Preface

Sri Lanka is a country I feel a particular attachment and commitment to. I have been
engaged in the country for a number of years, researching its progress and
challenges closely, and I have always been made thoroughly welcome there.
Through my work and engagement, I have accumulated many contacts and made
many friends. It is these people that have been instrumental in the success of the
MA in Post-war Recovery Studies field trip to Sri Lanka, which saw the current MA
class travel to the country for an intensive 11-day study visit in December 2010.

The flagship MA programme in Post-war Recovery Studies is central to the Post-war

Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU)‟s work which focuses on teaching,
trainings, research and advisory services to improve the design, management and
impact of development programming and service delivery in countries in, or recently
emerging from, conflict. However, the field trip in December 2010, the findings of
which are contained in the pages of this report, was not the first time our students
have visited Sri Lanka. In 1999, and again in 2003, previous MA classes visited Sri
Lanka to study the ongoing effects of continuing civil war and crisis. Over the years,
the PRDU has built a beneficial partnership with the Consortium of Humanitarian
Agencies (CHA) in Sri Lanka and we are all extremely grateful for their efforts in
receiving the students and supporting their research activities both in Colombo and
Batticaloa, not only in 2010 but in previous years. Without their instrumental help on
the ground, the data collection process would have been exceptionally challenging. I
would like to express my sincerest thanks to those who shared their knowledge with
the students or took the time out of their busy schedules to be interviewed. The
students particularly benefited from the kind assistance and support of numerous
PRDU alumni and friends in the country. In particular I would like to thank
Mr. Jeevan Thiagarajah, Mr. Gobinath Ponnuthurai, Mr. Basil Sylvester,
Dr. Vinya Ariyaratne, Ms. Himalee Arunathilake, Ms. Barbara Manzi, and
Mr. Kanishka Ratnapriyafor all their efforts and support.

The following report presents the conclusions and findings of the field study visit. The
high standard of research and analysis undertaken by the students demonstrates the
effort made, and depth of knowledge acquired, while studying the recovery process
in Sri Lanka following both the 2004 tsunami and decades of civil war. Although the
students have focused on four areas of the recovery process, this report
demonstrates considerable insight into the holistic nature of recovery with the
analysis effectively bringing together the multitude of overlapping issues and
linkages required in order to truly understand the complexities of contexts recovering
from crisis. In particular, this report highlights the unique aspects of a society not
only recovering from the multitudinous problems presented by protracted civil war,
but also facing extensive challenges presented by the natural environment.

The field study visit presents a unique opportunity for students to gain firsthand
experience of the practical challenges of conducting research in a post-conflict
environment. In addition, students not only develop a thorough understanding of the
context but also have an opportunity to put into the practice the academic theory
they have been exposed to during their intensive study in York – reflecting the
philosophy of the department to link both theory and practice.

i
Finally, the difficult task of carrying out rigorous field research into the recovery
process in Sri Lanka in such a short period of time would not have been possible
without the efforts and commitment of the PRDU staff that led the trip. Dr. Rajesh
Venugopal and Dr. David Connolly provided their expertise and support to the
students, and they deserve a special note of thanks. Additionally, my thanks go to
the Association for Cultural Exchange who provided vital financial support for the
field trip. The conclusions reached, and level of understanding gained, by the
students is a credit to the insight and hard work of both the students and all those
involved in the field trip. For this, I would like to express my sincerest thanks. This
case study of Sri Lanka presents a number of interesting lessons and
recommendations. With the conflict in Sri Lanka only ending two years ago, there are
still many challenges, as well as significant opportunities, to build a sustainable
peace for all its citizens.

Professor Sultan Barakat

Director Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit

ii
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................... v
Credits ........................................................................................................................vi
Disclaimer ................................................................................................................. vii
Acronyms and Abbreviations .................................................................................... viii
Executive Summary ................................................................................................... 1
Methodology ........................................................................................................... 1
Physical reconstruction and community infrastructure ............................................ 2
Return and Resettlement ........................................................................................ 2
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration .................................................... 3
Social Cohesion ...................................................................................................... 3
Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 4
Background ................................................................................................................ 5
Civil War.................................................................................................................. 5
Conflict and Disaster in the East ............................................................................. 6
Methodology ............................................................................................................... 8
Part I: Physical Reconstruction Needs ..................................................................... 13
Introduction ........................................................................................................... 14
Analysis................................................................................................................. 14
Conclusions and Recommendations ..................................................................... 21
Part II: Return and Resettlement .............................................................................. 23
Introduction ........................................................................................................... 24
Analysis................................................................................................................. 25
Conclusion and Recommendations ...................................................................... 28
Part III: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration ......................................... 30
Introduction ........................................................................................................... 31
Analysis................................................................................................................. 34
Conclusion and Recommendations ...................................................................... 41
Part IV: Social Cohesion .......................................................................................... 43
Introduction ........................................................................................................... 44
Analysis................................................................................................................. 45
Conclusions and Recommendations ..................................................................... 53
Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 55

iii
Appendices .............................................................................................................. 61
Appendix 1: NEHRP house details ....................................................................... 61
Appendix 2: Infrastructure in Sri Lanka ................................................................. 63
Appendix 3: Accessibility after the floods, January 2011 ...................................... 65
Appendix 4: Location of health care facilities ........................................................ 66
Appendix 5: DDR Key Concepts and Definitions .................................................. 67
Appendix 6: Government profiling categories of ex-combatants ........................... 68
Appendix 7: Rehabilitation categories of ex-combatants....................................... 69
Appendix 8: Rehabilitation time-frame .................................................................. 70

Table of Figures
Figure 1: The entrance to Batticaloa .......................................................................... 6
Figure 2: Map of Eastern Sri Lanka ............................................................................ 7
Figure 3: Students interviewing religious leaders ....................................................... 9
Figure 4: Group discussion ...................................................................................... 11
Figure 5: A Caritas EHED well ................................................................................. 15
Figure 6: A Caritas EHED house .............................................................................. 17
Figure 7: A ZOA Refugee Care house ..................................................................... 18
Figure 8: Community reconstruction needs .............................................................. 19
Figure 9: One of the researchers with a group of children........................................ 27
Figure 10: Researchers at PARC ............................................................................. 31
Figure 11: Unique Conditions for Disarmament and Demobilisation in Sri Lanka .... 33
Figure 12: IOM‟s ICRS programme: facilitating reinsertion and providing economic
reintegration opportunities ........................................................................................ 36
Figure 13: Categorisation and detention of suspected ex-combatants ..................... 39
Figure 14: Female Ex-Combatants........................................................................... 41
Figure 15: Question Bias .......................................................................................... 44
Figure 16: Traditional ceremony welcoming PRDU to Batticaloa ............................. 48

iv
Acknowledgements
The students of the MA course would like to thank a number of individuals and
organisations who helped us to organise a very successful field trip.

First, we would like to thank the staff at PRDU, in particular Dr. Rajesh Venugopal
and Dr. David Connolly, who helped us in our preparation prior to the trip and
accompanied us for the whole period. A special thank you goes to Ms. Sally Carter,
invaluable and eternally patient in managing all of the bureaucratic requirements and
practical organisational issues faced.

We wish to extend our sincerest gratitude to the Consortium of Humanitarian

Agencies (CHA), our host organisation in Sri Lanka, which was integral to organising
interesting meetings and lectures with a variety of actors involved in Sri Lanka's
reconstruction and development. Our research would have been impossible without
their help. In particular we would like to thank Mr. Thiagarajah, Executive Director of
CHA, who kindly hosted us in Colombo, and Mr. Gobinath Ponnuthurai for patiently
translating meetings and interviews during field visits in the east of Sri Lanka.

The students would like to especially like to thank the Association for Cultural
Exchange (ACE) for their generous donation towards our field study trip. ACE‟s
financial contribution significantly helped to reduce the cost of the field trip, and we
are sincerely grateful for this kind support.

Furthermore, we would like to thank the numerous people that shared with us their
experiences and opinions. This list includes practitioners working in relief and
development, Government officials and civil servants, and members of the religious
communities. The opportunity to tap into the wealth of knowledge and experience of
such a wide range of people was an invaluable opportunity for us to learn, in depth,
about Sri Lanka.

Particular thanks are extended to the staff of Caritas EHED, ZOA Refugee Care,
Child Fund, Oxfam, Unicef, UN-OCHA and CPN for all their support and for helping
us in our field research and data collection.

Finally, we would like to thank the scores of unnamed people in this report, the
people of Batticaloa city and its surrounding villages, for opening up their homes and
their hearts to us and for sharing their often painful and deeply personal experiences.
They showed great hospitality, patience, dignity and support and without them this
report would not have been possible. A very big thanks goes to each and every one
of you.

v
Credits
Co-Editors in Chief: John Chan and Sarah Wilson

Senior Editors: Ines Röleke, Jeremy Tomlinson,

Simon Boorman, Caroline Rütsch
Creative Directors: Hamzah Zekrya, Parwiz Habib
Photographs and Artwork: Hamzah Zekrya
Executive Summary: Dai Jing
Background: Patrick Keating
Proofreaders: Edmund Addington and Anna Shaw

Physical Reconstruction Needs

Lead Author: John Chan
Research Team Leaders: Nicoletta Antonini and Anna Shaw
Research collaborators: Edmund Addington, Jeremy Tomlinson, Rana Arafat,
Nasir Ebrahimkhal
Return and Resettlement
Lead author: Sisse Budolfsen
Research Team Leader: Sarah Wilson
Research collaborators: Jonathan Bunting-Williams, Tsutomu Date,
Haris Jahangeer, Mahboob Iltaf, Richard Milburn, Caroline Rütsch
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
Lead author: Charlotte Walker
Research Team Leader: Patrick Keating
Research collaborators: Majida Rasul, Ai Beng Yeo, Yuka Shimada,
Tomi Viertokoski, Samiullah Wardak, Hamzah Zekrya
Social Cohesion
Lead authors: Dai Jing and Brigitte Rohwerder
Research Team Leader: Alan Lloyd
Research collaborators: Simon Boorman, Nancy Hamad, Parwiz Habib, Ines Röleke

vi
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed in this report represent the collective finding of a
Masters Programme field visit. As such they are not the official stand-point of the
University of York or the Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU), or
of any of the organisations and individuals listed. Unless expressly stated, this work
represents the opinions of the authors‟ alone, based upon their research and
observations.
All photographs were taken during the field trip by the students of the MA course.

vii
Acronyms and Abbreviations
CHA The Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies

CS Conflict Sensitivity (approach)

DD Disarmament and Demobilisation

DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

FHH Female-headed household

Rehabilitation, Reinsertion, Reintegration and

Four R's
Reconciliation programme

GoSL Government of Sri Lanka

ICG International Crisis Group

ICJ International Commission of Jurists

ICRS Information Counselling and Referral Service

IDP Internally Displaced Person/ People

IGO Intergovernmental Organisation

INGO International Non-governmental Organisation

IOM International Organisation for Migration

Commission on Lessons Learnt and

LLRC
Reconciliation

LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

Ministry of Disaster Management and Human

MoDMHR
Rights

National Framework Proposal for Reintegration of

NAP
Ex-combatants into Civilian Life in Sri Lanka

NEHRP North East Housing Reconstruction Program

NFP National Framework Proposal

viii
 National Framework for Relief, Rehabilitation and
NFRRR
Reconciliation

NGO Non-governmental Organisation

Protective Accommodation and Rehabilitation

PARC
Centre

PRA Participatory Rapid Assessment

PRIU Policy Research and Information Unit

UN United Nations

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF United Nations Children‟s Fund

WFP World Food Programme

ix
Executive Summary
The aim of the MA in Post-war Recovery Studies 10/11 field study visit to Sri Lanka
in December 2010 was to gain first-hand experience of a post-conflict environment
with a specific focus on the Eastern District of Batticaloa. Not only were parts of the
district (mostly the hinterland) occupied by the LTTE and the stage for much of the
fighting during the war, but the Batticaloa area was also one of the areas worst
affected by the 2004 tsunami (Ruwanpura, 2009). Being both a post-conflict and
post-disaster setting, research in the Batticaloa area, as opposed to a different
context or setting, added an additional layer of complexity to the research.
The MA class was divided into four groups, each tasked with conducting research in
one of the following broad categories: (i) physical reconstruction needs, (ii) return
and resettlement, (iii) disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), and (iv)
social cohesion. After the initial literature review carried out in York prior to the field
visit, groups refined the broad categories into the specific research questions:
i. What are the physical reconstruction needs of resettling communities?
ii. Are the human security needs of resettled people being met in a
sustainable way?
iii. How successful has the Sri Lankan approach to DDR been?
iv. What fosters and challenges social cohesion in the Batticaloa District?
This report will present the findings of the field study visit and will be divided into six
sections. The Background will give an overview of the history and current context of
the Batticaloa District. Next, the Methodology will outline the overall research
approach taken, as well as highlight the limitations that arose, and the ethical
considerations that needed to be made. The subsequent four sections will discuss
the findings of each of the four research groups.

Methodology
Given that the post-conflict situation in Sri Lanka is highly complex, a single
approach for research would not have been sufficient. The MA group strived to
incorporate a variety of different research methods and approaches in a
complementary manner and to provide a balance between qualitative and
quantitative data. The main methods used by the students were semi-structured
interviews, unstructured interviews, focus groups, participatory rapid assessments
(PRA) and observation.

Ground conditions in Batticaloa presented many limitations to our research,

especially in terms of time constraints, access and language barriers, which affected
the sample size and spread. It is important to keep these factors in mind when
looking at the findings presented.

1
Physical reconstruction and community infrastructure

The physical reconstruction group endeavoured to evaluate the strengths and

weaknesses in both housing and broader reconstruction initiatives in order to answer
their research question.

In visiting projects implemented by the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and several
NGOs in the Batticaloa district, the group found that significantly different standards
existed. A government funded project, although attempting to foster local
empowerment and employment, was seen to suffer shortcomings due to lack of
resources, local capacities, and long-term engagement. Conversely, projects by
NGOs were generally found to be of higher quality and leading to greater beneficiary
satisfaction. These NGO projects often also considered broader factors such as
tsunami vulnerability and local needs.

Turning to issues beyond housing, the group looked at other concerns relating to the
reconstruction of physical and community infrastructure. First, a lack of
transportation, both to connect local communities and to connect Batticaloa to the
rest of Sri Lanka, is seen to have led to negative impacts on livelihoods, and access
to basic services. Second, the state of other significant infrastructure needs, such as
poorly developed disaster mitigation and tsunami warning measures, challenges
reconstruction in the region. At the same time, some aspects of the reconstruction
process are highlighted as being satisfactory or more than satisfactory, such as
healthcare and religious needs provisions. It is also noted that regional inequalities in
the state of infrastructure could threaten the prospect of lasting peace.

It was concluded that reconstruction efforts should focus on such objectives as

improving transportation, education provision, sustainable livelihoods, integration of
society, and disaster preparedness, as these would serve to enhance the
sustainability of community reconstruction more broadly.

Return and Resettlement

The return and resettlement group sought to investigate whether the human security
needs of formerly displaced people are being met by conducting a number of visits to
villages undergoing reconstruction and holding interviews with NGO staff and
community elites.

A number of challenges to achieving national unity and reconciliation, and therefore

meeting physical and community security needs, were found. While government
rhetoric and national initiatives place emphasis on ethnic reconciliation and
addressing the needs of resettled people, the intended effects have not always been
reflected on the ground. Therefore, some of the root causes of conflict are still
present in society, which may limit the potential for sustainable peace. Additional
complications arise considering that those who have returned remain extremely
vulnerable, and, among other impacts, this increases strains placed on their
psychological health.

2
Research showed that neither short nor long term needs have been fully addressed
in a sustainable manner. The resettled communities that were included in the study
still depend on outside aid to survive, despite many having begun to return as early
as 2007. Many communities are also impeded by fear and domestic problems which
prevent a return to normalcy. There is also insufficient emphasis on psycho-social
healing within the affected population, particularly with respect to families of people
still missing.

In summary, resettled populations feel that their human security needs are not being
met sufficiently. A focus on the long-term needs of the resettled is required, achieved
by self-empowerment initiatives and inclusion in reconstruction efforts. Furthermore,
there must be a collaborative effort to build livelihoods to facilitate a shift away from
dependency on outside aid.

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

The group focused on evaluating whether the Rehabilitation, Reinsertion,
Reintegration, and Reconciliation (Four R‟s) programme has achieved its intended
goals: to safeguard the human rights of affected populations; to contribute towards
sustainable peace, reconciliation, and social cohesion; and to increase the
employability as well as minimize socio-economic marginalization of ex-combatants.

It is felt that the third goal is where the programmes have had most success.
Vocational training provided at and following release from Government rehabilitation
centres have improved the employment prospects for many ex-combatants. That
said, there are still some areas for improvement in terms of post-reinsertion
monitoring: the reach of the IOM programme, suitability of training received, and
efforts to minimize socio-economic marginalization. The general lack of economic
investment and development in the north and east of Sri Lanka also limits job
opportunities.

It was found that, in terms of fostering reconciliation and social cohesion, the
problem was not between ex-combatants and their host communities, but was rather
a wider issue between the different ethnic groups in Sri Lanka. The prioritisation of
security and lack of transparency in the Four R‟s programme have been
counterproductive to this goal. While the GoSL has started some reconciliation
initiatives, they are not fully integrated with the Four R‟s programme.

In conclusion, reintegration efforts need to be complemented by wider political

reform to promote inclusivity and a feeling of ownership at the national level on the
part of all groups. Development needs to be carried out more quickly in the north and
east, and the wrongs of the past have to be addressed so people can move on.
Specific to the Four R‟s process, greater transparency and protection of human
rights needs to be achieved.

Social Cohesion
This group looked at what fostered or challenged social cohesion in Batticaloa to
gauge the potential for reconciliation and sustainable peace. To gather more
reflective results, they looked at both measurable indicators relating to provision of

3
infrastructure and services as well as qualitative indicators based around community
and family relations.

In terms of infrastructure and services, differences between access to services,

infrastructure and opportunities between rural and urban populations was stark,
contributing towards social jealousies.

Material assistance and investment, especially if it comes from the state, can
improve quality of life and give feelings of inclusion crucial for social cohesion. A risk
involved in such actions is that perceptions of unequal community treatment can
exacerbate social jealousies. Furthermore, a lack of coordination between NGOs
and the GoSL has created barriers to some initiatives.

The lack of a united Sri Lankan identity is one of the main impediments to social
cohesion. Similarly, unequal political representation of different ethnicities, negative
family dynamics, trauma and insecurity all can prevent social cohesion. In general,
whilst it was found that the environment on the ground was conducive to social
cohesion, there were still more challenges than fostering conditions for social
cohesion.

Conclusion
This research has identified a number of key issues and underlying trends that linked
the work of the four groups. On-going ethnic tensions at the community level and a
lack of unanimous Sri Lankan identity remain major challenges to sustainable peace
since many Tamil citizens continue to feel marginalized. Development and
investment in Sri Lanka have not been evenly distributed, and there are stark
differences between the infrastructure and services available in the north and east of
the country, where the war was mostly fought, and the rest of the country. The
inequality in physical infrastructure is compounded by the fact that the areas which
are lagging behind are majority Tamil areas. Furthermore, transportation networks
need to be prioritised to integrate the north and east into the rest of Sri Lanka both
for economic and socio-political reasons. Livelihood opportunities in the east are
scarce, and transport, development and investment can all contribute to addressing
this problem, but only if Tamil society is included in the reconstruction efforts. The
potential for Sri Lanka is enormous, providing socio-political scars are not allowed to
go unhealed.

4
Background
Civil War
In May 2009 the 26 year long civil war in Sri Lanka ended with the government
defeat of the rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The war resulted in the
deaths of more than 100,000 people and the displacement of hundreds of thousands
more. As well as causing massive physical destruction, the war left the northern and
eastern provinces underdeveloped in comparison with areas the government had
controlled consistently throughout the conflict. The manner in which the government
ended the war has also leaded to the deterioration of relations between the
government and much of the international community.

Since independence in 1948, the majority Sinhalese population had steadily

marginalised the minority Tamil population, in political, economic and cultural terms.
Inequality of opportunity and minority rights served to encourage the formation of
Tamil political groups and led to demands for their own independent state in the
majority Tamil speaking areas of the northern and eastern provinces, which finally
erupted into a violent conflict along ethnic lines in 1983. Initially the conflict saw the
birth of numerous Tamil militant groups all vying for power amongst the population
whilst fighting the government. Over the course of the first ten years of fighting the
Tamil factions were slowly absorbed into the LTTE which rapidly became the
dominant force within the Tamil community; from the late 1980s onwards the conflict
was primarily between the LTTE and the government. The war would draw in India,
whose support initially see-sawed between the rebels and the government, before
sponsoring negotiations and sending a large peacekeeping force to the north of the
country in 1987. This force left in 1990 after which the LTTE managed to steadily
gain ground as the fighting ebbed and flowed. By the time a ceasefire was declared
in 2002 the LTTE had gained control of much of the north and east of the country.
However, when relations between the two sides broke down in 2005 the government
launched major offensives and made steady progress; the LTTE were driven out of
the east in 2007 and the north by 2009. The war ended on the beaches of Mullativu
in north-east Sri Lanka in May 2009. The final days were characterised by major
international accusations that both sides, but primarily that the government, had
committed atrocities and war crimes against their opponents and Tamil civilians.

The LTTE admitted defeat on 17 May 2009, but the effects of the conflict remain. In
the final months of the war approximately 300,000 Tamils fled the fighting in the
north and were temporarily housed in camps in central Sri Lanka. This added to the
existing problem of internally displaced people during the conflict. Additionally, many
families were being displaced for the second or even third time. The Sri Lankan
government also had to deal with large numbers of former LTTE cadres who had
surrendered or been captured during the final phases of the war. This humanitarian
crisis occurred against the backdrop of northern and eastern provinces crippled by
fighting, a significant number of land mines, a devastated economy and a lack of
physical infrastructure. The resettlement and reconstruction effort continues today
(Venugopal 2009, Venugopal Lecture 2010).

5
Conflict and Disaster in the East
LTTE-held enclaves in the Eastern province, in which the Batticaloa district is
located, were recaptured by government forces in 2007, when the government
regained full control of the East. Its population has therefore been resettled for longer
that those displaced in the north; and the reconstruction effort is also far more
advanced. However, there are a number of specific factors in the east which have
influenced the recovery. First, there was a split in the LTTE in 2005 which saw their
Eastern Commander, Colonel Karuna, rebel, claiming that insufficient power was
being given to the Tamils in the east. This rift in the LTTE led to widespread
animosity and eventually the 'Karuna faction' allied itself with the government and
formed a political party. As a result of this split many fighters in the east did not
surrender and have not been taken into the official government DDR programme
because their leadership argued it was unnecessary. They therefore remain in a
state of limbo with some ex-combatants absorbed into NGO programmes while
others have resorted to crime (Janich Interview, 2010).

Figure 1: The entrance to Batticaloa

In addition to the difficulties posed by post-conflict recovery and development, the
Eastern province was devastated by the 2004 tsunami. More than 7,000 people were
killed in the eastern district of which 1,200 were in Batticaloa. Large swathes of
agricultural land were also ruined as well as homes and infrastructure. The
international relief effort was vast and in some parts of the east, post-tsunami
projects are still ongoing. Many post-war recovery programmes are therefore closely
tied with those of other agencies dealing with the tsunami‟s aftermath creating
additional challenges in coordinating projects (Venugopal lecture, 2010).

6
Figure 2: Map of Eastern Sri Lanka

7
Methodology
The challenges posed to research in conflict in comparison with research carried out
elsewhere are detailed by Barakat et al (2002). They recommend a „composite
approach‟, which “utilizes and combines different methodological strengths” (Barakat
et al, 2002:1001) and which involves a triangulation of sources and methods to
overcome the omissions that a single approach might leave. The complex post-war,
post-disaster situation found in the Batticaloa District of Sri Lanka serves to justify
our use of this approach.
Fundamental to researching conflict affected areas is the necessity to establish good
background knowledge of the context in which the work will be carried out. As such,
the MA group conducted a literature review before leaving the UK, relating both to
understanding the general picture of the conflict in Sri Lanka as well as the specific
domains of the individual groups. By conducting a desktop review before beginning
the field visit, the researcher becomes more equipped to narrow down the field of
research and thus limit potentially precarious exposure in-country (Barakat et al,
2002).

First hand data is more credible than reports from secondary sources and gives
more contextual breadth and depth. During the field visits reconstruction efforts
were viewed and assessed first hand, and communities directly consulted. The field
study visit consisted of twelve days in Sri Lanka hosted by The Consortium of
Humanitarian Agencies (CHA). At the start and end of the visit, several days were
occupied with lectures from NGO personnel, military commanders and community
leaders: a variety of stakeholders contributed to the research. Several more days
were absorbed in travel and presentations, meaning that the research groups were
limited to three full days in the field to conduct their research. This placed great
constraints on the amount of ground that could be physically covered and the volume
of data that could be gathered. However, in this short time stakeholders engaged in
valuable dialogue with the research groups and provided informative guided visits to
reconstruction projects.

The context in which we were working, the time we had, and the topics we were
researching made the collection of qualitative data more suitable than trying to
collect quantitative data. According to Denzin and Lincoln (1994:2):

“Qualitative research is multi-method in focus, involving an interpretive,

naturalistic approach to its subject matter. This means that qualitative
researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense
of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meaning people bring to them.”

Had a quantitative research design been chosen, it would have been hampered by
the small sample sizes which could be accessed in the allotted time and therefore
would not have provided us with such a rich and in-depth data set. It was also
apparent that the field study visit required flexibility to be built into the research
design to account for unforeseen variables and constraints. Additionally, the
methodological breadth and flexibility of composite data collection in qualitative
research allowed the research groups to triangulate data and have greater
confidence in their findings. The methods of data collection used are outlined below.

8
Semi structured interviews

One of the primary modes of data collection undertaken was semi-structured

interviews. These were largely employed when dealing with elites and key
stakeholders such as government officials, intergovernmental organisation (IGO)
workers, NGO workers, and religious and community leaders. This research method
allowed great depth and detail of information to be gained. The flexible and dynamic
nature of this form of interview allows the researcher to follow up on the answers to
questions during the course of a single interview (Kvale, 1996). These can often lead
to previously unconsidered issues being highlighted, offering the opportunity to
explore the topics in more detail (King et al, 1987). When a variety of actors are
interviewed, it is possible to gain a very broad and diverse range of perspectives on
a set theme. However, this approach is time-consuming and can be costly, which
can limit the number of interviews which researchers are able to conduct.

Figure 3: Students interviewing religious leaders

Unstructured interviews

The unstructured interview can be seen as an extension of the semi-structured

interview. This approach was employed when the semi-structured interview either
was not suitable or adequately prepared. Some interviewees represented
stakeholders in arenas not directly associated with the central research question.
Furthermore, there were occasions when it was appropriate to assign a researcher
to sit in on another group‟s interview and glean additional data as it presented itself.
Interviewing subjects on what may, to them, appear unrelated or irrelevant topics
would not have been constructive, and the unstructured approach enabled the group
to amass good contextual data. Valuable information was also gained through
general conversations with people which occurred on an ad hoc basis and had no
set structure to them. While a lot of the information received might be irrelevant or
off-topic because there is no clear link to the research area, it was a useful way of
finding out what people considered important enough to bring up themselves.

9
Focus groups

This type of data gathering was largely employed for seeking community
perspectives. Focus groups involve a guided discussion with a small group of
individuals giving their perspectives on a certain theme. We found the composition of
focus groups to be extremely important, with this method being particularly useful for
working with vulnerable individuals, when they were in a group in which they felt
comfortable and able to talk.1 The advantage of this method of data collection
includes access to a large sample and the likelihood that responses gained are more
representative of a population or community.

Additionally, consensus may be reached on topics, atypical opinions can be

identified, sensitive topics are quickly made apparent by the behaviour of the group,
and the general stimulus of a focus group can help provoke animated responses
(Morton-Williams, 1988). However, focus groups which were too diverse in their
composition would have yielded little information. We tried to mitigate this risk by
conducting many focus groups with individuals from different sectors of Sri Lankan
society. A further drawback to focus groups as an approach is that they can present
a biased opinion if some respondents are influenced by the viewpoints of others,
potentially leading to respondents not giving answers wholly reflective of their own
views.

Participatory Rapid Assessment (PRA)

PRA was employed as a method to include the beneficiaries themselves in the

research. This method of data collection broadens the scope of traditional focus
groups with participatory exercises, such as ranking and scoring activities, and the
construction and drawing of maps, for participants to work together on as a group.
This has the benefit of directly engaging the respondents in the research, and may
highlight new areas of interest to the researcher, or clarify prior knowledge or
findings.

Observation

Observation was an essential research method for all of the groups. Even to the
untrained eye, damaged roads and bridges, dilapidated schools or hospitals, and
poor drainage are immediately apparent. Challenges posed to the researchers in the
field, such as non-existent mobile phone coverage or transportation difficulties, also
provide the observer with key data when assessing infrastructural provision and
needs. In addition, observation played an important role in interviews as body
language and facial expressions could help the researcher gain a deeper
understanding of the emotional implications of the line of questioning and tailor or
truncate the semi-structured interview accordingly. Observation - simply „being there‟
- was an indispensable part of the research methodology.

1
For example, a group of ex-combatants undergoing rehabilitation together sharing their
experiences.

10
Constraints

In addition to the challenges relating to the specific data gathering techniques

explored above, there are a number of problems which are shared by all research
techniques employed, namely those concerning access, sampling, generalisation,
bias, and ethical issues (Barakat et al, 2002).

Figure 4: Group discussion

Time: As Barakat et al (2002:993) highlight, “time constraints often do not allow for
the exhaustive gathering of quantitative and qualitative information which might …
[lead] to a more penetrating and complete understanding of the situation”. With such
a large group of people on the field research trip we were still able to gain useful
information, even if more time would have further enhanced our research. Moreover,
the time constraints meant that we were unable to build trusting relationships with
respondents and had to rely heavily on gate-keepers. The potential existed that
participants may have been reluctant to share views reflecting negatively on gate-
keeper agencies, and that they may have given more favourable responses than
were their honest opinion.
Access: This was an issue due to the time we had, language barriers, the fact that
most of the trip had been organized for us, as well as security and transport
considerations on the ground. There were a number of instances where, for
example, we were not allowed through a roadblock, or an organization felt it would
not be appropriate for us to visit the people they were working with for reasons of
security.
Language: As no members of the MA class speak Tamil or Sinhalese, and few
people we met with spoke English, we had to rely heavily on interpreters. We cannot
be completely sure that our questions were conveyed as intended, or that the
respondents‟ answers were transmitted with the meaning they intended.
Respondents‟ perceptions of the interpreters may have influenced their answers,
being more or less open depending on their perception of the interpreter, and not just
based on how they felt about our presence as researchers. With this in mind, we
asked the interpreters we worked with to explain a little about themselves in order to,
hopefully, put interviewees at ease.
Sampling: Due to time, access, language, as well as lack of up-to-date census
information and the organised nature of the field trip, sampling was problematic. This
was partially overcome by utilising the wide variety of contacts we had and carrying

11
out as much research with as large a number of people as possible. From our initial
contacts we were able to snowball our sample to include other relevant sources. As
our initial group of contacts was large and varied our follow-on sample groups were
relatively diverse.
Ethical considerations and research bias: Ethical considerations were at the heart of
our approach. Questions relating to people‟s needs are sensitive as they relate to
human dignity and how to make sense of one's self and one‟s identity. Therefore, a
Conflict Sensitivity (CS) approach is essential when doing research in post-conflict
settings, as emphasis is placed upon understanding the context that is being
explored. Furthermore, CS attempts to appreciate how the researcher, as an
„outsider‟, might influence the meeting between interviewer and interviewee (CHA,
2009).
During the research process we quickly became aware of the importance of finding a
balance between attaining the information desired, whilst ensuring that this did not
cause unnecessary distress for the participants involved. The traumatic effect of
almost thirty years of war has left much of Sri Lankan society, including a great many
people we interviewed, in an extremely fragile psychological state, and it was
deemed fundamentally important not to prioritise our research over the participants‟
psychological wellbeing. An acute awareness of the particular dangers of
researching in post-conflict societies was also central to ensuring the group „did no
additional harm‟, and did not compromise the safety, security and emotional
wellbeing of those interviewed (Barakat et al, 2002).
An additional ethical and bias issue can arise from what Barakat et al (2002)
describe as: the respondents being motivated by their perceptions of what the
researcher is looking for; by their mistrust in the goals of the research; or by their
desire to use the research for their own purposes. It is because of this potential that
researchers from the MA group strived to convey a clear understanding of why they
were conducting research to the participants, making clear that no additional aid or
assistance would result, and that anonymity would be protected.
It is important to note that a certain bias necessarily comes from the MA group itself.
A lack of detailed knowledge and understanding of Sri Lankan society, coupled with
the group‟s collective identity, may have led to information being misinterpreted a
tendency to view the situation in Sri Lanka through an overly „western‟ lens.
Mitigation strategies for biases such as those listed above included, but were not
limited to: interviewing as many individuals and groups with potentially differing
viewpoints as possible; emphasising our neutrality and the reasons for our research
to all respondents; liaising with our translators to emphasise their need to fully
translate all that was said by respondents; and finally, acknowledging the potential
biases of our respondents, any statistical information which we obtained, and our
own biases. In this way we hoped to gain as full a picture as possible of the complex
realities occurring in Sri Lanka.

12
Part I: Physical
Reconstruction
Needs
(Lead author: John Chan)

13
Introduction

The aim of this report is to present a comprehensive review of the field study visit to
Sri Lanka in December 2010. The brief was „to reflect one‟s understanding and
critique regarding physical reconstruction and community infrastructure on the
reconstruction and recovery process in Sri Lanka‟, and the site selected for the
study, the district of Batticaloa. This required a thorough understanding of the
research topic with seven team members contributing to research both in the
planning stages and the field.
The research topic was very broad and time limited, so a practical research question
that could be adequately addressed in challenging field conditions was selected. The
research question identified was:

‘What are the physical reconstruction needs of resettling communities?’

The research question necessitates that the totality of physical and community
infrastructural frameworks be researched and studied in the recovery context.
Narrowing the scope of the question enabled the team to prioritise and focus its
research on those infrastructural needs which were most keenly expressed. It was
important to identify which communities would be studied as Batticaloa was not
being rebuilt from scratch, and the lower income rural population have been
disproportionately affected by conflict and disaster. The use of the term „resettling‟
rather than „resettled‟ emphasised that the recovery process was ongoing and the
needs of beneficiaries who were already housed still needed to be addressed. The
research question took into account that the limited reach and progress of the
infrastructure reconstruction process was clearly apparent in advance of the field trip,
given the scale of redevelopment required. As such, the perceived deficits or
oversights in completed projects needed to be reported.

Housing was selected as the central infrastructural research theme. This section of
the report attempts to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses in the housing and
broader reconstruction initiatives, and to highlight recommendations to address key
areas of the findings.

Analysis
Housing Needs
The housing reconstruction projects visited were implemented by either the GoSL or
NGOs (Caritas EHED and ZOA Refugee Care). Each has a different agenda,
budget, strategy and method of implementation. The North East Housing
Reconstruction Program (NEHRP) houses, built by the Ministry of Economic
Development were cheaper (325,000 Rs each), and were consistently of a lower
standard in terms of construction design and quality. Many of the NEHRP houses
visited in the field were not completed.

14
The Aayithiyamalai Housing Project had a combination of NEHRP and Caritas EHED
houses built to re-house war-affected households, and the contrast between the two
types of house was stark, both visibly and according to feedback supplied by
beneficiaries.

Figure 5: A Caritas EHED well

NEHRP beneficiaries were very pleased to have been housed, reporting that the
structures they inhabited were an immeasurable improvement compared to the
simple hut or the IDP camp tent or shelter they had occupied prior to re-housing.
When asked why houses were not completed several years after resettlement,
beneficiaries highlighted that the government would release funding for housing in
four stages, with each lump sum allocated as follows:

1. Foundations: 50,000 Rs

2. Superstructure: 75,000 Rs

3. Roof: 100,000 Rs

4. Plastering: 70,000 Rs + Additional features: 30,000 Rs2

Funds for the foundations and the superstructure were paid directly to the
beneficiary, who would then manage the construction of their property. This raised
issues of capacity and budgeting and it was frequently communicated that the
payments would either have been absorbed by daily household expenditures, or
would not have been sufficient to complete the structure in the first instance. Those
NEHRP beneficiaries who did manage to complete their houses reported that they
would have to fund a shortfall of 50,000 Rs themselves. NEHRP houses were
observed to be simple shells in some cases, consisting of three very simple rooms –
a bedroom, a kitchen and a living space, with no bathroom or toilet facilities. The list

2
Field visit to NEHRP project, 10.12.2010

15
of needs highlighted by occupants was disappointing – electricity, water and
sanitation deficiencies, and maintenance issues due to leaks.

The rationale behind assigning construction to untrained or unskilled beneficiaries

seemed illogical. However, according to the head of the Chamber of Commerce in
Batticaloa, putting beneficiaries in charge of construction was seen as providing
employment opportunities to the local communities.3 This notion stems from prior
housing programmes such as the One-Million-Houses Programme in 1985 with
Sheng (1988) proposing delegation to communities in housing construction. In some
cases this proved relatively successful with completed NEHRP houses appearing
pleasant and fit for purpose. But there can be no doubt that a significant proportion of
structures were substandard and potentially unsustainable without urgent
maintenance.

For example, depending on one‟s interpretation, an absent toilet can be seen to fall
short of Sphere (2011) guidelines which stipulate that “water and sanitation
services… are available or can be satisfactorily provided.” Despite these failings,
feedback was generally positive. However, due to their simplified design, poorer
quality building materials, and incomplete construction, government houses left
beneficiaries with greater needs than those housed by NGOs. See Appendix 1 for
NEHRP project details.

NGO housing projects visited included the Caritas EHED re-housing projects at
Mylampaveli for tsunami-displaced beneficiaries and at Aayithiyamalai for those
displaced by conflict, and the ZOA Refugee Care project in Maruthanager for those
displaced by the tsunami. All were located well outside the „buffer zone‟, a strip of
coastal land 200m wide left undeveloped, to reduce the risk of future tsunami
damage. Houses provided by NGOs were visibly larger, better constructed, and
equipped with better amenities.

The Caritas EHED housing project at Aayithiyamalai featured attractive houses

costing 850,000 Rs each, substantially more than the NEHRP properties. Each had
a kitchen, its own toilet and water well, and was well built, comfortable and spacious.
According to Caritas EHED, beneficiaries here were chosen according to acute
need. The first house that the research group was shown, housed a family of five,
including three handicapped children. A more spontaneous visit revealed a less
needy family, suggesting the first scenario presented was perhaps not typical. The
condition of the property and beneficiary feedback was, however, broadly the same.
Beneficiaries were very pleased with their house and listed no significant needs
directly related to shelter, only broader social needs, reflecting the relative success
of the project.

3
Interview with Chairman of the Batticaloa Chamber of Commerce, 12.10.2010

16
 Figure 6: A Caritas EHED house
The Caritas EHED housing project at Mylampaveli was less impressive, however the
properties were still clearly superior to the NEHRP houses seen. Houses at this site
cost 450,000 Rs, but some had not been fully completed due to funding constraints.
For example, in one house only one room was plastered and the roof was not
sealed, leading to leakages. Houses did have a robust and effective rainwater
collection tank which catered to the family‟s needs, as well as a toilet and small
kitchen. Caritas EHED also provided small smokeless wood burning stoves to the
beneficiary households. Feedback was, once again, broadly positive. One family
referred to their house as “a big gift.” The only major negative points raised included
expenses incurred for the maintenance of the properties which had not been
completed.

Initially, ZOA Refugee Care were due to take the research team to two sites,
however, it was not possible to access one of the areas due to security restrictions.
This meant ZOA Refugee Care was not able to show its preferred houses, which
may have been advantageous from a research perspective as donors often wish to
showcase their most successful projects. ZOA Refugee Care's houses at
Maruthanager cost 500,000 Rs each. Close inspection revealed adequate
construction, but with notable maintenance issues. The feedback from beneficiaries
was similar to the other sites visited: all were pleased to have their own home and it
catered to their basic needs. Significantly though, in this case some suggested that
maintaining the house in this condition was beyond their financial means, raising
questions about the sustainability of the project.

Additionally, at this site the interplay between government, NGO and beneficiaries
was discovered to be complicated. Qualitative data obtained through a PRA within
the community demonstrated that although NGOs were seen to have delivered more
than the GoSL, neither were held in particularly high esteem nor very well trusted.
The GoSL was severely criticised and ranked bottom in the survey presented. Some

17
residual animosity remains and post-war initiatives by the government have not yet
borne socio-political fruit. Ramsbotham (2009) identified that the government sector
is key as social and economic grievances are expressed in political form and
communities may unite to challenge state legitimacy. Success in its housing projects
might help lessen political resistance to the government, however there is no
evidence that this has yet occurred.

Figure 7: A ZOA Refugee Care house

Additional Reconstruction Needs

Although the data of primary interest was that which measured the effectiveness of
housing projects, consultation with the beneficiaries was broadened beyond this
topic. This was undertaken by considering how the reconstruction effort of wider
physical and community infrastructure would address community needs in the district
of Batticaloa. One factor consistently emphasised by interviewees was the lack of
public transportation. As shown by Figure 8 below, beneficiaries did not rate
transportation as their most pressing need but, when questioned, did state it was
completely inadequate. Transportation connects them to their livelihoods, hospitals,
and schools, and without it other infrastructural developments may be less effective,
leaving beneficiaries isolated in their communities.

One encouraging transportation initiative was observed in the Batticaloa city centre.
A central bus station was under construction with 65 million Rs of NGO funding
which will serve as a public transport hub for the district. However, public transport
seemed absent with only one bus (empty and parked) ever being observed in the
course of the whole study, and only tuk-tuks providing any form of public transport
(referred to as „expensive‟ by beneficiaries).

18
 Frequency of occurence in interviews
25

20

Beneficiary
15
prioritization of
needs
10 Beneficiaries
suggested lack
of needs
5
Total mention of
needs
0
Housing Healthcare facilities Sanitation
Education facilities Transportation Water and drainage
Community reconstruction needs

Figure 8: Community reconstruction needs

Roads were observed to be in a moderate condition in the city centre and areas held
by the Sri Lankan government during the war, but would visibly deteriorate once the
„border‟ into former LTTE-held territory was crossed. It was plainly evident that little
had been done to upgrade the roads in the short period since the war ended. This
presents a significant problem as the success of housing projects and the
reintegration of formerly disaffected outlying Tamil communities into the city and the
country as a whole depends upon good roads and transportation being established.
Although not highlighted in our interview data, research revealed only a single track
railway line running infrequent services. The fact that this was not highlighted further
emphasises that communities need the most fundamental infrastructure to be
completed first. Without even basic hotels tourism is negligible and tourism-based
reconstruction (Gunewardena, 2008b) clearly impractical. General infrastructure data
for Sri Lanka is shown in Appendix 2.

During the field study visit, only the simplest fishing vessels were observed. This
was deemed surprising in a region dominated by the sea and a large inland lagoon.
It was unclear if this was due to the devastation of the tsunami or whether this
infrastructure had never been more developed. However, the loss of livelihoods for
fishing communities and their relocation inland away from employment opportunities
or community infrastructure further emphasised the need for public transportation to
be developed. Historically, Batticaloa has experienced several major water-related
natural disasters, such as the 1978 tropical cyclone, the 2004 tsunami, and
devastating floods in December 2010/ January 2011 immediately following our field
study visit (see Appendix 3 for how the 2011 floods restricted mobility). Irrigation
channels for flooding were under construction, but poor drainage even in dry periods
meant stagnant, polluted water was observed throughout the city. Sustainable

19
development will require that disasters are minimised and that proper drainage and
strong flood defences are built and well maintained.

“We cannot get the images of the tsunami out of our minds.”4

With Batticaloa so dangerously exposed to the threat of a tsunami, a need for

disaster preparedness is obvious. However, five years since the 2004 disaster there
is no evidence of a tsunami warning system, evacuation route or assembly point.
The last tsunami destroyed ports and shipping vessels along virtually the entire Sri
Lankan coast, as well as fishing infrastructure. Not only does the loss of the fisheries
have an adverse effect on local livelihoods, coastal access is of key importance to
national economies (Collier, 2007). An island that loses marine infrastructure can
become effectively „landlocked‟ and unable to trade, an effect exacerbated by the
fact that Sri Lanka has no land border crossings with other states. Beneficiaries were
also deeply affected by the tsunami both materially and psychologically and the need
for the reconstruction effort to protect communities from another similar catastrophe
cannot be overstated.

Health care was highlighted as very important, and all beneficiaries reported that
clinics were situated within reasonable proximity of their abodes (see Appendix 4 for
distribution of heath centres). Clinics were often described as adequate for treating
simple ailments, but were not sufficiently equipped in the case of a medical
emergency. Educational needs were of paramount importance both to beneficiaries
and the government and, transportation issues aside, appear to have been met by
strong investment and commitment. Religious needs appeared to be of low priority
given that many beneficiaries were leading a hand-to-mouth existence, however, the
Catholic Church and other faiths were involved not only in reconciliation efforts but
also in community projects which are accompanying the reconstruction process.

Father Harry Miller of the Catholic Church has been in Batticaloa almost
continuously since 1948 and was able to offer a holistic overview that contextualises
the entire recovery process in the area. He stated that physical reconstruction was
central to rebuilding not just damaged national assets but society, a view supported
by Venugopal (2009). Father Miller stated that significant divisions remained
between the Sinhalese and Tamil communities, and the rebuilding of Tamil areas
would be central to any lasting peace. The Church is experienced at covering some
of the shortfalls of the government.

4
Beneficiary comment, 10.12.2010

20
According to Gunewardena (2008a:14):

“... restoring social coherence is inextricably intertwined with recovering

sustainable livelihoods. While displacement and dispossession are common
in disaster contexts, the disruption of informal social support networks and
mechanisms compound the loss of livelihoods.”

Schuller (2008:18) also sounds a warning stating that “anthropologists and other
disaster researchers have long pointed out that disaster events can trigger profound
social change.” The reconstruction process itself often demands another set of
questions to address the problem of “the disaster after the disaster.” A local religious
leader warned that vested interests in the reconstruction effort continue to
marginalise the local Tamils.

“... Why are the government bringing in Chinese companies to build roads?
We have engineers and companies here, but the government won‟t invest in
the local Tamil people because the government want control.” 5

Conclusions and Recommendations

Despite a number of limitations, qualitative research methods were effective in
studying the physical reconstruction needs of resettling communities in Batticaloa.
Research found that re-housing those displaced by war or the tsunami was of
importance to communities, to NGOs, and to the GoSL.
Communities expressed broad satisfaction in having been housed in either NEHRP
or NGO houses. However, NGO housing projects resulted in better constructions
and fewer outstanding community needs. Many NEHRP houses were incomplete
and substandard as beneficiaries do not always have the capacity or the fiscal
freedom to effectively implement the government‟s housing initiatives.

NGO projects also have their own failings. Some of the projects suffered from
reduced funding which also resulted in the constructions not having been completed,
albeit to a much lesser extent. However, even relatively minor omissions in
construction could lead to maintenance expenses that beneficiaries could not afford.

It was also found that communities need reconstruction efforts to be focussed on the
transportation network so that beneficiaries can maintain livelihoods which could
help to lift them out of poverty. Likewise, transportation needs to be provided so the
young can reach school reliably. Without the opportunities which education and
sustainable livelihoods provide, a generation of Tamils may grow up even more
disaffected than those generations who previously went to war. Numerous sources
also stress the importance of seizing the current opportunity to integrate traditionally

5
Interview with local religious leaders, 12.12.2010

21
disadvantaged communities into the country and better address essential needs.
Therefore, the physical reconstruction must immediately deliver on this front.

Beyond connecting communities within Batticaloa, the city must be better connected
to the rest of the country. The central bus station should offer long distance buses to
the rest of the country, the railway service can be upgraded and the airport
developed to offer commercial flights. Once Batticaloa connects with the rest of Sri
Lanka it will enjoy greater trade opportunities, capital flow and economic
development.

The issue here once again is integration. Batticaloa is a shattered city administrating
a shattered district. Social cohesion cannot be brought about if communities and
ethnicities are physically separated from one another, or if the isolation of
communities leads to impoverishment and political grievance. The physical
reconstruction of Batticaloa must work towards integrating all elements of society.

Lastly, disaster preparedness needs to be pushed forward. Although building flood

defences could be extremely expensive given the geography of the area,
continuously rebuilding Batticaloa is likely to cost more financially and continue to
cause humanitarian and social strains in the country. Installing a tsunami warning
system should not be expensive and although it might not be able to save the city, it
could save thousands of lives.

In view of the above, this report recommends the following:

 The GoSL and NGOs review their housing projects to ensure they are
better delivered. The government in particular should consider raising
its budget per house and tender construction projects out to local
(preferably Tamil) owned companies;
 Greater alignment between the government and NGOs;
 NGOs divert funds into completing and maintaining existing houses to
ensure that living in their houses remains affordable for beneficiaries;
 The government invests in public transport, the priority being a fleet of
subsidized public buses;
 Reconstruction in former LTTE held areas be accelerated, especially
roads and drainage facilities;
 Batticaloa‟s rail and air services be upgraded; and
 Flood defences and a tsunami warning system should be constructed

22
Part II: Return and
Resettlement
(Lead author: Sisse Budolfsen)

23
Introduction

'Are the human security needs of resettled people being met in a sustainable
way?'
This section of the report explores the post-conflict environment in Sri Lanka with
specific focus on the resettlement of people who were displaced during the 26 year
civil war which ended in May 2009.
Prior to, and throughout the civil war, politics in Sri Lanka had a distinctly ethnic
focus, dividing the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority. These ethnic
divisions were amplified by the fighting. Displacement due to conflict was a
significant characteristic of the war, particularly for the Tamil minority. The final stage
of the war from mid-2008, was, in particular, defined by the mass displacement of
civilians, many of whom, especially in the north, had been living under LTTE rule for
years if not decades.
Of Sri Lanka‟s population of 21.1 million, it is estimated that 1.7 million people were
forcibly displaced one or more times during the conflict (Danish Refugee Council,
2009). According to figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), as of August 2010, 195,000 IDPs from the final stages of the
war have resettled to their places of origin. The resettlement of IDPs will also
continue in the year 2011 (UNHCR, 2011). Unlike a refugee, an IDP has not
crossed an international border in order to seek refuge but remains inside their own
country. As a result, the protection of IDPs legally remains within the remit of the
government of their own country. This fact has important implications on the overall
process of post-war reconciliation and the resettlement taking place in Sri Lanka as
the intense last phase of the war contributed towards the reasons for displacement.
In addition to these human-affected causes of displacement, the December 2004
Indian Ocean tsunami hit the country unexpectedly. The disaster was not only
physically devastating but the cause of further distress, by increasing the number of
IDPs by approximately 550,000 people. As a result, the task of post-conflict
reconstruction faced by the country is made more complex by the increased
displacement, segregation and uncertainty for the future inherent in a post-disaster
context.
It will be argued that the physical war in Sri Lanka is over, but the root causes of
conflict still prevail. These root causes will have to be addressed in order to develop
the right conditions for sustainable peace and reconciliation. Efforts aimed at these
objectives have neither been planned nor exercised by the GoSL, nor are they
currently experienced amongst the Tamil population.
The initial motivation of this research was to understand the experiences of
displacement, return and resettlement of former IDPs in Batticaloa. The people who
this research focuses on have suffered greatly over an extended period of time, and
they are now faced with rebuilding their lives. The predominantly Tamil populated
northern and eastern areas of Sri Lanka are a population who have, on one hand
suffered considerably due to the LTTE‟s misguided sense of representation of its
people, and on the other hand, been disregarded directly and indirectly by a

24
government that has neglected to address a significant root cause of conflict, the
ethnic divide between Tamils and Sinhalese.
A psycho-social approach, one which considers the psychological and social impact
of an event or series of events, will be adopted during this report in order to
understand short-term and long-term needs of the resettled people. Focusing on the
Tamil population that has now resettled in the Batticaloa District following one or
more periods of displacement, this report will look at the process of community
healing and community acceptance of resettled people.

Analysis
National willingness towards unity and reconciliation?
Some of the initiatives by the GoSL, both during and after the war, seemingly hoped
to address the challenges of ethnic division and to help the country towards national
unity and reconciliation. These initiatives include the Commission on Lessons Learnt
and Reconciliation (LLRC) developed in August 2009, and the National Framework
for Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation (NFRRR) developed in July 1999.
According to the NFRRR, the government is committed to maintain a state of stability
for resettled populations and for the Sri Lankan people. As such, up to 50 billion Rs
has been spent since 1987 for “life-saving support” (GoSL, 1999:7). The main
objectives of the national framework are:
1) “to ensure that the basic needs of people affected by conflict are met;
2) to rebuild productive livelihoods; and
3) to facilitate reconciliation across ethnic lines” (GoSL,1999:8).
Furthermore, the very presence of the LLRC in Sri Lanka is to ensure that there will
be no re-emergence of armed conflict, that the very origins of conflict are addressed
and that all measures towards national unity and reconciliation are present.
During a focus group interview in a village in the Batticaloa District where people
have been resettled, the beneficiaries were asked about their opinion of the LLRC. In
response to this question one beneficiary stated, “we don‟t know about this. It is only
on paper.”6 This is an example of how people in the resettled communities have not
felt any direct change resulting from the various commissions. In addition, the
findings suggest that those communities often feel that decisions and initiatives
made at the national level are removed from their own lives.
An alternative perspective on the commission was relayed with reference to missing
persons and the families of those who are missing. Although we did not have direct
access to the families of the missing, interviews were conducted with people who
have worked close to this issue in Batticaloa. According to a local woman:

6
Interview with NGO project beneficiaries, 11.12.2010

25
 “Families of the missing are not really motivated to step forth because the
LTTE has been eradicated, so what can be done? The role of the commission
– in trying to find the persecutors of taking their loved-ones – is important and
needed as nothing is being done.”7
Perhaps this comment suggests that the commission may represent, at least, some
hope for the progress towards national unity and reconciliation.
Within the discourse of government policies and initiatives which take place at the
national level, sincere efforts seem to be present in addressing the needs of the
resettled people and confronting remaining ethnic divisions. However, in practice
progress towards reconciling Tamil and Sinhalese populations remains stagnant.
The coordinator of a local NGO expressed that the government does not trust the
work of local organisations and is suspicious about the work of local NGOs because
of the strong focus on aiding the Tamil population, working to further strengthen their
representation in the country. She stated:
“Local NGOs are not allowed to go to many places because of the
Government Defence Department and the army control. We are not working
independently and we have no freedom to do the work we need to do. It is
very difficult for us to go and ask what are the needs of the people because of
government policy.”8
With respect to the ideas of national unity and reconciliation, emphasis has to be
placed upon a collective effort to rebuild the country. This process must necessarily
include a focus on meeting the needs of those people resettling to their place of
origin, as well as ensuring that all ethnic groups feel a level of ownership in creating
peace. Emphasis must be placed on the latter factor as when the very causes of
conflict are ethnic division and social segregation, a process attempting to create
peace without engagement from all groups in society risks failure.
Sven Gunnar Simonsen (2005), Norwegian analyst and reporter from the
International Peace Research Institute, argues that an institutionalisation of ethnicity
has become a critical hindrance to the mechanisms of peace-building. He suggests
that institutional designs should be more flexible in the inclusion of different ethnic
groups within post-conflict societies and thereby assure representation for the
different ethnicities. What is experienced in the current post-conflict reconstruction
period of Sri Lanka is the exact opposite. With the government dominated by a
Sinhalese majority and regulations that seem to some to ensure difficult for Tamils to
pursue government positions, there is the impression of one-sidedness within an
institution that should represent the whole nation.
Collective vulnerability
Pierre Bordieu (1977), French sociologist and anthropologist, defines collective
vulnerability as a predictive result entailed by an understanding of a collective
identity shared by a group of peoples. Collective vulnerability comes about when this
shared identity or collective understanding of belonging is threatened. Belonging to a
minority which played a pivotal part in the conflict in Sri Lanka, it is likely that Tamils

7
Interview with Batticaloa residents, 9.12.2010
8
Interview with local NGO coordinator, 8.12.2010

26
have cause to feel extremely vulnerable. For example, in an interview with a Tamil
woman who has lived through the entire conflict in Batticaloa, when asked about the
physical and physiological improvements in Batticaloa, she responded:
“Batticaloa has not actually developed much: there is still a lot of vulnerability.
It might take another generation before the Sri Lankans as a whole will be
able to step back and have any self-reflection. It‟s too soon. Even though they
might not approve of the ways of the LTTE, the Tamils realise that they were
their only representative.”9
In this quote she reaffirms the reasoning of Bordieu, that the Tamil population do in
fact seem to have a shared understanding of their identity as a people and thereby
feel a strong sense of vulnerability at this stage. Furthermore, at present it seems
that people in the country, Tamils and Sinhalese alike, are simply too exhausted
from the long civil war and wish only that what peace exists should continue. It can
also be suggested that, given the current status quo, people are unwilling to take the
risks involved in a healing process that could potentially exacerbate tensions
between the two ethnic groups.

Figure 9: One of the researchers with a group of children

Sustainability of short-term/ long-term needs

According to statements made by beneficiaries in the Batticaloa District regarding
their experiences, there remains a strong desire for increased assistance in meeting
their basic human security needs. A focus group conducted with teachers in a local
school in the resettled community of Vammivaddavan revealed that the World Food
Program (WFP) delivers food daily. If they do not deliver food, even on one day,
children often faint as the school is sometimes their only access to food.
During the conflict, if a child was married and pregnant they would not be recruited
by the LTTE. This led to a surge in the number of early marriages for children as
young as 8 years of age. As a direct result of the pressure to marry young to avoid
conscription, a large number of children dropped out of school. A local NGO
coordinator described the population structure of the country as: the older generation
is slowly diminishing, the second generation has been crippled or physically injured
9
Interview with Batticaloa residents, 9.12.2010

27
by the war, and the young generation, the ones to lead the country towards the
future, are simply missing.
In addressing personal and community human security needs, an NGO coordinator
explained that there are a great deal of incidents of domestic abuse taking place in
the resettled communities, often as a result of alcoholic abuse. Due to the lack of
livelihood opportunities there is great frustration experienced within the communities,
particularly among men who are more often the primary providers of the family. As a
result, many seek solace from alcohol, and may become verbally and physically
abusive. The sense of having no control over the situation or what the future will
bring seems to be a recurring phenomenon for victims of war in post-conflict
environments.
According to David Becker, a psychologist focusing on psycho-social issues in post-
conflict environments, trauma is defined as the destruction of individual and
collective structures due to experiences of extreme violence that take place within
social contexts (Becker, 2001). In 1943, Bruno Bettelheim writes about his
experience in a concentration camp as:
“What characterized it most was its inescapability; its uncertain duration, but
potentiality for life; the fact that nothing about it was predictable; that one„s
very life was in jeopardy at every moment and that one could do nothing
about it.” (Bettelheim, 1943:418 (in Becker, 2001:4))
Similarly, when the population in Sri Lanka has experienced the uncertainties of
armed conflict such as not being able to have access to basic needs or not knowing
when the war will end, trauma is an obvious consequence.

Conclusion and Recommendations

In order to draw conclusions from researching resettled communities in the
Batticaloa District, the specific themes discussed in the analysis need to be brought
into focus. A general trend that seemed to occur in all of the settlements where
interviews were conducted is that there remains a sense of dependency on external
aid. One and a half years after the war officially ended, the basic needs of the former
IDPs are fulfilled only in the short term. Many resettled people feel hopeless about
the future and feel that there is little they can actively do to change their situation.
Moreover, the attempt of NGOs and INGOs to create livelihoods through establishing
vocational training centres can be seen as problematic. These training centres may
offer alternative opportunities in the scarce employment environment, however, they
have not been brought about by the people themselves. The livelihoods for which
they are being trained are seldom the livelihood activities that were present before
displacement, such as fishing and farming. There are also sustainability issues with
many of these vocational skills projects, for example, a lack of access to markets to
sell the goods that have been made.
Furthermore, there is scope to improve the way in which the government deals with
issues concerning the post-conflict challenges of the country. Emphasis on inviting
the Tamil population into the processes of relief, rehabilitation and reconciliation are

28
missing, and the government could enhance the ways in which it promotes unity
among the Sri Lankan people. Gaps between theory and practice still remain.
Political reconciliation is a crucial step in the overall reconciliation of the country, and
is essential to addressing the underlying causes of conflict which are still present.
This issue has to be genuinely understood within the government, and a willingness
to confront the existence of ethnic problems is vital. The confined space of civil
society has to be opened up in order to give adequate space for alternative voices
within the country. If there is no such action taken, so that the civil society voices
may be heard, the wider society as a whole will not be able to make positive
progress towards peace and reconciliation.
Therefore, the following recommendations stem from the findings of this report:

 Emphasis has to be placed upon long-term needs of the resettled people;

self-empowerment and inclusion of Tamil population in the processes of
reconstruction will need to be addressed by the actors involved;
 Building livelihoods that will have future benefit for the resettled people need
to be adapted to their needs, and the existing skills of the communities should
be taken into account. This will be up to the local NGOs and INGOs
implementing projects in this area;
 The confined space within which civil society and NGOs are supposed to
operate must be addressed. This will inevitably take time as it involves
changing the structures within society which have been created through
decades of armed conflict. However, these challenges need to be faced now
before new destructive patterns are formed between the ethnic groups; and
 Psycho-social challenges are indeed present in the resettled communities and
need to be given more attention than has been the case so far. There should
be increased focus upon inclusion of the affected communities so that their
opinions and needs are not ignored at the national level. The communities
themselves need to assume a much more prominent role in the reconstruction
and reconciliation processes of the country.

29
 Part III:
Disarmament,
Demobilisation
and Reintegration
(Lead author: Charlotte Walker)

30
Introduction
The vast majority of the DDR process in Sri Lanka has been undertaken by the
government and security forces. This section of the report will focus on these efforts,
drawing on the work of other agencies where appropriate. With regard to the
research question, it was decided that a focus on the economic livelihoods aspect of
DDR would be examined as an integral part of the reintegration of former
combatants. The overarching research question initially decided upon was as
follows:
'How successful has the Sri Lankan approach to DDR been?'
Whilst children were included in the DDR process, their rehabilitation was
undertaken in coordination with the United Nations Children‟s Fund (UNICEF), in a
manner distinct from that of adults. Analysis of such a process would require the
inclusion of further information not possible in this short chapter. Thus, for the
purposes of this report, only the reintegration of adult ex-combatants will be
addressed.

Figure 10: Researchers at PARC

Background
According to UN guidelines, the objectives of DDR processes are to facilitate a
smooth transition from violent conflict to peace time through contributing to security
and stability, key aspects which must be present for recovery and development to
commence.
“The DDR of ex-combatants is a complex process, with political, military,
security, humanitarian and socio economic dimensions. It aims to deal with the
post-conflict security issue that arises when ex-combatants are left without
livelihoods or support networks other than their former comrades, during the
vital transition period from conflict to peace and development.” (UN, 2009)

31
As in other countries which have recently emerged from years of armed conflict, the
process of DDR is a key aspect of recovery for the Sri Lankan government, who are
keen to restore security and stability, and to permanently cast off the history of
violent conflict which has plagued the country for 26 years. As such, the government
has begun a rigorous programme of DDR, as laid out in the Ministry of Disaster
Management and Human Rights (MoDMHR) National Action Plan of the National
Framework Proposal for Reintegration of Ex-combatants into Civilian Life in Sri
Lanka (NAP).10 The document recognises the importance of DDR in the post-war
transition phase, stressing that:
“[A]n effective reintegration process is critical for restoring stability and
security, stemming violence and crime and strengthening the rule of law in
post-conflict contexts. It is also essential for providing viable and sustainable
options in place of violence for adult ex-combatants and children formerly
associated with armed groups and, thereby, transforming them into
productive and active citizens.” (NAP, 2009b:1)
The emphasis, as with DDR programmes elsewhere, is on facilitating the transition
of ex-combatants from mobilised rebel soldiers to civilians.
Despite broad similarities to other DDR projects around the world, the Sri Lankan
case does differ markedly in many ways, not least due to the unique situation in
which it is taking place. In the vast majority, if not all cases, DDR occurs as a result
of ceasefire or peace negotiations, forming part of a broader peace process. It is
normally facilitated and supported by the UN and other external organisations seen
to be more neutral than parties involved with the conflict (UN, 2009). In Sri Lanka
however, the DDR process does not form part of a wider peace process, but has
followed a military victory by the GoSL over the LTTE.
Furthermore, the GoSL is independently undertaking what is essentially the „forced‟
DDR of their former adversaries largely without the involvement of external
agencies.11 An additional manner in which the Sri Lankan DDR process is distinct
from others of its kind is the fact that it essentially does not focus on the
disarmament and demobilisation aspects of DDR, instead focusing on the
reintegration stage. Due to the nature of the military victory, the Disarmament and
Demobilisation aspects (see Appendix 5 for detailed definitions) of DDR largely took
place as combatants surrendered, or were forced to surrender, immediately following
the end of the war, leaving only the final phase to complete (see Figure 11).
The DDR process in Sri Lanka is now focused on the reintegration stage, which the
government has subdivided into four categories, known as 'The Four R's' each with
components focusing on different aspects of reintegration.

10
MoDMHR, 2009b. Hereafter referred to as NAP 2009b.
11
Following the end of the war in 2009, former and suspected LTTE combatants were given a
choice between being detained and tried for suspected crimes in a court of law, or to undergo the
rehabilitation process in PARC facilities (Ranasinghe 2010; Human Rights Watch 2010).

32
 Figure 11: Unique Conditions for Disarmament and Demobilisation in Sri Lanka
The disarmament and demobilisation of ex-combatants following the end of the war in Sri
Lanka, unlike many contemporary 'DD' operations, was undertaken entirely by the Sri Lankan
government, with no involvement of the UN, who often undertake such programmes as part
of peacekeeping and peace building operations (UN, 2009).

Disarmament consisted of weapons being confiscated and either retained or destroyed by the
military (MoDMHR National Framework Proposal for Reintegration of Ex-Combatants into
Civilian Life in Sri Lanka 2009a (NFP):15).

In order to permanently dismantle the military structures of the LTTE, combatants went
through a demobilisation process which involved screening, verification and selection,
whereby the combatants' degree of involvement, “level of radicalisation”, time with rebel
groups and socio-economic profile was assessed (NAP 2009:13, see Appendix 6 for detailed
categories). In addition to those who surrendered, or were forced to surrender, individuals
were also screened for rebel involvement in both IDP camps (ICG, 2010:2), and, apparently,
also whilst in temporary detention centres.

Based on this assessment, the individuals in question were then either; released if it was
ascertained that they were not associated to the LTTE; transferred to the judicial system to
undergo a legal process; or sent to Protective Accommodation and Rehabilitation Centres
(PARCs) to undergo government rehabilitation depending on the perceived severity of their
case (Ranasinghe, 2010).

A total of 11,102 adults (9,078 men and 2,024 women) were placed in PARCs, and 594
children captured were placed in Protective Child Accommodation/ Rehabilitation centres.
Following placement in the PARC facilities, ex-combatants and children were designated to
one of six rehabilitation programmes lasting between 3 and 6 months, according to their
profile (MoDMHR 2009b, see Appendix 7 for detailed categories and time scales).

The Four R's: A context-based programme for reintegration of ex-combatants

into civilian life in Sri Lanka
Rehabilitation
The rehabilitation phase of the Four R's process takes place in PARCs, and is
governed by the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation, Brigadier Sudantha
Ranasinghe. Rehabilitation involves socio-economic profiling, vocational training
(including carpentry, agriculture, plumbing and electrician courses),12 psycho-social
initiatives (including group counselling and language courses in Sinhala and
English), and religious and cultural practices (including meditation). Participation is
compulsory, and rehabilitees are detained in PARC facilities until their rehabilitation
is deemed complete. The programme as a whole is described as:
“A comprehensive programme to address ideological, emotional, social,
religious and cultural needs‟ to transform terrorists into peace loving
civilians.” 13

12
PARC facility observation,08.12.2010
13
Presentation by Brigadier Ranasinghe, Colombo, 7.12.2010

33
Reinsertion
Reinsertion is the short term process whereby ex-combatants move from
rehabilitation centres back into the community. It is essentially a procedure
facilitating the stepping stone between rehabilitation and reintegration. The GoSL
assert that this phase involves pre-release orientation, a reinsertion package
consisting of clothing, utensils, hygiene products and a cash allowance for up to one
year (NAP 2009b).
Reintegration
The reintegration phase of the Four R's process is divided into two categories: social
and economic reintegration. The first aims to foster social cohesion within
communities, and to build good relations between ex-combatants and their host
communities, as well as fostering better relations between ethnic groups. Several
community-based measures to achieve this are proposed.14 Economic reintegration
aims to ensure “economic independence through access to productive livelihoods
and income-generating activities” (NAP 2009b:26-27) which includes the vocational
training given in PARC centres, as well as other initiatives to facilitate employment.
Reconciliation
Reconciliation is the only aspect of the Four R's process which is not specifically
referred to in the NAP framework for reintegration of ex-combatants, so it is unclear
as to the specific plans for this area of focus. However, during our visit to Sri Lanka,
our group was invited to a Government Awareness Raising Programme for Religious
Leaders and Community Leaders in Batticaloa, which Brigadier Ranasinghe
confirmed was part of a larger plan to promote social cohesion and reconciliation.
This involved bringing together local community and religious leaders, explaining the
Four R's process to them, and encouraging them to accept ex-combatants into the
community and provide them with integration support as they left PARC facilities.
During the field study trip, the group was fortunate to be given the opportunity of
having a short, guided visit to one of the PARC rehabilitation facilities, to visit NGOs
working on rehabilitation and reintegration-related issues, and communities hosting
returned ex-combatants. Based on this research and observation, the analysis
section will attempt to assess the success of rehabilitation and social and economic
integration of adult ex-combatants resulting from the aforementioned government
measures.

Analysis
The end of the three decade long armed conflict in Sri Lanka offered a historic
chance for the country to right the wrongs of the past and move forward towards a
peaceful and prosperous future. Our own experiences in Sri Lanka led us to believe
that in spite of differing views on how the war was fought by both sides, and how it
ultimately came to an end, there appears to be a general and pervasive feeling of

14
These include: Community level sensitisation and confidence building programmes,
community-based psychosocial support, civic and human rights, conflict transformation and peace
building. (NAP, 2009b: 25)

34
relief amongst all the country‟s peoples that the violent conflict is finally over. As
noted by the Sri Lankan government itself:
“The end of the war presents the greatest opportunity in nearly thirty years to
consolidate peace, security, reconciliation, national unity, and accelerated
recovery and development.” (NAP, 2009a:ii)
Understanding the aims and objectives of DDR are key to assessing its success.
The UN views the objective of DDR processes as to “contribute to security and
stability in post conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin,”
(UN, 2010:24) whilst the GoSL, in their National Action Plan, expand on these aims
as seen below.
“The goals of the NAP in Sri Lanka are threefold:
a) to safeguard the human rights of adult ex-combatants, children formerly
associated with armed groups, victims and host communities, including the
responsibility to protect and assist them in accordance with the Constitution of
the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the State's international
obligations;
b) to contribute towards sustainable peace, reconciliation and social
cohesion; and
c) to increase the employability of adult ex-combatants and children formerly
associated with armed groups, minimise their risk of socio-economic
marginalisation and create opportunities for economic revitalisation in post
conflict Sri Lanka.” (NAP, 2009b:5)
In order to assess the success of the rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-
combatants, we must therefore examine whether the Four R's process has seized
the historic opportunity presented by the end of the war, and made progress towards
achieving these goals. These goals are clearly inherently interlinked and mutually
reinforcing, and we shall explore them in turn, and in relation to one another, in order
to gain a clearer picture of progress made in the post-war context.
Increasing employability, minimising risks of socio-economic marginalisation
and creating opportunities for economic revitalisation
Increasing employability, minimising risks of socio-economic marginalisation and
creating opportunities for economic revitalisation are goals with strong links to the
rehabilitation and reinsertion stages of the Four R's process. They also appear to be
the area in which government projects have made the most progress (aside from
improving security, as will be shown below). Vocational training conducted in PARCs
and reinsertion programmes carried out in cooperation with the International
Organisation for Migration (IOM) have been particularly positive aspects of the DDR
programme.
For example, whilst lamenting their detention, ex-combatants living within the PARC
facility visited by the group confirmed that they felt some of the vocational training
they had received had given them skills which would be useful for their employment

35
prospects when returning home.15 Similarly, an example which highlights the
progress which can be made when the GoSL and external agencies work together
effectively is the IOM facilitated reinsertion programme referred to as the
Information Counselling and Referral Service (ICRS), which is currently contributing
significant funds to providing support for ex-combatants leaving PARC facilities (see
Figure 12).

Figure 12: IOM’s ICRS programme: facilitating reinsertion and providing economic
reintegration opportunities
IOM, in a rare example of the international community cooperating with the GoSL on DDR, has
set up a multi-donor programme designed to facilitate peace and sustainable development
through supporting ex-combatants undergoing the DDR process. One aspect of the programme
is specifically linked to improving employment opportunities.

Beneficiaries are initially offered a profiling process, during which their skills and capacities
are ascertained, and a reintegration plan is drawn up. Beneficiaries are then entitled to a
number of schemes designed to facilitate their economic and social re-integration. Examples
of schemes include: small grants of up to US$800 for beneficiaries wishing to set up their own
businesses; and employment schemes, whereby beneficiaries are matched to a company
which suits their skills, and IOM provide a percentage of initial wages, which is gradually
replaced by payment from the employer over a given period of time, providing companies
with an incentive to hire ex-combatants.

According to IOM, the US$15 million initiative has thus far supported over 1,900 ex-
combatants in the northern and eastern regions, and is continually building up new links to
businesses and return communities (IOM 2010).

It is clear that vocational training in PARCs and schemes such as ICRS can
contribute positively to the economic and social reintegration of ex-combatants – at
the very least on an individual basis – and thus, presumably, also to the overarching
goal of creating opportunities for economic revitalisation within Sri Lanka. However,
there are several issues with these employability measures. First, there has been
little monitoring of what happens to beneficiaries post-reinsertion in order to assess
how useful programmes have been. Similarly only a small percentage of former
combatants released have had access to the IOM programme16 and amongst those
that had not received IOM support, several ex-combatants raised concerns about
the suitability of the training that they received in PARC facilities.17
Furthermore, as a result of the protracted conflict in the region, there is a wider issue
of a lack of economic investment and development in the northern and eastern
regions of Sri Lanka which touches all groups, not only ex-combatants. Whilst
development initiatives are in place in the north and east, there appears to be

15
Focus group with PARC detainees, 08.12.2010
16
It is unclear how many ex-combatants have benefited from government reinsertion schemes
(which, according to NFP plans, should supply all ex-combatants with essential items and cash
allowances to support themselves post-reintegration). While in Sri Lanka we received differing
reports on what type of support, if any, was provided.
17
There were reports of detainees receiving training clearly not suitable to their existing skills
and prospects, such as doctors being given unskilled labour training and fishermen being trained in
agriculture (focus group with PARC detainees, 08.12.2010, interview with IGO worker, 11.12.2010)

36
concern amongst local residents that these have not sufficiently benefited the local
populations, and that young people remain particularly at risk.18 Most of the ex-
combatants interviewed who were currently in rehabilitation and training stated that
they were concerned about gaining employment when they returned home, and
many stated a desire to relocate to the Middle East as they thought there were better
opportunities there for employment, in addition to the chance to send money back to
their families.19
In terms of minimising socio-economic marginalisation, there appeared to be very
little effort on the part of the government to address this, at least in the first year of
the Four R programmes. Whilst the overall impression that we gained from
discussions from ex-combatants, NGOs, IGOs and community members was that
ex-combatants did not suffer particularly from socio-economic marginalisation,20 one
NGO worker did state that he had advised an ex-combatant applying for a job in the
tourism industry not to mention his ex-combatant status. It was also noted that the
police and civil service did not make enough effort to employ Tamil people in the
northern and eastern regions.21 This could suggest that there is some risk of
discrimination against former combatants, perhaps particularly if the employer is not
of Tamil origin.
Whilst a broader government reconciliation programme had recently been initiated
when we visited Sri Lanka, this appeared to largely target community leaders, as
opposed to also including local or national companies and potential employers. 22
This seems to represent a missed opportunity to directly combat socio-economic
marginalisation and promote reconciliation simultaneously.
Overall it would appear that whilst government and IOM initiatives have clearly
benefited ex-combatants in terms of employability at the individual level, it is too
early to tell whether this will lead to economic revitalisation. In order to achieve this
in the long term, DDR programmes should be linked to the wider goals of
accelerated development in the north and east. Similarly, it did not appear that the
government was taking full advantage of opportunities to limit socio-economic
marginalisation of ex-combatants, although participant responses seemed to
indicate that this was not a significant problem.
Contributing to security and stability vs. safeguarding human rights
The primary objective of a DDR process is to contribute the restoration of security.
This should be achieved whilst respecting the fundamental rights of the individuals
concerned, as laid out in International Humanitarian Law23 and International Human

18
Some interviewees complained about Sinhalese businessmen from Colombo benefiting from
tourism expansion, as well as infrastructure projects employing labourers from the capital instead of
local workers (interview with NGO worker, 09.12.2010)
19
Focus group with PARC detainees, 08.12.2010; focus group with ex-combatants at a non-
government rehabilitation centre, 09.12.2010
20
This was largely attributed to the former 'one child policy' of the LTTE which meant that all
families had to send one family member into LTTE forces, resulting in little discrimination amongst a
population who had all had similar experiences relating to the LTTE.
21
Interview with NGO worker, 09.12.2010
22
Government Awareness Raising Programme for Religious Leaders and Community Leaders,
13.12.2010,Batticaloa
23
The Geneva Conventions

37
Rights Law24 (Human Rights Watch, 2010; International Commission of Jurists25,
2010). Although the security element of DDR is not specifically referenced the in the
NAP goals, research carried out in Sri Lanka indicated that this has been an
extremely high priority for the GoSL, especially in the immediate aftermath of the
war. Research further appeared to indicate that security concerns and human rights
protection were somewhat in competition, with the government often prioritising
security.
Security measures in place include the detention of more than 280,000 civilians in
IDP camps in the aftermath of the war until they had been screened and cleared of
having any association with the LTTE (ICG, 2010:2), and the apparent refusal to
grant certain legal rights to, or release those identified as having had ties to the
LTTE, until they have gone through months and, in many cases, years of detention
and/ or rehabilitation.26 While government documents outline rehabilitation
programmes with a legal framework (including specified time scales for rehabilitation
and release, see Appendix 8) which are justified by emergency regulations, in
practice these are deemed unjustified by the ICJ and appear to be applied
inconsistently,27 (ICJ, 2010:5).
For example, diverse interviews suggested release from PARCs is based on
periodic psycho-social evaluations of detainees, designed to assess their potential to
resort to rebel activity again in the future.28 This would indicate that time scales are
not always adhered to, and that those interned are potentially subject to indefinite
detention.29 Similarly, there are concerns that the GoSL is also detaining individuals
suspected of LTTE involvement in further irregular detention camps (see Figure 13).
This serves to highlight the GoSL prioritisation of security, and indicates a lack of
independent monitoring and legal accountability of the screening and detention
process (Human Rights Watch 2010).

24
Including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which Sri Lanka
ratified in 1980, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Human Rights Watch 2010:19-20).
25
Further referred to as ICJ
26
Confirmed by numerous ex-combatants on several separate and unrelated occasions,
eastern region,8-15.12.2010.
27
The refusal to allow access of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to
detention centres, or to allow detainees access to legal counsel, the right to be given specific reasons
for detention or to challenge this in a court of law (Human Rights Watch 2010).
28
Conversation with military officer, 08.12.2010
29
This suggestion was supported by the detainees themselves, who asserted that they did not
know when they would be able to leave the camp.

38
 Figure 13: Categorisation and detention of suspected ex-combatants
An official involved in the DDR process explained that suspected former LTTE cadres were
grouped into five categories of camps ranging from A-E, according to the ex-combatants'
perceived danger to society (with 'A' representing the highest risk). The officer confirmed
that the PARC we saw was a level 'D' camp. These claims, that such a system exists, were
later denied by other officers, suggesting that it was not desirable for people outside the
DDR system to be aware of A-C category camps.

In a later, unrelated, interview, an ex-government official confirmed the A-E categorisation

procedure, explaining that the whereabouts of A-C category detainees remains unknown.
The ex-official noted that category „D‟ detainees were those identified as being a lesser
threat due to having no prior criminal record, or having been forcibly recruited to the LTTE.

Some released ex-combatants also described that they had been held in remand for months
before arriving in the PARCs. It is important to have full transparency on the names and
whereabouts of all ex-combatants and to clarify their legal status and the process they will
go through.

In addition, high levels of securitisation appear to continue outside of PARCs. Once

ex-combatants have been released from rehabilitation camps and other detention
centres, it would appear that many are subject to surveillance and monitoring.30
Several community members and ex-combatants themselves confided that they
were obliged to periodically sign in at police stations and that they received regular
intimidating visits from security forces.

It would appear that both ex-combatants themselves, and the communities in which
they live, are uneasy about the government/ military presence and monitoring of
people in their villages. We additionally heard concerns from ex-combatants and
community members about disappearances. Moreover, many were convinced that
the government preoccupation with security had led them to execute high ranking
members of the LTTE who had surrendered or been forced to surrender.31
As the above findings illustrate, while security measures put in place by the GoSL
have undoubtedly contributed to the amelioration of the security situation throughout
the country, which the UNHCR described in 2010 as “greatly improved” (UNHCR,
2010:16), this may, in some cases, have been at the direct expense of promoting
respect for the human rights of Sri Lankan citizens and for International Law. Such
measures have most definitely been lacking in transparency, which has in turn led to
a culture of mistrust and the widespread circulation of rumours about the GoSL‟s
treatment of suspected former LTTE cadres. These rumours, whether true or untrue,
jeopardise the achievement of progress towards the longer term goals of sustainable
peace, reconciliation and social cohesion.

30
This was confirmed in several interviews with IGO and NGO workers, as well as community
members, in addition to ex-combatants themselves.
31
Diverse interviews, Batticaloa 09.12.2010-10.12.2010.

39
Contributing towards sustainable peace, reconciliation and social cohesion
Contributing towards sustainable peace, reconciliation and social cohesion is the
most long-term of the goals of DDR in Sri Lanka. Perhaps, partly as a result of this,
it appears to be the area where the least progress has been made. As previously
mentioned, an initiative aiming to foster social cohesion and reconciliation has
recently begun, with religious and community leaders being brought together and
encouraged to accept and support ex-combatants following their release from
rehabilitation. However, research undertaken on the ground suggested that with
regard to social cohesion, the problem lay largely not between ex-combatants and
their host communities (see Figure 14 for exception)32 but was a larger issue of
cohesion between Sri Lanka‟s different ethnic groups on a national scale, particularly
with regards to relations between Tamil and Sinhalese populations.
Throughout the research period there was a continued theme of mutual mistrust
between the Tamil population and the government. This appeared to be reinforced
by government dealings with Tamil people following the end of the war, particularly
as a result of the heavy emphasis on security in the post-war period.33 The
screening and detention of civilian IDPs, in addition to the detention and regular
monitoring of those identified as linked to the LTTE would appear to have done little
to convince the wider Tamil population that the government genuinely desires to
protect and promote their rights and to work towards true reconciliation, social
cohesion, and sustainable peace.
Similarly, although the government has taken the commendable step of establishing
a Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC), which participants
confirmed has had sittings in the eastern district, this appears to have yet made a
significant contribution towards facilitating and encouraging true reconciliation.
Whilst the above would indicate that the government has begun efforts aimed at
promoting sustainable peace, reconciliation and social cohesion, our research
suggests that there is much left to do in this area both in general, and with specific
regard to the needs of minority groups. When questioned whether they thought
national reconciliation, social cohesion and sustainable peace would be achieved in
Sri Lanka, participants brought up issues relating to the government. Specifically,
they commented on its failure to grant equal democratic and human rights to the
Tamil people, political, social and economic inequality, and wider issues of social
cohesion and relations between ethnic groups. The overwhelming majority felt that
that such aims would never be achieved unless these deep seated and fundamental
issues were addressed.

32
A further exception to this was in the eastern region, where there had been an LTTE split,
with one faction (Karuna) allegedly becoming a paramilitary organisation and supporting government
counter-insurgency against the LTTE (International Crisis Group, 2010) Several research participants,
including one NGO worker, stated that there was suspicion amongst communities towards this group,
as it was believed that they had betrayed the Tamil people by working with the government (interview
with NGO worker, 10.12.2010).
33
One former government official stated that the LTTE were always “trained not to believe the
Sinhalese”, a view that was being reaffirmed by the lack of inclusivity in the government, and
continued “disappearances” of anyone who opposes it (interview with former government official,
09.12.2010).

40
 Figure 14: Female Ex-Combatants
Whilst most of our research suggested that ex-combatant‟s reintegration into their home
communities was considered not too problematic by all parties involved, one group proved to
be an exception to this. Several participants noted that it was particularly difficult for female
ex-combatants to reintegrate into society following the end of the conflict.

One former government official noted that communities treated female and male ex-
combatants differently, with women suffering several gender-specific difficulties with their
reintegration, including the fact that families are wary of having them at home due to worries
of government monitoring, and of husbands refusing to accept them back if they had been
subjected to sexual assault whilst with LTTE forces.

Similarly, one NGO worker suggested that female ex-combatants experienced discrimination
in terms of finding a partner and raising a dowry if the community was aware that they had
formally been LTTE cadres.

One woman we interviewed had been forced to join the LTTE aged 18 and was very nervous of
being identified as an ex-combatant. Despite having been screened in an IDP camp following
her escape from the LTTE before the end of the war, she had managed to avoid detection as
an ex-combatant. Following her and her family‟s return home, she had joined a programme to
receive vocational training at an NGO rehabilitation centre to train as a seamstress.
Participating in this programme however was cause for concern, that she would be identified
by the community or the government as being formerly associated with the LTTE.

No one apart from her parents and the head of the NGO were aware that she was an ex-
combatant, including her home community and the other women at the vocational training
centre, and she was visibly nervous at the prospect of them learning this.

Despite fear of identification, when asked, she did appear confident about her job prospects
as a seamstress and was eager to return home upon completion of her course, provided that
no one found out about her former combatant status.

(Interview with female ex-combatant – 09.12.2010.Batticaloa)

Conclusion and Recommendations

It is clear that the government has made some progress towards achieving the aims
of DDR processes as laid out in UN documents, and the GoSL‟s National Action
Plans for reintegration of ex-combatants. Successes thus far include; the
commendable vocational training and reinsertion programmes which the government
and IOM have developed for former combatants; the vast improvement in security
which the country has seen since the end of the conflict; and the initial efforts which
the government has made to foster social cohesion and promote national
reconciliation, including the establishment of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation
Commission.
However, there are ways in which the effectiveness can be improved and enhanced.
Such initiatives will be meaningless if they are not accompanied by comprehensive
efforts to reform Sri Lanka‟s political institutions to promote inclusivity and a feeling
of ownership at the national level on the part of all groups. Equally important are
initiatives to promote accelerated development in the northern and eastern parts of

41
the country, and to foster better relations with the international community, who have
the potential to contribute a great deal toward post-conflict recovery in Sri Lanka,
both in terms of financial investment and practical support.
Finally, some short-term objectives of DDR, such as security improvements, have
been attained at the direct expense of progress towards the overarching goals of
promoting national reconciliation, social cohesion and sustainable peace.
As such, the following recommendations are made:

 First and foremost, government transparency and the protection of the

fundamental rights of all of Sri Lanka‟s citizens must be guaranteed; and
 Similarly, in the medium to long term, the wrongs of the past, committed
by both parties to the conflict, must be assessed by a competent and
independent authority. Whilst the establishment of the LLRC is a good
first step, it must be ensured that this body is permitted to conduct an
independent, transparent and comprehensive investigation.

These steps, in addition to a genuinely committed effort on the part of all of Sri
Lanka‟s citizens to move beyond the division and traumatic experiences of the past,
will facilitate the conditions necessary to allow the country‟s peoples to progress
forward in good faith and with mutual trust towards a sustainable peace for future
generations.

42
Part IV: Social
Cohesion
(Lead authors: Dai Jing and Brigitte Rohwerder)

43
Introduction

In Sri Lanka, inter-communal tensions have had discernible effects on the course of
the conflict. Although the war may be over now, sustainable peace can only be
achieved with reconciliation and the alleviation of these tensions. Our group decided
to focus our research on community health, i.e. the ability of the members of a
community to form positive relations with each other. It was felt that a measure of
community health would reflect the level
of reconciliation present in the society.
The research question posed was: ‘What Figure 15: Question Bias
fosters and challenges social cohesion
in the Batticaloa District?’ There was an implicit assumption in the approach
taken that social cohesion contributes positively to
To answer the question it was decided, peace, which influenced what we would put in the
categories of „fosters‟ or „challenges‟. While we
that indicators of social cohesion would be
state that we were looking for evidence of social
used as a measure of community health. cohesion in the Batticaloa District, because of this
Indeed, Ratnapriya (2011) suggests that implicit assumption we were actually looking at
measuring positive and negative social social cohesion at the Sri Lankan state level, as it is
cohesion trends would be a useful tool in here that a truly sustainable peace for the whole
monitoring the health of the reconciliation country can be established. However, this might
process in Sri Lanka that might bring have prejudiced us against strong internal social
cohesion within the Batticaloa District, if it was at
about sustainable peace. odds with wider Sri Lankan social cohesion.
In further refining the scope of our
question it was important to include both hard and soft indicators of social cohesion.
Consequently we looked at infrastructure and services, community and family
relations, with an additional consideration of government, NGO and community
initiatives that foster or challenge social cohesion. Given the limitations highlighted in
the methodology section, the group decided to take a more ethnographic approach
to our research, hence the findings will be more qualitative in nature.
Findings suggest that, at the individual level, most people do not actually have any
issue with people who come from other communities. There are, in fact, many
accounts of acceptance and tolerance in society. Much of this goodwill, especially in
eastern districts such as Batticaloa, comes from a history of common suffering. The
encounters with members of another geographical community at IDP camps during
the repeated displacements have also created lasting relationships,34 strengthening
inter-community bonds. Cleavages seem to stem from external factors, at the state
level, and from circumstances resulting from the conflict. Most of these cleavages
manifest themselves only at a group level.
The following report will first give an overview of the theory behind social cohesion
and its indicators. Second, it will present the group's findings by outlining the
indicators of what fosters and challenges social cohesion in terms of infrastructure
and services, before moving on to do the same for community and family relations.
Finally, this report will conclude with some recommendations of what, it is hoped, will

34
Focus group, 11.12.10

44
help improve community health and contribute towards a peaceful future for
Batticaloa and Sri Lanka as a whole.

Analysis
Community health, reconciliation and social cohesion
For the purposes of our research, we took a relational (McMilan and Chavis, 1986)
definition of the term community, which is a group of people larger than a household
who form a human relationship based around a certain commonality. A broader
definition is especially important for Sri Lanka as communities and identities are very
complex issues. In addition to language and religion, many other factors contribute
towards different community memberships and identities. These factors include,
among others: political affiliations, geography, military and paramilitary allegiances,
class, caste and gender (Bush, 2003).
Hamber and Kelly have devised a working definition of reconciliation for societies in
conflict or coming out of conflict that sees it as “the process of addressing conflicting
and fractured relationships” (2004:3-4, original italics), which is a voluntary act that
involves a range of activities. These might include the development of a shared
vision of the future, acknowledging and dealing with the past, building positive
relationships, and substantial cultural/ attitudinal, social, economic and political
change.
This links in strongly with our primary focus of social cohesion. Maxwell (1986) states
that:
“[s]ocial cohesion involves building shared values and communities of
interpretation, reducing disparities in wealth and income, and generally
enabling people to have a sense that they are engaged in a community
enterprise, facing shared challenges, and that they are members of the same
community.” (In Stanley, 2003:7)
Thus, social cohesion shares many of the same processes as reconciliation, and
together they can contribute towards a sustainable peace.
There are an number of indicators of social cohesion that include the quality of
material conditions; social order relating to trust and security; positive interactions,
exchanges and networks between individuals and communities; the extent of social
inclusion or integration of people into the mainstream institutions of civil society and
their sense of belonging to the state; and social equality in terms of access to
opportunities and material circumstances (Ratnapriya, 2011), which we endeavoured
to look at while researching in Sri Lanka. The following section outlines the findings
of this research with respect to infrastructure and services.
Infrastructure and services
Infrastructure and services fall under different headings of indicators of social
cohesion, including material conditions, social inclusion and social equality. Where
there is equality of opportunity and access for all members of a state to infrastructure
and services, they feel part of the state and contribute positively to it, thus fostering
and enhancing social cohesion. Conversely, when their material conditions are

45
inferior and their quality of life suffers, especially when compared to other members
of the state, people are excluded and marginalised by their circumstances, and
social cohesion is challenged. Therefore, the extent and quality of infrastructure
provision impacts on people‟s participation in, and perception of, the state.
However, the difficulty with this choice of focus was that we did not have the time to
conduct extensive quantifiable surveys of people‟s provision and access, which
would have given us a more comprehensive picture of the situation. Instead, we
relied on people‟s testimonies. While this might not have produced results that
correspond to hard facts, it does allow us to measure perceptions, which we would
argue are as important as the reality, in that they influence people‟s thoughts and
actions. Therefore, if people perceive and act as though the infrastructure and
services are adequate or inadequate, this will impact on social cohesion.
Challenges
Relations between communities and security services: While the security situation
has improved compared with during the war, people remain cautious. The
relationship of some of the local communities with the police and the army is not a
very positive one, with a reluctance to discuss them, or by dismissing both
institutions as being the one and the same.35 The situation is not helped by the lack
of Tamil speaking police officers, the poor investigation and conviction rates for
reported crimes, or by the impression that the police will side with a Sinhalese in the
event of a dispute between a Tamil and a Sinhalese person.36
Rural-Urban Divide: In Batticaloa, the rural-urban divide is significant. Infrastructure
is poorly developed in many rural areas. An example is the village of Villavattuan,
where the nearest source of electricity is three kilometres from the village, which
greatly limits the economic opportunities within the village. In a survey conducted in
2009/2010, the Sri Lanka Department of Census and Statistics found that the
average urban household income is higher than its rural counterpart by more than a
third (No author, 2010).37 This divide creates inter-community jealousies which
impede social cohesion.
Rural Education and Youth Unemployment: While education is technically free
between the ages of 6 and 19, most rural villages do not have educational facilities
to cater for children beyond the age of 12. As many families cannot afford to send
their children to the cities to continue their education, the number of uneducated and
consequently unemployed youths is high.38 As seen in many other contexts, youth
unemployment is directly related to incidences of violence as young people form
youth groups that try to prove their self worth by committing violent „heroic‟ acts.
Some of these youth groups even attack initiatives aimed at fostering social
cohesion started by communities they are not part of.39 This poses a serious threat
to security and social order and is one of the main concerns voiced by the
communities and NGOs interviewed.
35
Focus group 11.12.10
36
Interview 11.12.10, focus group 10.12.10
37
Household Income and Expenditure Survey – 2009/10: Preliminary Results Vol. 1 , Issue 1,
Department of Census and Statistics
38
Ibid.
39
Semi-structured interview 09.12.10

46
Inequality of financial opportunities: Poverty remains a major problem for many
people due to the destruction and displacement caused by the conflict (and tsunami)
and this damages relations between people and communities, especially when there
is disparity of wealth and opportunities. Resentment existed amongst some Tamils
over the arrival of Sinhalese in the area as they felt that they were granted
disproportionate access to resources.40
The lack of employment or market opportunities was an issue that came up again
and again when talking with focus groups in local communities, with many people
concerned for the future of their community and their ability to survive. 41 Such a
pressure on their lives, especially when contrasted against the good fortune of others
can lead to resentment and despair, which in turn weakens social cohesion.
Fosters
Education: The introduction of Sinhalese and Tamil language lessons for all students
has contributed to fostering social cohesion.42 Furthermore, the teaching of skills to
those who have been marginalised by the war or other circumstances, such as ex-
combatants and female household heads, enables them to reintegrate into society
and make positive contributions. The teaching of psycho-social skills makes it
possible for people to overcome their traumas which may be hindering their social
relationships. However, access needs to be widened to all those in need.
Provision of security: The major change since the end of the war for most people
questioned was the new security situation. The removal of military checkpoints43
allowed for increased freedom of movement, a change which was perceived
positively and which will enable greater opportunities for previously marginalised
people (especially in rural areas) to access markets and other opportunities that can
enhance their position, as well as ensuring that the population can mix more freely
and come to know one another better.
Material assistance and investment: Those disadvantaged by their position and
circumstances need help to raise themselves towards a quality of life closer to that of
the rest of the population, enabling them to contribute positively towards the wider
society as they are no longer struggling to simply survive. When the aid comes from
the state, it can also contribute to a feeling of inclusion necessary for social
cohesion.
Section conclusions
Those mentioned above were not the only issues raised during our research. For
example, it was also pointed out that improved roads were helping to link people,
while conversely the lack of dam building in one area had served to disillusion
citizens over the interest of the government and state in meeting their needs. 44
Findings show that the perception of inequalities regarding the provision of
infrastructure and services identified above has fuelled social jealousy. It is easy for

40
Focus group 10.12.10
41
Focus group 10.12.10, Focus group 11.12.10
42
Lecture 6.12.10
43
Focus group 10.12.10, focus group 11.12.10
44
Focus group 10.12.10

47
people affected by disaster to feel like their needs are the most pressing. As such,
resentment can arise if a different community is perceived or seen to receive
assistance first, or in greater quantities, which breaks down positive social links and
undermines social cohesion.
Although there appear to be more challenges to social cohesion than elements
fostering it, this is not a static situation. As further improvements are made to
infrastructure and services, this will improve people‟s material conditions and social
inclusion and equality, which could contribute to greater social cohesion. However, if
the situation slides the other way, the issues which led to conflict in the first place will
not be rectified, and a similar violent situation could develop again.
The Tamil and, to an increasing extent, the Muslim population of Sri Lanka desire
equality45 and, as Lispet points out, the “passion for equality in modern societies …
has been at the base of confrontations ever since the creation of democracies” (in
Helly et al, 2003:31). If “society fails to distribute its social outcomes equitably social
cohesion deteriorates and social outcomes suffer” (Stanley, 2003:8), a factor behind
the war in Sri Lanka and one that is contributing to continuing tensions. If the
government expects a heightened degree of social responsibility and higher social
membership from its Tamil community, it risks creating a false community if it does
not address the demands for equality (Helly et al, 2003). Farrugia (2003) argues that
their “demands and behaviours, violent or not, cannot be considered as a
degeneration of the societal link, but rather as a rejection of a collective link
perceived as deficient” (in Helly et al, 2003:36), which offers hope that if the link
between the state and the Tamil community is repaired by addressing inequality and
marginalisation, they would feel part of Sri Lankan society.

Figure 16: Traditional ceremony welcoming PRDU to Batticaloa

45
Interview 10.12.10

48
Community and family relations
The ways in which people relate to one another is important for social cohesion. With
the family as the basic unit of society, whether relationships here are working or
damaged will impact the wider community, and thus society in general. The
relationships between communities, and whether they feel part of Sri Lanka, will also
impact on social cohesion. Under the framework of social cohesion indicators
outlined above, community and family relations fall under the indicator of social
order: positive interactions, exchanges and networks between individuals and
communities; the extent of social inclusion or integration of people into the
mainstream institutions of civil society; and, their sense of belonging to the state.
We researched what we termed the conducive environment, meaning the
environmental conditions that either foster or challenge social cohesion.
Government, NGO and local-community level initiatives can both foster and
challenge social cohesion, so we distinguished between what was happening at
different levels and what different actors were doing.
While these indicators of social cohesion might be less tangible, they are
nevertheless visible from the responses collected, and with more time it would have
been possible to discover more quantifiable evidence of social cohesion at this level,
for example, the numbers of mixed marriages. As before, people‟s perceptions of the
situation are important as perceptions lead you to act in a certain way.
Challenges
Conducive environment
Identity issues: One of the most important challenges to social cohesion at the group
level is the lack of a common Sri Lankan identity. Most participants responded
negatively when asked about the existence of a Sri Lankan identity. For example,
one said “we are born in Sri Lanka so we are Sri Lankan, but as Tamils we are
marginalised,”46 although, the subject of cricket did generate a more positive
response.47 These findings suggest that there is no overarching Sri Lankan
community that everyone can interact with as equal members. Members of mutually
exclusive communities treat each other as outsiders, creating an added barrier to
positive social interactions.
The government has tried to create a common identity, following fears of an
increasing number of Sinhalese and Tamil rebel groups, by introducing a citizenship
curriculum that incorporates the notion of a multi-ethnic Sri Lankan identity into the
compulsory school syllabus. However, this initiative has largely failed as it has not
been followed by policies that reflect the principles taught in the books. Instead,
there is still a perception that Sinhalese people are favoured in terms of educational
and job opportunities, and that Tamil schools still get insufficient resources.48

46
Focus group in village 11.12.10
47
Various focus groups and interviews 08 – 12.12.10
48
Various focus groups and interviews 08 – 12.12.10

49
During the course of the war the relationship between the Tamil and Muslim
communities deteriorated due to instances of ethnic cleansing by the LTTE, and due
to the closer Muslim-Sinhalese relationship.49 This is indicated by Ali (2006) and was
corroborated by sources on the ground, though one participant also highlighted the
now deteriorating Muslim-Sinhalese relationship.50 Social cohesion does not require
that individuals give up their ethnic identity as “socially cohesive societies
incorporate diversity and use it, not exclude it” (Stanley, 2003:9). The problem in Sri
Lanka seems to be that its minorities feel that their identity is being suppressed, and
that it is not a Sri Lankan identity they are supposed to embrace but a Sinhalese
one.51
Political representation and reconciliation: The official government stance is that the
war is over and peace is upon Sri Lanka (Goodhand, 2010). This sentiment was
echoed by the national elites we met during the field visit. However, an often
repeated statement from respondents is that the war may be over, but the conflict is
not52 as the root causes of conflict have not been addressed. For example, in
Batticaloa, which has a 72% Tamil population (Sharma, 2008), the recruitment target
for government posts is 80% Sinhalese, 12% Tamil and 8% Muslim. 53 This leads to
a perception that Tamil rights are being marginalised by unequal political
representation, unequal access to resources and opportunities, and a suppression of
Tamil culture. Hence, the Tamil population at large do not feel they can be part of the
state if the state does not treat them as equal citizens. This presents a major
challenge to social cohesion; if a segment of the population feels they do not belong
then social cohesion at the state level is unlikely to be achieved.
Negative family dynamics: The family forms the basic social unit in most
communities in Batticaloa and in society as a whole. As such, a breakdown of
familial relations creates disorder in the society, which can challenge society‟s ability
to function. Furthermore, social cohesion is not just a measure of inter-community
relations but also of individual relations and a sense of belonging as well (Friedkin,
2004). Hence, the anti-social behaviour caused by broken families is also disruptive
to community health.
During the conflict, the LTTE demanded one person per household to be conscripted
unless the children in the family were married. This resulted in early marriages, with
some children getting married as early as 12 years old to escape conscription.
Families formed this way were highly immature and problems such as domestic
violence and broken families have followed. Alcoholism following the relaxation of
alcohol restrictions post-LTTE control has further exacerbated the problem.54
Apart from young families, the conflict has also created many female-headed
households (FHHs), either due to widowhood or desertion by the husbands.
Ruwanpura and Humphries (2004) highlight the high instances of female-headed
households who, due to their disadvantaged situation, are in a position to challenge

49
Interview 10.12.10
50
Interview 9.12.10
51
Focus group 12.12.10
52
Various focus groups and interviews 08 – 12.12.10
53
Semi-structured interview 09.12.10
54
Focus group 09.12.10

50
social cohesion. Some of these women may find themselves marginalised, leaving
them feeling resigned and exhausted as to their situation, to the extent that it would
seem that many of their interactions with others were negative. 55 For example, the
dependency of some FHHs on male relatives has also resulted in gender-based
violence in some cases.56 Additionally, non-widow FHHs, especially in Muslim
communities, face negative social judgement and marginalisation, further alienating
them from their communities (Ruwanpura and Humphries, 2004).
Trauma and insecurity: In Batticaloa, there is still an atmosphere of fear and
insecurity57 which creates mistrust within the society, which hampers positive social
relations. When people live in fear, they also tend to keep to themselves or seek
solace within a very limited circle of people. Especially problematic is the fate of the
missing58. The lack of knowledge about their whereabouts and the apparent lack of
action on the part of the authorities have led to increased insecurity and do not
inspire people‟s confidence in the state. In addition, now that the war has ended,
former combatants (many non-LTTE) who have not been inducted into a
rehabilitation programme or found a sustainable livelihood have turned to criminal
activities for survival.59 This level of fear and insecurity amongst an element of the
population is extremely prohibitive to social cohesion as it undermines trust amongst
people.
Many in the population have also been left traumatised by their experiences and this
has contributed to negative impressions of the „other‟, mental health problems, and
increased alcoholism, all of which impact negatively on people‟s relationships.60
Government, NGO and community initiatives
Hostility and lack of coordination: The relationship between NGOs and the
government had been damaged, with the government quite hostile to NGOs61 and
NGOs fearful and disapproving of the government.62 Amid such an atmosphere of
hostility and suspicion, coordination of the activities which would contribute to social
cohesion is impaired and, in some cases, ineffective.
Inconsistent distribution and incomplete implementation of aid: Both NGOs and the
government are engaged in providing aid to the needy, however, the aid is not
distributed equality to all in need, which can lead to social jealously that damages
relationships between people (Lešnik and Urek, 2010; Uyangoda, 2005).
Additionally, the failure of the government in delivering on its promises of aid is
damaging to social cohesion as those it fails become alienated from the state.63

55
Focus group 10.12.10
56
Ibid
57
Lecture 7.12.10, 9.12.10
58
Interview 9.12.10
59
Focus group 11.12.10
60
Lecture 6.12.10
61
Lecture 7.12.10
62
Interview 9.12.10
63
Focus group 11.12.10

51
Fosters
Conducive environment:
Common experiences of suffering: After their long experience of war, Sri Lankans
are happy it is finally over. In their collective relief at the end of the conflict comes a
moment in which these emotions could provide the forward momentum necessary to
move the country past its conflict, towards a shared peaceful future.
Mixed families and lack of inter-personal enmity: There has not been the same
feeling of inter-ethnic hatred as elsewhere and, at an inter-personal level; there was
little enmity between members of different communities.64 For example, mixed
marriages seem to be widely accepted.65 This lack of individual inter-ethnic hatred
offers greater possibilities that Sri Lankans can embrace their diversity and interact
positively.
Government, NGO and community initiatives
Trauma, gender, youth and peace work: Government, NGO and community led
projects have been active in a range of activities that are, for example, aimed at
integrating the potentially marginalised; dealing with negative family dynamics; and
engaging in peace work.66 These activities enhance social order, positive
interactions, social inclusion and integration of people, as well as their sense of
belonging to the state.
The Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Committee (LLRC): The committee was set
up by the government, which stated that it is part of its effort to “drive the process of
reconciliation and create the basis for a stable, prosperous future” (PRIU, 2010). It is
encouraging that such an attitude exists, and, if the LLRC is able to promote
reconciliation this would also foster social cohesion. However, the LLRC is not
permitted to investigate recent events, which remain extremely controversial. It was
dismissed by a number of respondents as purely a “drama” and the people remain
suspicious of the intentions of the government and whether it can actually achieve
anything.67 With this perception, the LLRC could actually weaken social cohesion as
it angers and alienates people who feel their real grievances are unaddressed or are
being brushed over. To bring about reconciliation and foster social cohesion the
LLRC has to be trusted and effective.
Section conclusions
Once more, it was easier to find elements that challenged social cohesion than
fostered it. It was evident that progress was being made, both top-down and bottom-
up, at enhancing social order and inclusion as well as positive interactions,
exchanges and networks between individuals and communities. Although there have
been efforts at reconciliation, there is much more work to be done, especially in
inspiring confidence between different stakeholder groups. What occurs at all levels
of society is important, and all must be involved if social cohesion is to be fostered.

64
Lecture 6.12.10, 9.12.10
65
Interview 9.12.10
66
Interview 11.10.10
67
Focus group, 11.12.10, interview 9.12.10

52
Change needs to occur in people‟s environment and circumstances, but also in their
perceptions. Where positive work is being done by the government for example, it
would be beneficial if this was conveyed to the population in an effective manner.
Although it has a lot of work to do to overcome people‟s suspicions, the government
needs to accept the grievances of its population and overcome its own suspicions.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Having addressed what fosters and challenges social cohesion in the above
sections, we will go on to make some recommendations. While there continue to be
large groups of people in Sri Lanka who are marginalised and disadvantaged and
who do not feel part of the state, social cohesion will remain weak, and opportunities
for a sustainable peace will be limited. Further action must be taken at all levels of
society in a number of key areas:
Common identity: Sri Lanka must strive to create a common Sri Lankan identity,
which embraces the diversity of its people, and does not favour one community or
group to the detriment of others. Affording languages, religions and culture equal
status under the law would contribute to this, as would a discussion on what being
Sri Lankan means. This will contribute to the development of a common identity to
which all people can relate.
Psycho-social issues and reconciliation: Trauma and divisions in society must be
addressed if people are to be able to live 'normal' lives together with people against
whom they fought. Various respondents raised the point that there is a lack of
provision of psycho-social support and awareness, especially in the public sphere.
Therefore, psycho-social programs should continue and be expanded. Dialogue
between the different communities and groups, that address the fears and needs of
'the other' and which encourage genuine listening should be promoted. The LLRC
should be given real powers and have its remit expanded, with its decisions
respected and acted upon by all sides.
Equality and political representation: As a major underlying cause of the conflict,
issues of ethnic inequality and a lack of equal political representation could lead to
violence again if not adequately dealt with. Respondents repeatedly stated that “the
war is over but the conflict is not, the underlying problems have not been
addressed”.68 Changing legislation, investing in the region, and treating people as
equal and valuable citizens of Sri Lanka would help address these issues.
A shortage of livelihood opportunities is a major concern in the Batticaloa District.
More jobs need to be created, a market for people‟s goods must be found, and land
ownership issues addressed, otherwise people will remain marginalised. Channels of
communication need to be established connecting the state to the middle and grass-
roots levels of all communities in order to facilitate feedback in both directions.
Otherwise, even positive measures can be interpreted negatively given the culture of
mistrust that Tamils have for the state. To complement this, rural infrastructure, in
particular electricity and roads, has to be developed so that information can be
disseminated in a timely fashion.

68
Lecture 6.12.10, focus group10.12.10

53
Social Jealousy: This problem can potentially be solved by better and fairer planning
of infrastructure development and an emphasis on rural development. In situations
such as with different categories of ex-combatants, where completely equal
treatment is impractical, improved dialogue between policy makers and the general
public can engender better understanding.
Addressing the issues that have proved to be divisive or have left people
marginalised from society would contribute to the creation of a socially cohesive
society that has a greater chance of achieving sustainable peace, a goal all share
but which cannot be achieved if the underlying issues of conflict are not addressed.
Sri Lanka now faces a moment in which it can set its trajectory towards a peaceful
future but only if serious efforts are made to initiate complementary top-down and
bottom-up approaches.

54
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60
Appendices
Appendix 1: NEHRP house details

61
62
Appendix 2: Infrastructure in Sri Lanka

63
64
Appendix 3: Accessibility after the floods, January 2011

65
Appendix 4: Location of health care facilities

66
Appendix 5: DDR Key Concepts and Definitions

Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms,

ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatant and often also of
the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible
arms management programmes.

Demobilisation is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from

armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilisation may extend
from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of
troops in camps designed for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments,
assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilisation encompasses the
support package provided to the demobilised, which is called reinsertion.

Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilisation but

prior to the longer-term processes of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of
transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs to ex-combatants and their
families, and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter,
medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While
reintegration is a long-term continuous social and economic process of development,
reinsertion is a short-term material and/ or financial assistance to meet immediate
needs, and can last up to one year.

(National Framework Proposal for the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants into Civilian

Life in Sri Lanka, 2009a:6)

67
Appendix 6: Government profiling categories of ex-combatants
All adult ex-combatants and children formerly associated with armed groups
assigned to the PARCs of Protective Child Accommodation/ Rehabilitation Centres
will be further profiled through individual interviews by two offers, one with a legal
background and the other with a psychosocial background and both will be
conversant in the native language of the adult ex-combatant of the child formerly
associated with an armed group.

The information gathered will be jointly analysed and the adult ex-combatants and
children formerly associated with armed groups will be categorized into six groups:

 adult ex-combatants, who held command or decision-making positions or were

involved in recruiting or training combatants;
 adults ex-combatants, who participated actively and systematically in combat
activities and hostilities, including carrying a weapon;
 adult ex-combatants, who operated as combat support personnel in functions
such as porters, cooks, nurses, spies and radio operators etc. on a systematic
basis;
 adult ex-combatants, who occupied civilian functions in the LTTE;
 adult ex-combatants, who were recruited by the LTTE during the last phase of
the conflict or were determined to have been abducted or recruited forcefully;
 children formerly associated with armed groups.

In categorization of adult ex-combatants the rank or level of position occupied in the

LTTE combat or civilian structures, the number of years spent within the LTTE,
whether the ex-LTTE combatant was recruited when s/he was a child and
psychosocial elements will be taken into account.

All information gathered during the profiling undertaken in the PARCs and Protective
Child Accommodation/ Rehabilitation Centres will be registered in accordance with
forms which will be endorsed and integrated into the Reintegration Information
Management System (RIMS). The personal information in the RIMS will be
confidential and shall not be misused to further discriminate and stigmatize
participants. A specific database for children formerly associated with armed groups
will be established within the RIMS and maintained, to ensure that specific
information related to children is documented.

(National Action Plans of the National Framework Proposal for the Reintegration of
Ex-Combatants into Civilian Life in Sri Lanka, 2009b:18)

68
Appendix 7: Rehabilitation categories of ex-combatants

Rehabilitation Programme at the PARCs and

Protective Child Accommodation/ Rehabilitation Centres

Category Group 1 Group 2 and 6 Group 3 and 6 Group 4,5 and 6

Period of Stay From 12-24 months From 6-12 months From 3-6 months Up to 3 months
(rapid release
procedure)
Core programme Life skills
Civic and human rights education
Health and psychosocial care, including reproductive health HIV/AIDS
Vocational guidance
Formal education
Optional Catch up or accelerated education
programme English language skills
Computer skills
Entrepreneurship skills
Vocational training
Extra-curricular Communication with family members and family visits allowed once every two weeks
programme
Participation in Participation in Participation in Participation in
family day activities family day activities family day activities family day activities
after six months and after two months
upon and upon Participation in Participation in
recommendation of recommendation of community activities community activities
assigned monitor assigned monitor after one month
Participation in daily
Participation in Participation in daily vocational training
community activities vocational training activities outside the
after three months activities outside the centre
centre after three
months

69
Appendix 8: Rehabilitation time-frame

(National Action Plans of the National Framework Proposal for the Reintegration of
Ex-Combatants into Civilian Life in Sri Lanka, 2009b:13)

70