SPECPRO RULE 79| 1

G.R. No. L-17759 December 17, 1962

On November 10, 1959 Maria V. Lindayag died intestate in Olongapo,
ISABEL V. SAGUINSIN, petitioner-appellant, vs. Zambales. On May 27, 1960 her sister, Isabel V. Saguinsin filed with the
DIONISIO LINDAYAG, ET AL., oppositors-appellees. Court of First Instance of said province a verified petition for the issuance in
her favor of letters of administration over the estate of said deceased,
alleging, among other things, that the latter left real and personal
Executors and Administrators; Appointment; Who may be appointed properties situated in the Provinces of Zambales and Bulacan worth
administrator; When sister of decedent may not be appointed.—Where it is approximately P100,000.00; that the names, ages and residences of her
undisputed that the decedent left a husband and three legally adopted surviving heirs were: (1) Dionisio Lindayag, 60 years of age, surviving
children, a petition for issuance of letters of administration in favor of the husband, residing at Olongapo, Zambales, (2) Isabel V. Saguinsin 54 years
sister of said decedent was properly dismissed for lack of interest in the of age, sister of the deceased, residing at Hagonoy, Bulacan (3) Aurea V.
estate, she being neither an heir nor a creditor thereof. Sacdalan, 46 years of age, sister of the deceased, and (4) Ines V. Calayag,
70 years of age, sister of the deceased, both residing at Paombong,
Same; Same; Concept of “an interested person” in the estate of Bulacan; and that, as far as petitioner knew, the decedent left no debts at
decedent.—An interested party has been defined in this connection as one the time of her death.
who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a
claim against the estate, such as a creditor (Intestate Estate of Julio On June 21, 1960 Dionisio V. Lindayag, the surviving spouse, in his behalf
Magbanwa, 40 O.G. 1171). And it is well settled in this jurisdiction that in and in representation of the minors Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all
civil actions as well as special proceedings, the interest required in order surnamed Lindayag, filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground
that a person may be a party thereto must be material and direct, and not lack of interest in the estate, she being neither heir nor a creditor thereof.
merely indirect or contingent (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, L-3378, August 22, The motion alleged that the late Maria V. Lindayag was survived by her
1951; Espinosa vs. Barrios, 70 Phil. 311). husband — the movant — and their legally adopted minor children named
Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag the decedent
Pleadings and Practice; Motion to Dismiss; Hearing; When evidence may be having left no legitimate natural or illegitimate child. A certified true copy of
presented; Lack of legal capacity to institute proceedings as ground.—The the decision of the Justice of the Peace of Olongapo, Zambales, dated July
rule is that the hearing on the motion to dismiss should be conducted as an 6, 1953 decreeing the adoption of said minors the decedent and her
ordinary hearing where the parties are allowed to present evidence, except husband was attached to the motion.
when the motion is based on the failure of the complaint or of the petition
to state a cause of action. (Asejo vs. Leonoso, 44 O.G. No. 10, p. 3832.) In opposing the motion to dismiss petitioner argued that only the facts
Consequently, where the motion to dismiss the petition was grounded on alleged in the petition should be considered in determining its
the petitioner’s lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings, the sufficiency.lawphil.net
argument of the petitioner that only the facts alleged in the petition should
be considered in determining its sufficiency was properly overruled and the On July 28, 1960, after due hearing on the motion aforesaid, the Court
lower court was correct in considering the evidence presented during the issued the following order of dismissal:
hearing of said motion to prove petitioner’s lack of legal capacity to
commence the proceedings. It appearing that the herein petitioner is only a sister of the deceased Maria
V. Lindayag; that the deceased is survived by her husband and her three
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zambales. (3) adopted children named: Jesus, Concepcion and Catherine, all
[Saguinsin vs. Lindayag, 6 SCRA 874(1962)] surnamed Lindayag were adopted by the deceased on July 6, 1953; that
the herein petitioner is obviously not an heir and has no interest in estate;
DIZON, J.: and that the surviving heirs oppose the instant petition on the ground that
 SPECPRO RULE 79| 2

they want to settle the estate extra-judicially among them to avoid
unnecessary expenses in prosecuting this case, the Court finds the
oppositors' opposition to be well taken.
WHEREFORE, let this case be dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.
Petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of the above order having been
denied, she took the present appeal.
rules of evidence, and it has been held that for that purpose, the hearing
should be conducted as an ordinary hearing; and that the parties should be
allowed to present evidence, except when the motion is based on the failure
of the complaint or of the petition to state a cause of action (Asejo vs.
Leonoso, 44 O. G. No. 10, 3832). In the present case, the motion to
dismiss the petition was grounded on petitioner's lack of legal capacity to
institute the proceedings which, as already stated heretofore, was fully
substantiated by the evidence presented during the hearing.

The question to be resolved in this appeal is whether petitioner is "an IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order appealed from is affirmed,
interested person" in the estate of deceased Maria V. Lindayag. with costs.

According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
of administration must be filed an "interested person". An interested party Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
has defined in this connection as one who would be benefited by the estate,
such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
creditor (Intestate Estate of Julio Magbanwa, 40 O.G. 1171). And it is well
settled in this jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as special proceedings,
the interest required in order that a person may be a party thereto must be
material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. (Trillana vs.
Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-3378, August 22, 1951; Espinosa vs. Barrios, 70
Phil. 311)

Petitioner's interest in the estate of the deceased Maria V. Lindayag was

disputed, through a motion to dismiss her petition, by the surviving spouse
on the ground that said deceased was survived by him and by three legally
adopted children — thus excluding petitioner as an heir. In the course of
the hearing held in connection with said motion, evidence was introduced in
support thereof which, according to the lower court, established that said
deceased was survived not only by her husband but by three legally
adopted children named Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all surnamed
Lindayag.

Upon these facts — which petitioner does not dispute — it is manifest that
she is not an heir of her deceased sister and, therefore, has no material and
direct interest in her estate.

Petitioner's view that when a motion to dismiss a complaint or a petition is

filed, only the facts alleged in the complaint or petition may be taken into
account is not entirely correct. To the contrary, the rule is that at said
hearing said motion may be proved or disproved in accordance with the

G.R. No. L-44888 February 7, 1992
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
FIDEL P. DUMLAO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Agusan
Del Norte and Butuan City, BONIFACIO CANONOY, Judicial
Administrator of the Estate of Regino Canonoy, CARMEN VDA. DE
CANONOY, TEODULO CANONOY, REGINO CANONOY, JR.,
MARIANITA CANONOY GUINTO and GLORIA CANONOY BASA,
respondents.
Dominguez & Paderna Law Offices Co. for petitioner.
Wenceslao B. Rosales for private respondents.
Special Proceedings; Settlement of Estate; The allegation that a petitioner
seeking letters of administration is an interested person does not fall within
the enumeration of jurisdictional facts.—The jurisdictional facts alluded to
are: the death of the testator, his residence at the time of his death in the
province where the probate court is sitting or, if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, his having left his estate in such province. These facts are
amply enumerated in the petition filed by Gonzalez. The fact of death of the
intestate and of his residence within the country are foundation facts upon
which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate
rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time
of his death, and left no assets in the state, and none came into it
afterwards, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of
administration in any county. Clearly, the allegation that a petitioner
seeking letters of administration is an interested person, does not fall within
the enumeration of jurisdictional facts. Of course, since the opening
sentence of the section requires that the petition must be filed by an
interested person, it goes without saying that a motion to dismiss may lie
not on the basis of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court, but rather on
the ground of lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings.
Same; Same; Court defined an interested party as one who would be
benefited by the estate, such an heir or one who has a claim against the
estate such as a creditor.—This is precisely what happened in Saguinsin vs.
Lindayag, where the dismissal of a petition for letters of administration was
affirmed because the petitioner “is not an heir of her deceased sister and,
SPECPRO RULE 79| 3
therefore, has no material and direct interest in her estate.” In the said
case, this Court defined an interested party as one who would be benefited
by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate,
such as a creditor; this interest must be material and direct, not merely
indirect or contingent.
Remedial Law; Motion; If a motion to dismiss is not filed, any of the
grounds available for such a motion except for improper venue may be
pleaded as an affirmative defense and a preliminary hearing may be had
thereon; Exceptions.—However, if a motion to dismiss is not filed, as what
obtains in this case, any of the grounds available for such a motion, except
for improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense, and a
preliminary hearing thereon may be had as if a motion to dismiss had been
filed. Excepted from the above rules are the following grounds: (a) failure
to state a cause of action which may be alleged in a later pleading if one is
permitted, or by a motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on
the merits, and (b) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action,
subject to the exception as hereinafter discussed.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; While it may be true that jurisdiction may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings, a party who has affirmed and
invoked it in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief cannot be
allowed to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape penalty.—
Clearly, therefore, not only had the administrator and the rest of the
private respondents voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial
court, they even expressly affirmed and invoked such jurisdiction in praying
for reliefs and remedies in their favor, namely: (a) denial of Gonzalez’
prayer to be appointed as administrator, (b) appointment of Bonifacio
Canonoy as administrator, (c) denial of petitioner Shell’s amended claim
against the estate, and (d) the granting of the counterclaim. Hence, they
cannot now be heard to question the jurisdiction of the trial court. While it
may be true that jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, a party who has affirmed and invoked it in a particular matter
to secure an affirmative relief cannot be allowed to afterwards deny that
same jurisdiction to escape penalty.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision of the then Court of First
Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, Br. 2. Dumlao, J. [Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Dumlao, 206 SCRA 40(1992)]
 SPECPRO RULE 79| 4

DAVIDE, JR., J.: perform his duties efficiently;" and he is an employee of Shell Philippines,
Inc., an alleged creditor of the estate, and so "he would not be able to
Brought to focus in this petition are the following issues: (a) whether the properly and effectively protect the interest of the estate in case of
jurisdictional facts that need to be stated in a petition for letters of conflicts." They, however, "propose" and pray that since Bonifacio Canonoy,
administration under Section 2(a), Rule 79 of the Rules of Court include the one of Regino's sons, enjoys preference in appointment pursuant to Section
specific assertion that the petitioner therein is an "interested person," and 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, he should "be appointed administrator of
(b) whether the administration court may properly and validly dismiss a the said intestate estate and the corresponding letters of administration be
petition for letters of administration filed by one who is not an "interested issued in his favor."
person" after having appointed an heir of the decedent as administrator of
the latter's intestate estate and set for pre-trial a claim against the said On 25 July 1973, after due hearing, the trial court appointed Bonifacio
estate Canonoy as administrator of the intestate estate of Regino Canonoy, 3
having found him competent to act as such. None of the parties moved to
Ricardo M. Gonzalez, District Manager of Shell Philippines, Inc. for reconsider this order or appealed therefrom. On 23 November 1973, herein
Mindanao (hereinafter referred to as Shell), filed on 8 January 1973 a petitioner Shell, then known as Shell Philippines, Inc., filed its claim against
petition entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased the estate of the deceased Regino Canonoy. The duly appointed
Regino Canonoy, Petition for Letters of Administration, Ricardo M. Gonzalez, administrator, Bonifacio Canonoy, filed on 9 October 1974 a Motion to
Petitioner" with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) Dismiss the claim of Shell 4 which the latter contested by filing an
of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, praying therein that he be appointed Opposition. Shell likewise filed an amended claim against the estate. 5 On
judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased Regino Canonoy. The 12 May 1975, the administrator filed his Reply to the Opposition to Motion
case was docketed as SP PROC. No. 343 and was raffled to Branch II of the to Dismiss. 6 On 25 May 1975, he filed an Answer to the amended claim
trial court. filed by Shell. 7 In the said Answer, he interposes compulsory
counterclaims for the estate in the amount of P659,423.49 representing
On 27 January 1973, Judge Vicente B. Echavez, Jr. of Branch II issued an rentals for land occupied by the Shell Service Station, lighting allowances,
Order (1) setting the hearing on the petition for 23 March 1973 at 8:30 allowances for salaries and wages of service attendants, sales commission
a.m.; (2) directing that the order be published, at petitioner's expense, due the deceased Regino Canonoy and reasonable attorney's fees.
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper with a Petitioner filed an answer to the Counterclaim.
nationwide circulation published regularly by a government agency or
entity, or in any newspaper published and edited in any part of the country Upon joinder of the issues on Shell's claim, the trial court, this time
which is in operation during the existence of the present national presided over by respondent Judge Fidel P. Dumlao, set the pre-trial for 15
emergency and of general circulation in the province of Agusan del Norte August 1975. 8 This was later re-set to 23 September 1975. 9
and in Butuan City, if any there be; and (3) ordering that copies of the
order be sent by registered mail or personal delivery, at the petitioner's On 18 August 1975, petitioner filed a motion to require the judicial
expense, to each of all the known heirs of the deceased Regino Canonoy, administrator to file an inventory of the properties of the deceased. 10
within the periods prescribed by Section 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court. 1
At the pre-trial held on 23 September 1975, counsel for the administrator
In their Opposition to the issuance of letters of administration to Gonzalez requested for time to file a Motion to Dismiss the case. In an Order issued
filed on 21 March 1973, 2 private respondents, who are heirs of Regino on that date, the court granted him ten (10) days to file the motion;
Canonoy, allege that: Gonzalez "is a complete stranger to the intestate opposing counsel was likewise given ten (10) days from receipt of the same
estate" of Regino Canonoy; he is "not even a creditor" of the estate; he is a to file whatever pleading he may deem proper to file, after which the
resident of Davao City and thus if appointed as administrator of the estate, motion shall be deemed submitted for resolution. 11 The motion was filed
the bulk of which is located in Butuan City, "he would not be able to on 30 September 1975. It alleges that the court did not acquire jurisdiction
 SPECPRO RULE 79| 5

over the subject matter and nature thereof because the petitioner therein,
Mr. Gonzalez, is not the "interested person" contemplated by Section 2, (b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and
Rule 79 of the Rules of Court. 12 Shell filed its Opposition to the Motion on residences of the creditors, of the decedent;
16 October 1975 13 on the ground that the trial court had acquired
jurisdiction over the case to issue letters of administration as the interest of (c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
Gonzalez in the estate is not a jurisdictional fact that needs to be alleged in
the petition. If at all, Gonzalez' lack of interest in the estate of the deceased (d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are
only affected his competence to be appointed administrator. In an Order prayed.
dated 8 November 1975, respondent Judge, finding the motion to be well-
taken and meritorious, dismissed the case. 14 The motion for its But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of
reconsideration having been denied by the trial court on 23 January administration.
1976, 15 Shell filed the instant petition which it denominated as a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. xxx xxx xxx

In the Resolution dated 6 December 1976, this Court required the The jurisdictional facts alluded to are: the death of the testator, his
respondents to comment on the petition; 16 the latter complied with the residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court
same on 31 January 1977. 17 Thereafter, on 7 February 1977, this Court is sitting or, if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his
resolved, inter alia, to treat the petition for review as a special civil action
estate in such province. 21 These facts are amply enumerated in the
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and require the parties to submit their petition filed by Gonzalez. 22 The fact of death of the intestate and of his
respective Memoranda; 18 petitioner filed its Memorandum on 4 April 1977 residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all the
19 while the respondents filed theirs on 3 June 1977. 20 subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and that if
the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death,
The petition is impressed with merit; it must perforce be granted. and left no assets in the state, and none came into it afterwards, no
jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of administration in
Under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the trial court clearly acted any county. 23 Clearly, the allegation that a petitioner seeking letters of
with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed SP PROC. No. 343 after administration is an interested person, does not fall within the enumeration
having set for pre-trial petitioner's amended claim against the estate. That of jurisdictional facts. Of course, since the opening sentence of the section
said dismissal was predicated solely on the ground that petitioner therein, requires that the petition must be filed by an interested person, it goes
Ricardo Gonzalez, is not an "interested person," and that, since such without saying that a motion to dismiss may lie not on the basis of lack of
interest is a jurisdictional requirement, the trial court acquired no jurisdiction on the part of the court, but rather on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the case, serves only to compound the error. legal capacity to institute the proceedings.

1. Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides: This is precisely what happened in Saguinsin vs. Lindayag, 24 where the
dismissal of a petition for letters of administration was affirmed because the
xxx xxx xxx petitioner "is not an heir of her deceased sister and, therefore, has no
material and direct interest in her estate." 25 In the said case, this Court
Sec. 2. Contents of petition of letters of administration. — A petition for defined an interested party as one who would be benefited by the estate,
letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
show, so far as known to the petitioner: creditor; this interest must be material and direct, not merely indirect or
contingent. 26
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
 SPECPRO RULE 79| 6

The Saguinsin doctrine is not, however, without exception. An objection to In Eusebio vs. Valmores, 31 We held that:
a petition for letters of administration on that ground may be barred by
waiver or estoppel. xxx xxx xxx

Private respondents herein did not file a motion to dismiss the petition filedThe evidence submitted in the hearing does not satisfactorily prove that the
by Gonzalez on the ground of lack of capacity to sue; 27 they instead filed petitioner was legally adopted; hence, he did not have any interest in the
an Opposition which, unfortunately, did not ask for the dismissal of the properties of the deceased Rosalia Saquitan. Under ordinary circumstances,
petition but merely opposed the issuance of letters of administration in such defect would authorize the dismissal of the proceedings especially in
favor of Gonzalez because, among other reasons, he is a stranger to the view of the fact that the surviving spouse of Rosalia Saquitan had filed an
estate. The Opposition also proposed that Bonifacio Canonoy, one of the affidavit of adjudication under the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 of the
children of the deceased Regino Canonoy, be appointed administrator of the Rules. Counsel for Domingo Valmores, however, had not objected to the
latter's intestate estate. The failure to move for a dismissal amounted to a application for the appointment of an administrator; he only objected to the
waiver of the above-mentioned ground. Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of appointment of the said stranger Eulogio Eusebio as administrator, claiming
Court provides that: to have the right as surviving spouse to be appointed as such
administrator. By this act of Domingo Valmores, surviving spouse of the
A motion attacking a pleading or a proceeding shall include all objections deceased, therefore, the fatal defect in the petition may be considered, as
then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived. cured. In other words, the filing of the petition for the appointment of an
administrator may be considered as having been ratified by the surviving
However, if a motion to dismiss is not filed, as what obtains in this case, husband, Domingo Valmores, and for this reason the proceedings may not
any of the grounds available for such a motion, except for improper venue, be dismissed.
may be pleaded as an affirmative defense, and a preliminary hearing
thereon may be had as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. 28 Excepted 2. There can be no dispute that the trial court had acquired jurisdiction
from the above rules are the following grounds: (a) failure to state a cause over SP PROC. No. 343. Immediately after the filing of the case, the trial
of action which may be alleged in a later pleading if one is permitted, or by court complied with Section 3, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court by issuing the
a motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits; and Order dated 27 January 1973. At the initial hearing on 25 July 1973,
(b) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, 29 subject to petitioner Gonzalez established the jurisdictional requirements by
the exception as hereinafter discussed. submitting in evidence proof of publication and service of notices of the
petition. Thereafter, it heard the evidence on the qualifications and
In Insurance Company of North America vs. C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc., 30 this competence of Bonifacio Canonoy, then appointed him as the administrator
Court ruled: and finally directed that letters of administration be issued to him, and that
he takes his oath of office after putting up a surety or property bond in the
Finally, appellant would contend that plaintiff has no capacity to sue and is amount of P5,000.00. 32
not the real party in interest. It is now too late to raise these objections
here. These should have been asserted in the motion to dismiss filed by It is be presumed that Bonifacio Canonoy immediately qualified as
defendant below. Not having been included therein, they are now barred by administrator because in that capacity, he filed a motion to dismiss
the rule on omnibus motion. petitioner's claim against the estate, 33 a Reply to the Opposition to the
motion to dismiss 34 and an Answer to the petitioner's amended claim
By proposing that Bonifacio Canonoy be appointed as administrator instead against the estate wherein he interposed a counterclaim, 35 praying thus:
of Mr. Gonzalez, private respondents have in fact approved or ratified the
filing of the petition by the latter. WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to
dismiss the above-mentioned "Amended Claim Against the Estate" and to
 SPECPRO RULE 79| 7

order the claimant to pay into the intestate estate of Regino Canonoy the
said sum of P659,423.49, together with the interest thereon at the legal
rate beginning from the date hereof, the reasonable attorney's fees for the
prosecution of this counterclaim, and costs;
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, in the event that any sum is found due from and
payable by the said intestate estate of Regino Canonoy in favor of the said
claimant, the said amount be deducted from the above-mentioned sum
and, thereafter, to order the claimant to pay the balance remaining unto
the said intestate estate of Regino Canonoy, together with interest thereon
at the legal rate beginning from date hereof, the reasonable attorney's fees
for the prosecution of this counterclaim, and costs.
Clearly, therefore, not only had the administrator and the rest of the
private respondents voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial
court, they even expressly affirmed and invoked such jurisdiction in praying
for reliefs and remedies in their favor, namely: (a) denial of Gonzalez'
prayer to be appointed as administrator, (b) appointment of Bonifacio
Canonoy as administrator, (c) denial of petitioner Shell's amended claim
against the estate, and (d) the granting of the counterclaim. Hence, they
cannot now be heard to question the jurisdiction of the trial court. While it
may be true that jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, a party who has affirmed and invoked it in a particular matter
to secure an affirmative relief cannot be allowed to afterwards deny that
same jurisdiction to escape penalty.
loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-
Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs.
McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16
Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and
invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a
penalty.
The respondent Judge should have lent his ears to Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy
instead of peremptorily granting the motion to dismiss in an Order which
does not even care to expound on why the court found the said motion to
be meritorious. He exhibited undue haste in removing the case from his
docket and in abdicating judicial authority and responsibility. Howsoever
viewed, he committed grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the Order of
respondent Judge of 8 November 1975 in SP PROC. No. 343 is hereby SET
ASIDE. The court below is further ordered to hear and decide petitioner's
claim against the estate in said case, unless supervening events had
occurred making it unnecessary, and to conduct therein further proceedings
pursuant to the Rules of Court until the case is closed and terminated.
Costs against private respondents.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

In Tijam, et al. al. vs. Sibonghanoy, et al., 36 this Court held:

It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing
to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs.
Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of
explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether (sic) the
court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the
parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from
such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and
conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can
not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause
and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the

G.R. No. L-11848 May 31, 1962
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED
IRENE SANTOS.
JOSE D. VILLEGAS, Administrator, ADELA SANTOS GUTIERREZ,
movant-appellee,
vs.
JOSE D. VILLEGAS, and RIZALINA SANTOS RIVERA, oppositors-
appellants.
Intestate Proceedings; Effect of deed of assignment executed by an heir but
subsequently impugned as fraudulent.—Although ASG, one of the heirs in
the present intestate proceeding, executed a deed of assignment it is also a
fact that she allowed the same to be annulled in an action she instituted
before the Rizal CFI and although said heir had filed a manifestation
dropping herself from the proceedings and presenting therewith the
supposed Deed of Assignment, the record nevertheless fails to show that
action therein had been taken by the probate court. Every act intended to
put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legates or devises is deemed
to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an ex- change, a
compromise, or any other transaction (Art. 1082, NCC). It appearing that
the transaction is in the nature of extrajudicial partition, court approval is
imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over
the estate and over their persons, by the mere act of assignment and
desistance.
Same; Same; Judicial approval of deed of assignment effect on standing of
parties.—Thejudicial approval of the partition on the basis of the alleged
deed of assignment did not have the effect of making the party making the
assignment lose his standing in the proceedings.
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasay City
Branch). Rilloraza, J. [Gutierrez vs. Villegas, 5 SCRA 313(1962)]
PAREDES, J.:
On November 11, 1954, Irene Santos died intestate, leaving as her only
heirs her surviving spouse Jose D. Villegas and two nieces — daughters of a
deceased brother, Rizalina Santos Rivera and Adela Santos Gutierrez.
SPECPRO RULE 79| 8
Thereafter, the surviving spouse filed with the Rizal CFI, Pasay City Branch,
a petition for Letters of Administration (Sp. Proc. No. 2100), and was
appointed administrator of the estate. In the petition, he named as
intestate heirs, besides himself, Rizalina Santos Rivera and Adela Santos
Gutierrez. Under date of January 15, 1955, in the above-mentioned Special
Proceedings, an unverified manifestation signed by Adela Gutierrez,
accompanied by a public instrument entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihan at
Salinan", dated January 12, 1955, was presented to the Probate Court,
stating among others, the following —
The undersigned hereby solemnly manifests . . . that all her rights,
interests and participation in the estate subject of this proceeding now
belong to her sister, Rizalina Santos Rivera, and that hereafter she will not
take part in the above-entitled proceedings and is not entitled to the service
of any pleadings, motion, order or decision filed or promulgated therein.
In a verified manifestation presented before the probate Court on January
25, 1955, Adela averred that the deed of assignment of her rights,
participation and interest in the estate of Irene Santos and the first
manifestation were obtained thru fraud practiced by the administrator upon
her and were vitiated by mistake or undue influence. Therein, she narrated
that sometime in December, 1954, due to stringent financial conditions, she
(Adela) requested the administrator for an advance of P2,000.00 from the
estate. The administrator refused on the ground that it is against the law,
but suggested that she might obtain a loan from her sister Rizalina, offering
to help. After Christmas of 1954, the administrator informed Adela that he
was able to secure the conformity of Rizalina to give her a loan of
P10,000.00 instead of only P2,000.00. When Adela expressed surprise over
the amount, the administrator replied that he only wanted to help her get
started in business. On January 12, 1955, Adela was brought by Villegas
and Rizalina to the office of their lawyer, where she was made to sign a
document she could not read. On January 13, 1955, the lawyer asked Adela
to sign another document, which he said was to be presented in Court and
explained the contents of the document signed the day before. It was only
then that Adela came to know that said document was a deed of sale.1
When Adela protested, Villegas told her that the matter could be discussed
better in his house in Malabon. On arriving at Malabon, Villegas informed
Adela that the amount of P50,000.00 which Rizalina was paying for her
share in the inheritance, was probably more than what she would get in the
estate, because the estate is not valuable and had plenty of debts. Villegas
handed to Adela P6,800.00 in cash and a check drawn, by Rizalina on the
 SPECPRO RULE 79| 9

Prudential Bank for P3,200.00. Although Adela did not want to accept the
money, Villegas refused to take them back. When she was made to sign the
deed of assignment, Adela did not know the true value of the estate, which
she now estimates to be no less than P1,000.000.00. In the same
manifestation, Adela stated that a complaint for annulment of the Deed of
Assignment was being prepared; that she was tendering the full amount of
P10,000.00 to Villegas or Rizalina; that she was placing the above facts
within the knowledge of the Court so that no action be taken giving value to
the alleged deed of assignment and in order that she (Adela) might be
notified of each and all pleadings or orders connected with the proceedings.
The administrator Villegas and Rizalina filed exceptions and/or objections to
the Manifestation, denying the allegations of fraud, undue influence and the
like.
longer any legal standing in the case. On March 12, 1956, the Court (Judge
Emilio Rilloraza, presiding) promulgated the following order —
. . ., the Court is of the opinion that the said motion should be, as it is
hereby, granted and the said administrator and/or his attorneys are hereby
directed to furnish Adela Santos Gutierrez, through counsel, all copies of
the pleadings filed and to be filed in this case, except those mentioned in
said motion within a reasonable time upon notice hereof.
The Clerk of Court should see to it that before receiving for filing by the
administrator or the other legal heir, Rizalina Santos Rivera, and/or their
respective counsel, any pleadings, motion, etc., that copies thereof have
been furnished Adela Santos Gutierrez through counsel.

In a motion dated September 7, 1955, filed with the CFI of Pasay, Adela A series of long pleadings were presented by the parties, following a motion
asked the Court to transfer Special Proceedings No. 2100, to Branch I of reconsideration, containing arguments and authorities sustaining their
(Pasig), alleging that the complaint for the nullity of the Deed of respective theories. On June 2, 1956, vacation Judge Jesus Y. Perez,
Assignment filed with the Rizal CFI had been assigned to said Branch I; and handed down an Order, the material portions of which follow —
that the transfer would save time and effort on the part of all concerned.
The motion was strongly opposed by the administrator who stated, among xxx xxx xxx
others —
The only question for determination in this incident is whether or not Adela
That in the final distribution of the estate to the heirs, the share Santos Gutierrez has a right to intervene in this probate proceeding. The
corresponding to the movant Adela Santos Gutierrez may be ordered Administrator contends that she has no such right because she had already
withheld by this Court (if due motion therefor shall have been presented to assigned all her rights to her sister, Rizalina Santos Rivera.
this Court) until the validity of the deed of assignment shall have been
resolved by Branch I of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Although at the outset, Adela Santos Gutierrez bad the right to intervene
herein as one of the legal heirs of the deceased Irene Santos, yet, when
On September 16, 1955, the motion to transfer was denied. she filed her manifestation, accompanied by the Deed of Sale and
Assignment, informing this Court that she had assigned all her rights and
On February 9, 1956, Adela presented with the Probate Court, a motion interest as such heir to her sister, Rizalina Santos Rivera, said Adela Santos
praying that the administrator and/or his attorneys be required to furnish Gutierrez had ceased to have any interest in this estate and without such
her all copies of pleadings filed or to be filed in the intestate proceedings, it interest, she could no longer intervene in this proceeding. The assignment,
appearing that the administrator presented pleadings in Court without it copy of which is attached to the record, is in the form of a public deed
serving her copies thereof. which is entitled to be accorded the presumption of validity so that until the
same is annulled in the corresponding action filed by Adela Santos Gutierrez
An opposition was interposed by the administrator, who alleged that the in the Pasig Branch of this Court, her interest would merely be a contingent
movant, although originally a party to the probate proceeding, has one, that is, depending upon the contingency of a decision declaring such
voluntarily and expressly desisted from being so, and that having assigned annulment of the deed of assignment. This contingent interest of Adela
by sale, all her rights, interests and participations in the estate, she has no Santos Gutierrez is not sufficient to make her an interested party in this
proceedings, unless otherwise provided by law, the interest required in

order that a person may be a party, must be material and direct, and not
indirect or contingent (II Moran's Rules of Court, 1952 Ed., pp. 391-92). We
quote the following from Moran's Rules of Court:
xxx xxx xxx
In the same way, since the interest of Adela Santos Gutierrez to be
considered as heir is dependent upon the contingency that she would
succeed in her case for annulment of the Deed of Assignment in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, her contingent interest is not sufficient to make
her an interested party in this proceeding.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby sustains the motion for reconsideration filed
by the administrator and hereby sets aside the order of March 12,
1956.1äwphï1.ñët
Adela Santos Gutierrez, on June 26, 1956, moved for the reconsideration of
the above Order, contending that her motion on February 8, 1956, was not
a leave for intervention (Rule 13). At most, the rule on transfer of interest
pendente lite (Sec. 20, Rule 3), should be applicable, not that of
intervention. On August 10, 1956, Judge Rilloraza, who had already
returned from vacation, set aside the order of Judge Perez, stating —
..., this Court is of the opinion that the order of this Court dated June 2,
1956 should be, as it is hereby set aside.
Let the administrator and/or his attorney furnish henceforth Adela Santos
Gutierrez, through counsel, copies of all pleadings, motions, etc., to be filed
in this case.
The above Order is now the subject of the instant appeal, the administrator
and Rizalina Santos Rivera assigning three (3) errors allegedly committed
by the court a quo, all of which pose a singular issue, viz., whether Adela
Santos Gutierrez is still entitled to be furnished with pleadings filed by the
administrator in the probate proceedings and orders therein issue by the
lower court.
The order appealed from being interlocutory, cannot be the subject of an
appeal. Even on this plane alone, the appeal should be dismissed. Of
course, appellants cited the case of Tengco v. San Jose, G.R. No. L-8162,
Aug. 30, 1955, wherein We considered the appeal as petition for certiorari.
SPECPRO RULE 79| 10
That case, however, has no parallel to the one now under consideration. It
was one for mandamus for the purpose of compelling the Judge to give due
course to an appeal. Considering that in order for certiorari and mandamus
to prosper, allegations to the effect that the court has no jurisdiction, or it
acted in excess thereof or with grave abuse of discretion, must appear,
which is not obtaining in the instant case (because it is an ordinary appeal),
it becomes peremptory that the present appeal is not in order.
Moreover, it cannot be successfully denied that Adela Santos Gutierrez is an
indispensable party to the proceedings in question. Her interest in the
estate is not inchoate, it was established at the time of death of Irene
Santos on November 11, 1954. While it is true that she executed a deed of
assignment, it is also a fact that she asked the same to be annulled, which
action is now pending before the Rizal CFI, Pasig Branch. Although Adela
had filed a manifestation dropping herself from the proceedings and
presenting therewith the supposed Deed of Assignment, the record,
nevertheless fails to show that action thereon had been taken by the
probate Court. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-
heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it
should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other
transaction (Art. 1082, NCC). No serious argument can be offered to deny
the co-heirship of appellee in the estate under probate. It appearing (if We
assume the due execution of the Deed of Assignment), that the transaction
is in the nature of extrajudicial partition, court approval is imperative, and
the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over the estate and
over their persons, by the mere act of assignment and desistance. Thus, in
the case of Sandoval v. Santiago, G.R. No. L-1723, May 30, 1949, this
Court said: ". . . and the heirs of the deceased Marquez could not divest the
Court of First Instance of its already acquired jurisdiction by the mere fact
of dividing and distributing extrajudicially the estate of the deceased among
themselves". But even if the partition had been judicially approved on the
basis of the alleged deed of assignment, an aggrieved heir does not lose
her standing in the probate court.
In our opinion, the court that approved the partition and the agreement in
ratification thereof may annul both whenever, as it is here alleged, the
approval was obtained by deceit or fraud, and the petition must be filed in
the courts of the intestate proceedings, for it is generally admitted that
probate courts are authorized to vacate any decree or judgment procured
by fraud, not only while the proceedings in the course of which it was
issued are pending, but even, as in this case, within a reasonable time
 SPECPRO RULE 79| 11

thereafter. (Trillana v. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-3378, Aug. 22, 1951;

Espinosa v. Barrios. 70 Phil. 311).

We agree with appellee that the motion in question is not one of

intervention, but solely a plea to enforce a right and that is to receive
pleadings and orders related to the case. Evidently, the use of the word
"intervention" in the manifestation and pleadings presented by Adela was
resorted to for want of another appropriate word. In effect, all she wanted
to convey was that she should participate or continue taking part in the
case for being an original party therein. It was her belief that in filing the
manifestation dropping herself from the proceedings (but which she later
informed the court to have been secured thru fraud), her standing might
have been affected. Intervention as contemplated by the Rules is a
proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is permitted by the
court to make himself a party, either joining plaintiff in claiming what is
sought by the complaint, or uniting with defendant in resisting the claims of
plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both of them; the act or
proceeding by which a third person becomes a party in a suit pending
between others; the admission, by leave of court, of a person not an
original party to pending legal proceedings, which such person becomes a
party thereto for the protection of some right or interest alleged by him to
be affected by such proceedings (Judge of Camarines Sur, et al. vs. David,
et al., G.R. No. 45454, April 12, 1939, cited in Francisco's Rules of Court,
Vol. I, Part I, p. 639, emphasis supplied). The circumstances stated above
do not fit the status of Adela in the probate proceedings; she was not a
third person; she was an original party therein.

We see no prejudice to be suffered by the administrator and Rizalina, if

they are required to furnish copies of their pleadings to appellee. On the
contrary, doing so, will give appellee her day in court and provide
protection to the administrator himself.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, We find the Order appealed from to be in

conformity with the law and jurisprudence. The same should be, as it is
hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against the appellants Jose D.
Villegas and Rizalina Santos Rivera, in both instances.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and

Dizon, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., is on leave.