1. Case Digest: Natalia Realty, Inc.

and Estate Developer and Investors Corp vs DAR GR No

103302 Natalia Realty, Inc. and Estate Developer and Investors Corp vs DAR GR No 103302
August 12, 1993

Facts: Natalia is the owner of 3 contiguous parcels of land with an area of 120.9793 hectares, 1.3205
hectares and 2.7080 hectares or a total of 125.0078 hectares, which are covered by TCT No. 31527.
Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land as townsite areas to absorb the
population overspill in the metropolis which were designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite. The
Natalia properties are situated within the areas proclaimed as townsite reservation. Since private
landowners were allowed to develop their properties into low-cost housing subdivisions with the
reservation, petitioner EDIC as developer of Natalia applied for and was granted preliminary approval and
location clearances by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, which Natalia thereafter became
Antipolo Hills Subdivision. On June 15 1988, Ra 6657 went to effect. Respondent issed a Notice of
Coverage on the undeveloped portions of Antipolo Hills Subdivision. Natalia and EDIC immediately
registered its objection to the notice of coverage and requested the cancellation of the Notice of
Coverage. Natalia and EDIC both argued that the properties ceased to be agricultural lands when they
were included in the areas reserved by Presidential Proclamation for the townsite reservation. DAR then
contended that the permits granted were not valid and binding since they did not comply with t he
implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of PD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers
Protective Decree), and that there was no valid conversion of the properties.

Issue: Whether or not lands not classified for agricultural use, as approved by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board and its agencies prior to June 15, 1988 covered by RA 6657.

Ruling: No, Sec. 4 of RA 6657 provides that CARL shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands. And agricultural lands is referred to as land
devoted to agricultural activity and not classified as mineral, forst, residential, commercial or industrial
land. Thus, the underdeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot be considered as
agricultural.

2.Luz Farms v. Secretary of DARG.R. No. 86889 December 4, 1990

Facts:

On 10 June 1988, RA 6657 was approved by the President of the Philippines, which includes, among
others, the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage.

Petitioner Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business, avers that it would be
adversely affected by the enforcement of sections 3(b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of the said law. Hence, it
prayed that the said law be declared unconstitutional. The mentioned sections of the law provies, among
others, the product-sharing plan, including those engaged in livestock and poultry business.

Luz Farms further argued that livestock or poultry raising is not similar with crop or tree farming. That the
land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and represents no more than 5% of the total
investments of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. That the land is incidental but not the principal
factor or consideration in their industry. Hence, it argued that it should not be included in the coverage of
RA 6657 which covers “agricultural lands”.

Issue: Whether or not certain provisions of RA 6657 is unconstitutional for including in its definition of
“Agriculture” the livestock and poultyr industry?

Ruling:The Court held YES.

Looking into the transcript of the Constitutional Commission on the meaning of the word “agriculture”, it
showed that the framers never intended to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the
constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program of the government.

Further, Commissioner Tadeo pointed out that the reasin why they used the term “farmworkers” rather
than “agricultural workers” in the said law is because “agricultural workers” includes the livestock and
poultry industry, hence, since they do not intend to include the latter, they used “farmworkers” to have
distinction.

Hence, there is merit on the petitioner’s argument that the product-sharing plan applied to “corporate
farms” in the contested provisions is unreasonable for being consficatory and violative of the due process
of law.
3. Central Mindanao University vs. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board 215 SCRA
86 (1992)

Facts:

On 16 January 1958, President Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation No. 467 reserving for the Mindanao
Agricultural College, now the CMU, a piece of land to be used as its future campus. In 1984, CMU
embarked on a project titled "Kilusang Sariling Sikap" wherein parcels of land were leased to its faculty
members and employees. Under the terms of the program, CMU will assist faculty members and
employee groups through the extension of technical know-how, training and other kinds of assistance. In
turn, they paid the CMU a service fee for use of the land. The agreement explicitly provided that there will
be no tenancy relationship between the lessees and the CMU.

When the program was terminated, a case was filed by the participants of the "Kilusang Sariling Sikap"
for declaration of status as tenants under the CARP. In its resolution, DARAB, ordered, among others, the
segregation of 400 hectares of the land for distribution under CARP. The land was subjected to coverage
on the basis of DAR's determination that the lands do not meet the condition for exemption, that is, it is
not "actually, directly, and exclusively used" for educational purposes.

Issue: Is the CMU land covered by CARP? Who determines whether lands reserved for public use by
presidential proclamation is no longer actually, directly and exclusively used and necessary for the
purpose for which they are reserved?

Held: The land is exempted from CARP. CMU is in the best position to resolve and answer the question
of when and what lands are found necessary for its use. The Court also chided the DARAB for resolving
this issue of exemption on the basis of "CMU's present needs." The Court stated that the DARAB
decision stating that for the land to be exempt it must be "presently, actively exploited and utilized by the
university in carrying out its present educational program with its present student population and
academic faculty" overlooked the very significant factor of growth of the university in the years to come.

4. Alita v. CA

-petition seeking the reversal Court of Appeals decision: 1)Declaring Presidential Decree No.27
inapplicable to lands obtained thru the homestead law; 2) Declaring that the 4 registeredco-owners will
cultivate and operate the farmholding themselves as owners; & 3) Ejectingtenants, namely; Gabino Alita,
Jesus Julian, Sr., Jesus Julian, Jr., Pedro Ricalde, VicenteRicalde and Rolando Salamar, as the owners
would want to cultivate the farmholdingthemselves.-2 parcels of land at Guilinan, Tungawan, Zamboanga
del Sur acquired by respondentsReyes through homestead patent under Commonwealth Act No. 141-
Reyes wants to personally cultivate these lands, but Alita refuse to vacate, relying on theprovisions of
P.D. 27 and P.D. 316 and regulations of MAR/DAR-June 18, 1981: Respondents Reyes (Plaintiff)
instituted a complaint against Minister of Agrarian Reform Estrella, Regional Director of MAR Region IX
P.D. Macarambon, and Alitaet.al for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees, Letters of
Instructions and GeneralOrders inapplicable to homestead lands. Defendants Alita filed their answer with
special andaffirmative defenses.-July 19, 1982: Reyes filed urgent motion to enjoin the defendants from
declaring the landsin litigation under Operation Land Transfer and from being issued land transfer
certificates-November 5, 1982: Court of Agrarian Relations 16th Regional District, Branch IV,
PagadianCity (Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial Region, Branch XVIII) rendered its decision
dismissingcomplaint and the motion to enjoinOn January 4, 1983, plaintiffs moved to reconsider the Order
of dismissal, to whichdefendants filed their opposition on January 10, 1983.RTC: issued decision
prompting defendants Alita et al to move for reconsideration but wasdeniedCA: the same was sustained

ISSUE:whether or not lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by theAgrarian Reform
under P.D. 27.

Ruling: NO

We agree with the petitioners Alita et.al in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from
the bondage of the soil and transferring to them ownership of the land they tillis a sweeping social
legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution.
However, such contention cannot be invoked to defeatthe purpose of the enactment of the Public Land
Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141 toprotect one’s right to life itself by give a needy citizen a land wherein
they could build ahouse and plant for necessary subsistence.
Art XIII, Sec 6 of the Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the homesteaders' rights over
therights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute.Section 6. The State shall apply the
principles of agrarian reform or stewardship…in thedisposition or utilization of other natural resources,
including lands of public domain underlease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights,
homestead rights of smallsettlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or Republic Act No. 6657 likewise supports
theinapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands covered by homestead patents like those of the property inquestion,

Section 6. Retention Limits.

5. LUCRECIO PATRICIO, SEGUNDO DALIGDIG, FRANCISCO DALIGDIG, FLORENCIO ARELLANO

and EPIFANIO DALIGDIG, Petitioners, vs. ISABELO BAYOG, CONRADA, PEDRO, EMILIO,
ALFONSO, DIONISIO and ARSENIO, all surnamed MENDEZ, and COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

The legal issue in this case is whether the tenants hired by the purchaser of a homestead planted to
coconuts and bananas may be ejected by the homesteader's heirs who were allowed by the Court of
Appeals to repurchase the homestead and who desire to personally possess and till the
land.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As factual background, it should be stated that in 1934 Policarpio Mendez obtained a patent and Torrens
title for a homestead with an area of about twenty-three hectares located at Sitio Badiangon, Barrio
Dalipuga, Iligan City. He and his wife, Petra Macaliag and their nine children lived on the land, cleared it
and planted coconuts thereon.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In 1956, Mendez sold the homestead to the spouses Eugenio Lamberang and Ester Fuentes. In 1958,
Mendez and his children filed an action to annul the sale. Lamberang countered with an ejectment suit.
On March 20, 1961, Mendez and his children filed an action against the Lamberang spouses for the
reconveyance of the homestead.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The three cases reached the Court of Appeals which in a decision dated January 3, 1977 ordered
Lamberang to reconvey the homestead to the Mendezes "free of all liens and encumbrances " upon their
payment to Lamberang of P19,411.28 as redemption price. That judgment became final and
executory.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Court of Appeals also held that upon the execution of the deed of reconveyance and the delivery of
the redemption price to the Lamberang spouses, the Mendezes Would be "entitled to the possession and
occupancy" of the homestead. (Mendez vs. Lamberang, Lamberang vs. Bayug, and Mendez vs. Fuentes-
Lamberang CA-G.R. Nos. 50819-81-R.) chanrobles virtual law library

The Mendezes paid the redemption price and the Lamberang spouses reconveyed the homestead.
Pursuant to a writ of possession, a deputy sheriff placed Isabelo Bayog, the representative of the Mendez
family in possession of the homestead after ejecting the tenants of the Lamberang spouses named
Lucrecio Patricio, Florencio Arellano, Epifanio Daligdig, Francisco Daligdig and Segundo Daligdig, now
the petitioners herein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

However, the tenants reentered the homestead allegedly upon instruction of Bernardino O. Nuñez, a trial
attorney of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistant. Hence, the Mendezes filed a motion to declare them
and Nuñez in contempt of court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Before that contempt incident could be resolved, or on April 10, 1979, the tenants, represented by Nuñez,
filed in the Court of Agrarian Relations at Iligan City a complaint for damages against the heirs of
Policarpio Mendez named Isabelo Bayog and Conrada, Pedro, Emilio, Alfonso, Dionisio and Arsenio, all
surnamed Mendez (CAR Case No. 92), now private respondents.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

By reason of an agreement between the parties at the hearing on October 22, 1979, the said tenants
vacated the land. They are now not in possession of the land (p. 5, Rollo).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

The Agrarian Court in its decision of December 12, 1979 held that the plaintiffs were "tenants of the
landholding in question" and ordered their reinstatement therein. The lower court directed the Mendezes
to pay them their "unrealized shares" in the coconuts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The Agrarian Court concluded that the plaintiffs became the tenants of the Mendezes because the
Lamberangs, with whom they established a tenancy relationship, were not illegal possessors of the land,
having acquired it through a sale. The court said that under Section 10 of the Code of Agrarian Reform
tenants are entitled to security of tenure and that under section 36 of that Code, personal cultivation by
the landowner is no longer a ground for terminating tenancy. The Agrarian Court noted that Presidential
Decree No. 152 dated March 13, 1973, which prohibits the employment or use of share tenants in
complying with the requirements regarding entry, occupation and cultivation of public lands, is not
applicable to the case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Mendezes appealed to the Court of Appeals which on May 8, 1980 reversed the decision of the
Agrarian Court and declared that the Mendezes are "entitled to the homestead without the gravamen of
plaintiffs' tenancies" because the purpose of granting homesteads is "to distribute disposable agricultural
lots of the State to land destitute citizens for their home and cultivation" (Pascua vs. Talens, 80 Phil. 792,
793). That policy would be defeated " if the buter can install permanents tenants in the homestead who
would even have the right of preemption" (Patricio vs. Bayog, CA-G. R. No. 10611-CAR
).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The tenants appealed to this Court. They contend (a) that under section 118 of the Public Land Law,
share tenancy may be constituted in homestead after five years from the grant of the patent because
section 119 of the same law does not prohibit any encumbrance on the homestead after that period and
(b) that they cannot be ejected because they were not parties in any of the cases involving the Mendezes
and Lamberang.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

This is a case where two competing interests have to be weighed against each other: the tenant's right to
security of tenure as against the right of the homesteader or his heirs to own a piece of land for their
residence and livelihood.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We hold that the more paramount and superior policy consideration is to uphold the right of the
homesteader and his heirs to own and cultivate personally the land acquired from the State without being
encumbered by tenancy relations. * chanrobles virtual law library

This holding is consistent with the intention of the Code of Agrarian Reform to abolish agricultural share
tenancy, "to establish owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm as the basis of Philippine
agriculture and "to achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious institutional
restraints and practices" (Sec. 2).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.