SPECPRO RULE 77 | 1

G.R. No. 76714 June 2, 1994 Cunanan spouses should be probated jointly. Respondent Judge’s view that
SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ, petitioner, vs. HON. ZOTICO A. the Rules on allowance of wills is couched in singular terms and therefore
TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Bulacan, should be interpreted to mean that there should be separate probate
respondent. proceedings for the wills of theCunanan spouses is too literal and simplistic an
approach. Such view overlooks the provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 of the
Succession; Probate of Wills; Conflict of Laws; Proof that wills executed Revised Rules of Court, which advise that the rules shall be “liberally
abroad conform with the formalities prescribed by laws in the foreign construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in
jurisdiction or by Philippine laws is imperative.—The respective wills of the obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this proceeding.” A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would
country upon compliance with the followingprovision of the Civil Code of the only result in the delay in the administration of justice (Acain v. Intermediate
Philippines: “Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 100 [1987]; Roberts v. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33
the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place [1984]).
in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or
in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.” Thus, proof that both Same; Same; Same; Joint Wills; What the law expressly prohibits is the
wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by making of joint wills, not the joint probate of separate wills containing
Philippine laws is imperative. essentially the same provisions and pertaining to property which in all
probability are conjugal in nature.—What the law expressly prohibits is the
Same; Same; Same; Evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of making of joint wills either for the testators’ reciprocal benefit or for the
wills which have been probated outside the Philippines.—The evidence benefit of a third person (Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 818). In the
necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two
outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in
accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the all probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their
foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to joint probate. As this Court has held a number of times, it will always strive
probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or
court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of branch to bear the seeds of future litigation (Motoomull v. Dela Paz, 187
wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; SCRA 743 [1990]).
Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]).
Same; Same; Same; With regard to notices, the will probated abroad should
Same; Same; Same; Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign be treated as if it were an “original will” or a will that is presented for probate
laws.—The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which for the first time and accordingly must comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule
the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our 76, which require publication and notice to the known heirs, legatees and
courts cannot take judicial notice of them (Philippine Commercial and devisees, and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner.—The rule that the
Industrial Bank v. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266 [1974]). court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall “cause notice
thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance”
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; In the probate of wills, the courts should (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to
relax the rules on evidence, as the goal is to receive the best evidence of notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an “original
which the matter is susceptible before a purported will is probated or denied will” or a will that is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly,
probate.—Petitioner must have perceived this omission as in fact she moved compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and
for more time to submit the pertinent procedural and substantive New York notice by mail or personally to the “known heirs, legatees, and devisees of
laws but which request respondent Judge just glossed over. While the probate the testator resident in the Philippines” and to the executor, if he is not the
of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts should relax the rules on petitioner, are required.
evidence, the goal is to receive the best evidence of which the matter is
susceptible before a purported will is probated or denied probate (Vda. de Same; Same; Certiorari; Parties; A judge whose order is being assailed is
Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]). merely a nominal or formal party.—This petition cannot be completely
resolved without touching on a very glaring fact—petitioner has always
Same; Same; Same; The separate wills of the spouses may be probated considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she
jointly.—There is merit in petitioner’s insistence that the separate wills of the does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed

to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant
petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose
order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v.
Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]).
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.Certiorari. [Vda. de Perez vs.
Tolete, 232 SCRA 722(1994)]
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to
set aside the Order dated November 19, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 18, Bulacan presided by respondent Judge Zotico A. Tolete, in Special
Proceedings No. 1793-M.
We grant the petition.
II
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became
American citizens, established a successful medical practice in New York,
U.S.A. The Cunanans lived at No. 2896 Citation Drive, Pompey, Syracuse,
New York, with their children, Jocelyn, 18; Jacqueline, 16; and Josephine, 14.
On August 23, 1979, Dr. Cunanan executed a last will and testament,
bequeathing to his wife "all the remainder" of his real and personal property
at the time of his death "wheresoever situated" (Rollo, p. 35). In the event he
would survive his wife, he bequeathed all his property to his children and
grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He appointed his
wife as executrix of his last will and testament and Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr.
as substitute executor. Article VIII of his will states:
If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, and I shall die under such
circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the order of
our deaths, then it shall be presumed that I predeceased her, and my estate
shall be administered and distributed, in all respects, in accordance with such
presumption (Rollo, p. 41).
Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her own last
will and testament containing the same provisions as that of the will of her
husband. Article VIII of her will states:
If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances
that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the order of our deaths,
then it shall be presumed that he predeceased me, and my estate shall be
administered and distributed in all respects, in accordance with such
presumption. (Rollo, p. 31).
SPECPRO RULE 77 | 2
On January 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when they
were trapped by fire that gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael G.
Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and substitute executor of the two wills, filed
separate proceedings for the probate thereof with the Surrogate Court of the
County of Onondaga, New York. On April 7, these two wills were admitted to
probate and letters testamentary were issued in his favor.
On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn P.
Cunanan, and petitioner herein, filed with the Regional P. Cunanan, and
petitioner herein, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan a
petition for the reprobate of the two bills ancillary to the probate proceedings
in New York. She also asked that she be appointed the special administratrix
of the estate of the deceased couple consisting primarily of a farm land in San
Miguel, Bulacan.
On March 9, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Malolos, Bulacan, presided
by Judge Gualberto J. de la Llana, issued an order, directing the issuance of
letters of special administration in favor of petitioner upon her filing of a
P10,000.00 bond. The following day, petitioner posted the bond and took her
oath as special administration.
As her first act of administration, petitioner filed a motion, praying that the
Philippine Life Insurance Company be directed to deliver the proceeds in the
amount of P50,000.00 of the life insurance policy taken by Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan with Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan and their daughter Jocelyn as
beneficiaries. The trial court granted the motion.
Counsel for the Philippine American Life Insurance Company then filed a
manifestation, stating that said company then filed a manifestation, stating
that said company had delivered to petitioner the amount of P49,765.85,
representing the proceeds of the life insurance policy of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan.
In a motion dated May 19, 1983, petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael Cunanan,
Sr. be ordered to deliver to her a Philippine Trust Company passbook with
P25,594.00 in savings deposit, and the Family Savings Bank time deposit
certificates in the total amount of P12,412.52.
On May 31, Atty. Federico Alday filed a notice of appearance as counsel for
the heirs of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, namely, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., Priscilla
Cunanan Bautista, Lydia Cunanan Ignacio, Felipe F. Cunanan and Loreto
Cunanan Concepcion (Cunanan heirs). He also manifested that before
receiving petitioner's motion of May 19, 1983, his clients were unaware of the
filing of the testate estate case and therefore, "in the interest of simple fair
play," they should be notified of the proceedings (Records, p. 110). He
prayed for deferment of the hearing on the motions of May 19, 1983.

Petitioner then filed a counter manifestation dated June 13, 1983, asserting:
(1) that the "Cunanan collaterals are neither heirs nor creditors of the late Dr.
Jose F. Cunanan" and therefore, they had "no legal or proprietary interests to
protect" and "no right to intervene"; (2) that the wills of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan
and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, being American citizens, were executed in
accordance with the solemnities and formalities of New York laws, and
produced "effects in this jurisdiction in accordance with Art. 16 in relation to
Art. 816 of the Civil Code"; (3) that under Article VIII of the two wills, it was
presumed that the husband predeceased the wife; and (4) that "the Cunanan
collaterals are neither distributees, legatees or beneficiaries, much less, heirs
as heirship is only by institution" under a will or by operation of the law of
New York (Records, pp. 112-113).
On June 23, the probate court granted petitioner's motion of May 19, 1983.
However, on July 21, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion to nullify the
proceedings and to set aside the appointment of, or to disqualify, petitioner
as special administratrix of the estates of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn
Perez-Cunanan. The motion stated: (1) that being the "brothers and sisters
and the legal and surviving heirs" of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, they had been
"deliberately excluded" in the petition for the probate of the separate wills of
the Cunanan spouses thereby misleading the Bulacan court to believe that
petitioner was the sole heir of the spouses; that such "misrepresentation"
deprived them of their right to "due process in violation of Section 4, Rule 76
of the Revised Rules of Court; (2) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr., the
executor of the estate of the Cunanan spouses, was likewise not notified of
the hearings in the Bulacan court; (3) that the "misrepresentation and
concealment committed by" petitioner rendered her unfit to be a special
administratrix; (4) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had, by virtue of a verified
power of attorney, authorized his father,
Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., to be his attorney-in-fact; and (5) that Dr. Rafael
Cunanan, Sr. is qualified to be a regular administrator "as practically all of the
subject estate in the Philippines belongs to their brother, Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan" (Records, pp. 118-122). Hence, they prayed: (1) that the
proceedings in the case be declared null and void; (2) that the appointment
of petitioner as special administratrix be set aside; and (3) that Dr. Rafael
Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular administrator of the estate of the
deceased spouses.
Thereafter, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion requiring petitioner to submit an
inventory or accounting of all monies received by her in trust for the estate.
In her opposition, petitioner asserted: (1) that she was the "sole and only
heir" of her daughter, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan to the exclusion of the
"Cunanan collaterals"; hence they were complete strangers to the
proceedings and were not entitled to notice; (2) that she could not have
"concealed" the name and address of Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. because his
name was prominently mentioned not only in the two wills but also in the
SPECPRO RULE 77 | 3
decrees of the American surrogate court; (3) that the rule applicable to the
case is Rule 77, not Rule 76, because it involved the allowance of wills proved
outside of the Philippines and that nowhere in Section 2 of Rule 77 is there a
mention of notice being given to the executor who, by the same provision,
should himself file the necessary ancillary proceedings in this country; (4)
that even if the Bulacan estate came from the "capital" of Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan, he had willed all his worldly goods to his wife and nothing to his
brothers and sisters; and (5) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had unlawfully
disbursed $215,000.00 to the Cunanan heirs, misappropriated $15,000.00 for
himself and irregularly assigned assets of the estates to his American lawyer
(Records, pp. 151-160).
In their reply, the Cunanan heirs stressed that on November 24, 1982,
petitioner and the Cunanan heirs had entered into an agreement in the United
States "to settle and divide equally the estates," and that under Section 2 of
Rule 77 the "court shall fix a time and place for the hearing and cause notice
thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance"
(Records, pp. 184-185).
Petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. be cited for contempt of court
for failure to comply with the Order of June 23, 1983 and for appropriating
money of the estate for his own benefit. She also alleged that she had
impugned the agreement of November 24, 1982 before the Surrogate Court
of Onondaga, New York which rendered a decision on April 13, 1983, finding
that "all assets are payable to Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan’s executor to be then
distributed pursuant to EPTL4-1.1 subd [a] par [4]" (Rollo, p. 52).
On their part, the Cunanan heirs replied that petitioner was estopped from
claiming that they were heirs by the agreement to divide equally the estates.
They asserted that by virtue of Section 2 of Rule 77 of the Rules of Court, the
provisions of Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Rule 76 on the requirement of notice to
all heirs, executors, devisees and legatees must be complied with. They
reiterated their prayer: (1) that the proceedings in the case be nullified; (2)
that petitioner be disqualified as special administratrix; (3) that she be
ordered to submit an inventory of all goods, chattels and monies which she
had received and to surrender the same to the court; and (4) that Dr. Rafael
Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular administrator.
Petitioner filed a rejoinder, stating that in violation of the April 13, 1983
decision of the American court Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. made "unauthorized
disbursements from the estates as early as July 7, 1982" (Records, p. 231).
Thereafter, petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings as she
had "to attend to the settlement proceedings" of the estate of the Cunanan
spouses in New York (Records, p. 242). The Cunanans heirs opposed this
motion and filed a manifestation, stating that petitioner had received
$215,000.00 "from the Surrogate’s Court as part of legacy" based on the
aforesaid agreement of November 24, 1982 (Records, p. 248).

On February 21, 1984, Judge de la Llana issued an order, disallowing the
reprobate of the two wills, recalling the appointment of petitioner as special
administratrix, requiring the submission of petitioner of an inventory of the
property received by her as special administratrix and declaring all pending
incidents moot and academic. Judge de la Llana reasoned out that petitioner
failed to prove the law of New York on procedure and allowance of wills and
the court had no way of telling whether the wills were executed in accordance
with the law of New York. In the absence of such evidence, the presumption
is that the law of succession of the foreign country is the same as the law of
the Philippines. However, he noted, that there were only two witnesses to the
wills of the Cunanan spouses and the Philippine law requires three witnesses
and that the wills were not signed on each and every page, a requirement of
the Philippine law.
On August 27, 1985, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order
dated February 21, 1984, where she had sufficiently proven the applicable
laws of New York governing the execution of last wills and testaments.
On the same day, Judge de la Llana issued another order, denying the motion
of petitioner for the suspension of the proceedings but gave her 15 days upon
arrival in the country within which to act on the other order issued that same
day. Contending that the second portion of the second order left its finality to
the discretion of counsel for petitioner, the Cunanans filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the objectionable portion of the said order so that it would
conform with the pertinent provisions of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980 and the Interim Rules of Court.
On April 30, 1985, the respondent Judge of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial
Court, Malolos, to which the reprobate case was reassigned, issued an order
stating that "(W)hen the last will and testament . . . was denied probate," the
case was terminated and therefore all orders theretofore issued should be
given finality. The same Order amended the February 21, 1984 Order by
requiring petitioner to turn over to the estate the inventoried property. It
considered the proceedings for all intents and purposes, closed (Records,
p. 302).
On August 12, petitioner filed a motion to resume proceedings on account of
the final settlement and termination of the probate cases in New York. Three
days later, petitioner filed a motion praying for the reconsideration of the
Order of April 30, 1985 on the strength of the February 21, 1984 Order
granting her a period of 15 days upon arrival in the country within which to
act on the denial of probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses. On August
19, respondent Judge granted the motion and reconsidered the Order of April
30, 1985.
SPECPRO RULE 77 | 4
On August 29, counsel for petitioner, who happens to be her daughter,
Natividad, filed a motion praying that since petitioner was ailing in Fort Lee,
New Jersey, U.S.A. and therefore incapacitated to act as special
administratrix, she (the counsel) should be named substitute special
administratrix. She also filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order of
February 21, 1984, denying probate to the wills of the Cunanan spouses,
alleging that respondent Judge "failed to appreciate the significant probative
value of the exhibits . . . which all refer to the offer and admission to probate
of the last wills of the Cunanan spouses including all procedures undertaken
and decrees issued in connection with the said probate" (Records, pp. 313-
323).
Thereafter, the Cunanans heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order
of August 19, 1985, alleging lack of notice to their counsel.
On March 31, 1986, respondent Judge to which the case was reassigned
denied the motion for reconsideration holding that the documents submitted
by petitioner proved "that the wills of the testator domiciled abroad were
properly executed, genuine and sufficient to possess real and personal
property; that letters testamentary were issued; and that proceedings were
held on a foreign tribunal and proofs taken by a competent judge who
inquired into all the facts and circumstances and being satisfied with his
findings issued a decree admitting to probate the wills in question." However,
respondent Judge said that the documents did not establish the law of New
York on the procedure and allowance of wills (Records, p. 381).
On April 9, 1986, petitioner filed a motion to allow her to present further
evidence on the foreign law. After the hearing of the motion on April 25,
1986, respondent Judge issued an order wherein he conceded that
insufficiency of evidence to prove the foreign law was not a fatal defect and
was curable by adducing additional evidence. He granted petitioner 45 days
to submit the evidence to that effect.
However, without waiting for petitioner to adduce the additional evidence,
respondent Judge ruled in his order dated June 20, 1986 that he found "no
compelling reason to disturb its ruling of March 31, 1986" but allowed
petitioner to "file anew the appropriate probate proceedings for each of the
testator" (Records, p. 391).
The Order dated June 20, 1986 prompted petitioner to file a second motion
for reconsideration stating that she was "ready to submit further evidence on
the law obtaining in the State of New York" and praying that she be granted
"the opportunity to present evidence on what the law of the State of New
York has on the probate and allowance of wills" (Records, p. 393).
On July 18, respondent Judge denied the motion holding that to allow the
probate of two wills in a single proceeding "would be a departure from the

typical and established mode of probate where one petition takes care of one
will." He pointed out that even in New York "where the wills in question were
first submitted for probate, they were dealt with in separate proceedings"
(Records, p. 395).
On August 13, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
Order of July 18, 1986, citing Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, which
provides that no party may institute more than one suit for a single cause of
action. She pointed out that separate proceedings for the wills of the spouses
which contain basically the same provisions as they even named each other
as a beneficiary in their respective wills, would go against "the grain of
inexpensive, just and speedy determination of the proceedings" (Records, pp.
405-407).
On September 11, 1986, petitioner filed a supplement to the motion for
reconsideration, citing Benigno v. De La Peña, 57 Phil. 305 (1932) (Records,
p. 411), but respondent Judge found that this pleading had been filed out of
time and that the adverse party had not been furnished with a copy thereof.
In her compliance, petitioner stated that she had furnished a copy of the
motion to the counsel of the Cunanan heirs and reiterated her motion for a
"final ruling on her supplemental motion" (Records, p. 421).
On November 19, respondent Judge issued an order, denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner on the grounds that "the probate of
separate wills of two or more different persons even if they are husband and
wife cannot be undertaken in a single petition" (Records, pp. 376-378).
Hence, petitioner instituted the instant petition, arguing that the evidence
offered at the hearing of April 11, 1983 sufficiently proved the laws of the
State of New York on the allowance of wills, and that the separate wills of the
Cunanan spouses need not be probated in separate proceedings.
II
Petitioner contends that the following pieces of evidence she had submitted
before respondent Judge are sufficient to warrant the allowance of the wills:
(a) two certificates of authentication of the respective wills of Evelyn and
Jose by the Consulate General of the Philippines (Exhs. "F" and "G");
(b) two certifications from the Secretary of State of New York and
Custodian of the Great Seal on the facts that Judge Bernard L. Reagan is the
Surrogate of the Country of Onondaga which is a court of record, that his
signature and seal of office are genuine, and that the Surrogate is duly
authorized to grant copy of the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose
(Exhs. "F-1" and "G-1");
SPECPRO RULE 77 | 5
(c) two certificates of Judge Reagan and Chief Clerk Donald E. Moore
stating that they have in their records and files the said wills which were
recorded on April 7, 1982 (Exhs. "F-2" and "G-2");
(d) the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose (Exhs. "F-3", "F-6" and Exh.
"G-3" — "G-6");
(e) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk certifying to the
genuineness and authenticity of the exemplified copies of the two wills (Exhs.
"F-7" and "F-7");
(f) two certificates of authentication from the Consulate General of the
Philippines in New York (Exh. "H" and "F").
(g) certifications from the Secretary of State that Judge Reagan is duly
authorized to grant exemplified copies of the decree of probate, letters
testamentary and all proceedings had and proofs duly taken
(Exhs. "H-1" and "I-1");
(h) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk that letters
testamentary were issued to Rafael G. Cunanan (Exhs. "H-2" and "I-2");
(i) certification to the effect that it was during the term of Judge Reagan
that a decree admitting the wills to probate had been issued and appointing
Rafael G. Cunanan as alternate executor (Exhs. "H-3" and
"I-10");
(j) the decrees on probate of the two wills specifying that proceedings
were held and proofs duly taken (Exhs. "H-4" and "I-5");
(k) decrees on probate of the two wills stating that they were properly
executed, genuine and valid and that the said instruments were admitted to
probate and established as wills valid to pass real and personal property
(Exhs. "H-5" and "I-5"); and
(l) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk on the genuineness
and authenticity of each other’s signatures in the exemplified copies of the
decrees of probate, letters testamentary and proceedings held in their court
(Exhs. "H-6" and "I-6") (Rollo, pp. 13-16).
Petitioner adds that the wills had been admitted to probate in the Surrogate
Court’s Decision of April 13, 1983 and that the proceedings were terminated
on November 29, 1984.
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will
only be effective in this country upon compliance with the following provision
of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in
which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in
conformity with those which this Code prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New
York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have
been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution
of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his
domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has
been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign
tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure
and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 1970
ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54
Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner
submitted all the needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the
probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts
cannot take judicial notice of them (Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank v. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266 [1974]).
Petitioner must have perceived this omission as in fact she moved for more
time to submit the pertinent procedural and substantive New York laws but
which request respondent Judge just glossed over. While the probate of a will
is a special proceeding wherein courts should relax the rules on evidence, the
goal is to receive the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible before
a purported will is probated or denied probate (Vda. de Ramos v. Court of
Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]).
There is merit in petitioner’s insistence that the separate wills of the Cunanan
spouses should be probated jointly. Respondent Judge’s view that the Rules
on allowance of wills is couched in singular terms and therefore should be
interpreted to mean that there should be separate probate proceedings for
the wills of the Cunanan spouses is too literal and simplistic an approach.
Such view overlooks the provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules
of Court, which advise that the rules shall be "liberally construed in order to
promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."
A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only result in
the delay in the administration of justice (Acain v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 155 SCRA 100 [1987]; Roberts v. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33 [1984]).
SPECPRO RULE 77 | 6
What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the
testator’s reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person (Civil Code of
the Philippines, Article 818). In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses
executed separate wills. Since the two wills contain essentially the same
provisions and pertain to property which in all probability are conjugal in
nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate. As this Court has
held a number of times, it will always strive to settle the entire controversy in
a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future
litigation (Motoomull v. Dela Paz, 187 SCRA 743 [1990]).
This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very
glaring fact — petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of
Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir
of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of
the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded
respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is
merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA
876 [1992]).
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall
"cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for
allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with
regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an
"original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time.
Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require
publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees,
and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if
he is not the petitioner, are required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's
claim, are entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under
Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause
copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be
addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of
the testator, . . . "
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall
allow petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for
the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the
brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of
all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-19759 December 20, 1922
B. E. JOHANNES, principal administrator, CARLOS D'ALMEIDA, JOHN
E. JOHANNES and IDA D'ALMEIDA, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
ALFRED D'ALMEIDA, ancillary administrator, opponent-appellant.
Fisher, DeWitt, Perkins and Brady for appellant.
Amzi B. Kelly for appellees.
1.DUTY OF ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR.—After an ancillary administration
has been completed and upon the tender of a proper receipt, it is the duty of
the ancillary administrator to deliver the assets in his possession to the
domiciliary administrator of a foreign country.
2.ON PROPER SHOWING COURTS WILL PROTECT CITIZENS.—As in this case
sometimes in the orderly administration of justice, and to protect its own
citizens, the courts will retain a sufficient amount of the assets of the estate
in custodia legis within the Philippine Islands, pending the final decision of a
foreign court as to whether or not a local resident is entitled to share in the
distribution of the estate.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Harvey, J.
[Johannes vs. D'Almeida, 44 Phil. 212(1922)]
STATEMENT
This is an appeal by the defendant from the following decision of Judge
Harvey of the Court of First Instance:
This refers to a petition presented by B. E. Johannes in his capacity as
administrator appointed by the Supreme Court of Singapore, Straits
Settlements, where the deceased Carmen D'Almeida resided on the date of
her death, to order the delivery to him of the balance of the funds of this
estate.
The records show that the administrator has presented his final report in
which it appears that he has paid all the debts and expenses of the
administration and which report was approved by this court.
It appears of record that Mr. B. E. Johannes is the lawful husband of the
deceased Carmen D'Almeida Johannes and the legally appointed
administrator of the estate of Carmen D'Almeida Johannes in Singapore,
Strait Settlements; that the said B. E. Johannes is actually within the
jurisdiction of this court and by request of his attorney of record asks the
court to direct the administrator here (the ancillary administrator) to turn
SPECPRO RULE 77 | 7
over to him as the domicile administrator appointed in the residence of the
deceased all the cash money, liberty bonds and Spanish shares pertaining to
said estate.
Ordinarily the court would have been justified in transmitting the funds of this
estate to the probate court of the last residence of the deceased for
distribution in accordance with the laws of said jurisdiction, but in this case
the administrator B. E. Johannes is temporarily within this jurisdiction and ask
the court, through his attorney, to deliver to him the balance of the funds of
the estate in his capacity as administrator appointed by the court of the last
residence of the deceased and the court is of the opinion that it is proper to
deliver the funds to said administrator.
By virtue of which, the administrator Alfred D'Almeida is authorized to
withdraw the deposit slips and all the money deposited in the bank and, after
payment of the corresponding inheritance tax, make delivery of same to the
referred B. E. Johannes in his capacity as administrator of the estate of
Carmen D'Almeida Johannes, together with the liberty bonds and Casino
Espanol shares, and after making the delivery of the funds and the payment
of the tax, administrator Alfred D'Almeida shall be relieved of his duties and
responsibilities.
The appellant contends that the court erred in considering the application of
B. E. Johannes, the principals administrator, and the motion of August 25,
1922, for the reason that it was not presented within the rules of the court; in
ordering the ancillary administrator to pay the inheritance tax; and in
ordering him to deliver the property of the estate to B. E. Johannes, as
administrator, and in denying the motion of reconsideration.
JOHNS, J.:
In different forms this is the third time this case has been before this court.
The proceedings had their origin in the death of Carmen D'Almeida, who was
then a resident of Singapore, Straits Settlements. The plaintiff B. E.
Johannes, her surviving husband, was duly appointed administrator of her
estate by the Supreme Court of Singapore, qualified and entered upon the
discharge of his duties.
At the time of her death Carmen D'Almeida left an estate in the Philippine
Islands, consisting of liquid assets of about P100,000, over which Alfred
D'Almeida was appointed ancillary administrator by the Court of First
Instance of Manila. It appears that the deceased left few, if any, debts or
claims in the Philippine Islands, and that all of the duties of the defendant
were simple, and that there was nothing to do but to comply with the
formalities of law. It also appears that the administrator in the Philippine
 SPECPRO RULE 77 | 8

Islands has been completed, and that any and all debts and expenses of
administration have been paid, and that the only remaining thing to be done
is to turn over the remaining assets to someone that is legally authorized to
receive them. Apparently, about the only question involved on this appeal is
as to whether the defendant should turn over the assets in Manila, or whether
they should be forwarded to the Supreme Court of Singapore for
distribution.lawphil.net
the defendant is peremptorily ordered to turn over and deliver all other assets
to the plaintiff, as the principal administrator of Carmen D'Almeida, or his
order. So ordered.
Araullo, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, and Romualdez,
JJ., concur.

The record is conclusive that the plaintiff is the surviving husband of Carmen
D'Almeida, and in the absence of any will, it is very apparent that, under the
laws of Singapore, as such, he is entitled to have and receive all the proceeds
of her estate. The defendant is a resident of the Philippine Islands, and claims
or asserts that he is an heir of the deceased and is entitled to share in the
distribution of the estate.

Be that as it may, that question is not before this court, and under the law
and the decisions of this court, after the administrator has been completed, it
is the duty of the defendant to deliver the assets to the plaintiff as domiciliary
administrator of the Supreme Court of Singapore, and, in legal effect, that
was the decision of the Court of First Instance.

It is the inherent duty of courts to protect property rights of its own citizens
in so far as it can legally be done.

The record before us clearly indicated that the defendant Alfred D'Almeida is
not an heir of Carmen D'Almeida, and is not entitled to share in her estate.
But no harm or injustice will be done in retaining a sufficient amount of the
assets of the estate in custodia legis within the Philippine Islands pending a
final decision of the question as to whether or not he is entitled to share in
the estate. To that extent and for that purpose, the decision of the lower
court will be modified, so that P40,000 of the estate of the deceased now
within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands shall be and remain here in
custodia legis pending the final decision as to who is entitled to share in the
estate of the deceased Carmen D'Almeida, and subject to the control and
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance in which the probate proceedings
were instituted. Such money to be placed as a special deposit in some good
bank in the city of Manila to be selected by the Judge presiding over the
probate proceedings in the city of Manila, and to remain there subject to the
approval and order of such Judge. The bank so selected shall receipt the
defendant for the money, and such receipt shall be a full and complete
voucher to the defendant for the amount in the settlement of the estate. It is
further ordered that at any time pending the final decision of such heirship
when the plaintiff shall file a good bond to be approved by the Judge
presiding in the branch of the Court of First Instance to which probate
matters are assigned, that he shall then be entitled to have and receive any
and all of the proceeds of the estate. In all other things and respects the
decision of the lower court is affirmed, with costs in favor of the plaintiffs, and

G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984
POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of
Branch XXXVIII, Court of First Instance of Manila and NENITA
CAMPOS PAGUIA, respondents.
Ermelo P. Guzman for petitioner.
Armando Z. Gonzales for private respondent.
Succession; Due Process; Attorneys; There being a proper substitution of
attorneys where the Motion to Dismiss Opposition to reprobate of will was
filed, trial judge acted properly in hearing evidence ex parte on probate of will
in question.—We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent judge. No proof was adduced to support petitioner’s contention
that the motion to withdraw was secured through fraudulent means and that
Atty. Franco Loyola was not his counsel of record. The records show that after
the filing of the contested motion, the petitioner at a later date, filed a
manifestation wherein he confirmed that the Motion to Dismiss Opposition
was his voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the time the motion was filed,
the petitioner’s former counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long withdrawn
from the case and had been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn
filed the motion. The present petitioner cannot, therefore, maintain that the
old man’s attorney of record was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing the
motion. Since the withdrawal was in order, the respondent judge acted
correctly in hearing the probate of the will ex-parte, there being no other
opposition to the same.
Same; Where circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions be passed upon even before the extrinsic validity of will is
resolved, probate court should meet the issue.—The third issue raised deals
with the validity of the provisions of the will. As a general rule, the probate
court’s authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due
execution thereof, the testatrix’s testamentary capacity and the compliance
with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of
the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has
been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand
that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is
probated, the court should meet the issue. (Maninang v. Court of Appeals,
114 SCRA 478).
Same; The U.S. law on succession in the state of Pennsylvania applies to the
intrinsic and extrinsic validity of the last will and testament of a U.S. national
and resident of Pennsylvania under whose laws a person may give his entire
SPECPRO RULE 77 | 9
estate to a complete stranger.—Although on its face, the will appeared to
have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have
denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently
established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen
and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore,
under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively
provide: x x x x the law which governs Adoracion Campo’s will is the law of
Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Although the
parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and
that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger,
the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be
contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to
the specific provisions of Philippine Law.
Same; Same.—It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16 (2) and 1039 of the Civil
Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. This was squarely applied
in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358).
Motions; Due Process; There was no denial of due process as what the court
repeatedly set for hearing was the Petition for Relief, not the Motion to Vacate
Order of Jan. 10, 1979.—As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing
for the petition for relief, the records will bear the fact that what was
repeatedly scheduled for hearing on separate dates until June 19, 1980 was
the petitioner’s petition for relief and not his motion to vacate the order of
January 10, 1979. There is no reason why the petitioner should have been led
to believe otherwise. The court even admonished the petitioner’s failing to
adduce evidence when his petition for relief was repeatedly set for hearing.
There was no denial of due process. The fact that he requested “for the future
setting of the case for hearing x x x” did not mean that at the next hearing,
the motion to vacate would be heard and given preference in lieu of the
petition for relief. Furthermore, such request should be embodied in a motion
and not in a mere notice of hearing.
Succession; Jurisdiction; Probate of Will of American citizen who left an estate
in the Philippines was properly filed in the City of Manila where estate is
located.—Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was
correctly filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an
estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death
was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of
America and not a “usual resident of Cavite” as alleged by the petitioner.
Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
probate court in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his
opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction.

PETITION for review on certiorari the order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Br. XXXVIII. Leonidas, J. [Cayetano vs. Leonidas, 129 SCRA
522(1984)]
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the order of the
respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXXVIII,
which admitted to and allowed the probate of the last will and testament of
Adoracion C. Campos, after an ex-parte presentation of evidence by herein
private respondent.
On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father,
petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita C.
Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs. As
Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit
of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of Court whereby he
adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased
Adoracion Campos.
Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition
for the reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was
allegedly executed in the United States and for her appointment as
administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.
In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at
the time of her death and was a permanent resident of 4633 Ditman Street,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila on
January 31, 1977 while temporarily residing with her sister at 2167 Leveriza,
Malate, Manila; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last wig and
testament on July 10, 1975, according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.,
nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New Jersey as executor; that after the
testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed,
and registered with the Registry of Wins at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A.,
that Clement L. McLaughlin, the administrator who was appointed after Dr.
Barzaga had declined and waived his appointment as executor in favor of the
former, is also a resident of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and that therefore, there is
an urgent need for the appointment of an administratrix to administer and
eventually distribute the properties of the estate located in the Philippines.
On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by
herein petitioner alleging among other things, that he has every reason to
believe that the will in question is a forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of
the will are null and void; and that even if pertinent American laws on
intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they
would work injustice and injury to him.
SPECPRO RULE 77 | 10
On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner through his counsel, Atty.
Franco Loyola, filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or
Interests) stating that he "has been able to verify the veracity thereof (of the
will) and now confirms the same to be truly the probated will of his daughter
Adoracion." Hence, an ex-parte presentation of evidence for the reprobate of
the questioned will was made.
On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order, to wit:
At the hearing, it has been satisfactorily established that Adoracion C.
Campos, in her lifetime, was a citizen of the United States of America with a
permanent residence at 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, PA 19124, (Exhibit
D) that when alive, Adoracion C. Campos executed a Last Will and Testament
in the county of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according to the laws
thereat (Exhibits E-3 to E-3-b) that while in temporary sojourn in the
Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos died in the City of Manila (Exhibit C) leaving
property both in the Philippines and in the United States of America; that the
Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos was admitted and
granted probate by the Orphan's Court Division of the Court of Common
Pleas, the probate court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, County of
Philadelphia, U.S.A., and letters of administration were issued in favor of
Clement J. McLaughlin all in accordance with the laws of the said foreign
country on procedure and allowance of wills (Exhibits E to E-10); and that the
petitioner is not suffering from any disqualification which would render her
unfit as administratrix of the estate in the Philippines of the late Adoracion C.
Campos.
WHEREFORE, the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos is
hereby admitted to and allowed probate in the Philippines, and Nenita
Campos Paguia is hereby appointed Administratrix of the estate of said
decedent; let Letters of Administration with the Will annexed issue in favor of
said Administratrix upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00
conditioned under the provisions of Section I, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner on April 14, 1979,
confirming the withdrawal of his opposition, acknowledging the same to be
his voluntary act and deed.
On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief, praying that
the order allowing the will be set aside on the ground that the withdrawal of
his opposition to the same was secured through fraudulent means. According
to him, the "Motion to Dismiss Opposition" was inserted among the papers
which he signed in connection with two Deeds of Conditional Sales which he
executed with the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines (CDCP). He also alleged that the lawyer who filed the withdrawal

of the opposition was not his counsel-of-record in the special proceedings
case.
The petition for relief was set for hearing but the petitioner failed to appear.
He made several motions for postponement until the hearing was set on May
29, 1980.
On May 18, 1980, petitioner filed another motion entitled "Motion to Vacate
and/or Set Aside the Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for
lack of jurisdiction. In this motion, the notice of hearing provided:
Please include this motion in your calendar for hearing on May 29, 1980 at
8:30 in the morning for submission for reconsideration and resolution of the
Honorable Court. Until this Motion is resolved, may I also request for the
future setting of the case for hearing on the Oppositor's motion to set aside
previously filed.
The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the court for June 19, 1980.
When the case was called for hearing on this date, the counsel for petitioner
tried to argue his motion to vacate instead of adducing evidence in support of
the petition for relief. Thus, the respondent judge issued an order dismissing
the petition for relief for failure to present evidence in support thereof.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. In the
same order, respondent judge also denied the motion to vacate for lack of
merit. Hence, this petition.
Meanwhile, on June 6,1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and left a
will, which, incidentally has been questioned by the respondent, his children
and forced heirs as, on its face, patently null and void, and a fabrication,
appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix of his last will and testament.
Cayetano, therefore, filed a motion to substitute herself as petitioner in the
instant case which was granted by the court on September 13, 1982.
A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the
petitioner Hermogenes Campos merged upon his death with the rights of the
respondent and her sisters, only remaining children and forced heirs was
denied on September 12, 1983.
Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the respondent judge
acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction when:
1) He ruled the petitioner lost his standing in court deprived the Right to
Notice (sic) upon the filing of the Motion to Dismiss opposition with waiver of
rights or interests against the estate of deceased Adoracion C. Campos, thus,
paving the way for the hearing ex-parte of the petition for the probate of
decedent will.
SPECPRO RULE 77 | 11
2) He ruled that petitioner can waive, renounce or repudiate (not made
in a public or authenticated instrument), or by way of a petition presented to
the court but by way of a motion presented prior to an order for the
distribution of the estate-the law especially providing that repudiation of an
inheritance must be presented, within 30 days after it has issued an order for
the distribution of the estate in accordance with the rules of Court.
3) He ruled that the right of a forced heir to his legitime can be divested
by a decree admitting a will to probate in which no provision is made for the
forced heir in complete disregard of Law of Succession
4) He denied petitioner's petition for Relief on the ground that no
evidence was adduced to support the Petition for Relief when no Notice nor
hearing was set to afford petitioner to prove the merit of his petition — a
denial of the due process and a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction.
5) He acquired no jurisdiction over the testate case, the fact that the
Testator at the time of death was a usual resident of Dasmariñas, Cavite,
consequently Cavite Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction over the
case (De Borja vs. Tan, G.R. No. L-7792, July 1955).
The first two issues raised by the petitioner are anchored on the allegation
that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he
allowed the withdrawal of the petitioner's opposition to the reprobate of the
will.
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. No
proof was adduced to support petitioner's contention that the motion to
withdraw was secured through fraudulent means and that Atty. Franco Loyola
was not his counsel of record. The records show that after the firing of the
contested motion, the petitioner at a later date, filed a manifestation wherein
he confirmed that the Motion to Dismiss Opposition was his voluntary act and
deed. Moreover, at the time the motion was filed, the petitioner's former
counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long withdrawn from the case and had
been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn filed the motion. The
present petitioner cannot, therefore, maintain that the old man's attorney of
record was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing the motion. Since the
withdrawal was in order, the respondent judge acted correctly in hearing the
probate of the will ex-parte, there being no other opposition to the same.
The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As a
general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic
validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary
capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by
law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has
declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical

considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon,
even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. (Maninang vs.
Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge
allowed the reprobate of Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was
divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him.
This contention is without merit.
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and
thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the
private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the
time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and
1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide:
Art. 16 par. (2).
xxx xxx xxx
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.
Art. 1039.
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania,
U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit
that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the
estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the
petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be contrary
to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to the
specific provisions of Philippine Law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of thesuit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case,
will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national
law of the decedent must apply. This was squarely applied in the case of
Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358) wherein we ruled:
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a
involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of America and
SPECPRO RULE 77 | 12
same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to
leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national
law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
xxx xxx xxx
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the
State of Texas, U.S.A., and under the law of Texas, there are no forced heirs
or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will
and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law,
the Philippine Law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G.
Bellis.
As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief,
the records wig bear the fact that what was repeatedly scheduled for hearing
on separate dates until June 19, 1980 was the petitioner's petition for relief
and not his motion to vacate the order of January 10, 1979. There is no
reason why the petitioner should have been led to believe otherwise. The
court even admonished the petitioner's failing to adduce evidence when his
petition for relief was repeatedly set for hearing. There was no denial of due
process. The fact that he requested "for the future setting of the case for
hearing . . ." did not mean that at the next hearing, the motion to vacate
would be heard and given preference in lieu of the petition for relief.
Furthermore, such request should be embodied in a motion and not in a mere
notice of hearing.
Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of jurisdiction
utterly devoid of merit. Under Rule 73, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, it is
provided that:
SECTION 1.Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence
of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a
or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly
filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since
 SPECPRO RULE 77 | 13

not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover,

petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate
court in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke
the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent
and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction. (See Saulog Transit, Inc. vs. Hon. Manuel Lazaro, et al., G. R.
No. 63 284, April 4, 1984).

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed for
lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., (Chairman), took no part.