within the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it
may, the said act of respondent Mendoza which is the matter involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812
is entirely different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the plain facts
speak for themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of
the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the sale of
GENBANK to Allied Bank. The matter where he got himself involved was in informing
Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in
filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The
subject matter of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is
different from the subject matter in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves
the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged
ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor
does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stock of the
reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far removed from the issue of the dissolution and
liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others,
to the alleged banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the legality of the
liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of
the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that
Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza
because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an
intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.
Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the intervention contemplated by Rule
6.03. Intervene means, viz.:
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall, or
come in between points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or
modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two things (Paris, where the same city
lay on both sides of an intervening river . . .)[41]

On the other hand, intervention is defined as:

1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may

affect the interests of others.[42]

There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word intervene. Under the first
interpretation, intervene includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is
irrelevant or has no effect or little influence.[43] Under the second interpretation, intervene only
includes an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. [44] We hold
that this second meaning is more appropriate to give to the word intervention under Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be remedied by
the Rule do not exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be considered as
innocuous such as x x x drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.
In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon 36
provided that a former government lawyer should not, after his retirement, accept employment in
connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or
employ. As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase which he has investigated or passed
upon resulted in unjust disqualification of former government lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted
its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter in which the lawyer,
while in the government service, had substantial responsibility. The 1983 Model Rules further
constricted the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that a lawyer shall not represent a private
client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and
substantially as a public officer or employee.
It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812
is significant and substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is
an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting
Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to the actual participation of respondent
Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in slumberville for a long number
of years. None of the parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we note that the petition
filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal
role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of
creditors against the GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as
an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding,
the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that of the usual court litigator
protecting the interest of government.
 II

Balancing Policy Considerations

To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a commendable

effort on the part of the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government service. As
aforestressed, it is a take-off from similar efforts especially by the ABA which have not been
without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the United States is still fine tuning its DR 9-
101(b) rule.
In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility,
the Court took account of various policy considerations to assure that its interpretation and
application to the case at bar will achieve its end without necessarily prejudicing other values of
equal importance. Thus, the rule was not interpreted to cause a chilling effect on government
recruitment of able legal talent. At present, it is already difficult for government to match
compensation offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be able to
reverse that situation. The observation is not inaccurate that the only card that the government
may play to recruit lawyers is have them defer present income in return for the experience and
contacts that can later be exchanged for higher income in private practice.[45]Rightly, Judge
Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of entering government service would be too great for most
men to endure should ethical rules prevent them from engaging in the practice of a technical
specialty which they devoted years in acquiring and cause the firm with which they become
associated to be disqualified.[46] Indeed, to make government service more difficult to exit can
only make it less appealing to enter.[47]
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to
harass opposing counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal representation. The
danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted the tactical use of motions to
disqualify counsel in order to delay proceedings, deprive the opposing party of counsel of its
choice, and harass and embarrass the opponent, and observed that the tactic was so prevalent in
large civil cases in recent years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic
commentary.[48] Even the United States Supreme Court found no quarrel with the Court of
Appeals description of disqualification motions as a dangerous game.[49] In the case at bar,
the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult to divine. The disqualification of
respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was resuscitated after the lapse of many
years and only after PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of respondent Mendoza.
For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four
years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme
Court which were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Civil Case
Nos. 0096-0099.[50] At the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in
the case at bar were refiled put petitioners motive as highly suspect.
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice
to the client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a
disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but probably an
individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence.[51] The client with a disqualified lawyer
must start again often without the benefit of the work done by the latter.[52] The effects of this
prejudice to the right to choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in
denial of due process.
The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the
rule on the official independence of lawyers in the government service. According to Prof.
Morgan: An individual who has the security of knowing he or she can find private employment
upon leaving the government is free to work vigorously, challenge official positions when he or
she believes them to be in error, and resist illegal demands by superiors. An employee who lacks
this assurance of private employment does not enjoy such freedom.[53] He adds: Any system that
affects the right to take a new job affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on the ability
to quit inhibits official independence.[54] The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor
General, the office once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed
that the position of Solicitor General should be endowed with a great degree of
independence. It is this independence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal
of the innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to refuse to defend officials who
violate the trust of their office. Any undue dimunition of the independence of the Solicitor
General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.
No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer
of the freedom to exercise his profession. Given the current state of our law, the
disqualification of a former government lawyer may extend to all members of his law
firm.[55] Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal
profession.
It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public
confidence in government. But as well observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a
highly speculative exercise at best[56] which can lead to untoward results.[57] No less than Judge
Kaufman doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to former government attorneys will have
any detrimental effect on that free flow of information between the government-client and its
attorneys which the canons seek to protect.[58] Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory
has been rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct[59] and some courts
have abandoned per se disqualification based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of
interest exists, and demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant, government, the
witnesses in the case, and the public.[60]
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly
disfavors lawyers who switch sides. It is claimed that switching sides carries the danger that
former government employee may compromise confidential official information in the
process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of
respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate
GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about
the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the
danger that confidential official information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be
sure, there are no inconsistent sides to be bothered about in the case at bar. For there is no
question that in lawyering for respondents Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza is not working
against the interest of Central Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of the
action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their
interests coincide instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central Bank offered no
objection to the lawyering of respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of
respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides for no two sides are involved.
It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of
loyalties, i.e., that a government employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in
government service.[61] The example given by the proponents of this argument is that a lawyer
who plans to work for the company that he or she is currently charged with prosecuting might be
tempted to prosecute less vigorously.[62] In the cautionary words of the Association of the Bar
Committee in 1960: The greatest public risks arising from post employment conduct may well
occur during the period of employment through the dampening of aggressive administration of
government policies.[63] Prof. Morgan, however, considers this concern as probably
excessive.[64] He opines x x x it is hard to imagine that a private firm would feel secure hiding
someone who had just been disloyal to his or her last client the government. Interviews with
lawyers consistently confirm that law firms want the best government lawyers the ones who were
hardest to beat not the least qualified or least vigorous advocates.[65] But again, this particular
concern is a non factor in the case at bar. There is no charge against respondent Mendoza that
he advised Central Bank on how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later defending
respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues defending both the interests of
Central Bank and respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.
Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as
the excessive influence of former officials or their clout.[66] Prof. Morgan again warns against
extending this concern too far. He explains the rationale for his warning, viz: Much of what
appears to be an employees influence may actually be the power or authority of his or her
position, power that evaporates quickly upon departure from government x x x.[67] More, he
contends that the concern can be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him
further: x x x The idea that, present officials make significant decisions based on friendship
rather than on the merit says more about the present officials than about their former co-worker
friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in federal officials that does not seem justified
or intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials will tend to disfavor their friends in
order to avoid even the appearance of favoritism.[68]
 III

The question of fairness

Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent
interest prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a
prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively to
respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that (1) when
respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and
approved by this Court, and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the
lapse of time whose length cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point
they make relates to the unfairness of the rule if applied without any prescriptive period and
retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be initially addressed by the IBP
and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and
December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is
denied.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 5688
FELIPE E. ABELLA, VS
ATTY. ASTERIA E. CRUZABRA,

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

Felipe E. Abella (complainant) filed a complaint for violation of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713[1] (RA 6713) or the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees against Atty. Asteria
E. Cruzabra (respondent). In his affidavit-complaint[2] dated 8 May 2002, complainant charged
respondent with engaging in private practice while employed in the government service.

Complainant alleged that respondent was admitted to the Philippine Bar on 30 May 1986 and
was appointed as Deputy Register of Deeds of General Santos City on 11 August
1987.[3] Complainant asserted that as Deputy Register of Deeds, respondent filed a petition for
commission as a notary public and was commissioned on 29 February 1988 without obtaining
prior authority from the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ).[4] Complainant claimed
that respondent has notarized some 3,000 documents.[5]Complainant pointed out that respondent
only stopped notarizing documents when she was reprimanded by the Chief of the Investigation
Division of the Land Registration Authority.[6]

Complainant contended that respondent could not justify her act by pretending to be in good
faith because even non-lawyers are not excused from ignorance of the law. Complainant branded
as incredible respondents claim that she was merely motivated by public service in notarizing
3,000 documents. Complainant pointed out that respondent spent money to buy the Notarial
Register Books and spent hours going over the documents subscribed before her, thereby
prejudicing her efficiency and performance as Deputy Register of Deeds. Complainant believed
that even if respondent had obtained authority from the DOJ, respondent would still be guilty of
violating Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 because her practice as a notary public conflicts with her
official functions.[7]

In her Comment, respondent admitted that she was a notary public from 29 February 1988 to 31
December 1989.[8] Respondent stated that she was authorized by her superior, the Register of
Deeds, to act as a notary public. Respondent pointed out that the Register of Deeds, Atty. Pelagio
T. Tolosa, also subscribed petitions and documents that were required to be
registered.[9]Respondent explained that the Register of Deeds imposed the following conditions
for her application as a notary public:

xxx
4. That the application for commission was on the condition that respondent
cannot charge fees for documents required by the Office to be presented and
under oath.[10]

Respondent contended that when she filed her petition for commission as a notary public, the
requirement of approval from the DOJ Secretary was still the subject of a pending query by one
of the Registrars and this fact was not known to respondent.[11]Respondent maintained that she
had no intention to violate any rule of law. Respondent, as a new lawyer relying on the
competence of her superior, admitted that an honest mistake may have been committed but such
mistake was committed without willfulness, malice or corruption.[12]

Respondent argued that she was not engaged in illegal practice as a notary public because she
was duly commissioned by the court.[13] Respondent denied that she violated Section 7(b)(2) of
RA 6713 because she was authorized by her superior to act as a notary public. Respondent
reasoned that her being a notary public complemented her functions as Deputy Register of Deeds
because respondent could immediately have documents notarized instead of the registrants going
out of the office to look for a notary public. Respondent added that she did not charge fees for
the documents required by the office to be presented under oath.[14]

Respondent insisted that contrary to complainants claims, she only notarized 135 documents as
certified by the Clerk of Court of the 11th Judicial Region, General Santos City.[15]

In her Report and Recommendation (Report) dated 25 January 2005, Investigating

Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended to the IBP Board of Governors the dismissal of
the complaint against respondent for lack of merit. The Report reads in part:
However, the fact that she applied for commission as Notary Public without
securing the approval of the proper authority although she was allowed to do so
by her superior officer, was not her own undoing for having relied on the ample
authority of her superior officer, respondent being a neophyte in the law
profession for having newly passed the bar a year after at that time.
Records further showed that after having been reprimanded by Atty. Flestado for
said mistake which was done in good faith respondent ceased and desisted to
 perform notarial work since then up to the present as could be gleaned from the
Certification issued by Clerk of Court VI Atty. Elmer D. Lastimosa of the
11th Judicial Region General Santos City; dated December 23, 2004 that 135
documents have been notarized by the respondent from February 29, 1988 to
December 31 1989 and there was no record of any notarized documents from
January 19, 1990 to December 21, 1991.[16]

In a Resolution dated 12 March 2005, the IBP Board of Governors, in adopting and approving
the Report, dismissed the case for lack of merit.

Complainant claims that in dismissing the complaint for lack of merit despite respondents
admission that she acted as a notary public for two years, the IBP Board of Governors committed
a serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction or authority.[17]

Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 provides:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions

of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing
laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public
official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public
officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice
will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; or
xxx

Memorandum Circular No. 17[18] of the Executive Department allows government employees to
engage directly in the private practice of their profession provided there is a written permission
from the Department head. It provides:

The authority to grant permission to any official or employee shall be granted by

the head of the ministry or agency in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of
the Revised Civil Service Rules, which provides:
 Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any
private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any
commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking
without a written permission from the head of Department;
Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those
officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require
that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government:
Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to
engage in outside activities, the time so devoted outside of office
hours should be fixed by the chief of the agency to the end that it
will not impair in any way the efficiency of the other officer or
employee: And provided, finally, That no permission is necessary
in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which
do not involve any real or apparent conflict between his private
interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the
discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the
management of the enterprise or become an officer or member of
the board of directors,
Subject to any additional conditions which the head of the office deems necessary
in each particular case in the interest of the service, as expressed in the various
issuances of the Civil Service Commission. (Boldfacing supplied)
It is clear that when respondent filed her petition for commission as a notary public, she did not
obtain a written permission from the Secretary of the DOJ. Respondents superior, the Register of
Deeds, cannot issue any authorization because he is not the head of the Department. And even
assuming that the Register of Deeds authorized her, respondent failed to present any proof of that
written permission. Respondent cannot feign ignorance or good faith because respondent filed
her petition for commission as a notary public after Memorandum Circular No. 17 was issued in
1986.

In Yumol, Jr. v. Ferrer Sr.,[19] we suspended a lawyer employed in the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR) for failing to obtain a written authority and approval with a duly approved leave of
absence from the CHR. We explained:

Crystal clear from the foregoing is the fact that private practice of law by CHR
lawyers is not a matter of right. Although the Commission allows CHR lawyers to
engage in private practice, a written request and approval thereof, with a duly
approved leave of absence for that matter are indispensable. In the case at bar, the
record is bereft of any such written request or duly approved leave of absence. No
written authority nor approval of the practice and approved leave of absence by
the CHR was ever presented by respondent. Thus, he cannot engage in private
practice.
 As to respondents act of notarizing documents, records show that he applied for
commission as notary public on 14 November 2000, before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 42. This was granted by RTC
Executive Judge Pedro M. Sunga, Jr., on 01 December 2000. However, the CHR
authorized respondent to act as notary public only on 29 October 2001.
Considering the acts of notarization are within the ambit of the term practice of
law, for which a prior written request and approval by the CHR to engage into it
are required, the crucial period to be considered is the approval of the CHR on 29
October 2001 and not the approval of the RTC on 04 December 2000.[20]

In Muring, Jr. v. Gatcho,[21] we suspended a lawyer for having filed petitions for commission as
a notary public while employed as a court attorney. We held:

Atty. Gatcho should have known that as a government lawyer, he was prohibited
from engaging in notarial practice, or in any form of private legal practice for that
matter. Atty. Gatcho cannot now feign ignorance or good faith, as he did not seek
to exculpate himself by providing an explanation for his error. Atty. Gatchos
filing of the petition for commission, while not an actual engagement in the
practice of law, appears as a furtive attempt to evade the prohibition.[22]

Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, engaging in the private
practice of profession, when unauthorized, is classified as a light offense punishable by
reprimand.[23]

WHEREFORE, we find Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra guilty of engaging in notarial practice

without the written authority from the Secretary of the Department of Justice, and accordingly
we REPRIMAND her. She is warned that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future
shall merit a more severe sanction.

SO ORDERED.
 [A.C. No. 6289]

JULIAN MALONSO, VS

ATTY. PETE PRINCIPE.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The duty of courts is not alone to see that lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner; it is
also their duty to see that lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees. Certainly, no one, not even
the Court can deny them that right; there is no law that authorizes them to do so.[1]
In a Complaint[2] for disbarment dated 6 June 2001 filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Julian Malonso claimed that Atty. Pete Principe, without any authority entered
his appearance as Malonsos counsel in the expropriation proceedings initiated by the National
Power Corporation (NAPOCOR). In addition, he complained that Atty. Principe, after illegally
representing him in the said case, claimed forty (40%) of the selling price of his land to the
NAPOCOR by way of attorneys fees and, further, in a Motion to Intervene, claimed to be a co-
owner of Malonsos property.[3]
In his Answer,[4] respondent replied that the services of his law office, Principe Villano
Villacorta and Clemente Law Offices, was engaged by Samahan ng mga Dadaanan at
Maapektuhan ng NAPOCOR, Inc. (SANDAMA), through its President, Danilo Elfa, as
embodied in the Contract of Legal Services executed on 01 April 1997.[5] The Contract states in
part:

The parties mutually agree one with the other as follows:

I. SECOND PARTY engages the services of the FIRST PARTY as their lawyer of the
collection, claim, and/ or payment of just compensation of its members with the
NAPOCOR;
II. FIRST PARTY accepts the engagement; both parties further agree on the following
conditions:

A. Scope of Work - negotiation, legal documentation, attendance to court proceedings and

other related activities;

B. Payment of Fees is on contingent basis. No acceptance fees, appearance and liaison fees;

C. The legal fees or payment to FIRST PARTY:

1. Forty (40%) Percent of the selling price between NAPOCOR and the SANDAMA members;
this forty (40%) [percent] is the maximum rate and may be negotiated depending on the volume
of work involved;
2. Legal Fees as stated above shall cover:

i.) Attorneys Fees of FIRST PARTY;

ii.) His representation expenses and commitment expenses;
iii.) Miscellaneous Expenses, etc.

D. Both parties agree to exert their best efforts to increase or secure the best price from
NAPOCOR.

Respondent claimed that complainant Malonso is a member of SANDAMA and that said
member executed a special power of attorney[6] in favor of Elfa, which served as the latters
authority to act in behalf of Malonso. In the document, Malonso authorized Elfa in the following
manner:

Ako, si JULIAN M. MALONSO, nasa hustong gulang, may asawa, Pilipino at naninirahan sa 92
New York St. Cubao, Q.C., sa pamamagitan nito ay ITINATALAGA at BINIBIGYANG
KAPANGYARIHAN si G. DANILO V. ELFA, nasa hustong gulang, may asawa, Pilipino at
naninirahan sa 038 Dulong Bayan, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, upang gumanap at umakda para
sa akin/amin upang gumawa tulad ng mga sumusunod:

1. PANGASIWAAN, ISAAYOS at MAKIPAGKASUNDO (negotiate) para sa

pagbebenta ng akin/aming lupa, sa National Power Corp. (NAPOCOR), na may
Titulo Bilang T-229122, na nasasakupan ng Dulong Bayan, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan;

2. TUMAYONG KINATAWAN O REPRESENTANTE ko/naming saan man at ano

man maging sa hukuman o alin man sa mga opisinang may kinalaman hinggil sa
aming nabanggit na pagbebenta ng akin/aming lupa;

3. TUMANGGAP AT MAGSUMITE ng mga papeles na nauukol sa lupang nabanggit

sa Bilang 1;

4. GUMANAP ng ano man sa inaakala ni G. DANILO V. ELFA na nararapat, matuwid

at makabubuti para sa nabanggit sa Bilang 1;

5. NA sa pamamagitan ng kasunduan at kapasyahang ito ay binibigyan ng karapatan at

kapangyarihang lumagda sa lahat ng papeles/dokumento si G. Danilo V. Elfa,
ngunit sa isang pasubali na HINDI KAILAN MAN SIYA DAPAT AT WALA
SIYANG KARAPATANG LUMAGDA S GANAP NA BENTAHAN
(ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE).

DITOY AKING IGINAGAWAD sa naturan naming kinatawan ang lahat ng karapatang kumilos
at magsagawa upang isakatuparan ang kapangyarihang magbili sa bisa ng karapatang dito ay
iginagawad sa kanya nang kahalintulad nang kung kami, sa ganang aming sarili ang mismong
nagsasagawa, at ditoy AMING PINAGTITIBAY ang lahat ng kanyang gawin na nasa aming
naman ang lubos na karapatang siya ay palitan o bawiin ang Gawad na Karapatang ito.
 In his Reply,[7] Malonso reiterated that he did not authorize Elfa to act in his behalf,
considering that while the Contract of Legal Servicesentered into by Atty. Principe and Elfa was
dated 01 April 1997, the special power of attorney he executed bore a much later date, 27
November 1997. Moreover, he could not have authorized Elfa to hire a lawyer in his behalf since
he already had his own lawyer in the person of Atty. Benjamin Mendoza.
To counter this argument, Atty. Principe commented that the agreement entered into by
SANDAMA and his law firm is a continuing one and hence, Malonso was within the coverage of
the contract even if he executed the special power of attorney on a later date. Likewise, as a
member of SANDAMA, Malonso is bound to honor the organizations commitments.[8]
The Court adopts the chronological order of events as found by the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, Julio C. Elamparo:

In the early part of 1997, National Power Corp. (NPC for brevity) instituted expropriation
proceedings against several lot owners in Bulacan including the complainant in this case.

On April 1, 1997, a Contract of Legal Services was entered into between the law firm Principe
Villano and Clemente Law Offices and SANDAMA, Inc. (Samahan ng mga Dadaanan at
Maapektuhan ng National Power Corporation) represented by its President Danilo V. Elfa.
SANDAMA is the organization of lot owners affected by the expropriation proceedings.
Complainant is a member of this organization.

On November 27, 1997, complainant executed a Kasulatan ng Pagbibigay Kapangyarihan in

favor of Danilo Elfa appointing the latter as the attorney-in-fact of the complainant on the matter
of negotiation with the NPC.

On December 21, 1999, NPCs Board of Directors approved the amicable settlement of the
expropriation cases by paying all the lot owners the total of One Hundred Three Million Four
Hundred Thirteen Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P103,413,200.00).

More that two (2) years after the expropriation cases were instituted and while complainant was
represented therein by Atty. Benjamin Mendoza, or on January 18, 2000, respondent filed an Ex-
Parte Motion to Separate Legal Fees From Selling Price Between Plaintiffs and Defendants.

About ten days after respondent filed his motion to separate legal fees, respondent filed his
Notice of Entry of Appearance (dated January 28, 2000) claiming that respondent is the legal
counsel of the complainant, a defendant in said case.

On February 12, 2000, Sixty Nine (69) lot owners including the complainant wrote a letter to
NPC informing the latter that they have never authorized Mr. Danilo Elfa to hire the services of
the respondents law firm to represent them in the expropriation cases.

On February 17, 2000, complainant filed an Opposition to respondents entry of appearance and
motion to separate legal fees.
On March 7, 2000, respondent filed a Notice of Attorneys Lien claiming 40% of the selling price
of the properties being expropriated by NPC.

On April 10, 2000, respondent filed a Notice of Adverse Claim before the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan claiming 40% of the rights, title and interest of the lot owners over their lots being
expropriated including that of complainant.

On November 20, 2000, respondent herein filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene in the
expropriation case claiming to be a co-owner of the property being expropriated.

On February 26, 2001, respondent filed an Opposition to the Compromise Agreement submitted
by the lot owners and NPC for court approval.

Because of the actions taken by the respondent, the execution of the decision approving the
compromise agreement between the lot owners and the NPC was delayed.[9]

The Report found that the Contract of Legal Services is between SANDAMA, a corporate
being, and respondents law firm. SANDAMA is not a party in all of the expropriation
proceedings instituted by NAPOCOR, neither does it claim co-ownership of the properties being
expropriated. Furthermore, the power of attorney was executed by Malonso in favor of Elfa and
not SANDAMA, and that said power of attorney was executed after SANDAMA entered into
the Contract of Legal Services. Thus, the Report concluded that the right of co-ownership could
not be derived from the said documents.[10]
Likewise, the Report noted that the right of legal representation could not be derived from
the above-mentioned documents. A contract for legal services between a lawyer and his client is
personal in nature and cannot be performed through intermediaries. Even Elfa, the attorney-in-
fact of Malonso, was never authorized to engage legal counsels to represent the former in the
expropriation proceedings. Moreover, SANDAMA is not a party litigant in the expropriation
proceedings and thus Atty. Principe has no basis to interfere in the court proceeding involving its
members.
The Investigating Commissioner concluded that from the evidence presented by both
parties, Atty. Principe was guilty of misrepresentation. Atty. Principe was found to have violated
Canon 3, Rule 3.01, Canon 10, Rule 10.01 and Rule 12.04.[11] In representing himself as
Malonsos and the other lot owners legal counsel in the face of the latters opposition, Atty.
Principe was found to be guilty of gross or serious misconduct. Likewise, his act of falsely
claiming to be the co-owner of properties being expropriated and his filing of several actions to
frustrate the implementation of the decision approving the compromise agreement make his
conduct constitutive of malpractice. The Report recommended the penalty of two (2) years
suspension from the practice of law. [12]
In its Resolution[13] dated 25 October 2003, the IBP Board of Governors ordained:

RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2003-241

CBD Case No. 01-848
Julian Malonso v.
Atty. Pete Principe
RESOLVED to ADOPT AND APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and
considering respondents violation of Rule 3.01 of Canon 3, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 and Rule
12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Pedro Principe is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.

In his Appeal Memorandum,[14] respondent claims that the Resolution No. XVI-2003-241
has no factual and legal basis, the complaint having been motivated by pure selfishness and
greed, and the Resolution itself invalid for having failed to comply with Rule 139-B of the Rules
of Court.[15] According to the respondent, the Investigating Commissioner continued to
investigate the instant case despite the lapse of three months provided under Section 8 of Rule
139-B, without any extension granted by the Supreme Court.[16] Moreover, in the subsequent
review made by the IBP Board of Governors, no actual voting took place but a mere consensus,
and the required number of votes provided by the Rules was not secured considering that there
were only five (5) governors present.[17] Respondent opines that the actions of the IBP Board
were aimed at preventing him from pursuing his known intention to run for IBP National
President.[18]
We find for the respondent.
It is the duty of the Supreme Court to see to it that a lawyer accounts for his behavior
towards the court, his client, his peers in the profession and the public. However, the duty of the
Court is not limited to disciplining those guilty of misconduct, but also to protecting the
reputation of those wrongfully charged, much more, those wrongfully found guilty.
On the other hand, the IBP is aimed towards the elevation of the standards of the law
profession, the improvement of the administration of justice, and the enabling of the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively.[19] Despite its duty to police the ranks, the
IBP is not exempt from the duty to promote respect for the law and legal processes and to abstain
from activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.[20] Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be
minions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules
formulated for their observance.[21] For the very same reasons, the Court cannot accept the
explanation[22] of Atty. Carlos L. Valdez, Jr. on the non-holding of a formal voting for
respondents case that:

Eventually, the Board reached a consensus to reduce the recommended penalty from two years to
one year suspension. Since there was already a consensus, the Board did not hold a formal
voting. A formal voting became unnecessary inasmuch as it was obvious that the decision of the
Board became unanimous.

I assure the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court that due process was observed and the
Rules governing the Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys were faithfully observed and
complied with by the IBP Board of Governors.
 The procedures outlined by the Rules are meant to ensure that the innocents are spared from
the wrongful condemnation and that only the guilty are meted out their just due. These rules
cannot be taken lightly.[23]
This Court underscores the procedural transgression incurred by the IBP Board when it
issued Resolution No. XVI-2003-241 which was reached through a mere consensus, and not
through a formal voting, with the required number of votes not secured. As to the issue of the
protracted investigation without the requisite permission from the Supreme Court to extend the
investigation period, we agree with respondent that no such request was made to this Court.
The pertinent provisions of Rule 139-B read:

Sec. 8. Investigation. Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to answer, the
Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He shall have
the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent shall be given full
opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on his behalf, and be heard by himself and
counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation
shall proceed ex parte.

The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3) months from the date of its
commencement, unless extended for good cause by the Board of Governors upon prior
application.

...

Sec. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. (a)

(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent
should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth
its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall
forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.

Relevantly, Sec. 6, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court provides in part:

Sec. 6. Board of Governors. the Integrated Bar shall be governed by a Board of Governors. Nine
Governors shall be elected by the House of Delegates from the nine Regions on the
representation basis of one Governor from each Region.

The Board shall meet regularly once every three months, on such date and at such time and place
as it shall designate. A majority of all the members of the Board shall constitute a quorum to do
business.

From these provisions, it is clear that before a lawyer may be suspended from the practice of
law by the IBP, there should be (1) a review of the investigators report; (2) a formal voting; and
(3) a vote of at least five (5) members of the Board. The rationale for this rule is simple: a
decision reached by the Board in compliance with the procedure is the official decision of the
Board as a body and not merely as the collective view of the individual members thereof. This is
in keeping with the very nature of a collegial body which arrives at its decisions only after
deliberation, the exchange of views and ideas, and the concurrence of the required majority
vote.[24] Thus, the vote of the majority would be necessary for the validity of the Boards
resolution. Without a vote having been taken, Resolution No. XVI-2003-241 (CBD Case No. 01-
848) is void and has no effect.
The Court views with disapproval the fashion by which the IBP Board of Governors, with a
fellow lawyer and fellow governors reputation and good name at stake, cavalierly brushed aside
the procedural rules outlined no less by this Court for the discipline and protection of its
members. The IBP, more than anyone, knows that the success of a lawyer in his profession
depends almost entirely on his reputation. Anything, which will harm his good name, is to be
deplored.[25] And yet the IBP Board of Governors, despite clear evidence to the contrary, and
without any remorse, even asserted that due process was observed and the Rules governing the
Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys were faithfully observed and complied.
Normally, non-compliance with the procedural rules would result in the remand of the
case.[26] However, on many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and the expeditious
administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them for
further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand of
the case, or when public interest demands an early disposition of the case, or where the trial court
had already received all the evidence of the parties.[27] In view of the delay in resolving the
instant complaint against the respondent, and in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of
cases, the Court opts to resolve the same based on the records before it.[28]
Before delving at length on the merits of the other aspect of the present proceedings, there is
need to dwell first on a dimension of expropriation proceedings which is uniquely its own.
There are two stages in every action for expropriation. The first is concerned with the
determination by the courts of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent
domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. The
second phase is concerned with the determination by the court, with the assistance of
commissioners, of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken which relates to the
valuation thereof. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and
findings of, the commissioners would be final and would dispose of the second stage of the suit,
leaving nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue.[29] During this stage, the main
bone of contention is the valuation of the property concerned.
The second stage which involves the issue of just compensation is as important, if not more,
than the first stage which refers to the issue of public purpose. But as it frequently happens, as in
this case, the public purpose dimension is not as fiercely contested. Moreover, in their quest to
secure what they believe to be the fair compensation of their property, the owners seek inroads to
the leverages of executive power where compensation compromises are commenced and given
imprimatur. In this dimension, the services of lawyers different from the ordinary litigator may
prove to be handy or even necessary. Negotiations are mostly out of court and relies, for most
part, on the sagacity, persuasion, patience, persistence and resourcefulness of the negotiator.
In the instant case, the trial court had already ruled on the valuation of the properties subject
of the expropriation, the same order which is subject of the appeal filed by the NAPOCOR.
Aware that it might take a long time before the said appeal is finally resolved, and in view of the
delay in the adjudication of the case, the landowners and NAPOCOR negotiated for a
compromise agreement. To assist them, the landowners, through SANDAMA and its president,
Danilo Elfa, engaged the services of a lawyer in the person of respondent. It is clear that
respondent was hired precisely for the negotiation phase of the case.
Now, on to the merits.
As a legal entity, a corporation has a personality distinct and separate from its individual
stockholders or members and from that of its officers who manage and run its affairs.[30] The rule
is that obligations incurred by the corporation, acting through its directors, officers and
employees, are its sole liabilities.[31] Thus, property belonging to a corporation cannot be
attached to satisfy the debt of a stockholder and vice versa, the latter having only an indirect
interest in the assets and business of the former.[32] Thus, as summed by the IBP investigator,
respondent is the lawyer of SANDAMA, but SANDAMA is not a party litigant in all of the
expropriation cases; thus respondent had no basis to interfere in the court proceedings involving
the members. But things are not as simple as that.
A review of the records reveals that respondent had grounds to believe that he can intervene
and claim from the individual landowners. For one, the incorporation of the landowners into
SANDAMA was made and initiated by respondents firm so as to make negotiations with
NAPOCOR easier and more organized. SANDAMA was a non-stock, non-profit corporation
aimed towards the promotion of the landowners common interest. It presented a unified front
which was far easier to manage and represent than the individual owners. In effect, respondent
still dealt with the members, albeit in a collective manner.
Second, respondent relied on the representation of Danilo Elfa, former SANDAMA
president and attorney-in-fact of the members, with whom he entered into a contract for legal
services. Respondent could not have doubted the authority of Elfa to contract his firms services.
After all, Elfa was armed with a Board Resolution from SANDAMA, and more importantly,
individual grants of authority from the SANDAMA members, including Malonso.
Third, the contract for legal services clearly indicated a contingent fee of forty percent
(40%) of the selling price of the lands to be expropriated, the same amount which was reflected
in the deed of assignment made by the individual members of SANDAMA. Respondent could
have easily and naturally assumed that the same figure assigned to SANDAMA was the same
amount earmarked for its legal services as indicated in their service contract. Being a non-stock,
non-profit corporation, where else would SANDAMA get the funds to pay for the legal fees due
to respondent and his firm but from the contribution of its members.
Lastly, respondents legal services were disengaged by SANDAMAs new President Yolanda
Bautista around the same time when the SANDAMA members abandoned and disauthorized
former SANDAMA president Elfa, just when the negotiations bore fruit. With all these
circumstances, respondent, rightly or wrongly, perceived that he was also about to be deprived of
his lawful compensation for the services he and his firm rendered to SANDAMA and its
members. With the prevailing attitude of the SANDAMA officers and members, respondent saw
the immediate need to protect his interests in the individual properties of the landowners. The
hairline distinction between SANDAMA and its individual members interests and properties,
flowing as it does from a legal fiction which has evolved as a mechanism to promote business
intercourse but not as an instrument of injustice, is simply too tenuous, impractical and even
unfair in view of the circumstances.
Thus, the Court cannot hold respondent guilty of censurable conduct or practice justifying
the penalty recommended. While filing the claim for attorneys fees against the individual
members may not be the proper remedy for respondent, the Court believes that he instituted the
same out of his honest belief that it was the best way to protect his interests. After all,
SANDAMA procured his firms services and was led to believe that he would be paid for the
same. There is evidence which tend to show that respondent and his firm rendered legal and even
extra-legal services in order to assist the landowners get a favorable valuation of their properties.
They facilitated the incorporation of the landowners to expedite the negotiations between the
owners, the appraisers, and NAPOCOR. They sought the assistance of several political
personalities to get some leverage in their bargaining with NAPOCOR. Suddenly, just after
concluding the compromise price with NAPOCOR and before the presentation of the
compromise agreement for the courts approval, SANDAMA disengaged the services of
respondents law firm.
With the validity of its contract for services and its authority disputed, and having rendered
legal service for years without having received anything in return, and with the prospect of not
getting any compensation for all the services it has rendered to SANDAMA and its members,
respondent and his law firm auspiciously moved to protect their interests. They may have been
mistaken in the remedy they sought, but the mistake was made in good faith. Indeed, while the
practice of law is not a business venture, a lawyer nevertheless is entitled to be duly compensated
for professional services rendered.[33] It is but natural that he protect his interest, most especially
when his fee is on a contingent basis.[34]
Respondent was disengaged by SANDAMA after a compromise agreement was entered into
by the lot owners and NAPOCOR.[35] Its motions for separate legal fees as well as for
intervention were dismissed by the trial court. Prescinding from the ultimate outcome of an
independent action to recover attorneys fees, the Court does not see any obstacle to respondent
filing such action against SANDAMA or any of its members. Any counsel, worthy of his hire, is
entitled to be fully recompensed for his services.[36] Such independent action may be the proper
venue to show entitlement to the attorneys fees he is claiming, and for his client to refute the
same. [37] If respondent could resort to such separate action which obviously is more cumbersome
and portends to be more protracted, there is similarly no rhyme or reason to preclude him from
filing mere motions such as the ones he resorted to for the purpose of providing what he
perceives to be his legitimate claim. The bottom line is that respondent is not proscribed from
seeking recovery of attorneys fees for the services he and his firm rendered to SANDAMA and
its members. As to whether he would succeed in the quest, that is another story which obviously
does not have to be resolved in this case.
The fact that the contract stipulates a maximum of forty percent (40%) contingent fees does
not make the contract illegal or unacceptable. Contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law.
Its validity depends, in large measure, upon the reasonableness of the amount fixed as contingent
fee under the circumstances of the case.[38] Nevertheless, when it is shown that a contract for a
contingent fee was obtained by undue influence exercised by the attorney upon his client or by
any fraud or imposition, or that the compensation is clearly excessive, the Court must, and will
protect the aggrieved party.[39]
 WHEREFORE, this case is DISMISSED and considered CLOSED. The Integrated Bar of
the Philippines is enjoined to comply with the procedure outlined in Rule 139-B in all cases
involving the disbarment and discipline of attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 169079

FRANCISCO RAYOS VS
ATTY. PONCIANO G. HERNANDEZ

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review 1 of the Resolution dated 12 March 2005 of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), dismissing petitioner Francisco Rayos’s complaint for disbarment against
respondent Atty. Ponciano Hernandez.

Respondent was the counsel of petitioner in Civil Case No. SM-951 entitled, "Francisco Rayos v.
NAPOCOR," filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malolos, Bulacan. The complaint
alleged, among other things, that the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) recklessly,
imprudently and negligently opened the three floodgates of the spillway of Angat Dam at
midnight of 26 October 1978 until the early morning hours of 27 October 1978, during the
occurrence of typhoon "Kading" causing the release of a great volume of stored water, the
resultant swelling and flooding of Angat River, and the consequent loss of lives of some of
petitioner’s relatives and destruction of his family’s properties, for which he sought damages. Of
the 10 members of petitioner’s family who perished, only four bodies were recovered and only
petitioner and one of his sons, German Rayos, survived.

On 21 December 1979, the complaint was dismissed 2 on the ground that the State cannot be
sued without its consent as the operation and management of Angat Dam, Norzagaray, were
governmental functions. Said dismissal was questioned directly to this Court which set aside the
RTC decision and ordered the reinstatement of the complaint. 3

On 30 April 1990, however, the complaint was dismissed again by the RTC for lack of sufficient
and credible evidence. 4

The case was subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the RTC decision
and awarded damages in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:

CONFORMABLY TO THE FOREGOING, the joint decision appealed from is hereby

REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is hereby rendered:

xxxx

2. In Civil Case No. SM-951, ordering defendants-appellees to pay jointly and severally,
plaintiff-appellant, with legal interest from the date when this decision shall have become final
and executory, the following:

A. Actual damages of Five Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱520,000.00);

B. Moral Damages of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00); and

C. Litigation Expenses of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00).

xxxx

In addition, in all the four (4) instant cases, ordering defendants-appellees to pay, jointly and
severally, plaintiffs-appellants, attorney’s fees in an amount equivalent to 15% of the total
amount awarded. 5

The case was appealed to this Court, which affirmed the Court of Appeals Decision. 6 The
Decision of the Supreme Court became final and executory on 4 August 1993.

Thus, a Writ of Execution 7 was issued by the RTC on 10 December 1993, upon motion filed by
respondent. As a consequence, NAPOCOR issued Check No. 014710 dated 5 January 1994, in
the amount of ₱1,060,800.00 payable to petitioner. Thereafter, the check was turned over to
respondent as counsel of petitioner. Petitioner demanded the turn over of the check from
respondent, but the latter refused.

On 24 January 1994 , petitioner filed with the RTC a motion 8 to direct respondent to deliver to
him the check issued by NAPOCOR, corresponding to the damages awarded by the Court of
Appeals. Petitioner sought to recover the check in the amount of ₱1,060,800.00 from respondent,
claiming that respondent had no authority to receive the same as he was already dismissed by
petitioner as his counsel on 21 November 1993. 9 Respondent, on the other hand, justifies his
retention as a means to ensure payment of his attorney’s fees.

On 7 April 1994, the RTC issued an Order directing respondent to deliver the check to the
Sheriff of the court who will subsequently deliver it to petitioner. A Writ of Execution was
subsequently issued. Despite the Court Order, respondent refused to surrender the check.

However, on 4 July 1994, respondent deposited the amount of ₱502,838.79 with Farmers
Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., Norzagaray, Bulacan, in the name of petitioner which was
eventually received by the latter.

Thus, petitioner initiated this complaint for disbarment for the failure of respondent to return the
rest of the award in the amount of ₱557,961.21.

In his comment, 10 respondent alleged that he handled petitioner’s case, in Civil Case No. SM-
951, for 15 years, from the trial court up to the Supreme Court. On 21 November 1993, he
received a letter from petitioner dismissing him as counsel. Simultaneous thereto, respondent
received a letter dated 15 November 1993 from Atty. Jose G. Bruno asking him to comment on
the therein attached letter dated 19 November 1993 of petitioner addressed to NAPOCOR,
requesting that the award of damages granted by the Court of Appeals and affirmed by the
Supreme Court be paid to him.
Respondent also averred that petitioner had a verbal contract for attorney’s fees on a contingent
basis and that the said contract was only reduced in writing on 6 October 1991, duly signed by
both of them. By virtue of the contract, petitioner and respondent supposedly agreed on a 40%-
60% sharing, respectively, of the court award. Respondent was entitled to receive 60% of the
award because petitioner agreed to pay him 40% of the award as attorney’s fees and 20% of the
award as litigation expenses.

Respondent further asseverated that because petitioner dismissed the respondent and refused to
settle his obligation, he deposited the amount of ₱424,320.00 in a bank in petitioner’s name
under Account No. 381 (representing petitioner’s share of 40% of the total award) on 10 May
1994 11 ; and the amount of ₱63,648.00 in petitioner’s name under Account No. 389
(representing petitioner’s share of 40% of the ₱159,120.00 awarded as attorney’s fees by the
Court of Appeals) on 19 May 1994. 12 Petitioner already received the amount of ₱502,838.79 in
accordance with the RTC Order dated 7 April 1994.

Respondent contended that the petitioner’s complaint was without basis and was meant only to
harass and put him to shame before the residents of Norzagaray, Bulacan.

In a Resolution dated 9 August 1995, 13 the Court referred the case to the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.

A series of hearings were conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP at the IBP
Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, from March to September 2001.

On 1 February 2005, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro B. Funa submitted her

Report and Recommendation, 14 recommending the dismissal of the case.

Thereafter, the IBP issued its Resolution dated 12 March 2005, approving and adopting the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that the case lacks merit,
the same is hereby DISMISSED. 15

We do not agree in the recommendation of the IBP.

The threshold issue in this petition is: whether respondent is justified in retaining the amount
awarded to petitioner in Civil Case No. SM-951 to assure payment of his attorney’s fees.

Moneys collected by an attorney on a judgment rendered in favor of his client constitute trust
funds and must be immediately paid over to the client. 16 Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides as follows:
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come
into his possession.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.

In the case at bar, when respondent withheld and refused to deliver the NAPOCOR check
representing the amount awarded by the court in Civil Case No. SM-951, which he received on
behalf of his client (petitioner herein), he breached the trust reposed on him. It is only after an
Order was issued by the RTC ordering the delivery of the check to petitioner that the respondent
partially delivered the amount of ₱502,838.79 to the former, but still retaining for himself the
amount of ₱557,961.21 as payment for his attorney’s fees. The claim of the respondent that
petitioner failed to pay his attorney’s fees is not an excuse for respondent’s failure to deliver the
amount to the petitioner. A lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client’s money
for himself by the mere fact alone that the client owes him attorney’s fees. 17 The failure of an
attorney to return the client’s money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has
misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice and violation of the general morality, as well
as of professional ethics; it also impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment. In short, a lawyer’s unjustified withholding of money belonging to his client, as in
this case, warrants the imposition of disciplinary action. 18

It is true that under Canon 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, an attorney has the
following rights;

Rule 16.03- A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be
necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his
client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has
secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court. (Emphases supplied.)

But the fact alone that a lawyer has a lien for fees on moneys in his hands collected for his client,
as above-stated, does not relieve him of his duty to promptly account for the moneys received;
his failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. 19 Thus, what respondent should have
properly done in the case at bar was to provide the petitioner with an accounting before
deducting his attorney’s fees and then to turn over the remaining balance of the award collected
to petitioner. The Court notes that respondent represented petitioner from the time of filing of the
complaint in Civil Case No. SM-951 before what is now the RTC and of the appeal of the same
case to the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court. But respondent was not justified to hold on the
entire amount of award collected by him until his fees had been paid and received by him.

The relationship of attorney and client has always been rightly regarded as one of special trust
and confidence. An attorney must exercise the utmost good faith and fairness in all his
relationship vis-à-vis his client. Respondent fell far short of this standard when he failed to
render an accounting for the amount actually received by him on behalf of his client and when he
refused to turn over any portion of said amount to his client upon the pretext that his attorney’s
fees had not at all been paid. Respondent had, in fact, placed his private and personal interest
above that of his client.

We have held that lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not
merchants. 20 Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it
births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile
pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from governmental interference, is impressed
with a public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation. 21

A lawyer is not merely the defender of his client’s cause and a trustee of his client’s cause of
action and assets; he is also, and first and foremost, an officer of the court and participates in the
fundamental function of administering justice in society. 22 It follows that a lawyer’s
compensation for professional services rendered is subject to the supervision of the court, not
just to guarantee that the fees he charges and receives remain reasonable and commensurate with
the services rendered, but also to maintain the dignity and integrity of the legal profession to
which he belongs. Upon taking his attorney’s oath as an officer of the court, a lawyer submits
himself to the authority of the courts to regulate his right to charge professional fees. 23

There is another aspect to this case which the Court cannot just gloss over. Respondent claimed
that he charged petitioner, his client, a contingent fee comprising of forty percent (40%) as
attorney’s fees and twenty percent (20%) as litigation expenses. The agreement provides:

UNAWAIN NG LAHAT SA PAMAMAGITAN NITO:

Ako, si Francisco Rayos, Sr., Pilipino, may sapat na gulang at ngayon ay naninirahan sa
Pinagbarilan, Baliwag, Bulacan, sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito, ay nagpapatunay sa mga
sumusunod:

Na, kaugnay sa aking usapin laban sa NPC at Benjamin Chavez (Rayos vs. NPC, et al.) na
ngayon ay nakabinbin sa Court of Appeals, ako ay nakipagkasundo sa aking abogado, Atty.
Ponciano G. Hernandez, gaya ng sumusunod:

1 Sakaling ipanalo ang aking usapin, ang ano mang aking makukuha ay hahatiin gaya ng
sumusunod: 40% ang para sa akin; 40% ang para kay Atty. Ponciano G. Hernandez; 20% ay
ilalabas bilang gastos sa kaso.

2. Kung matalo ako sa kaso ay wala akong sagutin sa aking abogado.

Sa katunayan ng lahat, ako ay lumagda sa kasunduang ito dito sa Norzagaray, Bulacan ngayong
ika-6 ng Oktubre 1991.

(SGD)PONCIANO G. HERNANDEZ (SGD)FRANCISCO RAYOS

Abogado May Usapin 24

A contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction 25 and is generally recognized as valid
and binding but must be laid down in an express contract. 26 The amount of contingent fee agreed
upon by the parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal services
only if the suit or litigation prospers. A much higher compensation is allowed as contingent fee
in consideration of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails. 27 Contracts of this
nature are permitted because they redound to the benefit of the poor client and the lawyer
"especially in cases where the client has meritorious cause of action, but no means with which to
pay for legal services unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a contract for a contingent
fee to be paid out of the proceeds of the litigation. Oftentimes, the contingent fee arrangement is
the only means by which the poor and helpless can seek redress for injuries sustained and have
their rights vindicated." 28

Contingent fee contracts are subject to the supervision and close scrutiny of the court in order
that clients may be protected from unjust charges. 29 Section 13 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics states that "a contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable
under all the circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation,
but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness." Likewise,
Rule 138, Section 24, of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 24. Compensation of attorney’s; agreement as to fees. - An attorney shall be entitled to

have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a
view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services
rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of
attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony
and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall
control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable. (Underscoring supplied.)

The reduction of unreasonable attorney’s fees is within the regulatory powers of the
courts. 30 When the courts find that the stipulated amount is excessive or the contract is
unreasonable, or found to have been marred by fraud, mistake, undue influence or suppression of
facts on the part of the attorney, public policy demands that said contract be disregarded to
protect the client from unreasonable exaction. 31

There is, therefore, now a corollary issue of whether the stipulated attorney’s fees are
unreasonable and unconscionable under the circumstances of the case as to warrant a reduction
thereof.

Stipulated attorney’s fees are unconscionable whenever the amount is by far so disproportionate
compared to the value of the services rendered as to amount to fraud perpetrated upon the client.
This means to say that the amount of the fee contracted for, standing alone and unexplained
would be sufficient to show that an unfair advantage had been taken of the client, or that a legal
fraud had been perpetrated on him. 32
The decree of unconscionability or unreasonableness of a stipulated amount in a contingent fee
contract, will not, however, preclude recovery. It merely justifies the fixing by the court of a
reasonable compensation for the lawyer’s services.

Generally, the amount of attorney’s fees due is that stipulated in the retainer agreement which is
conclusive as to the amount of the lawyer’s compensation. A stipulation on a lawyer’s
compensation in a written contract for professional services ordinarily controls the amount of
fees that the contracting lawyer may be allowed, unless the court finds such stipulated amount
unreasonable or unconscionable. 33 In the absence thereof, the amount of attorney’s fees is fixed
on the basis of quantum meruit, i.e., the reasonable worth of the attorney’s services. Courts may
ascertain also if the attorney’s fees are found to be excessive, what is reasonable under the
circumstances. 34In no case, however, must a lawyer be allowed to recover more than what is
reasonable, pursuant to Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

We have identified the circumstances to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a

claim for attorney’s fees as follows: (1) the amount and character of the service rendered; (2)
labor, time, and trouble involved; (3) the nature and importance of the litigation or business in
which the services were rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of money or the
value of the property affected by the controversy or involved in the employment; (6) the skill and
experience called for in the performance of the services; (7) the professional character and social
standing of the attorney; (8) the results secured; (9) whether the fee is absolute or contingent, it
being recognized that an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is contingent
than when it is not; 35 and (10) the financial capacity and economic status of the client have to be
taken into account in fixing the reasonableness of the fee. 36

Rule 20.1, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enumerates the following factors
which should guide a lawyer in determining his fees:

(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;

(b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;

(c) The importance of the subject matter;

(d) The skill demanded;

(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;

(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to
which he belongs;

(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the
service;

(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;

(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and

(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

In the case at bar, respondent retained the amount of ₱557,961.21 out of the ₱1,060,800.00
award for damages paid by NAPOCOR to petitioner. Under the said scheme, respondent actually
collected fifty-three percent (53%) or more than half of the total amount due the petitioner;
indeed, he appropriated for himself more than the amount which he had already turned over to
and actually received by his client.

As adverted to above, we note that petitioner was unschooled and frustrated and hopeless with
the tragic loss of his loved ones caused by the inundation of the town of Norzagaray, Bulacan, on
26-27 October 1978 because of the negligent release by NAPOCOR of the water through the
spillways of the Angat Dam. Petitioner also had to face the loss and destruction of his family’s
properties. Under such circumstances and given his understandable desire to recover the
damages for the loss of his loved ones and properties, petitioner would easily succumb and
readily agree to the demands of respondent lawyer regarding his attorney’s fees.

We believe and so hold that the contingent fee here claimed was, under the facts obtaining in this
case, grossly excessive and unconscionable. Such a fee structure, when considered in
conjunction with the circumstances of this case, also shows that an unfair advantage was taken of
the client and legal fraud and imposition perpetrated upon him. Lawyers should not be permitted
to get a lion’s share of the benefits due the poor and the helpless. Contracts for legal services
between the helpless and attorney should be zealously scrutinized to the end that a fair share of
the benefits be not denied to the former. This Court has the power to guard a client, 37 especially
an aged and necessitous client, 38 against such a contract.

A survey of existing jurisprudence regarding attorney’s fees would reveal the following: in the
case of Amalgamated Laborers’ Association v. Court of Industrial Relations, 39 the rate of
attorney’s fees allowed was 25%; in Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit v. Court of
Appeals, 40 the rate allowed was 20%; in Polytrade Corporation v. Blanco, 41 25%; in Santiago v.
Dimayuga, 42 20%; in Cosmopolitan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Reyes, 43 15%; in Reyes v. Court of
Appeals, 44 15%; and in Social Security Commission v. Almeda, 45 15%.

In the present case, respondent Atty. Hernandez, after all, succeeded in obtaining a favorable
decision for his client, the petitioner. At first, respondent failed to obtain a favorable judgment in
the RTC as the case was dismissed. But on appeal to the Court of Appeals, the RTC Decision
was reversed and petitioner was awarded the amount of ₱1,060,800.00 as damages and
₱159,120.00 as attorney’s fees. Said award was sustained by the Supreme Court. We also take
note respondent’s efforts in litigating petitioner’s case for a long period of 15 years. Lastly, the
respondent took risk in representing petitioner on a contingent fee basis.

In consideration of the foregoing, a fee of 35% of the amount awarded to petitioner would be a
fair compensation for respondent’s legal services.
The misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to
be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, renders him unworthy to the
privileges which his license and the law confer upon him, may be sanctioned with disbarment or
suspension. 46

The court should also exercise a sound discretion in determining whether a lawyer should be
disbarred or merely suspended. It should bear in mind that admission to the Bar is obtained only
after years of labor and study and the office acquired often becomes the source of great honor
and emolument to its possessor. To most members of the legal profession, it is a means of
support for themselves and their families. To deprive one of such an office is often to decree
poverty to the lawyer and destitution to his family. 47 Disbarment, therefore, should never be
decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end
desired. 48

In the case of Schulz v. Atty. Flores, 49 a lawyer was suspended for six months for not returning
his client’s money despite demands, for unjustifiably refusing to return his client’s papers, and
for collecting excessive and unreasonable fees. Also in the case of Tanhueco v. Atty. De
Dumo, 50 a lawyer was suspended for a period of six months for failure to return the money
received by him on behalf of his client and for collecting excessive and unconscionable fees.

Guided by our rulings in the abovestated cases, suspension of respondent for six months is
justified in the case at bar.1awphi1.net

WHEREFORE the Court Resolves that:

1. Respondent is guilty of violation of the attorney’s oath and of serious professional misconduct
and shall be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months and WARNED that
repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely;

2. Respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees in the amount equivalent to thirty-five percent (35%)
of the total amount awarded 51 to petitioner in Civil Case No. SM-951; and

3. Respondent is to return the amount of Two Hundred Ninety Thousand One Hundred Nine
Pesos and Twenty-One Centavos (₱290,109.21), 52 which he retained in excess of what we
herein declared as fair and reasonable attorney’s fees, plus legal interest from date of finality of
this judgment until full payment thereof.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as member of the Bar
and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the IBP, and the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts of the country.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 10781
COBALT RESOURCES VS ATTY. RONALD AGUADO

PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Cobalt Resources, Inc. (CRI) against
respondent Atty. Ronald C. Aguado (Atty. Aguado) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
lawyer's oath.

The Antecedents

In its Complaint,[1] CRI alleged that on March 5, 2010, a group of armed men, clad in vests
bearing the mark "PASG" and pretending to be agents of the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Group
(PASG), hi-jacked its delivery van which was then loaded with cellular phones worth P1.3
million; that Dennis Balmaceda (Balmaceda), the driver of the delivery van, and his companions
were all forcibly taken away at gun point and were dropped at the Country Hill and Golf Club;
that Balmaceda called Antonio Angeles (Angeles), the Security Director of CRI, who
immediately reported the incident to the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation
Detection Unit (PNP-CIDU); that with the use of Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) Tracking
Device installed in the cellular phones, Angeles and the PNP-CIDU tracked down the location of
the cellular phones to be in front of Pegasus Bar along Quezon Avenue, Quezon City; that the
PNP-CIDU, together with Angeles proceeded to Pegasus Bar and found three (3) vehicles parked
in front of the bar: (1) Toyota Fortuner with Plate No. UNO-68 owned by Atty. Aguado, (2)
Chevrolet Optra with Plate No. ZDW-764 and (3) a motorcycle with Plate No. NK-1180; that
when the PNP-CIDU approached the vehicles, Anthony Palmes (Palmes) ran but he was chased
by the police officers and was arrested; that Atty. Aguado who was then standing in the reception
area of Pegasus Bar was not arrested as none of the police officers knew, at that time, of his
participation in the crime; that the PNP-CIDU searched the vehicles and found the cellular
phones, the Identification Card (ID) showing Atty. Aguado as Legal Consultant of the PASG, the
Mission Order identifying Atty. Aguado as the Assistant Team Leader, and a vest bearing the
mark PASG.

CRI further averred that the men who hijacked its delivery van used the fake mission order when
it flagged down the delivery van; that the mission order identified Atty. Aguado as the assistant
team leader and authorized the armed men to seize CRTs cellular phones; that the PASG issued a
certification stating that the mission order was fake; that Atty. Aguado carried an ID bearing his
picture and name which showed that he was a PASG legal consultant; and that this ID was
likewise fake as evidenced by a certification issued by the PASG.

Based on the Sinumpaang Salaysay,[2] dated September 8, 2010, executed by Palmes, CRI
concluded that it was Atty. Aguado who prepared the fake mission order and masterminded the
crime as he was the one who conceived it and laid down the nitty-gritty details of its execution;
and that it was; he who recruited the armed men who actually executed the hijacking.

Eventually, two separate Informations for Robbery[3] and Caraapping[4] were filed against Atty.
Aguado and several others.
The IBP directed Atty. Aguado to submit his answer but, despite several extensions, he failed to
do so.

The IBP then set the case for mandatory conference.

In his Conference Brief,[5] Atty. Aguado denied the allegations. He averred that "on March 5,
2010, at about 11:00 to 12:00 in the afternoon,"[6] his Toyota Fortuner with Plate No. UNO-68
was carnapped along Scout Mandarin while in the custody of his driver; that he reported the
incident to the police authorities; that on March 7, 2010, he was awakened by relatives informing
him that his name was on the front page of several tabloids in a story connecting him to the
alleged hijacking; and that he was indicted in the case because of the ID found hanging in his
carnapped vehicle.

In its Report and Recommendation,[7] dated May 3, 2011, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) found Atty. Aguado liable for unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct in
falsifying the ID and mission order showing him as the Legal Consultant and the Assistant Team
Leader, respectively, of the PASG. The IBP-CBD recommended that he be suspended for two
(2) years. It, however, deferred the issue of Atty. Aguado's purported participation in the alleged
hijacking incident as the issue pertained to a judicial function.

On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report of the CBD, as
follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that
Respondent committed unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct by falsifying the ID
and Mission Order, Atty. Ronaldo Aguado is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for two (2) years.[8]
Not satisfied, CRI filed a motion for reconsideration[9] praying that the May 3, 2011 report of the
IBP-CBD be set aside and that a new resolution ordering the disbarment of Atty. Aguado be
issued. CRI claimed that Atty. Aguado deserved the ultimate penalty of disbarment as the
falsification of public documents was sufficiently established and, as the CBD knew, he
masterminded the hijacking using his profession to commit the crime.

On July 25, 2013, Atty. Aguado also filed a motion for reconsideration[10] of the March 20, 2013
Resolution praying that it be set aside and a new one be issued dismissing the complaint. He
averred that the charges of usurpation of authority and falsification filed against him had been
dismissed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City; that he could not be presumed to
be the author of the falsification because he was never in possession of the falsified ID and
mission order; and that he never used, took advantage or profit therefrom. Atty. Aguado asserted
that this case should, at the very least, be suspended pending the resolution of the robbery and
carnapping charges against him.
In a Resolution,[11] dated September 27, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied both motions
and affirmed its March 20, 2013 Resolution.

Pursuant to Section 12(c), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, CRI filed a petition for
review[12] before the Court. CRI was firm in its stand that Atty. Aguado be meted out the penalty
of disbarment for his falsification of a PASG mission order and ID and for his involvement in the
hijacking of the CIR delivery van and its cargo.

Similarly, Atty. Aguado filed a petition for review insisting on his innocence and praying for the
dismissal of the complaint.

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds merit in the petition of CRI.

It must be emphasized that a disbarment proceeding, being administrative in nature, is separate

and distinct from a criminal action filed against a lawyer and they may proceed independently of
each other.[13] A finding of guilt in the criminal case does not necessarily mean a finding of
liability in the administrative case.[14] In the same way, the dismissal of a criminal case on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence against an accused, who is also a respondent in an
administrative case, does not necessarily exculpate him administratively because the quantum of
evidence required is different. In criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
required.[15] "In administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the quantum
of proof required is clearly preponderant evidence and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant."[16] Preponderance of evidence means "evidence which is more convincing to the
court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto."[17]

Clearly, Atty. Aguado committed the act complained of as it was established that he was in
possession of a falsified ID showing him as a legal consultant of the PASG and mission order
identifying him as the Assistant Team Leader of the anti-smuggling operation. Although Atty.
Aguado claimed in his Conference Brief that he was indicted merely on the basis of an ID found
hanging in his carnapped Toyota Fortuner,[18] his counsel, Atty. Letecia Amon (Atty. Amon),
during the mandatory conference held on February 25, 2011, acknowledged that the ID
and mission order were found in the Toyota Fortuner owned by Atty. Aguado, thus:

ATTY. HARON:
Is she willing to admit that respondent is the same person referred to in the document called
mission order marked as Annex "F" issued by the PASG.
ATTY. AMON:
I have no exact knowledge on that, Your Honor.
ATTY. HARON:
I'm showing counsel for respondent with a copy of a mission order marked as Annex "F"....
COMM. CACHAPERO:
Machine copy.
ATTY. HARON:
This is the copy.
COMM. CACHAPERO:
Take a look, is that a machine copy?
ATTY. HARON:
Yes, Your Honor. Annex "F" states that Atty. Ronald C. Aguado is the assistant team leader
of the team by mission order.
COMM. CACHAPERO:
He is only asking, the respondent is the one who owns that document. He is not yet asking
whether that document is authentic or not.
ATTY. AMON:
Yes, Your Honor, as written here.
COMM. CACHAPERO:
Yes, he is the one.
ATTY. HARON:
Would the respondent also like to admit that the identification card and the mission
order were found inside his Toyota Fortuner, Plate No. UNO-68.
ATTY. AMON:
Of which he is the owner, yes.
ATTY. HARON:
Admitted also, Your Honor.
ATTY. HARON:
Would the respondent also like to admit the certifications Annexes "G" and "H" issued by
the PASG are genuine and duly executed. I'm showing counsel copies of the certifications,
Your Honor, marked as Annexes "G" and "H" which bears the seal of that office, Your
Honor.
COMM. CACHAPERO:
What is your proposal Atty. Haron?
x x x.[19] [Emphasis supplied]
Moreover, the Sinumpaang Salaysay[20] of Palmes explicitly described Atty. Aguado's
participation in the crime as follows:

xxx

2. Alam ko kung sinu-sino ang mga taong kasama sa pagplano at pagsasagawa ng nasabing
'hijacking'. Bagamat may partisipasyon ako sa krimen, hindi ko alam na ang gagawing paghuli sa
mga nasabing cellphone ay labag sa batas dahil ako ay pinaniwala na ang gagawin naming
paghuli sa mga cellphone ng Cobalt ay isang lehitimong operasyon ng PASG.

3. Bago pa man naganap ang nasabing hijacking ay dati akong empleyado ng Cobalt na
nakatalaga sa Delivery Section/Pull Out Service. Ngunit hindi nagtagal ay nag-resign ako.

4. Noong ikalawang lingo ng Pebrero, nilapitan ako ni Jaime "James" Abedes at sinabi sa akin ng
kung pwede ay i-monitor ko daw ang ruta ng delivery van ng Cobalt at ako ay bibgyan niya ng
"budget" upang ang kanyang grupo ay makapagsagawa ng 'seizure operations.'
5. Noong una ay nag-alangan akong sumangayon sa mungkahi ni James ngunit ako ay
pinapanatag niya na lahat ng dokumento at papeles ay kumpleto. Sabi pa ni James, "Si Atty.
Aguado ang magbibigay ng complete documents at Mission Order dahil naka-direkta siya sa
PASG Malacanang para ma-flag down ang delivery van".

6. Ako ay naniwala sa kanyang sinabi dahil sa pagbanggit niya na may kasama kaming abogado.
Dahil dito ay pumayag ako sa mungkahi ni James.

7. Kinabukasan ay nagkita kami ni James sa Caltex Pioneer corner Shaw Boulevard. Nalaman ko
kay James na may hawak siyang Security Guard doon. Pinakilala niya ako kay Eliseo De Rosas
alias Nonoy na isa ring tauhan ni James. Siya ay may gamit na Honda na motorsiklo na kulay
berde na may plakang 1180 NK. Noong araw din na iyon ay nagtungo kami sa Brixton Street
upang i-monitor ang warehouse ng Cobalt dahil may warehouse ang Cobalt sa Brixton Street.

8. Pagkatapos naming pumunta sa Brixton Street ay nagtungo naman kami sa P. Tuazon Street
kung saan may mga clients ang Cobalt, at doon naming nakita ang delivery van na Mitsubishi L-
300 ng Cobalt.

9. Sinimulan namin ni Nonoy ang pagmonitor ng ruta ng delivery van ng Cobalt. Sa aming
ginawang pag-monitor ay napansin naming madalas magpakarga ng gas ang nasabing delivery
van sa Petron Station sa Ortigas Avenue corner B. Serrano Street. Isang lingo kaming nag-
monitor ni Nonoy sa ruta ng Cobalt.

Ipinaalam naming kay James ang nakakalap naming impormasyon. Noong natiyak naming ang
ruta ng delivery van ay nagpaschedule si James ng 'meeting' kay Atty. Aguado.

10. Ika-22 ng Pebrero 2010 alas-6 ng gabi sa McDonald's Quezon Avenue ay nag meeting kami.
Ang mga kasama sa meeting ay si James, Atty. Aguado, Joe Almonte, at Nonoy. Noong kami ay
nandoon ay lumipat ng lamesa si Atty. Aguado, James at Joe Almonte at sila ay nagusap.

11. Pagkatapos ng usapan nila ay pumunta sa amin si James at sinabi sa amin kung ano ang
kanilang napagusapan. Sinabi sa amin ni James na mag-iisue daw ng Mission Order si Atty.
Aguado. Si Atty. Aguado na rin daw ang magbubuo ng grupo ng mga lalake upang i-flag down
ang delivery van ng Cobalt.

12. Noong ika-25 ng Pebrero 2010 alas 7 ng gabi, ay muli kaming nagkita nila James, Nonoy at
Joe Almonte sa McDonald's Quezon Avenue. Pagsapit ng alas-8 ng gabi ay tumawag si Atty.
Aguado na nasa Starbucks Cafe sa Tomas Morato Avenue daw siya naka-puwesto. Kaya't
kaming apat ay sumunod sa Starbucks. Pagdating naming sa Starbucks ay nandoon nga si Atty.
Aguado at may kasama siyang isang pulis.

13. Hindi nagtagal ay umalis sila Atty. Aguado at James sakay ng Toyota Fortuner na may
plakang UNO-68. Sinabi sa amin ni James na sila ay magsasagawa ng "ocular" ng lugar kung
saan gagawin ang pag-flag down ng delivery van. Nang sila ay magbalik, kami ay sinabihan na
gagawin namin ang operasyon sa umaga ng kinabukasan (ika-26 ng Pebrero, Biernes).
Ayon pa sa kanila, ako raw ay pupuwesto sa Petron Station sa may Boni Serrano corner Ortigas
Avenue ng alas-8 ng umaga upang doon abangan ang pagdaan ng delivery van. Samantalang,
ang mga taong magsasagawa ng pag flag down (pawang mga tao ni Atty. Aguado) ay pupuwesto
na rin sa may Benitez Street. Kapag nakita ko na raw ang delivery van ay agad akong tumawag
kay James upang ipagbigay alam ang pagdaan nito at i-alert ang mga nasabing mga lalake,
pagkatapos ay tumungo raw ako sa Benitez Street upang siguraduhin na tama ang delivery van
na ipa-flag-down.

Pagkatapos ng meeting ng gabi na iyon ay isa-isa na kaming nagsi-uwian.

14. Kaya't kinabukasan, ika-26 ng Pebrero, alas-8 ng umaga ay nagtungo ako sa nasabing Petron
Station. Ngunit tumawag si James na hindi raw matutuloy ang operation dahil kulang sa tao si
Atty. Aguado.

15. Kami (ako, Joe Almonte at Nonoy) ay muling pinulong ni James sa McDonald's Quezon
Avenue noong ika-i ng Marso alas-7 ng gabi. Bandang alas-8 ng gabi ay dumating na rin si Atty.
Aguado. Sila Atty. Aguado, James at Joe Almonte [ay] nag-usap sa labas ng Smoking Area
samantalang kami ni Nonoy ay nanatili sa loob.

16. Nang matapos ang usapan ay sinabi sa amin ni James na nag-set ulit ng operation si Atty.
Aguado kinabukasan, ika-2 ng Marso, Martes, ngunit hintayin daw naming ang feedback mula
kay Atty. Aguado dahil kelangan daw ng gamit ang mga tao ni Atty. Aguado.

17. Muli akong nagtungo kinabukasan, ika-2 ng Marso, alas- 8 ng umaga, ngunit maya-maya
lamang ay tumawag sa akin si James at sinabi niya sa akin na hindi na naman daw tuloy ang
operation dahil hindi nakakuha ng gamit ang mga tao ni Atty. Aguado.

Sa puntong ito ay sinabi ko na kay James na sana sigurado ang mga papeles ni Atty. Aguado
dahil ayaw ko ng illegal na trabaho. Sinabi naman sa akin ni James na kumpleto naman daw ang
mga papeles at legal ang gagawing operation.

18. Ika-4 ng Marso 2010, ay tumawag sa akin si James at sinabi niya sa akin na tuloy na daw ang
operation kinabukasan (ika- 5 ng Marso). Sinabi rin niya sa akin na alas-8 ng umaga ay
kailangan daw na naka-puwesto na ako sa Petron Station.

19. Kaya noong ika-5 ng Marso 2010, alas-8 ng umaga, ako ay pumuwesto na sa Petron Gasoline
Station sa Boni Serrano corner Ortigas Avenue sakay ng isang motorsiklo. Bandang alas-8:3O ng
umaga ay dumating naman si James sakay ng isang Chevrolet na may plakang ZDW 764 at may
kasama pa siya na pinakilala sa aking "Larry."

Bandang alas-9 ng umaga ay dumating ang Toyota Fortuner ni Atty. Aguado. Nakita ko na sakay
ng nasabing Toyota Fortuner si Atty. Aguado at Joe Almonte. Hindi sila bumaba bagkus ay
nagpakarga lamang ito ng gasolina sa nasabing Petron Station. Hindi nagtagal ay umalis na rin
sila. Sumunod namang umalis si James at Larry sakay ng Chevrolet.
20. Bandang alas-9:3O ng umaga, nakita ko na dumating ang delivery van ng Cobalt sa Petron
upang ito ay magpakarga ng gasolina. Tumawag ako kay James gamit ang aking cellphone at
sinabi ko, "Nandito na ang delivery van na white, may plakang NKQ 734." Sumagot si James,
"ok nakapuwesto na kami. Andito na kami sa area"

21. Agad akong umalis patungo sa Benitez Street upang abangan ang pagdaan ng delivery van
upang ma-flag down ito. Gamit ang aking motorsiklo, ako ay dali-daling nagtungo sa Benitez
Street.

Pagdating ko doon ay nakita ko ang nasabing Chevrolet ni James at isang L-300 van na kulay
blue-green na may plakang DFN-733. Nadatnan ko rin ang tatlong lalake na pawang armado at
nakasuot ng tsalekong may tatak na PASG at nag-aabang sa gilid ng daan. Mayroon din akong
napansin na nakasakay sa loob ng nasabing blue-green na L-300 van ngunit hindi ko na nabilang
ang dami nila.

22. Ako ay pumunta sa Chevrolet (driver side), at binuksan naman ni James ang bintana nito.
Sinabi ko ulit sa kanya na parating na ang delivery van. Sumagot siya, "Sige. Timbrehan mo lang
sila pag malapit na. Hintayin mo relay kung saan ka susunod." Pagkatapos noon ay umalis na
sila.

23. Pagkaalis nila, kami at nang tatlong nasabing lalake ay nag-abang sa pagdaan ng delivery
van. Nang makita ko itong paparating, agad kong sinabi "approaching na. yang puti, yang puti."
Pagkatapos noon ay agad pinara ng isa sa mga nasabing lalakeng nakasumbrero ang delivery
van. Sumenyas ito sa driver ng delivery van na itabi ito sa gilid. Pilit binuksan ng tatlong lalake
ang magkabilang pintuan ng delivery van at nang mabuksan ang mga nasabing pintuan ay agad
hinila palabas ang tatlo nitong pahinante at agad silang pinosasan.

xxxx
From the foregoing, it can be clearly deduced that Atty. Aguado had participation in the crime as
charged in the complaint, from the planning stage up to its execution. These falsified documents
found in his possession, as certified found in his possession, as certified as evidenced by the
PASG, were used to facilitate the commission of the crime. The well-settled rule is that "in the
absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged document
is the forger and therefore guilty of falsification."[21] Atty. Aguado failed to rebut the allegations.
Other than the police blotter showing that he reported the carnapping of his vehicle, Atty.
Aguado presented no other convincing evidence to support his denial of the crime. He also failed
to show any ill motive on the part of Palmes in testifying against him whom he claimed to have
met only in February 2010.

Moreover, his story of the carnapping of his Fortuner cannot be given credence considering his
inconsistent statements on the matter. In this regard, the Court quotes a portion of the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Oliver Cachapero. Thus:

He, too, blabbered about the supposed carnapping of his Fortuner car on the same day the
hijacking was staged by supposed PASG personnel suggesting that he was a victim and not a
perpetrator. However, his allegations in this regard is put in serious doubt. In the QC PD alarm
sheet, Respondent reported that the carnapping took place at 2:30 of March 5, 2010 while in his
sworn statement, he claimed that his car was carnapped at 4:31 p.m. the precise time the
supposed carnapping was staged is too vital that Respondent could not have overlooked the same
in his narration of facts in his counter-affidavit or in his statement before the police authorities
expecially because he supposedly reported the incident on the very same day it happened. But as
correctly observed by the Complainant, even if the report on the time of the carnapping incident
would have been properly made, the hijacking took place much earlier and therefore the same
does not negate the commission of the crime by the Respondent. Also, the reporting did not
prove the fact of carnapping especially where, as in this case, no eyewitness account was
presented, no suspect apprehended, and no criminal case was filed.[22]
The Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) explicitly mandates:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.
It must be emphasized that a membership in the Bar is a privilege laden with conditions,[23] and
granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of
lawyers as instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice.[24] As officers of
the courts and keepers of the public's faith, lawyers are burdened with the highest degree of
social responsibility and so mandated to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and
honor.[25] They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also this high standard of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.[26]

Atty, Aguado has committed acts that showed he was unfit and unable to faithfully discharge his
bounden duties as a member of the legal profession. Because he failed to live up to the exacting
standards demanded of him, he proved himself unworthy of the privilege to practice law. As
vanguards of our legal system, lawyers, are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal professor and to refrain from any act or omission which might diminish the
trust and confidence reposed by the public in the integrity of the legal profession.[27]

In several cases, the Court, after finding the lawyer guilty of gross dishonesty, imposed the
supreme penalty of disbarment for engaging in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful acts by
falsifying documents. In Brennisen v. Atty. Contawi,[28] the Court disbarred the lawyer when he
falsified a special power of attorney so he could mortgage and sell his client's property.
In Embido v. Atty. Pe, Jr.,[29] the penalty of disbarment was meted out against the lawyer who
authored the falsification of an inexistent court decision.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Ronald C. Aguado is DISBARRED for gross misconduct and violation
of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and his name is
ordered STRICKEN OFF the roll of attorneys.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be made part of his
personal records; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
 [A.M. No. CA-05-18-P]

ZALDY NUEZ, VS

ELVIRA CRUZ-APAO,

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

What brings our judicial system into disrepute are often the actuations of a few erring court
personnel peddling influence to party-litigants, creating the impression that decisions can be
bought and sold, ultimately resulting in the disillusionment of the public. This Court has never
wavered in its vigilance in eradicating the so-called bad eggs in the judiciary. And whenever
warranted by the gravity of the offense, the supreme penalty of dismissal in an administrative
case is meted to erring personnel.[1]

The above pronouncement of this Court in the case of Mendoza vs. Tiongson[2] is applicable
to the case at bar.
This is an administrative case for Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct[3] against Elvira Cruz-
Apao (Respondent), Executive Assistant II of the Acting Division Clerk of Court of the Fifteenth
(15th) Division, Court of Appeals (CA). The complaint arose out of respondents solicitation of
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from Zaldy Nuez (Complainant) in exchange for a speedy
and favorable decision of the latters pending case in the CA,[4] more particularly, CA-G.R. SP
No. 73460 entitled PAGCOR vs. Zaldy Nuez.[5] Complainant initially lodged a complaint with the
Action Center of the Television program Imbestigador of GMA Network,[6] the crew of which
had accompanied him to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime CommissionSpecial Projects
Group (PAOCC-SPG) in Malacaang where he filed a complaint for extortion[7] against
respondent. This led to the conduct of an entrapment operation by elements of the Presidential
Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) on 28 September 2004 at the Jollibee Restaurant,
2nd Floor, Times Plaza Bldg., corner Taft and United Nations Avenue, Manila,[8] the place where
the supposed hand-over of the money was going to take place.
Respondents apprehension by agents of the PAOCTF in the course of the entrapment
operation prompted then CA Presiding Justice (PJ) Cancio C. Garcia (now Supreme Court
Justice) to issue Office Order No. 297-04-CG[9] (Order) which created an ad-hoc investigating
committee (Committee).[10] The Committee was specifically tasked among others to conduct a
thorough and exhaustive investigation of respondents case and to recommend the proper
administrative sanctions against her as the evidence may warrant.[11]
In accordance with the mandate of the Order, the Committee conducted an investigation of
the case and issued a Resolution[12] dated 18 October 2004 where it concluded that a prima facie
case of Dishonesty and Serious Misconduct against respondent existed. The Committee thus
recommended respondents preventive suspension for ninety (90) days pending formal
investigation of the charges against her.[13] On 28 January 2005, the Committee submitted
a Report[14] to the new CA Presiding Justice Romeo A. Brawner with its recommendation that
respondent be dismissed from service.
 Based on the hearings conducted and the evidence received by the Committee, the
antecedent facts are as follows:
Complainants case referred to above had been pending with the CA for more than two
years.[15] Complainant filed an illegal dismissal case against PAGCOR before the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). The CSC ordered complainants reinstatement but a writ of preliminary
injunction and a temporary restraining order was issued by the CA in favor of PAGCOR, thus
complainant was not reinstated to his former job pending adjudication of the case.[16] Desiring an
expeditious decision of his case, complainant sought the assistance of respondent sometime in
July 2004 after learning of the latters employment with the CA from her sister, Magdalena
David. During their first telephone conversation[17] and thereafter through a series of messages
they exchanged via SMS,[18] complainant informed respondent of the particulars of his pending
case. Allegedly, complainant thought that respondent would be able to advise him on how to
achieve an early resolution of his case.
However, a week after their first telephone conversation, respondent allegedly told
complainant that a favorable and speedy decision of his case was attainable but the person who
was to draft the decision was in return asking for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).[19]
Complainant expostulated that he did not have that kind of money since he had been jobless
for a long time, to which respondent replied, Eh, ganoon talaga ang lakaran dito, eh. Kung wala
kang pera, pasensiya na.[20] Complainant then tried to ask for a reduction of the amount but
respondent held firm asserting that the price had been set, not by her but by the person who was
going to make the decision.[21]Respondent even admonished complainant with the words Wala
tayo sa palengke iho![22] when the latter bargained for a lower amount.[23]
Complainant then asked for time to determine whether or not to pay the money in exchange
for the decision. Instead, in August of 2004, he sought the assistance of Imbestigador.[24] The
crew of the TV program accompanied him to PAOCCF-SPG where he lodged a complaint
against respondent for extortion.[25] Thereafter, he communicated with respondent again to verify
if the latter was still asking for the money[26] and to set up a meeting with her.[27] Upon learning
that respondents offer of a favorable decision in exchange for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00)
was still standing, the plan for the entrapment operation was formulated by Imbestigador in
cooperation with the PAOCC.
On 24 September 2004, complainant and respondent met for the first time in person at the
2nd Floor of Jollibee, Times Plaza Bldg.,[28]the place where the entrapment operation was later
conducted. Patricia Siringan (Siringan), a researcher of Imbestigador, accompanied complainant
and posed as his sister-in-law.[29] During the meeting, complainant clarified from respondent that
if he gave the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), he would get a favorable decision.
This was confirmed by the latter together with the assurance that it would take about a month for
the decision to come out.[30] Respondent also explained that the amount of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) guaranteed a favorable decision only in the CA but did not extend to the
Supreme Court should the case be appealed later.[31]
When respondent was asked where the money will go, she claimed that it will go to a male
researcher whose name she refused to divulge. The researcher was allegedly a lawyer in the CA
Fifth (5th) Division where complainant case was pending.[32] She also claimed that she will not
get any part of the money unless the researcher decides to give her some.[33]
 Complainant tried once again to bargain for a lower amount during the meeting but
respondent asserted that the amount was fixed. She even explained that this was their second
transaction and the reason why the amount was closed at One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was
because on a previous occasion, only Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00) was paid by
the client despite the fact that the amount had been pegged at One Million Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P1,300,000.00).[34] Complainant then proposed that he pay a down payment of
Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P700,000.00) while the balance of Three Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P300,000.00) will be paid once the decision had been released.[35] However, respondent
refused to entertain the offer, she and the researcher having learned their lesson from their
previous experience for as then, the client no longer paid the balance of Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00) after the decision had come out.[36]
Complainant brought along copies of the documents pertinent to his case during the first
meeting. After reading through them, respondent allegedly uttered, Ah, panalo ka.[37] The parties
set the next meeting date at lunchtime on 28 September 2004 and it was understood that the
money would be handed over by complainant to respondent then.[38]
On the pre-arranged meeting date, five (5) PAOCTF agents, namely: Capt. Reynaldo
Maclang (Maclang) as team leader, SPO1 Renato Banay (Banay), PO1 Bernard Villena
(Villena), PO1 Danny Feliciano, and PO2 Edgar delos Reyes[39] arrived at around 11:30 in the
morning at Jollibee.[40] Nuez and Siringan arrived at past noon and seated themselves at the table
beside the one occupied by the two (2) agents, Banay and Villena. Complainant had with him an
unsealed long brown envelope containing ten (10) bundles of marked money and paper money
which was to be given to respondent.[41] The envelope did not actually contain the One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) demanded by respondent, but instead contained paper money in
denominations of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) and One
Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), as well as newspaper cut-outs.[42] There were also ten (10)
authentic One Hundred Peso (P100.00) bills which had been previously dusted with ultra-violet
powder by the PAOCTF.[43] The three other PAOCTF agents were seated a few tables
away[44] and there were also three (3) crew members from Imbestigador at another table
operating a mini DV camera that was secretly recording the whole transaction.[45]
Respondent arrived at around 1:00 p.m.[46] She appeared very nervous and suspicious during
the meeting.[47] Ironically, she repeatedly said that complainant might entrap her, precisely like
those that were shown on Imbestigador.[48] She thus refused to receive the money then and there.
What she proposed was for complainant and Siringan to travel with her in a taxi and drop her off
at the CA where she would receive the money.[49]
More irony ensued. Respondent actually said that she felt there were policemen around and
she was afraid that once she took hold of the envelope complainant proffered, she would
suddenly be arrested and handcuffed.[50] At one point, she even said, Ayan o, tapos na silang
kumain, bakit hindi pa sila umaalis?,[51] referring to Banay and Villena at the next table. To allay
respondents suspicion, the two agents stood up after a few minutes and went near the staircase
where they could still see what was going on.[52]
Complainant, respondent and Siringan negotiated for almost one hour.[53] Complainant and
Siringan bargained for a lower price but respondent refused to accede. When respondent finally
touched the unsealed envelope to look at the money inside, the PAOCTF agents converged on
her and invited her to the Western Police District (WPD) Headquarters at United Nations Avenue
for questioning.[54]Respondent became hysterical as a commotion ensued inside the restaurant.[55]
On the way to the WPD on board the PAOCTF vehicle, Banay asked respondent why she
went to the restaurant. The latter replied that she went there to get the One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00).[56]
Respondent was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at the WPD where she was tested and
found positive for ultra-violet powder that was previously dusted on the money.[57] She was later
detained at the WPD Headquarters.
At seven oclock in the evening of 28 September 2004, respondent called Atty. Lilia
Mercedes Encarnacion Gepty (Atty. Gepty), her immediate superior in the CA at the latters
house.[58] She tearfully confessed to Atty. Gepty that she asked for money for a case and was
entrapped by police officers and the media.[59] Enraged at the news, Atty. Gepty asked why she
had done such a thing to which respondent replied, Wala lang maam, sinubukan ko lang baka
makalusot.[60] Respondent claimed that she was ashamed of what she did and repented the same.
She also asked for Atty. Geptys forgiveness and help. The latter instead reminded respondent of
the instances when she and her co-employees at the CA were exhorted during office meetings
never to commit such offenses.[61]
Atty. Gepty rendered a verbal report[62] of her conversation with their divisions chairman,
Justice Martin S. Villarama. She reduced the report into writing and submitted the same to then
PJ Cancio Garcia on 29 September 2004.[63] She also later testified as to the contents of her
report to the Committee.
During the hearing of this case, respondent maintained that what happened was a case of
instigation and not an entrapment. She asserted that the offer of money in exchange for a
favorable decision came not from her but from complainant. To support her contention, she
presented witnesses who testified that it was complainant who allegedly offered money to
anyone who could help him with his pending case. She likewise claimed that she never touched
the money on 28 September 2004, rather it was Capt. Maclang who forcibly held her hands and
pressed it to the envelope containing the money. She thus asked that the administrative case
against her be dismissed.
This Court is not persuaded by respondents version. Based on the evidence on record, what
happened was a clear case of entrapment, and not instigation as respondent would like to claim.
In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of ensnaring and capturing
the law-breakers in the execution of their criminal plan. On the other hand, in instigation, the
instigator practically induces the would-be defendant into the commission of the offense, and he
himself becomes a co-principal.[64]
In this case, complainant and the law enforcers resorted to entrapment precisely because
respondent demanded the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from complainant in
exchange for a favorable decision of the latters pending case. Complainants narration of the
incidents which led to the entrapment operation are more in accord with the circumstances that
actually transpired and are more credible than respondents version.
Complainant was able to prove by his testimony in conjunction with the text messages from
respondent duly presented before the Committee that the latter asked for One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) in exchange for a favorable decision of the formers pending case with the CA.
The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered by
Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence[65] which provides:

Ephemeral electronic communication refers to telephone conversations, text messages . . . and

other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained.

Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, Ephemeral electronic

communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or
who has personal knowledge thereof . . . . In this case, complainant who was the recipient of said
messages and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import.
Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in complainants cellphone from
which the messages originated was hers.[66] Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to
the admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and
attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant.[67] It is also well to
remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied.[68] We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as evidence in
determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.
Complainants testimony as to the discussion between him and respondent on the latters
demand for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was corroborated by the testimony of a
disinterested witness, Siringan, the reporter of Imbestigador who was present when the parties
met in person. Siringan was privy to the parties actual conversation since she accompanied
complainant on both meetings held on 24 and 28 of September 2004 at Jollibee.
Respondents evidence was comprised by the testimony of her daughter and sister as well as
an acquaintance who merely testified on how respondent and complainant first met. Respondents
own testimony consisted of bare denials and self-serving claims that she did not remember either
the statements she herself made or the contents of the messages she sent. Respondent had a very
selective memory made apparent when clarificatory questions were propounded by the
Committee.
When she was asked if she had sent the text messages contained in complainants cellphone
and which reflected her cellphone number, respondent admitted those that were not incriminating
but claimed she did not remember those that clearly showed she was transacting with
complainant. Thus, during the 17 November 2004 hearing, where respondent was questioned by
Justice Salazar-Fernando, the following transpired:

Q: After reading those text messages, do you remember having made those text
messages?

(Respondent)

A: Only some of these, your honors.

Justice Salazar-Fernando: Which one?

 A: Sabi ko po magpunta na lang sila sa office. Yung nasa bandang unahan po, your
Honors.

Q: What else?

A: Tapos yung sabi ko pong pagpunta niya magdala siya ng I.D. or isama niya sa
kanya si Len David.

Q: Okay, You remember having texted Zaldy Nuez on September 23, 2004 at 1309
which was around 1:09 in the afternoon and you said di me pwede punta na lang
kayo dito sa office Thursday 4:45 p.m. Room 107 Centennial Building.

A: Yes, your Honors.

Q: And on September 23, 2004 at 1731 which was around 5:31 in the afternoon you
again texted Zaldy Nuez and you said Sige bukas nang tanghali sa Times Plaza,
Taft Avenue, corner U.N. Avenue. Magdala ka ng I.D. para makilala kita o isama
mo si Len David.

A: Opo, your Honors.

Q: How about on September 23 at 5:05 in the afternoon when you said Di pwede kelan
mo gusto fixed price na iyon.

A: I dont remember that, your Honors.

Q: Again on September 23 at 5:14 p.m. you said Alam mo di ko iyon price and
nagbigay noon yung gagawa. Wala ako doon. You dont also remember this?

A: Yes, your Honors.

Q: September 27 at 1:42 p.m. Oo naman ayusin nyo yung hindi halatang pera. You also
dont remember that?

A: Yes Your Honors.

Q: September 27 at 1:30 in the afternoon, Di na pwede sabi sa akin. Pinakaiusapan ko

na nga ulit iyon. You dont remember that?

A: No, your Honors.[69]

Respondent would like this Court to believe that she never had any intention of committing
a crime, that the offer of a million pesos for a favorable decision came from complainant and that
it was complainant and the law enforcers who instigated the whole incident.
Respondent thus stated that she met with complainant only to tell the latter to stop calling
and texting her, not to get the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as pre-arranged.
 This claim of respondent is preposterous to say the least. Had the offer of a million pesos
really come from complainant and had she really intended to stop the latter from corrupting her,
she could have simply refused to answer the latters messages and calls. This she did not do. She
answered those calls and messages though she later claimed she did not remember having sent
the same messages to complainant. She could also have reported the matter to the CA Presiding
Justice, an action which respondent admitted during the hearing was the proper thing to do under
the circumstances.[70] But this course of action she did not resort to either, allegedly because she
never expected things to end this way.[71]
While claiming that she was not interested in complainants offer of a million pesos, she met
with him not only once but twice, ostensibly, to tell the latter to stop pestering her. If respondent
felt that telling complainant to stop pestering her would be more effective if she did it in person,
the same would have been accomplished with a single meeting. There was no reason for her to
meet with complainant again on 28 September 2004 unless there was really an understanding
between them that the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) will be handed over to her then.
Respondent even claimed that she became afraid of complainant when she learned that the latter
had been dismissed by PAGCOR for using illegal drugs.[72] This notwithstanding, she still met
with him on 28 September 2004.
Anent complainants narration of respondents refusal to reduce the amount of One Million
Pesos (P1,000.000.00) based on the lesson learned from a previous transaction, while admitting
that she actually said the same, respondent wants this Court to believe that she said it merely to
have something to talk about.[73] If indeed, respondent had no intention of committing any
wrongdoing, it escapes the Court why she had to make up stories merely to test if complainant
could make good on his alleged boast that he could come up with a million pesos. It is not in
accord with ordinary human experience for an honest government employee to make up stories
that would make party-litigants believe that court decisions may be bought and sold. Time and
again this Court has declared, thus:

Everyone in the judiciary bears a heavy burden of responsibility for the proper discharge of his
duty and it behooves everyone to steer clear of any situations in which the slightest suspicion
might be cast on his conduct. Any misbehavior on his part, whether true or only perceived, is
likely to reflect adversely on the administration of justice.[74]

Respondent having worked for the government for twenty four (24) years, nineteen (19) of
which have been in the CA,[75] should have known very well that court employees are held to the
strictest standards of honesty and integrity. Their conduct should at all times be above suspicion.
As held by this Court in a number of cases, The conduct or behavior of all officials of an agency
involved in the administration of justice, from the Presiding Judge to the most junior clerk,
should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.[76] Their conduct must, at all
times be characterized by among others, strict propriety and decorum in order to earn and
maintain the respect of the public for the judiciary.[77]
Respondents actuations from the time she started communicating with complainant in July
2004 until the entrapment operation on 28 September 2004 show a lack of the moral fiber
demanded from court employees. Respondents avowals of innocence notwithstanding, the
evidence clearly show that she solicited the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from
complainant in exchange for a favorable decision. The testimony of Atty. Gepty, the recipient of
respondents confession immediately after the entrapment operation, unmistakably supports the
finding that respondent did voluntarily engage herself in the activity she is being accused of.
Respondents solicitation of money from complainant in exchange for a favorable decision
violates Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel which took effect on 1 June 2004
pursuant to A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC. Sections 1 and 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel expressly provide:

SECTION 1. Court personnel shall not use their official position to secure unwarranted
benefits, privileges or exemption for themselves or for others.

SECTION 2. Court personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit based on
any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their
official actions. (Underscoring supplied)

It is noteworthy that the penultimate paragraph of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
specifically provides:

INCORPORATION OF OTHER RULES

SECTION 1. All provisions of the law, Civil Service rules, and issuances of the Supreme Court
governing the conduct of public officers and employees applicable to the judiciary are deemed
incorporated into this Code.

By soliciting the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from complainant,

respondent committed an act of impropriety which immeasurably affects the honor and dignity
of the judiciary and the peoples confidence in it.
In the recent case of Aspiras vs. Abalos,[78] complainant charged respondent, an employee of
the Records Section, Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Supreme Court for allegedly
deceiving him into giving her money in the total amount of Fifty Two Thousand Pesos
(P52,000.00) in exchange for his acquittal in a murder case on appeal before the Supreme Court.
It turned out that respondents representation was false because complainant was subsequently
convicted of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua by the Supreme
Court.[79]
The Supreme Court en banc found Esmeralda Abalos guilty of serious misconduct and
ordered her dismissal from the service. This Court aptly held thus:

In Mirano vs. Saavedra,[80] this Court emphatically declared that a public servant must exhibit at
all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity. The administration of justice is a sacred task,
and by the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, all those involved in it must faithfully
adhere to, hold inviolate, and invigorate the principle that public office is a public trust, solemnly
enshrined in the Constitution.[81]

Likewise, in the grave misconduct case against Datu Alykhan T. Amilbangsa of the Sharia
Circuit Court, Bengo, Tawi-Tawi,[82] this Court stated:
No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from the occupant than the
judicial office. Those connected with the dispensation of justice bear a heavy burden of
responsibility. Court employees in particular, must be individuals of competence, honesty and
probity charged as they are with safeguarding the integrity of the court . . . . The High Court has
consistently held that persons involved in the administration of justice ought to live up to the
strictest standards of honesty and integrity in the public service. He should refrain from financial
dealings which would interfere with the efficient performance of his duties.[83] The conduct
required of court personnel must always be beyond reproach.[84]

The following pronouncement of this Court in the case of Yrastorza, Sr. vs. Latiza, Court
Aide, RTC Branch 14 Cebu City[85] is also worth remembering:

Court employees bear the burden of observing exacting standards of ethics and morality. This is
the price one pays for the honor of working in the judiciary. Those who are part of the machinery
dispensing justice from the lowliest clerk to the presiding judge must conduct themselves with
utmost decorum and propriety to maintain the publics faith and respect for the judiciary.
Improper behavior exhibits not only a paucity of professionalism at the workplace but also a
great disrespect to the court itself. Such demeanor is a failure of circumspection demanded of
every public official and employee.[86]

In view of the facts narrated above and taking into account the applicable laws and
jurisprudence, the Committee in their Report[87]recommended that respondent be dismissed from
government service for GRAVE MISCONDUCT and violation of Sections 1 and 2, Canon 1 of
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel.[88]
Finding the Committees recommendation to be supported by more than substantial evidence
and in accord with the applicable laws and jurisprudence, the recommendation is well taken.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Elvira Cruz-Apao is found GUILTY of
GRAVE MISCONDUCT and violation of SECTIONS 1 and 2 of the CODE OF CONDUCT
FOR COURT PERSONNEL and is accordingly DISMISSED from government service, with
prejudice to re-employment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government,
including government-owned and controlled corporations. Her retirement and all benefits except
accrued leave credits are hereby FORFEITED.
SO ORDERED.
 A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant

vs
JUDGE ELIZA B. YU, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 47, PASAY CITY,
Respondent

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

We hereby consider and resolve respondent Eliza B. Yu's Motion for Reconsideration with
Explanation for the Show Cause Order filed vis-a-vis the decision promulgated on November 22,
2016 disposing against her as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES respondent JUDGE ELIZA B. YU

GUILTY of GROSS INSUBORDINATION; GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW; GROSS
MISCONDUCT; GRAVE ABUSE OF AUTHORITY; OPPRESSION; and CONDUCT
UNBECOMING OF A JUDICIAL OFFICIAL; and, ACCORDINGLY, DISMISSES her from
the service EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, with FORFEITURE OF ALL HER BENEFITS,
except accrued leave credits, and further DISQUALIFIES her from reinstatement or appointment
to any public office or employment, including to one in any government-owned or government-
controlled corporations.

Respondent JUDGE ELIZA B. YU is directed to show cause in writing within ten (10) days
from notice why she should not be disbarred for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics as outlined herein.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator for its
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.1

In her motion, the respondent repeatedly denies committing all the administrative offenses for
which she was held guilty, and insists on the absence of proof to support the findings against her.
She pleads that the Court reconsiders based on the following:

1. Noncompliance with A.O. No. 19-2011

The complaint against her was premature because of the pendency of her protest against night
court duty. A.O. No. 19-2011 did not carry a penal provision, and was only directory because of
the use of the permissive word may. In addition to A.O. No. 19-2011 being noncompliant with
the requirements of a valid administrative order, the requirement of night court duty violated
Section 5, Rule XVII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative
Code,2 which limited the working hours for government officials and employees. It was also not
illegal to write to the Secretary of the Department of Tourism (DOT) considering that he was the
requesting authority regarding the rendering of the night court duty. She did not publicly
broadcast her disobedience to A.O. No. 19-2011 when she wrote the letter to the Secretary.
There was no law prohibiting her from writing the protest letters. At any rate, she had the right to
do so under the Freedom of Speech Clause. She did not refuse to obey A.O. No. 19-2011
because she actually allowed her staff to report for night duty. She did not willfully and
intentionally disobey because her protest had legal basis. She would also violate Section 3(a) 3 of
Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) if she would comply with the
patently illegal A.O. No. 19-2011.4

2. Refusal to honor the appointments of Ms. Mariejoy P. Lagman and Ms. Leilani Tejero-
Lopez

The respondent claims that she did not refuse to honor the appointment because rejection was
different from protesting the appointment. She merely exercised her statutory right as a judge to
question the appointment of the branch clerk of court assigned to her sala. Under Canon 2,
Section 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,5 she was mandated
to bring to the proper authorities the irregularities surrounding the appointments. Moreover, the
contents of the complaint letter and the protest could not be used against her pursuant to the
constitutional right against self-incrimination. She did not also commit any act of cruelty against
Ms. Tejera-Lopez; on the contrary, it was Ms. Tejero-Lopez who "went beyond the norms of
decency by her persistent and annoying application in my court that it actually became a
harassment." Her opposition against the appointment of Ms. Lagman was meritorious. She only
employed the wrong choice of words with her choice of the term privileged communication that
was viewed negatively. There was no proof of the alleged verbal threats, abuse, misconduct or
oppression committed against Ms. Tejero-Lopez. It was not proper to penalize a judge based on a
"letter with few words that other people find objectionable."6

3. Show-cause order respondent issued against fellow judges

The respondent posits that the show-cause order she issued to her fellow judges had legal basis
because "anything that is legal cannot be an assumption of the role of a tyrant wielding power
with unbridled breath."7 It was premature to rule that she thereby abused and committed
misconduct because she did not issue any ruling on the explanation by the other judges.8 She did
not violate Section 5, Canon 3 and Section 8, Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. What the
other judges should have done was to avail themselves of the appropriate remedy.9

4. Refusal to sign the leave of absence of Mr. Noel Labid

The refusal to sign the application for leave of absence had factual and legal bases.10 Moreover,
she should be presumed to have acted in good faith if she misconstrued the rules on approval of
application of leave.11

5. Allowing on-the-job trainees

The respondent claims that she did not order the trainees to perform judicial tasks. She asserts
that she could not remember their affidavit. She had no personal knowledge that the trainees
were made to serve as assistant court stenographers. Based on what she heard, the trainees were
only in the premises of her court for a few hours. She reminds that she allowed the trainees to
merely observe proceedings. OCA Circular No. 111-2005 was impliedly amended when
paralegals and law students were allowed to be trained under the Hustisyeah Project.12

6. Designation of an officer-in-charge and ordering reception of evidence by a non-lawyer

The respondent denies having violated CSC Memorandum Circular No. 06-05 when she
designated an officer-in-charge. There was no proof showing that she willfully and deliberately
intended to cause public damage. In fact, the OCA recognized Mr. Ferdinand Santos as the OIC
of her branch in several letters. There was no proof that she violated Section 9, Rule 30 of
the Rules of Court. The ex parte reception of evidence by a non-lawyer clerk of court was
allowed under the Rules of Court, as well as by Section 2l(e), Administrative Circular No. 35-
2004, and Administrative Circular No. 37-93.13

7. Allowing criminal proceedings to continue despite the absence of counsel

The respondent merely followed the Rules of Criminal Procedure in allowing criminal
proceedings despite absence of counsel. In so doing, she relied in good faith on the rulings
in People v. Arcilla,14Bravo v. Court of Appeals,15 and People v. Malinao.16 Under Section l(c),
Rule 115 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in
person without the assistance of counsel.17

8. Sending of inappropriate email messages

The respondent maintains that the e-mail messages were hearsay because the certification by the
SC-MISO was not presented to her, depriving her of the opportunity to object. Her granting
access by the MISO to her private e-mails was conditional to prove tampering. Her

Lycos e-mail account was hacked. She did not completely waive her right to privacy.
Considering that she did not authenticate said e-mail messages, the same were inadmissible for
being hearsay. The e-mail messages with her full name written in capital letters as the sender did
not emanate from her because her Yahoo! and MSN accounts carried her name with only the first
letters being capitalized. The e-mails reproduced in the decision were not the same messages that
she had requested Judge San Gaspar-Gito to delete. There were words that she did not write on
the e-mail messages pertaining to her demand for reimbursement of $10.00. Her writing style
was different from what appeared in the e-mail messages. She denies having opened the "Rudela
San Gaspar" account. It was wrong to penalize her based on assumptions and speculations. She
did not commit electronic libel. Her funny and innocent comments were not actionable
documents. The certification by the SC MISO was not an authentication as to the truthfulness of
the contents of the e-mail messages and as to the identification of the sender or author of the
messages. It was wrong and unjust to impute wrongdoing to her when there was no proof that
she had sent the inappropriate messages. The disclaimer in the e-mails were not printed in the
decision; hence, the messages were inadmissible. The presentation of the messages without her
consent as the sender was covered by the exclusionary rule. Letters and communications in
writing were guaranteed and protected by Sections 2,18 3(1),19 Article III of the 1987
Constitution, and Article 723 of the Civil Code,20 Articles 22621 and 22822 of the Revised Penal
Code, Section 2756 of the Revised Administrative Code,23 Sections 3224 and 3325 of the R.A. No.
8792. There was no proof that she had apologized through e-mail, and had sent messages with
sexual undertones and lewd graphics. Judge Gita had a dirty mind because nothing was wrong
with the 69 image by Felicien Raps. She (respondent) did not commit internet stalking. She had
difficulty in remembering the private communications, which were taken out of context. It was
Judge Gita who must have a problem because she had kept the trash messages. She (respondent)
did not transgress any law. The allegations against her were hearsay. She submitted a letter
proposal for a "winwin" solution so that she would not pursue any criminal action against Judge
Gito. She did not violate Section 8, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct because it was
one of her staff who had typed the letter addressed to Atty. San Gaspar. To find her to have
abused her power and committed impropriety was unwarranted. Her absence from the
investigation conducted by Justice Abdulwahid could not be taken against her and could not be
construed as her admission of wrong doing or as an evasion of truth. There was no proof that she
had used the phrase our court to advance her personal interest.26

Ruling of the Court

We deny the respondent's Motion for Reconsideration with Explanation for the Show Cause
Order for the following reasons.

1.

The respondent's Motion for Reconsideration is denied for lack of merit

The submissions tendered in the respondent's Motion for Reconsideration with Explanation for
the Show Cause Order were matters that the Court had already exhaustively considered and fully
resolved in the decision of November 22, 2016. We deem it unnecessary to dwell at length on
such submissions. We still hold and declare that the respondent flagrantly and blatantly violated
the Lawyer's Oath, and several canons and rules of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canon of Judicial Ethics and the New Judicial Code of Conduct.

Nonetheless, we propose to expound on some points for greater enlightenment on the issues and
grounds taken into consideration in removing the respondent from the Judiciary, and for
purposes of providing the requisite predicate to the ruling on the directive for her to show
sufficient cause in writing why she should not also be disbarred from the Roll of Attorneys.

The respondent insists that there was no proof to support the adverse findings of the Court. She is
absolutely mistaken. The records involved in these cases were voluminous, because they
consisted of the affidavits and other evidence submitted by the several complainants as well as
her own pleadings and motions, most of which constituted proof of her administrative
wrongdoings. As the per curiam decision of November 22, 2016 indicated, her explanations vis-
a-vis the complaints often backfired against her, and all the more incriminated her by
systematically exposing her personal and professional ineptitude and stilted logic. In short, the
evidence against her was too compelling to ignore, and sufficed to warrant the supreme action of
her removal from the Judiciary. She was more than aware that the quantum of evidence required
in administrative proceedings like these was substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.27

The respondent's argument that she was deprived of the guarantee against self-incrimination has
no basis. As a judge, she was quite aware that the constitutional guarantee only set the privilege
of an individual to refuse to answer incriminating questions that may directly or indirectly render
her criminally liable. The constitutional guarantee simply secures to a witness - whether a party
or not - the right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question.28 The privilege did
not prohibit legitimate inquiry in non-criminal matters. At any rate, the rule only finds
application in case of oral testimony and does not apply to object evidence. As the Court has
pointed out in People v. Malimit:29

[The right against self-incrimination], as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States, "x
x x is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from
him x x x" It is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the [accused] 's own
lips, against his will, admission of his guilt. It docs not apply to the instant case where the
evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement but an object evidence.
Wigmore, discussing the question now before us in his treatise on evidence, thus, said:

If, in other words (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical control of his] own
vocal utterances, but also for his physical control in whatever form exercise, then, it would be
possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his house, with all the tools and indicia of his
crime, and defy the authority of the law to employ in evidence anything that might be obtained
by forcibly overthrowing his possession and compelling the surrender of the evidential articles -
a clear reduction ad absurdum. In other words, it is not merely compulsion that is the kernel of
the privilege, x x x but testimonial compulsion.30

The respondent's correspondences were outside the scope of the constitutional proscription
against self-incrimination. She had not been subjected to testimonial compulsion in which she
could validly raise her right against self-incrimination. Worthy to recall is that she had herself
voluntarily waived her right to be present and to confront the complainant and her witnesses and
evidence during the administrative investigation conducted by CA Associate Justice Hakim
Abdulwahid. She was emphatically granted the opportunity to confront the complainant and her
witnesses but the voluntary and knowing waiver of her presence divested her of the right to insist
on the right to confrontation, if any.

The respondent contends that she was not given the opportunity to raise her objection to the
certification issued by the SC-MISO. This contention is dismissed also because of the same
voluntary waiver of her presence from the proceedings held before Justice Abdulwahid.

At any rate, the respondent alternatively pleads for compassion and mercy, and vows not to
repeat the same transgressions. In this connection, she would have the Court consider in her
favor the following mitigating circumstances pursuant to Section 48, Rule 10 of the Revised
Rules of Administrative Cases in Civil Service,31which provides thus:

1. Medications on allergies as analogous circumstance to an unsubstantiated charge;

2. Good faith on each the unsubstantiated charge xxx;

3. First time offense of the unsubstantiated charge;

4. Lack of education or lack of experience on administrative matters as analogous circumstance

to the unsubstantiated charge;

5. Newness or short number in the judicial service as analogous circumstance to the

unsubstantiated charge;

6. Very different work culture from previous employment as unsubstantiated charge;

7. Lack of prejudice to the public as analogous circumstance to the unsubstantiated charge;

8. Remorse for not listening to the unsolicited advices of Court Administrator Jose Midas
Marquez and Assistant Court Administrator Thelma Bahia as analogous circumstance to the
unsubstantiated charge;

9. Lack of intent to commit any wrong as analogous circumstance to the unsubstantiated charge;

10. Previously received awards in the performance of his duties to the unsubstantiated charge;
and

11. Outstanding court performance as to cases disposal for year to the unsubstantiated charge.32

The respondent's pleading is unworthy of sympathy.

Firstly, the respondent does not thereby present any compelling argument on how her having
medications for allergies was analogous to physical illness under Section 48(a) of the Revised
Rules of Administrative Cases in Civil Service. Although the list of circumstances in Section 48
is not exclusive because the provision expressly recognizes other analogous circumstances, she
cannot simply state any situation without pointing out why it would be analogous to the listed
circumstances. The Court is unable to appreciate how her consumption of medications for
allergies could generate arrogance, insubordination, gross ignorance of laws, and offensive
conduct that manifested themselves in the periods material to the administrative complaints.

Secondly, the respondent's overall conduct negated her allegation of good faith. Good faith
implies the lack of any intention to commit a wrongdoing. Based on the totality of her acts and
actuations, her claims of good faith and lack of intent to commit a wrong cannot be probable.
According to Civil Service Commission v. Maala,33 good faith as a defense in administrative
investigations has been discussed in this wise:

In common usage, the term "good faith" is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting
"honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the
holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of
another, even through technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or
benefit or belief of facts which render transaction unconscientious."

In short, good faith is actually a question of intention. Although this is something internal,
we can ascertain a person's intention by relying not on his own protestations of good faith,
which is self-serving, but on evidence of his conduct and outward acts. (bold emphasis supplied)

The respondent is reminded that her removal from the Judiciary by reason of her gross
insubordination and gross misconduct did not proceed only from her non-compliance with A.O.
No. 19-2011. Other acts and actuations were also efficient causes, namely: (1) her refusal to
abide by the directive of MeTC Executive Judge Bibiano Colasito that resulted in the disruption
of orderliness in the other Pasay City MeTCs to the prejudice of the public service and public
interest; (2) her direct communications to the DOT Secretary and other agencies that seriously
breached established protocols, thereby opening an irregular avenue to publicly broadcast her
defiance to the directive of the Court itself; and (3) her willful disregard of the direct advice by
the Court Administrator despite the latter being the official expressly authorized by law to assist
the Court in exercising administrative supervision over all lower courts and personnel.34

Furthermore, we emphatically observed and pointed out in the decision of November 22, 2016
the following:

In all, Judge Yu exhibited an unbecoming arrogance in committing insubordination and gross

misconduct. By her refusal to adhere to and abide by A.O. No. 19-2011, she deliberately
disregarded her duty to serve as the embodiment of the law at all times. She thus held herself
above the law by refusing to be bound by the issuance of the Court as the duly constituted
authority on court procedures and the supervision of the lower courts. To tolerate her
insubordination and gross misconduct is to abet lawlessness on her part. She deserved to be
removed from the service because she thereby revealed her unworthiness of being part of the
Judiciary. (Bold emphasis supplied)

We have stated in the decision of November 22, 2016 that the respondent's recalcitrant streak did
not end with her unbecoming repudiation of and defiance to A.O. No. 19-2011. To recall, she
also exhibited extreme arrogance in rejecting the valid appointments of Ms. Lagman and Ms.
Tejero-Lopez despite being fully aware that the appointing powers pertained to and were being
thereby exercised by the Court, and that she was bereft of any discretion to control or reject the
appointments. Under no circumstance could she be justified in draping herself with the mantle of
good faith in regard to her insubordination and arrogance.

We also reject the respondent's appeal for relief based on her supposed lack of experience as a
neophyte judge, and her previously received awards and outstanding court performance. Lack of
experience had no relevance in determining her administrative liabilities for acts and actuations
fundamentally irregular or contrary to judicial ethical standards. We even believe that her being a
novice in the Judiciary, instead of mitigating her liability, could have aggravated her offense, for
her being a neophyte judge should have impelled her instead to practice greater prudence and
caution in her daily actuations and performance. But instead of pausing and hesitating, she acted
rashly and imprudently by condescendingly asserting herself over her peers, by flagrantly
disobeying her superiors, including this Court, and by ignoring obvious boundaries that should
have kept her in check or reined her in. On the other hand, the awards for outstanding
performances as a professional and as a judge, far from accenting her good qualities as a person,
rather highlighted her unworthiness to remain on the Bench by showing that her misconduct and
general bad attitude as a member thereof has put the awards and recognitions in serious question.

2.

Disbarment is also to be imposed on the respondent

The respondent's accountability did not end with her removal from the Judiciary. In the decision
of November 22, 2016, we declared that her misdemeanor as a member of the Bench could also
cause her expulsion from the Legal Profession through disbarment. Consequently, we directed
her to show good and sufficient cause why her actions and actuations should not also be
considered grounds for her disbarment, justifying our directive in the following manner, viz.:

The foregoing findings may already warrant Judge Yu's disbarment.

A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, dated September 17, 2002 and entitled Re: Automatic Conversion of Some
Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of
Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary

Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine
Bar, relevantly states:

Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan;
judges of regular and special courts; and court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds
which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the
Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics,
or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds
for the discipline of lawyers.

In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary
action against the respondent Justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar.
The respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he
should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinarily sanctioned as a member of
the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, an attorney may be disbarred on the ground of
gross misconduct and willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court. Given her
wanton defiance of the Court's own directives, her open disrespect towards her fellow judges, her
blatant abuse of the powers appurtenant to her judicial office, and her penchant for threatening
the defenseless with legal actions to make them submit to her will, we should also be imposing
the penalty of disbarment.1âwphi1 The object of disbarment is not so much to punish the
attorney herself as it is to safeguard the administration of justice, the courts and the public from
the misconduct of officers of the court. Also, disbarment seeks to remove from the Law
Profession attorneys who have disregarded their Lawyer's Oath and thereby proved themselves
unfit to continue discharging the trust and respect given to them as members of the Bar.

The administrative charges against respondent Judge Yu based on grounds that were also
grounds for disciplinary actions against members of the Bar could easily be treated as justifiable
disciplinary initiatives against her as a member of the Bar. This treatment is explained by the fact
that her membership in the Bar was an integral aspect of her qualification for judgeship. Also,
her moral and actual unfitness to remain as a Judge, as found in these cases, reflected her
indelible unfitness to remain as a member of the Bar. At the very least, a Judge like her who
disobeyed the basic rules of judicial conduct should not remain as a member of the Bar because
she had thereby also violated her Lawyer's Oath.

Indeed, respondent Judge Yu's violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct embodied
in the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary would constitute a breach of
the following canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

CANON 1 - A LA WYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF

THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.

CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT

SERVICE IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL TASKS.

Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or
advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO

THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR
CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts.

The Court does not take lightly the ramifications of Judge Yu's misbehavior and misconduct as a
judicial officer. By penalizing her with the supreme penalty of dismissal from the service, she
should not anymore be allowed to remain a member of the Law Profession.

However, this rule of fusing the dismissal of a Judge with disbarment does not in any way
dispense with or set aside the respondent's right to due process. As such, her disbarment as an
offshoot of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC without requiring her to comment on the disbarment would be
violative of her right to due process. To accord due process to her, therefore, she should first be
afforded the opportunity to defend her professional standing as a lawyer before the Court would
determine whether or not to disbar her.
In her comment, the respondent reiterates her submissions in the Motion for Reconsideration
with Explanation for the Show Cause Order. Considering that we have dismissed her pleadings
altogether for the reasons given earlier, her disbarment is now inevitable.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. - A member of the
bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Accordingly, gross misconduct, violation of the Lawyer's Oath, and willful disobedience of any
lawful order by the Court constitute grounds to disbar an attorney. In the respondent's case, she
was herein found to have committed all of these grounds for disbarment, warranting her
immediate disbarment as a consequence.

We deem it worthwhile to remind that the penalty of disbarment being hereby imposed does not
equate to stripping the respondent of the source of her livelihood. Disbarment is intended to
protect the administration of justice by ensuring that those taking part in it as attorneys should be
competent, honorable and reliable to enable the courts and the clients they serve to rightly repose
their confidence in them.35

Once again, we express our disdain for judges and attorneys who undeservedly think too highly
of themselves, their personal and professional qualifications and qualities at the expense of the
nobility of the Law Profession. It is well to remind the respondent that membership in the Law
Profession is not like that in any ordinary trade. The Law is a noble calling, and only the
individuals who are competent and fit according to the canons and standards set by this Court,
the law and the Rules of Court may be bestowed the privilege to practice it.36

Lastly, every lawyer must pursue only the highest standards in the practice of his calling. The
practice of law is a privilege, and only those adjudged qualified are permitted to do so. 37 The
respondent has fallen short of this standard thus meriting her expulsion from the profession.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration with Explanation for the
Show Cause Order with FINALITY; DISBARS EFFECTIVE
IMMEDIATELY respondent ELIZA B. YU pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC for violation of
the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional
Ethics; and

ORDERS the striking off of respondent ELIZA B. YU's name from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished to: (a) the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their information and guidance; (b) the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and (c) the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to the
respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.
 [A.C. No. 6585]

TOMAS B. YUMOL, JR., FELIX S. VENTIC, ELMER L. MANIEGO and JAKE M.

MAGCALAS, VS

ATTY. ROBERTO R. FERRER, SR.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Tomas B. Yumol, Jr., Felix S. Ventic,
Elmer L. Maniego and Jake Magcalas against Atty. Roberto R. Ferrer, Sr., for grave misconduct.
At all time material to the controversy, complainants were employees of the Commission on
Human Rights (CHR), Atty. Yumol as Officer-in-Charge,[1] Mr. Ventic, as Supervising Special
Investigator, Mr. Maniego as Special Investigator III and Mr. Magcalas as Special Investigator I.
Respondent Atty. Ferrer, Sr., held the position of Attorney IV, also of the Commission.
On 17 September 2001, Mrs. Ma. Cecilia Mallari-Dy sought the assistance of the CHR for
the alleged kidnapping of her child Jianzil Irish M. Dy by her husband, John Burt Dy, and the
coercive act of the latter in the transfer of her account with the Porac Rural Bank. Acting on this,
Atty. Ferrer, a Senior Legal Officer of the CHR, issued the two (2) Orders quoted below.
The facts as above stated resulted in the heated altercation that took place on 28 September
2001 between respondent and one Mr. John Burt Dy, whereby the latter accused the CHR of
conniving with his wife, Mrs. Ma. Cecilia Dy, and of destroying his reputation and good name at
the Porac Rural Bank. Atty. Yumol, being the OIC Head of the Office, asked Mr. Dy if he could
substantiate his accusations. The latter showed him two (2) alleged Office Orders dated 18 and
19 September 2001, both signed by respondent.
The Order dated 18 September 2001,[2] reads:

Acting on the Complaint of Ma. CECILIA M. DY, and pursuant to the provision of the Family
Code that children five (5) years and below should remain under the custody of the mother, in
relation to the provisions of the Constitution vesting powers unto this Commission and in
particular, Section 18, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, the respondent is hereby ordered to
give custody of JIANZIL IRISH M. DY to the maternal custody of the aforementioned mother.

Wherefore, premises considered, pending investigation of the above-entitled case, the custody
of JIANZIL IRISH M. DY is hereby awarded to the mother MA. CECILIA M. DY.

SO ORDERED.

City of San Fernando, Pampanga, September 18, 2001.

(SGD)ATTY. ROBERTO R. FERRER, SR.
Senior Legal Counsel
The Order dated 19 September 2001,[3] reads:
Before this Commission is the Complaint filed by complainant wife for alleged kidnapping of
her child Jianzil Irish M. Dy which happened last August 22, 2001 and the coercive mean (sic)
of respondent JOHN BURT DY in the transfer of the complainants cash deposit with the Porac
Rural Bank.

Finding the allegations to (sic) sufficiently established, custody of the child was awarded to the
Complainant and properly executed with the aid [of] the Sangguniang Barangay of Sta. Cruz,
Porac, Pampanga and the elements of the Porac PNP.

Likewise, we find that there had been coercion in the transfer of complainant (sic) deposit in
bank, which was already effected by the aforementioned Rural Bank.

NOW, THEREFORE, pending the final determination of this above-entitled case and by virtue
of the powers and authority granted this Commission under Sec. 18, Article 13 of the
Constitution, the Rural Bank of Porac is hereby ordered to reinstate the account of
complainant MA. CECILIA M. DY.

SO ORDERED.

City of San Fernando, Pampanga, September 19, 2001.

(SGD)ATTY. ROBERTO R. FERRER, SR.
Senior Legal Counsel IV
Complainants Yumol and Magcalas, together with their staff, witnessed the incident and
were surprised to see the two (2) orders allegedly issued by respondent. Mr. Dy also informed
Atty. Yumol that the two (2) orders were already enforced by respondent himself and his co-
employees V. Rigor and E. Enolpe, Police Officer Larucom and the Barangay Captain of their
place.
Concerned by the acts of respondent, Atty. Yumol tried to clarify the matter by writing a
letter[4] to the Bank Manager stating, thus:

In reference to the order of Atty. Roberto R. Ferrer, Sr., Attorney IV of this Regional Office, the
undersigned would like to inform your good office that the Commissions participation on the
matter is limited only to extend legal guidance/assistance considering that the disagreement of
spouses John Burt Dy and Ma. Cecilia M. Dy is a family matter. Hence, you are being advised to
disregard Atty. Ferrers order dated September 19, 2001.

Moreover, the said case is not officially docketed as part of Human Rights cases handled by the
Commission.

I hope this will clarify any misinterpretation of the Commissions mandate.

On 28 September 2001, Yumol required[5] respondent to explain within seventy-two (72)

hours the unauthorized issuance of the said Orders.
 It turned out later that respondent was engaged in private practice by handling private cases
in courts and other quasi-judicial bodies as shown by the following pleadings:
Pleadings Where Filed
Motion for Reconsideration in Sp. Proc. No. MTC, Sta. Ana, Candaba,
01-01 Pampanga.[6]
Motion for Issuance of Mandatory Injunction MTC, San Fernando,
Pampanga[7]
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion For Issuance of RTC-58, Angeles City[8]
Preliminary Injunction
Petition MTC, Sta. Ana, Candaba,
Pampanga[9]
Motion for Reconsideration and Urgent RTC-58, Angeles City[10]
Motion for Postponement
Motion for Reconsideration - do -[11]
Motion for Reconsideration On Denial of the - do -[12]
Release of Vehicle
Addendum to Motion For Re-Investigation - do -[13]
Motion to Set Motion For Release of Vehicle - do -[14]
Several documents were also notarized by respondent, viz:
Documents Where Used
Reply of Norberto San Angel dated October MTC, Branch 1, San Fernando,
16, 2001 Pampanga[15]
Sworn Statement dated October 15, 2001 of Civil Case No. 8509 filed with
May Paule, et al. the MTC San Fernando,
Pampanga[16]
Criminal Complaint of Myrna Bulaon Criminal Case No. 01-1401
MTC of Sta. Ana, Pampanga[17]
Reply Affidavit of Myrna Bulaon - do-[18]
Affidavit of Renato P. Canlas Special Proceeding No. 01-01 at
MTC, Sta. Ana, Pampanga[19]
Respondent also attended court hearings as shown in the following Minutes of Hearings,
Orders, and Transcripts of Stenographic Notes:
Date Time Case No. Court
March 2, 2001 9:00 A.M. 01-01 (Ejectment MTC/Sta. Ana,
Case) Pampanga[20]
April 23, 2001 1:30 P.M. Crim. Case No. 00- RTC-58 Angeles
1164 City[21]
March 6, 2001 2:15 P.M. Crim. Case No. 00- - do -[22]
1164
August 3, 2001 9:00 A.M. Crim. Case No. 01- MTC, Sta. Ana.
1401 Pampanga[23]
Sept. 7, 2001 - do - - do -[24]
 8:30 A.M. Civil Case No. 17360 RTC 42, San Frdo.,
October 15, 2001
Pamp.[25]
Nov. 5, 2001 2:00 P.M. Civil Case No. 8509 MTC Branch 1, San
Fernando,
Pampanga.[26]
Nov. 27, 2001 Civil Case No. 8509 RTC 58, Angeles
City[27]
Dec. 6, 2001 2:00 P.M. Civil Case No. 8509 MTC Br. I, San
Fernando,
Pampanga.[28]
During those times that respondent attended hearings, he declared in his Daily Time Records
(DTRs) that he was present at the Office as shown by the DTRs attached to the complaint.
The actuations of the respondent provoked the filing of several criminal cases against him,
to wit:

(1) Falsification of Public Documents,[29]

(2) Usurpation of Functions,[30] and

(3) Violation of Republic Act No. 6713.[31]

Still, despite the cases filed against him, respondent continued attending hearings in
different courts as demonstrated by the following photostatic copies of the Minutes of the trials
of the cases:[32]
Dates Time Court
October 24, 2002 2:00 PM MTC Arayat, Pampanga[33]
November 7, 2002 2:00 PM - do -
January 17, 2003 9:00 AM MTC Sta. Ana,
Pampanga[34]
February 10, 2003 9:00 AM MTC Arayat, Pampanga[35]
March 10, 2003 9:00 AM - do -[36]
March 24, 2003 - do -[37]
March 28, 2003 9:00 AM MTC Sta. Ana,
Pampanga[38]
May 9, 2003 9:00 AM - do -[39]
May 29, 2003 8:30 AM RTC-54, Macabebe,
Pampanga[40]
June 12, 2003 2:00 PM MTC Arayat, Pampanga[41]
June 17, 2003 MTC-4, San Frdo.,
Pampanga[42]
July 17, 2003 8:30 AM RTC-54, Macabebe,
Pampanga[43]
August 26, 2003 9:00 A.M. MTC-4, San Frdo.,
 Pampanga[44]

Complainants maintained that all these acts constitute grave misconduct.

We referred the present case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and investigation.
On 04 November 2003, respondent filed a motion[45] for extension of twenty (20) days
within which to file his answer, which was granted by the Commission on Bar Discipline, IBP,
Pasig City.[46]
In his answer,[47] respondent admitted that Mrs. Ma. Cecilia Mallari-Dy dropped by at the
CHR to seek assistance regarding the recovery of her minor son and the restitution of her time
deposit. He also acknowledged having issued the two orders but maintained that the same were
in consonance with the powers and functions granted to all CHR lawyers. He argued that CHR
lawyers, pursuant to CHR Resolution No. A-88-056 dated 8 October 1988 and CHR Resolution
No. A89-109-A dated 19 July 1989, can file, appear, prosecute and represent the Commission for
underprivileged victims and persons whose human rights have been violated or in need of
protection in civil, criminal and administrative matters which are properly cognizable by the
Commission. He likewise claimed that he was allowed by the CHR to file a petition for
commission as a notary public and was commissioned on 01 December 2000. He denied having
falsified his DTRs as the same were certified by complainant Atty. Yumol as Officer-In-Charge
of their office and that his appearances in courts were for legal assistance as allowed in CHR
Resolution No. A-88-056. Lastly, respondent insisted that the instant complaint was an offshoot
of the administrative case filed by Mrs. Ma. Cecilia Mallari-Dy against Atty. Yumol and the
other complainants, which prevented the issuance of a certificate of clearance to Atty. Yumol
relative to his impending retirement.
In their reply,[48] complainants claimed that respondents commission as notary public was
granted only by the CHR on 29 October 2001, and received by the CHR Region 3 on 07
November 2001, hence, the belated authority granted to him cannot be made to retroact to the
notarized documents which were all done before 07 November 2001. Complainants likewise
argued that respondents act of appearing in courts as counsel is a form of private practice which
is expressly prohibited by Republic Act No. 6713.[49] They further explained that the CHR has no
authority to issue the questioned orders as it cannot try and decide cases which courts of justice
or quasi-judicial bodies do. Finally, they pointed out that the complaint filed by Mrs. Dy against
them was already dismissed in an Order dated 15 October 2003.
After investigative hearings, IBP Investigating Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala
submitted her report, the dispositive portion of which reads:[50]

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, there is merit in the complaint and it is hereby recommended
that respondent ATTY. ROBERTO R. FERRER, SR. be SUSPENDED for a period of TWO (2)
YEARS from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and as a member of the bar.

On 30 July 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner but modified the penalty imposed: [51]
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that
respondent can be held liable for falsification for making it appear that he was at the CHR office
by logging in at the DTR when actually he was attending a hearing in some courts, Atty. Roberto
R. Ferrer, Sr., is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.

The issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not respondent has committed gross
misconduct arising from the following alleged acts:
1. Engaging in the private practice of his profession while being a government
employee;
2. Falsifying his Daily Time Records;
3. Issuing unauthorized orders; and
4. Continuously engaging in private practice even after the filing of case against him for
engaging in private practice.
Relative to the first ground, respondent contends that CHR lawyers are authorized to engage
in private practice by invoking CHR Resolution No. (III) A2002-133.
CHR Resolution No. (III) A2002-133 authorizes CHR lawyers to engage in private practice
(adopting the Civil Service Commission Resolution) subject to the following conditions, [52] to
wit:

NOW THEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission hereby resolves to adopt
the following policy:

Lawyers employed in the Civil Service Commission, upon written request, may be authorized to
practice their profession subject to the following conditions:

1. It shall not entail any conflict of interest insofar as the functions of the Commission are
concerned;

2. It shall not be in representation of a client whose cause of action is against the government;

3. It shall not involve the use of government funds or property;

4. It shall not impair the lawyers efficiency in the discharge of his/her regular functions in the
office, and absences incurred, if any, shall be covered by duly approved vacation leaves and pass
slips;

5. It shall be subject to the provisions of RA No. 6713 and such other relevant Civil Service
Laws and Rules;
6. The lawyers can appear only in courts of law, offices of state prosecutors (Department of
Justice), Office of the Ombudsman and quasi-judicial agencies decisions of which are rendered
by presidential appointees;

7. Authority is for one year subject to renewal after review of the lawyers office performance;

8. Provided, that, the commission reserves its right to revoke the said authority.

...

Recognizing that the dearth of lawyers committed to the civil service is due to the . . . huge
disparity in the income of government lawyers as compared to those employed in the private
sector, the Commission on Human Rights is convinced that CHR lawyers may be authorized to
engage in the practice of their profession to augment their income so as to encourage them in the
government service.

NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission on Human Rights adopts the above-cited conditions to
authorize, upon written request, to practice their profession. However, it is the Commission (sic)
position that said authority should be strictly construed to maintain efficient and effective
delivery of Commission programs and services. (Underscoring supplied)

Crystal clear from the foregoing is the fact that private practice of law by CHR lawyers is
not a matter of right. Although the Commission allows CHR lawyers to engage in private
practice, a written request and approval thereof, with a duly approved leave of absence for
that matter are indispensable. In the case at bar, the record is bereft of any such written request
or duly approved leave of absence. No written authority nor approval of the practice and
approved leave of absence by the CHR was ever presented by respondent. Thus, he cannot
engage in private practice.
As to respondents act of notarizing documents, records show that he applied[53] for
commission as notary public on 14 November 2000, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 42. This was granted by RTC Executive Judge Pedro M.
Sunga, Jr., on 01 December 2000.[54] However, the CHR authorized[55] respondent to act as
notary public only on 29 October 2001.[56]Considering that acts of notarization are within the
ambit of the term practice of law, for which a prior written request and approval by the CHR to
engage into it are required, the crucial period to be considered is the approval of the CHR on 29
October 2001 and not the approval of the RTC on 04 December 2000.
Practice of law has a settled meaning. It refers to any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage
in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.[57] Thus, as correctly pointed out by
complainants, the belated authority granted to respondent cannot be made to retroact to the
notarized documents dated prior thereto.
As to the alleged falsification of DTRs, records show that respondent has been actually
attending hearings in different courts as shown by the minutes of hearings and/or orders issued
by different courts. Since it has been amply established that he was not properly authorized to do
so as no written request by him and approval thereof of his request and of his leave of absence
was made by the CHR, it is an ineluctable conclusion that he falsified his DTRs when he
certified thereon that he was at the office on the same days and time. Needless to say, he could
not be at two different places at the same time.
We shall now discuss respondents authority to issue the two (2) Orders. The following are
instructive:

. . . The [1987] Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission [on Human
Rights] the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. . .

But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even
quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or
the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.

Investigate, commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into,
research on, study. The dictionary definition of investigate is to observe or study closely: inquire
into systematically: to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an
official inquiry. The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn,
obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving
a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established
by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of investigate is essentially the same: to follow up step by step by patient
inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care
and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal
inquiry; to inquire; to make an investigation, investigation being in turn described as (a)n
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing . . .

Adjudicate, commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide,

determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as to settle finally (the rights
and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: x x to pass judgment on:
settle judicially: x x act as judge. And adjudge means to decide or rule upon as a judge or with
judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x x.

In the legal sense, adjudicate means: To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine
finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense; and adjudge means: To pass on
judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x Implies a judicial
determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment.[58]

The Commission on Human Rights having merely the power to investigate, cannot and
should not try and resolve the subject matters involved in the Order dated 18 September 2001,
which awarded the custody of the child to her mother, and Order dated 19 September 2001,
which ordered the Rural Bank of Porac to reinstate the account of the mother of the child. These
matters are undoubtedly and clearly within the judicial and adjudicatory powers of a regular
court.
As to the fourth charge, suffice it to state that despite the cases filed against respondent in
courts, he continued without the proper authority and approved leave of absence, to engage in the
private practice of his profession as shown by certified true copies of the minutes and orders of
the different courts where he attended hearings.
In Spouses Jeneline Donato and Mario Donato v. Atty. Isaiah B. Asuncion, Sr.,[59] we
explained the concept of gross misconduct as any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful
conduct on the part of the person concerned in the administration of justice which is prejudicial
to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. Such conduct is generally
motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. The term, however, does not
necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent.
To our mind, respondents acts of issuing the subject orders, engaging in private practice
without prior written request and authority of the CHR and duly approved leave of absence,
notarizing documents even before being so authorized by the CHR and falsifying his DTRs,
constitute gross misconduct for which he may be suspended, per the dictates of Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or Suspension of Attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefore.- A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. . . .

The question now arises as to the penalty to be imposed.

Complainants ask that respondent be disbarred. On imposing the supreme penalty of
disbarment, the rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. [60] While we
will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where
the evidence calls for it, we will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to
accomplish the desired end.[61] In the case at bar, the IBP Investigating Commissioner Rebecca
V. Maala recommended the suspension of respondent for two (2) years while the IBP Board of
Governors recommended a lighter penalty of six (6) months suspension. Taking our cue
therefrom, we find one (1) year suspension to be sufficient sanction against respondent -
suspension being primarily intended not as a punishment, but as a means to protect the public
and the legal profession.[62]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Roberto Ferrer, Sr., is hereby found guilty of Gross Misconduct and
is hereby SUSPENDED for One (1) year from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of
this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
 Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney and served on
the IBP, as well as to the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Zarcilla VS Quesada
OCA VS Arreza
 A.M. No. 17-11-06-CA

RE: ANONYMOUS LETTERCOMPLAINT (with Attached Pictures) AGAINST

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NORMANDIE B. PIZARRO, COURT OF APPEALS,

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

This administrative matter arose from an anonymous letter-complaint1 charging Associate Justice
Normandie B. Pizarro (Justice Pizarro) of the Court of Appeals (CA) of habitually gambling in
casinos, "selling" decisions, and immorally engaging in an illicit relationship. The subject letter-
complaint was initially filed with the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) on 20 September
2017. The matter was referred by the Ombudsman to this Court on 24 October 2017.2

The anonymous letter-complaint accused Justice Pizarro of being a gambling addict who would
allegedly lose millions of pesos in the casinos daily, and insinuated that Justice Pizarro resorted
to "selling" his cases in order to support his gambling addiction.

The anonymous complainant further accused Justice Pizarro of having an illicit relationship,
claiming that Justice Pizarro bought his mistress a house and lot in Antipolo City, a
condominium unit in Manila, and brand new vehicles such as Toyota Vios and Ford Everest
worth millions of pesos. Lastly, the anonymous complainant alleged that Justice Pizarro, together
with his mistress and her whole family, made several travels abroad to shop and to gamble in
casinos.

Attached to the anonymous letter-complaint are four (4) sheets of photographs3 showing Justice
Pizarro sitting at the casino tables allegedly at the Midori Hotel and Casino in Clark, Pampanga.

On 21November2017, the Court issued a Resolution4 noting the 27 September 2017 Letter of the
Ombudsman referring the anonymous letter-complaint; and requiring Justice Pizarro to file his
comment on the anonymous letter-complaint.

On 8 December 2017, Justice Pizarro filed his comment5 wherein he admitted to his indiscretion.
He stated that he was indeed the person appearing on the subject photographs sitting at a casino
table. He explained that the photographs were taken when he was accompanying
a balikbayan friend; and that they only played a little in a parlor game fashion without big stakes
and without their identities introduced or made known. Justice Pizarro averred that the
photographs may have been taken by people with ulterior motives considering his plan for early
retirement.

He further confessed that sometime in 2009 he also played at the casino in what he termed,
again, a parlor game concept. He maintained, however, that such was an indiscretion committed
by a dying man because, prior to this, he had learned that he had terminal cancer.
He also found as cruel, baseless, and highly unfair the accusation that he is the "most corrupt
justice in the Philippines" noting that no administrative case had been filed against him for the
past seven (7) years; that his first administrative case, which this Court resolved in his favor,
actually involved his former driver in Ilocos Sur who forged his signature to make it appear that
the driver was employed in the judiciary; and that all of the few administrative cases filed against
him did not involve corruption; and that he was absolved in all.

Justice Pizarro likewise categorically denied having a mistress. He characterized such

accusations as cowardly acts of his detractors, who even furnished· copies of the anonymous
complaint to the presiding justice of the appellate court and the leader of a major religious group,
with the intent of destroying his character.

ISSUE

The sole issue before the Court is whether Justice Pizarro is guilty of the accusations against him
for which he may be held administratively liable.

THE COURT’S RULING

Under the Rules of Court, administrative complaints against judges of regular courts and special
courts as we11 as justices of the CA and the Sandigan,bayan may be instituted: (1) by the
Supreme Court motu proprio; (2) upon a verified complaint, supported by affidavits of persons
who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may
substantiate said allegations; or (3) upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public records
of indubitable integrity.6

The rationale for the requirement that complaints against judges and justices of the judiciary
must be accompanied by supporting evidence is to protect magistrates from the filing of t1imsy
and virtually unsubstantiated charges against them.7 This is consistent with the rule that in
administrative proceedings, the complainants bear the burden of proving the allegations in their
complaints by substantial evidence. If they fail to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon
which their claims are based, the respondents are not obliged to prove their exception or
defense.8

In this case, the anonymous complaint accused Justice Pizarro of selling favorable decisions,
having a mistress, and habitually playing in casinos; and essentially charging him of dishonesty
and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law, immorality, and unbecoming
conduct. These accusations, however, with the only exception of gambling in casinos, are not
supported by any evidence or by any public record of indubitable integrity. Thus, the bare
allegations of corruption and immorality do not deserve any consideration. For this reason, the
charges of corruption and immorality against Justice Pizarro must be dismissed for lack of merit.

Inasmuch as the Court would want to cleanse the Judiciary of its erring and undesirable members
and personnel, such policy could only be implemented with the strict observance of due process,
such that substantial evidence is required to prove the charges against a member of the
Judiciary.9 The Court is duty bound to protect its ranks or any member or personnel of the
Judiciary from baseless or unreasonable charges.10

Indeed, while the law and justice abhor all forms of abuse committed by public officers and
employees whose sworn duty is to discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity,
competence, accountability, and loyalty, the Court must protect them against unsubstantiated
charges that tend to adversely affect, rather than encourage, the effective performance of their
duties and functions.11

As regards the accusation of habitually playing in casinos, it is clear that the anonymous
complaint was not supported by public records of indubitable integrity as required by the rules.
Nevertheless, it is equally undisputed, as in fact it was admitted, that Justice Pizarro was the
same person playing in a casino in Clark, Pampanga, as shown by the photographs attached to
the anonymous complaint. He also admitted that he played in a casino sometime in 2009. The
Court cannot simply ignore this evident and admitted fact. The issue now is whether Justice
Pizarro may be held administratively liable for gambling in casinos.

Recently, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) reminded judges and court personnel to
strictly comply with the prohibition against gambling or being seen in gambling places such as
the casino.12 The OCA cited Circular No. 413 issued by the Court on 27 August 1980 which
reads:

The attention of the Court has been invited to the presence of some judges in gambling casinos
operating under Presidential Decree No. 1067- B. This is clearly violative of Section 5(3-b) of
said Decree. It reads as follows:

(3-b) Persons not allowed to play -

(a) Government officials connected directly with the operation of the government or any of
its agencies."

In accordance with law and pursuant to the Resolution of the Court en bane in Administrative
Matter No. 1544-0, dated August 21, 1980, judges of inferior courts and the court
personnel are enjoined from playing in or being present in gambling casinos.

Moreover, judges are likewise enjoined to keep in mind the Canons of Judicial Ethics, paragraph
3 of which provides:

3. Avoidance of appearance of impropriety. - A judge’s official conduct should be free from the
appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach."
(emphases supplied and italics in the original)

With respect to Circular No. 4 and Administrative Matter No. 1544-0, it is with regret that the
Court finds them inapplicable to the present case. It is clear from the words of these issuances
that the prohibition from entering and gambling in casinos is applicable only to judges of inferior
courts and court personnel. Stated differently, the aforesaid issuances do not cover justices of
collegial courts for the simple reason that they are neither judges of the inferior courts nor can
they be described as personnel of the court. Although the term "judge" has been held to
comprehend all kinds of judges, the same is true only if the said term is not modified by any
word or phrase.14 In the case of Circular No. 4 and Administrative Matter No. 1544- 0, the term
"judge" has been qualified by the phrase "inferior courts." Thus, absurd as it may seem, Justice
Pizarro cannot be held administratively liable under Circular No. 4 and Administrative Matter
No. ] 544-0.

Nevertheless, the inapplicability of the aforestated Court issuances to justices of collegial courts
does not necessarily mean that Justice Pizarro is absolutely cleared of his evident and admitted
act of playing in casinos.

Section 5 (3-b)(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1067-B and Section 14(4)(a) of P.D. No.
1869, which consolidated P.D. No. 1067-B with other presidential decrees issued relative to the
franchise and powers of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, did not define the
meaning of the term "government officials connected directly with the operation of the
government or any of its agencies" as well as the words used therein. The same is true with
respect to the presidential issuances relative to such prohibition.15 Considering, however, that the
obvious purpose of the subject prohibition is the regulation of conduct of government officials,
reference may be made to pertinent administrative laws and jurisprudence pertaining thereto to
comprehend the meaning of the term under scrutiny.

In this regard, Section 2(1) of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 or the Administrative Code of
1987 defines "Government of the Republic of the Philippines" as "the corporate governmental
entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines,
including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which
political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous
regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local
government."16The term "Government of the Republic of the Philippines" or "Philippine
Government" is broad enough to include the local governments and the central or national
government which, in turn, consist of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, as well as
constitutional bodies and other bodies created in accordance with the constitution.17

Section 2(4) of E.O. No. 292 further states that "Agency of the Government" refers to any of the
various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or
government-owned or -controlled corporations, or a local government or a distinct unit therein.

Section 2(14) of E.0. No. 292 also defines an "officer" as distinguished from a "clerk" or
"employee" as "a person whose duties, not being of a clerical or manual nature, involves the
exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions of the government." On the other hand,
when used with reference to a person having authority to do a particular act or perform a
particular function in the exercise of governmental power, "officer" includes any government
employee, agent or body having authority to do the act or exercise that function.
As regards the qualifying phrase "connected directly with the operation," its definition could not
be found in the Administrative Code and other similarly applicable statutes and rules. It is
settled, however, that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used
in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning.18

The words should be read and considered in their natural, ordinary, commonly accepted and
most obvious signification, according to good and approved usage and without resorting to
forced or subtle construction.19 Indeed, the lawmaker is presumed to have employed the words in
the statute in their ordinary and common use and acceptation.20

Thus, the words "connected," "directly," and "operation" must be given their ordinary meaning in
relation to their ordinary use in organizations or institutions such as the government. Hence, the
term "connected" may mean "involved" "associated" or "related;" "directly" may mean
"immediately" "without any intervening agency or instrumentality or determining influence" or
"without any intermediate step;" and "operation" may mean "doing or performing action" or
"administration." Additionally, "to operate" is synonymous to the terms "to exercise" and "to
act."

From the foregoing, it is opined that the term "government official connected directly to the
operation of the government or any of its agencies" refers to any person employed by the
government whose tasks is the performance and exercise of any of the functions and powers of
such government or any agency thereof, as conferred on them by law, without any intervening
agency. Simply put, a "government official connected directly to the operation of the government
or any of its agencies" is a government officer who performs the functions of the government on
his own judgment or discretion - essentially, a government officer under Section 2(14) of E.O.
No. 292.

Applying the above definition to the present case, it is clear that Justice Pizarro is covered by the
term "government official connected directly with the operation of the government." Indeed, one
of the functions of the government, through the Judiciary, is the administration of justice within
its territorial jurisdiction. Justice Pizarro, as a magistrate of the CA, is clearly a government
official directly involved in the administration of justice; and in the performance of such
function, he exercises discretion. Thus, by gambling in a casino, Justice Pizarro violated the
prohibition from gambling in casinos as provided under Section 14(4)(a) of P.D. No. 1869.

Although P.D. No. 1869 did not provide for a penalty for any act done in contravention of its
provisions particularly the prohibition on gambling, in City Government of Tagbilaran v.
Hontanosas, Jr., 21 it was held that such transgression constitutes violations of Paragraphs 3 and
22 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which respectively provide:

3. Avoidance of appearance of impropriety -

A judge’s official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal
behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his
everyday life, should be beyond reproach.
 xxxx

22. Infractions of law -

The judge should be studiously careful himself to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law,
lest it be a demoralizing example to others.22

Further, Justice Pizarro also violated Canons 2 and 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary which pe1tinently provides:

CANON 2
INTEGRITY

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal
demeanor of judges.

SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived
to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.

SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of
the judiciary.1âwphi1 Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.

xxxx

CANON 4
PROPRIETY

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of
a judge.

SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.

SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In
particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the
judicial office.

The Court has repeatedly reminded judges to conduct themselves irreproachably, not only while
in the discharge of official duties but also in their personal behavior every day.23 No position
demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its occupant than does the judicial
office. Judges in particular must be individuals of competence, honesty and probity, charged as
they are with safeguarding the integrity of the court and its proceedings. Judges should behave at
all times so as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all their activities. A judge's personal
behaviour outside the court, and not only while in the performance of his official duties, must be
beyond reproach, for he is perceived to be the personification of law and justice. Thus, any
demeaning act of a judge degrades the institution he represents.24

Accordingly, the Court finds respondent Justice Pizarro guilty of conduct unbecoming of a
member of the judiciary. Considering, however, that this is the respondent justice's first
transgression, and further bearing in mind his immediate admission of his indiscretion as well as
the number of years he has been in government service, the Court finds the imposition of a fine
in the amount of ₱100,000.00 sufficient in this case.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Associate Justice Normandie B.

Pizarro GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a member of the judiciary, and is
hereby ORDERED to pay a fine in the amount of ₱100,000,00.

SO ORDERED.