Origins of Security Cooperation in Southern Cone Santos

The Origins of Security Cooperation
in the Southern Cone

Jodo Resende-Suntos
ABSTRACT
Argentine-Brazilian relations have undergone a remarkable trans-
formation over the last two decades, from enduring rivalry to coop-
eration. Dating back to the late 1970s, security cooperation has
been a byproduct of two different sets of factors, strategic and mil-
itary organizational,that propelled the two countries independently
but simultaneously toward peaceful settlement. The 1979-80 settle-
ment of disputes over hydroelectric power and nuclear technology
not only ended centuries of militarized competition but established
the first institutional structures of what is today one of the world’s
most durable security regimes.
I nterstate relations in the Western Hemisphere have experienced pro-

found transformations over the last two decades. Despite meager
results in the April 2001 Quebec Summit of the Americas, the move to
erect a hemispherewide free trade zone indicates the underlying
changes in the relationships between the United States and Latin Amer-
ica and among other countries in the region. Unlike any other time in
its troubled history, today the hemisphere is characterized by a dense,
overlapping web of bilateral and multilateral cooperative arrangements
encompassing economic, diplomatic, and security issues (Pion-Berlin
2000; Aravena 1999; Dominguez 1998; Hirst 1996a).
In no small measure, the institutionalization of cooperation in the
hemisphere was anticipated and facilitated by dramatic changes in the
Argentine-Brazilian relationship that began in the late 1970s. Argentine-
Brazilian cooperation is the core component of the larger structure of
regional economic and security cooperation today, and it will necessar-
ily be one of the pillars of any future hemispherewide arrangement. It
is therefore appropriate to inquire how the two South American giants
came to redefine their relations. This article reexamines the origins of
institutionalized security cooperation between Argentina and Brazil,
specifically the principal factors that propelled them to seek a compre-
hensive settlement in the late 1970s, putting an end to their centuries-
old geopolitical rivalry.
Over the past decade-and-a-half, Brazil and Argentina have erected
one of the most successful cooperation regimes in the world, including
a robust nuclear security regime based on proliferation restraint and the
Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR). In the wider context of
89
90 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 44: 4
South American diplomatic history, these changes are matched only by

those in postwar Western Europe-yet without the same kinds of eco-
nomic and military safety nets furnished by the United States. Almost
overnight, Argentine-Brazilian relations went from geopolitical rivalry
and an escalating nuclear technology race to stable cooperation.
How this transformation came about has been treated in only a
cursory, uncritical manner in the social science literature. To be sure,
the transformation cannot be explained fully without considering the
catalytic role of democratization and the economic crises of the 1980s.
The cumulative political-historical process of redefining national
security and other vital interests has been widened and strengthened
by the dynamics of democratization and the inherent momentum of
economic integration. The origins and sources of the transformation,
however, are not to be found in either of those movements. Cooper-
ation did not start with the return of democracy, nor did it begin in
1986, for economic cooperation was made possible (and conceivable)
only after the two historical enemies had reconciled their political-
strategic differences.
The shift from rivalry to cooperation, it may be argued, occurred in
the late 1970s. It unfolded in two distinct but interconnected stages, and
political factors were primary in both. The first and most important
phase was consolidated in a series of agreements in 1979-80. The
second phase is essentially the institutionalization of the first phase, and
it was consolidated with the signing of two further historic agreements
in 1985-86, erecting a nuclear security regime and economic integration.
The mid-1980s agreements, significant as they were, did not begin coop-
eration de novo. While a new set of factors prompted both sides in the
mid-1980s to erect more elaborate, deeper structures, institutionalized
cooperation was built o n the foundations established in 1979-80.
Indeed, given its unprecedented pace and scope, the second phase was
possible only because these longtime enemies had already resolved
their rivalry and established the first nascent institutional pillars of coop-
eration in 1979-80.
The purpose of this article is to provide an account of the first,
understudied yet crucial phase while recognizing the complexities and
distinctive aspects of the second phase of cooperation. This study will
show that a fortuitous convergence of strategic and military organiza-
tional interests led both sides respectively to resolve peacefully their
outstanding disputes as well as to establish a durable framework of
cooperation.
The importance of fine-tuning questions regarding the origins of
security cooperation in the Southern Cone can be appreciated when w e
consider that within a span of months, relations between Brazil and
Argentina went from the closing of borders and diplomatic rupture to
RESENDE-SANTOS: SECURITY COOPERATION 91
the signing of a historic political settlement. What makes Brazilian-

Argentine security cooperation more puzzling is that it emerged in the
context of an enduring rivalry (Diehl 1998; Goertz and Diehl 1993;
Vasquez 1993), a rivalry dating back to Iberian colonial rule, fueled by
mutual hatred and militarized competition for continental mastery.
There may b e nothing remarkable about episodes of cooperation
among nations, especially if the agreements are instrumental or shallow
in form. Indeed, the Brazil-Argentine relationship was not one of pure,
unremitting rivalry, but one sprinkled with episodes of cooperation and
mutual adjustment. Despite their standoff in the La Plata River Basin in
the 1970s, for example, the two rivals tacitly fashioned common diplo-
matic initiatives against international controls on nuclear proliferation.
Still, we would intuitively expect cooperation (of any kind) between
enduring rivals to be more difficult to achieve, sustain, and institution-
alize. The Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement is puzzling also because it
occurred under conditions-such as military rule-that are usually
assumed to militate against international peace and cooperation. It
occurred during a time when military regimes engaged in state terror at
home and aggressive nationalism in foreign policy. Cooperation
emerged at a time when both regimes still adhered to the Doctrine of
National Security and Development, prevalent among South American
armed forces since the 1950s. By the 1970s, moreover, the doctrine had
expanded to include a “diplomacy of national security” based on geopo-
litical competition, mercantilist practices, and Realpolitik thinking
(Mares 1998, 2001; Kelly and Child 1988; Child 1985).
The principal goal of this study is to explain the sources, timing, and
scope of the initial phase of security cooperation. It examines only the
primary factors propelling each side to a negotiated settlement; therefore
it does not pretend to be exhaustive or oblivious to other factors that
may have contributed to the eventual consolidation in the mid-1980s.
Because the primary factors driving each side were different, fur-
thermore, this study sacrifices theoretical parsimony for historical accu-
racy. Although it is based on extensive archival research and primary
sources, its ability to show direct causal links was made difficult by gaps
in the empirical record, the secretive nature of the decisionmaking
process, the intricate political dynamics of the story, and the subtle
power plays within the military governments.
This study relies o n an assortment of primary sources, including
archival records, memoirs, and recently published interviews with key
Brazilian decisionmakers. A number of key documents were discovered
during field research that shed greater light o n underlying motivations,
especially on the Argentine side.’ But we must await the further release
of documents and greater access to sensitive archives from the period
of military rule for more exhaustive and conclusive evidence.
In the Argentine case, intuition as well as theory leads us to expect

that nation to seek accommodation with Brazil. The real question about
Argentina is why it sought a permanent rather than a temporary settle-
ment. Given this assumption, this study dwells less on the Argentine
case and more on that of Brazil, in which the causal connection was
more indirect, subtle, and complex. Indeed, Brazil’s decision to seek
accommodation with its historical rival is puzzling if we consider only
external factors or the specifics of the La Plata Basin dispute.
EXPLAINING
CONFLICT AND
COOPERA~ONIN THE SOUTHERN
CONE
The October 1979 Tripartite Corpus-Itaipu Agreement, which resolved
the dispute over hydroelectric projects in the Upper Paranii River, and
the May 1980 Accord on Cooperation for the Development and Appli-
cation for the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (AMRE 1980a), which
established a framework for technical cooperation, put an end to the
Argentine-Brazilian rivalry dating back to the “Line of Tordesillas.” The
1979-80 settlement transformed regional affairs and led to one of the
most successful cooperation regimes outside the North Atlantic commu-
nity. Brazilian-Argentine cooperation began suddenly and deepened
gradually. What accounts for this sudden transition?
Works on regional cooperation, if they address Argentine-Brazilian
relations at all, give the topic superficial attention or focus only on
developments after the mid-1980s. Indeed, only a few works have been
devoted to the Corpus-Itaipb dispute as a turning point (Sagre 1990;
Pedone 1989; Soares de Lima 1986; Rosa 1983). In general, the pre-
sumption is strong in the literature that democratization, specifically
consolidation demands involving military control problems, gave rise to
both economic and security cooperation in the region (Cason 2000; Hur-
re11 1998). An equally strong presumption is that economic cooperation,
starting with the landmark 1986 Brazil-Argentina Pact of Integration and
Cooperation, opened the way for (or spilled over into) security cooper-
ation, though the origins of economic cooperation itself are left unex-
plained (Pion-Berlin 2000).
Works that explicitly seek to explain the origins of regional cooper-
ation give prominence to economic factors. The rapid growth of MER-
COSUR into a trillion-dollar market, along with the dominance of eco-
nomic issues in bilateral relations in the last decade, has given the
economic dimension exaggerated significance. The steep economic crisis
of the 1980s is often cited as a catchall explanation for changes in both
domestic and foreign affairs in the region. The crisis presumably forced
regional governments to scale back military competition in favor of
greater economic interchange. For example, it is often argued that eco-
KESENDE-SANTOS: SECURITY COOPERATION 93
nomic recession and contradictions in development strategy pressed the

Brazilian regime to launch political liberalization, uberturu (opening),
and, presumably, external cooperation (Kucinski 1982; Furtado 1981).
While the causal logic of why and how economic crisis necessarily
leads to international cooperation is never specified, this explanation
contradicts longstanding theoretical propositions, such as the diversion-
ary war thesis, which links domestic crisis to external conflict behavior.
Indeed, this is a common explanation for Argentina’s behavior in the
Falklands-Malvinas War. Regardless of the merits of the economic crisis
explanation, it remains the case that Argentine-Brazilian cooperation
began before the regional economic crisis of the 1980s set in.
Alternatively, it is mistakenly argued that economic interests com-
pelled both sides to seek cooperation in the 1970s as a means to resolve
mounting domestic economic problems. A common account cites the
policies of Argentine finance minister Jose Martinez de Hoz, who, it is
argued, needed to expand trade in order to resuscitate the nation’s
economy (Sagre 1990, 11r19). A familiar interpretation of Brazil’s for-
eign policy in the 1970s was its aggressive promotion of commercial
interests, including market expansion in Latin America. A more theoret-
ically ambitious explanation is advanced by Solingen, who argues that
cooperation was the result of “liberalizing coalitions”-for which
nuclear proliferation and security competition were obstacles to eco-
nomic liberalization at home and detriments to private economic inter-
ests (Solingen 1994, 1996). Argentine documents do show that trade
issues had consumed the bulk of bilateral diplomacy (at least for the
Argentine side) since the late 1960s.
Economic considerations, however, were negligible in the political
settlement’s origins, as evidenced in several ways. First, the political
weight of “liberalizing” economic coalitions in policymaking (especially
security policy) during the military regimes is debatable, and certainly
no greater than the nationalist forces in both public and private indus-
tries or in the national security establishment on both sides. Moreover,
only the economic policies of Martinez de Hoz, and not those of Brazil,
can be described as liberalizing-and his policies were strongly resisted
within the armed forces.
Second, there is no evidence that economic considerations impelled
moderate officers in Brazil to launch uberturu or seek cooperation.
Abertzrru was launched at a time of economic prosperity, not crisis. The
Brazilian economy certainly performed erratically between 1974 and
1979, oscillating widely-but at high annual growth rates-as a result of
the world energy crisis. During the regime of Ernest0 Geisel (1974-791,
the economy averaged a remarkable 6.6 percent annual growth rate
(World Bank 1988-89). To be sure, economic interests certainly domi-
nated Brazilian foreign policy in the 1970s (Selcher 1978; Schneider
1976), and both sides became interested in the prospects of commercial

exchanges in nuclear technology and equipment, but this interest sur-
faced only after the 1979-80 settlement was drafted.
Economic interdependence between the two rivals was historically
low, with most of their trade directed out of the region. In 1970 less than
10 percent of Argentina’s total trade was with Brazil, while less than 6
percent of Brazil’s trade went across the Parank River (AMRE 1 9 7 4 ~ )As.
diplomatic cables reveal, what little trade occurred provoked more dis-
cord than the Corpus-Itaipu dispute (AMRE 1968,1974a). For Brazil, the
importance of the Southern Cone was strategic, not economic (Costa
Vaz 1999). The importance of relations with Argentina was not the com-
mercial interests served but the domestic political-organizational objec-
tives pursued.
COOPERATION
AND RIVALRY
The diplomatic history of South America largely revolves around the

continent’s two principal axes of geopolitical competition, the inter-
locked Brazil-Argentina and Chile-Argentina rivalries (Burr 1965). The
genesis of Argentine-Brazilian rivalry dates to colonial times. From their
first major war in 1825-28, but especially from World War 11 to the
1970s, Brazil and Argentina continually viewed each other as enemies.
Argentina (and Spanish America for that matter) harbored fears of Luso-
Brazilian expansionism and regional political hegemony.
Unlike the Argentine-Chilean axis, however, the Brazil-Argentina
rivalry lacked intractable disputes over valuable territories. The La Plata
River Basin had strategic value, but the dispute over it was about access
and influence over mutually recognized shared waterways, not posses-
sion. For Argentina, both Brazil and Chile were military threats, but the
stakes were much higher across the Andes. The most significant feature
of the interlocking rivalries was Argentina’s encirclement; Argentina
always had to accommodate one rival when confronting the other. Even
though a Chile-Brazil encircling alliance never actually materialized,
Argentina could never be certain of the possible reaction of one when
facing the other.
The Corpus-Itaipb Dispute
The 1970s witnessed a sharp increase in the intensity and scope of rival-
ries across the region. The principal issues fueling the resurgence in mil-
itarized competition were territorial, as the world energy crisis made
access and possession of natural resources and “open spaces” a critical
issue in the Southern Cone, the South Atlantic, and Antarctica (Child
1985; Selcher 19811, as well as the La Plata Basin.
For Brazil and Argentina specifically, two clusters of issues caused

relations to deteriorate. First and more alarming was their escalating
nuclear technology race (Malheiros 1993; Gorman 1979; Guglialmelli
1975, 1976a, b). Their claridestine military nuclear programs were
geared mainly toward acquiring military nuclear capacity and develop-
ing naval propulsion systems, rather than operational nuclear forces
(D’Araujo and Castro 1995, 340-41). Each nation sought to develop the
technological capability as an insurance policy against the other’s
nuclear ambitions. Because both rejected the 1968 Nuclear Nonprolifer-
ation Treaty (NPT), the international regime prohibiting the spread of
military nuclear technology, and did not adhere to the 1967 Treaty of
Tlatelolco banning nuclear weapons in Latin America, the lack of inter-
national controls increased the dangers of a full-blown nuclear arms
race for these countries.
The race to be first to acquire nuclear weapons, which Argentina
led, was abruptly altered in 1971, when Brazil purchased a Westing-
house nuclear plant. In 1975, Brazil acquired full-cycle technology from
West Germany, a n agreement that not only gave it full fuel-cycle repro-
cessing and uranium enrichment technology but also freed it from the
U.S. nonproliferation policy and export controls. Brazil changed the
nuclear balance, presenting Argentina with the specter of a nuclear-
armed, hegemonic rival. By 1976, strategists on both sides had con-
cluded that the two rivals were nuclear-capable (Guglialmelli 1976a).
The second and more heated set of issues involved resource explo-
ration in the La Plata Basin, particularly Brazil’s 1966 agreement with
Paraguay (not signed until 1973) to build the world’s largest hydroelec-
tric dam, Itaipu. Itaipli was to be constructed just north of the Argentine
border on the Paraguay-Brazil portion of the Parani River, which the
two historical rivals shared as a natural border. Argentina vehemently
protested the agreement, and months later signed its own treaty with
Paraguay for a second binational hydroelectric project, Yacireta, near its
first planned dam, Corpus. Itaipu was to be constructed only a few miles
upstream from the Argentine border and its two proposed dams. Itaipu’s
planned height (120 meters fall, 220 meters above sealevel) meant that
Corpus could not be more than 100 meters tall. Corpus’s planned height
of 120 meters above sealevel, in turn, was intended to make Itaipd invi-
able by raising upstream water levels to flood its turbines.
To be sure, practical concerns motivated Buenos Aires in making
these competing plans. The construction of Itaipli would impair its own
planned hydroelectric projects. More serious was the potential eco-
nomic harm to downstream navigation in the Argentine stretch of the
Parank, which was crucial to internal trade and transport.
Argentina and Brazil had been on a collision course in the La Plata
Basin since the early 1960s. All the Basin countries (Argentina, Brazil,
96 LAI’IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 44: 4
Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay) had engaged in periodic but con-

tentious negotiations for a multilateral convention to govern frontier
resource exploration and infrastructure development on the shared
Parani and Uruguay Rivers, but the irreconcilable positions of Brazil
and Argentina had made agreement elusive. Argentina insisted on the
principle of prior consultation for all development projects that had the
potential of harming neighbors. Despite Brazil’s promise in the 1971
Asuncicin Declaration to consult others when any project might cause
“reasonable harm,” the dispute worsened during the brief civilian inter-
regnum (1973-76) in Buenos Aires. While Brazil pressed ahead with
Itaipb’s construction, it continued to entertain multilateral and bilateral
talks that were short on progress and full of acrimony. Argentina
accused Brazil of “successive delays” (AMRE 1974b).
Aside from threatening to build its own dams, Argentina turned to
a number of strategies to block Itaipu and, it hoped, thereby contain
Brazil’s expansion. Given that it could not stop Brazil’s numerous joint
projects, Argentina’s principal strategy was to insist on multilateral reg-
ulation and consultation. It also internationalized the dispute in the
United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, and regional forums.
Argentine maneuvers did not deter Brazil, however, which turned the
dispute into a fait accompli when it began constructing I t a i p ~in early
1974.
From a technical perspective, there was no shortage of solutions
with respect to the compatibility of the two dams and the management
of downstream water levels. Indeed, an investigative report in the Octo-
ber 7, 1979, Jornal do B r a d (1979d) noted that technical working
groups from both sides had reached a rough agreement as early as 1974
on the configuration of the two dams, with Brazilian engineers agreeing
to a height of 105 meters for Corpus. The real dispute in the Basin was
not about technical coordination to resolve a common-pool problem.
“Since the time of [their] independence,” noted the Argentine Foreign
Ministry in 1964, “relations between Argentina and Brazil were the most
difficult and unstable, constantly driven by an enduring and disguised
[disirnuladal struggle for influence [gravitaci6nl over the rest of the
members of the Latin American community” (AMRE 1964).
With its own power in rapid decline, for Argentina the Basin dis-
pute was about staving off Brazilian hegemony. Itaipu was one of a
series of joint development projects Brazil had with neighboring
Paraguay, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Ecuador, in addition to frontier projects
such as the Transamazonian Highway and the colonization of the
Amazon. Rapid economic growth and industrial expansion increased
Brazil’s energy needs. Its military regime invested heavily in energy pro-
grams. These projects raised Argentine fears that the continent would
soon be in Brazil’s orbit.
As Argentine strategists and diplomats acknowledged, by the early

1970s Brazil’s regional hegemony was indeed more reality than aspira-
tion (Guglialmelli 1976a, 48). Brazil’s joint projects and commercial
expansion invariably extended its regional dominance. To Argentina’s
dismay, Brazil was also flexing its military muscle to extend its influ-
ence. Itaipfi, after all, was the product of blunt coercion (and not just
generous economic payoffs), beginning with Brazil’s brief military occu-
pation of Paraguayan territory in 1965-66 to extract Asuncibn’s compli-
ance (Pedone 1989, 282). Brazil openly intervened in the 1970-71 Boli-
vian crisis to support the pro-Brazilian Hugo Banzer. In similar fashion,
it massed troops o n the Uruguayan border in 1971 in preparation for a
possible intervention in the event of an electoral victory by the leftist
Frente Amplio (Bandeira 1993).
More alarming for the Argentines, the postwar power disparity with
Brazil widened in the 1970s. Brazil outsized Argentina in population,
territory, and economy, with an average annual economic growth rate
reaching 10 percent by the mid-1970s. The combination of Brazil’s
industrial growth and Argentina’s own economic implosion greatly
skewed the balance of power. Argentine military and political leaders
publicly expressed concern about Brazil’s “hegemonic ambitions” and
feared that their country would soon be nothing more than an outlying
province of Brazil (Viamonte 1974; Guglialmelli 1972; Sanguenetti 1972).
Thus Argentina’s deteriorating position in the Basin was a n important
factor compelling Argentina to seek negotiated, durable settlement that
would preserve it some latitude and influence in the region. By the late
1970s, Argentina had concluded that the only solution to the rapid
growth of Brazilian power was a “permanent foundation” that would
“guarantee balanced growth” (AMRE 1978a).
A SE’ITLEMENT BASIN
IN THE LA PLATA
After centuries of competition, the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry ended
suddenly and peacefully with the signing of the October 1979 Corpus-
Itaipu accords and the May 1980 nuclear energy agreements. The
197940 settlement resolved the Basin dispute and allowed both dams
to operate near original capacity, but its true purpose was to serve far
greater objectives. Brazil was its principal beneficiary, as Argentina
essentially surrendered its claims in the Upper Paran5. Why did
Argentina propose a settlement that essentially recognized what it feared
all along-the consolidation of Brazilian hegemony in the Basin?
The critical phase in the transition from rivalry to cooperation was
December 1976 to September 1979. This period corresponds to two cm-
cia1 developments: the escalation of Argentina’s near-war crisis with Chile
and the critical phase of Brazil’s political liberalization, or abertzim. That
Argentina, facing imminent war with Chile in the South Atlantic, would
seek to accommodate Brazil is not puzzling theoretically or historically.
What is puzzling is Brazil’s accession. Given its power and bargaining
advantage, and with Itaipu a fait accompli, Brazil was not as compelled
to accommodate its historical rival. Indeed, with Argentina cornered, a
cruder strategy might have been to reject Argentina’s overtures and
extract maximum advantage in the Upper Paran5.
The Argentine Initiative
The available evidence shows that the initiative to break the diplomatic
impasse and seek a general settlement originated with Argentina. After
years of denouncing Itaipu, Argentina suddenly reversed its position. In
a personal letter delivered at a December 1976 regional conference,
General Jorge Rafael Videla, head of the Argentine ruling junta,
appealed to Brazilian president General Ernest0 Geisel to reopen talks
on Corpus-Itaipu, adding that all other matters should be “settled in the
spirit of friendship” (AMRE 1976). Videla’s letter was followed a few
months later by another Argentine proposal to create a tripartite com-
mission to resolve the technical compatibility of the two projects. At the
same time, Videla established a special interministerial task force on
Corpus (Lanus 1984, 309). Videla’s newly appointed ambassador to
Brazil, Oscar Camilih, moreover, was considered a moderate and a
Brazilian expert.
The primary, though not exclusive, reason for this sudden turn-
around was strategic, owing partly to Argentina’s worsening relations
with Chile. Despite 1902 border accords, Chile and Argentina continued
to dispute possession of the strategically important Beagle Channel, as
well as Antarctica and maritime territorial limits (Garrett 1985). The
Beagle Channel dispute had been placed under British arbitration, and
Argentine-Chilean relations collapsed when Chile was awarded the ter-
ritories in April 1977 (a decision Argentina formally renounced in Janu-
ary 1978). For nearly two years, from early 1977 to early 1979, Chile and
Argentina prepared for war. Argentine war plans called for an attack in
December 1978, and both sides mobilized their armed forces (Jordan
1993, 151).
As the continent braced for a transandean war, another militarized
crisis was simmering in the South Atlantic as Argentina and Britain
faced off over the disputed Malvinas-Falklands Islands. For Argentina,
the two disputes were indivisible. Loss of the Beagle Channel, Argen-
tine strategists feared, would mean loss of Argentina’s claims to the
Malvinas, the South Atlantic seabed, and Antarctica. Argentina, more-
over, suspected collusion between Chile and Britain, which historically
shared warm ties.
RESENDE-SANTOS: SECURITY COOI’ERATION 99
By early 1977, then, Argentina found itself encircled by its most

powerful enemies. Accommodating Brazil was a strategic necessity,
both because Argentina simply could not hope to confront both rivals
simultaneously and because it could not be certain of Brazil’s reaction
if war broke out over the Beagle Channel. Though the likelihood was
low that Brazil would have played an overt role in a Beagle Channel
war, historically close ties between Brazil and Chile-and Brazil’s own
ambitions in the South Atlantic and Antarctica-were sufficient to cause
doubt in Buenos Aires. At the same time, wooing Brazil served another
purpose: confrontation with Britain over the Malvinas would require, at
a minimum, Brazilian diplomatic support. Chile, moreover, had resumed
its close affiliation with Brazil after the 1973 military coup (in which
Brazil participated).
The real question is why Argentina sought a more durable and com-
prehensive settlement rather than a mere truce or holding pattern in the
Upper Parana. It did so for several reasons. First, the crises in the South
Atlantic dragged on from late 1976 into the early 1980s. N o suggestion
is made that Argentine leaders were prescient or had the blueprint for
a settlement from the start. The point is only that there was a temporal
dimension to the crises to which they reacted and adjusted accordingly,
and which helps explain the two-plus-year gap between the first Argen-
tine initiative and the final settlement. What’s more, the idea of a com-
prehensive settlement had been circulating among leading Argentine
strategists and military figures before the South Atlantic crises.
An additional factor was the growing power disparity between
Argentina and Brazil. Argentine apprehension over the widening power
gap is prominent in military and strategic writings in the 1970s. Leading
strategists concluded that a “condominium” settlement with Brazil,
giving shared regional leadership, was the only viable option to salvage
the country’s declining position in the Basin. Yet another reason, though
more tangential, involves renewed Argentine concerns over develop-
ments in Brazil-U.S. relations. Foreign Ministry documents reveal this to
be a salient topic of discussion in the regime. The historically close
“unwritten alliance” between the United States and Brazil had always
been a source of angst for Argentina. Its fears were heightened by the
1976 Memorandum of Understanding, in which the United States desig-
nated Brazil the regional leader in Latin America.
The break in US.-Brazilian relations during the first half of the
Carter administration was celebrated within the Argentine Foreign Min-
istry, but by mid-1978 the United States was moving to repair relations.
In the wake of President Jimmy Carter’s visit to Brazil, Argentine lead-
ers feared a new pact between Brazil and the United States. The Foreign
Ministry’s North American department warned the leadership, “you will
have to bear in mind that if Brazil obtains a new and enhanced military
agreement [with the United States], the Republic will fall behind unless
it opts for a similar cooperation with another power” (AMRE 1978b).
The Strategy of Brazil’s Military Moderates

For its part, Brazil’s decision to accept a negotiated settlement in the
Upper Paran5 was driven not by strategic pressures or economic and
political troubles at home, but by a much broader strategy by moderate
military officers aimed at correcting problems in military organization.
Although Argentina’s deteriorating strategic situation actually enhanced
Brazil’s bargaining position in the Upper Parani, the Argentine initiative
provided moderates in the Brazilian military regime with a n auspicious
opportunity to pursue domestic and organizational objectives.
The moderates pursued a dual strategy of liberalization at home and
detente abroad to limit the corrosive influence of extremist forces,
specifically the internal security and intelligence apparatus lodged inside
the military and the state. Because extremists were present in both the
domestic and foreign policy bureaucracy, reducing external tensions
became an essential part of the government’s broader strategy to elimi-
nate their noxious influence and restore military professionalism.2
Stepan’s classic thesis regarding the intraorganizational sources of
abertura (1988) is essentially correct (Oliveira 1994; Stumpf and Pereira
1979; G6es 1984, 1978). The political and organizational project of mod-
erate officers, it should be added, also necessitated an external aher-
tura. To the extent that moderates had been committed since 1964 to
returning power to civilians and had seen the military’s intervention as
a temporary departure from its historical “moderating” role, abertura
was an end in itself.
The moderates’ commitment, however, was only partly philosophi-
cal. By 1974, professional concerns had assumed a much greater and
more urgent role in their thinking and political strategy. Fears of weak-
ening hierarchic control and discipline were pronounced after the so-
called authoritarian turn of the 1967-74 period. During the successive
hardline presidencies, military rule was more brutal; the size and power
of the internal security apparatus were expanded. Political authority and
military power within the regime consequently diverged, and parallel
chains of command and power centers emerged. Confronted with run-
away internal security agencies and eroding hierarchic control, moder-
ates used abertura to subordinate the military to political authority and
to restore professionalism.
After the mid-l970s, military organizational imperatives drove much
of Brazil’s domestic and foreign policy. The use of foreign policy to
achieve domestic political ends, of course, is not a novel idea (Putnam
1988), but it is an overlooked aspect of Brazilian foreign policy after
1974. Overlooked in particular is how developments inside the military

conditioned policymaking. Beginning in 1974 under General Geisel and
continuing under his hand-picked successor, General Jo50 Batista d o
Figueiredo (1979-85), moderate officers implemented their dual-track
strategy.
The origins and nature of abertura have been widely discussed in
the literature and reaffirmed by key decisionmakers (Contreiras 1998;
D’Araujo and Castro 1997; Soares et al. 1995; Stepan 1983). The strat-
egy’s intellectual architect was General Golbery d o Couto e Silva,
Geisel’s longtime confidant and head of the Civil Cabinet (Casa Civil),
a position he retained under Figueiredo. Golbery was Brazil’s premier
geopolitical theorist and strategist. He participated in the original plan-
ning of Itaipu. N o other person was better suited and positioned to
grasp the requirements and ramifications of abertura at home and
abroad. He frequently intervened in foreign policymaking during the
Geisel administration, often going against positions adopted by the For-
eign Ministry. He was a favorite target of Argentine denunciations of
what that country’s leaders perceived to be Brazil’s hegemonic policies
(Rehder 1770, 264).
Both Golbery and Geisel had occupied key posts in the first mili-
tary government of General Huniberto Castello Branco (1964-671,
Geisel as head of the Military Cabinet and Golbery the founding direc-
tor of the principal internal security and intelligence agency, the ServiCo
Nacional de Informacdes (SNI). Since the first military government,
Geisel and Golbery had been part of the subtle but growing political
power struggle between moderates (brandos) and hardliners (duros) in
the officer corps. They had witnessed firsthand how the hardliners, led
by the army minister, General Arthur Costa e Silva, imposed their will
during the 1967 succession.
Because of their ties to the moderates and their unrelenting efforts
to bloc the Costa e Silva candidacy, Geisel and Golbery earned deep
antipathy from the military’s right wing. Hardliners despised Golbery,
who enjoyed superminister status under Geisel; they opposed his
appointment and objected to his great latitude in the government. While
no one doubted Geisel’s superb credentials and capacity, his own selec-
tion for the presidency-made possible by the domineering role of his
brother Orlando, army minister and former armed forces chief of
staff-deepened the right wing’s resentment.
Geisel and Golbery, aided by other key officers closely identified
with Castello Branco (or Castellistas), conceived the broad outlines of
their abertura strategy before assuming power (D’Araujo and Castro
1997, 264; Stumpf and Pereira 1979, 16). Gradual political opening,
including restoring press and civic freedoms, was intended to reduce
domestic tensions, thereby making it easier both to expose the abuses
of extremist organs and to undercut their raison d’itre. Reducing ten-

sions at home through political opening would arrest the role expansion
of the repressive apparatus and lessen the need for the kinds of opaque
activities it thrived on.
Geisel’s own term to describe the political opening, disten@o, or
releasing of tensions, was appropriate because it truly reflected his
intention to bring the repressive apparatus under control. With extrem-
ists ensconced in both domestic and foreign policymaking, it was nec-
essary to release tensions o n both fronts. Sustaining such tensions
would not only entrench them more deeply but also would strengthen
hardliners politically.
The two master strategists also planned the rough parameters of an
external abertura strategy before taking office. The domestic front
undoubtedly was the main battleground, but there is also ample evidence
that foreign policy was deemed a crucial component in the overall strat-
egy (Mathias 1995, 123-24). Geisel immediately reversed the aggressive
Brad Potincia foreign policy of the previous right-wing administrations,
adopting what he called pragmatismo responsavel, responsible pragma-
tism (Geisel 1974; D’Araujo and Castro 1997; Soares de Lima and Moura
1983; Stumpf and Pereira 1979, 17). His foreign minister, AntGnio Azeredo
da Silveira, a professional diplomat and former ambassador to Argentina,
was a strong advocate of abertura (Soares et al. 1995,69). In the opinion
of one of Geisel’s confidants, General Gustavo Moraes Rego, Silveira was
chosen for his competence but also for his close relationship with Argen-
tine diplomatic circles (Soares et al. 1995, 51).
Geisel and Golbery conceived their strategy as a long-term, gradual
process that would span at least two administrations-making even
greater the need for unchallenged presidential authority and military
command, both to control the process as well as to hand-pick succes-
sors. Yet neither domestic nor external abertura was based on any
detailed, fixed blueprint or timetable (D’Araujo and Castro 1997, 264).
There is no evidence, moreover, that they saw external opening as
entailing major concessions to Argentina or backing off from original
objectives in the La Plata Basin. Geisel was emphatic that foreign policy
had to be “realistic” but also made “with conviction and in the interests
of Brazil” (D’Araujo and Castro 1997, 35-36),
On both fronts, Geisel and Golbery proceeded flexibly and cau-
tiously, so as not to provoke backlash from the hardliners. For any gen-
eral-president, the assent and obedience of the military leadership was
paramount, especially given the implications of the new strategy. Aber-
tura, moreover, may have received unconditional backing from the small
Castellista group but not from all moderates, many of whom objected to
its pace and scope rather than the overall idea of removing the armed
forces from direct rule. Aside from the need to retain moderate support,
the fear of provoking hardliner backlash was the major constraint on

domestic and foreign policy under both moderate governments. Geisel
always had to placate duros with each advance of abertura. Indeed, the
pattern of political liberalization at home was neither linear nor constant
but combined advances with inany deliberate tactical retreats and calcu-
lated pauses. The same delicate balancing act applied externally. Con-
troversial decisions, such as the recognition of Communist China and
Marxist-Leninist Angola, had already drawn open criticism from hardlin-
ers, forcing the government to backtrack or give ground in other areas.
Consequently, change in the Upper Paran5 was slow. Brazilian
policy in the Basin during 1974-79 was a mixture of gradual softening
with episodes of intransigence. Indeed, one of the new government’s
first acts after taking office was to begin construction of Itaiph and to
appoirlt General Jose Costa Cavalcanti, former minister of interior and
of mines and energy under the hardline government of General Emilio
Garrastazu Miidici and deemed a hardliner by many, as president of
Itaipu Binacional, the agency in charge of the project. Cavalcanti con-
sistently favored an uncompromising approach and viewed the Argen-
tine dams as menacing to 1taipii.j
Restoring Military Professionalism
By the early 1970s, moderates had concluded that the military’s “per-
manence” in power was producing “costs” to the institution itself, a sit-
uation Geisel described as a “grave problem” (D’Araujo and Castro,
1997, 168, 402; Contreiras 1998; Oliveira 1994; Stepan 1988). In Latin
America and elsewhere, direct rule invariably politicizes the military and
degrades institutional discipline and coherence (Remmer 1989; Martins
1986; Finer 1962). By 1974, the “military as government,” as Stepan
(1988) argues, realized that the growing dominance and autonomy of
the internal security agencies were harmful to the “military as institu-
tion” (Oliveira 1994; Skidmore 1988; Stepan 1988; Goes 1984; Goes and
Camargo 1984).
From the onset of military rule in 1964, unity, discipline, and hier-
archy were cardinal principles in the institution, which devised numer-
ous safeguards and informal practices to preempt, minimize, and con-
tain the expected costs of direct rule. Yet as early as 1970, key military
leaders, such as the respected Marshall Osvaldo Cordeiro de Farias and
General Alfred0 do Souto Malan, publicly warned against institutional
costs of direct rule. Moderate officers became alarmed over the erosion
and decay (disgaste) affecting the institution (Contreiras 1998, 39; Math-
ias 1995, 59). The “professionalism of the armed forces was damaged
under military rule,” observed one air force chief, as a result of their
involvement in internal repression (Contreiras 1998, 79, 82).
The unique features of military rule in Brazil magnified institutional

costs. Military rule was institutional in form, not personal o r factional as
in Chile and Argentina, respectively. As a result, the Brazilian military
was less able to shield itself against the internally corrosive effects of
direct rule. The institution as a whole suffered the damaging side effects
of runaway security organs, o n top of the other costs and legitimacy
crises that attend military rule (Martins 1986).
The repressive apparatus had multiplied in numbers and in power
since 1964 such that by 1974 it had become a parallel power, or “state
within a state,” in direct contention with the hierarchy for control over
both the state and the military institution (Oliveira 1994, 107). While the
small guerrilla problem had disappeared by 1970, the internal security
apparatus remained entrenched. The peak agency in this sprawling,
hydra-headed apparatus was the SNI, a cabinet-level ministry. Although
after 1974 it was firmly under the control of softliners when Geisel
appointed Figueiredo its director, it had already amassed such enor-
mous power and influence that its own creator, Golbery, considered it
too powerful. The SNI rivaled the Army Ministry as the second most
important organ (in terms of both policy and succession politics) in the
military as government and institution.
Much more dangerous, and more difficult to control, were the
“information” agencies of the services, the army’s Centro de Infor-
magdes do Exercito (CIEX, also CIE), the navy’s CENIMAR, and the air
force’s CISA. CIEX was the most powerful and most feared of the three
and, as illustrated by its June 1975 study circulated in the military, was
also an open opponent of abertura (Baffa 1989, 49). Deeper in the
shadows were the interservice Internal Security Detachment (Destaca-
mento de Opera@es Internas, DO11 and the Internal Defense Operations
Command (Comando Operacional or Centro de Opera@es de Defesa
Interna, CODI), dominated by extremists and responsible for the more
egregious acts of torture and state terror. Unlike the SNI, these other
internal security agencies were subgroups not of the presidency but of
the individual armed services or multiagency collaboration. The
DOVCODI apparatus, for instance, was an interservice coordinating and
operational agency that included participation from the federal police,
military police, and state and municipal security agencies.*
The repressive apparatus penetrated the federal machinery as well
as security and police forces in the lower tiers of government. Evidence
pointed, moreover, to collaboration between the repressive agencies,
paramilitary groups, and death squads. Although Brazil was spared the
extreme level of state terror seen in Chile and Argentina, the acts of
repression that did occur were considered by moderates “too violent”
and damaging to the institution. General OctAvio Costa, a leading mod-
erate who considered the creation of DOVCODI a “great mistake,”
regarded the “repression of the 1970s [as1 a grave error, with damaging
consequences for the armed forces” because its perpetrators “over-
stepped military authority” (Contreiras 1998, 83, 9 6 9 7 ) .
The mission and role expansion of the internal security agencies
accelerated under the successive hardline administrations of Costa e
Silva and Medici during 1967-74 and became the institutional basis of
hardliner power. The DOI/CODI system, for example, was set u p during
this period and remained outside the control of moderates after 1974.
Hardliners in key posts either controlled or actively backed the princi-
pal repressive agencies, such as CIEX and the DOI/CODI, during the
first half of the Geisel presidency. A hardliner, General Sylvio Frota,
headed the Army Ministry, using his position to provide active support
to the repressive agencies, often publicly defending their actions and
accusing their critics of being communists. Heading CIEX until late 1977
was General AntBnio da Silva Campos, an ardent hardliner and Frota
associate. With Siio Paulo as its main base of operations, the DOVCODI
detachment received ample protection and backing from the Second
Army, headed during most of the 1970s by two hardliners, Generals
Humberto de Souza Mello and Eduardo d’Avila Mello. D’Avila, subse-
quently dismissed by Geisel, was a stubborn critic of ahertura.
The operational commander of the SHo Paulo DOI/CODI was
Colonel Albert0 Ustra, whom a female congressional deputy later
accused of personally torturing her. The Siio Paulo DOVCODI unit was
responsible for two highly publicized murders of detainees, that of jour-
nalist Vladimir Herzog in October 1975 and Manuel Fie1 Filho the fol-
lowing January. According to General Moraes Rego, the Second Army’s
chief of staff at the time, General Gentil Marcondes and the head of its
Second Section (Information), Colonel Jos6 de Barros Paes, were later
in command positions in the First Army in Rio de Janeiro during the
infamous Riocentro car bombing carried out by secret service agents
(Soares et al. 1995, 86-87).
For Geisel and the moderates, the internal security apparatus had
grown too large and too independent at the expense of hierarchic con-
trol. There was “an excessive concentration of power in the hands of
radicals,” observed a close supporter of Geisel, Admiral Hernani Goulart
Fortuna (Contreiras 1998, 101). Indeed, complained Geisel, they oper-
ated outside the control and knowledge of the Planalto (presidency).
“We found out about what happened in the CIEX only after it had
already occurred,” he remarked (D’Araujo and Castro 1997, 217). Not
even the SNI, in the hands of moderates after 1974 and a powerful
weapon in the war against extremists, was able to track all their activi-
ties. Geisel’s power and authority, not so much as president but as com-
mander-in-chief, were threatened. While he believed that the 1964
“Revolution” had accomplished its goals, his overriding preoccupation
was restoring hierarchy, control, and discipline, and returning the mili-
tary and the country to “normalcy” (D’Araujo and Castro 1997).
The military organizational and political problems created by the
internal security apparatus thus were numerous and multifaceted. The
first set of problems stemmed from the agencies’ autonomy and inde-
pendence. They undercut the hierarchy’s monopoly over the means of
coercion and information. Not only did the agencies operate outside the
chain of command, but they engaged in their own independent state
terror and policymaking. They challenged both the high command and
the structure of political authority. Golbery argued that their activities
often “put in check the hierarchy of the military” (Baffa 1989, 17). Their
proliferation and bureaucratic sprawl, moreover, made top-down control
and policy implementation difficult. Thus, although moderates headed the
Army Ministry and SNI during most of the Geisel and Figueiredo years,
lower echelons inside them often acted independently of the policy direc-
tion and wishes of the leadership. The intelligence organs “had to be con-
trolled by the presidency,” argued Geisel, because “their particularistic
activities escaped the control of the presidency” (D’Araujo and Castro
1997, 227-28). A senior admiral, Armando Amorim Ferreira Vidigal, added
that the military intelligence services “practically became parallel powers,
which brought them, on certain occasions, into collision with the princi-
ples of hierarchy and military ethics” (Contreiras 1998, 100).
The agencies’ functional expansion and presence in the state appa-
ratus allowed them to “colonize” key domestic and foreign policy
arenas, giving them the ability to interfere directly in policymaking and
implementation. Since their creation in the late 1960s, bureaus of the
Divis6es de SeguranGa e InformaG6es (Divisions of Security and Infor-
mation, DSI) and Assessorias de Seguranp e InformaG6es (Departments
of Security and Information, ASI) were established in all ministries and
state-run enterprises. An AS1 unit was present even in the national
tourism agency. The DSI and AS1 bureaus monitored all activities and
decisions they deemed to have national security implications. The secu-
rity apparatus was embedded in the nuclear, informatics, and defense
bureaucracies.
Brazil’s nuclear energy program was under the military’s control,
with overall supervision and planning by the powerful, military-domi-
nated National Security Council (CSN), the highest organ of national
security decisionmaking. The nuclear research agency, the military-con-
trolled National Commission on Nuclear Energy (CNEN), also coordi-
nated the parallel military nuclear program (Soares de Lima 1986, 118).
A hardliner, Colonel Francisco Araripe, headed the military’s nuclear
program into the early 1980s.
In the Foreign Ministry, however, the formal presence of the internal
security establishment appears to have been minimal. Unlike its Argen-
KESENDE-SANTOS: SECURI7Y COOPERATION 107
tine counterpart, Itamarati retained its professionalism and civilian direc-

tion, enjoying a measure of autonomy in foreign policymaking unrelated
to national security matters. Yet Itamarati did not have a free hand in
negotiations with Argentina (Hirst 1996b). Key policy areas involved in
relations with Argentina-national security and defense, the nuclear pro-
gram, and major infrastructural projects like Itaipfi-were not under its
control but under the national security bureaucracy, primarily the CNS
and the military ministries. During the Geisel years, a CNS staff member
and army officer, Flavio Moutinho de Carvalho, worked as liaison with
the Foreign Ministry. Walder De G6es (1978, 38) describes the relation-
ship between Itamarati and the CNS as one of “total integration,” though
one diplomat does not share this assessment (Maciel 1994). In general,
major foreign policymaking involved two overlapping spheres of nego-
tiations, between Itamarati and the Planalto (especially the CNS) and
between the Planalto and the officer corps (G6es 1978).
As the power and mission of the internal security apparatus
expanded, so did its political influence within the military and the state.
As it became a parallel, shadow power in the regime and the military
institution (Oliveira 1994, 34; Martins 1986, 811, the various agencies
became power centers for individual ministers and therefore deeply
political in terms of factional and interservice rivalries, promotions as
well as presidential succession (Alves 1985, 128-31). More troubling for
the institution, they began to interfere directly in the core procedures of
the military establishment; namely, promotions and command assign-
ments (Goes 1984, 370-71). The internal security organs, along with
their hardline sponsors, were jeopardizing the cardinal principle of mil-
itary organization: hierarchy. “They became autonomous, and this in
certain ways affected the chain of command,” Geisel noted. “What mat-
tered above all,” he declared, “was hierarchy and the spirit of discipline”
(D’Araujo and Castro 1997, 402; Mathias 1995, 58).
The repressive apparatus actively sought to derail abertura. Not
only did the military right wing vocally oppose the government’s
domestic and foreign policies, it launched a deliberate campaign to
destabilize the moderate governments. There is no concrete evidence of
a coordinated, systematic plan or high-level machination. Instead, the
campaign apparently was carried out sporadically by renegade units and
individual persons who may or may not have had sanction from the
middle and upper ranks. The aim of the campaign, moreover, may have
been not so much to topple the government as to force it to retreat on
policy and to win support for a more hardline approach. Brazil was
nonetheless shaken by a series of bombings, kidnappings, and political
killings in the late 1970s and early 1980s, nearly all of which were
against suspected leftist targets and attributed to the internal security
apparatus and associated paramilitary groups.
108 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 44:4
Destabilization by the right wing was particularly serious during the

early Figueiredo government. In the first eight months of 1980, for exam-
ple, an estimated 25 such incidents took place (Lagoa 1983, 109). One of
the most serious occurred in downtown Rio de Janeiro in April 1981
when a car bomb, presumably targeted at a large concert for progressive
causes, exploded prematurely, killing the two D O K O D I perpetrators.
Hardline opposition, it should be noted, stemmed mainly from the
underlying power struggle over presidential successions as well as hos-
tility toward abertura generally, rather than the Corpus-Itaipu dispute
per se. Nevertheless, hardliners were critical of the government’s foreign
policy orientation, and a significant nationalist current ran through the
armed forces (though perhaps weaker and less disruptive than its
Argentine counterpart). Hardliners considered Foreign Minister Silveira
a leftist; Army Minister Frota criticized him (Soares et al. 1995, 51;
Rehder 1990, 67). One hardliner, General Jo50 Paulo Moreira Burnier,
former head of CISA, observed that Geisel’s “attitudes more and more
led us to believe that General Geisel was really under the influence of
General Golbery, who himself was a socialist.” In reference to the 1980
accords, Burnier added that Geisel’s “nuclear policy [was] premature
and poorly planned, bringing us to a failure whose consequences w e
are still suffering today” (quoted in Soares et al. 1995, 214-15).
The corrosive influence of the internal security apparatus was com-
pounded by the way it aggravated factionalism in the officer corps
(Skidmore 1988; Stumpf and Pereira 1979; Goes 1978). The moderates’
commitment to withdraw the military from government not only created
certain ambiguities and contradictions of military rule in Brazil from the
start, but also gave rise to a fundamental cleavage in the institution (Linz
1973; Oliveira 1994). Factional cleavage was embodied functionally, with
hardliners dominating the security-intelligence organs and other state
agencies, so that the political and mission expansion of these organs
necessarily meant growth in the power of hardliners. Both factions were
heterogeneous, and represented a small but active fraction of the officer
corps; the majority of officers were ideologically and politically neutral
or undefined. The Brazilian regime and the military institution itself were
far more cohesive and stable than their Argentine counterparts. Power
struggles between the two factions resembled chess matches, as General
Moraes Rego observed, rather than violent contests (Soares et al. 1995,
54-55). Factionalism emerged, nevertheless, during the first military gov-
ernment in 1964 and deepened thereafter, culminating in the failed coup
attempt of October 1977 (for details, see G6es 1978, chap. 3).
Predictably, opening on both fronts aggravated internal divisions
within the military, since its progress came at the expense of hardliners.
Abertura required (and facilitated) breaking the power of the internal
security system. Geisel and the architects of abertura understood that its
most difficult terrain would be inside the military. Opposition from hard-
liners determined the limits of opening domestically and externally.
Intramilitary opposition did not diminish after 1974, but in many
ways it was magnified by the looming power struggle over the 1979
succession, often referred to as the segunda guerra (second war)
between the faction^.^ Each presidential succession was a moment of
crisis for the regime (Oliveira 1994, 44), but viewed more broadly,
opposition to abertura and the heated politics of succession repre-
sented a much bigger clash. By 1974, two dominant (parallel) structures
of power, with contradictory interests, had emerged inside the state and
military (Oliveira 1994; G6es 1984). The contest was not so much over
ahertura as it was for control over both the state machinery and the mil-
itary institution. Needless to say, whichever faction controlled the reins
of power determined the character of both military rule and domestic
and foreign policy. The moderates’ political project thus represented a
fatal threat to the position and interests of the hardliners and the inter-
nal security apparatus.
The loci of military opposition to Geisel and abertura were the
internal security apparatus; the Second Army, based in S2o Paulo; and
the powerful Army Ministry, headed by the strident and unpredictable
Frota.” Until his unprecedented dismissal in October 1977, Frota was the
hardliners’ vocal leader and the self-anointed presidential successor.
Thrust to center stage by the importance of his position rather than his
own personal qualities, Frota became the focal point of efforts by hard-
liners both in the military and Congress to retake power. The principal
coordinator of his presidential campaign was the redoubtable General
Jayme Portella, the extremist Cusa Militar (Military Cabinet) chief under
Costa e Silva and a leading figure among anti-Geisel forces inside and
outside the military.
Though Frota’s political ambitions and open campaigning troubled
Geisel, the principal source of friction between them was Frota’s actions
inside the military and government. Frota not only acted independently
and without consulting Geisel, he refused to carry out the reforms and
promotions the president wanted. He also publicly criticized the admin-
istration’s policies, going as far as accusing the government of turning
communist. Frota even criticized the austere “April Package” of 1977
(the illiberal set of electoral and constitutional changes restricting the
democratic opposition) and openly called for the adoption of more dra-
conian measures.
While Frota and his coterie carefully avoided the president himself,
Geisel’s key advisers and mouthpieces of ahertura, such as Golbery and
Foreign Minister Silveira, became targets of criticism (Rehder 1990, 67,
75). Frota demanded that Golbery’s activities be restricted. He actively
supported and defended the extremist agencies, giving free rein to asso-
ciates involved in torture, such as his CIEX director Adyr Fiuza de

Castro. He appointed hardline allies to key army posts in Rio de Janeiro
and Silo Paulo, in addition to the Planalto military command. What was
more egregious, he defied Geisel’s orders to open an investigation into
the murder and torture of detainees in DOI/CODI.
In the words of one Castellistu, “normalization” would require a
“complicated process of neutralization of the nest of the radicals” (Con-
treiras 1998, 68). Geisel, as befit his imperial temperament and auto-
cratic management style, concentrated in his own hands far greater
powers over political and military affairs than previous military presi-
dents had; he placed promotion and assignment authority in the
Planalto rather than in the Army Ministry. Geisel slowly replaced hard-
liners in the high command (although their presence remained strong in
the middle ranks). After taking power, he used his authority as president
and military commander-in-chief to cleanse the high command of
extremists through reassignments, changes in promotion regulations,
and outright dismissals, To promote Castellistus and moderates to key
positions, he instituted new regulations that shortened the duration of
service in the high command.
Geisel also summarily removed commanders, the most serious case
being the January 1976 dismissal of Second Army chief D’Avila, whom
Geisel immediately replaced with a close ally and defender of abertura,
General Dilermando Gomes Monteiro. D’Avila’s dismissal came after a
second detainee in the command’s DOVCODI was murdered, despite
Geisel’s repeated orders to D’Avila and Frota to put an end to arbitrary
abuses.
Another step was to appoint trusted officers and allies to key com-
mand posts and positions of authority. In particular, Geisel promoted
hand-picked confidants to the Superior Tribunal Militar (STM), the high-
est military-judicial organ responsible for reviewing and interpreting
national security legislation and military justice. The STM, composed of
numerous Geisel appointees and outspoken critics of torture and the
security agencies, played a significant role in the battle against extrem-
ists. The objective, said Geisel, was to prevent key agencies in the insti-
tution and state from “becoming a platform of projection for radicals
w ho intended t o create problems for the political project of my gov-
ernment” (quoted in Contreiras 1998, 130).
Geisel also assigned allies to the principal army groups, making it
impossible for hardliners to launch a coup. Where hardliners held com-
mand, as in the Second Army in S P o Paulo until 1976, he appointed trusted
brigade commanders in the respective army group. By 1976, moreover,
Castellisas had adopted a more concerted campaign to dismantle the
internal security apparatus, although with far less success. The DOIKODI
system was not fully disbanded until after 1982 (Baffa 1989, 15).
Predictably, hardliners resisted and used their principal bases of

power, the Army Ministry and security apparatus, to counterattack. On
the whole, violent opposition to abertura remained sporadic and unco-
ordinated, though active into the early 1980s in sometimes extreme
forms, such as the April 1981 car bombing. The clash between moder-
ates and hardliners reached a turning point in what many observers
regard as an abortive coup attempt by Army Minister Frota in late 1977.’
Succession politics and Frota’s own open campaign to be nomi-
nated presidential successor played a part in his October 1977 dismissal.
Geisel, however, defended his decision on the basis of military hierar-
chy and unity and what he regarded as Frota’s open disobedience and
disloyalty. Although Frota’s boorish and clumsy conduct attracted few
admirers among moderates and professionals, he nonetheless voiced
hardliner concerns and criticisms of the government’s policies. In his so-
called manifesto, released publicly and sent to all military commands on
the day of his dismissal, he denounced Geisel’s domestic and foreign
policies, for which he blamed “faulty advice” originating from a “small
coterie ensconced in the government.” He decried “the constant attacks
to destroy the national security structure” and “to remove the armed
forces from the decisionmaking processes of the nation” (Silva and
Ribas Carneiro 1983, 99).
Reaffirming his authority, Geisel used the Frota episode to purge
extremists from the Army Ministry, to which he appointed as chief
another trusted ally and consummate professional soldier, General Fer-
nando Belfort Bethlem. After Frota’s dismissal, Bethlem and other mili-
tary chiefs publicly declared their unconditional obedience to presiden-
tial authority and support for abertura. The newly appointed armed
forces chief of staff, General Tacito The6philo Gaspar, openly declared
support for the government’s foreign policy (Rehder 1990, 171).
Abertura at Home and Abroad
The military organizational imperatives driving reconciliation with

Argentina did not diminish after the abortive coup attempt but instead
intensified from 1978 into the early 1980s. The pressures o n the mod-
erate governments to reach an agreement in the Upper Paran5 contin-
ued to grow and remained high into the first years of the Figueiredo
government. Indeed, presidential succession and negotiations in the
Upper Paran2 were peaking at the same time, along with the strategic
and political-organizational circumstances that pushed the two sides
toward settlement, though for Brazil the path to settlement was not a
straight line.
Presidential succession imposed its own limitations on foreign
policy. The residual strength and presence of hardliners, even if some-
what diluted, meant that the Castellistas still had to proceed cautiously
on both fronts. Extremists stepped u p the destabilization offensive in the
wake of Figueiredo’s nomination. Figueiredo’s selection, while a victory
for the moderates, did not receive unanimous assent in the military.
Many of the radicals tied to the repressive agencies, who had been
Frota’s most ardent supporters, remained in place. Various agencies and
freelancers attached to them carried out assorted bombings, reprisals,
and provocations.
Right-wing destabilization efforts surged between 1979 and 1981,
some with the complicity of SNI, CIE, CENIMAR, and CISA, according to
General Moraes Rego (Soares et al. 1995, 88). The SNI during the
Figueiredo government, it soon became evident, was not under the full
control of its leadership. The army’s CIE also appears to have escaped
the control of the hierarchy. General Octavio Costa, Army Ministry staff
officer and Geisel aide, observed, “the more the process of liberalization
expanded, the more noticeable the reactions of the more hardline sec-
tors and the information system in particular” (Soares et al. 1995, 116).
In the army high command, moderates actually lost ground from
late 1977 to mid-1980, when only 3 of the 13 members were considered
moderates (Kucinski 1982, 72). Hardliners commanded all 4 army
groups in 1980. Despite the removal of Frota and others, moreover, nei-
ther Geisel nor Figueiredo could carry out a full-scale demobilization of
the internal security apparatus. To retain the support (or acquiescence)
of the high command and moderates, Geisel agreed not to dismantle the
security organs. Soon after dismissing Frota, he dispatched a special
brief to all members of the high command informing them of that deci-
sion (Kucinski 1982, 71; Goes 1978, 76). On another front, by 1979
social mobilization in the form of popular protests and labor strikes
resurfaced. The effect was to make it appear as if the government had
lost control of abertura and to give hardliners more political potency.
Abertura became an even more delicate balancing act.
Argentina’s overture therefore was propitious, for the Brazilian gov-
ernment’s military organizational objectives simply could not be accom-
plished by reducing tensions only at home. While moderates could not
move too far or too fast in the Upper Parani, conflict abroad would
derail political liberalization and undermine the organizational project.
This tight link made a strategy of external diversion-giving the military
new functions or stirring tensions abroad-inconceivable, because it
would only increase the domestic political power and institutional pre-
rogative of extremist groups and individuals. The potential for instabil-
ity abroad arising from unpredictable sources created further incentives
for moderates to reach a settlement, despite Brazil’s bargaining advan-
tage in the Basin. Specifically, Argentina’s historic unpredictability, emo-
tionalism, and penchant for impulsive behavior-as Brazilians saw
it-had always been a source of concern. The opportunity to bind

Argentina to a formal agreement would guard against that unpre-
dictability in the Upper Parank In sum, the risks of n o agreement and
unilateralism in the Upper Parana far outweighed any costs associated
with a political settlement.
THEROADTO DETENTE
Negotiations during the year and a half following Videla’s December
1976 letter proved difficult. Policy reversals and inconsistencies, more
serious on the Argentine side, largely accounted for the lack of progress.
Argentina’s policy vacillated greatly from the time of Videla’s letter to late
1978. Reversals and inconsistencies in Argentine foreign policy, while not
new, were directly linked to deep divisions and the fractured nature of
decisionmaking in the Processo de Reorganizacibn Nacional, the military
junta. The result was an anarchical foreign policymaking process Uordan
1993; Perina and Russell 1988; Pion-Berlin 1985; Tulchin 1984).
The other major reason for Argentine policy inconsistencies was
intramilitary opposition, particularly from the hardline nationalist fac-
tion. Videla’s government also faced military organizational constraints
on foreign policy, such that preliminary agreements and policy meas-
ures adopted in the course of negotiations were frequently rescinded or
blocked. The hardline nationalists, led by the strident Admiral Isaac
Rojas and Navy Minister Emilio Eduardo Massera, vehemently opposed
settlement in the Basin. The strains of fragmentation erupted in the 1981
and 1982 coups (Pion-Berlin 1985). Also badly split was the Foreign
Ministry, run by the military (navy) rather than civilian professionals as
in Brazil. It is interesting that Brazilian leaders were judicious in their
appraisal of Argentina’s frequent reversals and inconsistencies, blaming
specific factions or individuals in and out of the foreign ministry rather
than Videla personally.
Relations reached new lows during the first half of 1977, as
Argentina reintroduced the demand for prior consultation and intimated
that previous bilateral treaties o n the Basin would have to be renegoti-
ated. The most serious point in the Corpus-ItaipO dispute arose just as
tensions with Chile were mounting. In July, Argentina closed the trans-
andean Cuevas-Caracoles tunnel to Brazilian commercial trucks headed
for Chile, triggering the so-called truck wars. While the closing was
directly linked to the Chilean crisis, Brazil responded by closing its
border to Argentine goods and vehicles, and broke off talks.
With each rupture in negotiations, however, both sides initiated
secret diplomatic and military contacts. Videla and Geisel turned to
secret military-to-military talks to jump-start negotiations, for example,
dispatching military aides to Foz d e Iguaqu to diffuse the July border
crisis (Bandeira 1993, 260). Days later, both foreign ministries

announced the resumption of talks. From mid-1977 to late 1978, nego-
tiations were shadowed by secret contacts and shuttle diplomacy. In
September 1978, during the last months of Geisel’s administration, Brazil
and Argentina reached a tentative agreement during a United Nations
foreign ministers’ meeting in New York. Secret negotiations followed in
Rio de Janeiro that resulted in the Rio Document, which heavily favored
Brazil (making no mention of prior consultation and allowing the “flex-
ible” operation of Itaipd, for instance).
Despite this apparent breakthrough, negotiations broke down a
month later when Brazil suddenly announced that the Itaipd Dam
would be outfitted with 2 additional turbines instead of the original 18.8
Argentina renounced the Rio accords even as it prepared for war in the
Beagle Channel, and reintroduced its original demands for Corpus’s
configuration and prior consultation.
Although negotiations were stalled, both sides were pressed in late
1978 to reach an agreement; Argentina by the threat of war with Chile
and Brazil by a succession crisis. Videla initiated another round of shut-
tle diplomacy, sending Admiral Horacio Colombo to Brazil with a new
set of proposals. Videla summoned a high-level cabinet meeting in Feb-
ruary 1979 and personally intervened in the negotiating process, accord-
ing toJornal do Brad (1979b). The critical initiative to break the impasse
occurred shortly thereafter when Argentina announced it would accept a
105-meter limit for Corpus-provided that Brazil agreed to only 18 tur-
bines for Itaipd (Lanus 1984, 310). Foreign Minister Carlos Pastor told
Jornal do B r a d o n February 1, “there should not be any doubt that these
negotiations will proceed successfully. The agreement we will make with
Brazil and Paraguay regarding the dams is only the initial step in a series
of common endeavors that w e will confront” (1979a). According to 0
Estado de SGo Paulo (19791, Pastor, together with high-ranking advisers
from the Casa Rosada, met privately with the Brazilian ambassador to
finalize an agreement as soon as Figueiredo took office in March.
Figueiredo accelerated the Corpus-Itaipu negotiations; he, too, per-
sonally intervened in the process. As the departing head of SNI,
Figueiredo understood well the shadowy activities of extremists and the
underlying political prerequisites of internal and external abertura. Sev-
eral months before taking office he told the Jornal do Brasil(1979c) and
foreign correspondents that disagreements over the specific configura-
tions of the Paran5 dams were trivial given the more important issues
facing Brazil and Argentina. He informed his foreign minister-designate,
Ramiro Saraiva Guerrero, that the top priority in foreign policy was res-
olution of the Corpus-Itaipd dispute (Guerrero 1992, 92); according to
the Jornal do B r a d (1979~1,he instructed his first cabinet meeting that
efforts must be devoted to reducing existing tensions with Argentina.
Figueiredo and Guerrero planned a unified Brazilian position in the

Upper Parana. With presidential backing, Guerrero’s first move was to
reestablish the primacy of Itamarati diplomats and freeze out those from
Mines and Energy. In response to Argentina’s new offer, Guerrero won
approval from Figueiredo and key cabinet members to drop the pro-
posal for additional turbines. In late September 1979, another foreign
ministers’ meeting in New York penned the key outlines of an accord.
The final 1979-80 settlement was broad in scope and varied in content,
going beyond the particulars of the Corpus-ItaipQ dispute.
A Global Settlement
The Corpus-Itaipu treaty was signed in October 1979 during an elabo-

rate ceremony in Asuncibn, Paraguay, followed by the separate signing
of the bilateral nuclear energy accords in May. Accompanying those
agreements were other accords involving frontier sanitation, bilateral
trade, and cultural-scientific exchange. A separate accord was reached
o n another unresolved dispute over shared use of the Uruguay River. In
addition, Brazil and Argentina signed a Memorandum of Understanding
calling for high-level consultation on all bilateral and international mat-
ters (AMRE 1980b). In tacit reference to the Nonproliferation Treaty, the
memorandum called for policy coordination on international issues
“directly concerning developing countries as well as, in particular, issues
of interest to Latin America and in the spirit of regional cooperation”
(AMRE 1980b).
More significant in terms of future cooperation, Brazil and Argentina
agreed to establish “a flexible and agile mechanism” at the ministerial
level to manage relations. After the signing, Videla told the Jornal da
Repziblica (1979) that the settlement’s importance went “beyond the rec-
onciliation of legitimate interests, and advance[dl objectives that are
more important and of profound significance in the Basin and South
America.” Although the agreements resolved concrete issues (or mas-
saged them with diplomatic language), their more salient feature was
that they were frameworks in which to establish mechanisms and issue
areas for follow-on bilateral accords. A significant feature of the 1979-80
political settlement, moreover, is how it linked security, economic, and
political issues. The settlement gave rise to the singular characteristic of
succeeding Argentine-Brazilian cooperation: the coupling of security
and economic issues.
The 1979 Corpus-ItaipQ agreement resolved the immediate issues
pertaining to the basic configuration of the two dams, downstream
water levels, and notification procedures covering various aspects of
Itaipu’s operation. As the most important institutional feature of the
Upper Paran5 settlement, Brazil and Argentina agreed to resuscitate the
dormant Argentine-Brazilian Special Coordination Commission (CEBAC)

as the principal forum for all bilateral negotiations. The major victory for
Brazilian diplomacy was to insist on the language of “flexible operation”
for ItaipO, which not only meant that it could subsequently add addi-
tional turbines without consulting Argentina but which it interpreted as
carte blanche. On the other hand, the treaty stipulated that alterations
of the projects “be preceded by negotiations among the three parties,”
which Argentines interpreted as victory for its position. Few in Argentina
were satisfied with the agreement, however. Hardline nationalists
openly denounced it.
The May 1980 nuclear accord was unexpected but emerged as an
integral part of the overall political settlement in the Basin. The
accord was unrelated to the Corpus-Itaiph dispute and appears to
have arisen in parallel secret talks just before the signing of the
Corpus-Itaiph agreement in October, with full negotiation begun in
December. The nuclear accord was not an arms control agreement; it
called for technical-scientific collaboration in nuclear research over
ten years for the full nuclear combustion cycle, as well a s commercial
sales of materials and equipment. An important feature was the ten-
tative references to research and operations safeguards, including
“physical protection of nuclear materials.” In effect, both sides took
the first tentative steps toward a rudimentary mutual inspection and
verification regime.
The 1980 agreement did not put an end to the nuclear technology
race, but the accord became the first major step toward a comprehen-
sive nuclear regime based o n proliferation restraint and mutual safe-
guards-a regime methodically put together over the next decade.
The available evidence indicates that the initiative for a nuclear
accord-like the initiative for the general settlement-originated with
Argentina. This suggests that Argentina was pursuing a more compre-
hensive, long-term calculus to address strategic problems and imbal-
ances. Specifically, Argentina was pursuing a “condominium” settle-
ment, one that could not only guarantee against a nuclear-armed,
hegemonic Brazil (by neutralizing its program) but also preserve for
Argentina some influence in the region. Soon after Brazil acquired full-
cycle nuclear technologies, Argentine military strategists began calling
for a broad settlement. In late 1975 and again in 1976, the influential
military strategist and editor of the military journal Estrutkgia, General
Juan Guglialmelli, recommended a “global” settlement with Brazil, one
that would deal with nuclear energy policy and should also incorporate
Chile (Guglialmelli 1976b, 1975).
The earliest official statement o n nuclear cooperation was prepared
in 1978 by the Foreign Ministry’s policy planning staff. The document
urged
close monitoring of Brazil’s nuclear program for the purpose of

adopting policies and measures necessary to neutralize or eliminate
any real or potential threat to our country. At the same time, to
study the possibilities of establishing cooperation rules or accords
that could favor Argentina’snuclear program. (AMRE 1978aI9
An annual planning document from the Foreign Ministry’s Latin Ameri-

can bureau urged a strategy of “strengtheningthe dialogue” with Brazil
to create “a climate in bilateral relations that allows [us] to assume
common responsibilities in all questions regarding development and
security in Latin America.” Argentina’s goal should be to “secure a per-
manent basis for a political-economic understanding” (AMRE 1978a).
In late 1979, Ambassador Camili6n cabled a detailed report to
Buenos Aires on Brazil’s extensive uranium reserves and argued that its
nuclear program was far more advanced than previously thought (AMRE
1979). He warned that Brazil’s recent advances “facilitate its access to
nuclear equipment and technologies.” Explicit proposals for a conven-
tion dealing with nuclear policy surfaced in the Videla government
immediately before the signing of the Itaipii agreement. Videla observed
that Argentina was willing to “offer its experience in the research and
application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes” (quoted in Folha
de S2o Paul0 1979). Argentina, moreover, favored a limited, mutual con-
fidence-building accord involving a mutual inspection. In the first major
step toward a nuclear security regime, Article VII of the 1980 accord
mentioned “safeguard procedures for materials and equipment” and
stated that when “suitable,” both sides would adopt “corresponding
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards” (AMRE 1980a).
Brazil’s main interest in a nuclear accord was access to Argentine tech-
nical knowhow, in exchange for sales of Brazilian nuclear equipment.
Figueiredo admitted, “Argentine technology is several steps ahead of
our own. Brazil, for its part, is well positioned to provide some heavy
equipment” (Malheiros 1993, 129).
Since the 1979-80 accords, Argentine-Brazilian cooperation has
been marked by several distinctive features. The first is the coupling of
security and economic matters. Second, though unsurprising, is that
cooperation in the economic area has outpaced that in security affairs.
(International relations theory tells us that cooperation is much harder
to achieve in security matters.) Another feature is the top-down nature
of the process, in which cooperation has been pushed and defended by
the executive, usually through presidential summits (Cason 2000).
The first major steps to institutionalize the security and economic
cooperation begun in 1979-80 were the 1985 Joint Declaration on
Nuclear Policy, followed in 1986 by the Argentine-Brazilian Integration
and Cooperation Pact, the economic integration agreement giving rise
to MERCOSUK. Under the 1985 Joint Declaration, Brazil and Argentina
renounced nuclear research for military applications (although their

clandestine military nuclear programs, especially Brazil’s, continued into
the early 1990s, as did Argentina’s intermediate-range missile program).
The Joint Declaration established a preliminary inspection regime; a
robust security regime, involving bilateral, full-scope inspection, did not
fully materialize until after 1990.
Institutionalized cooperation between Argentina and Brazil, with
MERCOSUR and a robust nuclear security regime as its core compo-
nents, both widened and deepened in the latter half of the 1990s. In
1990 the nuclear security regime was expanded to include the partici-
pation of IAEA and the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), the implementing organ of the
Tlatelolco Treaty, though both countries still failed to sign the NPT.
Again coupling security and economic cooperation, two major steps
were taken in 1791. One was the creation of MERCOSUR; the other, the
establishment of the Argentina-Brazil Agency for the Accountability and
Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), the binational technical organ
responsible for mutual inspection, facilities operation, and accounting of
nuclear materials. Months later, an agreement was reached with the
IAEA for comprehensive inspection and safeguards. It was at this time
that the first steps were taken to enlarge the bilateral security regime to
include Chile, with a tripartite agreement renouncing chemical and bio-
logical weapons. The following year, all three countries signed the
Tlatelolco Treaty.
In 1995 Argentina, under pressure from the United States (and the
prospects for associate membership in NATO), signed the NPT. In July
1978 Brazil ratified the NPT. By the turn of the new century, the three
regional powers had developed numerous security cooperation meas-
ures and institutionalized practices, including intermilitary ties, joint
exercises, relocation of military bases, and limited arms control. In 1998
the MERCOSUR members declared the area a zone of peace.
TOWARD
A LONG PEACE?
Peaceful settlement between Brazil and Argentina in the La Plata River

Basin was a byproduct of a fortuitous combination of strategic and mili-
tary organizational factors. Argentina’s decision was primarily a product
of strategic necessity. In a rare show of adept diplomacy during a crisis,
Argentina achieved a more durable entendimiento with Brazil. Despite
its trademark unpredictability and what the Brazilians saw as erratic emo-
tionalism, Argentina acted rationally and with some measure of success. lo
To its credit, Argentina turned necessity into virtue as it sought to
protect its long-term position in the Basin and to neutralize Brazil in the
South Atlantic disputes. For Brazil, cooperation in the Basin was part of
a two-track political strategy by the moderate military governments to

demobilize extremist forces in the state and military. To some extent,
Brazil’s decision to embrace a political settlement is less puzzling, con-
sidering that the accords basically entailed Argentine surrender in the
Basin. That the major concessions were made by Argentina and not
Brazil certainly made the agreements more palatable to the Brazilian
armed forces and, thus, politically feasible for the moderates. Yet Brazil
had equally compelling reasons for a settlement, especially given the
political and organizational risks without one.
The more intriguing question is whether there would have been a
settlement in the absence of such fortuitous circumstances, or if only
one side had compelling reasons to pursue one. It is impossible to
determine how and when either side would have responded, or to
imagine the shape of such a settlement. For both sides, moreover, the
same strategic and organizational factors lingered into the early 1980s,
if in muted form. The South Atlantic crises persisted for Argentina; con-
solidation problems became paramount for both sides, giving them
important reasons to sustain and deepen the 1979-80 settlement. Addi-
tional factors emerged by the mid-1980s to propel cooperation forward,
including Argentina’s military defeat in the 1982 Falklands-Malvinas War
and the profound economic crisis of that decade.
There are four salient aspects of the 1979-80 settlement that created
a solid foundation for the institutionalized cooperation that followed.
First, the settlement was global, in that it covered economic and secu-
rity issues. Second, it established the first institutionalized procedures
and structures of bilateral cooperation, especially in nuclear security. It
established the first important mutual confidence-building measures and
reciprocity procedures of what eventually became a full-blown security
regime in the Southern Cone. Institutionalized security cooperation
evolved and deepened gradually, spurred by myriad other factors but
built on the 1979-80 foundations.
Third, the accords were framework agreements, designed to allow
follow-on agreements on a host of bilateral issues. Although neither side
in 1979-80 could have envisioned the kind of institutionalized cooperation
of only half a decade later, they deliberately fashioned a comprehensive
framework to foster more lasting cooperative relations. Fourth, the settle-
ment introduced the single most distinctive aspect of Brazil-Argentine
cooperation: the coupling of economic and security issues. Every major
initiative undertaken to institutionalize cooperation in the subsequent
years followed the 1979-80 pattern. Though by the early 1990s institu-
tionalized cooperation was skewed toward commercial relations, each
major step to deepen it combined security and economic aspects.
What does the Brazilian-Argentine case tell us about the origins of
cooperation? It shows that the remarkable structure of Brazil-Argentine
cooperation today has a more remote and fortuitous beginning than

commonly realized. To be sure, those fortuitous aspects limit the case’s
generalizability, but the strategic and military organizational dynamics
driving foreign policy behavior may be found in many other parts of the
world and the region.
The case also illustrates the importance of military organizational
factors in propelling external cooperation. In contrast to so-called third-
image explanations of international cooperation, which give primacy to
sources in the international system, such as the malign strategic factors
driving Argentine policy, this study also advances a particular kind of
second-image explanation. It locates the sources of foreign policy
behavior at the military organizational level. Military control problems,
along with other institutional dynamics and constraints affecting exter-
nal behavior, are also to be found in autocratic governments rather than
only in democracies, as the democratic peace literature implies.
Pertinent to the larger literature on cooperation, moreover, this
study shows that cooperation, and not merely strategic accommodation,
is possible between military-authoritarian regimes. It is possible because
such regimes also face certain internal dynamics and limitations that
often necessitate pacific external behavior. In the case of Brazil, exter-
nal cooperation became one of the key instruments through which the
military government attempted to solve its own “military control prob-
lem.” These military organizational imperatives undoubtedly are not uni-
versal, but they may be sufficiently pervasive to warrant a more careful,
comprehensive inquiry into how much they accounted for patterns of
conflict and cooperation in the region.
The military’s historically pervasive presence in Latin American poli-
tics, its institutional and political legacies, and its expansive definition of
its mission in domestic and foreign affairs, resulted in a tight link between
its role expansion and its political power (Stepan 1973). This expansion,
however, was accompanied by certain costs to the military organization.
The dynamic was pronounced in the region’s most professional military
establishments, forcing them to choose between professionalism and
political ambitions, and thus likely fostered the pursuit of accommodation
and settlement. These organizational dynamics may help to account for
the region’s“long peace” and the transformations of the past two decades.
Institutionalized cooperation may have reached a point of durabil-
ity and momentum that makes reversal unlikely. This is not to say that
Southern Cone economic and security cooperation does not face seri-
ous challenges. MERCOSUR has been plagued by heated disagreements,
some inherent to such commercial arrangements, others created by
Brazil’s disproportionate size and unilateralism. This, combined with
Argentina’s own prolonged economic recession and pro-U.S. orienta-
tion, have somewhat strained the bilateral relationship. The likelihood
of Argentine and Chilean defection from MERCOSUR is real, as illus-

trated at the Quebec City Summit of 2002 by the two countries’ tepid
support for Brazil’s South American free trade bloc initiative.
With the possibility of the Free Trade Area of the Americas and
growing acrimony in bilateral relations, the future of MERCOSUR
appears in doubt for the first time. Unlike its European Union counter-
part, moreover, as Diamint (1999) points out, MERCOSUR is built on
weak institutional, administrative, and political supports. Whether and
how MERCOSUR’s dismantling or atrophy may harm security coopera-
tion has yet to be studied.
Security cooperation, moreover, has fallen short of the parallel insti-
tutionalization and integration of the economic realm. It is uneven in the
region, both across the Parank and with regard to the incorporation of
Chile and Chile-Argentine bilateral security relations. The three regional
powers have different perspectives and objectives in terms of regional
security cooperation and national security policy (Pion-Berlin 2000).
Despite the many challenges facing the region, and Argentine-Brazil-
ian relations in particular, a reversal to the militarized competition of the
1970s is unlikely in the Southern Cone. More likely is that the existing
structures of security and economic cooperation will simply stagnate, as
the countries (except Brazil) gravitate more and more toward U.S.-led
hemispherewide arrangements. Such arrangements-namely the FTAA-
neither cover nor promote cooperation in security matters but only sup-
port shallow commercial exchange on preferential terms. The question
that will therefore confront the hemisphere is what structures of security
cooperation and mutual confidence will emerge to sustain and deepen the
historic transformation in regional affairs over the last two decades.
Archival research was made possible by the generous support of the

African-American Mellon Postdoctoral Fellowship, University of Pittsburgh. Writ-
ing was completed with the support and encouragement of the Political Science
Department, University of Pennsylvania. Many thanks to Deborah Yashar, Jorge
Dominguez, and members of the weekly seminar at the Rockefeller Center for
Latin American Studies, Harvard University, for their comments on an earlier
draft; to Barry Ames, Juliana Martinez, and Luiz Pedone for their assistance
during field research; to Wendy Hunter for her generous time and research sug-
gestions; to David Mares and Pablo Dreyfus for thoughtful comments on a panel
version of the paper; and to anonymous reviewers of earlier versions for their
constructive comments. Special thanks also to Hon. Luiz MacGarrell, FSO,
Carmen Rebagliati, Claudio Lafont, and the staff of the Archivo Historico, Min-
isterio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, Buenos Aires; and the staff at the Bib-
lioteca d o Congresso, Camara dos Deputados, Brasilia, for their research assis-
tance and generosity.
1. The documents are drawn from the Archivo Historico del Ministerio
de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, Caja Brasil, hereafter cited as AMRE. Unless
otherwise noted, all documents cited are drawn from AMRE and its Caja Brasil
collection.
2. Note that professionalism here is defined differently and narrowly,
mainly in terms of hierarchic control and discipline, rather than in terms of the
political or partisan role and orientation of the military and its officers. Unlike
its more common usage in the literature, as defined by Huntington (19571, this
definition does not connote a politically sterile military subordinate to civilians.
It is used largely because this is how Brazilian officers, moderates in particular,
implicitly defined it.
3. Geisel, it should be noted, did not consider Cavalcanti “very radical”
(D’Araujo and Castro 1997, 221). Cavalcanti, Figueiredo’s former classmate and
supporter of his candidacy, is sometimes identified with the Castellistus rather
than with the hardline faction.
4. For an insider account of the DOI/CODI and an apologia for its activ-
ities, see Col. Brilhante Ustra (1987). Ustra was commander of the Siio Paulo
DOI/CODI, the largest in the nationwide network.
5. The first “war” was over the presidential successor to Castello Branco.
On the 1979 succession see also Stumpf and Pereira 1979; Rehder 1990.
6. Geisel’s choice for the Army Ministry died before assuming office and
was succeeded by Frota, then chief of staff. While Geisel maintained that Frota’s
appointment was based on routine promotions and tradition, Frota’s presence
was consistent with the inclusionary pattern of governing since 1964. Frota,
moreover, was nominated by Orlando Geisel. Finally, Frota was not originally
identified as a hardliner or a major figure in the corps. As commander of the
First Army, he had denounced torture and investigated alleged abuses in the
command’s security services. For many observers, Frota was “seduced”by hard-
liners and came to believe in his own importance. See Rehder 1990, 72.
7. For details on the Frota episode and the maneuvering to appoint
Figueiredo, see Rehder (1990). On the coup attempt see G6es (1978, 77-85).
Although the Third Army (based in Rio Grande d o Sul) was also in the hands
of a hardliner, the only military unit to attempt a revolt was the famous Fourth
Army Division in Minas Gerais, but the attempt was immediately put down
(Kucinski 1982, 71).
8. The role of hardliners in the turbine controversy is unclear. The pro-
posal originated with the Mines and Energy Ministry and Itaipfi Binacional and
was apparently approved by Geisel.
9. Note, however, that as early as June 1977, Brazilian journalists were
reporting that the two sides were engaged in talks on a nuclear accord (Goes
1978, 158-59).
10. Thanks to Jorge I. Dominguez for pointing this out.
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Origins of Security Cooperation in Southern Cone Santos

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Origins of Security Cooperation in Southern Cone Santos

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The Origins of Security Cooperation

in the Southern Cone

I nterstate relations in the Western Hemisphere have experienced pro-

South American diplomatic history, these changes are matched only by

the signing of a historic political settlement. What makes Brazilian-

In the Argentine case, intuition as well as theory leads us to expect

nomic recession and contradictions in development strategy pressed the

1976), and both sides became interested in the prospects of commercial

The diplomatic history of South America largely revolves around the

The Corpus-Itaipb Dispute

For Brazil and Argentina specifically, two clusters of issues caused

Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay) had engaged in periodic but con-

As Argentine strategists and diplomats acknowledged, by the early

The Argentine Initiative

By early 1977, then, Argentina found itself encircled by its most

The Strategy of Brazil’s Military Moderates

1974. Overlooked in particular is how developments inside the military

of extremist organs and to undercut their raison d’itre. Reducing ten-

the fear of provoking hardliner backlash was the major constraint on

Restoring Military Professionalism

The unique features of military rule in Brazil magnified institutional

tine counterpart, Itamarati retained its professionalism and civilian direc-

Destabilization by the right wing was particularly serious during the

ciates involved in torture, such as his CIEX director Adyr Fiuza de

Predictably, hardliners resisted and used their principal bases of

Abertura at Home and Abroad

The military organizational imperatives driving reconciliation with

it-had always been a source of concern. The opportunity to bind

crisis (Bandeira 1993, 260). Days later, both foreign ministries

Figueiredo and Guerrero planned a unified Brazilian position in the

The Corpus-Itaipu treaty was signed in October 1979 during an elabo-

dormant Argentine-Brazilian Special Coordination Commission (CEBAC)

close monitoring of Brazil’s nuclear program for the purpose of

An annual planning document from the Foreign Ministry’s Latin Ameri-

renounced nuclear research for military applications (although their

Peaceful settlement between Brazil and Argentina in the La Plata River

a two-track political strategy by the moderate military governments to

cooperation today has a more remote and fortuitous beginning than

of Argentine and Chilean defection from MERCOSUR is real, as illus-

Archival research was made possible by the generous support of the

Folha de SZo Paulo. 1979. Assinado o acordo tripartite. October 20: 6.

Lanus, Juan. 1984. De Hapultepec a1 Beagle: politica exterior argentina,

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