ADECER vs.
AKUT agreement with the complainant with respect to the handling of the latter's
Facts: The complainants were charged with committing a crime punishable
under RPcode (Other Deceits) and the respondent was their legal counsel.
Respondent received a copy of the MTCC¶s Decision convicting the
complainants of Other Deceits and sentencing to pay penalties. The Decision
was promulgated in the absence of the complainants who were accorded
with due notice. And received a copy via registered mail and has 15days to
file an appeal or a petition for probation in behalf of the complainants, but
the respondent failed to file a Petition for Probation alleging he was out of
town for more important hearings and his attention for his wife¶s developing
tumor. A warrant of arrest was served waited for his lawyer and raised the
amount needed to pay the civil indemnity. Claiming (atty) that the
complainants had only themselves to blame for failing to file the timely
petition, they failed to meet him seasonably for signing and verification of the
petition for probation.
Held: CPR mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence. He shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation. Nor shall he neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, his
negligence in connection shall render him liable. In the case at bar, despite
a receipt of a copy of the decision the consequent 15day running pd for the
filing of the Petition for Probation respondent went out of town without
contacting complainants for advise. The availability of mobile phones or
emails was not attended. A lawyer must also give his full attention, skill and
competence regardless of his impression that one case or hearing is more
important than the other. His failure to file an appeal in a timely manner fir
motion for reconsideration renders him liable for negligence. Suspended.
6mos.
CESARIO ADARNE vs. ATTY. DAMIAN V. ALDABA
Sps. Cumpio filed an action for forcible entry against herein complaint
Cesario Adarne, Aning Arante, and Miguel Inokando. Atty. Isauro Marmita
represented the defendants. The case was dismissed by the Justice of the
Peace for lack of jurisdiction and was appealed to the CFI of Carigara. The
CFI returned the case to the lower court finding that it had jurisdiction. After
trial, JOP again dismissed the case and it was again appealed to the CFI.
Attys. Arturo Mirales and Generoso Casimpan filed the answer for the
defendants. At the hearing, Adarne, noting that his attorneys had not yet
arrived, prevailed upon Atty. Aldaba, who was then present in court, to
appear as counsel for them and ask for the Postponement of the trial. Atty.
Aldaba, who is his third degree cousin, agreed, and entered a special
appearance. Upon noticing that the plaintiffs and their counsel were not also
present in court, Aldaba, instead of asking for a postponement, moved for
the dismissal of the case, which was granted. The plaintiffs then appealed. At
the hearing, Atty. Aldaba was again prevailed upon by Adarne to appear in
his behalf. The respondent entered a "special appearance" for the
complainant and thereafter argued that the interest of justice would best be
served of the defendants were allowed to file an action for quieting of title
and the case heard jointly with the pending action for forcible entry. Finding
merit, the court ordered Adarne to file an action for quieting of title within 1
week, after which both cases would be tried jointly. Thereafter, the court
declared the defendants in default for their failure to appeal at the hearing
set for that day and directed the plaintiffs to present evidence to support
their claim. Because of this, Cesario Adarne filed the present complaint
against Atty. Aldaba. The respondent denied that he ever had any
complainant's case and subsequently failing to render such services is a clear
case except for the "special appearance" that he entered for the
complainant, in view of the non-availability of the complainant's lawyers on
said dates.
HELD: The judgment by default rendered against the complainant cannot be
attributed to the respondent attorney. The blame lies with the complainant
for having engaged the services of several lawyers to handle his case without
formally withdrawing the authority he had given to them to appear in his
behalf as to place the responsibility upon the respondent. It appeared that
there have been three changes made of the attorneys for the complainant
in the forcible entry case. However, no formalities whatever were observed
in those changes such that the respondent entered a "special appearance"
for the complainant in order that he could ask for the dismissal of the case for
the failure of the adverse party to prosecute. No substitution of attorneys will
be allowed unless there be filed: (1) a written application for such substitution;
(2) the written consent of the client; (3) the written consent of the attorney
substituted; and (4) in case such written consent can not be secured, there
must be filed with the application proof of service of notice of such motion
upon the attorney to be substituted, in the manner prescribed by the rules.
Besides, the respondent honestly believed that he had appeared for the
complainant only for a special purpose and that the complainant had
agreed to contact his attorney of record to handle his case after the hearing,
so that he did nothing more about it. WHEREFORE, the present administrative
complaint is hereby DISMISSED
CARLOS B. REYES vs. ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITAN
Carlos Reyes hired the services of respondent Atty. Jeremias Vitan for the
purpose of filing the appropriate complaint or charge against his sister-in-law
and her niece for refusing to abide with the Decision of the RTC ordering the
partition of the properties left by Reyes s brother; and that Atty. Vitan, after
receiving the amount of P17,000.00, did not take any action on complainant's
case. From the IBP investigation, it was found that: It was complainant who
submitted the supposed letters of the respondent Estelita Reyes and Juliet
Alegonza but there were no proofs when they sent and when the same were
received by the addressee. Likewise, the complaint submitted by Atty. Vitan
was only a format in the sense that it was not signed by the respondent; the
RTC Branch No. was left blank; there was no Civil Case No. and there was no
proof that said pleading was filed which amounts only to a mere scrap of
paper and not a pleading or authenticated document in the legal parlance.
As it is, nothing had been done by the respondent for the complainant as his
client for the legal fees he collected which was paid by the complainant as
reflected in the receipts issued by the respondent in handwritten forms and
signed by him. Atty. Vitan not only violated Cannon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for having neglected a legal matter entrusted to
him and did not inform complainant the status of his case but also
disregarded the orders of the Commission without reasons, which amounted
to utter disrespect of authority and unethical conduct in the practice of his
profession, thus, should be sanctioned.
HELD: When respondent accepted the amount of P17,000.00 from Reyes, it
was understood that he agreed to take up the latter's case and that an
attorney-client relationship between them was established. From then on, it
was expected of him to serve his client, herein complainant, with
competence and attend to his cause with fidelity, care and devotion. The
act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling
violation of Canon 18 of the CPR which provides that a lawyer shall serve his
client with competence and diligence. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty.
Jeremias R. Vitan is hereby declared guilty of violation of Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months effective upon notice of this Decision. He is
ordered to return to complainant within five (5) days from notice the sum of
P17,000.00 with interest of 12% per annum from the date of the promulgation
of this Decision until the full amount shall have been returned.
Santiago vs Fojas
FACTS: An expulsion case was faced by the complainants contending that
they have illegally removed from the union (FEUFA) membership Mr. Paulino
Salvador. The lower court resolved in favor of Salvador and ordered the
complainants to pay, jointly and severally, Mr. Salvador. The case was then
elevated to the Court of Appeals. The complainants lost in their petition at
the Court of Appeals due to abandonment, failure to act accordingly, or
serious neglect of their counsel, Atty. Fojas to answer the civil complaint on
an expulsion case. Atty. Fojas assured them that everything was in order and
he had already answered the complaint. However, the appellants soon
discovered that he never answered it after all because, according to him, he
was a very busy man. Atty. Fojas admitted his “mistake” in failing to file an
answer for the expulsion case, but he alleges that it was cured by his filing of
a motion for reconsideration. However, such motion for reconsideration was
denied. Atty. Fojas defended his negligence with the reason that the case
was a losing cause after all. Atty. Fojas also asserts that he was about to
appeal the said decision to this Court, but his services as counsel for the
complainants and for the union were illegally and unilaterally terminated by
complainant. Complainants then filed for a disbarment case.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent committed culpable negligence, as would
warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for the complainants an answer
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court upheld Canon 14 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer
owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. This means that his client is entitled to the benefit
of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the
land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.
In his motion for reconsideration of the default order, the respondent
explained his non-filing of the required answer by impliedly invoking
forgetfulness occasioned by a large volume and pressure of legal work, while
in his Comment in this case he attributes it to honest mistake and excusable
neglect due to his overzealousness to question the denial order of the trial
court. Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact remains that the
respondent did not comply with his duty to file an answer.
Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the
respondent’s inability to exercise due diligence in the performance of his duty
to file an answer. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention,
diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its importance and whether
he accepts it for a fee or for free. Furthermore, a breach of Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which requires him to serve his clients, the
complainants herein, with diligence and, more specifically, Rule 18.03 thereof
which provides: “A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.”
Atty. Fojas’s negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-
V-91 was in fact a “losing cause”. The Supreme Court held that he should
have seasonably informed the complainants thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15
of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly provides: A lawyer, when
advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and
probable results of the client’s case, neither overstating nor understanding
the prospects of the case.REPRIMANDED AND ADMONISHED
NEBREJA vs REONAL- Annulment of marriage
Gonzales vs sabacajan-unreturned transfer certificate of title
Pena Vs Aparicio
In the case of FERNANDO MARTIN O. PENA vs. ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO, A.C.
No. 7298 [Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1565], June 25, 2007, the Supreme Court
found the respondent lawyer liable for violation of Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and was meted out the penalty of
reprimand with the stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
would be dealt with more severely.Let me digest the case below for legal
research purposes of the visitors of this blog.
In this administrative complaint, the respondent lawyer is charged with
violation of Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
for writing a demand letter the contents of which threatened complainant
with the filing of criminal cases for tax evasion and falsification of documents.
The salient parts of the demand letter are as follows:
“BUT if these are not paid on August 10, 2005, we will be constrained to file
and claim bigger amounts including moral damages to the tune of millions
under established precedence of cases and laws. In addition to other
multiple charges like:
1. Tax evasion by the millions of pesos of income not reported to the
government.
2. Criminal Charges for Tax Evasion
3. Criminal Charges for Falsification of Documents
4. Cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws.
These are reserved for future actions in case of failure to pay the above
amounts as settlements in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).”
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “a lawyer shall
represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law,” reminding legal
practitioners that a lawyer’s duty is not to his client but to the administration
of justice; to that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate; and his
conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and
ethics. In particular, Rule 19.01 commands that a “lawyer shall employ only
fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall
not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded
criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding.” Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file any
unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his
client designed to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or
withdraw their own cases against the lawyer’s client.
In the case at bar, respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its Rule
proscribe. Through his letter, he threatened complainant that should the
latter fail to pay the amounts they propose as settlement, he would file and
claim bigger amounts including moral damages, as well as multiple charges
such as tax evasion, falsification of documents, and cancellation of business
license to operate due to violations of laws. The threats are not only unethical
for violating Canon 19, but they also amount to blackmail.
Blackmail is “the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation
or exposure or opposition in the public prints,…obtaining of value from a
person as a condition of refraining from making an accusation against him,
or disclosing some secret calculated to operate to his prejudice.” In common
parlance and in general acceptation, it is equivalent to and synonymous with
extortion, the exaction of money either for the performance of a duty, the
prevention of an injury, or the exercise of an influence. Not infrequently, it is
extorted by threats, or by operating on the fears or the credulity, or by
promises to conceal or offers to expose the weaknesses, the follies, or the
crime of the victim.
In Sps. Boyboy v. Atty. Yabut, Jr., we held that “[a]n accusation for blackmail
and extortion is a very serious one which, if properly substantiated, would
entail not only respondent’s disbarment from the practice of law, but also a
possible criminal prosecution.” While the respondent in Boyboy was
exonerated for lack of evidence, the same may not be said of respondent in
the present case for he admits to writing the offensive letter.
In fact, respondent does not find anything wrong with what he wrote,
dismissing the same as merely an act of pointing out massive violations of the
law by the other party, and, with boldness, asserting that “a lawyer is under
obligation to tell the truth, to report to the government commission of offenses
punishable by the State.” He further asserts that the writing of demand letters
is a standard practice and tradition and that our laws allow and encourage
the settlement of disputes.
Respondent’s assertions, however, are misleading, for it is quite obvious that
respondent’s threat to file the cases against complainant was designed to
secure some leverage to compel the latter to give in to his client’s demands.
It was not respondent’s intention to point out complainant’s violations of the
law as he so gallantly claims. Far from it, the letter even contains an implied
promise to “keep silent” about the said violations if payment of the claim is
made on the date indicated.
Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in
this jurisdiction. It is usually done by a lawyer pursuant to the principal-agent
relationship that he has with his client, the principal. Thus, in the performance
of his role as agent, the lawyer may be tasked to enforce his client’s claim
and to take all the steps necessary to collect it, such as writing a letter of
demand requiring payment within a specified period. However, the letter in
this case contains more than just a simple demand to pay. It even contains a
threat to file retaliatory charges against complainant which have nothing to
do with his client’s claim for separation pay. The letter was obviously designed
to secure leverage to compel complainant to yield to their claims. Indeed,
letters of this nature are definitely proscribed by the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Respondent cannot claim the sanctuary provided by the privileged
communication rule under which a private communication executed in the
performance of a legal duty is not actionable. The privileged nature of the
letter was removed when respondent used it to blackmail complainant and
extort from the latter compliance with the demands of his client.
However, while the writing of the letter went beyond ethical standards, we
hold that disbarment is too severe a penalty to be imposed on respondent,
considering that he wrote the same out of his overzealousness to protect his
client’s interests. Accordingly, the more appropriate penalty is reprimand.
Leviste vs CA
On September 7, 1963, Leviste, a practicing attorney, entered into a written
agreement with the Rosa del Rosario to appear as her counsel in a petition
for probate of the holographic will of the late Maxima C. Reselva. It was
agreed that the contigent fee would be 35% of the property Rosa will receive
upon the probate of the will. On August 20, 1965, Leviste received a letter
from Ms. Del Rosario, informing him that she was terminating his services as
her counsel due to “conflicting interest.” On September 20, 1965, petitioner
filed a motion to Intervene to Protect His Rights to Fees for Professional
Services but was soon denied since he had not filed a claim for attorney’s
fees nor recorded his attorney’s lien. On November 23, 1965, petitioner filed
a formal statement of Claim for Attorney’s Fees and Recording of Attorney’s
Lien. Despite the denial of his motion to intervene, Atty. LEviste kept on
receiving copies of the court’s orders, as well the pleadings of the other
parties in the case. He also continued to file pleadings. On November 23,
1966, Del Rosario and Rita Banu, the special administratrix-legatee, filed a
motion To Withdraw Petition for Probate. They alleging that Del Rosario
waived her rights to the devise and agreed that the De Guzman brothers and
sisters who opposed her petition for probate, shall inherit all the properties left
by the decedent. The trial court denied the motion to withdraw the petition
for being contrary to public policy. The court disallowed the will, holding that
the legal requirements for its validity were not satisfied as only two witnesses.
Atty. Leviste filed an appeal bond, notice of appeal, and record on appeal.
The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground
that petitioner was not a party in interest. Atty. Leviste opposed the motion
claiming that he has a direct and material interest in the decision sought to
be reviewed. He also asked that he be substituted as party-petitioner but was
denied. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, he suffered the same fate.
Leviste brought this case to the Supreme Court asserting Art. 1052 of the Civil
Code: ART. 1052: If the heir repudiates the inheritance to the prejudice of his
own creditors, the latter may petition the court to authorize them to accept
it in the name of the heir. The acceptance shall benefit the creditors only to
an extent sufficient to cover the amount of their credits. The excess, should
there be any, shall in no case pertain to the renouncer, but shall be
adjudicated to the persons to whom, in accordance with the rules
established in this Code, it may belong. Thus, Leviste asserts he has a right to
accept for his client Del Rosario to the extent of 35% thereof the devise in her
favor (which she in effect repudiated) to protect his contigent attorney’s
fees.
ISSUE:Whether or not an attorney who was engaged on a contingent fee
basis may, in order to collect his fees, prosecute an appeal despite his client’s
refusal to appeal the decision of the trial court.
HELD:No. The Supreme Court held Article 1052 of the Civil Code does not
apply to this case. That legal provision protects the creditor of a repudiating
heir. Petitioner is not a creditor of Rosa del Rosario. The payment of his fees is
contingent and dependent upon the successful probate of the holographic
will. Since the petition for probate was dismissed by the lower court, the
contingency did not occur. Attorney Leviste is not entitled to his fee. Also,
Article 1052 presupposes that the obligor is an heir. Rosa del Rosario is not a
legal heir of the late Maxima C. Reselva. The contract for contingent
attorney’s fees neither gives, nor purports to give, to the lawyer any right
whatsoever, personal or real, in his client’s share of the properties. The amount
thereof is simply a basis for the computation of said fees. SC claimed that the
lower court did not err in holding that notice of an attorney’s lien did not
entitle the attorney-appellant to subrogate himself in lieu of his client. It only
gives him the right to collect a certain amount for his services in case his client
is awarded a certain sum by the court. DENIED for lack of merit
LICUDAN vs CA- none
Licudan vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 91958 January 24, 1991) Facts: The
petitioners fault the respondent Court for its failure to exercise its inherent
power to review and determine the propriety of the stipulated attorney's fees
in favor of the respondent lawyer and accuse the respondent lawyer of
having committed an unfair advantage or legal fraud by virtue of the
Contract for Professional Services devised by him after the trial court awarded
him attorney's fees for P1,000.00 only instead of respecting the trust and
confidence of the highest level reposed on him considering the close blood
and affinal relationship between him and his clients. The petitioners contend
that under the award for professional services, they may have won the case
but would lose the entire property won in litigation to their uncle-lawyer. They
would be totally deprived of their house and lot and the recovered damages
considering that of the 271.5 square meters of the subject lot, the respondent
lawyer is claiming 121.5 square meters and the remaining portion of 150
square meters would also go to attorney's fees since the said portion pertains
to the lawyer's son by way of usufruct for ten (10) years. Issue: Whether or not
the award of attorney's fees in this case is reasonable, being in the nature of
contingent fees? Held: The instant petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals'
decision of September 12, 1989 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Atty.
Domalanta is awarded reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of
P20,000.00. Ratio Decidendi: The practice of law is a profession rather than
trade. Courts must guard against the charging of unconscionable and
excessive fees by lawyers for their services when engaged as counsel. Under
Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall charge
only fair and reasonable fees. In determining whether or not the lawyer fees
are fair and reasonable, Rule 2001 of the same Code enumerates the factors
to be considered in resolving the said issue. A similar provision is contained
under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which partly states
that: Sec. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. — An
attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a
reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of
the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and
the professional standing of the attorney. . . . A written contract for services
shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable.
Bautista vs Gonzales
FACTS: In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista, respondent Ramon
A. Gonzales was charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and
violation of lawyer’s oath. Required by this Court to answer the charges
against him, respondent filed a motion for a bill of particulars asking this Court
to order complainant to amend his complaint by making his charges more
definite. In a resolution the Court granted respondent’s motion and required
complainant to file an amended complaint. Complainant submitted an
amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent committed
the following acts:
1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely, Alfaro
Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado and Editha Fortunado [hereinafter referred to
as the Fortunados] to pay all expenses, including court fees, for a contingent
fee of fifty percent (50%) of the value of the property in litigation
4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract
with him on August 30, 1971 for the development into a residential subdivision
of the land involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143, covered by TCT No. T-1929,
claiming that he acquired fifty percent (50%) interest thereof as attorney’s
fees from the Fortunados, while knowing fully well that the said property was
already sold at a public auction on June 30, 1971, by the Provincial Sheriff of
Lanao del Norte and registered with the Register of Deeds of Iligan City;
Pertinent to No. 4 above, the contract, in No. 1 above, reads:
We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you
[respondent Ramon Gonzales] defray all expenses, for the suit, including
court fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent committed serious misconduct involving a
champertous contract.
HELD: YES. Respondent was suspended from practice of law for six (6) months.
RATIO: The Court finds that the agreement between the respondent and the
Fortunados contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which
provides that a lawyer may not properly agree with a client to pay or bear
the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of Professional
Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses
of litigation, the same should be subject to reimbursement. The agreement
between respondent and the Fortunados, however, does not provide for
reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid by him. An
agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to
enforce the client’s rights is champertous [citation omitted]. Such
agreements are against public policy especially where, as in this case, the
attorney has agreed to carry on the action at his own expense in
consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute [citation
omitted]. The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship
between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur
administrative sanctions.