SPECPRO RULE 78| 1

G.R. No. 167321 July 31, 2006 reconsideration of the judgment, order or resolution was submitted; and
(3) when notice of the denial thereof was received by petitioner. The
EPIFANIO SAN JUAN, JR., petitioner, requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari
vs. under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is for the purpose of determining its
JUDGE RAMON A. CRUZ, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 224, timeliness, considering that a petition is required to be filed not later than
QUEZON CITY and ATTY. TEODORICO A. AQUINO, respondents. 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be
nullified.

Remedial Law; Certiorari; Pro Forma Motions; The proscription against a Same; The 60-day period shall be reckoned from the trial court’s denial of
pro forma motion applies only to a final resolution or order and not to an his first motion for reconsideration, otherwise indefinite delays will ensue.—
interlocutory one.—We agree with the ruling of the CA that the petition for We agree with the ruling of the CA that the petition for certiorari filed by
certiorari filed by petitioner in the appellate court was time-barred. petitioner with the CA on November 22, 2004 was filed beyond the 60-day
However, the raison d’etre for its ruling is incorrect. Contrary to the ruling period therefor. Petitioner received, on March 18, 2004, the February 27,
of the CA, the proscription against a pro forma motion applies only to a 2004 Order of the court denying his motion for reconsideration of the
final resolution or order and not to an interlocutory one. The ruling of this December 2, 2003 Order. Petitioner had 60 days from March 18, 2004 or
Court in University of Immaculate Concepcion v. Secretary of Labor and until May 17, 2004 within which to file his petition for certiorari. However,
Employment, 432 SCRA 601 (2004), involved a final order of the NLRC and petitioner filed his petition for certiorari with the CA only on November 22,
not an interlocutory order. 2004. The 60-day period should not be reckoned from petitioner’s receipt
on June 11, 2004 of the denial of his May 7, 2004 second motion for
Pro Forma Motions; The second motion for reconsideration filed by reconsideration. The 60-day period shall be reckoned from the trial court’s
petitioner cannot be rejected on the ground that a second motion for denial of his first motion for reconsideration, otherwise indefinite delays will
reconsideration of an interlocutory order is forbidden by law or by the Rules ensue.
of Court.—It bears stressing however that while the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner assailing the December 2, 2003 Order of Settlement of Estate; Substitution of Parties; The heirs may be allowed to
the trial court based on the same grounds as those alleged in his first be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an
motion is not pro forma, such second motion for reconsideration can administrator or executor; Pronouncement of the Court in Lawas v. Court of
nevertheless be denied on the ground that it is merely a rehash or a mere Appeals, 146 SCRA 173 (1986) is no longer true.—The second paragraph of
reiteration of grounds and arguments already passed upon and resolved by the rule is plain and explicit: the heirs may be allowed to be substituted for
the court. Such a motion cannot be rejected on the ground that a second the deceased without requiring the appointment of an administrator or
motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order is forbidden by law or executor. However, if within the specified period a legal representative fails
by the Rules of Court. to appear, the court may order the opposing counsel, within a specified
period, to process the appointment of an administrator or executor who
Certiorari; Three essential dates that must be stated in a petition for shall immediately appear for the estate of the deceased. The
certiorari brought under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the nullification of pronouncement of this Court in Lawas v. Court of Appeals, 146 SCRA 173
a judgment, resolution or order; The purpose is to determine its timeliness, (1986) (relied upon by petitioner), that priority is given to the legal
considering that a petition is required to be filed not later than 60 days representative of the deceased (the executor or administrator) and that it is
from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be nullified.— only in case of unreasonable delay in the appointment of an executor or
There are three essential dates that must be stated in a petition for administrator, or in cases where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial
certiorari brought under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the nullification of settlement of the estate that the court may adopt the alternative of
a judgment, resolution or order: (1) the date when notice of the judgment, allowing the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the deceased, is no
resolution or order was received; (2) when a motion for a new trial or longer true.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ortega, Del Castillo, Bacorro, Odulio, Calma & Carbonell for petitioner.
Quino, Galang, Lucas, [San Juan, Jr. vs. Cruz, 497 SCRA 410(2006)]
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Resolution1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87458 dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction of petitioner Epifanio San Juan, Jr., as
well as its Resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
The Antecedents
Loreto Samia San Juan executed a Last Will and Testament naming Oscar
Casa as one of the devisees therein. Upon Loreto's death on October 25,
1988, Atty. Teodorico A. Aquino filed a petition for the probate of the will in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. The case was raffled to
Branch 224 of the court and was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 98-
36118.
While the petition was pending, Oscar Casa died intestate on May 24, 1999.
The firm of Aquino, Galang, Lucas, Espinoza, Miranda & Associates entered
their appearance as counsel of Federico Casa, Jr., who claimed to be one of
the heirs of Oscar Casa and their representative.
On August 14, 2002, the probate court issued an Order denying the entry
of appearance of said law firm, considering that Federico Casa, Jr. was not
the executor or administrator of the estate of the devisee, hence, cannot be
substituted for the deceased as his representative as required by Section
16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. On November 22, 2002, the court issued
an order directing Aquino to secure the appointment of an administrator or
executor of the estate of Oscar Casa in order that the appointee be
substituted in lieu of the said deceased.
SPECPRO RULE 78| 2
On February 26, 2003, Aquino filed a pleading entitled "Appointment of
Administrator" signed by Candelaria, Jesus, Arlyn, Nestor, Edna, Benhur,
Federico, Rafael and Ma. Eden, all surnamed Casa, on February 24, 2003,
praying that one of them, Federico Casa, Jr., be designated as
administrator of the estate of the deceased and that he be substituted for
the deceased.
NOW THEREFORE, in compliance with the ORDER of the Probate Court,
cited above, we, the legal heirs of the deceased OSCAR CASA, unanimously
designate and appoint FEDERICO CASA, JR., as the ADMINISTRATOR of the
property to be inherited by the deceased OSCAR CASA, in the WILL of the
late LORETO SAMIA SAN JUAN, considering that FEDERICO CASA, JR., is
the nearest accessible heir to attend the hearing of the probate of the will
and is most competent to assume the responsibilities and the duties of the
ADMINISTRATOR. We authorize him to represent us the heirs of the
deceased OSCAR CASA, on the hearing of the probate of the will of the
testatrix and to perform such duties as might be required by the Probate
Court; to take possession of the properties designated in the WILL upon
distribution by the appointed ADMINISTRATOR of the Estate of LORETO
SAMIA SAN JUAN. (emphasis supplied)3
In compliance with the order of the court, Epifanio San Juan filed a "Motion
to Declare Appointment of Administrator As Inadequate or Insufficient."4
He maintained that the heirs should present an administrator of the estate
of Oscar Casa as the representative of the estate in the case.
In his reply, Aquino stated that, under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, the heirs of Oscar Casa may be substituted for the deceased without
need for appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate. He also
claimed that the court is enjoined to require the representative to appear
before the court and be substituted within the prescribed period.
On December 2, 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying the motion of San
Juan. Contrary to its Order dated November 22, 2002, the court held that
there was, after all, no need for the appointment of an administrator or
executor as substitute for the deceased devisee. It is enough, the court
declared, that a representative be appointed as provided in Section 16,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.5

San Juan received a copy of the December 2, 2003 Order on December 15,
2003 and filed, on December 30, 2003, a motion for reconsideration
thereof. Citing the ruling of this Court in Lawas v. Court of Appeals,6 he
averred that, under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, while the court
may allow the heirs of the deceased to be substituted in cases of
unreasonable delay in the appointment of an executor or administrator, or
where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial settlement of the estate, priority
is still given to the legal representative of the deceased, that is, the
executor or administrator of the estate. Moreover, in case the heirs of the
deceased will be substituted, there must be a prior determination by the
probate court of who the rightful heirs are. He opined that this doctrine is in
line with Article 1058 of the New Civil Code, and the provisions of Section
6, Rule 78 and Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court. In this case,
however, the alleged heirs of Oscar Casa did not file any petition for the
appointment of an administrator of his estate; hence, Federico Casa, Jr. is
not qualified to be appointed as substitute for the deceased devisee. San
Juan pointed out that the December 2, 2003 Order of the probate court
contravened its August 14, 2002 and November 22, 2002 Orders.7
The motion for reconsideration was denied on February 27, 2004 where the
probate court declared that it had carefully evaluated the arguments raised
by the parties and found no compelling ground or cogent reason to set
aside its December 2, 2003 Order.8 Petitioner received a copy of the Order
on March 18, 2004.
On May 7, 2004, San Juan filed a Motion to Admit his second motion for
reconsideration dated May 6, 2004, appending thereto the December 2,
2003 Order of the RTC.9 He cited Torres, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,10 where it
was held that the purpose behind the rule on substitution of parties is the
protection of the right of every party to due process, to ensure that the
deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit
through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. The need for
substitution of heirs is based on the right to due process accruing to every
party in any proceeding, and the exercise of judicial power to hear and
determine a cause presupposes that the trial court acquires jurisdiction
over the persons of the parties.
San Juan emphasized that it is only in the absence of an executor or
administrator that the heirs may be allowed by the court to substitute the
deceased party. He averred that the purported heirs simply agreed among
themselves to appoint a representative to be substituted for the deceased,
SPECPRO RULE 78| 3
which is contrary to the requirement of a prior hearing for the court to
ascertain who the rightful heirs are. The Orders of the Court dated
December 2, 2003 and February 27, 2004 may be used by purported heirs
in order to "inherit" properties from estates of deceased parties, which will
then allow the rules of procedure to be used as an instrument for fraud and
undermining due process.11 San Juan reiterated the rulings of this Court in
Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals12 and Lawas v. Court of Appeals,13 that
court proceedings conducted or continued without a valid substitution of a
deceased party cannot be accorded validity and binding effect. He prayed
that the February 27, 2004 Order be reconsidered and a new order be
issued as follows:
(a) declaring the "Appointment of Administrator" dated February 14, 2003
insufficient or inadequate compliance with the rules of procedure on
substitution of a deceased party;
(b) directing petitioner to secure from the appropriate court the
appointment of an administrator of the estate of the deceased Oscar Casa;
and
(c) directing that further proceedings in the case be deferred until after the
substitution of the deceased Oscar Casa by the court-appointed
administrator or executor of his estate.
Oppositor prays for other and further reliefs which may be just and
equitable.14
On June 11, 2004, the probate court issued an order denying the second
motion for reconsideration of San Juan. It noted that the motion merely
reiterated the same arguments in his first motion for reconsideration which
had already been passed upon. Citing the rulings in Montañano v. Suesa15
and Riera v. Palmanori,16 it concluded that there was no need for the
appointment of an administrator of the estate of the deceased Oscar Casa
at that stage of the proceedings since a legatee is not considered either as
an indispensable or necessary party in the probate of a will.17
When San Juan received a copy of the June 11, 2004 Order of the trial
court, he filed, on July 23, 2004, a motion for reconsideration thereof. He
took exception to the probate court's reliance in the Montañano and Riera
cases, as claiming that said rulings were not relevant to the issue of the
validity of the appointment of Federico Casa Jr., by the alleged heirs of

Oscar Casa, as administrator and substitute for the deceased devisee. He
insisted that the cases dealt only with the question of whether or not the
probate court can rule on the validity of the provisions of the will; they do
not involve the same issue presented by the oppositor, namely, whether or
not a substitution of a legatee under the will who died during the probate
proceedings may be done by simply submitting an "Appointment of
Administrator," or whether or not there is a need for a deceased legatee to
be substituted by his/her duly appointed legal representative or
administrator of his estate.
San Juan further posited that the estate court, sitting as a probate court,
does not only decide on the questions of identity and testamentary capacity
of the testator and the due execution of the will; it is likewise charged with
the settlement of the estate of the testator after the will has been
approved. Thus, the probate court must not only determine the validity of
the will, but also the rightful heirs, legatees and devisees for the purpose of
settling the estate of the testator.18
Aquino opposed the motion, contending that it was, in fact, a third motion
for reconsideration, a prohibited pleading under Section 3, Rule 37 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.19
On September 8, 2004, the probate court issued an Order sustaining
Aquino's argument and denied the motion for reconsideration of San
Juan.20
San Juan, now petitioner, filed a petition for certiorari with the CA on
November 22, 2004 for the nullification of the orders issued by the probate
court on the following grounds:
A. THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHICH AMOUNTS TO LACK, OR IN EXCESS, OF
JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT THE "APPOINTMENT OF ADMINISTRATOR"
DATED FEBRUARY 14, 2003 MADE BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE ON PROPER
SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES.
B. THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHICH AMOUNTS TO LACK, OR IN EXCESS, OF
JURISDICTION IN DENYING DUE COURSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION ON THE GROUND THAT SAID MOTION IS A THIRD
SPECPRO RULE 78| 4
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHICH IS A PROHIBITED PLEADING
UNDER SEC. 5, RULE 37 OF THE RULES OF COURT.21
On December 1, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition on the ground that it
was filed beyond the 60-day period counted from notice to petitioner of the
trial court's February 27, 2004 Order. The appellate court declared that the
May 6, 2004 motion for reconsideration of petitioner was a pro forma
motion because it was a second motion for reconsideration which sought
the same relief as the first motion, hence, did not toll the running of the 60-
day period.22 The appellate court cited the ruling of this Court in University
of Immaculate Concepcion v. Secretary of Labor and Employment.23
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the CA,
contending that the orders sought to be reconsidered by him were
interlocutory, hence, cannot be considered pro forma or forbidden by the
Rules of Court. He cited the rulings of this Court in Dizon v. Court of
Appeals,24 Philgreen Trading Construction Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,25 and the cases cited in the latter decision.26 However, on
February 24, 2005, the CA resolved to deny the motion of petitioner.27
Petitioner now seeks relief from this Court, via a petition for review on
certiorari, for the reversal of the resolutions of the appellate court. He
raises the following issues:
(A)
WHETHER OR NOT THE SIXTY-DAY PERIOD FOR FILING A PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS RECKONED
FROM NOTICE OF DENIAL OF THE FIRST MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
OF AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER EVEN THOUGH A SECOND AND THIRD
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (WHICH ARE NOT PROHIBITED
MOTIONS) OF THE SAME INTERLOCUTORY ORDER HAD BEEN FILED AND
WERE LATER DENIED.
(B)
WHETHER OR NOT A PERSON NOMINATED AS "ADMINISTRATOR" BY
PURPORTED HEIRS OF A DEVISEE OR LEGATEE IN A WILL UNDER PROBATE
MAY VALIDLY SUBSTITUTE FOR THAT DEVISEE OR LEGATEE IN THE
PROBATE PROCEEDINGS DESPITE THE FACT THAT SUCH
 SPECPRO RULE 78| 5

"ADMINISTRATOR" IS NOT THE COURT-APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF respondent trial court when it wrongfully assumed in its Order denying the
THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED DEVISEE OR LEGATEE.28 third motion for reconsideration that the order sought to be reconsidered is
a final order on the merits of the case and that the motion for
On the first issue, petitioner avers that the reckoning of the 60-day period reconsideration is a third motion for reconsideration of a final order.30
for filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court from
the notice of denial of the first motion for reconsideration is applicable only The petition is denied for lack of merit.
if the subject of the petition is a judgment, final resolution, or order. It does
not apply if the subject of the petition is merely an interlocutory order. He We agree with the ruling of the CA that the petition for certiorari filed by
points out that the reason for this is that only one motion for petitioner in the appellate court was time-barred. However, the raison
reconsideration of a judgment or final order is allowed under Section 5, d'etre for its ruling is incorrect.
Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. A second motion for reconsideration of a
judgment or final order is a prohibited pleading; hence, the period for filing Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the proscription against a pro forma
a petition for certiorari may not be reckoned from notice of denial of such motion applies only to a final resolution or order and not to an interlocutory
second and prohibited motion for reconsideration. Petitioner asserts that a one. The ruling of this Court in University of Immaculate Concepcion v.
second (or even a third) motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory Secretary of Labor and Employment31 involved a final order of the NLRC
order is not prohibited; hence, the 60-day period for filing a petition for and not an interlocutory order.
certiorari may be reckoned from notice of denial of subsequent motions for
reconsideration. In this case, the December 2, 2003 Order of the trial court denying the
motion of petitioner to consider insufficient or inadequate respondent's
Petitioner further claims that the Orders dated December 2, 2003, February compliance with its November 22, 2002 Order is interlocutory. The order
27, 2004, June 11, 2004 and September 8, 2004 issued by the RTC are does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the task of the court
only interlocutory orders. They deal solely with the issue concerning the of adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their rights and
proper substitution of the deceased Oscar Casa who is one of the devisees liabilities as regards each other but obviously indicates that other things
and legatees named in the purported will of the testatrix, Loreto San Juan, remain to be done. Such order may not be questioned except only as part
which is the subject matter of the probate proceedings pending with the of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment
respondent court. Said orders did not terminate or finally dispose of the rendered in the case.32 It bears stressing however that while the motion
case but left something to be done by the respondent court before the case for reconsideration filed by petitioner assailing the December 2, 2003 Order
is finally decided on the merits. The assailed orders do not go into the of the trial court based on the same grounds as those alleged in his first
merits of the probate case, particularly on the due execution and validity of motion is not pro forma, such second motion for reconsideration can
the will. It pertains only to the proper substitution of the parties. Thus, the nevertheless be denied on the ground that it is merely a rehash or a mere
orders are not final orders from which no second or third motion for reiteration of grounds and arguments already passed upon and resolved by
reconsideration may be filed.29 It cannot also be said that the second the court. Such a motion cannot be rejected on the ground that a second
motion for reconsideration did not toll the running of the reglementary motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order is forbidden by law or
period for filing a petition for certiorari, considering that there is no by the Rules of Court.33
prohibition in the filing of a second motion for reconsideration of an
interlocutory order. Furthermore, there is no intention on the part of Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as amended by the
petitioner to delay proceedings before the lower court when he filed the resolution of the Court in Bar Matter No. 00-2-03-SC which took effect on
third motion for reconsideration, as he only sought to correct the probate September 1, 2000, reads:
court's patently erroneous application of the law. Petitioner emphasizes that
he filed the petition for certiorari with the CA in view of the grave abuse of Sec. 4. Where and when petition filed. – The petition shall be filed not later
discretion which amounted to lack of or excess of jurisdiction committed by than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In

case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such
motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from
notice of the denial of the said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts
or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person,
in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as
defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals
whether or not the same is in the aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the
acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by
law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the
Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for
compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.
Thus, there are three essential dates that must be stated in a petition for
certiorari brought under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the nullification of
a judgment, resolution or order: (1) the date when notice of the judgment,
resolution or order was received; (2) when a motion for a new trial or
reconsideration of the judgment, order or resolution was submitted; and
(3) when notice of the denial thereof was received by petitioner.
The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is for the purpose of
determining its timeliness, considering that a petition is required to be filed
not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution
sought to be nullified.34
We agree with the ruling of the CA that the petition for certiorari filed by
petitioner with the CA on November 22, 2004 was filed beyond the 60-day
period therefor. Petitioner received, on March 18, 2004, the February 27,
2004 Order of the court denying his motion for reconsideration of the
December 2, 2003 Order. Petitioner had 60 days from March 18, 2004 or
until May 17, 2004 within which to file his petition for certiorari. However,
petitioner filed his petition for certiorari with the CA only on November 22,
2004.
The 60-day period should not be reckoned from petitioner's receipt on June
11, 2004 of the denial of his May 7, 2004 second motion for
SPECPRO RULE 78| 6
reconsideration. The 60-day period shall be reckoned from the trial court's
denial of his first motion for reconsideration, otherwise indefinite delays will
ensue.35
We note that the parties articulated their stance in their respective
pleadings not only on the timeliness of the petition for certiorari in the CA
but also on the validity of the assailed December 2, 2003 Order of the trial
court. Ordinarily, in view of the dismissal of the petition because it was
time-barred, the Court will no longer delve into and resolve the other issues
raised in the petition. However, in this case, we find it appropriate and
necessary to resolve once and for all the issue of whether there is a need
for the appointment of an administrator of the estate of Oscar Casa, or
whether it is enough that he be substituted by his heirs.
Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reads:
Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. – Whenever a party to a pending
action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty
of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of
the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal
representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this
duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the
deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives
to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party,
or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the
court may order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the
appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased
and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased.
The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the
opposing party, may be recovered as costs.
The rule is a revision of Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which
reads:

Death of party. – After a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal
representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the
deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be
granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the
court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court,
and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the
interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the
deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.36
The second paragraph of the rule is plain and explicit: the heirs may be
allowed to be substituted for the deceased without requiring the
appointment of an administrator or executor. However, if within the
specified period a legal representative fails to appear, the court may order
the opposing counsel, within a specified period, to process the appointment
of an administrator or executor who shall immediately appear for the estate
of the deceased.37 The pronouncement of this Court in Lawas v. Court of
Appeals38 (relied upon by petitioner), that priority is given to the legal
representative of the deceased (the executor or administrator) and that it is
only in case of unreasonable delay in the appointment of an executor or
administrator, or in cases where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate that the court may adopt the alternative of
allowing the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the deceased, is no
longer true.39 In Gochan v. Young,40 a case of fairly recent vintage, the
Court ruled as follows:
The above-quoted rules, while permitting an executor or administrator to
represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the
heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to
cases in which an administrator has already been appointed. But no rule
categorically addresses the situation in which special proceedings for the
settlement of an estate have already been instituted, yet no administrator
has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait
for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the
administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the
SPECPRO RULE 78| 7
rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing
while the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or
dissipated.
The Rules are to be interpreted liberally in order to promote their objective
of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding. They cannot be interpreted in such a way as to unnecessarily
put undue hardships on litigants. For the protection of the interests of the
decedent, this Court has in previous instances recognized the heirs as
proper representatives of the decedent, even when there is already an
administrator appointed by the court. When no administrator has been
appointed, as in this case, there is all the more reason to recognize the
heirs as the proper representatives of the deceased. Since the Rules do not
specifically prohibit them from representing the deceased, and since no
administrator had as yet been appointed at the time of the institution of the
Complaint with the SEC, we see nothing wrong with the fact that it was the
heirs of John D. Young, Sr. who represented his estate in the case filed
before the SEC. (Emphasis supplied)41
The heirs of the estate of Oscar Casa do not need to first secure the
appointment of an administrator of his estate, because from the very
moment of his death, they stepped into his shoes and acquired his rights as
devisee/legatee of the deceased Loreto San Juan. Thus, a prior
appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate of Oscar Casa is
not necessary for his heirs to acquire legal capacity to be substituted as
representatives of the estate.42 Said heirs may designate one or some of
them as their representative before the trial court.
Hence, even on the threshold issue raised in the RTC and in the petition for
certiorari in the CA, the assailed order of the RTC is correct.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, J.J.,
concur.

G.R. No. 183053 October 10, 2012
EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioner,
vs.
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent.
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Administrators; The paramount
consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a
decedent is the prospective administrator’s interest in the estate.―The
paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the
estate of a decedent is the prospective administrator’s interest in the
estate. This is the same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into
account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of
administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those who
will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the
estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste,
improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most
influential motive to administer the estate correctly. In all, given that the
rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to be appointed
administrator of a decedent’s estate must demonstrate not only an interest
in the estate, but an interest therein greater than any other candidate.
Same; Same; Same; In a number of cases, the Supreme Court has
sanctioned the appointment of more than one administrator for the benefit
of the estate and those interested therein.―In a number of cases, we have
sanctioned the appointment of more than one administrator for the benefit
of the estate and those interested therein. We recognized that the
appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent or the
determination of a person’s suitability for the office of judicial administrator
rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the
power of appointment. Under certain circumstances and for various reasons
well-settled in Philippine and American jurisprudence, we have upheld the
appointment of co-administrators: (1) to have the benefits of their
judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented;
(2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be
represented in the management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where
the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to
settle; (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives
to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate; and when a person
SPECPRO RULE 78| 8
entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have another
competent person associated with him in the office.
Civil Law; Succession; Curtain Bar Rule; Article 992 of the Civil Code or the
curtain bar rule is inapplicable in resolving the issue of who is better
qualified to administer the estate of the decedent.―Once again, as we have
done in the Decision, we exercise judicial restraint: we uphold that the
question of who are the heirs of the decedent Cristina is not yet upon us.
Article 992 of the Civil Code or the curtain bar rule is inapplicable in
resolving the issue of who is better qualified to administer the estate of the
decedent.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Honorato Y. Aquino for petitioner.
Estelito P. Mendoza for respondent. [Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay,
683 SCRA 439(2012)]
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
The now overly prolonged, all-too familiar and too-much-stretched
imbroglio over the estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay has continued. We
issued a Decision in the dispute as in Inter Caetera.1 We now find a need to
replace the decision.
Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay (respondent Isabel) of our Decision2 in G.R. No. 183053
dated 16 June 2010, directing the issuance of joint letters of administration
to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent. The
dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of
Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall
issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to be set by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding
Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan
is likewise directed to make a determination and to declare the heirs of

decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual milieu
as proven by the parties, and all other persons with legal interest in the
subject estate. It is further directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.3
We are moved to trace to its roots the controversy between the parties.
The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June
1990. Cristina was survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico)
and five grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including herein
respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner
Emilio III, all by Federico’s and Cristina’s only child, Emilio A. Suntay
(Emilio I), who predeceased his parents.
The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both reared from
infancy by the spouses Federico and Cristina. Their legitimate
grandchildren, Isabel and her siblings, Margarita and Emilio II, lived with
their mother Isabel Cojuangco, following the separation of Isabel’s parents,
Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco. Isabel’s parents, along with her paternal
grandparents, were involved in domestic relations cases, including a case
for parricide filed by Isabel Cojuangco against Emilio I. Emilio I was
eventually acquitted.
In retaliation, Emilio I filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife,
charging her among others with infidelity. The trial court declared as null
and void and of no effect the marriage of Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco on
the finding that:
From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the
Veterans memorial Hospital. Although at the time of the trial of parricide
case (September 8, 1967) the patient was already out of the hospital, he
continued to be under observation and treatment.
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental
aberration classified as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest
even as early as 1955; that the disease worsened with time, until 1965
when he was actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrist (sic)
treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked progress, the
remains bereft of adequate understanding of right and wrong.
SPECPRO RULE 78| 9
There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected
on July 9, 1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact
would justify a declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 85 of the
Civil Code which provides:
Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes
after (sic) existing at the time of the marriage:
xxxx
(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming
to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife.
There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew
about the mental condition of plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff
continues to be without sound reason. The charges in this very complaint
add emphasis to the findings of the neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient,
that plaintiff really lives more in fancy than in reality, a strong indication of
schizophernia (sic).4
Intent on maintaining a relationship with their grandchildren, Federico and
Isabel filed a complaint for visitation rights to spend time with Margarita,
Emilio II, and Isabel in the same special lower court. The Juvenile Domestic
Relations Court in Quezon City (JDRC-QC) granted their prayer for one hour
a month of visitation rights which was subsequently reduced to thirty
minutes, and ultimately stopped, because of respondent Isabel’s testimony
in court that her grandparents’ visits caused her and her siblings stress and
anxiety.5
On 27 September 1993, more than three years after Cristina’s death,
Federico adopted his illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration over Cristina’s estate docketed as Special Proceeding Case
No. 117-M-95. Federico, opposed the petition, pointing out that: (1) as the
surviving spouse of the decedent, he should be appointed administrator of
the decedent’s estate; (2) as part owner of the mass of conjugal properties
left by the decedent, he must be accorded preference in the administration
thereof; (3) Isabel and her siblings had been alienated from their
grandparents for more than thirty (30) years; (4) the enumeration of heirs

in the petition was incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his
son, Emilio III and Nenita; (5) even before the death of his wife, Federico
had administered their conjugal properties, and thus, is better situated to
protect the integrity of the decedent’s estate; (6) the probable value of the
estate as stated in the petition was grossly overstated; and (7) Isabel’s
allegation that some of the properties are in the hands of usurpers is
untrue.
Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel’s petition for letters of
administration on the ground that Isabel had no right of representation to
the estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a
result of Isabel’s parents’ marriage being declared null and void. However,
in Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically declared that Isabel and
her siblings, having been born of a voidable marriage as opposed to a void
marriage based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the Civil Code, were
legitimate children of Emilio I, who can all represent him in the estate of
their legitimate grandmother, the decedent, Cristina.
Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the
decedent’s estate on his behalf in the event letters of administration issues
to Federico. Consequently, Emilio III filed an Opposition-In-Intervention,
echoing the allegations in his grandfather’s opposition, alleging that
Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to
administer and manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
On 13 November 2000, Federico died.
Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the trial court rendered a
decision appointing Emilio III as administrator of decedent Cristina’s
intestate estate:
WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is DENIED and the
Opposition-in-Intervention is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III (sic) is hereby
appointed administrator of the estate of the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo
Suntay, who shall enter upon the execution of his trust upon the filing of a
bond in the amount of P 200,000.00, conditioned as follows:
(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true and complete
inventory;
SPECPRO RULE 78| 10
(2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all debts, legatees,
and charge on the same, or dividends thereon;
(3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and at any other
time when required by the court, and
(4) To perform all orders of the Court.
Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of Administration
be issued in his favor.6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the
RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and
appointed respondent as administratrix of the subject estate:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision dated
November 9, 2001 of Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in
SPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the letters of
administration issued by the said court to Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if any, are
consequently revoked. Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is hereby
appointed administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo
Suntay. Let letters of administration be issued in her favor upon her filing of
a bond in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (P 200,000.00) Pesos.7
As previously adverted to, on appeal by certiorari, we reversed and set
aside the ruling of the appellate court. We decided to include Emilio III as
co-administrator of Cristina’s estate, giving weight to his interest in
Federico’s estate. In ruling for co-administration between Emilio III and
Isabel, we considered that:
1. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her
husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as their grandchild;
2. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the
decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their conjugal partnership of gains
during the subsistence of their marriage;

3. Cristina’s properties, forming part of her estate, are still commingled
with those of her husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal
partnership remains undetermined and unliquidated; and
4. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the
distribution of the latter’s estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico,
and not simply in representation of his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio
I.
In this motion, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the Court of Appeals’
Decision in favor of her sole administratorship based on her status as a
legitimate grandchild of Cristina, whose estate she seeks to administer.
Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the
Rules of Court on the order of preference for the issuance of letters of
administration cannot be ignored and that Article 992 of the Civil Code
must be followed. Isabel further asserts that Emilio III had demonstrated
adverse interests and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does not deserve to
become a co-administrator thereof.
Specifically, Isabel bewails that: (1) Emilio III is an illegitimate grandchild
and therefore, not an heir of the decedent; (2) corollary thereto, Emilio III,
not being a "next of kin" of the decedent, has no interest in the estate to
justify his appointment as administrator thereof; (3) Emilio III’s actuations
since his appointment as administrator by the RTC on 9 November 2001
emphatically demonstrate the validity and wisdom of the order of
preference in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court; and (4) there is no
basis for joint administration as there are no "opposing parties or factions
to be represented."
To begin with, the case at bar reached us on the issue of who, as between
Emilio III and Isabel, is better qualified to act as administrator of the
decedent’s estate. We did not choose. Considering merely his demonstrable
interest in the subject estate, we ruled that Emilio III should likewise
administer the estate of his illegitimate grandmother, Cristina, as a co-
administrator. In the context of this case, we have to make a choice and
therefore, reconsider our decision of 16 June 2010.
The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a
decedent is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:
SPECPRO RULE 78| 11
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent
and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband
or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the
person to apply for administration or to request that administration be
granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select.
Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference,
in the appointment of an administrator. This order of preference, which
categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the
creditors in the appointment of an administrator, has been reinforced in
jurisprudence.8
The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over
the estate of a decedent is the prospective administrator’s interest in the
estate.9 This is the same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into
account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of
administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those who
will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the
estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste,
improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most
influential motive to administer the estate correctly.10 In all, given that the
rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to be appointed
administrator of a decedent’s estate must demonstrate not only an interest
in the estate, but an interest therein greater than any other candidate.
To illustrate, the preference bestowed by law to the surviving spouse in the
administration of a decedent’s estate presupposes the surviving spouse’s
 SPECPRO RULE 78| 12

interest in the conjugal partnership or community property forming part of
the decedent’s estate.11 Likewise, a surviving spouse is a compulsory heir
of a decedent12 which evinces as much, if not more, interest in
administering the entire estate of a decedent, aside from her share in the
conjugal partnership or absolute community property.
administration thereof. Thus, we held that justice and equity demands that
the two (2) factions among the non-compulsory heirs of the decedent,
consisting of an instituted heir (Matias) and intestate heirs (respondents
thereat), should be represented in the management of the decedent’s
estate.19

It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in the Another oft-cited case is Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, where we held that
appointment of administrator of a decedent’s estate, that the appointment "inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal properties and
of co-administrators has been allowed, but as an exception. We again refer that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to deprive her of any
to Section 6(a) of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court which specifically states hand in the administration of the estate prior to the probate of the will
that letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving spouse would be unfair to her proprietary interests."20
and the next of kin. In addition and impliedly, we can refer to Section 2 of
Rule 82 of the Rules of Court which say that "x x x when an executor or Hewing closely to the aforementioned cases is our ruling in Ventura v.
administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining executor or Ventura21 where we allowed the appointment of the surviving spouse and
administrator may administer the trust alone, x x x." legitimate children of the decedent as co-administrators. However, we drew
a distinction between the heirs categorized as next of kin, the nearest of kin
In a number of cases, we have sanctioned the appointment of more than in the category being preferred, thus:
one administrator for the benefit of the estate and those interested
therein.13 We recognized that the appointment of administrator of the In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura
estate of a decedent or the determination of a person’s suitability for the is Juana Cardona while the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura
office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin" has been defined as those
judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment.14 persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the decedent’s
property (citations omitted). It is generally said that "the nearest of kin,
Under certain circumstances and for various reasons well-settled in whose interest in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the
Philippine and American jurisprudence, we have upheld the appointment of choice of administrator. ‘Among members of a class the strongest ground
co-administrators: (1) to have the benefits of their judgment and perhaps for preference is the amount or preponderance of interest. As between next
at all times to have different interests represented;15 (2) where justice and of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred.’" (citations omitted)
equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the
management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court,
or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle;16 (4) to have Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio
all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest
for the best interests of the estate;17 and when a person entitled to the of kin of Gregorio Ventura, they are entitled to preference over the
administration of an estate desires to have another competent person illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel
associated with him in the office.18 Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of
Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed administrator are Juana
Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as
In the frequently cited Matias v. Gonzales, we dwelt on the appointment of nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the
special co-administrators during the pendency of the appeal for the probate discretion of the Court, in order to represent both interests.22 (Emphasis
of the decedent’s will. Pending the probate thereof, we recognized Matias’ supplied)
special interest in the decedent’s estate as universal heir and executrix
designated in the instrument who should not be excluded in the
 SPECPRO RULE 78| 13

In Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,23 we maintained that the order of court in ignoring the applicant's distinctive status in the selection of another
preference in the appointment of an administrator depends on the special administrator.
attendant facts and circumstances. In that case, we affirmed the legitimate
child’s appointment as special administrator, and eventually as regular In Corona we gave "highest consideration" to the "executrix's choice of
administrator, of the decedent’s estate as against the surviving spouse who Special Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the wide
the lower court found unsuitable. Reiterating Sioca v. Garcia24 as good law, latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in her will," for this Court to
we pointed out that unsuitableness for appointment as administrator may compel her appointment as special co-administrator. It is also manifest
consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately from the decision in Corona that the presence of conflicting interests among
interested in the estate. the heirs therein was not per se the key factor in the designation of a
second special administrator as this fact was taken into account only to
In Valarao v. Pascual,25 we see another story with a running theme of heirs disregard or, in the words of Corona, to "overshadow" the objections to the
squabbling over the estate of a decedent. We found no reason to set aside appointment on grounds of "impracticality and lack of kinship."
the probate court’s refusal to appoint as special co-administrator Diaz, even
if he had a demonstrable interest in the estate of the decedent and Finally in Vda. de Dayrit we justified the designation of the wife of the
represented one of the factions of heirs, because the evidence weighed by decedent as special co-administrator because it was "our considered
the probate court pointed to Diaz’s being remiss in his previous duty as co- opinion that inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal
administrator of the estatein the early part of his administration. Surveying properties and that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to
the previously discussed cases of Matias, Corona, and Vda. de Dayrit, we deprive her of any hand in the administration of the estate prior to the
clarified, thus: probate of the will would be unfair to her proprietary interests." The special
status of a surviving spouse in the special administration of an estate was
Respondents cannot take comfort in the cases of Matias v. Gonzales, also emphasized in Fule v. Court of Appeals where we held that the widow
Corona v. Court of Appeals, and Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, cited in the would have more interest than any other next of kin in the proper
assailed Decision. Contrary to their claim, these cases do not establish an administration of the entire estate since she possesses not only the right of
absolute right demandable from the probate court to appoint special co- succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent but also
administrators who would represent the respective interests of squabbling a share in the conjugal partnership for which the good or bad
heirs. Rather, the cases constitute precedents for the authority of the administration of the estate may affect not just the fruits but more critically
probate court to designate not just one but also two or more special co- the naked ownership thereof. And in Gabriel v. Court of Appeals we
administrators for a single estate. Now whether the probate court exercises recognized the distinctive status of a surviving spouse applying as regular
such prerogative when the heirs are fighting among themselves is a matter administrator of the deceased spouse's estate when we counseled the
left entirely to its sound discretion. probate court that "there must be a very strong case to justify the
exclusion of the widow from the administration."
Furthermore, the cases of Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit hinge upon
factual circumstances other than the incompatible interests of the heirs Clearly, the selection of a special co-administrator in Matias, Corona and
which are glaringly absent from the instant case. In Matias this Court Vda. de Dayrit was based upon the independent proprietary interests and
ordered the appointment of a special co-administrator because of the moral circumstances of the appointee that were not necessarily related to
applicant's status as the universal heir and executrix designated in the will, the demand for representation being repeatedly urged by respondents.26
which we considered to be a "special interest" deserving protection during (Emphasis supplied)
the pendency of the appeal. Quite significantly, since the lower court in
Matias had already deemed it best to appoint more than one special In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, we unequivocally declared the mandatory
administrator, we found grave abuse of discretion in the act of the lower character of the rule on the order of preference for the issuance of letters of
administration:
 SPECPRO RULE 78| 14

adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the order of preference set

Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of
preference in the issuance of letters of administration, it categorically seeks
out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and requires
that sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator. It would be a
grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously set aside and
insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and sufficient reason
therefor.27
Subsequently, in Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya,28 we expounded on the legal
contemplation of a "next of kin," thus:
Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of
administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is
preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the law speaks of
"next of kin," the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute
of distribution, to the decedent's property; one whose relationship is such
that he is entitled to share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir.
In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters of
administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court
perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate
action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration, the
trial court acted within bounds when it looked into and passed upon the
claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.29
forth in Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of
the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with
is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator.31
Given Isabel’s unassailable interest in the estate as one of the decedent’s
legitimate grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of kin," the
appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of the same estate, cannot be
a demandable right. It is a matter left entirely to the sound discretion of the
Court32 and depends on the facts and the attendant circumstances of the
case.33
Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts and circumstances of this
case even as we reiterate Isabel’s and her sibling’s apparent greater
interest in the estate of Cristina.
These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of the order of
preference mapped out in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. They
compel that a choice be made of one over the other.
1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing animosity between Isabel, on
the one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, traced back from the time their
paternal grandparents were alive, which can be characterized as adverse
interest of some kind by, or hostility of, Emilio III to Isabel who is
immediately interested in the estate;

Finally, in Uy v. Court of Appeals,30 we took into consideration the size of, 2. Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and Emilio III
and benefits to, the estate should respondent therein be appointed as co- working harmoniously as co-administrators may result in prejudice to the
administrator. We emphasized that where the estate is large or, from any decedent’s estate, ultimately delaying settlement thereof; and
cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle, the appointment of co-
administrators may be sanctioned by law. 3. Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the management of Cristina’s
estate, has not looked after the estate’s welfare and has acted to the
In our Decision under consideration, we zeroed in on Emilio III’s damage and prejudice thereof.
demonstrable interest in the estate and glossed over the order of
preference set forth in the Rules. We gave weight to Emilio III’s Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio III’s
demonstrable interest in Cristina’s estate and without a closer scrutiny of demonstrable interest in the estate makes him a suitable co-administrator
the attendant facts and circumstances, directed co-administration thereof. thereof, the evidence reveals that Emilio III has turned out to be an
We are led to a review of such position by the foregoing survey of cases. unsuitable administrator of the estate. Respondent Isabel points out that
after Emilio III’s appointment as administrator of the subject estate in
The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate 2001, he has not looked after the welfare of the subject estate and has
to be settled does not ipso facto entitle an interested person to co- actually acted to the damage and prejudice thereof as evidenced by the
administration thereof. Neither does squabbling among the heirs nor following:
 SPECPRO RULE 78| 15

2. The delay in Emilio III’s filing of an inventory was due to Isabel’s

1. Emilio III, despite several orders from the probate court for a complete vociferous objections to Emilio III’s attempts to act as administrator while
inventory, omitted in the partial inventories34 he filed therewith properties the RTC decision was under appeal to the Court of Appeals;
of the estate35 including several parcels of land, cash, bank deposits,
jewelry, shares of stock, motor vehicles, and other personal properties, 3. The complained partial inventory is only initiatory, inherent in the nature
contrary to Section 1,36 paragraph a, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court. thereof, and one of the first steps in the lengthy process of settlement of a
decedent’s estate, such that it cannot constitute a complete and total listing
2. Emilio III did not take action on both occasions against Federico’s of the decedent’s properties; and
settlement of the decedent’s estate which adjudicated to himself a number
of properties properly belonging to said estate (whether wholly or partially), 4. The criminal cases adverted to are trumped-up charges where Isabel, as
and which contained a declaration that the decedent did not leave any private complainant, has been unwilling to appear and testify, leading the
descendants or heirs, except for Federico, entitled to succeed to her Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44 of Mamburao, Occidental
estate.37 Mindoro, to warn the prosecutor of a possible motu propio dismissal of the
cases.
In compliance to our Resolution dated 18 April 2012 requiring Emilio III to
respond to the following imputations of Isabel that: While we can subscribe to Emilio III’s counsel’s explanation for the blamed
delay in the filing of an inventory and his exposition on the nature thereof,
1. Emilio III did not file an inventory of the assets until November 14, partial as opposed to complete, in the course of the settlement of a
2002; decedent’s estate, we do not find any clarification on Isabel’s accusation
that Emilio III had deliberately omitted properties in the inventory, which
2. The inventory Emilio III submitted did not include several properties of properties of Cristina he knew existed and which he claims to be
the decedent; knowledgeable about.

3. That properties belonging to the decedent have found their way to
different individuals or persons; several properties to Federico Suntay
himself; and
4. While some properties have found their way to Emilio III, by reason of
falsified documents;38
The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his unsuitability as
administrator rooted in his failure to "make and return x x x a true and
complete inventory" which became proven fact when he actually filed
partial inventories before the probate court and by his inaction on two
occasions of Federico’s exclusion of Cristina’s other compulsory heirs,
herein Isabel and her siblings, from the list of heirs.

Emilio III refutes Isabel’s imputations that he was lackadaisical in assumingAs administrator, Emilio III enters into the office, posts a bond and
and performing the functions of administrator of Cristina’s estate: executes an oath to faithfully discharge the duties of settling the decedent’s
estate with the end in view of distribution to the heirs, if any. This he failed
1. From the time of the RTC’s Order appointing Emilio III as administrator, to do. The foregoing circumstances of Emilio III’s omission and inaction
Isabel, in her pleadings before the RTC, had vigorously opposed Emilio III’s become even more significant and speak volume of his unsuitability as
assumption of that office, arguing that "the decision of the RTC dated 9 administrator as it demonstrates his interest adverse to those immediately
November 2001 is not among the judgments authorized by the Rules of interested in the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
Court which may be immediately implemented or executed;"
In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the
protracted litigation, is the inescapable fact that Emilio III and respondent
Isabel have a deep aversion for each other.1awp++i1 To our mind, it

becomes highly impractical, nay, improbable, for the two to work as co-
administrators of their grandmother’s estate. The allegations of Emilio III,
the testimony of Federico and the other witnesses for Federico and Emilio
III that Isabel and her siblings were estranged from their grandparents
further drive home the point that Emilio III bears hostility towards Isabel.
More importantly, it appears detrimental to the decedent’s estate to appoint
a co-administrator (Emilio III) who has shown an adverse interest of some
kind or hostility to those, such as herein respondent Isabel, immediately
interested in the said estate.
Bearing in mind that the issuance of letters of administration is simply a
preliminary order to facilitate the settlement of a decedent’s estate, we
here point out that Emilio III is not without remedies to protect his interests
in the estate of the decedent. In Hilado v. Court of Appeals,39 we mapped
out as among the allowable participation of "any interested persons" or
"any persons interested in the estate" in either testate or intestate
proceedings:x x x x
4. Section 640 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the
estate of the deceased "to complain to the court of the concealment,
embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of evidence
of the decedent’s title or interest therein;"
5. Section 1041 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of
the examination and allowance of the Administrator’s account "to persons
interested;"
6. Section 7(b)42 of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the
persons interested" before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the
disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and
7. Section 1,43 Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in the estate"
to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of
the decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for.44
In addition to the foregoing, Emilio III may likewise avail of the remedy
found in Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or
administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation, or removal. – If an
executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the
SPECPRO RULE 78| 16
estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or
a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane,
or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may
remove him, or, in its discretion, may permit him to resign. When an
executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining
executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the court
grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is no remaining executor
or administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable person.
Once again, as we have done in the Decision, we exercise judicial restraint:
we uphold that the question of who are the heirs of the decedent Cristina is
not yet upon us. Article 992 of the Civil Code or the curtain bar rule is
inapplicable in resolving the issue of who is better qualified to administer
the estate of the decedent.
Thus, our disquisition in the assailed Decision:
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us
to refrain from making a final declaration of heirship and distributing the
presumptive shares of the parties in the estates of Cristina and Federico,
considering that the question on who will administer the properties of the
long deceased couple has yet to be settled.
Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata on the same issue remains good law:
The declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although the
evidence sufficiently shows who are entitled to succeed the deceased. The
estate had hardly been judicially opened, and the proceeding has not as yet
reached the stage of distribution of the estate which must come after the
inheritance is liquidated.
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the foregoing
admonition:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. - x x x. If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled
under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary
cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above
mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any
 SPECPRO RULE 78| 17

of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the participated and concurred in the rendition of the decision or signed
payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.45 resolution remains, he or she shall be designated as the new ponente.

Lastly, we dispose of a peripheral issue raised in the Supplemental If a Member (not the ponente) of the Division which rendered the decision
Comment46 of Emilio III questioning the Special Second Division which or signed resolution has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is
issued the 18 April 2012 Resolution. Emilio III asseverates that "the disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself from acting on the motion
operation of the Special Second Division in Baguio is unconstitutional and for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be replaced through raffle
void" as the Second Division in Manila had already promulgated its Decision by a replacement Member who shall be chosen from the other Divisions
on 16 June 2010 on the petition filed by him: until a new Justice is appointed as replacement for the retired Justice. Upon
the appointment of a new Justice, he or she shall replace the designated
7. The question is: who created the Special Second Division in Baguio, Justice as replacement Member of the Special Division.
acting separately from the Second Division of the Supreme Court in Manila?
There will then be two Second Divisions of the Supreme Court: one acting Any vacancy or vacancies in the Special Division shall be filled by raffle
with the Supreme Court in Manila, and another Special Second Division from among the other Members of the Court to constitute a Special Division
acting independently of the Second Division of the Supreme Court in of five (5) Members.
Manila.47
If the ponente and all the Members of the Division that rendered the
For Emilio III’s counsels’ edification, the Special Second Division in Baguio Decision or signed Resolution are no longer Members of the Court, the case
is not a different division created by the Supreme Court. shall be raffled to any Member of the Court and the motion shall be acted
upon by him or her with the participation of the other Members of the
The Second Division which promulgated its Decision on this case on 16 June Division to which he or she belongs.
2010, penned by Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, now has a different
composition, with the advent of Justice Nachura’s retirement on 13 June If there are pleadings, motions or incidents subsequent to the denial of the
2011. Section 7, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court motion for reconsideration or clarification, the case shall be acted upon by
provides: the ponente on record with the participation of the other Members of the
Division to which he or she belongs at the time said pleading, motion or
Sec. 7. Resolutions of motions for reconsideration or clarification of incident is to be taken up by the Court. (Emphasis supplied)
decisions or signed resolutions and all other motions and incidents
subsequently filed; creation of a Special Division. – Motions for As regards the operation thereof in Baguio City, such is simply a change in
reconsideration or clarification of a decision or of a signed resolution and all venue for the Supreme Court's summer session held last April.48
other motions and incidents subsequently filed in the case shall be acted
upon by the ponente and the other Members of the Division who WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Our
participated in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution. Decision in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010 is MODIFIED. Letters of
Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall
If the ponente has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is solely issue to respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment of a
disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself from acting on the motion bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in
for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be replaced through raffle Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch
by a new ponente who shall be chosen among the new Members of the 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to settle the estate of decedent
Division who participated in the rendition of the decision or signed Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.
resolution and who concurred therein. If only one Member of the Court who
SO ORDERED.
 SPECPRO RULE 78| 18

G.R. No. 164108 May 8, 2009 indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as represented by its
administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas
ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS the other civil case was already pending review before this Court at the
HOLDING CORPORATION, Petitioners, time of Benedicto’s death.
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE AMOR A. Same; Same; Same; While there is no general right on the part of a
REYES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 creditor or any person interested in the estate to intervene on the part of
and ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO, Respondents. the petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from
the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer
or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and
Wills and Succession; Settlement of Estates; Intervention; Notwithstanding there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can be
Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not protected—it is under this standard that we assess the three prayers sought
extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent by petitioners.—In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings
claim—the definition of “intervention” under Rule 19 simply does not do not provide a creditor or any person interested in the estate, the right to
accommodate contingent claims.—It is not immediately evident that participate in every aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but
intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure necessarily comes into instead provides for specific instances when such persons may accordingly
operation in special proceedings. The settlement of estates of deceased act in those proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to
persons fall within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of Court, intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to seek
not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for
“[i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their
actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special proceedings.” interest in the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by
We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, which such interests can be protected. It is under this standard that we
intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a assess the three prayers sought by petitioners.
decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of
“intervention” under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent Same; Same; Same; Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to
claims. the records of the intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable
precedent than mandating the service of court processes and pleadings
Same; Same; Same; Torts; Actions for tort or quasi-delict, being as they upon them; Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special
are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced against Proceedings do require notice to any or all “interested parties, petitioners
the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87.—Had the claims of as “interested parties” will be entitled to such notice.—Allowing creditors,
petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate proceedings
implied, then they should have filed their claim, even if contingent, under is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the service of court
the aegis of the notice to creditors to be issued by the court immediately processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the interest of the
after granting letters of administration and published by the administrator creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and disposed of
immediately after the issuance of such notice. However, it appears that the in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right
claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his actions to access the records, rather than entitling them to the service of every
in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions court order or pleading no matter how relevant to their individual claim, will
for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the administrator and the heirs
the notice to creditors required under Rule 86. These actions, being as they of the decedent, while providing a viable means by which the interests of
are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced against the creditors in the estate are preserved. Nonetheless, in the instances that
the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all “interested

parties” the petitioners as “interested parties” will be entitled to such
notice. The instances when notice has to be given to interested parties are
provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of
examining and allowing the account of the executor or administrator; (2)
Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or
administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise
encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for
the application for an order for distribution of the estate residue. After all,
even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the
existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners.
Same; Same; Same; There are reliefs available to compel an administrator
to return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and
personal estate of the deceased within three (3) months from appointment
and to render an account of his administration within one (1) year from
receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration, but a person whose
claim against the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do
so.—Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a
true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the
deceased within three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of
Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an account of his
administration within one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary
or of administration. We do not doubt that there are reliefs available to
compel an administrator to perform either duty, but a person whose claim
against the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still,
even if the administrator did delay in the performance of these duties in the
context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections
enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with
contingent claims against the estate.
Same; Same; Same; While Section 2, Rule 82 is silent as to who may seek
with the court the removal of the administrator, the Court does not doubt
that a creditor, even a contingent one, would have the personality to seek
such relief.—Concerning complaints against the general competence of the
administrator, the proper remedy is to seek the removal of the
administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82. While the provision is
silent as to who may seek with the court the removal of the administrator,
we do not doubt that a creditor, even a contingent one, would have the
personality to seek such relief. After all, the interest of the creditor in the
estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the
SPECPRO RULE 78| 19
debt, and the general competence or good faith of the administrator is
necessary to fulfill such purpose.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Andres H. Hagad, Daniel H. Hagad, Victor Cabalusa & Ralph A. Sarmiento
for petitioners.
Dominador R. Santiago for respondent. [Hilado vs. Court of Appeals, 587
SCRA 464(2009)]
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15
May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos
Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca
Benedicto-Paulino.1 At the time of his death, there were two pending civil
cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No.
95-9137, was then pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod
City, Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs
therein. The second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending with the RTC
of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and
First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein.2
On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the
RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her
favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
petition was raffled to Branch 21, presided by respondent Judge Amor A.
Reyes. Said petition acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent
to be P5 Million, "net of liabilities."3 On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC
issued an order appointing private respondent as administrator of the
estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration in her
favor.4 In January 2001, private respondent submitted an Inventory of the
Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of
her deceased husband.5 In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory,
private respondent included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned
two pending claims then being litigated before the Bacolod City courts.6
Private respondent stated that the amounts of liability corresponding to the
two cases as P136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137 and
P35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178.7 Thereafter, the Manila RTC

required private respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory
and appraisal report pertaining to the estate.8
On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a
Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela,9 praying that they be furnished
with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate
proceedings. Private respondent opposed the manifestation/motion,
disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of her husband. Even before the Manila RTC acted on the
manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that the
Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private respondent of the
required inventory of the decedent’s estate.10 Petitioners also filed other
pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of
private respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the
inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and
inaccurate.
On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the
manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not interested
parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the
intestate proceedings.11 After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners’
motion for reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court
of Appeals. The petition argued in general that petitioners had the right to
intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being
the defendant in the civil cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.
On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision12
dismissing the petition and declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the intestate
proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene,
according to the appellate court, is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court. The Court of Appeals cited the fact that the claims of petitioners
against the decedent were in fact contingent or expectant, as these were
still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts.
Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower
courts erred in denying them the right to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto. Interestingly, the rules of
procedure they cite in support of their argument is not the rule on
intervention, but rather various other provisions of the Rules on Special
Proceedings.13
SPECPRO RULE 78| 20
To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by
the courts a quo. First, they prayed that they be henceforth furnished
"copies of all processes and orders issued" by the intestate court as well as
the pleadings filed by administratrix Benedicto with the said court.14
Second, they prayed that the intestate court set a deadline for the
submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete
inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof, order the inheritance
tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to assist in the appraisal
of the fair market value of the same.15 Third, petitioners moved that the
intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administrator of her
verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her
examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and
other parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the
estate.16
The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely
informed by the rule on intervention. We can readily agree with the Court
of Appeals on that point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that an intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x" While the language
of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening
in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal
interest required of an intervenor "must be actual and material, direct and
immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant."17
Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules
of Civil Procedure necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings.
The settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of
special proceedings under the Rules of Court,18 not the Rules on Civil
Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that "[i]n the absence of
special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far
as practicable, applicable to special proceedings."
We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72,
intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a
decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of
"intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent
claims.

Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to
intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they
had sought then before the RTC, and also now before us, do not square
with their recognition as intervenors. In short, even if it were declared that
petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would
not necessarily mean the disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before
the RTC since the right to intervene is not one of those reliefs.
To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be,
let us now turn our focus to the Rules on Special Proceedings.
In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle "any
interested persons" or "any persons interested in the estate" to participate
in varying capacities in the testate or intestate proceedings. Petitioners cite
these provisions before us, namely: (1) Section 1, Rule 79, which
recognizes the right of "any person interested" to oppose the issuance of
letters testamentary and to file a petition for administration;" (2) Section 3,
Rule 79, which mandates the giving of notice of hearing on the petition for
letters of administration to the known heirs, creditors, and "to any other
persons believed to have interest in the estate;" (3) Section 1, Rule 76,
which allows a "person interested in the estate" to petition for the
allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an individual
interested in the estate of the deceased "to complain to the court of the
concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the decedent,
or of evidence of the decedent’s title or interest therein;" (5) Section 10 of
Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the examination and
allowance of the Administrator’s account "to persons interested;" (6)
Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the
persons interested" before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the
disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and (7) Section
1, Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in the estate" to petition for
an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the decedent,
after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for.
Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract,
whether express or implied, then they should have filed their claim, even if
contingent, under the aegis of the notice to creditors to be issued by the
court immediately after granting letters of administration and published by
the administrator immediately after the issuance of such notice.19
However, it appears that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort,
SPECPRO RULE 78| 21
as they arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and
Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within
the class of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under
Rule 86.20 These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the
decedent and may be commenced against the administrator pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of
Benedicto, as represented by its administrator, was successfully impleaded
in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case21 was already pending
review before this Court at the time of Benedicto’s death.
Evidently, the merits of petitioners’ claims against Benedicto are to be
settled in the civil cases where they were raised, and not in the intestate
proceedings. In the event the claims for damages of petitioners are
granted, they would have the right to enforce the judgment against the
estate. Yet until such time, to what extent may they be allowed to
participate in the intestate proceedings?
Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia,22
and it does provide us with guidance on how to proceed. A brief narration of
the facts therein is in order. Dinglasan had filed an action for reconveyance
and damages against respondents, and during a hearing of the case,
learned that the same trial court was hearing the intestate proceedings of
Lee Liong to whom Dinglasan had sold the property years earlier. Dinglasan
thus amended his complaint to implead Ang Chia, administrator of the
estate of her late husband. He likewise filed a verified claim-in-intervention,
manifesting the pendency of the civil case, praying that a co-administrator
be appointed, the bond of the administrator be increased, and that the
intestate proceedings not be closed until the civil case had been terminated.
When the trial court ordered the increase of the bond and took cognizance
of the pending civil case, the administrator moved to close the intestate
proceedings, on the ground that the heirs had already entered into an
extrajudicial partition of the estate. The trial court refused to close the
intestate proceedings pending the termination of the civil case, and the
Court affirmed such action.
If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it
was only pursuant to their desire to protect their interests it appearing that
the property in litigation is involved in said proceedings and in fact is the
only property of the estate left subject of administration and distribution;
and the court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil case because of
the unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will
 SPECPRO RULE 78| 22

necessarily reflect and have a far reaching consequence in the
determination and distribution of the estate. In so taking cognizance of civil
case No. V-331 the court does not assume general jurisdiction over the
case but merely makes of record its existence because of the close
interrelation of the two cases and cannot therefore be branded as having
acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
to protect their respective interests in the estate. Anybody with a
contingent claim based on a pending action for quasi-delict against a
decedent may be reasonably concerned that by the time judgment is
rendered in their favor, the estate of the decedent would have already been
distributed, or diminished to the extent that the judgment could no longer
be enforced against it.

Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a
closing of the intestate proceedings pending determination of the separate creditor or any person interested in the estate, the right to participate in
civil action for the reason that there is no rule or authority justifying the every aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides
extension of administration proceedings until after the separate action for specific instances when such persons may accordingly act in those
pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot be proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to intervene on
entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or
that "action to recover real or personal property from the estate or to reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if
enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the
person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such
executor or administrator." What practical value would this provision have if interests can be protected. It is under this standard that we assess the
the action against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its termination three prayers sought by petitioners.
simply because the heirs desire to close the intestate proceedings without
first taking any step to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule is but a The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and
corollary to the ruling which declares that questions concerning ownership orders issued in connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the
of property alleged to be part of the estate but claimed by another person pleadings filed by the administrator of the estate. There is no questioning
should be determined in a separate action and should be submitted to the as to the utility of such relief for the petitioners. They would be duly alerted
court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. These rules would be of the developments in the intestate proceedings, including the status of
rendered nugatory if we are to hold that an intestate proceedings can be the assets of the estate. Such a running account would allow them to
closed by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs x x x23 (Emphasis pursue the appropriate remedies should their interests be compromised,
supplied) [Citations omitted] such as the right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate
court if property of the estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently
It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conveyed.
conformed to an action-in-intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure,
but we can partake of the spirit behind such pronouncement. Indeed, a few At the same time, the fact that petitioners’ interests remain inchoate and
years later, the Court, citing Dinglasan, stated: "[t]he rulings of this court contingent counterbalances their ability to participate in the intestate
have always been to the effect that in the special proceeding for the proceedings. We are mindful of respondent’s submission that if the Court
settlement of the estate of a deceased person, persons not heirs, were to entitle petitioners with service of all processes and pleadings of the
intervening therein to protect their interests are allowed to do so to protect intestate court, then anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent
the same, but not for a decision on their action."24 or otherwise, would have the right to be furnished such pleadings, no
matter how wanting of merit the claim may be. Indeed, to impose a
Petitioners’ interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, precedent that would mandate the service of all court processes and
but they are viable interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of pleadings to anybody posing a claim to the estate, much less contingent
Special Proceedings allows not just creditors, but also "any person claims, would unduly complicate and burden the intestate proceedings, and
interested" or "persons interested in the estate" various specified capacities
 SPECPRO RULE 78| 23

would ultimately offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the
disposition of cases. petition to authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate,
or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1,
Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for
recognized by this Court, with respect to the petitioners herein, that distribution of the estate residue. After all, even the administratrix has
addresses the core concern of petitioners to be apprised of developments in acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the existence of the pending
the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge Reyes,25 the Court heard a cases filed by the petitioners.
petition for mandamus filed by the same petitioners herein against the RTC
judge, praying that they be allowed access to the records of the intestate We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline
proceedings, which the respondent judge had denied from them. Section 2 be set for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified
of Rule 135 came to fore, the provision stating that "the records of every and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof: the
court of justice shall be public records and shall be available for the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue be required to
inspection of any interested person x x x." The Court ruled that petitioners assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same; and that the
were "interested persons" entitled to access the court records in the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administratrix of
intestate proceedings. We said: her verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for
her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them
Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records to—monitor and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of
prompt compliance with the Rules governing the preservation and proper the estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.
disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of
the Inventory and the submission by the Administratrix of an annual Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true
accounting—appears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased
sum of money against Roberto Benedicto, et al., they have an interest over within three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85
the outcome of the settlement of his estate. They are in fact "interested requires the administrator to render an account of his administration within
persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x26 one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration.
We do not doubt that there are reliefs available to compel an administrator
Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the to perform either duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still
intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator
the service of court processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the did delay in the performance of these duties in the context of dissipating
interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved the assets of the estate, there are protections enforced and available under
and disposed of in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied. Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent claims against the
Acknowledging their right to access the records, rather than entitling them estate.
to the service of every court order or pleading no matter how relevant to
their individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the Concerning complaints against the general competence of the
administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while providing a viable means administrator, the proper remedy is to seek the removal of the
by which the interests of the creditors in the estate are preserved.1awphi1 administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82. While the provision is
silent as to who may seek with the court the removal of the administrator,
Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do we do not doubt that a creditor, even a contingent one, would have the
require notice to any or all "interested parties" the petitioners as "interested personality to seek such relief. After all, the interest of the creditor in the
parties" will be entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the
given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in debt, and the general competence or good faith of the administrator is
reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the account of necessary to fulfill such purpose.
 SPECPRO RULE 78| 24

All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is
correct. Nonetheless, as we have explained, petitioners should not be
deprived of their prerogatives under the Rules on Special Proceedings as
enunciated in this decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that

petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate estate of Roberto
Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and rights as provided for such
interested persons in the Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased
Persons under the Rules on Special Proceedings. No pronouncements as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.
 SPECPRO RULE 78| 25

G.R. No. 166520 March 14, 2008 only remedy against the appointment of a special administrator is Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which was what petitioners filed with
VILMA C. TAN, GERARDO "JAKE" TAN and GERALDINE TAN, the Court of Appeals. Certiorari, however, requires nothing less than grave
REPRESENTED BY EDUARDO NIERRAS, Petitioners, abuse of discretion, a term which implies such capricious and whimsical
vs. exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction.
THE HON. FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 12, evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
ORMOC CITY, ROGELIO LIM SUGA and HELEN TAN RACOMA, law, or to act at all in contemplation of law.
REPRESENTED BY ROMUALDO LIM, Respondents.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An error of judgment is one which the court
may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable
Probate Proceedings; Settlement of Estates; Administrators; The order of only by an appeal, while, on the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one
preference in the appointment of a regular administrator provision does not in which the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-
apply to the selection of a special administrator.—The order of preference judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
petitioners speak of is found in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, discretion which is tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.—Assuming
which provides: SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration for the sake of argument that petitioner Vilma is indeed better suited for
granted.—If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors the job as special administratrix, as opposed to Romualdo, who was
are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies actually appointed by the court as special administrator of Gerardo’s estate,
intestate, administration shall be granted: (a) To the surviving husband or the latter’s appointment, at best, would constitute a mere error of
wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the judgment and would certainly not be grave abuse of discretion. An error of
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; (b) If such jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other
surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person hand, an error of jurisdiction is one in which the act complained of was
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of
or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or
apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to excess of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals could not have reversed a mere
some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal error of judgment in a Certiorari petition.
creditors, if competent and willing to serve; (c) If there is no such creditor
competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as Same; Same; Same; The principal object of the appointment of a
the court may select. However, this Court has consistently ruled that the temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass into the
order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator as hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of
provided in the afore-quoted provision does not apply to the selection of a creditors and heirs.—If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the
special administrator. The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules order of preference provided in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, so
of Court for the next of kin refers to the appointment of a regular that petitioner Vilma as the supposed next of kin of the late Gerardo may
administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the appointment of the take over administration of Gerardo’s estate, they should already pursue
latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable. the appointment of a regular administrator and put to an end the delay
which necessitated the appointment of a special administrator. The
Same; Same; Same; Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice; Not being appointment of a special administrator is justified only when there is delay
appealable, the only remedy against the appointment of a special in granting letters, testamentary (in case the decedent leaves behind a will)
administrator is Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which was or administrative (in the event that the decedent leaves behind no will, as
what petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals.—Not being appealable, the in the Petition at bar) occasioned by any cause. The principal object of the

appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it
can pass into the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the
benefit of creditors and heirs.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Capahi Law Office for petitioners.
Escalon Law Office for respondents. [Tan vs. Gedorio, Jr., 548 SCRA
528(2008)]
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking the reversal of the Decision1 dated 29 July 2004 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79335. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals affirmed the Order2 dated 17 July 2003 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Ormoc City in SP. PROC. No. 4014-0 denying reconsideration of its
Order dated 12 June 2003 whereby it appointed Romualdo D. Lim as special
administrator to the estate of the late Gerardo Tan.
The factual and procedural antecedents of this case are as follows:
Gerardo Tan (Gerardo) died on 14 October 2000, leaving no will. On 31
October 2001, private respondents, who are claiming to be the children of
Gerardo Tan, filed with the RTC a Petition for the issuance of letters of
administration. The Petition was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4014-0
and was raffled to Branch 12. Petitioners, claiming to be legitimate heirs of
Gerardo Tan, filed an Opposition to the Petition.
Private respondents then moved for the appointment of a special
administrator, asserting the need for a special administrator to take
possession and charge of Gerardo’s estate until the Petition can be resolved
by the RTC or until the appointment of a regular administrator. They prayed
that their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo D. Lim (Romualdo), be appointed as
the special administrator. Petitioners filed an Opposition to private
respondents’ Motion for Appointment, arguing that none of the private
respondents can be appointed as the special administrator since they are
not residing in the country. Petitioners contend further that Romualdo does
not have the same familiarity, experience or competence as that of their
SPECPRO RULE 78| 26
co-petitioner Vilma C. Tan (Vilma) who was already acting as de facto
administratrix of his estate since his death.
On 18 March 2002, Atty. Clinton Nuevo (Nuevo), as court-appointed
commissioner, issued directives to Vilma, in her capacity as de facto
administratrix, to wit:
b.1.) requiring the de facto administratrix Ms. Vilma Tan to deposit in the
fiduciary account of the Court all money and or cash at hand or deposited in
the bank(s) which rightfully belong to the estate of the decedent within five
(5) days from receipt hereof;
b.2.) requiring the same administratrix to deposit in the same account the
proceeds of all sugarcane harvest or any crop harvest, if any, done in the
past or is presently harvesting or about to undertake, which belong to the
estate of the decedent;
b.3.) relative to the foregoing, the same de facto administratrix is also
required to submit a financial report to the Commission as regards the
background of the cash at hand or deposited in bank(s), if any, the
expenses incurred in course of her administration and other relevant facts
including that of the proceeds of the sugarcane/crop harvest, which
submission will be done upon deposit of the foregoing with the court as
above-required.3
More than a year later or on 23 May 2003, the RTC, acting on the private
respondents’ Urgent Ex-parte Motion to resolve pending incident, gave
Vilma another 10 days to comply with the directive of Atty. Nuevo. Again,
no compliance has been made.
Consequently, on 12 June 2003, RTC Judge Eric F. Menchavez issued an
Order4 appointing Romualdo as special administrator of Gerardo’s Estate,
the fallo of which states:
Foregoing considered, the motion for the appointment of a special
administrator is hereby GRANTED. Mr. Romualdo D. Lim is hereby
appointed as Special Administrator and shall immediately take possession
and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits and estate of the
deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator
afterwards appointed, upon his filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00
and upon approval of the same by this Court.5
 SPECPRO RULE 78| 27

On 14 February 2005, this Court issued a Resolution9 denying the Petition

Petitioners filed on 19 June 2003 a Motion for Reconsideration of the on the ground of late filing, failure to submit an affidavit of service of a
foregoing Order, claiming that petitioner Vilma should be the one appointed copy of the Petition on the Court of Appeals and proof of such service,
as special administratix as she was allegedly next of kin of the deceased. failure to properly verify the Petition, and failure to pay the deposit for the
Salary Adjustment for the Judiciary (SAJ) fund and sheriff’s fee. Upon
On 17 July 2003, respondent Judge Francisco Gedorio (Gedorio), in his Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, however, this Court issued
capacity as RTC Executive Judge, issued an Order6 denying petitioners’ on 18 July 2005 a Resolution10 reinstating the Petition.
Motion for Reconsideration.1avvphi1
Petitioners contend11 that they should be given priority in the
Petitioners instituted with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and administration of the estate since they are allegedly the legitimate heirs of
Prohibition assailing the 17 July 2003 Order, again insisting on petitioner the late Gerardo, as opposed to private respondents, who are purportedly
Vilma’s right to be appointed as special administratix. Petitioners likewise Gerardo’s illegitimate children. Petitioners rely on the doctrine that
prayed for the issuance of preliminary injunction and/or temporary generally, it is the nearest of kin, whose interest is more preponderant, who
restraining order (TRO) to enjoin Romualdo from entering the estate and is preferred in the choice of administrator of the decedent’s estate.
acting as special administrator thereof.
Petitioners also claim that they are more competent than private
On 29 July 2004, the Court of Appeals issued a Decision denying respondents or their attorney-in-fact to administer Gerardo’s estate.
petitioners’ Petition. On 6 December 2004, the Court of Appeals similarly Petitioners Vilma and Gerardo "Jake" Tan (Jake) claim to have lived for a
denied the ensuing Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, to wit: long time and continue to reside on Gerardo’s estate, while respondents are
not even in the Philippines, having long established residence abroad.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
rendered by us DENYING and DISMISSING the petition filed in this case andPetitioners additionally claim that petitioner Vilma has been acting as the
AFFIRMING the assailed order in Special Proceeding No. 4014-0.7 administratrix of the estate since Gerardo’s death on 14 October 2000 and
is thus "well steeped in the actual management and operation of the estate
On 22 January 2005, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review on (which essentially consists of agricultural landholdings)."12
Certiorari assigning the following errors:
As regards the denial of petitioners’ plea for the issuance of a Writ of
I. Preliminary Injunction and/or TRO, petitioners argue that such denial would
leave Romualdo, private respondents’ attorney-in-fact, free to enter
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE COURT A QUO BOTH GRIEVOUSLY Gerardo’s estate and proceed to act as administrator thereof to the
ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS’ PLEA TO BE GIVEN PRIMACY IN THE prejudice of petitioners.
ADMINISTRATION OF THEIR FATHER’S ESTATE.
The appeal is devoid of merit.
II.
The order of preference petitioners speak of is found in Section 6, Rule 78
THE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS’ PLEA of the Rules of Court, which provides:
FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR A
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.—If no
THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT.8 executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
 SPECPRO RULE 78| 28

Atty. Clinton C. Nuevo, in his capacity as court appointed commissioner,

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or directed oppositor Vilma Tan in the latter’s capacity as de fact[o]
both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving administratrix, to deposit in the fiduciary account of the court all money
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and cash at hand or deposited in the banks which rightfully belong to the
and willing to serve; estate within five days from receipt of the directive. Oppositor Vilma Tan
was likewise directed to deposit in the same account the proceeds of all
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or sugarcane harvest or any crop from the estate of the decedent. She was
the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband likewise directed to submit a financial report as regards the background of
or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the the cash on hand, if any, the expenses incurred in the course of her
person to apply for administration or to request that administration be administration. The directive was issued by Atty. Nuevo on March 18, 2002
granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the or more than a year ago. On May 23, 2003, this Court, acting on the urgent
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve; ex parte motion to resolve pending incident, gave Vilma Tan another ten
days to comply with the directive of Atty. Nuevo. Again, no compliance has
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be been made.
granted to such other person as the court may select.
This Court is called upon to preserve the estate of the late Gerardo Tan for
However, this Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in the benefit of all heirs be that heir is (sic) the nearest kin or the farthest
the appointment of a regular administrator as provided in the afore-quoted kin. The actuation of oppositor Vilma Tan does not satisfy the requirement
provision does not apply to the selection of a special administrator.13 The of a special administrator who can effectively and impartially administer the
preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin estate of Gerardo Tan for the best interest of all the heirs.16 (Emphases
refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special supplied.)
administrator, as the appointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion
of the court, and is not appealable.14 Assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner Vilma is indeed better
suited for the job as special administratrix, as opposed to Romualdo, who
Not being appealable, the only remedy against the appointment of a special was actually appointed by the court as special administrator of Gerardo’s
administrator is Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which was estate, the latter’s appointment, at best, would constitute a mere error of
what petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals. Certiorari, however, judgment and would certainly not be grave abuse of discretion. An error of
requires nothing less than grave abuse of discretion, a term which implies judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other
an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent hand, an error of jurisdiction is one in which the act complained of was
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or
law.15 excess of jurisdiction.17 The Court of Appeals could not have reversed a
mere error of judgment in a Certiorari petition.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that there was no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent Judge Gedorio in affirming Judge Furthermore, petitioners were not able to sufficiently substantiate their
Menchavez’s appointment of Romualdo as special administrator. Judge claim that their co-petitioner Vilma would have been the more competent
Menchavez clearly considered petitioner Vilma for the position of special and capable choice to serve as the special administratrix of Gerardo’s
administratrix of Gerardo’s estate, but decided against her appointment for estate. Contrary to petitioners’ bare assertions, both the RTC and the Court
the following reasons: of Appeals found that the documented failure of petitioner Vilma to comply
 SPECPRO RULE 78| 29

with the reportorial requirements after the lapse of a considerable length of denial by the appellate court of their prayer for the issuance of a writ of
time certainly militates against her appointment. preliminary injunction and/or TRO.

We find immaterial the fact that private respondents reside abroad, for the WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The
same cannot be said as regards their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo, who is, Decision dated 29 July 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
after all, the person appointed by the RTC as special administrator. It is 79335 affirming the Order dated 17 July 2003 of the Regional Trial Court
undisputed that Romualdo resides in the country and can, thus, personally (RTC) of Ormoc City, in SP. PROC. No. 4014-0 denying reconsideration of
administer Gerardo’s estate. its Order dated 12 June 2003, whereby it appointed Romualdo D. Lim as
special administrator of the estate of Gerardo Tan, is AFFIRMED. Costs
If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of preference against petitioners.
provided in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, so that petitioner
Vilma as the supposed next of kin of the late Gerardo may take over SO ORDERED.
administration of Gerardo’s estate, they should already pursue the
appointment of a regular administrator and put to an end the delay which
necessitated the appointment of a special administrator. The appointment
of a special administrator is justified only when there is delay in granting
letters, testamentary (in case the decedent leaves behind a will) or
administrative (in the event that the decedent leaves behind no will, as in
the Petition at bar) occasioned by any cause.18 The principal object of the
appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it
can pass into the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the
benefit of creditors and heirs.19

In the case at bar, private respondents were constrained to move for the
appointment of a special administrator due to the delay caused by the
failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the directives of the court-
appointed commissioner. It would certainly be unjust if petitioner Vilma
were still appointed special administratix, when the necessity of appointing
one has been brought about by her defiance of the lawful orders of the RTC
or its appointed officials. Petitioners submit the defense that petitioner
Vilma was unable to comply with the directives of the RTC to deposit with
the court the income of Gerardo’s estate and to provide an accounting
thereof because of the fact that Gerardo’s estate had no income. This
defense is clearly specious and insufficient justification for petitioner Vilma’s
non-compliance. If the estate truly did not have any income, petitioners
should have simply filed a manifestation to that effect, instead of continuing
to disregard the court’s orders.

Finally, as we are now resolving the case in favor of private respondents,

there is no longer any need to discuss petitioners’ arguments regarding the

G.R. No. 101512 August 7, 1992
NILDA GABRIEL, EVA GABRIEL, EDGAR GABRIEL, GEORGE GABRIEL,
ROSEMARIE GABRIEL, MARIBEL GABRIEL, CYNTHIA GABRIEL,
RENATO GABRIEL, GERARDO GABRIEL, JOJI ZORAYDA GABRIEL,
DANIEL GABRIEL and FELICITAS JOSE-GABRIEL, petitioners,
vs.
HON COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL E. YUZON, Judge, Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI, and ROBERTO DINDO GABRIEL,
respondents.
Remedial Law; Administration of Decedent Estates; Order of preference in
the issuance of letters of administration to be observed in appointing an
administrator.—Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes
the order of preference in the issuance of letters of administration,
categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the
creditors, and requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an
administrator. It would be a grave abuse of discretion for the probate court
to imperiously set aside and insouciantly ignore that directive without any
valid and sufficient reason therefor.
Same; Same; In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a
deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in
said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator.—In the
appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the
principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the
one to be appointed as administrator. This is the same consideration which
Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of
preference in the appointment of administrators for the estate. The
underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap the
benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or,
on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or
mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to
administer the estate correctly.
Same; Same; Petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel has every right and is very
much entitled to the administration of the estate of her husband since one
who has greater interest in the estate is preferred to another who has
less.—Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a
portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from her share in
SPECPRO RULE 78| 30
the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as much, if not
more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other
next of kin. On this ground alone, petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel, the
widow of the deceased Domingo Gabriel, has every right and is very much
entitled to the administration of the estate of her husband since one who
has greater interest in the estate is preferred to another who has less.
Same; Same; Failure to apply for letters of administration for thirty (30)
days after decedent’s death is not sufficient to exclude the widow from the
administration of the estate of her husband.—It is true that Section 6(b) of
Rule 78 provides that the preference given to the surviving spouse or next
of kin may be disregarded by the court where said persons neglect to apply
for letters of administration for thirty (30) days after the decedent’s death.
However, it is our considered opinion that such failure is not sufficient to
exclude the widow from the administration of the estate of her husband.
There must be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the widow from
the administration.
Same; Same; Just as the order of preference is not absolute and may be
disregarded for valid cause so may the 30-day period be likewise waived.—
Moreover, just as the order of preference is not absolute and may be
disregarded for valid cause despite the mandatory tenor in the opening
sentence of Rule 78 for its observance, so may the 30-day period be
likewise waived under the permissive tone in paragraph (b) of said rule
which merely provides that said letters, as an alternative, “may be granted
to one or more of the principal creditors.”
Same; Same; Determination of a person’s suitability for the office of judicial
administrator rests in the sound judgment of the Court exercising the
power of appointment.—On the other hand, we feel that we should not
nullify the appointment of private respondent as administrator. The
determination of a person’s suitability for the office of judicial administrator
rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the
power of appointment and said judgment is not to be interfered with on
appeal unless the said court is clearly in error. Administrators have such a
right and corresponding interest in the execution of their trust as would
entitle them to protection from removal without just cause. Thus, Section 2
of Rule 82 provides the legal and specific causes authorizing the probate
court to remove an administrator.

Same; Same; The removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims,
caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the Estate.—While it is
conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in the removal of
an administrator, it must, however, have some fact legally before it in order
to justify such removal. There must be evidence of an act or omission on
the part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules
or the orders of the court which it deems sufficient or substantial to warrant
the removal of the administrator. In the instant case, a mere importunity
by some of the heirs of the deceased, there being no factual and substantial
bases therefor, is not adequate ratiocination for the removal of private
respondent. Suffice it to state that the removal of an administrator does not
lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the
estate. In addition, the court may also exercise its discretion in appointing
an administrator where those who are entitled to letters fail to apply
therefor within a given time.
Same; Same; Co-administrators; Various reasons upholding the
appointment of co-administrators.—Under both Philippine and American
jurisprudence, the appointment of co-administrators has been upheld for
various reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps
at all times to have different interests represented; (2) where justice and
equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the
management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large
or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle; (4) to have all
interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for
the best interests of the estate; and (5) when a person entitled to the
administration of an estate desires to have another competent person
associated with him in the office.
APPEAL by certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. [Gabriel
vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 413(1992)]
REGALADO, J.:
In its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 19797 promulgated on August 23, 1991, 1
respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by
herein petitioners assailing the orders of the lower court in Special
Proceeding No. 88-44589 thereof which effectively sustained the
appointment of private respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel as administrator
of the estate of the late Domingo Gabriel.
SPECPRO RULE 78| 31
Petitioners' present appeal by certiorari would have this Court set aside that
decision of respondent court, hence the need to examine the chronology of
antecedent facts, as found by respondent court and detailed hereunder,
pertinent to and which culminated in their recourse now before us.
On May 12, 1988, or nine (9) months after Domingo Gabriel died on August
6, 1987, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XI, a petition for letters of administration alleging, among others,
that he is the son of the decedent, a college graduate, engaged in business,
and is fully capable of administering the estate of the late Domingo Gabriel.
Private respondent mentioned eight (8) of herein petitioners as the other
next of kin and heirs of the decedent. 2
On May 17, 1988, the court below issued an order 3 setting the hearing of
the petition on June 29, 1988, on which date all persons interested may
show cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted. The court
further directed the publication of the order in "Mabuhay," a newspaper of
general circulation, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. No
opposition having been filed despite such publication of the notice of
hearing, private respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex parte.
Thereafter, the probate court issued an order, dated July 8, 1988,
appointing private respondent as administrator of the intestate estate of the
late Domingo Gabriel on a bond of P30,000.00. 4
Subsequently, a notice to creditors for the filing of claims against the estate
of the decedent was published in the "Metropolitan News." As a
consequence, Aida Valencia, mother of private respondent, filed a "Motion
to File Claim of (sic) the Intestate Estate of Domingo P. Gabriel" alleging
that the decision in a civil case between her and the deceased remained
unsatisfied and that she thereby had an interest in said estate. 5
On December 12, 1988, private respondent filed for approval by the
probate court an "Inventory and Appraisal" placing the value of the
properties left by the decedent at P18,960,000.00, which incident was set
for hearing on January 16, 1989. 6
On February 2, 1989, petitioners Nilda, Eva, Boy, George, Rosemarie, and
Maribel, all surnamed Gabriel, filed their "Opposition and Motion" praying
for the recall of the letters of administration issued to private respondent
and the issuance of such letters instead to petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the

legitimate daughter of the deceased, or any of the other oppositors who are
the herein petitioners. 7 After some exchanges and on order of the court,
petitioners filed an "Opposition to the Petition and Motion," dated May 20,
1989, alleging that (1) they were not duly informed by personal notice of
the petition for administration; (2) petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the
legitimate daughter, should be preferred over private respondent; (3)
private respondent has a conflicting and/or adverse interest against the
estate because he might prefer the claims of his mother and (4) most of
the properties of the decedent have already been relinquished by way of
transfer of ownership to petitioners and should not be included in the value
of the estate sought to be administered by private respondent. 8
On September 21, 1989, the probate court issued an order denying the
opposition of petitioners on the ground that they had not shown any
circumstance sufficient to overturn the order of July 8, 1988, in that (1) no
evidence was submitted by oppositor Nilda Gabriel to prove that she is a
legitimate daughter of the deceased; and (2) there is no proof to show that
the person who was appointed administrator is unworthy, incapacitated or
unsuitable to perform the trust as to make his appointment inadvisable
under these circumstances. 9 The motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners was likewise denied in an order dated December 22, 1989. 10
From said orders, herein petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals, on the following grounds:
1. The orders of September 21, 1989 and December 22, 1989 are null
and void, being contrary to the facts, law and jurisprudence on the matter;
2. Respondent judge, in rendering the aforesaid orders, gravely acted
with abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction,
hence said orders are null and void ab initio; and
3. Private respondent is morally incompetent and unsuitable to
perform the duties of an administrator as he would give prior preference to
the claims of his mother against the estate itself. 11
As stated at the outset, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing
that petition for certiorari on the ground that the appointment of an
administrator is left entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court which
may not be interfered with unless abused; that the fact that there was no
personal notice served on petitioners is not a denial of due process as such
SPECPRO RULE 78| 32
service is not a jurisdictional requisite and petitioners were heard on their
opposition; and that the alleged violation of the order of preference, if any,
is an error of fact or law which is a mistake of judgment, correctible by
appeal and not by the special civil action of certiorari. 12
In the petition for review on certiorari at bar, petitioners primarily aver that
under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, it is the surviving spouse
who is first in the order of preference for the appointment of an
administrator. Petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel is the widow and legal
surviving spouse of the deceased Domingo Gabriel and should, therefore,
be preferred over private respondent who is one of the illegitimate children
of the decedent by claimant. Aida Valencia. Secondly, they claim that
assuming that the widow is incompetent, the next of kin must be
appointed. As between a legitimate and an illegitimate child, the former is
preferred, hence petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter, must
be preferred over private respondent who is an illegitimate son. Thirdly, it
is contended that the non-observance or violation per se of the order of
preference already constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that the court did not
commit a grave abuse of discretion in not following the order of preference
because the same is not absolute and the choice of who to appoint rests in
the sound discretion of the court. He calls attention to the fact that
petitioners Nilda Gabriel and Felicitas Jose-Gabriel never applied for
appointment despite the lapse of more than nine (9) months from the
death of Domingo Gabriel, hence it was not possible for the probate court
to have considered them for appointment. Besides, it is not denied that
several properties of the deceased have already been relinquished to herein
petitioners, hence they would have no interest in applying for letters of
administration. Lastly, private respondent submits that it has not been
shown that he is incompetent nor is he disqualified from being appointed or
serving as administrator.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
 SPECPRO RULE 78| 33

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. 15
kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such On this ground alone, petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel, the widow of the
surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if deceased Domingo Gabriel, has every right and is very much entitled to the
competent and willing to serve; administration of the estate of her husband since one who has greater
interest in the estate is preferred to another who has less. 16
(b) If such husband or wife, as the case may be, or the next of kin, or
the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband Private respondent, however, argues that Felicitas Jose-Gabriel may no
or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the longer be appointed administratrix by reason of her failure to apply for
person to apply for administration or to request that administration be letters of administration within thirty (30) days from the death of her
granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the husband, as required under the rules.
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
It is true that Section 6(b) of Rule 78 provides that the preference given to
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may the surviving spouse or next of kin may be disregarded by the court where
be granted to such other person as the court may select. (Emphases ours.) said persons neglect to apply for letters of administration for thirty (30)
days after the decedent's death. However, it is our considered opinion that
Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of such failure is not sufficient to exclude the widow from the administration of
preference in the issuance of letters of administration, categorically seeks the estate of her husband. There must be a very strong case to justify the
out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and requires exclusion of the widow from the administration. 17
that sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator. It would be a
grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously set aside and In the case at bar, there is no compelling reason sufficient to disqualify
insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and sufficient reason Felicitas Jose-Gabriel from appointment as administratrix of the decedent's
therefor. estate. Moreover, just as the order of preference is not absolute and may
be disregarded for valid cause 18 despite the mandatory tenor in the
In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, opening sentence of Rule 78 for its observance, so may the 30-day period
the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the be likewise waived under the permissive tone in paragraph (b) of said rule
one to be appointed as administrator. This is the same consideration which which merely provides that said letters, as an alternative, "may be granted
Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of to one or more of the principal creditors."
preference in the appointment of administrators for the estate. The
underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap the On the other hand, we feel that we should not nullify the appointment of
benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, private respondent as administrator. The determination of a person's
on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in
mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and
administer the estate correctly. 13 said judgment is not to be interfered with on appeal unless the said court is
clearly in error. 19 Administrators have such a right and corresponding
This is likewise the same consideration which the law takes into account in interest in the execution of their trust as would entitle them to protection
establishing the preference of the widow to administer the estate of her from removal without just cause. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 82 provides the
husband upon the latter's death, because she is supposed to have an legal and specific causes authorizing the probate court to remove an
interest therein as a partner in the conjugal partnership. 14 Under the law, administrator.
the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the
exclusive property of the decedent, aside from her share in the conjugal While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in the
partnership. For such reason, she would have as much, if not more, interest removal of an administrator, it must, however, have some fact legally
 SPECPRO RULE 78| 34

before it in order to justify such removal. There must be evidence of an act petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel and private respondent Roberto Dindo
or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in Gabriel. As earlier stated, the purpose of having co-administrators is to
disregard of the rules or the orders of the court which it deems sufficient or have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have
substantial to warrant the removal of the administrator. 20 In the instant different interests represented, especially considering that in this
case, a mere importunity by some of the heirs of the deceased, there being proceeding they will respectively represent the legitimate and illegitimate
no factual and substantial bases therefor, is not adequate ratiocination for groups of heirs to the estate. Thereby, it may reasonably be expected that
the removal of private respondent. Suffice it to state that the removal of an all interested persons will be satisfied, with the representatives working in
administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs harmony under the direction and supervision of the probate court.
or beneficiaries of the estate. In addition, the court may also exercise its
discretion in appointing an administrator where those who are entitled to WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is MODIFIED by
letters fail to apply therefor within a given time. 21 AFFIRMING the validity of the appointment of respondent Roberto Dindo
Gabriel as judicial administrator and ORDERING the appointment of
On the equiponderance of the foregoing legal positions, we see no reason petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel as co-administratrix in Special Proceeding
why, for the benefit of the estate and those interested therein, more than No. 88-4458 of Branch XI, Regional Trial Court of Manila.
one administrator may not be appointed since that is both legally
permissible and sanctioned in practice. 22 Section 6(a) of Rule 78 SO ORDERED.
specifically states that letters of administration may be issued to both the
surviving spouse and the next of Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Nocon, JJ., concur.
kin. 23 In fact, Section 2 of Rule 82 contemplates a contingency which may
arise when there is only one administrator but which may easily be
remediable where there is co-administration, to wit: "When an executor or
administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the remaining executor or
administrator may administer the trust alone, . . . ." Also, co-administration
herein will constitute a recognition of both the extent of the interest of the
widow in the estate and the creditable services rendered to and which may
further be expected from private respondent for the same estate.

Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of co-

administrators has been upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have the
benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different
interests represented; 24 (2) where justice and equity demand that
opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the
estate of the deceased; 25
(3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and
perplexing one to settle; 26 (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and
the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate;
27 and (5) when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires
to have another competent person associated with him in the office. 28

Under the circumstances obtaining herein, we deem it just, equitable and

advisable that there be a co-administration of the estate of the deceased by