G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
It
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio
Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June
19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his
conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic
encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently,
the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of
the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard
to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-
appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the
offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People
v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of
reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the
Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is
pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his
position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo
and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the
criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die
before final judgment is rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the
affirmative. This same issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the death of
Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal responsibility and his civil liability as a
consequence of the alleged crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute.
reads, in part:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally
extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal
penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties
liability therefor is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final
judgment;
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question.
The law is plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said liability
is extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before
final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of ascertaining the legal
import of the term "final judgment." Is it final judgment as
contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment
which is final and executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed is lifted
from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in
part, recites:
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas
personales siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias,
solo cuando a su fallecimiento no hubiere
recaido sentencia firme.
xxx xxx xxx
The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term
"sentencia firme." What is "sentencia firme" under the old statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 473, furnishes the ready
answer: It says:
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere
la fuerza de las definitivas por no haberse
utilizado por las partes litigantes recurso alguno
 contra ella dentro de los terminos y plazos
legales concedidos al efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is
definite. Because, it is only when judgment is such that, as Medina
y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed — "en condena
determinada;" or, in the words of Groizard, the guilt of the accused
becomes — "una verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the accused
die, according to Viada, "no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni
delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase." And, as Judge
Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies before judgment
becomes executory, "there cannot be any determination by final
judgment whether or not the felony upon which the civil action
might arise exists," for the simple reason that "there is no party
defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421.
Senator Francisco holds the same view. Francisco, Revised Penal
Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in
the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body
mention the term "final judgment" in the sense that it is already
enforceable. This also brings to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court which states that a judgment in a criminal case
becomes final "after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal
or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or
served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to
appeal."
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected
funnel down to one positive conclusion: The term final judgment
employed in the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond
recall. Really, as long as a judgment has not become executory, it
cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the
felony charged against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason.
For where, as in this case, the right to institute a separate civil
action is not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of
necessity, cover "both the criminal and the civil aspects of the
case." People vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p.
964. See also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco,
Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge
Kapunan observed that as "the civil action is based solely on the
felony committed and of which the offender might be found guilty,
the death of the offender extinguishes the civil liability." I Kapunan,
Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's
criminal liability is out. His civil liability is sought to be enforced by
reason of that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we must,
the criminal action and let the civil aspect remain, we will be faced
with the anomalous situation whereby we will be called upon to
clamp civil liability in a case where the source thereof — criminal
liability — does not exist. And, as was well stated in Bautista, et
al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held
criminally liable in a civil suit," which solely would remain if we are
to divorce it from the criminal proceeding."
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted by the Supreme
Court in the cases of People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4 People of
the Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al. 5 and People of the Philippines v. Satorre 6 by
dismissing the appeal in view of the death of the accused pending appeal of said
cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been
established, and considering that there is as yet no final judgment
in view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil liability
of the said accused-appellant Alison was extinguished by his death
(Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed.,
p. 717, citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045);
consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura Belamala
v. Marcelino Polinar 7 and Lamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of
Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the former, the issue decided by this court was:
Whether the civil liability of one accused of physical injuries who died before final
judgment is extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any claim therefore
against his estate. It was the contention of the administrator-appellant therein that the
death of the accused prior to final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil
liabilities resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code. However, this court ruled therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been
extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative
eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the
Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action
for damages on account of physical injuries, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
 Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil
action for damages was to be considered instituted together with
the criminal action still, since both proceedings were terminated
without final adjudication, the civil action of the offended party
under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the
extinction of the criminal liability under Article 89, only when the civil
liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated
differently, where the civil liability does not exist independently of
the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso
facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death
supervenes before final judgment. The said principle does not apply
in instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor
originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase
and sale. (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the
accused who was charged with estafa could likewise trace its genesis to
Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said accused had swindled the
first and second vendees of the property subject matter of the contract of
sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently, while the death of the accused
herein extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability based
on the laws of human relations remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the accused,
notwithstanding the extinction of his criminal liability due to his death pending appeal
of his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied on the
following ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 9 requires the
dismissal of all money claims against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the
final judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions
for recovery of money may continue to be heard on appeal, when the death of the
defendant supervenes after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In such case,
explained this tribunal, "the name of the offended party shall be included in the title of
the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the
deceased-accused should be substituted as defendants-appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule
established was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same
can be predicated on sources of obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the
claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it were
solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10 departed from this
long-established principle of law. In this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged
with and convicted by the lower court of malversation thru falsification of public
documents. Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency of the appeal of
his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but
only to the extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive
although it was clear that such claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the
criminal action already extinguished. The legal import of such decision was for the
court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon
the correctness of Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the criminal action,
for the purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a
Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil
liability survived Sendaydiego because his death occurred after
final judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes of
malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the
Province in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted
with the criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its
reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and distinct
from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil.
1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant
dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be
dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money
judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of First
Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal
(Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67
SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds
improperly disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U.S. vs.
Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil.
583).
 In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal
of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is
concerned, the Court Resolved to continue exercising appellate
jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money claims of the
Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts
complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against
him, thus making applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article
30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose, his counsel is
directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names and
addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is
under administration and has a duly appointed judicial
administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be substituted for the
deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil liability is concerned
(Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our
ruling in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a reaffirmance of our abandonment
of the settled rule that a civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex
delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise of the
accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our
decision in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil
action impliedly instituted in the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter's
extinction due to death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to
Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability
arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are
instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of
evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling
in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is there a grant of authority to continue exercising
appellate jurisdiction over the accused's civil liability ex delicto when his death
supervenes during appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate
civil action which may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal
offense independently of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of
evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be that which is compatible
with civil liability and that is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil action
despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether
civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of
the accused during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished
by the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal
liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as
to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when
the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxx xxx xxx
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89.
It allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil
action impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no
criminal proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil action. This had the
effect of converting such claims from one which is dependent on the outcome of the
criminal action to an entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which does
not even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. 12 One would be hard put to
pinpoint the statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in mind that
in recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the
criminal action, rooted as it is in the court's pronouncement of the guilt or innocence
of the accused. This is but to render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that "every person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal action due to death of the
accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of the civil
liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination
of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action,
such that when the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant
pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability
springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime.
Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be
declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that
which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution
of a separate civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The
Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977, however, failed to take note of this
fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action referred to
under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement
to authorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as that
contemplated under Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the
resolution of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:
 Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of
showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for
which his estate would be liable. 13
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly
made a determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced,
was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus,
it upheld Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his
civil liability. Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final
determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal
action already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We
reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso
facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis
for the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court, the Court made the inference that civil actions of the type involved
in Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the recovery of which may be continued on
appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable
therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant
dies before final judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be
dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided" in
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money
judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of First
Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of
procedural law, this course taken in Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly
observed by Justice Regalado:
xxx xxx xxx
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in
both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the provisions of
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained
implication therefrom that where the civil liability instituted together
with the criminal liabilities had already passed beyond the judgment
of the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court),
the Court of Appeals can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction
thereover despite the extinguishment of the component criminal
liability of the deceased. This pronouncement, which has been
followed in the Court's judgments subsequent and consonant
to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set aside and abandoned
as being clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil
actions. There is neither authority nor justification for its application
in criminal procedure to civil actions instituted together with and as
part of criminal actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the
summary conversion from the latter category of an ordinary civil
action upon the death of the offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of
civil liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as
that referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased
accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the
provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which
in Sendaydiego was held liable for Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are
contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are
contractual money claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex delicto may
include even the restitution of personal or real property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86
provides an exclusive enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate.
These are: funeral expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments for money and
claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear that money claims
arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could
be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual
money claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it
to survive by filing a claim therefor before the estate of the deceased accused.
Rather, it should be extinguished upon extinction of the criminal action engendered by
the death of the accused pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil
liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission
complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time predicated not on the
felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation
upon which the separate civil action is premised determines against whom the same
shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by
provision of law, result in an injury to person or property (real or personal), the
separate civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator 17 of the
estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against
executor or administrator. — No action upon a claim for the
recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced
against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or
personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to
enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury
 to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against
him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held that, in recovering
damages for injury to persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of
the Civil Code, the same must be filed against the executor or administrator of the
estate of deceased accused and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86
because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses for
the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from
contract, express or implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only
topurely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the
separate civil action must be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec.
5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with
provisions of Article 1155 21 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant
Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act
complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without
qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de
oficio.

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein: SO ORDERED.

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates
his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on
the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused,
if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation
from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law 20

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) . . .

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or
the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same is based as explained above.
 [G.R. No. 133978. November 12, 2002]
JOSE S. CANCIO, JR., represented by ROBERTO L.
CANCIO, petitioner, vs. EMERENCIANA ISIP, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The instant petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raises pure
questions of law involving the March 20, 1998 [1] and June 1,
[2] [3]
1998 Orders rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 49, in
Civil Case No. G-3272.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Petitioner, assisted by a private prosecutor, filed three cases of Violation of B.P.
No. 22 and three cases of Estafa, against respondent for allegedly issuing the
following checks without sufficient funds, to wit: 1) Interbank Check No. 25001151 in
the amount of P80,000.00; 2) Interbank Check No. 25001152 in the amount of P
80,000.00; and 3) Interbank Check No. 25001157 in the amount of P30,000.00. [4]
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor dismissed Criminal Case No. 13356, for
Violation of B.P. No. 22 covering check no. 25001151 on the ground that the check
was deposited with the drawee bank after 90 days from the date of the check. The
two other cases for Violation of B.P. No. 22 (Criminal Case No. 13359 and 13360)
were filed with and subsequently dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court of Guagua,
Pampanga, Branch 1, on the ground of failure to prosecute. [5]
Meanwhile, the three cases for Estafa were filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga, Branch 49, and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. G-3611 to G-3613. On
October 21, 1997, after failing to present its second witness, the prosecution moved
to dismiss the estafa cases against respondent. The prosecution likewise reserved its
right to file a separate civil action arising from the said criminal cases. On the same
date, the trial court granted the motions of the prosecution. Thus-
Upon motion of the prosecution for the dismissal of these cases without prejudice to
the refiling of the civil aspect thereof and there being no comment from the defense,
let these cases be dismissed without prejudice to the refiling of the civil aspect of the
cases.
SO ORDER[ED].[6]
On December 15, 1997, petitioner filed the instant case for collection of sum of
money, seeking to recover the amount of the checks subject of the estafa cases. On
February 18, 1998, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint contending
that petitioners action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Respondent further
prayed that petitioner should be held in contempt of court for forum-shopping.[7]
On March 20, 1998, the trial court found in favor of respondent and dismissed
the complaint. The court held that the dismissal of the criminal cases against
respondent on the ground of lack of interest or failure to prosecute is an adjudication
on the merits which amounted to res judicata on the civil case for collection. It further
held that the filing of said civil case amounted to forum-shopping.
On June 1, 1998, the trial court denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.[8] Hence, the instant petition.
The legal issues for resolution in the case at bar are: 1) whether the dismissal of
the estafa cases against respondent bars the institution of a civil action for collection
of the value of the checks subject of the estafa cases; and 2) whether the filing of said
civil action violated the anti-forum-shopping rule.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate
civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code;[9] and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those
(a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony [e.g. culpa
contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31[10] of the Civil
Code,[11] intentional torts under Articles 32[12] and 34,[13] and culpa aquiliana under
Article 2176[14] of the Civil Code]; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to
file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action [Article 33,[15] Civil
Code].[16] Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against the offender
subject, however, to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended
party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both
causes.[17]
The modes of enforcement of the foregoing civil liabilities are provided for in the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Though the assailed order of the trial court was
issued on March 20, 1998, the said Rules, which took effect on December 1, 2000,
must be given retroactive effect in the instant case considering that statutes
regulating the procedure of the court are construed as applicable to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage.[18]
Section 1, Rule 111, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before
the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
xxxxxxxxx
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the
court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil
and criminal actions.
Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988 and under
the present Rules, the civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted with the criminal
action, but the offended party is given the option to file a separate civil action before
the prosecution starts to present evidence.[19]
Anent the independent civil actions under Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code, the old rules considered them impliedly instituted with the civil liability ex-
delicto in the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action. Under the present Rules, however, the independent civil actions may
be filed separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the
criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver
of the right to file a separate and independent civil action based on these articles of
the Civil Code.[20]
In the case at bar, a reading of the complaint filed by petitioner show that his
cause of action is based on culpa contractual, an independent civil action. Pertinent
portion of the complaint reads:
xxxxxxxxx
2. That plaintiff is the owner/proprietor to CANCIOS MONEY EXCHANGE
with office address at Guagua, Pampanga;
3. That on several occasions, particularly on February 27, 1993 to April 17
1993, inclusive, defendant drew, issued and made in favor of the plaintiff the
following checks:
CHECK NO. DATE AMOUNT
1. INTERBANK CHECK NO. 25001151 March 10, 1993 P80,000.00
2. INTERBANK CHECK NO. 25001152 March 27, 1993 P80,000.00
3. INTERBANK CHECK NO. 25001157 May 17, 1993 P30,000.00
in exchange of cash with the assurance that the said checks will be honored
for payment on their maturity dates, copy of the aforementioned checks are
hereto attached and marked.
4. That when the said checks were presented to the drawee bank for
encashment, the same were all dishonored for reason of DRAWN AGAINST
INSUFFICIENT FUNDS (DAIF);
5. That several demands were made upon the defendant to make good the
checks but she failed and refused and still fails and refuses without justifiable
reason to pay plaintiff;
6. That for failure of the defendant without any justifiable reason to pay
plaintiff the value of the checks, the latter was forced to hire the services of
undersigned counsel and agreed to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as
attorneys fees and P1,000.00 per appearance in court;
7. That for failure of the defendant without any justifiable reason to pay
plaintiff and forcing the plaintiff to litigate, the latter will incur litigation expenses
in the amount of P20,000.00.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is prayed of this Court that after due
notice and hearing a judgment be rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff
as follows:
a. the principal sum of P190,000.00 plus the legal interest;
b. attorneys fees of P30,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per court appearance;
c. litigation expenses in the amount of P20,000.00
PLAINTIFF prays for other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.
x x x x x x x x x.[21]
Evidently, petitioner sought to enforce respondents obligation to make good the
value of the checks in exchange for the cash he delivered to respondent. In other
words, petitioners cause of action is the respondents breach of the contractual
obligation. It matters not that petitioner claims his cause of
action to be one based on delict.[22] The nature of a cause of action is determined by
the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action. The purpose of
an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the
party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself,
its allegations and prayer for relief.[23]
Neither does it matter that the civil action reserved in the October 21, 1997 order
of the trial court was the civil action ex delicto. To reiterate, an independent civil
action arising from contracts, as in the instant case, may be filed separately and
prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. Under
Article 31 of the Civil Code [w]hen the civil action is based on an obligation not arising
from the act or omission complained of as a felony, [e.g. culpa contractual] such civil
action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter. Thus, in Vitola, et al. v. Insular Bank of Asia and America,[24] the
Court, applying Article 31 of the Civil Code, held that a civil case seeking to recover
the value of the goods subject of a Letter of Credit-Trust Receipt is a civil action ex
contractu and not ex delicto. As such, it is distinct and independent from the estafa
case filed against the offender and may proceed regardless of the result of the
criminal proceedings.
One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes of action.[25] In the
instant case, it must be stressed that the action filed by petitioner is an independent
civil action, which remains separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution based
on the same act.[26] Not being deemed instituted in the criminal action based on culpa
criminal, a ruling on the culpability of the offender will have no bearing on said
independent civil action based on an entirely different cause of action, i.e., culpa
contractual.
In the same vein, the filing of the collection case after the dismissal of the estafa
cases against respondent did not amount to forum-shopping. The essence of forum-
shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable
judgment. Although the cases filed by petitioner arose from the same act or omission
of respondent, they are, however, based on different causes of action. The criminal
cases for estafa are based on culpa criminal while the civil action for collection is
anchored on culpa contractual. Moreover, there can be no forum-shopping in the
instant case because the law expressly allows the filing of a separate civil action
which can proceed independently of the criminal action.[27]
Clearly, therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners complaint for
collection of the value of the checks issued by respondent. Being an independent civil
action which is separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution and which require
no prior reservation for its institution, the doctrine of res judicata and forum-shopping
will not operate to bar the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is
GRANTED. The March 20, 1998 and June 1, 1998 Orders of the Regional Trial Court
of Pampanga, Branch 49, in Civil Case No. G-3272 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The instant case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 108395. March 7, 1997]
HEIRS OF THE LATE TEODORO GUARING, JR., petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., and ANGELES
CUEVAS, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, reversing the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 20, which ordered respondent
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, to pay various
amounts in damages to petitioners, the heirs of the late Teodoro Guaring, Jr.
This case arose from an unfortunate vehicular accident which happened on
November 7, 1987, along the North Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico,
Pampanga. Involved in the accident were a Mitsubishi Lancer car driven by Teodoro
Guaring, Jr., who died as a result of the mishap, Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415,
driven by Angeles Cuevas, and a Toyota Cressida car, driven by Eligio Enriquez. The
Mitsubishi Lancer was heading north, at the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per
hour. Following it was the Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415, with Plate No. CVD-584. On
the other hand, the Toyota Cressida was cruising on the opposite lane, bound for
Manila.
Petitioners, heirs of Teodoro Guaring, Jr., brought this action for damages,
based on quasi delict, in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Their evidence tended to
show that the Rabbit bus tried to overtake Guarings car by passing on the right
shoulder of the road and that in so doing it hit the right rear portion of Guarings
Mitsubishi Lancer. The impact caused the Lancer to swerve to the south-bound lane,
as a result of which it collided with the Toyota Cressida car coming from the opposite
direction.
With Teodoro Guaring, Jr. in the Lancer, seated beside him in front, was
Bonifacio Clemente. Riding in the Toyota Cressida driven by Sgt. Eligio Enriquez was
his mother, Dolores Enriquez, who was seated beside him. Seated at the back were
his daughter Katherine (who was directly behind him), his wife Lilian, and his nephew
Felix Candelaria.
Killed in the collision were Teodoro Guaring, Jr., who was driving the Lancer,
and Dolores Enriquez, who was riding in the Cressida, while injured were Bonifacio
Clemente and the occupants of the Toyota Cressida.
Private respondents, on the other hand, presented evidence tending to show
that the accident was due to the negligence of the deceased Guaring. They claimed
that it was Guaring who tried to overtake the vehicle ahead of him on the highway and
that in doing so he encroached on the south-bound lane and collided with the
oncoming Cressida of U.S. Air Force Sgt. Enriquez. Private respondents claim that as
a result of the collision the Lancer was thrown back to its lane where it crashed into
the Rabbit bus.
On May 16, 1990, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment finding Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, at fault, and holding them
solidarily liable for damages to petitioners. The dispositive portion of its decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendants, ordering the latter to pay the former, jointly and severally, the sum
of:
1. P500,000.00 for loss of earning capacity of the deceased Teodoro Guaring, Jr.;
2. P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
3. P50,000.00 as and for attorneys fees; and
4. Costs of suit.
From this judgment, private respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. appealed,
contending:
1. The lower court erred in not finding that the proximate cause of the collision
was Guarings negligence in attempting to overtake the car in front of him.
2. The lower court erred in not holding that PRBL exercised due diligence in the
supervision of its employees.
3. The lower court erred in awarding the amount of P500,000.00 in favor of
plaintiffs-appellees representing Guarings loss of earning capacity.
4. The lower court erred in awarding moral damages in favor of plaintiffs-
appellees.
5. The lower court erred in awarding attorneys fees in favor of plaintiffs-
appellees.
On December 16, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, setting aside
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in the civil action for damages and
dismissing the complaint against private respondents Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines,
Inc. and Cuevas, on the strength of a decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court at
San Fernando, Pampanga, in the criminal case, acquitting the bus driver Angeles
Cuevas of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and double
homicide. The appellate court held that since the basis of petitioners action was the
alleged negligence of the bus driver, the latters acquittal in the criminal case rendered
the civil case based on quasi delict untenable.
Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend that
[1] EVIDENCE IN ONE CASE IS INADMISSIBLE IN ANOTHER CASE
AGAINST A PERSON NOT A PARTY IN THE FIRST CASE AND TO
HOLD OTHERWISE IS VIOLATIVE OF PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS.
[2] THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS WITHOUT
FACTUAL FINDINGS AND DID NOT RESOLVE SQUARELY THE
ASSIGNED ERRORS AND IS THEREFORE A VOID JUDGMENT.
 [3] ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE,
WHETHER ON REASONABLE DOUBT OR NOT, IS NO BAR TO THE
PROSECUTION FOR DAMAGES BASED ON QUASI-DELICT.
The question is whether the judgment in the criminal case extinguished the
liability of private respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles
Cuevas, for damages for the death of Teodoro Guaring, Jr. In absolving private
respondents from liability, the Court of Appeals reasoned:[1]
Since the appellees civil action is predicated upon the negligence of the accused
which does not exist as found by the trial court in the said criminal case, it
necessarily follows that the acquittal of the accused in the criminal case carries
with it the extinction of the civil responsibility arising therefrom. Otherwise
stated, the fact from which the civil action might arise, that is, the negligence of
the accused, did not exist.
The finding in the criminal case that accused Cuevas was not negligent and the
proximate cause of the accident was the act of deceased Guaring in overtaking
another vehicle ahead of him likewise exonerates PRB from any civil liability.
Although it did not say so expressly, the appellate court appears to have based
its ruling on Rule 111, 2(b) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil,
unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil might arise did not exist.
This provision contemplates, however, a civil action arising from crime, whereas
the present action was instituted pursuant to Art. 2176 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he
is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi
delict. Thus, in Tayag v. Alcantara,[2] it was held:
. . . a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or
not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c), Section 3, Rule
111 [now Rule 111, 2(b)], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act
considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or
has not been committed by the accused. . . .
It is noteworthy that the accident in that case also involved a Philippine Rabbit
bus and that, as in this case, the acquittal of the bus driver was based on reasonable
doubt. We held that the civil case for damages was not barred since the cause of
action of the heirs was based on quasi delict.
Again, in Gula v. Dianala it was held:[3]
Since the cause of action of plaintiffs-appellants is based on culpa aquiliana and
not culpa criminal, thus precluding the application of the exception in Sec. 3(c) of
Rule 111 [now Rule 111, 2(b)], and the fact that it can be inferred from the
criminal case that defendant-accused, Pedro Dianala, was acquitted on reasonable
doubt because of dearth of evidence and lack of veracity of the two principal
witnesses, the doctrine in Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113, will not find
application. In that case, the acquittal was not based on reasonable doubt and the
cause of action was based on culpa criminal, for which reason we held the suit for
damages barred.
Even if damages are sought on the basis of crime and not quasi delict, the
acquittal of the bus driver will not bar recovery of damages because the acquittal was
based not on a finding that he was not guilty but only on reasonable doubt. Thus, it
has been held:[4]
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages
only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise
did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only
preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly
declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De
Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the
felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives
who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and,
where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act
of which the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4
SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623).
In the present case, the dispositive portion of the decision of the RTC in the criminal
case reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court, entertaining reasonable doubt as to his
guilt, the accused is hereby acquitted, of the offense of reckless imprudence
resulting to double homicide and damage to property as charged in the
Information, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[5]
It was thus error for the appellate court to skip the review of the evidence in this
case and instead base its decision on the findings of the trial court in the criminal
case. In so doing, the appellate court disregarded the fact that this case had been
instituted independently of the criminal case and that petitioners herein took no part in
the criminal prosecution. In fact this action was filed below before the prosecution
presented evidence in the criminal action. The attention of the Court of Appeals was
called to the decision in the criminal case, which was decided on September 7, 1990,
only when the decision of the trial court in this case was already pending review
before it (the Court of Appeals).
 The appellate court did not even have before it the evidence in the criminal
case. What it did was simply to cite findings contained in the decision of the criminal
court. Worse, what the criminal court considered was reasonable doubt concerning
the liability of the bus driver the appellate court regarded as a categorical finding that
the driver was not negligent and, on that basis, declared in this case that the
proximate cause of the accident was the act of deceased Guaring in overtaking
another vehicle ahead of him. The notion that an action for quasi delict is separate
and distinct from the criminal action was thus set aside.
This case must be decided on the basis of the evidence in the civil case. This is
important because the criminal court appears to have based its decision, acquitting
the bus driver on the ground of reasonable doubt, solely on what it perceived to be
the relative capacity for observation of the prosecution and defense witnesses. [6] The
prosecution did not call Bonifacio Clemente to testify despite the fact that shortly after
the accident he gave a statement to the police, pinning the blame for the accident on
the Philippine Rabbit bus driver. Indeed, the civil case involved a different set of
witnesses. Petitioners presented Eligio Enriquez, who was driving the Cressida, and
Bonifacio Clemente, who was a passenger in Guarings car. Thus, both had full view
of the accident.
It is unfair to bind petitioners to the result of the criminal action when the fact is
that they did not take part therein. That the witnesses presented on behalf of the
petitioners are different from those presented by the prosecution should have brought
home to the appellate court the fundamental unfairness of considering the decision in
the criminal case conclusive of the civil case.
Because the Court of Appeals did not consider the evidence in the civil case,
this case should be remanded to it so that it may render another decision in
accordance with the law and the evidence. The issues raised by petitioners are
essentially factual and require the evaluation of evidence, which is the function of the
Court of Appeals in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction. They cannot be
decided in this Court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and this
case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals with instruction to render judgment with
reasonable dispatch in accordance with law and the evidence presented in Civil Case
No. 88-43860.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 130362. September 10, 2001]
INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES (PHIL.), INC., petitioner,
vs. MERLIN J. ARGOS and JAJA C. PINEDA, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition assails the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 7, 1997,
dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by herein petitioner as a
consequence of the orders by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, in Civil Case No.
65026 for damages.
Petitioner International Flavors and Fragrances (Phils.) Inc., hereafter IFFI, is a
corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws. Respondents Merlin J. Argos and
Jaja C. Pineda are the general manager and commercial director, respectively, of the
Fragrances Division of IFFI.
In 1992, the office of managing director was created to head the corporations operation
in the Philippines. Hernan H. Costa, a Spaniard, was appointed managing
director. Consequently the general managers reported directly to Costa.
Costa and respondents had serious differences. When the positions of the general
managers became redundant, respondents agreed to the termination of their services. They
signed a Release, Waiver and Quitclaim on December 10, 1993. On the same date, Costa
issued a Personnel Announcement which described respondents as persona non grata and
urged employees not to have further dealings with them.
On July 1, 1994, respondents filed a criminal complaint for libel resulting in the filing of
two Informations against Costa docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 9917 and 9918 with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Taguig, Metro Manila.
On March 31, 1995, respondents filed a civil case for damages filed and docketed as
Civil Case No. 65026 at the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, against Costa and
IFFI, in its subsidiary capacity as employer. Herein petitioner IFFI moved to dismiss the
complaint.
On October 23, 1995, the Regional Trial Court granted the motion to dismiss Civil Case
No. 65026 for respondents failure to reserve its right to institute a separate civil action.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court granted in an order
dated January 9, 1996.
IFFI filed a motion to reconsider said order. This was denied. Hence, IFFI elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals, reiterating the same grounds for the dismissal of the civil
complaint which it invoked before the court a quo. The appellate court dismissed the
petition. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
All told, the allegations of petitioner that the lower court has gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the orders complained of has not been
substantiated.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.[1]
IFFIs motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition for review,
with petitioner alleging that the Court of Appeals:
I
...GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED
BY HEREIN PETITIONER AND IN DENYING THE LATTERS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, THEREBY AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE
COURT A QUO CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THE COMPLAINT IS ONE TO ENFORCE THE SUBSIDIARY CIVIL
LIABILITY OF PETITIONER UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE FOR
THE ALLEGED LIBELOUS STATEMENTS OF ITS FORMER
EMPLOYEE.
B. AN EMPLOYER DOES NOT INCUR SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY
UNDER THE CIVIL CODE, BUT ONLY UNDER THE REVISED PENAL
CODE. UNDER THE LATTER, AN EMPLOYER ONLY BECOMES
SUBSIDIARILY LIABLE UPON CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED
EMPLOYEE AND PROOF OF HIS INSOLVENCY.
C. WHILE A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES MAY PROCEED
AGAINST HERNAN H. COSTA UNDER ARTICLE 33 OF THE CIVIL
CODE, NO SUCH ACTION MAY PROCEED AGAINST PETITIONER TO
ENFORCE ITS SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY AS EMPLOYER UNDER THE
SAME ARTICLE.
II
...SERIOUSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING RESPONDENTS RIGHT TO FILE THE
CIVIL CASE AGAINST PETITIONER NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR ADMITTED
FAILURE TO MAKE A RESERVATION AND THEIR CONTINUED
PARTICIPATION IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
III
...FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT RESPONDENTS FAILURE TO RESERVE AND
THEIR CONTINUED PARTICIPATION IN THE CRIMINAL CASE BAR THE
FILING OF THE COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AGAINST MR. COSTA AND
PETITIONER, CONSIDERING THAT:
 A. UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF LITIS PENDENTIA, THE CIVIL ACTION
TO ENFORCE PETITIONERS SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY MUST
BE DISMISSED.
B. THE CIVIL ACTION TO ENFORCE PETITIONERS SUBSIDIARY CIVIL
LIABILITY MUST BE DISMISSED TO PREVENT FORUM-SHOPPING
OR MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS.[2]
Despite the foregoing formulation of alleged errors, we find that petitioner raises one
principal issue for the Courts resolution: Could private respondents sue petitioner for damages
based on subsidiaryliability in an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code,
during the pendency of the criminal libel cases against petitioners employee?
In our view, respondents suit based on subsidiary liability of petitioner is premature.
At the outset, we are constrained to delve into the nature of Civil Case No. 65026,
respondents complaint for damages against IFFI. Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals
erred when it treated said complaint as one to enforce petitioners primary liability under
Article 33[3] of the Civil Code. It asserts that in so doing the appellate court introduced a new
cause of action not alleged nor prayed for in respondents complaint. Petitioner argues that a
cause of action is determined by the allegations and prayer in a complaint. Respondents in
their complaint did not allege that IFFI was primarily liable for damages. On the contrary,
petitioner says the complaint was replete with references that IFFI was being sued in
its subsidiary capacity. According to petitioner, the Court of Appeals could not, on its own,
include allegations which were not in the complaint, nor could it contradict the cause of action
nor change the theory of the case after petitioner had answered. While pleadings should be
liberally construed, says the petitioner, liberal construction should not be abused. Misleading
the adverse party should be avoided. Further, it avers that where allegations in the pleading are
inconsistent, the pleader is bound by those most favorable to its opponent, [4] and consequently,
respondents complaint should not be treated as one to enforce IFFIs primary liability as the
appellate court erroneously did, considering that the complaint plainly adverts to the alleged
subsidiary liability of IFFI as the employer of Costa.
Respondents, on the other hand, aver that the Court of Appeals was correct in treating
the action as a civil action for damages entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action
that can proceed independently in accordance with Art. 33 of the Civil Code. [5] It was also
correct when it recognized respondents right to move directly against IFFI as the employer of
Costa, who had long fled the country, respondents added.
On this score, we find petitioners contentions persuasive and respondents position
untenable. The well-established rule is that the allegations in the complaint and the character
of the relief sought determine the nature of an action. [6] A perusal of the respondents civil
complaint before the regional trial court plainly shows that respondents is suing IFFI in a
subsidiary and not primary capacity insofar as the damages claimed are concerned.
First, respondents entitled the complaint, MERLIN J. ARGOS AND JAJA C. PINEDA v.
MR. HERNAN COSTA, as former Managing Director of IFF (Phil.), Inc., AND
INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES (PHILS.), INC. ... in its subsidiary
capacity, as employer of Hernan H. Costa. Although the title of the complaint is not
necessarily determinative of the nature of the action, it nevertheless indicates respondents
intention.[7] The designation of the nature of the action, or its title is not meaningless or of no
effect in the determination of its purpose and object.[8]
Second, paragraph 2 of the complaint expressed in categorical terms that respondents
were suing IFFI in its subsidiary capacity. It stated, defendant IFFI is being sued in its
subsidiary capacity as employer of Hernan H. Costa, in accordance with the pertinent
provisions under the Rules of Court, the Revised Penal Code and/or the Civil Code of the
Philippines.[9]
Third, respondents described the nature of such liability in paragraph 22: ... in case of
his (Costas) default, defendant (IFFI) should be held subsidiarily liable as an employer of
Hernan Costa. Defendant has the absolute and sole power and authority in matters of company
policies and management (Arts. 100, 101, 102 and 104 of the Revised Penal Code). [10]
Lastly, the prayer of the complaint reads:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after hearing, this Honorable Court renders
judgment against the defendant, Hernan H. Costa and/or against defendant International
Flavors and Fragrances (Phil.), Inc., in its subsidiary capacity (subsidiary liability) as an
employer...[11]
To reiterate, nothing could be clearer than that herein respondents are suing IFFI civilly in its
subsidiary capacity for Costas alleged defamatory acts. Moreover, the appellate court could
not convert allegations of subsidiary liability to read as averments of primary liability without
committing a fundamental unfairness to the adverse party.
Essential averments lacking in a pleading may not be construed into it, nor facts not
alleged by a plaintiff be taken as having no existence. [12] Justice requires that a man be
apprised of the nature of the action against him so that he may prepare his defense. A pleading
must be construed most strictly against the pleader. He is presumed to have stated all the facts
involved, and to have done so as favorably to himself as his conscience will permit. So, if
material allegations were omitted, it will be presumed in the absence of an application to
amend that those matters do not exist.[13] This is a basic rule in pleadings.[14]
Given the circumstances herein, could petitioner be sued for damages because of its
alleged subsidiary liability under Art. 33 of the Civil Code? In instituting the action for
damages with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, respondents seek to enforce a
civil liability allegedly arising from a crime. Obligations arising from crimes are governed by
Article 1161[15] of the Civil Code, which provides that said obligations are governed by penal
laws, subject to the provision of Article 2177[16] and the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2,
Preliminary Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of Book IV of the Civil Code.
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code is also pertinent. It provides that every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In default of the persons criminally liable,
employers engaged in any kind of industry shall be civilly liable for felonies committed by
their employees in the discharge of their duties.[17]
Article 33 of the Civil Code provides specifically that in cases of defamation, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party. Such civil action proceeds independently of the criminal prosecution and
requires only a preponderance of evidence. In Joaquin vs. Aniceto, 12 SCRA 308 (1964), we
held that Article 33 contemplates an action against the employee in his primary civil
liability. It does not apply to an action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary civil
liability, because such liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal
case or when the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act in a criminal action and
found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties.[18] Any action brought
against the employer based on its subsidiary liability before the conviction of its employee is
premature.[19]
However, we note that by invoking the principle of respondeat superior,[20] respondents
tried to rely on Art. 33 to hold IFFI primarily liable for its employees defamatory
statements. But we also find that respondents did not raise the claim of primary liability as a
cause of action in its complaint before the trial court. On the contrary, they sought to enforce
the alleged subsidiary liability of petitioner as the employer of Costa, the accused in pending
criminal cases for libel, prematurely.
Having established that respondents did not base their civil action on petitioner IFFIs
primary liability under Art. 33 but claimed damages from IFFI based on its subsidiary liability
as employer of Costa, prematurely, we need not delve further on the other errors raised by
petitioner. Plainly both the trial and the appellate courts erred in failing to dismiss the
complaint against herein petitioner by respondents claiming subsidiary liability while the
criminal libel cases against IFFIs employee, Costa, were pending before the metropolitan trial
court. Nothing herein said, however, ought to prejudice the reliefs that respondents might seek
at the appropriate time.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated February 7, 1997 and August 28, 1997, respectively, are hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.The civil complaint for damages filed and docketed as Civil
Case No. 65026 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, against herein
petitioner is ORDERED DISMISSED. Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G. JESUS B. RUIZ, petitioner,
vs.
ENCARNACION UCOL and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte
dismissing the plaintiff-appellant's complaint for damages against defendant-appellee
on the ground of res judicata. The issue involved being a pure question of law, the
appellate court certified the appeal to us for decision on the merits.
The facts are not disputed, Agustina Tagaca, laundrywoman for plaintiff-appellant
Atty. Jesus B. Ruiz filed an administrative charge against defendant-appellee
Encarnacion Ucol, a midwife in the health center of Sarratt Ilocos Norte. In her
answer to the charges, Ucol alleged that Tagaca was merely used as a tool by Atty.
Ruiz who wanted to get back at the Ucol's because of a case filed by Encarnacion
Ucol's husband against Ruiz. She was also alleged to have made remarks that Atty.
Ruiz instigated the complaint and fabricated the charges.
The administrative case was dismissed. Ruiz decided to file his own criminal
complaint for libel against Ucol based on the alleged libelous portion of Ucol's answer.
Upon arraignment, Ucol entered a plea of not guilty. During the proceedings in the
libel case, complainant Atty. Ruiz entered his appearance and participated as private
prosecutor. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment acquitting Ucol on the
ground that her guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt. No
pronouncement was made by the trial court as to the civil liability of the accused.
Instead of appealing the civil aspects of the case, Ruiz filed a separate complaint for
damages based on the same facts upon which the libel case was founded.
Ucol filed a motion to dismiss stating that the action had prescribed and that the
cause of action was barred by the decision in the criminal case for libel.
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. As earlier
stated, on appeal, the Court of Appeals certified the case to us, the only issue being
whether or not the civil action for damages was already barred by the criminal case of
libel.
Before going into the merit of this appeal, it is noteworthy to mention that there are
actually two cases now before us involving the contending parties. Defendant-
appellee Ucol filed an "appeal by certiorari" before this Court questioning
the dissenting opinion of the Court of Appeals.
Ucol prays for a ruling "that the respondent Court of Appeals committed a grave
abuse of discretion in not dismissing the present case but instead in ordering the
same remanded to the lower court for further proceedings ... ."
Any ordinary student in law school should readily know that what comprises a
decision which can be the subject of an appeal or a special civil action is the majority
opinion of the members of the court, but never the dissenting opinion. Moreover, no
decision on appeal has as yet been rendered in this case. The act of the defendant-
appellee's counsel in filing such a petition defies logic or reason. It is totally
inexplicable how a member of the bar could be so careless or, if the act was
deliberate, could have the courage to come before this Court asking us to review a
dissenting opinion. Counsel is warned that we do not find his mistake in the slightest
bit amusing.
Turning now to the present appeal, plaintiff-appellant Ruiz contends that there can be
no res judicata since nowhere in its decision did the trial court pass upon the civil
aspect of the criminal case nor did it make any express declaration that the fact on
which said case was predicated did not exist. He cites the pertinent provisions of
Article 29 of the Civil Code and Rule III, Section 3 subsection (c) of the Rules of Court
which respectively provide:
ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted
on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may
be instituted. ...
xxx xxx xxx
RULE III, Sec. 3(c) —
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the
civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
...
We may also mention Article 33 of the Civil Code which gives an offended party in
cases of defamation, among others, the right to file a civil action separate and distinct
from the criminal proceedings whether or not a reservation was made to that effect.
The plaintiff-appellant's contentions have no merit. The right of the plaintiff-appellant
under the above provisions to file the civil action for damages based on the same
facts upon which he instituted the libel case is not without limitation.
We find the appeal of G. Jesus B. Ruiz without merit. We see no advantage or benefit
in adding to the clogged dockets of our trial courts what plainly appears from the
records to be a harassment suit.
In acquitting Encarnacion Ucol of the libel charge, the trial court made these factual
findings:
Clearly then, Atty. Ruiz filed the instant Criminal Case against
Encarnacion Ucol as retaliation for what he believed was an act of
ingratitude to him on the part of her husband. The precipitate haste
with which the administrative complaint was filed shows that he was
the one personally interested in the matter. All that Agustina
Tagaca told him was double hearsay. The incident, if there was,
happened between the accused and Ceferino in the absence of
Agustina; so that, all that Ceferina allegedly told her, and she in
turn told Atty. Ruiz, was undoubtedly double check hearsay; and
Atty. Ruiz should therefore check the facts with Ceferino, but he did
not do that, and he did not even present Ceferino as a witness. For
these reasons, accused has every reason to believe that Atty. Ruiz
was the author who concocted the charges in the administrative
complaint and had his laundry-woman, complainant Agustina
Tagaca, sign it. Agustina has very little education and could hardly
speak English, yet the administrative complaint was written in
polished English, and who else but Atty. Ruiz could have authored
those phrases in the complaint: "The retention of Mrs. Ucol in this
government service is inimical to the good intentions of the
Department to serve humanity and a disgrace and liability to
present administration." As will be shown later on, it appears that it
is this complaint signed by Agustina, but authored by Atty. Ruiz,
that is libelous and not the respondent's answer; and even,
assuming that the administrative complaint may not have been
impelled by actual malice, the charge(s) were certainly reckless in
the face of proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not
established for parties to give bent to their prejudice. The poor and
the humble are, as a general rule, grateful to a fault, that intrigues
and ingratitude are what they abhor. (Amended Record on Appeal,
pp. 8-10).
The findings in the criminal case, therefore, show a pattern of harassment. First,
petitioner Ruiz had something to do with the administrative complaint. The complaint
was dismissed. Second, he filed a criminal case for libel based on portions of Mrs.
Ucol's answer in the administrative case. Third, he acted as private prosecutor in the
criminal case actively handling as a lawyer the very case where he was the
complainant. And fourth, after the accused was acquitted on the basis of the facts
stated above, Atty. Ruiz pursued his anger at the Ucols with implacability by filing a
civil action for damages. As stated by the trial judge, "court actions are not
established for parties to give bent to their prejudice." This is doubly true when the
party incessantly filing cases is a member of the bar. He should set an example in
sobriety and in trying to prevent false and groundless suits.
In Roa v. de la Cruz, et al. (107, Phil. 10) this Court ruled:
Under the above provisions (Art. 33 of the Civil Code),
independently of a criminal action for defamation, a civil suit for the
recovery of damages arising therefrom may be brought by the
injured party. It is apparent, however, from the use of the words
"may be," that the institution of such suit is optional." (An Outline of
Philippine Civil Law by J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, Vol. I, p. 54) In
other words, the civil liability arising from the crime charged may
still be determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party
does not waive to have it adjudged, or does not reserve his right to
institute a separate civil action against the defendant. (The case of
Reyes v. de la Rosa (52 Off. Gaz., [15] 6548; 99 Phil., 1013) cited
by plaintiff in support of her contention that under Art. 33 of the New
Civil Code the injured party is not required to reserve her right to
institute the civil action, is not applicable to the present case. There
was no showing in that case that the offended party intervened in
the prosecution of the offense, and the amount of damages sought
to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the criminal court so
that a reservation of the civil action was useless or unnecessary.)
(Dionisio v. Alvendia, 102 Phil., 443; 55 Off. Gaz., [25]4633.])
In the instant case, it is not disputed that plaintiff Maria C. Roa —
upon whose initiative the criminal action for defamation against the
defendant Segunda de la Cruz was filed — did not reserve her right
to institute it, subject, always to the direction and control of the
prosecuting fiscal. (Section 15 in connection with section 4 of Rule
106, Rules of Court; Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco, 94 Phil., 197). The
reason of the law in not permitting the offended party to intervene in
the prosecution of the offense if he had waived or reserved his right
to institute the civil action is that by such action her interest in the
criminal case has disappeared. Its prosecution becomes the sole
function of the public prosecutor. (Gorospe, et al., v. Gatmaitan, et
al., 98 Phil., 600; 52 Off. Gaz., [15] 2526). The rule, therefore, is
that the right of intervention reserved to the injured party is for the
sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act
and not of demanding punishment of the accused. (People v. Orais,
65 Phil., 744; People v. Velez, 77 Phil., 1026; People v. Flores, et
al., G.R. No. L-7528, December 18,1957; see also U.S. v. Malabon,
1 Phil., 731; U.S. v. Heery, 25 Phil., 600).
Plaintiff having elected to claim damages arising from the offense
charged in the criminal case through her appearance or
intervention as private prosecutor we hold that the final judgment
rendered therein constitutes a bar to the present civil action for
damages based upon the same cause. (See Tan v. Standard
Vacuum Oil Co., et al., 91 Phil., 672; 48 Off. Gaz., [7] 2745.).
We are, therefore, constrained to dismiss the present appeal. Atty. Ruiz has more
than had his day in court. The then court of first instance acquitted Mrs. Ucol and
stated in the dispositive portion of its decision that her guilt was not established
beyond reasonable doubt. A review of the court's findings, however, indicates that the
disputed Answer of Mrs. Ucol in the administrative case contains no libel. As stated
by the trial court, "As will be shown later, it appears that it is this complaint signed by
Agustina, but authored by Atty. Ruiz, that is libelous and not the respondent's
answer." (Emphasis supplied). The court found the charges against Ucol, if not
malicious, at least reckless in the face of proven facts and circumstances.

The trial court stated.

Analyzing defendant's answer Exh. "5", even with meticulous care,

the Court did not find any defamatory imputation which causes
dishonor or discredit to the complainant. She was the victim of an
unprovoked, unjustified and libelous attack against her honor,
honesty, character and reputation; she has a right to self-defense,
which she did in her answer, to protect her honesty and integrity
and the very job upon which her family depend for their livelihood.
Every sentence in her answer (Exh. "5") is relevant, and constitutes
privileged matter. She did not go further than her interest or duties
require. She did not go beyond explaining what was said of her in
the complaint for the purpose of repairing if not entirely removing
the effects of the charge against her. She had absolutely no motive
to libel Atty. Ruiz who, by the way, cast the first stone. ... (Amended
Record on Appeal pp. 10-11)

WHEREFORE, the appeal filed by appellant Jesus B. Ruiz is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The petition filed by petitioner Encarnacion Ucol is likewise DISMISSED for
patent lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 119398. July 2, 1999] 6. To pay P28,000.00 plus interest thereon from April 26, 1987 until complete payment
thereof;

7. To pay P14,000.00 plus interest thereon from May 17, 1987 until complete payment
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO JR., petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE thereof;
PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE and FERNANDO O.
CARRASCOSO JR., respondents. 8. To pay P140,000.00 plus interest thereon from August 9, 1987 until complete payment
thereof;
DECISION
9. To pay P174,000.00 plus interest thereon from December 13, 1987 until complete payment
PANGANIBAN, J.:
thereof;

To hold public officers personally liable for moral and exemplary damages and for
10. To pay P140,000.00 plus interest thereon from September 18, 1988 until complete
attorneys fees for acts done in the performance of official functions, the plaintiff must prove
payment thereof;
that these officers exhibited acts characterized by evident bad faith, malice, or gross
negligence. But even if their acts had not been so tainted, public officers may still be held
liable for nominal damages if they had violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights. 11. All income derived from the foregoing amounts.

ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

The Case
Ordering defendant Fernando O. Carrascoso the following:

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set 1. To pay moral damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00);
aside the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-GR CV No. 39252 promulgated on
September 9, 1994. The assailed Decision reversed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, 2. To pay exemplary damages in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00);
Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 91-55873, which disposed of the controversy in favor of herein
petitioner in the following manner:[3]
3. To pay attorneys fees in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00);
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants, ordering them, jointly and severally the following: 4. To pay the costs of suit.

ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION The counterclaim is ordered dismissed, for lack of merit.

1. To pay P143,000.00 plus interest thereon from March 26, 1986 until complete payment SO ORDERED.
thereof;
In a Resolution[4] dated March 7, 1995, Respondent Court denied petitioners Motion for
2. To pay P28,000.00 plus interest thereon [from] June 8, 1986 until complete payment Reconsideration.
thereof;

3. To pay P142,700.00 plus interest thereon from July 10, 1987 until complete payment The Facts
thereof;

4. To pay P70,000.00 plus interest thereon from February 1, 1987 until complete payment The following is the Court of Appeals undisputed narration of the facts:
thereof;
Plaintiff [herein petitioner] is a known businessman-sportsman owning several racehorses
5. To pay P140,000.00 plus interest thereon from March 22, 1987 until complete payment which he entered in the sweepstakes races between the periods covering March 6, 1986 to
thereof; September 18, 1989.Several of his horses won the races on various dates, landing first, second
or third places, respectively, and winning prizes together with the 30% due for trainer/grooms
which are itemized as follows:
Date Place Stake Horse Racewinning 30% Due Net Amount
Winner Prize Claims Training Withheld by
Grooms PCSO
03/25/86 1st Hansuyen 200,000.00 57,000.00 143,000.00
06/08/86 2nd Stronghold 40,000.00 12,000.00 28,000.00
07/10/86 1st Kahala 200,000.00 57,300.00 142,700.00
02/01/87 1st Devil's Brew 100,000.00 30,000.00 70,000.00
03/22/87 1st Time to Explode 200,000.00 60,000.00 140,000.00
04/26/87 3rd Stormy Petril 40,000.00 12,000.00 28,000.00
05/17/87 1st Starring Role 20,000.00 6,000.00 14,000.00
08/09/87 1st Star Studded 200,000.00 60,000.00 140,000.00
12/13/87 2nd Charade 250,000.00 75,000.00 174,000.00
09/18/88 1st Hair Trigger 200,000.00 60,000.00 140,000.00
TOTAL 1,450,000.00 429,300.00 1,020,700.00
[Herein petitioner] sent letters of demand (Exhibits A, dated July 3, 1986; B dated August 18,
1986; and C, dated September 11, 1990) to the defendants [herein private respondents] for the
collection of the prizes due him. And [herein private respondents] consistently replied
(Exhibits 2 and 3) that the demanded prizes are being withheld on advice of Commissioner
Ramon A. Diaz of the Presidential Commission on Good Government. Finally on January 30,
1991, this case was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. But before receipt of the
summons on February 7, 1991, Presidential Commission on Good Government advi[s]ed
defendants that it poses no more objection to the remittance of the prize winnings (Exh. 6) to
[herein petitioner]. Immediately, this was communicated to Atty. Estelito Mendoza by [Private
Respondent Fernando] Carrascoso [Jr.].[5]
As culled from the pleadings of the parties, Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza, petitioners
counsel, refused to accept the prizes at this point, reasoning that the matter had already been
brought to court.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that Respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO)
and its then chairman, Respondent Fernando O. Carrascoso Jr., had no authority to withhold
the subject racehorse winnings of petitioner, since no writ of sequestration therefor had been
issued by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). It held that it was
Carrascosos unwarranted personal initiative not to release the prizes. Having been a previous
longtime associate of petitioner in his horse racing and breeding activities, he had supposedly
been aware that petitioners winning horses were not ill-gotten.The trial court held that, by not
paying the winnings, Carrascoso had acted in bad faith amounting to the persecution and
harassment of petitioner and his family.[6] It thus ordered the PCSO and Carrascoso to pay in
solidum petitioners claimed winnings plus interests. It further ordered Carrascoso to pay moral
and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit.
While the case was pending with the Court of Appeals, petitioner moved for the partial
execution pending appeal of the RTC judgment, praying for the payment of the principal
amount of his prize winnings. Private respondents posed no objection thereto and manifested
their readiness to release the amount prayed for. Hence, the trial court issued on February 14,
1992, an Order[7] for the issuance of a writ of execution in the amount
of P1,020,700. Accordingly, on May 20, 1992, Respondent PCSO delivered the amount to
petitioner.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Before the appellate court, herein private respondents assigned the following errors:[8]
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
ACTED IN BAD FAITH IN WITHHOLDING PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE[S] PRIZE[S];
II.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED [IN] AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES, EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE.
In reversing the trial courts finding of bad faith on the part of Carrascoso, the Court of
Appeals held that the former PCSO chairman was merely carrying out the instruction of the
PCGG in regard to the prize winnings of petitioner. It noted that, at the time, the scope of the
sequestration of the properties of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and his cronies was
not well-defined. Respondent Court explained:[9]
xxx Under those equivocalities, defendant Carrascoso could not be faulted in asking further
instructions from the PCGG, the official government agency on the matter, on what to do with
the prize winnings of the [petitioner], and more so, to obey the instructions subsequently
given. The actions taken may be a hard blow on [petitioner] but defendant Carrascoso had no
alternative. It was the safest he could do in order to protect public interest, act within the
powers of his position and serve the public demands then prevailing. More importantly, it was
the surest way to avoid a possible complaint for neglect of duty or misfeasance of office or an
anti-graft case against him.
The Court of Appeals also noted that the following actuations of Carrascoso negated bad
faith: (1) he promptly replied to petitioners demand for the release of his prizes, citing PCGGs
instruction to withhold payment thereof; (2) upon PCGGs subsequent advice to release
petitioners winnings, he immediately informed petitioner thereof; and (3) he interposed no
objection to the partial execution, pending appeal, of the RTC decision. Respondent Court
finally disposed as follows:[10]
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING this case. No
pronouncement as to costs.
On September 29, 1994, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied on March 7, 1995. Hence, this petition.[11]
Issues
Petitioner asks this Court to resolve the following issues:
a. Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal of respondent Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO);
b. Whether the appeal of respondent Carrascoso, Jr. should have been dismissed for his failure
to file an appeal brief;
c. Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review and reverse the judgment on a
cause of action which was not appealed from by the respondents;
d. Whether the award for damages against respondent Carrascoso, Jr. is warranted by evidence
and the law.[12]
Being related, the first two issues will be discussed jointly.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
First and Second Issues: Effect of PCSOs Appeal Brief
Petitioner contends that the appeal filed by the PCSO before Respondent Court of
Appeals should have been dismissed outright. The appealed RTC decision ruled on two causes
of action: (1) a judgment against both PCSO and Carrascoso to jointly and severally pay
petitioner his winnings plus interest and income; and (2) a judgment against
Carrascoso alone for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees and costs. The
PCSO, through the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), appealed only the
second item: the impropriety of the award of damages xxx. This appealed portion, however,
condemned only Carrascoso, not the PCSO. Technically, petitioner claims, PCSO could not
have appealed the second portion of the RTC Decision which ruled against Carrascoso only,
and not against the government corporation.
Petitioner further avers that Carrascoso failed to file his own appeal brief; accordingly,
his appeal should have been dismissed. The PCSO brief, he submits, could not have inured to
the benefit of Carrascoso, because the latter was no longer chairman of that office at the time
the brief was filed and, hence, could no longer be represented by the OGCC.
On the other hand, respondents aver that the withholding of petitioners racehorse
winnings by Respondent Carrascoso occurred during the latters incumbency as PCSO
chairman. According to him, he had honestly believed that it was within the scope of his
authority not to release said winnings, in view of then President Corazon C. Aquinos
Executive Order No. 2 (EO 2), in which she decreed the following:
(1) Freeze all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or
his wife, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close friends, subordinates, business
associates, dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest or participation;
(2) Prohibit any person from transferring, conveying, encumbering or otherwise depleting or
concealing such assets and properties or from assisting or taking part in their transfer,
encumbrance, concealment, or dissipation, under pain of such penalties as are prescribed by
law.
Moreover, he argues that he sought the advice of the PCGG as to the nature of the
subject racehorse winnings, and he was told that they were part of petitioners sequestered
properties. Under these circumstances and in his belief that said winnings were fruits of
petitioners ill-gotten properties, he deemed it his duty to withhold them. The chairman of the
PCSO, he adds, is empowered by law to order the withholding of prize winnings.
The representation of the OGCC on behalf of the PCSO and Mr. Carrascoso is pursuant
to its basic function to act as the principal law office of all government-owned or controlled
corporations, their subsidiaries, other corporate offsprings and government acquired asset
corporations and xxx [to] exercise control and supervision over all legal departments or
divisions maintained separately and such powers and functions as are now or may hereafter be
provided by law.[13] The OGCC was therefore duty-bound to defend the PCSO because the
latter, under its charter,[14] is a government-owned corporation. The government counsels
representation extends to the concerned government functionarys officers when the issue
involves the latters official acts or duties.[15]
Granting that upon his separation from the government, Carrascoso ceased to be entitled
to the legal services of the government corporate counsel, this development does not
automatically revoke or render ineffective his notice of appeal of the trial courts Decision. The
filing of an appellants brief is not an absolute requirement for the perfection of an
appeal.[16] Besides, when noncompliance with the Rules of Court is not intended for delay or
does not prejudice the adverse party, the dismissal of an appeal on a mere technicality may be
stayed and the court may, at its sound discretion, exercise its equity jurisdiction.[17] The
emerging trend in our jurisprudence is to afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity
for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.[18]
What is important is that Respondent Carrascoso filed his notice of appeal on time and
that his counsel before the lower court, who was presumed to have continued representing him
on appeal,[19] had filed an appeal brief on his behalf. The Manifestation of Carrascoso before
the Court of Appeals that he intended to hire the services of another counsel and to file his
own brief did not ipso facto effect a change of counsel under the existing rules of
procedure. The former counsel must first file a formal petition withdrawing his appearance
with the clients consent, and the newly appointed attorney should formally enter his
appearance before the appellate court with notice to the adverse party. [20] But other than
Carrascosos manifestation of his intention to hire a counsel of his own, the requisites for a
change of counsel were not fully complied with. Nevertheless, as stated earlier, even an
effective change of attorney will not abrogate the pleadings filed before the court by the
former counsel.
All in all, we hold that the appellate court committed no reversible error in not
dismissing the appeal, since this matter was addressed to its sound discretion, and since such
discretion was exercised reasonably in accordance with the doctrine that cases should, as much
as possible, be decided on their merits.
Third Issue: Scope of the Appeal Before Respondent Court
Petitioner is correct in asserting that the entire RTC judgment was not appealed to
Respondent Court of Appeals. The errors assigned in the appellants Brief, as quoted earlier,
attacked only the trial courts (1) conclusion that defendants-appellants acted in bad faith and
(2) award of damages in favor of herein petitioner. In short, only those parts relating to the
second cause of action could be reviewed by the CA.
Respondent Court could not therefore reverse and set aside the RTC Decision in its
entirety and dismiss the original Complaint without trampling upon the rights that had accrued
to the petitioner from the unappealed portion of the Decision. It is well-settled that only the
errors assigned and properly argued in the brief, and those necessarily related thereto, may be
considered by the appellate court in resolving an appeal in a civil case.[21] The appellate court
has no power to resolve unassigned errors, except those that affect the courts jurisdiction over
the subject matter and those that are plain or clerical errors.[22]
Having said that, we note, however, that Respondent Court in its Decision effectively
recognized the confines of the appeal, as it stated at the outset that this appeal shall be limited
to the damages awarded in the [RTC] decision other than the claims for race winning
prizes.[23] The dispositive portion of the Decision must be understood together with the
aforequoted statement that categorically defined the scope of Respondent Courts
review. Consequently, what the assailed Decision reversed and set aside was only that part of
the appealed judgment finding bad faith on the part of herein Private Respondent Carrascoso
and awarding damages to herein petitioner. It did not annul the trial courts order for
Respondent PCSO to pay Petitioner Cojuangco his racehorse winnings, because this Order had
never been assigned as an error sought to be corrected.
On the contrary, Respondent PCSO had probably never intended to further object to the
payment, as it so manifested before the trial court[24] in answer to Petitioner Cojuangcos
Motion[25] for the partial execution of the judgment. In fact, on May 20, 1992, PCSO willingly
and readily paid the petitioner the principal amount of P1,020,700 in accordance with the writ
of execution issued by the trial court on February 14, 1992.[26] Obviously and plainly, the RTC
judgment, insofar as it related to the first cause of action, had become final and no longer
subject to appeal.
In any event, the Court of Appeals discussion regarding the indispensability of the
PCGG as a party-litigant to the instant case was not pivotal to its reversal of the appealed trial
court Decision. It merely mentioned that the non-joinder of the PCGG made the
Complaint vulnerable or susceptible to dismissal. It did not rule that it was the very ground, or
at least one of the legal grounds, it relied upon in setting aside the appealed judgment. It could
not have legally done so anyway, because the PCGGs role in the controversy, if any, had
never been an issue before the trial court. Well-settled is the doctrine that no question, issue or
argument will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the court a quo.[27]
The aforementioned discussion should therefore be construed only in light of the
previous paragraphs relating to Respondent Carrascosos good faith which, the appellate court
surmised, was indicated by his reliance on PCGGs statements that the subject prize winnings
of Petitioner Cojuangco were part of the sequestered properties. In other words, Respondent
Courts view that the non-inclusion of PCGG as a party made the Complaint dismissible was a
mere aside that did not prejudice petitioner.
Fourth Issue: Damages
Petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial courts finding that
Respondent Carrascoso acted in bad faith in withholding his winnings. We do not think so.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a
known duty due to some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. [28]
We do not believe that the above judicially settled nature of bad faith characterized the
questioned acts of Respondent Carrascoso. On the contrary, we believe that there is sufficient
evidence on record to support Respondent Courts conclusion that he did not act in bad faith. It
reasoned, and we quote with approval:[29]
A close examination of the June 10, 1986 letter of defendant Carrascoso to Jovito Salonga,
then Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, readily display
uncertainties in the mind of Chairman Carrascoso as to the extent of the sequestration against
the properties of the plaintiff. In the said letter (Exhibit 1) the first prize for the March 16,
1986 draw and the second prize for the June 8, 1986 draw, were, in the meantime, being
withheld to avoid any possible violation of your sequestration order on the matter because
while he is aware of the sequestration order issued against the properties of defendant Eduardo
Cojuangco, he is not aware of the extent and coverage thereof. It was for that reason that, in
the same letter, defendant Carrascoso requested for a clarification whether the prizes are
covered by the order and if it is in the affirmative, for instructions on the proper disposal of the
two (2) prizes taking into account the shares of the trainer and the groom.
Correspondingly, in a letter dated June 13, 1986 (Exhibit 2) PCGG Commissioner Ramon A.
Diaz authorized the payment to the trainer and the groom but instructed the withholding of the
amounts due plaintiff Eduardo Cojuangco. This piece of evidence should be understood and
appreciated in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time. PCGG was just a newly
born legal creation and sequestration was a novel remedy which even legal luminaries were
not sure as to the actual procedure, the correct approach and the manner how the powers of the
said newly created office should be exercised and the remedy of sequestration properly
implemented without violating due process of law. To the mind of their newly installed power,
the immediate concern is to take over and freeze all properties of former President Ferdinand
E. Marcos, his immediate families, close associates and cronies. There is no denying that
plaintiff is a very close political and business associate of the former President. Under those
equivocalities, defendant Carrascoso could not be faulted in asking further instructions from
the PCGG, the official government agency on the matter, on what to do with the prize
winnings of the plaintiff, and more so, to obey the instructions subsequently given. The
actions taken may be a hard blow on plaintiff but defendant Carrascoso had no alternative. It
was the safest he could do in order to protect public interest, act within the powers of his
position and serve the public demands then prevailing. More importantly, it was the surest way
to avoid a possible complaint for neglect of duty or misfeasance of office or an anti-graft case
against him.
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, the finding of bad faith against defendant Carrascoso is overshadowed by the
evidences showing his good faith. He was just recently appointed chairman of the PCGG
when he received the first demand for the collection of the prize for the March 16, 1986 race
which he promptly answered saying he was under instructions by the PCGG to withhold such
payment. But the moment he received the go signal from the PCGG that the prize winnings of
plaintiff Cojuangco could already be released, he immediately informed the latter thereof,
interposed no objection to the execution pending appeal relative thereto, in fact, actually paid
off all the winnings due the plaintiff. xxx
Carrascosos decision to withhold petitioners winnings could not be characterized as
arbitrary or whimsical, or even the product of ill will or malice. He had particularly sought
from PCGG a clarification of the extent and coverage of the sequestration order issued against
the properties of petitioner.[30] He had acted upon the PCGGs statement that the subject prizes
were part of those covered by the sequestration order and its instruction to hold in a proper
bank deposits [sic] earning interest the amount due Mr. Cojuangco. [31] Besides, EO 2 had just
been issued by then President Aquino, freez[ing] all assets and properties in the Philippines
[of] former President Marcos and/or his wife, xxx their close friends, subordinates, business
associates, xxx; and enjoining the transfer, encumbrance, concealment, or dissipation
[thereof], under pain of such penalties as prescribed by law. It cannot, therefore, be said that
Respondent Carrascoso, who relied upon these issuances, acted with malice or bad faith.
The extant rule is that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary
damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing of
bad faith, malice or gross negligence.[32] Attorneys fees and expenses of litigation cannot be
imposed either, in the absence of a clear showing of any of the grounds provided therefor
under the Civil Code.[33] The trial courts award of these kinds of damages must perforce be
deleted, as ruled by the Court of Appeals.
Nevertheless, this Court agrees with the petitioner and the trial court that Respondent
Carrascoso may still be held liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights
and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
xxx xxx xxx
In Aberca v. Ver,[34] this Court explained the nature and the purpose of this article as
follows:
It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the
deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no
man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval or of
social and political stress, when the temptation is strongest to yield -- borrowing the words of
Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee -- to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is
necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot
be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. The rule of law
must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Our commitment to democratic principles and to the
rule of law compels us to reject the view which reduces law to nothing but the expression of
the will of the predominant power in the community. Democracy cannot be a reign of
progress, of liberty, of justice, unless the law is respected by him who makes it and by him for
whom it is made. Now this respect implies a maximum of faith, a minimum of idealism. On
going to the bottom of the matter, we discover that life demands of us a certain residuum of
sentiment which is not derived from reason, but which reason nevertheless controls. [35]
Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice
or bad faith.[36] To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights
of petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of
ones duties.[37]
We hold that petitioners right to the use of his property was unduly impeded. While
Respondent Carrascoso may have relied upon the PCGGs instructions, he could have further
sought the specific legal basis therefor. A little exercise of prudence would have disclosed that
there was no writ issued specifically for the sequestration of the racehorse winnings of
petitioner. There was apparently no record of any such writ covering his racehorses either. The
issuance of a sequestration order requires the showing of a prima facie case and due regard for
the requirements of due process.[38] The withholding of the prize winnings of petitioner
without a properly issued sequestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights
without due process of law.
Article 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of nominal damages to a plaintiff
whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or
recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered.[39] The court
may also award nominal damages in every case where a property right has been
invaded.[40] The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court,
with the relevant circumstances taken into account.[41]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed Decision, as
herein clarified, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Private Respondent Fernando
O. Carrascoso Jr. is ORDERED TO PAY petitioner nominal damages in the amount of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000). No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182976 January 14, 2013
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO), Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO, doing business under the trade name and style
of PERMANENT LIGHT MANUFACTURING ENTERPRISES and GUIA S.
CASTILLO, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition1 for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
Decision2 dated May 21, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80572. The
Court of Appeals had affirmed with modification the Decision 3dated July 9, 2003 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 168, in Civil Case No. 65224.
The appellate court deleted the award to petitioner Manila Electric Company
(Meralco) of the amount of P1, 138,898.86, representing overpaid electric bills, and
ordered petitioner to pay temperate damages to respondents in the amount of
P500,000.
The facts follow.
Respondents Pablito M. Castillo and Guia S. Castillo are spouses engaged in the
business of manufacturing and selling fluorescent fixtures, office steel cabinets and
related metal fabrications under the name and style of Permanent Light
Manufacturing Enterprises (Permanent Light).
On March 2, 1994, the Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) approved the award to Permanent Light of a contract for the supply
and installation of 1,200 units of lateral steel filing cabinets worth
P7,636,800.4 Immediately, Permanent Light began production of the steel cabinets so
that it can obtain the award for the supply of 500 additional units.
In the afternoon of April 19, 1994, Joselito Ignacio and Peter Legaspi, Fully Phased
Inspectors of petitioner Meralco, sought permission to inspect Permanent Light’s
electric meter. Said inspection was carried out in the presence of Mike Malikay, an
employee of respondents.
The results of the inspection, which are contained in a Special Investigation
Report,5 show that the terminal seal of Permanent Light’s meter was deformed, its
meter seal was covered with fake lead, and the 100th dial pointer was misaligned. On
the basis of these findings, Ignacio concluded that the meter was tampered with and
electric supply to Permanent Light was immediately disconnected. The questioned
meter was then taken to Meralco’s laboratory for verification.
By petitioner Meralco’s claim, it sustained losses in the amount of P126,319.92 over a
24-month period,6 on account of Permanent Light’s tampered meter. The next day, in
order to secure the reconnection of electricity to Permanent Light, respondents paid
P50,000 as down payment on the differential bill to be rendered by Meralco. 7
Thereafter, Meralco performed a Polyphase Meter Test on the disputed meter and
made the following findings:
1. The ST-5 seal#A217447 padlock type was tampered by forcibly pulling out the
sealing hasp while the lead cover seals (ERB#1 (1989) and Meralco#21) were found
fake.
2. The meshing adjustment between the 1st driven gear and the rotating disc was
found altered causing the said gear to [disengage] totally from the driving gear of the
same disc. Under this condition, the meter failed to register, hence, had not been
registering the energy (KWhrs) and kw demand used by the customer.
3. The 100th dial pointer of the register was found out of alignment which indicates
that the meter had been opened to manipulate said dial pointer and set manually to
the desired reading.8
Petitioner Meralco billed Permanent Light the amount of P61,709.11, representing the
latter’s unregistered electric consumption for the period of September 20, 1993 to
March 22, 1994. Meralco, however, credited the initial payment of P50,000 made by
respondents. It assessed respondents a balance of P11,709.11, but later reduced
said amount to P5,538.20 after petitioner allowed respondents a 10% discount on
their total bill. Then, petitioner received the amount of P5,538.20 as full settlement of
the remaining balance.
Subsequently, respondents received an electric bill in the amount of P38,693.53 for
the period of March 22, 1994 to April 21, 1994. This was followed by another bill for
P192,009.64 covering the period from November 19, 1993 to April 21, 1994.
Respondents contested both assessments in a Letter dated October 12, 1994.9 They
likewise complained of a significant increase in their electric bills since petitioner
installed the replacement meter on April 20, 1994.
In a Letter dated December 7, 1994,10 petitioner Meralco explained that the bill for
P38,693.53 was already a "corrected bill." According to petitioner, the bill for
P192,009.64 was adjusted on August 25, 1994 to reflect respondents’ payment of
P61,709.11 as settlement of Permanent Light’s electric bills from September 20, 1993
to March 22, 1994. It assured respondents that Permanent Light’s meter has been
tested on November 29, 1994 and was found to be in order. In the same letter,
petitioner informed respondents that said meter was replaced anew on December 1,
1994 after it sustained a crack during testing. While respondents continued to pay,
allegedly under protest, the succeeding bills of Permanent Light, they refused to pay
the bill for P38,693.53.
On August 2, 1995, respondents filed against Meralco a Petition 11 for Injunction,
Recovery of a Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The case was
raffled to Branch 162 of the Pasig RTC, which was presided over by Judge Manuel S.
Padolina, and docketed as Civil Case No. 65224.
Mainly, respondents prayed for the issuance of a permanent injunction to enjoin
petitioner from cutting power supply to Permanent Light, refrain from charging them
unrecorded electric consumption and demanding payment of P38,693.53,
representing their bill for March 22, 1994 to April 21, 1994. Corollary to this,
respondents sought reimbursement of the P55,538.20 that they had paid as the
estimated electric bill of Permanent Light from September 20, 1993 to March 22,
1994. They likewise prayed for the reinstatement of their old meter, which
respondents believe accurately records Permanent Light’s electric consumption.
In an Order12 dated August 29, 1995, the RTC directed the issuance of a TRO to
restrain petitioner Meralco from disconnecting electricity to Permanent Light. Later, in
an Order13 dated September 8, 1995, the RTC directed the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction upon the posting of a bond in the amount of P95,000.
While trial was pending, respondents reiterated their request for a replacement meter.
According to them, the meters installed by Meralco ran faster than the one it
confiscated following the disconnection on April 19, 1994.
In 1997, Judge Manuel S. Padolina retired. Thus, the case was heard by Pairing
Judge Aurelio C. Trampe until the parties had presented all their witnesses. On
October 30, 1998, respondents rested their case and submitted a Written Offer of
Exhibits.14 Meanwhile, petitioner filed a Formal Offer of Evidence 15 on September 22,
1999. By then, a regular presiding judge had been appointed to Branch 162 in the
person of Hon. Erlinda Piñera Uy. However, on November 8, 1999, respondents filed
an Urgent Motion to Inhibit Ad Cautelam.16 Judge Uy voluntarily recused herself from
hearing the case by Order17 dated November 10, 1999. Eventually, the case was
raffled to Branch 168 of the Pasig RTC presided by Judge Leticia Querubin Ulibarri.
On November 28, 2001, Meralco installed a new electric meter at the premises of
Permanent Light. Following this, on January 29, 2002, respondents filed an Urgent
Motion to Proffer and Mark the Latest Meralco Bill of P9,318.65 which was Reflected
in the 3rd Meralco Electric Meter
Recently Installed by Defendant Meralco.18 Despite petitioner’s opposition, the RTC
admitted said bill into evidence.
On July 9, 2003, the Pasig RTC, Branch 168, rendered judgment in favor of
respondents. The fallo of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
petitioners and against the respondent ordering the latter to pay the former the
following:
1. P1,138,898.86 representing overpayments made by the petitioners from May 1994
to November 2001;
2. P200,000.00 as and for moral damages;
3. P100,000.00 as and for exemplary damages;
4. P100,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees; and
5. the costs of this suit.
On the other hand, petitioners are hereby ordered to pay to the respondent the
amount of P38,693.53 representing the billing differential.
The Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court is hereby made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.19
The trial court ruled that petitioner failed to observe due process when it disconnected
electricity to Permanent Light. It explained that under Section 4 of Republic Act No.
783220 (RA 7832), in order that a tampered meter may constitute prima facie
evidence of illegal use of electricity by the person benefited thereby, the discovery
thereof must have been witnessed by an officer of the law or an authorized
representative of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB). In this case, however, the RTC
noted that no officer of the law or authorized ERB representative was present when
the tampered meter was discovered. Moreover, the trial court found no direct
evidence to prove that respondents were responsible for tampering with said meter.
On the basis of the proffered bill dated December 29, 2001,21 the RTC concluded that
the replacement meter installed by Meralco did not accurately register Permanent
Light’s electric consumption. Consequently, it ordered petitioner to reimburse
respondents in the amount of P1,138,898.86, representing the supposed
overpayment from April 1994 to November 2001. For failure to observe due process
in disconnecting electricity to Permanent Light, the trial court likewise imposed upon
petitioner Meralco moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000 and
P100,000, respectively.
In the assailed Decision dated May 21, 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed with
modification the Decision of the RTC. It deleted the award of P1,138,898.86 in favor
of respondents and instead ordered petitioner to pay temperate damages in the
amount of P500,000.
The Court of Appeals held that petitioner abused its right when it disconnected the
electricity of Permanent Light. The appellate court upheld the validity of the provision
in petitioner’s service contract which allows the utility company to disconnect service
upon a customer’s failure to pay the differential billing. It however stressed that under
Section 9722 of Revised Order No. 1 of the Public Service Commission, the right of a
public utility to discontinue its service to a customer is subject to the requirement of a
48-hour written notice of disconnection. Petitioner’s failure in this regard, according to
the appellate court, justifies the award of moral and exemplary damages to
respondents.
The Court of Appeals ordered petitioner to reimburse respondents for overpayment
on their electric bills. It sustained the finding of the trial court that the electric meter
installed by petitioner in Permanent Light’s premises on April 20, 1994 was registering
a higher reading than usual. The appellate court based its conclusion on the marked
difference between Permanent Light’s net billing from 1985 to 2001 compared to its
consumption after the new meter was installed, and the consequent decrease after
said meter was replaced on November 28, 2001. However, instead of actual
damages, the Court of Appeals awarded respondents temperate damages in the
amount of P500,000.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner submits the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF MORAL AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENTS;23
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AWARDING P500,000.00 FOR AND AS TEMPERATE
DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENTS.24
Amplified, the issues for our resolution are two-fold: (1) Are respondents entitled to
claim damages for petitioner’s act of disconnecting electricity to Permanent Light on
April 19, 1994? and (2) Are respondents entitled to actual damages for the supposed
overbilling by petitioner Meralco of their electric consumption from April 20, 1994 to
November 28, 2001?
Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for affirming the award of moral and exemplary
damages to respondents. It argues that respondents failed to establish how the
disconnection of electricity to Permanent Light for one day compromised its
production. Petitioner cites respondents’ admission that soon after the power went
out, they used generators to keep the operations of Permanent Light on track.
Petitioner further negates bad faith in discontinuing service to Permanent Light
without notice to respondents. It contends that the 48-hour notice requirement in
Section 97 of Revised General Order No. 1 applies only to a customer who fails to
pay the regular bill. Petitioner insists that the discovery by its Fully Phased Inspectors
of Permanent Light’s tampered meter justified disconnection of electricity to the latter.
Also, petitioner challenges the award of temperate damages to respondents for the
alleged overbilling. It objects to the admission into evidence of Permanent Light’s
December 29, 2001 electric bill, which respondents proffered two years after the case
was submitted for decision by the court a quo. Petitioner disputes the finding of the
RTC and the Court of Appeals that respondents overpaid on Permanent Light’s
electric bill. It reasons that the volume of business of any establishment varies from
season to season such that it cannot be expected to constantly register the same
electric consumption. Lastly, petitioner protests the award of P500,000 in temperate
damages as excessive and unconscionable.
In a Memorandum dated May 27, 2009, respondents denied any involvement in the
tampering of Permanent Light’s electric meter. Respondents reiterate that petitioner
violated their right to due process when it disconnected electricity to Permanent Light
without apprising them of their violation and affording them an opportunity to pay the
differential bill within the 10-day grace period provided by law. Respondents claim
that such disconnection imperiled the prompt completion of Permanent Light’s
contract with GSIS, thereby causing them anxiety. They believe that the
"embarrassment, humiliation and pain" brought about by such disconnection justify
the award of moral damages in their favor. Respondents invoke Article 24 25 of the
Civil Code on parens patriae against the alleged abuse by petitioner Meralco of its
monopoly as an electric service provider.
Respondents also rely on the testimony of Enrique Katipunan, Meralco Billing Expert,
to prove that the sudden increase in Permanent Light’s electric consumption was
caused by the "high-speed" replacement meter installed by petitioner. They reiterate
their claim for actual damages, arguing that absolute certainty as to its amount need
not be shown since the loss has been established.
Upon a careful consideration of the circumstances of this case, the Court resolves to
deny the petition.
The pertinent law relative to the immediate disconnection of electricity is Section 4,
RA 7832, which reads:
SEC. 4. Prima Facie Evidence.–(a) The presence of any of the following
circumstances shall constitute prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity, as
defined in this Act, by the person benefitted thereby, and shall be the basis for: (1) the
immediate disconnection by the electric utility to such person after due notice, x x x
(iv) The presence of a tampered, broken, or fake seal on the meter, or mutilated,
altered, or tampered meter recording chart or graph, or computerized chart, graph, or
log;
xxxx
(viii) x x x Provided, however, That the discovery of any of the foregoing
circumstances, in order to constitute prima facie evidence, must be personally
witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative
of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB).
Thus, in order for the discovery of a tampered, broken or fake seal on the meter to
constitute prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity by the person who benefits
from such illegal use, the discovery thereof must have been personally witnessed and
attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the ERB.
Citing Quisumbing v. Manila Electric Company,26 we reiterated the significance of this
requirement in Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) v. Chua, 27 thus:
The presence of government agents who may authorize immediate disconnections go
into the essence of due process. Indeed, we cannot allow respondent to act virtually
as prosecutor and judge in imposing the penalty of disconnection due to alleged
meter tampering. That would not sit well in a democratic country. After all, Meralco is
a monopoly that derives its power from the government. Clothing it with unilateral
authority to disconnect would be equivalent to giving it a license to tyrannize its
hapless customers.
On cross-examination, Meralco’s Fully Phased Inspector, Joselito M. Ignacio,
recounted who were present during the inspection:
Q. Mr. Ignacio, let us reconstruct the evidence on April 19, 1994. Before you came
across the Meralco meter of the plaintiffs, where did you come from?
A. We were inspecting other meters within that vicinity.
Q. So you mean to tell us that you were cruising in the vicinity of Cubao, Quezon City
on April 19?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And were you alone?
A. No, sir, we were two.
Q. Who was with you?
A. Mr. Peter Legaspi, sir.28
On further cross-examination by Atty. Pablito M. Castillo, Ignacio confirmed that only
he and another Fully Phased Inspector were present when they discovered
Permanent Light’s tampered meter:
Q. Who was with you when you entered the compound of the plaintiffs?
ATTY. BONA: Already answered, Mr. Legaspi.
ATTY. CASTILLO: No. They were both on board but the question now is more
particular.
ATTY. BONA: At what particular time?
WITNESS:
A. Mr. Legaspi.
COURT: Only?
WITNESS: Yes, sir.29
Absent any showing that an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of
the ERB personally witnessed and attested to the discovery of Permanent Light’s
tampered electric meter, such discovery did not constitute prima facie evidence of
illegal use of electricity that justifies immediate disconnection of electric service.
Besides, even if there is prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity, Section 4,
RA 7832 requires due notice to the person benefited before disconnection of
electricity can be effected. Specifically, Section 6 of RA 7832 calls for prior written
notice or warning, thus:
SEC. 6. Disconnection of Electric Service. - The private electric utility or rural electric
cooperative concerned shall have the right and authority to disconnect immediately
the electric service after serving a written notice or warning to that effect, without the
need of a court or administrative order, and deny restoration of the same, when the
owner of the house or establishment concerned or someone acting in his behalf shall
have been caught in flagrante delicto doing any of the acts enumerated in Section
4(a) hereof, or when any of the circumstances so enumerated shall have been
discovered for the second time: Provided, That in the second case, a written notice or
warning shall have been issued upon the first discovery: x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, even when the consumer, or someone acting in his behalf, is caught in
flagrante delicto or in the act of doing any of the acts enumerated in Section 4 of RA
7832, petitioner may not immediately disconnect electricity without serving a written
notice or warning to the owner of the house or establishment concerned.
Petitioner Meralco submitted a memorandum with Control No. 6033-9430 dated April
19, 1994 to prove that respondents were duly notified of the disconnection.
Notwithstanding, petitioner maintains that the 48-hour notice of disconnection does
not apply in this case since Section 97 of Revised Order No. 1 of the Public Service
Commission pertains to nonpayment of bills while the cause for discontinuing service
to Permanent Light was the discovery of the tampered meter.
We do not agree.
On February 9, 1987, the Bureau of Energy approved 31 the Revised Terms and
Conditions of Service and Revised Standard Rules and Regulations of Meralco’s
Electric Service Contract. Pertinent to this case, the provision on Discontinuance of
Service under the Revised Terms and Conditions of Service states:
DISCONTINUANCE OF SERVICE:
The Company reserves the right to discontinue service in case the Customer is in
arrears in the payment of bills or for failure to pay the adjusted bills in those cases
where the meter stopped or failed to register the correct amount of energy consumed,
or for failure to comply with any of these terms and conditions, or in case of or to
prevent fraud upon the Company. Before disconnection is made in case of or to
prevent fraud, the Company may adjust the bill of said Customer accordingly and if
the adjusted bill is not paid, the Company may disconnect the same. In case of
disconnection, the provisions of Revised Order No. 1 of the former Public Service
Commission (now the Board of Energy) shall be observed. Any such suspension of
service shall not terminate the contract between the Company and the
Customer.32 (Emphasis supplied)
On August 3, 1995, the ERB passed Resolution No. 95-21 or the Standard Rules and
Regulations Governing the Operation of Electrical Power Services which superseded
and revoked Revised Order No. 1, which the Public Service Commission adopted on
November 27, 1941. The relevant provision on disconnection of service is found in
Section 48 of ERB Resolution No. 95-21, which reads:
SEC. 48. Refusal or Discontinuance of Service. – An electric utility shall not refuse or
discontinue service to an applicant, or customer, who is not in arrears to the electric
utility, even though there are unpaid charges due from the premises occupied by the
applicant, or customer, on account of unpaid bill of a prior tenant, unless there is
evidence of conspiracy between them to defraud the electric utility.
Service may be discontinued for the nonpayment of bills as provided for in Section 43
hereof, provided that a forty eight (48)-hour written notice of such disconnection has
been given the customer; Provided, however, that disconnections of service shall not
be made on Fridays, Saturdays, Sundays and official holidays; Provided, further, that
if at the moment of the disconnection is to be made the customer tenders payment of
the unpaid bill to the agent or employee of the electric utility who is to effect the
disconnection, the said agent, or employee shall be obliged to accept tendered
payment and issue a temporary receipt for the amount and shall desist from
disconnecting the service.
The electric utility may discontinue service in case the customer is in arrear(s) in the
payment of bill(s). Any such suspension of service shall not terminate the contract
between the electric utility and the customer.
In the case of arrear(s) in the payment of bill(s), the electric utility may discontinue the
service notwithstanding the existence of the customer’s deposit with the electric utility
which will serve as guarantee for the payment of future bill(s) after service is
reconnected. (Emphasis supplied)
True, Section 48 of ERB Resolution No. 95-21 expressly provides for the application
of the 48-hour notice rule to Section 43 on Payment of Bills. However, petitioner
Meralco, through its Revised Terms and Conditions of Service, adopted said notice
requirement where disconnection of service is warranted because (1) the consumer
failed to pay the adjusted bill after the meter stopped or failed to register the correct
amount of energy consumed, (2) or for failure to comply with any of the terms and
conditions, (3) or in case of or to prevent fraud upon the Company.
Considering the discovery of the tampered meter by its Fully Phased Inspectors,
petitioner Meralco could have disconnected electricity to Permanent Light for no other
reason but to prevent fraud upon the Company. Therefore, under the Revised Terms
and Conditions of Service vis-a-vis Section 48 of ERB Resolution No. 95-21,
petitioner is obliged to furnish respondents with a 48-hour notice of disconnection.
Having failed in this regard, we find basis for the award of moral and exemplary
damages in favor of respondents for the unceremonious disconnection of electricity to
Permanent Light.
Moral damages are awarded to compensate the claimant for physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury.33Jurisprudence has established the
following requisites for the award of moral damages: (1) there is an injury whether
physical, mental or psychological, which was clearly sustained by the claimant; (2)
there is a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) the wrongful act or
omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the
claimant; and (4) the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code.34
Pertinent to the case at hand, Article 32 of the Civil Code provides for the award of
moral damages in cases where the rights of individuals, including the right against
deprivation of property without due process of law, are violated.35In Quisumbing v.
Manila Electric Company, this Court treated the immediate disconnection of electricity
without notice as a form of deprivation of property without due process of law, which
entitles the subscriber aggrieved to moral damages. We stressed:
More seriously, the action of the defendant in maliciously disconnecting the electric
service constitutes a breach of public policy. For public utilities, broad as their powers
are, have a clear duty to see to it that they do not violate nor transgress the rights of
the consumers. Any act on their part that militates against the ordinary norms of
justice and fair play is considered an infraction that gives rise to an action for
damages. Such is the case at bar.36
Here, petitioner failed to establish factual basis for the immediate disconnection of
electricity to Permanent Light and to comply with the notice requirement provided by
law. As the court a quo correctly observed, there is no direct evidence that points to
respondents as the ones who tampered with Permanent Light’s electric meter.
Notably, the latter’s meter is located outside its premises where it is readily accessible
to anyone.
In addition to moral damages, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good. In this case, to serve as an example - that before
disconnection of electric supply can be effected by a public utility, the requisites of law
must be complied with - we sustain the award of exemplary damages to respondents.
In the assailed Decision dated May 21, 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed the award
of moral damages and exemplary damages to respondents in the amount of
P200,000 and P100,000, respectively. In line with prevailing jurisprudence, however,
this Court deems the award of moral damages in the amount of P100,00037 and
exemplary damages in the amount of P50,00038 appropriate in cases where Meralco
has wrongfully disconnected electric service to its customer.
Nonetheless, the Court finds no reason to order the reimbursement to respondents of
the P55,538.20, which petitioner received as full settlement of Permanent Light’s
"differential billing" for its unregistered consumption from September 20, 1993 to
March 22, 1994. At this point, it is well to clarify that RA 7832 assigns a specific
meaning to "differential billing" and utilizes various methodologies as basis for
determining the same. More particularly, Section 6 39 of RA 7832 defines "differential
billing" as the amount to be charged to the person concerned for the unbilled
electricity illegally consumed by him. However, since RA 7832 was approved only on
December 8, 1994 and introduced such concept only on said date, it would be
improper to treat the term "differential billing" as used by Meralco in this case in such
context. Rather, we shall treat the same as a generic term to refer to the unbilled
electricity use of Permanent Light from September 20, 1993 to March 22, 1994.
The Computation Worksheet40 of said "differential billing" shows that the amount of
P61,709.11 was derived based on Permanent Light’s average KWhour consumption
for the six months immediately preceding September 20, 1993. We find such method
of computation in accord with the Terms of Service approved by the Bureau of Energy
on February 9, 1987, thus:
PAYMENTS:
Bills will be rendered by the Company to the Customer monthly in accordance with
the applicable rate schedule. Said bills are payable to collectors or at the main or
branch offices of the Company or at its authorized banks within ten (10) days after the
regular reading date of the electric meters. The word "month" as used herein and in
the rate schedule is hereby defined to be the elapsed time between two succeeding
meter readings approximately thirty (30) days apart. In the event of the stoppage or
the failure by any meter to register the full amount of energy consumed, the Customer
shall be billed for such period on an estimated consumption based upon his use of
energy in a similar period of like use or the registration of a check meter.41 (Emphasis
supplied)
Spreading the P61,709.11 over the 6-month period covered by the "differential billing"
will yield a monthly rate of P10,284.85 - well within Permanent Light’s average net bill
for the previous months. It is undisputed by respondents that from September 20,
1993 to March 22, 1994, Permanent Light continued to enjoy petitioner’s services
even as its electric meter stopped functioning and no monthly electric bills were
issued to it. We cannot therefore allow respondents to enrich themselves unjustly at
the expense of petitioner public utility.
However, we are at a loss as to how petitioner Meralco arrived at the second
"differential billing" for P38,693.53, which represents Permanent Light’s unregistered
consumption from March 22, 1994 to April 21, 1994. It bears mentioning that it was
not until April 19, 1994 that petitioner’s Fully Phased Inspectors replaced Permanent
Light’s electric meter. In months prior to that, Permanent Light’s electric meter had
been stationary; hence, the first differential bill for its consumption from September
20, 1993 to March 22, 1994. The first differential bill was computed in accordance
with the Terms of Service approved by the Bureau of Energy. It is only proper that the
same standard be used in estimating Permanent Light’s consumption for the period of
March 22, 1994 to April 21, 1994.
Considering, however, that Permanent Light’s electric meter had stopped registering
its consumption for months prior to April 20, 1994, we shall base our estimate on
Permanent Light’s use of energy in a similar period. Permanent Light’s Bill
History42 shows that from March 19, 1992 to April 20, 1992, it consumed 3,648
KWhours of electricity. It last posted the same level of consumption for the period of
July 20, 1993 to August 19, 1993, for which it was billed P10,834.58. We deem this
amount a reasonable approximation of the net bill that respondents should pay for
Permanent Light’s use of electricity from March 22, 1994 to April 21, 1994.
We now turn to the question of whether respondents are entitled to actual damages
for the supposed overbilling by petitioner Meralco of their electric consumption from
April 20, 1994 to November 28, 2001.
Actual damages are compensation for an injury that will put the injured party in the
position where it was before the injury. They pertain to such injuries or losses that are
actually sustained and susceptible of measurement. Except as provided by law or by
stipulation, a party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss
as is duly proven. Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, not only must the
amount of loss be capable of proof; it must also be actually proven with a reasonable
degree of certainty premised upon competent proof or the best evidence obtainable. 43
Respondents anchor their claim for actual damages on the alleged overbilling by
petitioner Meralco of Permanent Light’s electricity use from April 20, 1994 to
November 28, 2001. In support, respondents presented in evidence the Comparative
Monthly Meralco Bills of Permanent Light Mfg. Enterprises from 1985-2001.44 Said
document lists the amounts which respondents supposedly paid based on Permanent
Light’s electric bills from the year 1985 to 2001 for a total of P2,466,941.22. In
particular, respondents submitted "representative Meralco bills" of Permanent Light
for the years 1985 to 1987, 1993 to 1997 and 2001 to 2002.
On January 29, 2002, respondents filed with the court a quo an Urgent Motion to
Proffer and Mark the Latest Meralco Bill of P9,318.65 which was Reflected in the 3rd
Meralco Electric Meter Recently Installed by Defendant Meralco. Attached to said
pleading is a copy of Permanent Light’s electric bill for the period of November 29,
2001 to December 29, 2001 for P9,318.65. Apparently, Meralco installed a new
electric meter at the premises of Permanent Light on November 28, 2001.
Respondents claim that the bill for P9,318.65 more accurately reflects Permanent
Light’s normal consumption, consistent with the latter’s electric bills before its meter
was first replaced on April 20, 1994. Respondents argue that, at most, their net bill
should be at par with those of Permanent Light’s neighboring establishments, Eureka
Steel and Asiatic Steel Manufacturing Co., (Asiatic Steel) which are purportedly
engaged in the same business. For the court’s reference, respondents submitted
"representative Meralco bills" of Eureka Steel for 1996 to 1997 and Asiatic Steel for
the years 1994 to 1998. Using the figures in the latter bills vis-a-vis Permanent Light’s
"comparative bills" from 1986 to 2001, respondents seek the refund of P1,138,898.86,
representing their alleged overpayment to Meralco.
However, Section 34,45 Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
dictates that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
In this case, respondents rely heavily on the bill for P9,318.65 covering the period of
November 29, 2001 to December 29, 2001 to demonstrate a defect in the
replacement meter installed at Permanent Light on April 20, 1994. However, said bill
was not included in the Written Offer of Exhibits which respondents filed much earlier,
on October 30, 1998. To be sure, it could not have been made part thereof.
Yet, even if we disregard the bill for P9,318.65, we cannot ignore the sudden and
unexplainable increase in Permanent Light’s electric consumption following the
replacement of its broken meter. Normally, when a tampered electric meter is
replaced, assuming the same amount of monthly rate of usage, the new electric
meter will register the increased use of electricity that had previously been concealed
by the tampered meter.46 While Permanent Light’s electric meter, indeed, registered a
sharp increase in its electricity use after being replaced on April 20, 1994, there is no
direct evidence to suggest that respondents tampered with said meter. Truth be told,
respondents repeatedly sought technical assistance from Meralco after Permanent
Light’s electric meter stopped working on December 7, 1993,47 albeit, without
success. This fact remains undisputed by petitioner.
Based on Permanent Light’s Meralco bills of record, its electricity use has increased
by approximately 96.3% from an average of 1,672 KWhours per month in 1985 to
3,282 KWhours per month in 1993. On the other hand, the last recorded electric
consumption of Permanent Light before its meter broke, that is, from August 19, 1993
to September 20, 1993, was 3,432 KWhours while it registered a reading of 11,904
KWhours from June 20, 1994 to July 20, 1994 – a 246.85% increase in consumption
over a period of nine (9) months.
This inordinate surge in electric reading is inconsistent with the pattern of steady but
gradual rise in Permanent Light’s consumption over the years. To our mind, the fact
that Permanent Light registered a significant increase in its electric use after the
replacement meter was installed is no reason to automatically conclude that its meter
had been running tampered long before the same stopped working. From 1985 to
1993, petitioner Meralco has observed nothing irregular with Permanent Light’s
recorded electric use such as a drastic and unexplainable drop in its consumption to
arouse suspicion that its meter has been tampered. As the appellate court correctly
observed, petitioner did not even present an iota of proof to refute the claim that the
replacement meter was running at an unusually high speed.48 It must be underscored
that petitioner has the imperative duty to make a reasonable and proper inspection of
its apparatus and equipment to ensure that they do not malfunction, and the due
diligence to discover and repair defects therein.49
Notably, respondents complained of a sudden spike in Permanent Light’s net bill in
their Letter50 to Meralco dated December 7, 1993 - two days before Permanent
Light’s meter stopped working. Thus, if it is true that there was evidence of tampering
found on April 19, 1994 yet Permanent Light continued to register an increased
consumption even after its meter was replaced, the better view would be that the
defective meter was not actually corrected after the first inspection.
Be that as it may, we cannot award actual damages to respondents.
We reiterate that actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be
duly proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. The award is dependent upon
competent proof of the damage suffered and the actual amount thereof. The award
must be based on the evidence presented, not on the personal knowledge of the
court; and certainly not on flimsy, remote, speculative and unsubstantial proof. 51
In this case, respondents presented a summary of Permanent Light’s electric bills
from the years 1986 to 2001. Said list contains the amounts which respondents
allegedly paid on Permanent Light’s from 1986 to 2001. Curiously, respondents
submitted mere "representative samples" of
Permanent Light’s electric bills for the years 1985 to 1987 and from 1993 to 1997. It
appears, however, that respondents conveniently selected the bills which cover the
period from December to mid-March - months in which demand for electricity is
normally less. To our mind, respondents did this for no other reason than to magnify
the disparity between Permanent Light’s net bill before and after its meter was
replaced on April 20, 1994 so that it can demand greater in damages.
Nonetheless, in the absence of competent proof on the amount of actual damages
suffered, a party is entitled to temperate damages.52 Temperate or moderate
damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may
be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.53 The amount
thereof is usually left to the discretion of the courts but the same should be
reasonable, bearing in mind that temperate damages should be more than nominal
but less than compensatory.
In this case, we are convinced that respondents sustained damages from the
abnormal increase in Permanent Light’s electric bills after petitioner replaced the
latter’s meter on April 19, 1994. However, respondents failed to establish the exact
amount thereof by competent evidence. Considering the attendant circumstances, an
award of temperate damages in the amount of P300,000 is just and reasonable.
Finally, we delete the award of attorney’s fees for lack of basis.
An award of attorney’s fees has always been the exception rather than the
rule.1âwphi1 Attorney’s fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit.
The policy of the Court is that no premium should be placed on the right to
litigate.54 The trial court must make express findings of fact and law that bring the suit
within the exception. What this demands is that factual, legal or equitable justifications
for the award must be set forth not only in the fallo but also in the text of the decision,
or else, the award should be thrown out for being speculative and conjectural. 55
Here, the award of attorney’s fees in favor of respondents appeared only in the fallo
of the trial court’s Decision dated July 9, 2003. Neither did the appellate court proffer
any justification for sustaining said award.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 21, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 80572 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, as follows:

(a) Petitioner is ordered to pay respondents ;P300,000 as temperate

damages, ;PI 00,000 as moral damages and ;P50,000 as exemplary
damages;

(b) Respondents are ordered to pay petitioner ; PI 0,834.58, representing the

estimate of its unregistered consumption for the period from March 22, 1994
to April 21, 1994; and

(c) The award of attorney's fees is DELETED for lack of basis.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-48006 July 8, 1942
FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,
vs.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.
Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Jose G. Advincula for respondents.
BOCOBO, J.:
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein,
Fausto Barredo, liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the
negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon
and Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the
Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro
Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy
Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal action
was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was
convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to
two years of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the petition
that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino Garcia and
Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the
Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the
Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First
Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal
interest from the date of the complaint. This decision was modified by the Court of
Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the
action was instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of
the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As to
Barredo's responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:
... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that
he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
(See p. 22, appellant's brief.) In fact it is shown he was careless in
employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation of the
Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit A) — violation which appeared in the
records of the Bureau of Public Works available to be public and to himself.
Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of
the Civil Code.
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by
the Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been
no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot
be held responsible in the case. The petitioner's brief states on page 10:
... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure
to exercise all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of Pedro Fontanilla to prevent damages suffered by the
respondents. In other words, The Court of Appeals insists on applying in the
case article 1903 of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in
Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes said article to
a civil liability arising from a crime as in the case at bar simply because
Chapter II of Title 16 of Book IV of the Civil Code, in the precise words of
article 1903 of the Civil Code itself, is applicable only to "those (obligations)
arising from wrongful or negligent acts or commission not punishable by law.
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be
imposed upon him in this action is not a civil obligation arising from a felony
or a misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation
imposed in article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the
selection or supervision of his servant or employee.
The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil
action against Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly, responsible
under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The
defendant maintains that Fontanilla's negligence being punishable by the Penal Code,
his (defendant's) liability as an employer is only subsidiary, according to said Penal
code, but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property has not been
exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must cut through the tangle that has, in the
minds of many confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes
under the Penal Code and fault or negligence under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil
Code. This should be done, because justice may be lost in a labyrinth, unless
principles and remedies are distinctly envisaged. Fortunately, we are aided in our
inquiry by the luminous presentation of the perplexing subject by renown jurists and
we are likewise guided by the decisions of this Court in previous cases as well as by
the solemn clarity of the consideration in several sentences of the Supreme Tribunal
of Spain.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a
separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and
individuality that is entirely apart and independent from delict or crime. Upon this
principle and on the wording and spirit article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and
direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as follows:
 CIVIL CODE
ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts,
and from acts and omissions which are unlawful or in which any kind of fault
or negligence intervenes.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be
governed by the provisions of the Penal Code.
ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or
negligence, not punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject to the
provisions of Chapter II, Title XVI of this book.
xxx xxx xxx
ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to
another by his fault or negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is
enforcible, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom another is responsible.
The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for
any damages caused by the minor children who live with them.
Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons
subject to their authority and living with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for
any damages caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of the
service in which employed, or on occasion of the performance of their duties.
The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special
agent, but not if the damage shall have been caused by the official upon
whom properly devolved the duty of doing the act performed, in which case
the provisions of the next preceding article shall be applicable.
Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages
caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons
mentioned therein prove that they are exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage.
ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may
recover from the latter what he may have paid.
REVISED PENAL CODE
ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. — Every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption
from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12
and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption
from civil liability, which shall be enforced to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts
committed by any imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine
years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has
acted without discernment shall devolve upon those having such person
under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault
or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his
authority, legal guardianship, or control, or if such person be insolvent, said
insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting
property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for
whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in
proportion to the benefit which they may have received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for
which each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even approximately, or
when the liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants
of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damage has been caused with the
consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner
prescribed by special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using
violence or causing the fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no
such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part
of their property exempt from execution.
ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and
proprietors of establishment. — In default of persons criminally liable,
innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any other persons or corporation shall be
civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where
 a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police
regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by
robbery or theft within their houses lodging therein, or the person, or for the
payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in
advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the
deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the
directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them
with respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall
attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation against or
intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary liability
established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers,
teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for
felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or
employees in the discharge of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period; if it would
have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act
which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have
constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
period shall be imposed."
It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be
broad enough to cover the driver's negligence in the instant case, nevertheless article
1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not punishable by law." But inasmuch
as article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even simple
imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code
has apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the "confusion
worse confounded." However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of scope
in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between the civil liability
arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual.
The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a
crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-
delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and
unmistakable. This legal institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors
being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish legal terminology, this
responsibility is often referred to as culpa aquiliana. The Partidas also contributed to
the genealogy of the present fault or negligence under the Civil Code; for instance,
Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es de fazer emienda, porque, como quier
que el non fizo a sabiendas en daño al otro, pero acaescio por su culpa."
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article
1089, one of the five sources of obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-
delito or culpa extra-contractual: "los actos . . . en que intervenga cualquier genero de
culpa o negligencia." Then article 1093 provides that this kind of obligation shall be
governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV, meaning articles 1902-0910. This
portion of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted to the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private
concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the
Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished
only if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos,
include all acts in which "any king of fault or negligence intervenes." However, it
should be noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility,
such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction
of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. (See Colin and Capitant, "Curso Elemental
de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.)
Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-delicts
and the employer's primary and direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia Juridica
Española" (Vol. XXVII, p. 414) says:
El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y
comprende a diferentes personas. Asi, existe una responsabilidad civil
propiamente dicha, que en ningun casl lleva aparejada responsabilidad
criminal alguna, y otra que es consecuencia indeclinable de la penal que
nace de todo delito o falta."
The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and
comprises different persons. Thus, there is a civil responsibility, properly
speaking, which in no case carries with it any criminal responsibility, and
another which is a necessary consequence of the penal liability as a result of
every felony or misdemeanor."
Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There had
been a collision between two trains belonging respectively to the Ferrocarril
Cantabrico and the Ferrocarril del Norte. An employee of the latter had been
prosecuted in a criminal case, in which the company had been made a party as
subsidiarily responsible in civil damages. The employee had been acquitted in the
criminal case, and the employer, the Ferrocarril del Norte, had also been exonerated.
The question asked was whether the Ferrocarril Cantabrico could still bring a civil
action for damages against the Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's opinion was in the
affirmative, stating in part (Maura, Dictamenes, Vol. 6, pp. 511-513):
Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de
los hechos, todavia menos parece sostenible que exista cosa
juzgada acerca de la obligacion civil de indemnizar los quebrantos y
menoscabos inferidos por el choque de los trenes. El titulo en que se funda
la accion para demandar el resarcimiento, no puede confundirse con las
responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, siquiera exista en este, sea el
cual sea, una culpa rodeada de notas agravatorias que motivan sanciones
penales, mas o menos severas. La lesion causada por delito o falta en los
derechos civiles, requiere restituciones, reparaciones o indemnizaciones,
que cual la pena misma atañen al orden publico; por tal motivo vienen
encomendadas, de ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y claro es que si por esta
via se enmiendan los quebrantos y menoscabos, el agraviado excusa
procurar el ya conseguido desagravio; pero esta eventual coincidencia de
los efectos, no borra la diversidad originaria de las acciones civiles para
pedir indemnizacion.
Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpas contractuales, que no
vendrian a cuento y que tiene otro regimen), dimanan, segun el articulo
1902 del Codigo Civil, de toda accion u omision, causante de daños o
perjuicios, en que intervenga culpa o negligencia. Es trivial que acciones
semejantes son ejercitadas ante los Tribunales de lo civil cotidianamente,
sin que la Justicia punitiva tenga que mezclarse en los asuntos. Los
articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al 128 del Codigo Penal, atentos al espiritu y a los
fines sociales y politicos del mismo, desenvuelven y ordenan la materia de
responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, en terminos separados del
regimen por ley comun de la culpa que se denomina aquiliana, por alusion a
precedentes legislativos del Corpus Juris. Seria intempestivo un paralelo
entre aquellas ordenaciones, y la de la obligacion de indemnizar a titulo de
culpa civil; pero viene al caso y es necesaria una de las diferenciaciones
que en el tal paralelo se notarian.
Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su modo las
responsabilidades civiles, entre los que sean por diversos conceptos
culpables del delito o falta, las hacen extensivas a las empresas y los
establecimientos al servicio de los cuales estan los delincuentes; pero con
caracter subsidiario, o sea, segun el texto literal, en defecto de los que sean
responsables criminalmente. No coincide en ello el Codigo Civil, cuyo
articulo 1903, dice; La obligacion que impone el articulo anterior es exigible,
no solo por los actos y omisiones propios, sino por los de aquellas personas
de quienes se debe responder; personas en la enumeracion de las cuales
figuran los dependientes y empleados de los establecimientos o empresas,
sea por actos del servicio, sea con ocasion de sus funciones. Por esto
acontece, y se observa en la jurisprudencia, que las empresas, despues de
intervenir en las causas criminales con el caracter subsidiario de su
responsabilidad civil por razon del delito, son demandadas y
condenadas directa y aisladamente, cuando se trata de la obligacion, ante
los tribunales civiles.
Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando
verdadero postulado de nuestro regimen judicial la separacion entre justicia
punitiva y tribunales de lo civil, de suerte que tienen unos y otros normas de
fondo en distintos cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos de proceder,
habiendose, por añadidura, abstenido de asistir al juicio criminal la
Compañia del Ferrocarril Cantabrico, que se reservo ejercitar sus acciones,
parece innegable que la de indemnizacion por los daños y perjuicios que le
irrogo el choque, no estuvo sub judice ante el Tribunal del Jurado, ni fue
sentenciada, sino que permanecio intacta, al pronunciarse el fallo de 21 de
marzo. Aun cuando el veredicto no hubiese sido de inculpabilidad, mostrose
mas arriba, que tal accion quedaba legitimamente reservada para despues
del proceso; pero al declararse que no existio delito, ni responsabilidad
dimanada de delito, materia unica sobre que tenian jurisdiccion aquellos
juzgadores, se redobla el motivo para la obligacion civil ex lege, y se
patentiza mas y mas que la accion para pedir su cumplimiento permanece
incolume, extraña a la cosa juzgada.
As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems
less tenable that there should be res judicata with regard to the civil
obligation for damages on account of the losses caused by the collision of
the trains. The title upon which the action for reparation is based cannot be
confused with the civil responsibilities born of a crime, because there exists
in the latter, whatever each nature, a culpa surrounded with aggravating
aspects which give rise to penal measures that are more or less severe. The
injury caused by a felony or misdemeanor upon civil rights requires
restitutions, reparations, or indemnifications which, like the penalty itself,
affect public order; for this reason, they are ordinarily entrusted to the office
of the prosecuting attorney; and it is clear that if by this means the losses
and damages are repaired, the injured party no longer desires to seek
another relief; but this coincidence of effects does not eliminate the peculiar
nature of civil actions to ask for indemnity.
Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual faults
which are not pertinent and belong to another scope) are derived, according
to article 1902 of the Civil Code, from every act or omission causing losses
and damages in which culpa or negligence intervenes. It is unimportant that
such actions are every day filed before the civil courts without the criminal
courts interfering therewith. Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to 128 of the Penal
Code, bearing in mind the spirit and the social and political purposes of that
Code, develop and regulate the matter of civil responsibilities arising from a
crime, separately from the regime under common law, of culpa which is
known as aquiliana, in accordance with legislative precedent of the Corpus
Juris. It would be unwarranted to make a detailed comparison between the
former provisions and that regarding the obligation to indemnify on account
 of civil culpa; but it is pertinent and necessary to point out to one of such
differences.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in their own way the
civil responsibilities among those who, for different reasons, are guilty of
felony or misdemeanor, make such civil responsibilities applicable to
enterprises and establishments for which the guilty parties render service,
but with subsidiary character, that is to say, according to the wording of the
Penal Code, in default of those who are criminally responsible. In this
regard, the Civil Code does not coincide because article 1903 says: "The
obligation imposed by the next preceding article is demandable, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another
is responsible." Among the persons enumerated are the subordinates and
employees of establishments or enterprises, either for acts during their
service or on the occasion of their functions. It is for this reason that it
happens, and it is so observed in judicial decisions, that the companies or
enterprises, after taking part in the criminal cases because of their subsidiary
civil responsibility by reason of the crime, are sued and
sentenced directly and separately with regard to the obligation, before the
civil courts.
Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation between
punitive justice and the civil courts being a true postulate of our judicial
system, so that they have different fundamental norms in different codes, as
well as different modes of procedure, and inasmuch as the Compaña del
Ferrocarril Cantabrico has abstained from taking part in the criminal case
and has reserved the right to exercise its actions, it seems undeniable that
the action for indemnification for the losses and damages caused to it by the
collision was not sub judice before the Tribunal del Jurado, nor was it the
subject of a sentence, but it remained intact when the decision of March 21
was rendered. Even if the verdict had not been that of acquittal, it has
already been shown that such action had been legitimately reserved till after
the criminal prosecution; but because of the declaration of the non-existence
of the felony and the non-existence of the responsibility arising from the
crime, which was the sole subject matter upon which the Tribunal del
Jurado had jurisdiction, there is greater reason for the civil obligation ex
lege, and it becomes clearer that the action for its enforcement remain intact
and is not res judicata.
Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code, on
which the Spanish Civil Code is largely based and whose provisions on cuasi-
delito or culpa extra-contractual are similar to those of the Spanish Civil Code, says,
referring to article 1384 of the French Civil Code which corresponds to article 1903,
Spanish Civil Code:
The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for
another), without including the author of the act. The action against the
principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a
prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the
sense that it can not be instituted till after the judgment against the author of
the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action for
responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal action. (Laurent,
Principles of French Civil Law, Spanish translation, Vol. 20, pp. 734-735.)
Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429, 430),
declares that the responsibility of the employer is principal and not subsidiary. He
writes:
Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por las
acciones u omisiones de aquellas personas por las que se debe responder,
es subsidiaria? es principal? Para contestar a esta pregunta es necesario
saber, en primer lugar, en que se funda el precepto legal. Es que realmente
se impone una responsabilidad por una falta ajena? Asi parece a primera
vista; pero semejante afirmacion seria contraria a la justicia y a la maxima
universal, segun la que las faltas son personales, y cada uno responde de
aquellas que le son imputables. La responsabilidad de que tratamos se
impone con ocasion de un delito o culpa, pero no por causa de ellos, sino
por causa del causi delito, esto es, de la imprudencia o de la negligencia del
padre, del tutor, del dueño o director del establecimiento, del maestro, etc.
Cuando cualquiera de las personas que enumera el articulo citado (menores
de edad, incapacitados, dependientes, aprendices) causan un daño, la ley
presume que el padre, el tutor, el maestro, etc., han cometido una falta de
negligencia para prevenir o evitar el daño. Esta falta es la que la ley castiga.
No hay, pues, responsabilidad por un hecho ajeno, sino en la apariencia; en
realidad la responsabilidad se exige por un hecho propio. La idea de que
esa responsabilidad sea subsidiaria es, por lo tanto, completamente
inadmisible.
Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or
omissions of those persons for who one is responsible, subsidiary or
principal? In order to answer this question it is necessary to know, in the first
place, on what the legal provision is based. Is it true that there is a
responsibility for the fault of another person? It seems so at first sight; but
such assertion would be contrary to justice and to the universal maxim that
all faults are personal, and that everyone is liable for those faults that can be
imputed to him. The responsibility in question is imposed on the occasion of
a crime or fault, but not because of the same, but because of the cuasi-
delito, that is to say, the imprudence or negligence of the father, guardian,
proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever
anyone of the persons enumerated in the article referred to (minors,
incapacitated persons, employees, apprentices) causes any damage, the
law presumes that the father, guardian, teacher, etc. have committed an act
of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. It is this fault that is
condemned by the law. It is, therefore, only apparent that there is a
responsibility for the act of another; in reality the responsibility exacted is for
one's own act. The idea that such responsibility is subsidiary is, therefore,
completely inadmissible.
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes al Codigo
Civil Español," says in Vol. VII, p. 743:
 Es decir, no responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde solo de su
propia culpa, doctrina del articulo 1902; mas por excepcion, se responde de
la ajena respecto de aquellas personas con las que media algun nexo o
vinculo, que motiva o razona la responsabilidad. Esta responsabilidad, es
directa o es subsidiaria? En el orden penal, el Codigo de esta clase
distingue entre menores e incapacitados y los demas, declarando directa la
primera (articulo 19) y subsidiaria la segunda (articulos 20 y 21); pero en el
orden civil, en el caso del articulo 1903, ha de entenderse directa, por el
tenor del articulo que impone la responsabilidad precisamente "por los actos
de aquellas personas de quienes se deba responder."
That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is
liable only for his own faults, this being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by
exception, one is liable for the acts of those persons with whom there is a
bond or tie which gives rise to the responsibility. Is this responsibility direct
or subsidiary? In the order of the penal law, the Penal Code distinguishes
between minors and incapacitated persons on the one hand, and other
persons on the other, declaring that the responsibility for the former is direct
(article 19), and for the latter, subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); but in the
scheme of the civil law, in the case of article 1903, the responsibility should
be understood as direct, according to the tenor of that articles, for precisely it
imposes responsibility "for the acts of those persons for whom one should be
responsible."
Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has
upheld the principles above set forth: that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a
separate and distinct legal institution, independent from the civil responsibility arising
from criminal liability, and that an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code,
primarily and directly responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.
One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21, 1910. In
that case, Ramon Lafuente died as the result of having been run over by a street car
owned by the "compañia Electric Madrileña de Traccion." The conductor was
prosecuted in a criminal case but he was acquitted. Thereupon, the widow filed a civil
action against the street car company, paying for damages in the amount of 15,000
pesetas. The lower court awarded damages; so the company appealed to the
Supreme Tribunal, alleging violation of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code
because by final judgment the non-existence of fault or negligence had been
declared. The Supreme Court of Spain dismissed the appeal, saying:
Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el equivocado
supuesto de que el Tribunal a quo, al condonar a la compañia Electrica
Madrileña al pago del daño causado con la muerte de Ramon La fuente
Izquierdo, desconoce el valor y efectos juridicos de la sentencia absolutoria
deictada en la causa criminal que se siguio por el mismo hecho, cuando es
lo cierto que de este han conocido las dos jurisdicciones bajo diferentes as
pectos, y como la de lo criminal declrao dentro de los limites de su
competencia que el hecho de que se trata no era constitutivo de delito por
no haber mediado descuido o negligencia graves, lo que no excluye, siendo
este el unico fundamento del fallo absolutorio, el concurso de la culpa o
negligencia no califacadas, fuente de obligaciones civiles segun el articulo
1902 del Codigo, y que alcanzan, segun el 1903, netre otras perosnas, a los
Directores de establecimientos o empresas por los daños causados por sus
dependientes en determinadas condiciones, es manifesto que la de lo civil,
al conocer del mismo hehco baho este ultimo aspecto y al condenar a la
compañia recurrente a la indemnizacion del daño causado por uno de sus
empleados, lejos de infringer los mencionados textos, en relacion con el
articulo 116 de la Ley de Enjuciamiento Criminal, se ha atenido
estrictamente a ellos, sin invadir atribuciones ajenas a su jurisdiccion propia,
ni contrariar en lo mas minimo el fallo recaido en la causa.
Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken
supposition that the trial court, in sentencing the Compañia Madrileña to the
payment of the damage caused by the death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo,
disregards the value and juridical effects of the sentence of acquittal
rendered in the criminal case instituted on account of the same act, when it
is a fact that the two jurisdictions had taken cognizance of the same act in its
different aspects, and as the criminal jurisdiction declared within the limits of
its authority that the act in question did not constitute a felony because there
was no grave carelessness or negligence, and this being the only basis of
acquittal, it does no exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence which is
not qualified, and is a source of civil obligations according to article 1902 of
the Civil Code, affecting, in accordance with article 1903, among other
persons, the managers of establishments or enterprises by reason of the
damages caused by employees under certain conditions, it is manifest
that the civil jurisdiccion in taking cognizance of the same act in this latter
aspect and in ordering the company, appellant herein, to pay an indemnity
for the damage caused by one of its employees, far from violating said legal
provisions, in relation with article 116 of the Law of Criminal
Procedure, strictly followed the same, without invading attributes which are
beyond its own jurisdiction, and without in any way contradicting the decision
in that cause. (Emphasis supplied.)
It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with the
street car company. This is precisely what happens in the present case: the driver,
Fontanilla, has not been sued in a civil action, either alone or with his employer.
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but the
Supreme Tribunal of Spain said that this did not exclude the co-existence of fault or
negligence, which is not qualified, on the part of the conductor, under article 1902 of
the Civil Code. In the present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal
negligence, so that if he had even sued for his civil responsibility arising from the
crime, he would have been held primarily liable for civil damages, and Barredo would
have been held subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing
Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of his own presumed negligence —
which he did not overcome — under article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of
Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising
from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary liability as an
employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take,
and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within their
rights. It might be observed in passing, that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious
and effective method of relief, because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just
been released, and besides, he was probably without property which might be seized
in enforcing any judgment against him for damages.
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the employer
was held liable civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee (the conductor) in
a previous criminal case, with greater reason should Barredo, the employer in the
case at bar, be held liable for damages in a civil suit filed against him because his taxi
driver had been convicted. The degree of negligence of the conductor in the Spanish
case cited was less than that of the taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the former was
acquitted in the previous criminal case while the latter was found guilty of criminal
negligence and was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day
to two years of prision correccional.
(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above quoted.)
In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an action
was brought against a railroad company for damages because the station agent,
employed by the company, had unjustly and fraudulently, refused to deliver certain
articles consigned to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Spain held that this action
was properly under article 1902 of the Civil Code, the court saying:
Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de los hechos
que consigna con relacion a las pruebas del pleito: 1.º, que las expediciones
facturadas por la compañia ferroviaria a la consignacion del actor de las
vasijas vacias que en su demanda relacionan tenian como fin el que este las
devolviera a sus remitentes con vinos y alcoholes; 2.º, que llegadas a su
destino tales mercanias no se quisieron entregar a dicho consignatario por
el jefe de la estacion sin motivo justificado y con intencion dolosa, y 3.º, que
la falta de entrega de estas expediciones al tiempo de reclamarlas el
demandante le originaron daños y perjuicios en cantidad de bastante
importancia como expendedor al por mayor que era de vinos y alcoholes por
las ganancias que dejo de obtener al verse privado de servir los pedidos
que se le habian hecho por los remitentes en los envases:
Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los cuatro
motivos que integran este recurso, porque la demanda inicial del pleito a
que se contrae no contiene accion que nazca del incumplimiento del
contrato de transporte, toda vez que no se funda en el retraso de la llegada
de las mercancias ni de ningun otro vinculo contractual entre las partes
contendientes, careciendo, por tanto, de aplicacion el articulo 371 del
Codigo de Comercio, en que principalmente descansa el fallo recurrido, sino
que se limita a pedir la reparaction de los daños y perjuicios producidos en
el patrimonio del actor por la injustificada y dolosa negativa del porteador a
la entrega de las mercancias a su nombre consignadas, segun lo reconoce
la sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad esta claramente sancionada en el
articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a la Compañia
demandada como ligada con el causante de aquellos por relaciones de
caracter economico y de jurarquia administrativa.
Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in virtue of the facts
which it declares, in relation to the evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice
issued by the railroad company in favor of the plaintiff contemplated that the
empty receptacles referred to in the complaint should be returned to the
consignors with wines and liquors; (2) that when the said merchandise
reached their destination, their delivery to the consignee was refused by the
station agent without justification and with fraudulent intent, and (3) that the
lack of delivery of these goods when they were demanded by the plaintiff
caused him losses and damages of considerable importance, as he was a
wholesale vendor of wines and liquors and he failed to realize the profits
when he was unable to fill the orders sent to him by the consignors of the
receptacles:
Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four
assignments of error, as the original complaint did not contain any cause of
action arising from non-fulfillment of a contract of transportation, because the
action was not based on the delay of the goods nor on any contractual
relation between the parties litigant and, therefore, article 371 of the Code of
Commerce, on which the decision appealed from is based, is not applicable;
but it limits to asking for reparation for losses and damages produced on the
patrimony of the plaintiff on account of the unjustified and fraudulent
refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods consigned to the plaintiff as stated
by the sentence, and the carrier's responsibility is clearly laid down in article
1902 of the Civil Code which binds, in virtue of the next article, the defendant
company, because the latter is connected with the person who caused the
damage by relations of economic character and by administrative hierarchy.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under
both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was
unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal
action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article
1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the
employee who was being sued.
Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.
In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359, 362-365
[year 1907]), the trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff, a laborer of the
defendant, because the latter had negligently failed to repair a tramway in
consequence of which the rails slid off while iron was being transported, and caught
the plaintiff whose leg was broken. This Court held:
It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the
necessary conclusion from these collated laws is that the remedy for injuries
through negligence lies only in a criminal action in which the official
criminally responsible must be made primarily liable and his employer held
only subsidiarily to him. According to this theory the plaintiff should have
procured the arrest of the representative of the company accountable for not
repairing the track, and on his prosecution a suitable fine should have been
imposed, payable primarily by him and secondarily by his employer.
This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this
subject. Article 1093 of the Civil Code makes obligations arising from faults
or negligence not punished by the law, subject to the provisions of Chapter II
of Title XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter reads:
"A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another
when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the
damage so done.
"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is
demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for
those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for
the damages caused by the minors who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx
"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally
liable for the damages caused by their employees in the service of
the branches in which the latter may be employed or in the
performance of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to avoid the damage."
As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be
sufficient to point out that nowhere in our general statutes is the employer
penalized for failure to provide or maintain safe appliances for his workmen.
His obligation therefore is one 'not punished by the laws' and falls under civil
rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the answer may be a broader one.
We should be reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction
of these scientific codes, such as is proposed by the defendant, that would
rob some of these articles of effect, would shut out litigants against their will
from the civil courts, would make the assertion of their rights dependent
upon the selection for prosecution of the proper criminal offender, and
render recovery doubtful by reason of the strict rules of proof prevailing in
criminal actions. Even if these articles had always stood alone, such a
construction would be unnecessary, but clear light is thrown upon their
meaning by the provisions of the Law of Criminal Procedure of Spain (Ley
de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which, though never in actual force in these
Islands, was formerly given a suppletory or explanatory effect. Under article
111 of this law, both classes of action, civil and criminal, might be
prosecuted jointly or separately, but while the penal action was pending the
civil was suspended. According to article 112, the penal action once started,
the civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless it had been waived by
the party injured or been expressly reserved by him for civil proceedings for
the future. If the civil action alone was prosecuted, arising out of a crime that
could be enforced only on private complaint, the penal action thereunder
should be extinguished. These provisions are in harmony with those of
articles 23 and 133 of our Penal Code on the same subject.
An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation of
these articles suffices to show that the civil liability was not intended to be
merged in the criminal nor even to be suspended thereby, except as
expressly provided in the law. Where an individual is civilly liable for a
negligent act or omission, it is not required that the injured party should seek
out a third person criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition
precedent to the enforcement of the civil right.
Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be
regarded as subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his employees
only while they are in process of prosecution, or in so far as they determine
the existence of the criminal act from which liability arises, and his obligation
under the civil law and its enforcement in the civil courts is not barred
thereby unless by the election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal
proceeding had been instituted, growing our of the accident in question, the
provisions of the Penal Code can not affect this action. This construction
renders it unnecessary to finally determine here whether this subsidiary civil
liability in penal actions has survived the laws that fully regulated it or has
been abrogated by the American civil and criminal procedure now in force in
the Philippines.
The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case
appears from the briefs before us to have arisen from the interpretation of
the words of article 1093, "fault or negligence not punished by law," as
applied to the comprehensive definition of offenses in articles 568 and 590 of
the Penal Code. It has been shown that the liability of an employer arising
out of his relation to his employee who is the offender is not to be regarded
as derived from negligence punished by the law, within the meaning of
articles 1902 and 1093. More than this, however, it cannot be said to fall
within the class of acts unpunished by the law, the consequence of which
are regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. The acts to which
these articles are applicable are understood to be those not growing out of
pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already
formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi contract,
then breaches of those duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of
the same code. A typical application of this distinction may be found in the
consequences of a railway accident due to defective machinery supplied by
the employer. His liability to his employee would arise out of the contract of
employment, that to the passengers out of the contract for passage, while
that to the injured bystander would originate in the negligent act itself.
In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 of 9-year-old
child Salvador Bona brought a civil action against Moreta to recover damages
resulting from the death of the child, who had been run over by an automobile driven
and managed by the defendant. The trial court rendered judgment requiring the
defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 as indemnity: This Court in affirming
the judgment, said in part:
If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana
Street, had to stop his auto before crossing Real Street, because he had met
vehicles which were going along the latter street or were coming from the
opposite direction along Solana Street, it is to be believed that, when he
again started to run his auto across said Real Street and to continue its way
along Solana Street northward, he should have adjusted the speed of the
auto which he was operating until he had fully crossed Real Street and had
completely reached a clear way on Solana Street. But, as the child was run
over by the auto precisely at the entrance of Solana Street, this accident
could not have occurred if the auto had been running at a slow speed, aside
from the fact that the defendant, at the moment of crossing Real Street and
entering Solana Street, in a northward direction, could have seen the child in
the act of crossing the latter street from the sidewalk on the right to that on
the left, and if the accident had occurred in such a way that after the
automobile had run over the body of the child, and the child's body had
already been stretched out on the ground, the automobile still moved along a
distance of about 2 meters, this circumstance shows the fact that the
automobile entered Solana Street from Real Street, at a high speed without
the defendant having blown the horn. If these precautions had been taken by
the defendant, the deplorable accident which caused the death of the child
would not have occurred.
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in
a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable
by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence
being a proper subject-matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil
liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for
fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the
separate individually of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has
been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the
wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for
which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising
from his crime.
Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same doctrine.
In Bernal and Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil.,
327, the parents of the five-year-old child, Purificacion Bernal, brought a civil action to
recover damages for the child's death as a result of burns caused by the fault and
negligence of the defendants. On the evening of April 10, 1925, the Good Friday
procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with her daughter
Purificacion Bernal had come from another municipality to attend the same. After the
procession the mother and the daughter with two others were passing along Gran
Capitan Street in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., owned
by defendants J. V. House, when an automobile appeared from the opposite
direction. The little girl, who was slightly ahead of the rest, was so frightened by the
automobile that she turned to run, but unfortunately she fell into the street gutter
where hot water from the electric plant was flowing. The child died that same night
from the burns. The trial courts dismissed the action because of the contributory
negligence of the plaintiffs. But this Court held, on appeal, that there was no
contributory negligence, and allowed the parents P1,000 in damages from J. V.
House who at the time of the tragic occurrence was the holder of the franchise for the
electric plant. This Court said in part:
Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he
nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of the action because of the
contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. It is from this point that a majority of
the court depart from the stand taken by the trial judge. The mother and her
child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on
the evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing
abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the
mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing
and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water.
The doctrine announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf
and Pacific Co. ([1907]), 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code
must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and her
mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest
sense could only result in reduction of the damages.
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article
1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally
prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made
civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded
damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of
the Civil Code.
In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the action was for
damages for the death of the plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been caused by the
negligence of the servant in driving an automobile over the child. It appeared that the
cause of the mishap was a defect in the steering gear. The defendant Leynes had
rented the automobile from the International Garage of Manila, to be used by him in
carrying passengers during the fiesta of Tuy, Batangas. Leynes was ordered by the
lower court to pay P1,000 as damages to the plaintiff. On appeal this Court reversed
the judgment as to Leynes on the ground that he had shown that the exercised the
care of a good father of a family, thus overcoming the presumption of negligence
under article 1903. This Court said:
As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care
and diligence of a good father of a family. He obtained the machine from a
reputable garage and it was, so far as appeared, in good condition. The
workmen were likewise selected from a standard garage, were duly licensed
by the Government in their particular calling, and apparently thoroughly
competent. The machine had been used but a few hours when the accident
occurred and it is clear from the evidence that the defendant had no notice,
either actual or constructive, of the defective condition of the steering gear.
The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:
Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of
negligence, but also provides when the liability shall cease. It says:
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to avoid the damage."
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused
by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the matter or
employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision
over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is juris
tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows
necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in
selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieve from
liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own
negligence and not on that of his servant.
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs. Medel (33
Phil., 37 [year 1915]). In the latter case, the complaint alleged that the defendant's
servant had so negligently driven an automobile, which was operated by defendant as
a public vehicle, that said automobile struck and damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle.
This Court, applying article 1903 and following the rule in Bahia vs. Litonjua and
Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that:
The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the
owner or director of a business or enterprise and the negligent acts are
committed while the servant is engaged in his master's employment as such
owner.
Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes was
Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year 1930). The latter case was an
action for damages brought by Cuison for the death of his seven-year-old son Moises.
The little boy was on his way to school with his sister Marciana. Some large pieces of
lumber fell from a truck and pinned the boy underneath, instantly killing him. Two
youths, Telesforo Binoya and Francisco Bautista, who were working for Ora, an
employee of defendant Norton & Harrison Co., pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide
through reckless negligence and were sentenced accordingly. This Court, applying
articles 1902 and 1903, held:
The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship
of pater familias. This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on
his own negligence and not on that of his servant. (Bahia vs.Litonjua and
Leynes [1915], 30 Phil., 624; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. [1918], 38
Phil., 768.)
In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517 (year
1930) the plaintiff brought an action for damages for the demolition of its wharf, which
had been struck by the steamer Helen C belonging to the defendant. This Court held
(p. 526):
The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf
collapsed was a duly licensed captain, authorized to navigate and direct a
vessel of any tonnage, and that the appellee contracted his services
because of his reputation as a captain, according to F. C. Cadwallader. This
being so, we are of the opinion that the presumption of liability against the
defendant has been overcome by the exercise of the care and diligence of a
good father of a family in selecting Captain Lasa, in accordance with the
doctrines laid down by this court in the cases cited above, and the defendant
is therefore absolved from all liability.
It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability is
negatived by the six cases above set forth. He is, on the authority of these cases,
primarily and directly responsible in damages under article 1903, in relation to article
1902, of the Civil Code.
Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We study
first, City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A collision
between a truck of the City of Manila and a street car of the Manila Electric Co. took
place on June 8, 1925. The truck was damaged in the amount of P1,788.27. Sixto
Eustaquio, the motorman, was prosecuted for the crime of damage to property and
slight injuries through reckless imprudence. He was found guilty and sentenced to
pay a fine of P900, to indemnify the City of Manila for P1,788.27, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable to collect the indemnity from Eustaquio,
the City of Manila filed an action against the Manila Electric Company to obtain
payment, claiming that the defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main defense was
that the defendant had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
the damage. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This Court
held, in part, that this case was governed by the Penal Code, saying:
With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the
conclusion that the provisions of the Penal Code govern. The Penal Code in
easily understandable language authorizes the determination of subsidiary
liability. The Civil Code negatives its application by providing that civil
obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the
provisions of the Penal Code. The conviction of the motorman was a
misdemeanor falling under article 604 of the Penal Code. The act of the
motorman was not a wrongful or negligent act or omission not punishable by
law. Accordingly, the civil obligation connected up with the Penal Code and
not with article 1903 of the Civil Code. In other words, the Penal Code
affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. This is a
case of criminal negligence out of which civil liability arises and not a case of
civil negligence.
 xxx xxx xxx
Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not
to the Civil Code. Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any different
ruling would permit the master to escape scot-free by simply alleging and
proving that the master had exercised all diligence in the selection and
training of its servants to prevent the damage. That would be a good
defense to a strictly civil action, but might or might not be to a civil action
either as a part of or predicated on conviction for a crime or misdemeanor.
(By way of parenthesis, it may be said further that the statements here made
are offered to meet the argument advanced during our deliberations to the
effect that article 0902 of the Civil Code should be disregarded and codal
articles 1093 and 1903 applied.)
It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition, because
the Court of Appeals based its decision in the present case on the defendant's
primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code and not on his subsidiary
liability arising from Fontanilla's criminal negligence. In other words, the case of City
of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, is predicated on an entirely different theory,
which is the subsidiary liability of an employer arising from a criminal act of his
employee, whereas the foundation of the decision of the Court of Appeals in the
present case is the employer's primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
We have already seen that this is a proper and independent remedy.
Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by the
defendant. A motorman in the employ of the Manila Electric Company had been
convicted o homicide by simple negligence and sentenced, among other things, to
pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P1,000. An action was then brought to
enforce the subsidiary liability of the defendant as employer under the Penal Code.
The defendant attempted to show that it had exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family in selecting the motorman, and therefore claimed exemption from civil
liability. But this Court held:
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1)
that the exemption from civil liability established in article 1903 of the Civil
Code for all who have acted with the diligence of a good father of a family, is
not applicable to the subsidiary civil liability provided in article 20 of the
Penal Code.
The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the instant case,
because the action there had for its purpose the enforcement of the defendant's
subsidiary liability under the Penal Code, while in the case at bar, the plaintiff's cause
of action is based on the defendant's primary and direct responsibility under article
1903 of the Civil Code. In fact, the above case destroys the defendant's contention
because that decision illustrates the principle that the employer's primary
responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code is different in character from his
subsidiary liability under the Penal Code.
In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has failed to
recognize the distinction between civil liability arising from a crime, which is governed
by the Penal Code, and the responsibility for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the
Civil Code, and has likewise failed to give the importance to the latter type of civil
action.
The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That case
need not be set forth. Suffice it to say that the question involved was also civil liability
arising from a crime. Hence, it is as inapplicable as the two cases above discussed.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-
delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a
distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the
Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of
the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability
arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the
authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer — in this
case the defendant-petitioner — is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of
the Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be
sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that
have been little understood in the past, it might not be inappropriate to indicate their
foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also
simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer
only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import of article
1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little
scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to
property through any degree of negligence — even the slightest — would have to be
indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a
state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are
loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and
anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter
that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of
the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and
such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved
and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of
criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be
proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and
should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus
ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and
that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be
tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party
obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress.
expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the
defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is
facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure indicated by the defendant is hereby affirmed, with costs against the defendant-petitioner.
wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that
professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyance usually do not have
sufficient means with which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be
required in all cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably
useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and
facilitate the pathways of right and justice.

At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of
employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society.
Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid
injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits
resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is but right that they
should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety
of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach themselves, at least, some for
their weakness, others for their poor selection and all for their negligence." And
according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility
should fall upon the principal or director who could have chosen a careful and prudent
employee, and not upon the injured person who could not exercise such selection
and who used such employee because of his confidence in the principal or director."
(Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the
employer on the principle of representation of the principal by the agent. Thus,
Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons the
employer and employee "vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion
de la del dependiente en la de quien le emplea y utiliza." ("become as one personality
by the merging of the person of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes
him.") All these observations acquire a peculiar force and significance when it comes
to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility
of owners of motor vehicles.

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and
the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence
of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and
efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to
seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting
that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil
Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless
rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy
based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are
asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed
out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for
fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is
high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own
natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime
under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding of
private rights because it re-establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the
further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues,
 FIRST DIVISION
Lauro Tangco, Evangelines husband, together with his six minor children (respondents) filed

with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal case of Homicide
SAFEGUARD SECURITY G.R. NO. 165732
AGENCY, INC., and ADMER against Pajarillo, docketed as Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806 and assigned to Branch
PAJARILLO,
Petitioners, 78. Respondents reserved their right to file a separate civil action in the said criminal case. The
Present:
RTC of Quezon City subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide in its Decision
PANGANIBAN, C.J. dated January 19, 2000.[3] On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed with
YNARES-SANTIAGO, (Working Chairperson)
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, modification as to the penalty in a Decision[4] dated July 31, 2000. Entry of Judgment was
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. made on August 25, 2001.

LAURO TANGCO, VAL TANGCO,

VERN LARRY TANGCO, VAN Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch
LAURO TANGCO, VON LARRIE
TANGCO, VIEN LARI TANGCO 273, Marikina City, a complaint[5] for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting
and VIVIEN LAURIZ TANGCO, Promulgated:
Respondents. December 14, 2006 Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
family to prevent the damage committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual,

moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In their Answer,[6] petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint and

alleged that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Safeguard Security Agency,
supervision of Pajarillo; that Evangelines death was not due to Pajarillos negligence as the
Inc. (Safeguard) and Admer Pajarillo (Pajarillo) assailing the Decision[1] dated July 16,
latter acted only in self-defense. Petitioners set up a compulsory counterclaim for moral
2004 and the Resolution[2] dated October 20, 2004 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in
damages and attorneys fees.
CA-G.R. CV No. 77462.

On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to

Trial thereafter ensued. On January 10, 2003, the RTC rendered its
Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advise of the
Decision,[7] the dispositive portion of which reads:
banks cashier as she would sign a specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
with corresponding permit to carry the same outside her residence, approached security plaintiffs, the heirs of Evangeline Tangco, and against
defendants Admer Pajarillo and Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. ordering
guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm from her bag to said defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the following:
deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun
1. ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND
hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death. FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS (P157,430.00),
as actual damages
2. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as
death indemnity;
 3. ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as moral Agency, Inc.s civil liability in this case is only subsidiary under Art.
damages; 103 of the Revised Penal Code. No pronouncement as to costs.[9]
4. THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P300,000.00), as exemplary damages;
5. THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), as
attorneys fees; and
6. costs of suit. In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the applicable

For lack of merit, defendants counterclaim is hereby provisions are not Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts,
DISMISSED.
but the provisions on civil liability arising from felonies under the Revised Penal Code; that
[8]
SO ORDERED. since Pajarillo had been found guilty of Homicide in a final and executoryjudgment and is said

to be serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he must be adjudged civilly liable under the provisions
The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected Pajarillos claim
of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code since the civil liability recoverable in the criminal
that he merely acted in self-defense. It gave no credence to Pajarillos bare claim that
action is one solely dependent upon conviction, because said liability arises from the offense
Evangeline was seen roaming around the area prior to the shooting incident since Pajarillo had
charged and no other; that this is also the civil liability that is deemed extinguished with the
not made such report to the head office and the police authorities. The RTC further ruled that
extinction of the penal liability with a pronouncement that the fact from which the civil action
being the guard on duty, the situation demanded that he should have exercised proper
might proceed does not exist; that unlike in civil liability arising from quasi-delict, the defense
prudence and necessary care by asking Evangeline for him to ascertain the matter instead of
of diligence of a good father of a family in the employment and supervision of employees is
shooting her instantly; that Pajarillo had already been convicted of Homicide in Criminal Case
inapplicable and irrelevant in civil liabilities based on crimes or ex-delicto; that Article 103 of
No. 0-97-73806; and that he also failed to proffer proof negating liability in the instant case.
the Revised Penal Code provides that the liability of an employer for the civil liability of their

employees is only subsidiary, not joint or solidary.

The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and severally

liable with Pajarillo. It ruled that while it may be conceded that Safeguard had perhaps
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied in a
exercised care in the selection of its employees, particularly of Pajarillo, there was no
Resolution dated October 20, 2004.
sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family

in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguards evidence simply showed that it required its
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari with the following assignment
guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not the supervision contemplated under the
of errors, to wit:
law; that supervision includes not only the issuance of regulations and instructions designed

for the protection of persons and property, for the guidance of their servants and employees,
but also the duty to see to it that such regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On July 16, 2004, the CA issued
its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is
hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Safeguard Security
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding
petitioner Pajarillo liable to respondents for the payment of damages and
other money claims.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when it applied
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code in holding petitioner
Safeguard solidarily [sic] liable with petitioner Pajarillo for the payment of
damages and other money claims.

The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to find that
petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees, hence, should be excused from
any liability.[10]
The issues for resolution are whether (1) Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting
liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the
Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of
the accused.

Evangeline; and (2) Safeguard should be held solidarily liable for the damages awarded to
Respondents reserved the right to file a separate civil action and in fact filed the
respondents.
same on January 14, 1998.
Safeguard insists that the claim for damages by respondents is based

on culpa aquiliana under Article 2176[11] of the Civil Code, in which case, its liability is
The CA found that the source of damages in the instant case must be the crime of
jointly and severally with Pajarillo. However, since it has established that it had exercised due
homicide, for which he had already been found guilty of and serving sentence thereof, thus
diligence in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo, it should be exonerated from civil
must be governed by the Revised Penal Code.
liability.

We do not agree.
We will first resolve whether the CA correctly held that respondents, in filing a

separate civil action against petitioners are limited to the recovery of damages arising from a
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil
crime or delict, in which case the liability of Safeguard as employer under Articles 102 and
liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the
103 of the Revised Penal Code[12] is subsidiary and the defense of due diligence in
Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an
the selection and supervision of employee is not available to it.
act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from

law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and
The CA erred in ruling that the liability of Safeguard is only subsidiary.
34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party

is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action under
The law at the time the complaint for damages was filed is Rule 111 of the 1985
Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender
Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, to wit:
subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot

recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes.[13]

It is important to determine the nature of respondents cause of action. The nature of

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause

of action.[14] The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not

by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the
complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.[15]
The pertinent portions of the complaint read:
7. That Defendant Admer A. Pajarillo was the guard assigned
and posted in the Ecology Bank Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, who was
employed and under employment of Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.
hence there is employer-employee relationship between co-defendants.
The Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. failed to observe the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage to herein plaintiffs.
8. That defendant Admer Pajarillo upon seeing
Evangeline Tangco, who brought her firearm out of her bag, suddenly
without exercising necessary caution/care, and in idiotic manner, with the
use of his shotgun, fired and burst bullets upon Evangeline M. Tangco,
killing her instantly. x x x
xxxx
16. That defendants, being employer and the employee are
jointly and severally liable for the death of Evangeline M. Tangco.[16]
Thus, a reading of respondents complaint shows that the latter are invoking their right to
recover damages against Safeguard for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused
by Pajarillos act of shooting and killing Evangeline under Article 2176, Civil Code which
provides:
ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
The scope of Article 2176 is not limited to acts or omissions resulting from
negligence. In Dulay v. Court of Appeals,[17] we held:
x x x Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers
not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary
and intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77
SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that:
"x x x Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence,"
covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in
character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in
a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty
or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is
actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and
would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111,
refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly
stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law." (Emphasis
supplied)
The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the criminal liability
of Pajarillo in the criminal case but one based on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict which is
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from crime.[18] The source of the obligation
sought to be enforced in the civil case is a quasi-delict not an act or omission punishable by
law.
In Bermudez v. Melencio-Herrera,[19] where the issue involved was whether the civil
action filed by plaintiff-appellants is founded on crime or on quasi-delict, we held:
x x x The trial court treated the case as an action based on a
crime in view of the reservation made by the offended party in the
criminal case (Criminal Case No. 92944), also pending before the court, to
file a separate civil action. Said the trial court:
It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the
assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence in the accident of May 10,
1969 constituted a quasi-delict. The Court cannot accept the validity of
that assumption. In Criminal Case No. 92944 of this Court, plaintiffs had
already appeared as complainants. While that case was pending, the
offended parties reserved the right to institute a separate civil action. If, in
a criminal case, the right to file a separate civil action for damages is
reserved, such civil action is to be based on crime and not on tort. That
was the ruling in Joaquin vs. Aniceto, L-18719, Oct. 31, 1964.
We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial court
is inapplicable to the instant case x x x.
 xxxx
findings of the trial court, affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and may not be
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the
choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime reviewed on appeal. The established exceptions are: (1) when the inference made is
under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi-
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3)
delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the
latter, he may hold the employer solidarily liable for the negligent act of when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the
his employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the
diligence of a good father of the family. judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that appellants reserved their
right in the criminal case to file an independent civil action did not the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of
preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for quasi-
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) when
delict.[20] (Emphasis supplied)
the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if
Although the judgment in the criminal case finding Pajarillo guilty of Homicide is properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (9) when the findings of fact of
already final and executory, such judgment has no relevance or importance to this case.[21] It the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on
would have been entirely different if respondents cause of action was for damages arising record. [24]
from a delict, in which case the CA is correct in finding Safeguard to be only subsidiary liable

pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.[22] A thorough review of the records of the case fails to show any cogent reason for us

to deviate from the factual finding of the trial court and affirmed by the CA that
As clearly shown by the allegations in the complaint, respondents cause of action is petitioner Pajarillo was guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline.
based on quasi-delict. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when the injury is caused by the

negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was Respondents evidence established that Evangelines purpose in going to the bank was
negligence on the part of the master or the employer either in the selection of the servant or to renew her time deposit.[25] On the other hand, Pajarillo claims that Evangeline drew a gun
employee, or in the supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer from her bag and aimed the same at him, thus, acting instinctively, he shot her in self-defense.
under Article 2180 is direct and immediate. Therefore, it is incumbent upon petitioners to

prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and Pajarillo testified that when Evangeline aimed the gun at him at a distance of about
supervision of their employee. one meter or one arms length[26] he stepped backward, loaded the chamber of his gun and shot

her.[27] It is however unimaginable that petitioner Pajarillo could still make such movements if
We must first resolve the issue of whether Pajarillo was negligent in shooting indeed the gun was already pointed at him. Any movement could have prompted Evangeline
Evangeline. to pull the trigger to shoot him.

The issue of negligence is factual in nature. Whether a person is negligent or not is a Petitioner Pajarillo would like to justify his action in shooting Evangeline on
question of fact, which, as a general rule, we cannot pass upon in a petition for review his mere apprehension that Evangeline will stage a bank robbery. However, such claim is
on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law. [23] Generally, factual befuddled by his own testimony. Pajarillo testified that prior to the incident, he saw
Evangeline roaming under the fly over which was about 10 meters away from the bank[28]and gun is a threatening act, regardless of whether or not the gun was intended to be used against

saw her talking to a man thereat;[29] that she left the man under the fly-over, crossed the street petitioner Pajarillo;[33] that the fear that was created in the mind of petitioner Pajarillo as he

and approached the bank. However, except for the bare testimony of Pajarillo, the records do saw Evangeline Tangco drawing a gun from her purse was suddenly very real and the former
not show that indeed Evangeline was seen roaming near the vicinity of the bank and acting merely reacted out of pure self-preservation.[34]

suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. In fact, there is no evidence that Pajarillo called the

attention of his head guard or the banks branch manager regarding his concerns or that he Considering that unlawful aggression on the part of Evangeline is

reported the same to the police authorities whose outpost is just about 15 meters from the absent, Pajarillos claim of self-defense cannot be accepted specially when such claim was

bank. uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence other than his testimony which was even

Moreover, if Evangeline was already roaming the vicinity of the bank, she could doubtful. Pajarillos apprehension that Evangeline will shoot him to stage a bank robbery has

have already apprised herself that Pajarillo, who was posted outside the bank, was armed with no basis at all. It is therefore clear that the alleged threat of bank robbery was just a figment

a shotgun; that there were two guards inside the bank[30] manning the entrance door. Thus, it is of Pajarillos imagination which caused such unfounded unlawful aggression on his part.

quite incredible that if she really had a companion, she would leave him under the fly-over

which is 10 meters far from the bank and stage a bank robbery all by herself without a back- Petitioners argue that Evangeline was guilty of contributory negligence. Although

up. In fact, she would have known, after surveying the area, thataiming her gun she was a licensed firearm holder, she had no business bringing the gun in such establishment

at Pajarillo would not ensure entrance to the bank as there were guards manning the entrance where people would react instinctively upon seeing the gun; that had Evangeline been prudent,

door. she could have warned Pajarillo before drawing the gun and did not conduct herself with

suspicion by roaming outside the vicinity of the bank; that she should not have held the gun
Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible with the nozzle pointed at Pajarillo who mistook the act as hold up or robbery.

witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of

mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of We are not persuaded.

human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience.

Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside judicial As we have earlier held, Pajarillo failed to substantiate his claim that Evangeline

cognizance.[31] was seen roaming outside the vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting

incident. Evangelines death was merely due to Pajarillos negligence in shooting her on his

That Evangeline just wanted to deposit her gun before entering the bank and was imagined threat that Evangeline will rob the bank.

actually in the act of pulling her gun from her bag when petitioner Pajarillo recklessly shot
her, finds support from the contentions raised in petitioners petition for review where they Safeguard contends that it cannot be jointly held liable since it had adequately

argued that when Evangeline approached the bank, she was seen pulling a gun from inside her shown that it had exercised the diligence required in the selection and supervision of its

bag and petitioner Pajarillo who was suddenly beset by fear and perceived the act as a employees. It claims that it had required the guards to undergo the necessary training and to

dangerous threat, shot and killed the deceased out of pure instinct; [32] that the act of drawing a submit the requisite qualifications and credentials which even the RTC found to have been
complied with; that the RTC erroneously found that it did not exercise the diligence required In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them

in the supervision of its employee. Safeguard further claims that it conducts monitoring of the as to their qualifications, experience, and service records.[35] On the other hand, due diligence

activities of its personnel, wherein supervisors are assigned to routinely check the activities of in the supervision of employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for
the security guards which include among others, whether or not they are in their proper post the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection

and with proper equipment, as well as regular evaluations of the employees performances; that of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees

the fact that Pajarillo loaded his firearm contrary to Safeguards operating procedure is not and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as

sufficient basis to say that Safeguard had failed its duty of proper supervision; that it was may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and

likewise error to say that Safeguard was negligent in seeing to it that the procedures and beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of

policies were not properly implemented by reason of one unfortunate event. consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting

through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory

We are not convinced. functions.[36] To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious liability,

employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.

Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is We agree with the RTCs finding that Safeguard had exercised the diligence in the
demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of
selection of Pajarillo since the record shows that Pajarillo underwent a psychological
persons for whom one is responsible.
and neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by the St. Martin de Porres Center where no
xxxx
psychoses ideations were noted, submitted a certification on the Pre-licensing training course
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned for security guards, as well as police and NBI clearances.
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

xxxx The RTC did not err in ruling that Safeguard fell short of the diligence required in

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the the supervision of its employee, particularly Pajarillo. In this case, while Safeguard presented
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage. Capt. James Camero, its Director for Operations, who testified on the issuance of company

rules and regulations, such as the Guidelines of Guards Who Will Be Assigned To

As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for Banks,[37] Weapons Training,[38] Safeguard Training Center Marksmanship Training Lesson

the quasi-delict committed by the former. Safeguard is presumed to be negligent in the Plan,[39] Disciplinary/Corrective Sanctions,[40] it had also been established

selection and supervision of his employee by operation of law. This presumption may be during Cameros cross-examination that Pajarillo was not aware of such rules and

overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and the regulations.[41] Notwithstanding Cameros clarification on his re-direct examination that these

diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee. company rules and regulations are lesson plans as a basis of guidelines of the instructors

during classroom instructions and not necessary to give students copy of the same, [42] the

records do not show that Pajarillo had attended such classroom instructions.
 The records also failed to show that there was adequate training and continuous demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. Moral

evaluation of the security guards performance. Pajarillo had only attended an in-service damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements

training on March 1, 1997 conducted by Toyota Sta. Rosa, his first assignment as security that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of the
guard of Safeguard, which was in collaboration with Safeguard. It was established that the defendants culpable action. Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the

concept of such training was purely on security of equipments to be guarded and protection of spiritual status quo ante; thus it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. [45] The

the life of the employees.[43] intensity of the pain experienced by the relatives of the victim is proportionate to the intensity

of affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the

It had not been established that after Pajarillos training in Toyota, Safeguard had offender.[46]

ever conducted further training of Pajarillo when he was later assigned to guard a bank which

has a different nature of business with that of Toyota. In fact, Pajarillo testified that being on In this case, respondents testified as to their moral suffering caused by Evangelines

duty in a bank is different from being on duty in a factory since a bank is a very sensitive death was so sudden causing respondent Lauro to lose a wife and a mother to six children who

area.[44] were all minors at the time of her death. In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,[47] we awarded one

million pesos as moral damages to the heirs of a seventeen-year-old girl who was

Moreover, considering his reactions to Evangelines act of just depositing her firearm murdered. In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[48] we likewise awarded

for safekeeping, i.e., of immediately shooting her, confirms that there was no training or the amount of one million pesos as moral damages to the parents of a third year high school

seminar given on how to handle bank clients and on human psychology. student and who was also their youngest child who died in a vehicular accident since the girls

death left a void in their lives. Hence, we hold that the respondents are also entitled to the
Furthermore, while Safeguard would like to show that there were inspectors who go amount of one million pesos as Evangelines death left a void in the lives of her husband and

around the bank two times a day to see the daily performance of the security guards assigned minor children as they were deprived of her love and care by her untimely demise.

therein, there was no record ever presented of such daily inspections. In fact, if there was

really such inspection made, the alleged suspicious act of Evangeline could have been taken We likewise uphold the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P300,000.00.

noticed and reported. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or

correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory

Turning now to the award of damages, we find that the award of actual damages in damages.[49] It is awarded as a deterrent to socially deleterious actions. In quasi-delict,

the amount P157,430.00 which were the expenses incurred by respondents in connection with exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. [50]

the burial of Evangeline were supported by receipts. The award of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the death of Evangeline is likewise in order. Pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney's fees may be recovered when,

as in the instant case, exemplary damages are awarded. Hence, we affirm the award of

As to the award of moral damages, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00.

spouse, legitimate children and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may
 WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated July 16,

2004 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the civil liability

of petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. is SOLIDARY and PRIMARY under Article
2180 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000]
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and
HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., being the Judge of the RTC, Branch
139, Makati City, respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
seeks to review and set aside the Order dated January 28, 1999 issued by Judge
Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 in
Special Civil Case No. 98-3056, entitled "Meynardo Beltran vs. People of the
Philippines and Hon. Judge Alden Cervantes of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati
city, Branch 61." The said Order denied petitioners prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge Cervantes from proceeding with the trial of
Criminal Case No. 236176, a concubinage case against petitioner on the ground that
the pending petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by petitioner against his
wife constitutes a prejudicial question.
The antecedent facts of the case are undisputed:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16,
1973 at the Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City. [1]
On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four
children,[2] petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code before Branch 87 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-
30192.[3]
In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was
petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named
Milagros Salting.[4] Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for
concubinage[5] under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner and his
paramour before the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in a Resolution dated
September 16, 1997, found probable cause and ordered the filing of an
Information[6] against them. The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 236176, was
filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61.
On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of
Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for
declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination
of the criminal case. Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the foregoing motion in
the Order[7] dated August 31, 1998. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said
Order of denial was likewise denied in an Order dated December 9, 1998.
In view of the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings in the concubinage case,
petitioner went to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 on certiorari,
questioning the Orders dated August 31, 1998 and December 9, 1998 issued by
Judge Cervantes and praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. [8] In
an Order[9] dated January 28, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Makati denied the
petition for certiorari. Said Court subsequently issued another Order[10] dated
February 23, 1999, denying his motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his
petition.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.
Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his
marriage based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a
prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of the criminal case for
concubinage filed against him by his wife.
Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two conflicting decisions might
result from the civil case for annulment of marriage and the criminal case for
concubinage. In the civil case, the trial court might declare the marriage as valid by
dismissing petitioner's complaint but in the criminal case, the trial court might acquit
petitioner because the evidence shows that his marriage is void on ground of
psychological incapacity. Petitioner submits that the possible conflict of the courts'
ruling regarding petitioner's marriage can be avoided, if the criminal case will be
suspended, until the court rules on the validity of marriage; that if petitioner's marriage
is declared void by reason of psychological incapacity then by reason of the
arguments submitted in the subject petition, his marriage has never existed; and that,
accordingly, petitioner could not be convicted in the criminal case because he was
never before a married man.
Petitioner's contentions are untenable.
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. [11]
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a
prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the
final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case
involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also
that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt
or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
"The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void."
In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals,[12] this Court ruled that the import of said Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a
provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage.
declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
evidence is acceptable. The pertinent portions of said Decision read:
SO ORDERED.
"xxx Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a
party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for
liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property
between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody
and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters'
presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity.
These needs not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a
court declaring such previous marriage void."

So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not
present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in
the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment
declaring his marriage void.

With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of

concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that
even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not
a defense.

Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Reloval[13] cited in Donato vs.
Luna[14] where this Court held that:

"xxx Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the
ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the
outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when
the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and
so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy."

Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to
judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he
who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court
therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial
ABUNDIO MERCED, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CLEMENTINO V. DIEZ, ETC. ET AL., respondents.
Pedro A. Bandoquillo for petitioner.
Fulvio Pelaez for respondents.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari with prohibition to prohibit the judge presiding
the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, Hon. Clementino V. Diez, from
proceeding further in the Criminal Case No. V-6520, entitled People of the Philippines
vs. Abundio Merced until after final termination of Civil Case No. R-5387, for the
annulment of the marriage of petitioner Abundio Merced with Elizabeth Ceasar, also
pending in same court.
The record disclose the following proceedings in the court a quo: On January 30,
1958, Abundio Merced filed a complaint for annulment of his second marriage with
Elizabeth Ceasar. The complaint is docketed as Civil Case No. R-5387. The
complaint alleges that defendant Elizabeth Ceasar and her relatives forced,
threatened and intimated him into signing an affidavit to the effect that he and
defendant had been living together as husband and wife for over five years, which is
not true; that this affidavit was used by defendant in securing their marriage of
exceptional character, without the need for marriage license; that he was again
forced, threatened and intimated by defendant and her relatives into entering the
marriage with her on August 21, 1957 before Municipal Judge Medardo A. Conde;
that immediately after the celebration of the marriage plaintiff left defendant and never
lived with her; that the defendant wrote him on October 29, 1957, admitting that he
was forced into the marriage and asking him to go to Cebu to have the marriage
annulled, but he refused to go for fear he may be forced into living with the defendant.
Merced prays for annulment of the marriage and for moral damages in the amount of
P2,000. On March 3, 1958, Elizabeth Ceasar filed her answer to the complaint. In her
answer, she denies the material allegations of the complaint and avers as affirmative
defenses that neither she nor her relatives know of plaintiff's previous marriage to
Eufrocina Tan; that sometime in July, 1957, plaintiff asked her mother to intercede on
their behalf to secure her father's consent to their marriage as plaintiff could not
concentrate on his studies without marrying Elizabeth, but that her mother advised
him to finish his studies first; that sometime in April, 1957, defendant learned that
plaintiff was engaged to marry Eufrocina Tan, but plaintiff, upon being confronted with
such discovery, showed her a letter which he wrote breaking off his engagement with
Tan. As a counterclaim defendant asks P50,000 as moral damages for the deceit,
fraud and insidious machinations committed upon her by plaintiff.
On February 19, 1958, after had filed Civil Case No. R-5387 defendant Elizabeth
Ceasar filed a criminal complaint for bigamy 39 3 against plaintiff Abundio Merced
with the office of the City Fiscal of Cebu. On April 7, 1958 the Assistant City Fiscal
filed Criminal Case No. V-6520, charging Merced with bigamy for the second
marriage. The information reads.
The undersigned Assistant Fiscal of City of Cebu accuses Abundio Merced
of the crime of bigamy, committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of August, 1957, in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused Abundio Merced, being previously united in lawful marriage with
Eufrocina Tan, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved
did then and there wilfully unlawfully, feloniously contract a second marriage
with Elizabeth Ceasar.
Contrary to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. (Annex "2".)
Abundio Merced filed a motion to hold to trial of said criminal case in abeyance until
final termination of Civil Case No. R- 5387. Reason alleged for the motion is that the
Civil Action involves facts which if proved will determine the innocence of the
accused. After an opposition thereto was filed by the assistant provincial fiscal, the
court granted the motion. However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by the fiscal,
the order was set aside and another entered denying the motion of accused for
suspension of the criminal proceedings, which last order is the one sough herein to
be annulled. The court held in its last order that inasmuch as by virtue of the decision
of the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Mendoza, 95 Phil., 50 Off. Gaz. [10],
4767, judicial declaration of nullity of a second and bigamous marriage is not
necessary, there is no need in this case to decide the nullity of the second marriage,
or to determine and declare the existence of the grounds for annulling the same, but
that said grounds should be used as a defense in the criminal action. A motion to
reconsider the second order of the court having been denied, petition herein was
filed.
When the petition for certiorari with prohibition was filed, the petitioner secured from
this Court a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin respondent judge from proceeding
further in the criminal case.
Before this Court the sole question raised is whether an action to annul the second
marriage is a prejudicial question in a prosecution for bigamy.
The definition and the elements of a prejudicial question have been set forth by us as
follows:
Prejudicial question has been defined to be that which arises in a case, the
resolution of which (question) is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in
said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another Tribunal
(Cuestion prejudicial, es 3o 3 la que surge en un pleito o causa cuya
resolucion sean antecedente logico de la cuestion-objeto del pleito o causa
y cuyo conocimiento corresponda a los Tribunales de otro orden o
jurisdiccion. — Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 228). The prejudicial
question must be determinative of the case before the court; this is its first
element. Jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal;
this is the second element. In an action for bigamy for example, if the
accused claims that the first marriage is null and void and the right to decide
 such validity is vested in another tribunal, the civil action for nullity must be
first decided before the action for bigamy can proceed, hence, the validity of
the first marriage is a prejudicial question. (People vs. Aragon, 94 Phil., 357;
50 Off. Gaz., No. 10, 4863).
In order that a person may be held guilty of the crime of bigamy, the second and
subsequent marriage must have all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it
not for the subsistence of the first marriage. This was the ruling of this Court in People
vs. Dumpo, 62 Phil., 246, where we said:
It is an essential element of the crime of bigamy that the alleged second
marriage, having all the essential requisites, would be valid were it not for
the subsistence of the first marriage. It appearing that the marriage alleged
to have been contracted by the accused with Sabdapal, her former marriage
with Hassan being undissolved, can not be considered as such, according to
Mohameddan rites, there is no justification to hold her guilty of the crime
charged in the information. (People vs. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246).
One of the essential elements of a valid marriage is that the consent thereto of the
contracting parties must be freely and voluntarily given. Without the element of
consent a marriage would be illegal and void. (Section 29, Act No. 3613, otherwise
known as the Marriage Law.) But the question of invalidity can not ordinarily be
decided in the criminal action for bigamy but in a civil action for annulment. Since the
validity of the second marriage, subject of the action for bigamy, cannot be
determined in the criminal case and since prosecution for bigamy does not lie unless
the elements of the second marriage appear to exist, it is necessary that a decision in
a civil action to the effect that the second marriage contains all the essentials of a
marriage must first be secured.
We have, therefore, in the case at bar, the issue of the validity of the second
marriage, which must be determined before hand in the civil action, before the
criminal action can proceed. We have a situation where the issue of the validity of the
second marriage can be determined or must be determined in the civil action before
the criminal action for bigamy can be prosecuted. The question of the validity of the
second marriage is, therefore, a prejudicial question, because determination of the
validity of the second marriage is determinable in the civil action and must precede
the criminal action for bigamy.
Spanish jurisprudence, from which the principle of prejudicial question has been
taken, requires that the essential element determinative of the criminal action must be
cognizable by another court. This requirement of a different court is demanded in
Spanish jurisprudence because Spanish courts are divided according to their
jurisdictions, some courts being exclusively of civil jurisdiction, others of criminal
jurisdiction. In the Philippines, where our courts are vested with both civil and criminal
jurisdiction, the principle of prejudicial question is to be applied even if there is only
one court before which the civil action and the criminal action are to be litigated. But
in this case the court when exercising its jurisdiction over the civil action for the
annulment of marriage is considered as a court distinct and different from itself when
trying the criminal action for bigamy.
Our conclusion that the determination of the validity of the marriage in the civil action
for annulment is a prejudicial question, insofar as the criminal action for bigamy is
concerned, is supported by Mr. Justice Moran in his dissenting opinion in De Leon vs.
Mabanag, 70 Phil., 207 thus:
La regla general es que cuando hay una cuestion civil y otra criminal sobre
un mismo delito u ofensa, la segunda debe verse antes que la primera, por
la razon de que las formas de un juicio criminal son las mas a proposito para
la averiguacion de un delito, y no las de un juicio civil. Esta regla tiene, sin
embargo, una excepcion, y es la que se refiere a una cueston civil
prejudicial. Una cuestion civil es de caracter prejudicial y debe resolverse
antes que una cuestion criminal, cuando versa sonbre un hecho distinto y
separado del delito, pero tan intimamente ligado a el que determina la
culpabilidad o inocencia del acusado. Por ejemplo, una accion criminal por
bigamia.
The majority decision in said case of De Leon vs. Mabanag also sustains the theory
that when a civil action is pending in court, in which a validity of a document claimed
to be false and fictitious is in issue, the fiscal may not prosecute the person who
allegedly executed the false document because the issue of the validity of the
instrument is sub judice and the prosecuting officer should be ordered to suspend the
criminal action until the prejudicial question has been finally determined. Thus the
Court said"
Hablando en terminos generales la facultad del Fiscal y su deber perseguir
los delitos no deben ser controlados ni coartados por los tribunales; pero no
hay duda que esa facultad puede ser regulada para que no se abuse de
ella. Cuando un miembro del Ministerio Fiscal se desvia de la ley y
entorpece la recta administracion de justicia procesando a una persona por
hechos constituvos de delito que se encuentran sub-judice y de los cuales
se propone una cuestion prejudicial administrativa, es deber de los
tribunales llamarle la atencion y obligarle que suspenda toda accion criminal
hasta que la cuestion prejudicial administrativa se haya decidido finalmente.
(De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil., 207.)
The case of People vs. Mendoza, supra, upon which the trial court and the
respondents rely, presents a different sets of facts from the case at bar. So is the
ruling therein as contained in the syllabus. In the case of People vs. Mendoza,
Mendoza was charged with and convicted of bigamy for a marriage with one
Carmencita Panlilio, contracted in August, 1949. Mendoza was married for the first
time in 1946 with Josefa de Asis; then married for the second time with Olga Lema;
and then married for the third time to Panlilio in 1949. On February 2, 1943, Josefa de
Asis died. The court citing the provisions of Article 29 of the marriage law, held that
the second marriage of the appellant Mendoza with Lema was operation of law null
and void, because at the time of the second marriage in 1941, appellant's former wife
Josefa de Asis was still living. This marriage of appellant with Lema being null and
void at the time the appellant contracted the said marriage, the impediment of the
second marriage did not exist. Hence the appellant was acquitted of bigamy for the
1949 marriage because his previous marriage with Lema in 1941, by operation of law,
was void ab initio.
In the case at bar, in order that the petitioner be held guilty of the crime of bigamy, the
marriage which she contracted for the second time with Elizabeth Ceasar, must first
be declared valid. But its validity has been questioned in the civil action. This civil
action must be decided before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed.

For the foregoing considerations, the petition for the issuance of a writ
of certiorari and prohibition is hereby granted. The order of the court denying the
petition of the herein petitioner to prohibit the Fiscal from prosecuting the case for
bigamy, criminal case no. V-6520, entitled People vs. Abundio Merced, is hereby set
aside and the preliminary injunction issued by this court to that effect is hereby made
permanent. So Ordered.
LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA;
PAZ B. ABAYAN, respondents.
Leopoldo P. Dela Rosa for petitioner.
Emiterio C. Manibog for private respondent.
City Fiscal of Manila for public respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question for
the resolution of the Court is whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending
before the Court of First Itance of Manila should be suspended in view of a civil case
for annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question. The respondent judge
ruled in the negative. We sustain him.
The pertinent facts as set forth in the records follow. On January 23, 1979, the City
Fiscal of Manila acting thru Assistant City Fiscal Amado N. Cantor filed an information
for bigamy against herein petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato with the Court of First
Instance of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 43554 and assigned to Branch
XXXII of said court. The information was filed based on the complaint of private
respondent Paz B. Abayan.
On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment, private respondent filed
with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a civil action for declaration
of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978, which
action was docketed as Civil Case No. E-02627. Said civil case was based on the
ground that private respondent consented to entering into the marriage, which was
petitioner Donato's second one, since she had no previous knowledge that petitioner
was already married to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping on June 30, 1978. Petitioner
Donato's answer in the civil case for nullity interposed the defense that his second
marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force,
violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by private respondent to
obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the
subsequent or second marriage, petitioner and private respondent had lived together
and deported themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for a
period of at least five years as evidenced by a joint affidavit executed by them on
September 26, 1978, for which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed
with pursuant to Article 76 of the New Civil Code pertaining to marriages of
exceptional character.
Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 43554, petitioner
filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of said case contending that Civil Case No.
E-02627 seeking the annulment of his second marriage filed by private respondent
raises a prejudicial question which must first be determined or decided before the
criminal case can proceed.
In an order dated April 7, 1980. Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied the motion to suspend
the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 43554 for bigamy. Respondent judge's basis for
denial is the ruling laid down in the case of Landicho vs. Relova. 1 The order further
directed that the proceedings in the criminal case can proceed as scheduled.
A motion for reconsideration was flied by herein petitioner thru counsel citing as one
of his grounds for suspension of proceedings the ruling laid down by this Court in the
case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito 2 which was a much later case than that cited by
respondent judge in his order of denial.
The motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied in an order
dated April 14, 1980, for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction.
A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the
resolution of which question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case,
and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. 3 It is one based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal
action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of
the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined. 4 A prejudicial question usually comes into play in a
situation where a civil action and a criminal action may proceed, because howsoever
the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of
the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case.5
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be
noted that the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon
the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or
innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the
herein private respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the
second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit.
Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should have been
declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation allegedly
employed against him by private respondent only sometime later when he was
required to answer the civil action for anulment of the second marriage. The doctrine
elucidated upon by the case of Landicho vs. Relova 6 may be applied to the present
case. Said case states that:
The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered
into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that
 "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as to
warrant the suspension of the case. In order that the case of
annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the
bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that the
petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was
obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that
his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be
the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. The situation in
the present case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner
was indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two
marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be
indisputable. And it was the second spouse, not the petitioner who
filed the action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and
intimidation. And it was only on June 15, 1963, that petitioner, as
defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the
first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared
null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation.
Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground
alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the outcome
of the case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to
the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of
the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as
there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage
exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy. The lower court therefore, has not
abused much less gravely abused, its discretion in failing to
suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner.
In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the
second marriage has been obtained by the use of threats, force and intimidation.
Petitioner calls the attention of this Court to the fact that the case of De la Cruz vs.
Ejercito is a later case and as such it should be the one applied to the case at bar.
We cannot agree. The situation in the case at bar is markedly different. In the
aforecited case it was accused Milagros dela Cruz who was charged with bigamy for
having contracted a second marriage while a previous one existed. Likewise,
Milagros dela Cruz was also the one who filed an action for annulment on the ground
of duress, as contra-distinguished from the present case wherein it was private
respondent Paz B. Abayan, petitioner's second wife, who filed a complaint for
annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained
through deceit since she was not aware that petitioner's marriage was still subsisting.
Moreover, in De la Cruz, a judgment was already rendered in the civil case that the
second marriage of De la Cruz was null and void, thus determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In the present case, there is as yet no
such judgment in the civil case.
Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner Donato cannot
apply the rule on prejudicial questions since a case for annulment of marriage can be
considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it
is proved that the petitioner's consent to such marriage was obtained by means of
duress, violence and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent
marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the basis for
conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar.
Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the
prosecution of the criminal case. The records reveal that prior to petitioner's second
marriage on September 26, 1978, he had been living with private respondent Paz B.
Abayan as husband and wife for more than five years without the benefit of marriage.
Thus, petitioner's averments that his consent was obtained by private respondent
through force, violence, intimidation and undue influence in entering a subsequent
marriage is belled by the fact that both petitioner and private respondent executed an
affidavit which stated that they had lived together as husband and wife without benefit
of marriage for five years, one month and one day until their marital union was
formally ratified by the second marriage and that it was private respondent who
eventually filed the civil action for nullity.
Another event which militates against petitioner's contentions is the fact hat it was
only when Civil Case No. E-02627 was filed on September 28, 1979, or more than the
lapse of one year from the solemnization of the second marriage that petitioner came
up with the story that his consent to the marriage was secured through the use of
force, violence, intimidation and undue influence. Petitioner also continued to live with
private respondent until November 1978, when the latter left their abode upon
learning that Leonilo Donato was already previously married.
In the light of the preceding factual circumstances, it can be seen that the respondent
Judge did not err in his earlier order. There is no pivotal issue that must be pre-
emptively resolved in Civil Case No. E-02627 before proceedings in the criminal
action for bigamy can be undertaken.
Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial
issued by the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 161075 July 15, 2013
RAFAEL JOSE-CONSING, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party does not
raise a prejudicial question to stop the proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution
of the defendant for estafa through falsification. This is because the result of the
independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused.
The Case
On appeal is the amended decision promulgated on August 18, 2003, 1 whereby the
Court of Appeals (CA) granted the writ of certiorari upon petition by the State in C.A.-
G.R. No. 71252 entitled People v. Han. Winlove M Dumayas, Presiding Judge,
Branch 59, Regional Trial Court, Makati City and Rafael Consing, Jr., and set aside
the assailed order issued on November 26, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 59, in Makati City deferring the arraignment of petitioner in Criminal Case No.
00-120 entitled People v. Rafael Consing, Jr. upon his motion on the ground of the
existence of a prejudicial question in the civil cases pending between him and the
complainant in the trial courts in Pasig City and Makati City.
Antecedents
Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz
(de la Cruz) various loans totaling ₱18,000,000.00 from Unicapital Inc. (Unicapital).
The loans were secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on a parcel of land
(property) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-687599 of the Registry
of Deeds for the Province of Cavite registered under the name of de la Cruz.2 In
accordance with its option to purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to
purchase one-half of the property for a total consideration of ₱21,221,500.00.
Payment was effected by off-setting the amounts due to
Unicapital under the promissory notes of de la Cruz and Consing in the amount of
₱18,000,000.00 and paying an additional amount of ₱3,145,946.50. The other half of
the property was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc. (Plus Builders), a joint venture
partner of Unicapital.3
Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the property, they learned that the
title to the property was really TCT No. 114708 in the names of Po Willie Yu and
Juanito Tan Teng, the parties from whom the property had been allegedly acquired by
de la Cruz. TCT No. 687599 held by De la Cruz appeared to be spurious.4
On its part, Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount of ₱41,377,851.48 as
of April 19, 1999 that had been paid to and received by de la Cruz and Consing, but
the latter ignored the demands.5
On July 22, 1999, Consing filed Civil Case No. 1759 in the Pasig City Regional Trial
Court (RTC) (Pasig civil case) for injunctive relief, thereby seeking to enjoin Unicapital
from proceeding against him for the collection of the ₱41,377,851.48 on the ground
that he had acted as a mere agent of his mother.
On the same date, Unicapital initiated a criminal complaint for estafa through
falsification of public document against Consing and de la Cruz in the Makati City
Prosecutor’s Office.6
On August 6, 1999, Unicapital sued Consing in the RTC in Makati City (Civil Case No.
99-1418) for the recovery of a sum of money and damages, with an application for a
writ of preliminary attachment (Makati civil case).7
On January 27, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City filed against
Consing and De la Cruz an information for estafa through falsification of public
document in the RTC in Makati City (Criminal Case No. 00-120), which was assigned
to Branch 60 (Makati criminal case).8
On February 15, 2001, Consing moved to defer his arraignment in the Makati criminal
case on the ground of existence of a prejudicial question due to the pendency of the
Pasig and Makati civil cases. On September 25, 2001, Consing reiterated his motion
for deferment of his arraignment, citing the additional ground of pendency of CA-G.R.
SP No. 63712 in the CA. On November 19, 2001, the Prosecution opposed the
motion.9
On November 26, 2001, the RTC issued an order suspending the proceedings in the
Makati criminal case on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question, and on
March 18, 2001, the RTC denied the Prosecution’s motion for reconsideration.10
The State thus assailed in the CA the last two orders of the RTC in the Makati
criminal case via petition for certiorari (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252).
On May 20, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
71252,11 dismissing the petition for certiorari and upholding the RTC’s questioned
orders, explaining:
Is the resolution of the Pasig civil case prejudicial to the Cavite and Makati criminal
cases?
We hold that it is. The resolution of the issue in the Pasig case, i.e. whether or not
private respondent may be held liable in the questioned transaction, will determine
the guilt or innocence of private respondent Consing in both the Cavite and Makati
criminal cases.
The analysis and comparison of the Pasig civil case, Makati criminal case, Makati civil
case and Cavite criminal case show that: (1) the parties are identical; (2) the
transactions in controversy are identical; (3) the Transfer Certificate of Titles (TCT)
involved are identical; (4) the questioned Deeds of Sale/Mortgage are identical; (5)
the dates in question are identical; and (6) the issue of private respondent’s culpability
for the questioned transactions is identical in all the proceedings.
As discussed earlier, not only was the issue raised in the Pasig civil case identical to
or intimately related to the criminal cases in Cavite and Makati. The similarities also
extend to the parties in the cases and the TCT and Deed of Sale/ Mortgage involved
in the questioned transactions.
The respondent Judge, in ordering the suspension of the arraignment of private
respondent in the Makati case, in view of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, where Unicapital
was not a party thereto, did so pursuant to its mandatory power to take judicial notice
of an official act of another judicial authority. It was also a better legal tack to prevent
multiplicity of action, to which our legal system abhors.
Applying the Tuanda ruling, the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 may be validly
invoked to suspend private respondent’s arraignment in the Makati City criminal case,
notwithstanding the fact that CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 was an offshoot, merely, in the
Cavite criminal case.12
In the meanwhile, on October 13, 1999, Plus Builders commenced its own suit for
damages against Consing (Civil Case No. 99-95381) in the RTC in Manila (Manila
civil case).13
On January 21, 2000, an information for estafa through falsification of public
document was filed against Consing and De la Cruz in the RTC in Imus, Cavite,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 7668-00 and assigned to Branch 21 (Cavite criminal
case). Consing filed a motion to defer the arraignment on the ground of the existence
of a prejudicial question, i.e., the pendency of the Pasig and Manila civil cases. On
January 27, 2000, however, the RTC handling the Cavite criminal case denied
Consing’s motion. Later on, it also denied his motion for reconsideration. Thereafter,
Consing commenced in the CA a special civil action for certiorari with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction
(C.A.-G.R. SP No. 63712), seeking to enjoin his arraignment and trial in the Cavite
criminal case. The CA granted the TRO on March 19, 2001, and later promulgated its
decision on May 31, 2001, granting Consing’ petition for certiorari and setting aside
the January 27, 2000 order of the RTC, and permanently enjoining the RTC from
proceeding with the arraignment and trial until the Pasig and Manila civil cases had
been finally decided.
Not satisfied, the State assailed the decision of the CA in this Court (G.R. No.
148193), praying for the reversal of the May 31, 2001 decision of the CA. On January
16, 2003, the Court granted the petition for review in G.R. No. 148193, and reversed
and set aside the May 31, 2001 decision of the CA,14 viz:
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of
the proceedings in the criminal case (the Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil
Case No. SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive Relief is whether or not
respondent (Consing) merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz;
while in Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for Damages and
Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his mother are liable to pay
damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot.
Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction
involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal
liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public
documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA
1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in
the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document.
Likewise, the resolution of PBI’s right to be paid damages and the purchase price of
the lot in question will not be determinative of the culpability of the respondent in the
criminal case for even if PBI is held entitled to the return of the purchase price plus
damages, it does not ipso facto follow that respondent should be held guilty of estafa
through falsification of public document. Stated differently, a ruling of the court in the
civil case that PBI should not be paid the purchase price plus damages will not
necessarily absolve respondent of liability in the criminal case where his guilt may still
be established under penal laws as determined by other evidence.
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can,
according to law, proceed independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
Thus, in Rojas v. People, the petitioner was accused in a criminal case for violation of
Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code, for executing a new chattel mortgage on
personal property in favor of another party without consent of the previous
mortgagee. Thereafter, the offended party filed a civil case for termination of
management contract, one of the causes of action of which consisted of petitioner
having executed a chattel mortgage while the previous chattel mortgage was still valid
and subsisting. Petitioner moved that the arraignment and trial of the criminal case be
held in abeyance on the ground that the civil case was a prejudicial question, the
resolution of which was necessary before the criminal proceedings could proceed.
The trial court denied the suspension of the criminal case on the ground that no
prejudicial question exist. We affirmed the order of the trial court and ruled that:
… the resolution of the liability of the defendant in the civil case on the eleventh cause
of action based on the fraudulent misrepresentation that the chattel mortgage the
defendant executed in favor of the said CMS Estate, Inc. on February 20, 1957, that
his D-6 "Caterpillar" Tractor with Serial No. 9-U-6565 was "free from all liens and
encumbrances" will not determine the criminal liability of the accused in the said
Criminal Case No. 56042 for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 319 of the Revised
Penal Code. . . . (i) That, even granting for the sake of argument, a prejudicial
question is involved in this case, the fact remains that both the crime charged in the
information in the criminal case and the eleventh cause of action in the civil case are
based upon fraud, hence both the civil and criminal cases could proceed
independently of the other pursuant to Article 33 of the new Civil Code which
provides: "In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence." (j) That, therefore, the act of respondent judge in issuing the orders
referred to in the instant petition was not made with "grave abuse of discretion."
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on
account of the alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the
disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As
such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the
criminal case at bar.15
Turning back to the Makati criminal case, the State moved for the reconsideration of
the adverse decision of the CA, citing the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, supra, to the
effect that the Pasig and Manila civil cases did not present a prejudicial question that
justified the suspension of the proceedings in the Cavite criminal case, and claiming
that under the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, the Pasig and Makati civil cases did not
raise a prejudicial question that would cause the suspension of the Makati criminal
case.
In his opposition to the State’s motion for reconsideration, Consing contended that the
ruling in G.R. No. 148193 was not binding because G.R. No. 148193 involved Plus
Builders, which was different from Unicapital, the complainant in the Makati criminal
case. He added that the decision in G.R. No. 148193 did not yet become final and
executory, and could still be reversed at any time, and thus should not control as a
precedent to be relied upon; and that he had acted as an innocent attorney-in-fact for
his mother, and should not be held personally liable under a contract that had
involved property belonging to his mother as his principal.
On August 18, 2003, the CA amended its decision, reversing itself. It relied upon the
ruling in G.R. No. 148193, and held thusly:
CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 is similar with the case at bench. The transactions in
controversy, the documents involved; the issue of the respondent’s culpability for the
questioned transactions are all identical in all the proceedings; and it deals with the
same parties with the exception of private complainant Unicapital.
However, the Supreme Court, upon review of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, People of the
Philippines vs. Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. (G.R. No. 148193, January 16, 2003) held
that "Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and attachment on account of alleged
fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to Plus
Builders, Inc. is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As
such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the
criminal case at bar." In view of the aforementioned decision of the Supreme Court,
We are thus amending Our May 20, 2003 decision.
WHEREFORE, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The Orders
dated November 26, 2001 and March 18, 2002 issued by the respondent Judge are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is hereby ordered to
proceed with the hearing of Criminal Case No. 00-120 with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.16
Consing filed a motion for reconsideration,17 but the CA denied the motion through
the second assailed resolution of December 11, 2003.18
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Issue
Petitioner reiterates his contention that the decision in G.R. No. 148193 was not
controlling in relation to C.A.-G.R. No. 71252, which involved Plus Builders, not
Unicapital, the complainant in Criminal Case No. 00-120. He posits that in arriving at
its amended decision, the CA did not consider the pendency of the Makati civil case
(Civil Case No. 99-1418), which raised a prejudicial question, considering that the
resolution of such civil action would include the issue of whether he had falsified a
certificate of title or had willfully defrauded Unicapital, the resolution of either of which
would determine his guilt or innocence in Criminal Case No. 00-120.
In its comment,19 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that Unicapital
brought the Makati civil case as an independent civil action intended to exact civil
liability separately from Criminal Case No. 00-120 in a manner fully authorized under
Section 1(a) and Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.20 It argues that the CA
correctly took cognizance of the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, holding in its challenged
amended decision that the Makati civil case, just like the Manila civil case, was an
independent civil action instituted by virtue of Article 33 of the Civil Code; that the
Makati civil case did not raise a prejudicial question that justified the suspension of
Criminal Case No. 00-120; and that as finally settled in G.R. No. 148193, the Pasig
civil case did not also raise any prejudicial question, because the sole issue thereat
was whether Consing, as the mere agent of his mother, had any obligation or liability
toward Unicapital.
In his reply,21 Consing submits that the Pasig civil case that he filed and Unicapital’s
Makati civil case were not intended to delay the resolution of Criminal Case No. 00-
120, nor to pre-empt such resolution; and that such civil cases could be validly
considered determinative of whether a prejudicial question existed to warrant the
suspension of Criminal Case No. 00-120.
Did the CA err in reversing itself on the issue of the existence of a prejudicial question
that warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the Makati criminal case?
Ruling
The petition for review on certiorari is absolutely meritless.
Consing has hereby deliberately chosen to ignore the firm holding in the ruling in G.R.
No. 148193 to the effect that the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 00-120 could not
be suspended because the Makati civil case was an independent civil action, while
the Pasig civil case raised no prejudicial question. That was wrong for him to do
considering that the ruling fully applied to him due to the similarity between his case
with Plus Builders and his case with Unicapital.
A perusal of Unicapital’s complaint in the Makati civil case reveals that the action was
predicated on fraud. This was apparent from the allegations of Unicapital in its
complaint to the effect that Consing and de la Cruz had acted in a "wanton,
fraudulent, oppressive, or malevolent manner in offering as security and later object
of sale, a property which they do not own, and foisting to the public a spurious
title."22 As such, the action was one that could proceed independently of Criminal
Case No. 00-120 pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, which states as follows:
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
As far as the Pasig civil case is concerned, the issue of Consing’s being a mere agent
of his mother who should not be criminally liable for having so acted due to the
property involved having belonged to his mother as principal has also been settled in
G.R. No. 148193, to wit:
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of
the proceedings in the criminal case (the Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil
Case No. SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive Relief is whether or not
respondent (Consing) merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz;
while in Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for Damages and
Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his mother are liable to pay
damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot.
Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction
involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal
liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public
documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA
1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in
the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document. 25 (Words in
parentheses supplied; bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)

It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the amended decision promulgated on August
may be independently instituted pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not 18, 2003; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of a criminal
case.23 This was precisely the Court’s thrust in G.R. No. 148193, thus: SO ORDERED.

Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can,
according to law, proceed independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.

xxxx

In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on
account of the alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the
disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As
such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the
criminal case at bar.24

Contrary to Consing’s stance, it was not improper for the CA to apply the ruling in
G.R. No. 148193 to his case with Unicapital, for, although the Manila and Makati civil
cases involved different complainants (i.e., Plus Builders and Unicapital), the civil
actions Plus Builders and Unicapital had separately instituted against him were
undeniably of similar mold, i.e., they were both based on fraud, and were thus
covered by Article 33 of the Civil Code. Clearly, the Makati criminal case could not be
suspended pending the resolution of the Makati civil case that Unicapital had filed.
JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, G.R. No. 172060 7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity
Petitioner,
of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - PERALTA, On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the
BERSAMIN,*
ABAD, and RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question.Petitioner asserted
VILLARAMA, JR.,** JJ.
that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide,
MARIA CHRYSANTINE
L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE Promulgated: the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. September 13, 2010 him before the RTC Quezon City.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

The Decision of the Trial Court

DECISION
The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 2005[3] holding that the pendency of
CARPIO, J.: the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of

the criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon City held that the issues in Criminal Case No.
The Case Q-04-130415 are the injuries sustained by respondent and whether the case could be tried

even if the validity of petitioners marriage with respondent is in question. The RTC Quezon
Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals, City ruled:
promulgated on 20 March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.

The Antecedent Facts WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings On the [Ground] of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question is,
for lack of merit, DENIED.

The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals decision: SO ORDERED.[4]

On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order,[5] the RTC Quezon
for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case
City denied the motion.
No. Q-04-130415, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to

Branch 223 (RTC Quezon City).

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court
and 22 August 2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon City.
of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-
 The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of
Appeals ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the
offender commenced the commission of the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did
not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for annulment of
marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner
and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because
prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide
had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required for the charge
of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still
subsisting.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals decision.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is
a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide
against petitioner.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Civil Case Must be Instituted
Before the Criminal Case
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure[6] provides:
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal
action. In this case, the Information[7] for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It
was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the
Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial
on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7
February 2005.[8] Respondents petition[9] in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November
2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after
the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7,
Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed
subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question
in Criminal Case for Parricide
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the
suspension of the criminal action.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and
there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the
criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. [10] A
prejudicial question is defined as:
x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent
of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from
 the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is
appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those
concerned x x x. First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.[11]
liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court

ruled in Tenebro that [t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of
marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.[18] In fact, the Court
parricide,[12] which punishes any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
declared in that case that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse. [13] The
psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are
relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from
concerned.[19]
murder[14] or homicide.[15] However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or

intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship
In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. The trial
between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the resolution of the issue in Civil Case
accused.
No. 04-7392 is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Decision of the
whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since
SO ORDERED.
petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts

of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless,

did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioners will.[16] At the time of the

commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent

dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will

have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the

marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled,

petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the

alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.

We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals[17] that the judicial

declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to

 [G.R. No. 125646. September 10, 1999]
CITY OF PASIG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTION
and THE MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF
RIZAL, respondents.
[G.R. No. 128663. September 10, 1999]
MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS CITY OF PASIG, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are two (2) petitions which both question the propriety of the suspension of
plebiscite proceedings pending the resolution of the issue of boundary disputes between the
Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig.
G.R. No. 125646 involves the proposed Barangay Karangalan while G.R. No. 128663
involves the proposed Barangay Napico. The City of Pasig claims these areas as part of its
jurisdiction/territory while the Municipality of Cainta claims that these proposed barangays
encroached upon areas within its own jurisdiction/territory.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be
segregated from its mother Barangays Manggahan and Dela Paz, City of Pasig, and to be
converted and separated into a distinct barangay to be known as Barangay Karangalan, the
City Council of Pasig passed and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating
Barangay Karangalan in Pasig City.[1] Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was
thereafter set for June 22, 1996.
Meanwhile, on September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No. 52,
Series of 1996, creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City.[2] Plebiscite for this purpose was set
for March 15, 1997.
Immediately upon learning of such Ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta moved to
suspend or cancel the respective plebiscites scheduled, and filed Petitions with the
Commission on Elections (hereinafter referred to as COMELEC) on June 19, 1996 (UND No.
96-016)[3] and March 12, 1997 (UND No. 97-002), respectively. In both Petitions, the
Municipality of Cainta called the attention of the COMELEC to a pending case before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, for settlement of boundary
dispute.[4] According to the Municipality of Cainta, the proposed barangays involve areas
included in the boundary dispute subject of said pending case; hence, the scheduled plebiscites
should be suspended or cancelled until after the said case shall have been finally decided by
the court.
In UND No. 96-016, the COMELEC accepted the position of the Municipality of Cainta
and ordered the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan to be held in abeyance until
after the court has settled with finality the boundary dispute involving the two
municipalities.[5] Hence, the filing of G.R. No. 125646 by the City of Pasig.
The COMELEC, however, ruled differently in UND No. 97-002, dismissing the Petition
for being moot in view of the holding of the plebiscite as scheduled on March 15, 1997 where
the creation of Barangay Napico was ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast
therein.[6] Hence, the filing of G.R. No. 128663 by the Municipality of Cainta.
The issue before us is whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of
Barangays Karangalan and Napico should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending
boundary dispute between the two local governments.
To begin with, we agree with the position of the COMELEC that Civil Case No. 94-
3006 involving the boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig
presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided before plebiscites for the creation
of the proposed barangays may be held.
The City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same
contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not come into play where both cases are
civil, as in the instant case. While this may be the general rule, this Court has held in Vidad v.
RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42,[7] that, in the interest of good order, we can very well suspend
action on one case pending the final outcome of another case closely interrelated or linked to
the first.
In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the areas covered by the
proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico are within its territory, it can not deny that
portions of the same area are included in the boundary dispute case pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo. Surely, whether the areas in controversy shall be decided as
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the City of Pasig has material
bearing to the creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico. Indeed, a requisite
for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes
and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries.[8] Precisely because territorial
jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved
with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be an
exercise in futility. Not only that, we would be paving the way for potentially ultra vires acts
of such barangays. Indeed, in Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,[9] we held that
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of
government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the
limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise
powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits,
its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government
units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will
prejudice the peoples welfare.
Moreover, considering the expenses entailed in the holding of plebiscites, it is far more
prudent to hold in abeyance the conduct of the same, pending final determination of whether
or not the entire area of the proposed barangays are truly within the territorial jurisdiction of
the City of Pasig.
Neither do we agree that merely because a plebiscite had already been held in the case of
the proposed Barangay Napico, the petition of the Municipality of Cainta has already been
rendered moot and academic. The issues raised by the Municipality of Cainta in its petition
before the COMELEC against the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of Barangay
Napico are still pending determination before the Antipolo Regional Trial Court.
In Tan v. Commission on Elections,[10] we struck down the moot and academic argument
as follows --

Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-compliance with
constitutional requisites, the fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new province
proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case before Us cannot truly be viewed as already
moot and academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly proclaimed province which
petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to be inquired into by this
Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its creation, the commission of that error
should not provide the very excuse for perpetration of such wrong. For this Court to yield to
the respondents urging that, as there has been fait accompli, then this Court should passively
accept and accede to the prevailing situation is an unacceptable suggestion. Dismissal of the
instant petition, as respondents so propose is a proposition fraught with mischief. Respondents
submission will create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court decline now to perform its
duty of interpreting and indicating what the law is and should be, this might tempt again those
who strut about in the corridors of power to recklessly and with ulterior motives, create,
merge, divide and/or alter the boundaries of political subdivisions, either brazenly or
stealthily, confident that this Court will abstain from entertaining future challenges to their
acts if they manage to bring about a fait accompli.

Therefore, the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in

abeyance pending final resolution of the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the
Municipality of Cainta by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City. In the same vein, the
plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico, Pasig City,
should be annulled and set aside.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
1. The Petition of the City of Pasig in G.R. No. 125646 is DISMISSED for lack of
merit; while
2. The Petition of the Municipality of Cainta in G.R. No. 128663 is
GRANTED. The COMELEC Order in UND No. 97-002, dated March 21,
1997, is SET ASIDE and the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the
creation of Barangay Napico in the City of Pasig is declared null and
void. Plebiscite on the same is ordered held in abeyance until after the courts
settle with finality the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the
Municipality of Cainta, in Civil Case No. 94-300.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970
CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA
CABILIN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.
Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellants.
Godardo Jacinto for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte
(Judge Onofre Sison Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case No. 1590, dismissing a complaint for
support and damages, and another order denying amendment of the same pleading.
The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:
Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below. In
her complaint it was averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and
confidential relations; that defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal
intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and without her consent; that as
a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had
to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's
fees.
Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the
complaint did not allege that the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial
judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse,
plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled
that no amendment was allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action.
Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.
We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived child, although as
yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as
explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore,
has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose
paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is
only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive
donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in
his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the
testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the testator Article 854,
Civil Code).
ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be
accepted by those persons who would legally represent them if they were
already born.
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will
or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but
the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution
shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of 'representation.
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that
support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support
to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that
nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the
conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds
further "provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article" (i.e.,
that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb). This
proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it
were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective. Manresa, in
his Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the corresponding Article 29 of the Spanish Civil Code,
clearly points this out:
Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son simples expectativas, ni
aun en el sentido tecnico que la moderna doctrina da a esta figura
juridica sino que constituyen un caso de los propiamente Ilamados
'derechos en estado de pendenci'; el nacimiento del sujeto en las
condiciones previstas por el art. 30, no determina el nacimiento de
aquellos derechos (que ya existian de antemano), sino que se trata de
un hecho que tiene efectos declarativos. (1 Manresa, Op. cit., page
271)
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force
a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case)
constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim
compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:
ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....
Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself
had a cause of action for damages under the terms of the complaint; and the order
dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs
against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.
A.P. Salvador for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a
woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from physician
who caused the same.
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent
Oscar Lazo, the of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician.
Convinced of the merits of the complaint upon the evidence adduced, the trial court
rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant Geluz, ordering the
latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.
On appeal, Court of Appeals, in a special division of five, sustained the award by a
majority vote of three justices as against two, who rendered a separate dissenting
opinion.
The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:
Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time
in 1948 — through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by
her present husband before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal
her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she
had herself aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff,
she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission
on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself
aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later,
she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her
sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the
defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the
three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-
month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine
currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan,
campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor
gave his consent, to the abortion.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and
award of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum
of P3,000.06 upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. This we believe to be error, for the said article, in fixing a
minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an
unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. Under the system of our Civil
Code, "la criatura abortiva no alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en
consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera,
"Diccionario de Derecho Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and
obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death
pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such
damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it
received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In
fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was
extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place
from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from
capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived
child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that
same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition
that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the
condition specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute
that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held
that recovery can not had for the death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway
Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs. Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242; and
numerous cases collated in the editorial note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639).
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But
such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the
injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity.
Because the parents can not expect either help, support or services from an unborn
child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the
normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of
distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental
expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the
circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us, both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award of moral
damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of
his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was
unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The lower court
expressly found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it,
that the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities are that he
was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he
appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and
secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third
abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and
criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed
at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00
damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the
circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.

The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:

It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels

outraged by the abortion which his wife has deliberately sought at the hands
of a physician would be highminded rather than mercenary; and that his
primary concern would be to see to it that the medical profession was
purged of an unworthy member rather than turn his wife's indiscretion to
personal profit, and with that idea in mind to press either the administrative
or the criminal cases he had filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in
favor of a civil action for damages of which not only he, but also his wife,
would be the beneficiaries.

It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's

wife, without medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible
act, that can not be too severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of
her husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not
justify an award of damage that, under the circumstances on record, have no factual
or legal basis.

The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed.
Without costs.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board of
Medical Examiners for their information and such investigation and action against the
appellee Antonio Geluz as the facts may warrant.
CONTINENTAL STEEL G.R. No. 182836
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE
Petitioner,
Present:
xxxx
- versus -
CARPIO, J.,
Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVEThe Company agrees to
HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY Chairperson,
grant a bereavement leave with pay to any employee in case of death of
ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAO CHICO-NAZARIO,
the employees legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children, brothers
and NAGKAKAISANG VELASCO, JR.,
and sisters) based on the following:
MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL NACHURA, and
CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF PERALTA, JJ.
2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days
UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR
EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS 2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days
(NMCSC-SUPER), Promulgated:
Respondents.
xxxx

ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS

October 13, 2009
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
xxxx

Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCEThe

Company shall grant death and accidental insurance to the employee or his
DECISION
family in the following manner:

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the Decision[1] dated 27 February 2008 and the Resolution[2] dated 9 May
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution[3] dated 20
November 2007 of respondent Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao
(Montao) granting bereavement leave and other death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano
(Hortillano), grounded on the death of his unborn child.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
xxxx
4.3 DEPENDENTSEleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos
(Php11,550.00) in case of death of the employees legitimate dependents
(parents, spouse, and children). In case the employee is single, this benefit
covers the legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only with proper legal
document to be presented (e.g. death certificate).[4]
The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn child. Hortillanos wife,
Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the
38thweek of pregnancy.[5] According to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006,
the female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental
insufficiency.[6]

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation
(Continental Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel
Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms
(Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death
and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union, which reads:
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but
denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and
accident insurance.[7]
Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillanos claims for
bereavement and other death benefits, the Union resorted to the grievance machinery provided
in the CBA. Despite the series of conferences held, the parties still failed to settle their
dispute,[8] prompting the Union to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE),
National Capital Region (NCR).[9] In a Submission Agreement dated 9 October 2006,
the Union and Continental Steel submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole issue of whether
Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to Article X,
Section 2
and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.[10] The parties mutually chose Atty. Montao, an
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.[11]
When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling the
dispute, the parties proceeded to submit their respective Position Papers, [12] Replies,[13]and
Rejoinders[14] to Atty. Montao.
The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death
benefits pursuant to the CBA. The Union maintained that Article X, Section 2 and Article
XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first
been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death
could be covered by the CBA death benefits. The Union cited cases wherein employees of
MKK Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister
companies of Continental Steel, in similar situations as Hortillano were able to receive death
benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs.
The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an
employee of Mayer Steel, whose wife also prematurely delivered a fetus, which had already
died prior to the delivery. Dugan was able to receive paternity leave, bereavement leave, and
voluntary contribution under the CBA between his union and Mayer Steel. [15]Dugans child
was only 24 weeks in the womb and died before labor, as opposed to Hortillanos child who
was already 37-38 weeks in the womb and only died during labor.
The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are located in
the same compound as Continental Steel; and the representatives of MKK Steel and Mayer
Steel who signed the CBA with their respective employees unions were the same as the
representatives of Continental Steel who signed the existing CBA with the Union.
Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all
doubts in labor legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety of and
decent living for the laborer.
On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA
did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed
that there are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status
as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillanos case.Continental Steel, relying
on Articles 40, 41 and 42[16] of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil personality
could die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical
personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus
that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the
term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A
fetus that was delivered dead could not be considered a dependent, since it never needed any
support, nor did it ever acquire the right to be supported.
Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and
unambiguous. Since neither of the parties qualified the terms used in the CBA, the legally
accepted definitions thereof were deemed automatically accepted by both parties. The failure
of the Union to have unborn child included in the definition of dependent, as used in the CBA
the death of whom would have qualified the parent-employee for bereavement leave and other
death benefits bound the Union to the legally accepted definition of the latter term.
Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees of its
sister companies, MKK Steel and Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union, were irrelevant and
incompetent evidence, given the separate and distinct personalities of the companies. Neither
could the Union sustain its claim that the grant of bereavement leave and other death benefits
to the parent-employee for the loss of an unborn child constituted company practice.
On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montao, the appointed Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator, issued a Resolution[17] ruling that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with
pay and death benefits.
Atty. Montao identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus:

This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of bereavement
leave with pay by the covered employees as provided under Article X,
Section 2 of the parties CBA, three (3) indispensable elements must be
present: (1) there is death; (2) such death must be of employees dependent;
and (3) such dependent must be legitimate.
On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and
accident insurance as provided under Article XVIII, Section 4, paragraph
(4.3) of the parties CBA, four (4) indispensable elements must be present:
(a) there is death; (b) such death must be of employees dependent; (c) such
dependent must be legitimate; and (d) proper legal document to be
presented.[18]
Atty. Montao found that there was no dispute that the death of an employees
legitimate dependent occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the
very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could
not have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else,
specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the fetus was already a dependent, although he/she
died during the labor or delivery. There was also no question that Hortillano and his wife were
lawfully married, making their dependent, unborn child, legitimate.
In the end, Atty. Montao decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby
rendered ORDERING [herein petitioner Continental Steel] to pay Rolando
P. Hortillano the amount of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine
Pesos (P4,939.00), representing his bereavement leave pay and the amount
of Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00) representing
death benefits, or a total amount of P16,489.00
The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with
the herein dispositions.
Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review
on Certiorari,[19] under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
101697.
Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montao erred in granting Hortillanos claims for
bereavement leave with pay and other death benefits because no death of an
employees dependent had occurred. The death of a fetus, at whatever stage of pregnancy, was
excluded from the coverage of the CBA since what was contemplated by the CBA was the
death of a legal person, and not that of a fetus, which did not acquire any juridical
personality. Continental Steel pointed out that its contention was bolstered by the fact that the
term death was qualified by the phrase legitimate dependent. It asserted that the status of a
child could only be determined upon said childs birth, otherwise, no such appellation can be
had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Hortillanos entitlement to bereavement leave and
other death benefits under the CBA were lacking.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty.
Montaos Resolution dated 20 November 2007. The appellate court interpreted death to mean
as follows:
[Herein petitioner Continental Steels] exposition on the legal
sense in which the term death is used in the CBA fails to impress the
Court, and the same is irrelevant for ascertaining the purpose, which the
grant of bereavement leave and death benefits thereunder, is intended to
serve. While there is no arguing with [Continental Steel] that the
acquisition of civil personality of a child or fetus is conditioned on being
born alive upon delivery, it does not follow that such event of premature
delivery of a fetus could never be contemplated as a death as to be covered
by the CBA provision, undoubtedly an event causing loss and grief to the
affected employee, with whom the dead fetus stands in a legitimate
relation. [Continental Steel] has proposed a narrow and technical
significance to the term death of a legitimate dependent as condition for
granting bereavement leave and death benefits under the CBA. Following
[Continental Steels] theory, there can be no experience of death to speak
of. The Court, however, does not share this view. A dead fetus simply
cannot be equated with anything less than loss of human life, especially
for the expectant parents. In this light, bereavement leave and death
benefits are meant to assuage the employee and the latters immediate
family, extend to them solace and support, rather than an act conferring
legal status or personality upon the unborn child. [Continental Steels]
insistence that the certificate of fetal death is for statistical purposes only
sadly misses this crucial point.[20]
Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution
 dated November 20, 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan
S. Montao is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel].[21]
In a Resolution[22] dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for
Reconsideration[23] of Continental Steel.
Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA is clear and
unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death should be applied. Only one with
juridical personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired a juridical personality.
We are not persuaded.
As Atty. Montao identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article X, Section 2 of
the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child,
brother, or sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate relations of the dependent to the
employee. The requisites for death and accident insurance under Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of
the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, who could be a parent, spouse,
or child of a married employee; or a parent, brother, or sister of a single employee; and (4)
presentation of the proper legal document to prove such death, e.g., death certificate.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel that the
provisions of the CBA are clear and unambiguous, its fundamental argument for denying
Hortillanos claim for bereavement leave and other death benefits rests on the purportedly
proper interpretation of the terms death and dependent as used in the CBA. If the provisions of
the CBA are indeed clear and unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to the interpretation
or construction of the same. Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted that neither
management nor the Union sought to define the pertinent terms for bereavement leave and
other death benefits during the negotiation of the CBA.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the
legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires
personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered
born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of
the Civil Code on natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code,
the very first of the general provisions on civil personality, which reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject
of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only
through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal
effect, is acquired and may be lost.
We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical
capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a question before us whether
the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that
were passed on to or assumed by the childs parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other
death benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the
latters death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition
of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be
extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical
personality could die.
And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life.[24] Life is not synonymous with civil
personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die.Even a child
inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the
unborn from conception,[25] that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If
the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered,
qualifies as death.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental
Steel itself defines, a dependent is one who relies on another for support; one not able to exist
or sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone else. Under said general
definition,[26] even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillanos child could not
have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother,
Hortillanos wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question
that the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or the parent,
brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child
dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil personality, as
Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in its more
general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mothers womb.
The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent childs status in relation to
his/her parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya,[27] we have expounded on who is a legitimate
child, viz:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and
lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly
no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family
Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: Children conceived or born
during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. (Emphasis ours.)
Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,[28] we identified an illegitimate child to be as
follows:
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate
children have been eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are only
two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally
adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All
children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate,
unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)
It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence,
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case,
it was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that their child was
conceived during said marriage, hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception.
Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth element
entitling him to death and accident insurance under the CBA, i.e., presentation of the death
certificate of his unborn child.
Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death benefits under
the CBA, Hortillanos claims for the same should have been granted by Continental Steel.
We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to
give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered
the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents grief and sense of loss arising from
the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but
died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died
subsequently.
Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other death
benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time and again,
the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law
or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor. [29] In the same way,
the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. In Marcopper Mining v.
National Labor Relations Commission,[30] we pronounced:
Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor
Arbiter in the assailed decision that "when the pendulum of judgment
swings to and fro and the forces are equal on both sides, the same must be
stilled in favor of labor." While petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in
the interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, it
insists that what is involved-here is the amended CBA which is essentially
a contract between private persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is the
avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our Constitution, to accord
utmost protection and justice to labor, a policy, we are, likewise, sworn to
uphold.
In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v.
NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we categorically stated that:
When conflicting interests of labor and
capital are to be weighed on the scales of social
justice, the heavier influence of the latter should be
counter-balanced by sympathy and compassion the
law must accord the underprivileged worker.
Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v.
NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)], we declared:
Any doubt concerning the rights of labor
should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social
justice policy.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February
2008 and Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697,
affirming the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty.
Allan S. Montao, which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other
death benefits in the amounts of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00)
and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the
death of his unborn child, are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel Manufacturing
Corporation.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
On October 20, 1948, FELICIANO CATALAN (Feliciano) was discharged from

CORAZON CATALAN, G.R. No. 159567 active military service. The Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs
LIBRADA CATALAN-LIM,
EULOGIO CATALAN, found that he was unfit to render military service due to his schizophrenic reaction, catatonic
MILA CATALAN-MILAN,
type, which incapacitates him because of flattening of mood and affect, preoccupation with
ZENAIDA CATALAN, Present:
ALEX CATALAN, DAISY worries, withdrawal, and sparce (sic) and pointless speech. [1]
CATALAN, FLORIDA PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CATALAN and GEMMA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CATALAN, Heirs of the late CORONA,
FELICIANO CATALAN, AZCUNA, and On September 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo.[2]
Petitioners, GARCIA, JJ.
- versus -
Promulgated: On June 16, 1951, a document was executed, titled Absolute Deed of

JOSE BASA, MANUEL BASA, Donation,[3] wherein Feliciano allegedly donated to his sister MERCEDES
LAURETA BASA, DELIA BASA,
JESUS BASA and ROSALINDA CATALAN(Mercedes) one-half of the real property described, viz:
BASA, Heirs of the late MERCEDES
CATALAN, A parcel of land located at Barangay Basing, Binmaley,
Respondents. July 31, 2007 Pangasinan. Bounded on the North by heirs of Felipe Basa; on the South
by Barrio Road; On the East by heirs of Segundo Catalan; and on the West
x------------------------------------------------x
by Roman Basa. Containing an area of Eight Hundred One (801) square
meters, more or less.

DECISION
The donation was registered with the Register of Deeds. The Bureau of Internal

Revenue then cancelled Tax Declaration No. 2876, and, in lieu thereof, issued Tax Declaration
PUNO, C.J.:
No. 18080[4] to Mercedes for the 400.50 square meters donated to her. The remaining half of

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of the property remained in Felicianos name under Tax Declaration No. 18081. [5]

Court of the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 66073, which affirmed the
On December 11, 1953, Peoples Bank and Trust Company filed Special Proceedings
judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Lingayen, Pangasinan, in Civil Case No.
No. 4563[6] before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan to declare Feliciano
17666, dismissing the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of
incompetent. On December 22, 1953, the trial court issued its Order for Adjudication of
Possession and Ownership, and damages.
Incompetency for Appointing Guardian for the Estate and Fixing Allowance[7] of

Feliciano. The following day, the trial court appointed Peoples Bank and Trust Company as
The facts, which are undisputed by the parties, follow:
Felicianos guardian.[8] Peoples Bank and Trust Company has been subsequently renamed, and

is presently known as the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI).

 On November 22, 1978, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lots 1 and 3 of their
property, registered under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 18920, to their son Eulogio
Catalan.[9]
On March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the property in issue in favor of her children
Delia and Jesus Basa.[10] The Deed of Absolute Sale was registered with the Register of Deeds
of Pangasinan on February 20, 1992, and Tax Declaration No. 12911 was issued in the name
of respondents.[11]
On June 24, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 2 of the
aforementioned property registered under OCT No. 18920 to their children Alex Catalan,
Librada Catalan and Zenaida Catalan. On February 14, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo
donated Lot 4 (Plan Psu-215956) of the same OCT No. 18920 to Eulogio and Florida
Catalan.[12]
On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Felicianos guardian, filed a case for Declaration of
Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership,[13] as well as damages against
the herein respondents. BPI alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation to Mercedes was
void ab initio, as Feliciano never donated the property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred
that even if Feliciano had truly intended to give the property to her, the donation would still be
void, as he was not of sound mind and was therefore incapable of giving valid consent. Thus,
it claimed that if the Deed of Absolute Donation was void ab initio, the subsequent Deed of
Absolute Sale to Delia and Jesus Basa should likewise be nullified, for Mercedes Catalan had
no right to sell the property to anyone. BPI raised doubts about the authenticity of the deed of
sale, saying that its registration long after the death of Mercedes Catalan indicated fraud. Thus,
BPI sought remuneration for incurred damages and litigation expenses.
On August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away. The original complaint was amended to
substitute his heirs in lieu of BPI as complainants in Civil Case No. 17666.
On December 7, 1999, the trial court found that the evidence presented by the
complainants was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was sane and
competent at the time he executed the deed of donation in favor of Mercedes Catalan. Thus,
the court declared, the presumption of sanity or competency not having been duly impugned,
the presumption of due execution of the donation in question must be upheld. [14] It rendered
judgment, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations,
judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Dismissing plaintiffs complaint;
2. Declaring the defendants Jesus Basa and Delia Basa the
lawful owners of the land in question which is now
declared in their names under Tax Declaration No. 12911
(Exhibit 4);
3. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants Attorneys fees
of P10,000.00, and to pay the Costs.(sic)
SO ORDERED.[15]
Petitioners challenged the trial courts decision before the Court of Appeals via a
Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court.[16] The appellate court
affirmed the decision of the trial court and held, viz:
In sum, the Regional Trial Court did not commit a reversible
error in disposing that plaintiff-appellants failed to prove the insanity or
mental incapacity of late (sic) Feliciano Catalan at the precise moment
when the property in dispute was donated.
Thus, all the elements for validity of contracts having been
present in the 1951 donation coupled with compliance with certain
solemnities required by the Civil Code in donation inter vivos of real
property under Article 749, which provides:
xxx
Mercedes Catalan acquired valid title of ownership over the
property in dispute. By virtue of her ownership, the property is completely
subjected to her will in everything not prohibited by law of the
concurrence with the rights of others (Art. 428, NCC).
 The validity of the subsequent sale dated 26 March MERCEDES CATALAN TO HER CHILDREN
1979 (Exhibit 3, appellees Folder of Exhibits) of the property by Mercedes RESPONDENTS JESUS AND DELIA BASA; AND-
Catalan to defendant-appellees Jesus Basa and Delia Basa must be
upheld. Nothing of the infirmities which allegedly flawed its authenticity 4. WHETHER OR NOT CIVIL CASE NO. 17666 IS BARRED
is evident much less apparent in the deed itself or from the evidence BY PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES.[18]
adduced. As correctly stated by the RTC, the fact that the Deed of
Absolute Sale was registered only in 1992, after the death of Mercedes
Catalan does not make the sale void ab initio. Moreover, as a notarized
document, the deed of absolute sale carries the evidentiary weight Petitioners aver that the presumption of Felicianos competence to donate property to
conferred upon such public document with respect to its due execution
(Garrido vs. CA 236 SCRA 450). In a similar vein, jurisprudence has it Mercedes had been rebutted because they presented more than the requisite preponderance of
that documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor
the presumption of regularity, and to contradict the same, there must be evidence. First, they presented the Certificate of Disability for the Discharge of Feliciano
evidence that is clear, convincing and more than preponderant (Salame vs.
CA, 239 SCRA 256). Catalan issued on October 20, 1948 by the Board of Medical Officers of the Department of

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision Veteran Affairs. Second, they proved that on December 22, 1953, Feliciano was judged an
dated December 7, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, is hereby
affirmed. incompetent by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, and put under the guardianship of

BPI. Based on these two pieces of evidence, petitioners conclude that Feliciano had been
SO ORDERED.[17]
suffering from a mental condition since 1948 which incapacitated him from entering into any

contract thereafter, until his death on August 14, 1997. Petitioners contend that Felicianos

Thus, petitioners filed the present appeal and raised the following issues: marriage to Corazon Cerezo on September 28, 1948 does not prove that he was not insane at
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS HAS DECIDED CA-G.R. CV NO. 66073 IN A the time he made the questioned donation. They further argue that the donations Feliciano
WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH
THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE executed in favor of his successors (Decision, CA-G.R. CV No. 66073) also cannot prove his
COURT IN HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT DID NOT COMMIT A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN competency because these donations were approved and confirmed in the guardianship
DISPOSING THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS
proceedings.[19] In addition, petitioners claim that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed
(PETITIONERS) FAILED TO PROVE THE INSANITY OR
MENTAL INCAPACITY OF THE LATE FELICIANO on March 26, 1979 by Mercedes Catalan and her children Jesus and Delia Basa is simulated
CATALAN AT THE PRECISE MOMENT WHEN THE
PROPERTY IN DISPUTE WAS DONATED; and fictitious. This is allegedly borne out by the fact that the document was registered only
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CERTIFICATE OF on February 20, 1992, more that 10 years after Mercedes Catalan had already died. Since
DISABILITY FOR DISCHARGE (EXHIBIT S) AND THE
REPORT OF A BOARD OF OFFICERS CONVENED UNDER Delia Basa and Jesus Basa both knew that Feliciano was incompetent to enter into any
THE PROVISIONS OF ARMY REGULATIONS (EXHIBITS
S-1 AND S-2) ARE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE; contract, they cannot claim to be innocent purchasers of the property in question.[20] Lastly,

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF petitioners assert that their case is not barred by prescription or laches under Article 1391 of
APPEALS HAS DECIDED CA-G.R. CV NO. 66073 IN A
WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH the New Civil Code because they had filed their case on April 1, 1997, even before the four
THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE
COURT IN UPHOLDING THE SUBSEQUENT SALE OF year period after Felicianos death on August 14, 1997 had begun.[21]
THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE BY THE DONEE
 The petition is bereft of merit, and we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals
and the trial court.
A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or
right in favor of another, who accepts it.[22] Like any other contract, an agreement of the
parties is essential. Consent in contracts presupposes the following requisites: (1) it should be
intelligent or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3)
it should be spontaneous.[23] The parties' intention must be clear and the attendance of a vice of
consent, like any contract, renders the donation voidable.[24]
In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donors capacity to
give consent at the time of the donation. Certainly, there lies no doubt in the fact that insanity
impinges on consent freely given.[25] However, the burden of proving such incapacity rests
upon the person who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will
be presumed.[26]
A thorough perusal of the records of the case at bar indubitably shows that the
evidence presented by the petitioners was insufficient to overcome the presumption that
Feliciano was competent when he donated the property in question to Mercedes. Petitioners
make much ado of the fact that, as early as 1948, Feliciano had been found to be suffering
from schizophrenia by the Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran
Affairs. By itself, however, the allegation cannot prove the incompetence of Feliciano.
A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still be
presumed capable of attending to his property rights. Schizophrenia was brought to the
attention of the public when, in the late 1800s, Emil Kraepelin, a German psychiatrist,
combined hebrephrenia and catatonia with certain paranoid states and called the condition
dementia praecox. Eugene Bleuler, a Swiss psychiatrist, modified Kraepelins conception in the
early 1900s to include cases with a better outlook and in 1911 renamed the condition
schizophrenia. According to medical references, in persons with schizophrenia, there is a
gradual onset of symptoms, with symptoms becoming increasingly bizarre as the disease
progresses. The condition improves (remission or residual stage) and worsens (relapses) in
cycles. Sometimes, sufferers may appear relatively normal, while other patients in remission
may appear strange because they speak in a monotone, have odd speech habits, appear to have
no emotional feelings and are prone to have ideas of reference. The latter refers to the idea that
random social behaviors are directed against the sufferers.[27] It has been proven that the
administration of the correct medicine helps the patient. Antipsychotic medications help bring
biochemical imbalances closer to normal in a schizophrenic. Medications reduce delusions,
hallucinations and incoherent thoughts and reduce or eliminate chances of
relapse.[28] Schizophrenia can result in a dementing illness similar in many aspects to
Alzheimers disease. However, the illness will wax and wane over many years, with only very
slow deterioration of intellect.[29]
From these scientific studies it can be deduced that a person suffering from
schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his
property. By merely alleging the existence of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show
substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost
total control of his mental faculties. Thus, the lower courts correctly held that Feliciano was of
sound mind at that time and that this condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary
was adduced.[30] Sufficient proof of his infirmity to give consent to contracts was only
established when the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan declared him an incompetent
on December 22, 1953.[31]
It is interesting to note that the petitioners questioned Felicianos capacity at the time he
donated the property, yet did not see fit to question his mental competence when he entered
into a contract of marriage with Corazon Cerezo or when he executed deeds of donation of his
other properties in their favor. The presumption that Feliciano remained competent to execute
contracts, despite his illness, is bolstered by the existence of these other contracts.

Competency and freedom from undue influence, shown to have existed in the other acts done

or contracts executed, are presumed to continue until the contrary is shown.[32]

Needless to state, since the donation was valid, Mercedes had the right to sell the

property to whomever she chose.[33] Not a shred of evidence has been presented to prove the

claim that Mercedes sale of the property to her children was tainted with fraud or falsehood. It

is of little bearing that the Deed of Sale was registered only after the death of Mercedes. What

is material is that the sale of the property to Delia and Jesus Basa was legal and binding at the

time of its execution. Thus, the property in question belongs to Delia and Jesus Basa.

Finally, we note that the petitioners raised the issue of prescription and laches for the

first time on appeal before this Court. It is sufficient for this Court to note that even if the

present appeal had prospered, the Deed of Donation was still a voidable, not a void, contract.

As such, it remained binding as it was not annulled in a proper action in court within four

years.[34]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, there being no merit in the arguments of the petitioners, the

petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66073 is

affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 127540. October 17, 2001]
EUGENIO DOMINGO, CRISPIN MANGABAT and SAMUEL
CAPALUNGAN, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, FELIPE C.
RIGONAN and CONCEPCION R. RIGONAN, respondents.
EUGENIO DOMINGO, CRISPIN MANGABAT and SAMUEL
CAPALUNGAN, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, and FELIPE C. RIGONAN and CONCEPCION R.
RIGONAN, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition[1] seeks to annul the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 29,
1996, which set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte, Branch
17, in Civil Case No. 582-17 for reinvindicacion consolidated with Cadastral Case No.
1.[2] The petition likewise seeks to annul the resolution dated December 11, 1996, denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, culled from the records, are as follows:
Paulina Rigonan owned three (3) parcels of land, located at Batac and Espiritu, Ilocos
Norte, including the house and warehouse on one parcel. She allegedly sold them to private
respondents, the spouses Felipe and Concepcion Rigonan, who claim to be her relatives. In
1966, herein petitioners Eugenio Domingo, Crispin Mangabat and Samuel Capalungan, who
claim to be her closest surviving relatives, allegedly took possession of the properties by
means of stealth, force and intimidation, and refused to vacate the same. Consequently, on
February 2, 1976, herein respondent Felipe Rigonan filed a complaint
for reinvindicacion against petitioners in the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte. On
July 3, 1977, he amended the complaint and included his wife as co-plaintiff. They alleged
that they were the owners of the three parcels of land through the deed of sale executed by
Paulina Rigonan on January 28, 1965; that since then, they had been in continuous possession
of the subject properties and had introduced permanent improvements thereon; and that
defendants (now petitioners) entered the properties illegally, and they refused to leave them
when asked to do so.
Herein petitioners, as defendants below, contested plaintiffs claims. According to
defendants, the alleged deed of absolute sale was void for being spurious as well as lacking
consideration. They said that Paulina Rigonan did not sell her properties to anyone. As her
nearest surviving kin within the fifth degree of consanguinity, they inherited the three lots and
the permanent improvements thereon when Paulina died in 1966. They said they had been in
possession of the contested properties for more than 10 years. Defendants asked for damages
against plaintiffs.
During trial, Juan Franco, Notary Public Evaristo P. Tagatag[3] and plaintiff Felipe
Rigonan testified for plaintiffs (private respondents now).
Franco testified that he was a witness to the execution of the questioned deed of absolute
sale. However, when cross-examined and shown the deed he stated that the deed was not the
document he signed as a witness, but rather it was the will and testament made by Paulina
Rigonan.
Atty. Tagatag testified that he personally prepared the deed, he saw Paulina Rigonan
affix her thumbprint on it and he signed it both as witness and notary public. He further
testified that he also notarized Paulinas last will and testament dated February 19, 1965. The
will mentioned the same lots sold to private respondents. When asked why the subject lots
were still included in the last will and testament, he could not explain. Atty. Tagatag also
mentioned that he registered the original deed of absolute sale with the Register of Deeds.
Plaintiff Felipe Rigonan claimed that he was Paulinas close relative. Their fathers were
first cousins. However, he could not recall the name of Paulinas grandfather. His claim was
disputed by defendants, who lived with Paulina as their close kin. He admitted the
discrepancies between the Register of Deeds copy of the deed and the copy in his
possession. But he attributed them to the representative from the Office of the Register of
Deeds who went to plaintiffs house after that Office received a subpoena duces
tecum. According to him, the representative showed him blanks in the deed and then the
representative filled in the blanks by copying from his (plaintiffs) copy.
Counsel for defendants (petitioners herein) presented as witnesses Jose Flores, the
owner of the adjacent lot; Ruben Blanco, then acting Registrar of Deeds in Ilocos Norte; and
Zosima Domingo, wife of defendant Eugenio Domingo.
Jose Flores testified that he knew defendants, herein petitioners, who had lived on the
land with Paulina Rigonan since he could remember and continued to live there even after
Paulinas death. He said he did not receive any notice nor any offer to sell the lots from
Paulina, contrary to what was indicated in the deed of sale that the vendor had notified all the
adjacent owners of the sale. He averred he had no knowledge of any sale between Paulina and
private respondents.
Ruben Blanco, the acting Registrar of Deeds, testified that only the carbon copy, also
called a duplicate original, of the deed of sale was filed in his office, but he could not explain
why this was so.
Zosima Domingo testified that her husband, Eugenio Domingo, was Paulinas
nephew. Paulina was a first cousin of Eugenios father. She also said that they lived with
Paulina and her husband, Jose Guerson, since 1956. They took care of her, spent for her daily
needs and medical expenses, especially when she was hospitalized prior to her death. She
stated that Paulina was never badly in need of money during her lifetime.
On March 23, 1994, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of defendants (now the
petitioners). It disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of defendants and
against the plaintiffs, and as prayed for, the Amended Complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
Defendants are hereby declared, by virtue of intestate succession, the lawful owners and
possessors of the house including the bodega and the three (3) parcels of land in suit and a
Decree of Registration adjudicating the ownership of the said properties to defendants is
hereby issued.
The alleged deed of sale (Exhs. A, A-1, 1 and 1-a) is hereby declared null and void and fake
and the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is hereby denied.
Plaintiffs are hereby ordered to pay defendants:
a) P20,000.00 as moral damages;
b) P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c) P10,000.00 attorneys fees and other litigation expenses.
No pronouncement as to costs.[4]
Private respondents herein appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On August 29, 1996, the CA reversed the trial courts decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated March 23, 1994 is hereby SET ASIDE. The plaintiffs-
appellants Felipe Rigonan and Concepcion Rigonan are declared the owners of the properties
under litigation and the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to VACATE the subject
properties and SURRENDER the possession thereof to the heirs of the plaintiffs-appellants.
Costs against the defendants-appellees.[5]
Hence, this petition assigning the following as errors:
I discarded when Franco retracted his oral and written testimony that he was a witness to the
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED QUESTIONS
OF LEGAL SUBSTANCE AND SIGNIFICANCE NOT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE EVIDENCE, LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.
II
THAT THE FINDINGS OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ARE
CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE TRIAL COURT AND CLEARLY
VIOLATES THE RULE THAT THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF TRIAL
COURTS ARE ENTITLED TO GREAT WEIGHT AND RESPECT ON
APPEAL, ESPECIALLY WHEN SAID FINDINGS ARE ESTABLISHED
BY UNREBUTTED TESTIMONIAL AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE.
III
THAT THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF RESPONDENT COURT
OF APPEALS ARE GROUNDED ENTIRELY ON SPECULATIONS,
SURMISES, CONJECTURES, OR ON INFERENCES MANIFESTLY
MISTAKEN.
IV
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY
OVERLOOKED CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS NOT DISPUTED BY THE
PARTIES AND WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD
JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION.
V
THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS ARE PREMISED ON SUPPOSED ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE
BUT IS CONTRADICTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD THUS
CONSTITUTES GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.[6]
The basic issue for our consideration is, did private respondents sufficiently establish the
existence and due execution of the Deed of Absolute and Irrevocable Sale of Real
Property? Marked as Exhibits A, A-1, 1 and 1-a, this deed purportedly involved nine (9)
parcels of land, inclusive of the three (3) parcels in dispute, sold at the price of P850 by
Paulina Rigonan to private respondents on January 28, 1965, at Batac, Ilocos Norte.[7] The trial
court found the deed fake, being a carbon copy with no typewritten original presented; and the
court concluded that the documents execution was tainted with alterations, defects,
tamperings, and irregularities which render it null and void ab initio.[8]
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in not applying the doctrine that factual
findings of trial courts are entitled to great weight and respect on appeal, especially when said
findings are established by unrebutted testimonial and documentary evidence. They add that
the Court of Appeals, in reaching a different conclusion, had decided the case contrary to the
evidence presented and the law applicable to the case. Petitioners maintain that the due
execution of the deed of sale was not sufficiently established by private respondents, who as
plaintiffs had the burden of proving it. First, the testimonies of the two alleged instrumental
witnesses of the sale, namely, Juan Franco and Efren Sibucao, were dispensed with and
execution of the subject deed. As a consequence, the appellate court merely relied on Atty.
Tagatags (the notary public) testimony, which was incredible because aside from taking the
double role of a witness and notary public, he was a paid witness. Further his testimony, that
the subject deed was executed in the house of Paulina Rigonan, was rebutted by Zosima
Domingo, Paulinas housekeeper, who said that she did not see Atty. Tagatag, Juan Franco and
Efren Sibucao in Paulinas house on the alleged date of the deeds execution.
Secondly, petitioners said that private respondents failed to account for the typewritten
original of the deed of sale and that the carbon copy filed with the Register of Deeds was only
a duplicate which contained insertions and erasures. Further, the carbon copy was without an
affidavit of explanation, in violation of the Administrative Code as amended, which requires
that if the original deed of sale is not presented or available upon registration of the deed, the
carbon copy or so-called duplicate original must be accompanied by an affidavit of
explanation, otherwise, registration must be denied.[9]
Thirdly, petitioners aver that the consideration of only P850 for the parcels of land sold,
together with a house and a warehouse, was another indication that the sale was fictitious
because no person who was financially stable would sell said property at such a grossly
inadequate consideration.
 Lastly, petitioners assert that there was abundant evidence that at the time of the
execution of the deed of sale, Paulina Rigonan was already senile. She could not have
consented to the sale by merely imprinting her thumbmark on the deed.
In their comment, private respondents counter that at the outset the petition must be
dismissed for it lacks a certification against forum-shopping. Nonetheless, even disregarding
this requirement, the petition must still be denied in due course for it does not present any
substantial legal issue, but factual or evidentiary ones which were already firmly resolved by
the Court of Appeals based on records and the evidence presented by the parties. Private
respondents claim that the factual determination by the trial court lacks credibility for it was
made by the trial judge who presided only in one hearing of the case.The trial judge could not
validly say that the deed of absolute sale was fake because no signature was forged, according
to private respondents; and indeed a thumbmark, said to be the sellers own, appears thereon.
In their reply, petitioners said that the copy of the petition filed with this Court was
accompanied with a certification against forum shopping. If private respondents copy did not
contain same certification, this was only due to inadvertence. Petitioners ask for the Courts
indulgence for anyway there was substantial compliance with Revised Circular No. 28-91.
On the contention that here only factual issues had been raised, hence not the proper
subject for review by this Court, petitioners reply that this general rule admits of exceptions,
as when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory; when
the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; and when the
Court of Appeals overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties which if
properly considered would justify a different conclusion. All these, according to petitioners,
are present in this case.
Before proceeding to the main issue, we shall first settle procedural issues raised by
private respondents.
While the trial judge deciding the case presided over the hearings of the case only once,
this circumstance could not have an adverse effect on his decision. The continuity of a court
and the efficacy of its proceedings are not affected by the death, resignation or cessation from
the service of the presiding judge. A judge may validly render a decision although he has only
partly heard the testimony of the witnesses.[10] After all, he could utilize and rely on the
records of the case, including the transcripts of testimonies heard by the former presiding
judge.
On the matter of the certification against forum-shopping, petitioners aver that they
attached one in the copy intended for this Court. This is substantial compliance. A deviation
from a rigid enforcement of the rules may be allowed to attain their prime objective for, after
all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the courts existence.[11]
While the issues raised in this petition might appear to be mainly factual, this petition is
properly given due course because of the contradictory findings of the trial court and the Court
of Appeals.Further, the latter court apparently overlooked certain relevant facts which justify a
different conclusion.[12] Moreover, a compelling sense to make sure that justice is done, and
done rightly in the light of the issues raised herein, constrains us from relying on technicalities
alone to resolve this petition.
Now, on the main issue. Did private respondents establish the existence and due
execution of the deed of sale? Our finding is in the negative. First, note that private
respondents as plaintiffs below presented only a carbon copy of this deed. When the Register
of Deeds was subpoenaed to produce the deed, no original typewritten deed but only a carbon
copy was presented to the trial court. Although the Court of Appeals calls it a duplicate
original, the deed contained filled in blanks and alterations. None of the witnesses directly
testified to prove positively and convincingly Paulinas execution of the original deed of
sale. The carbon copy did not bear her signature, but only her alleged thumbprint. Juan Franco
testified during the direct examination that he was an instrumental witness to the
deed. However, when cross-examined and shown a copy of the subject deed, he retracted and
said that said deed of sale was not the document he signed as witness. [13] He declared
categorically he knew nothing about it.[14]
We note that another witness, Efren Sibucao, whose testimony should have corroborated
Atty. Tagatags, was not presented and his affidavit was withdrawn from the court,[15] leaving
only Atty. Tagatags testimony, which aside from being uncorroborated, was self-serving.
Secondly, we agree with the trial court that irregularities abound regarding the execution
and registration of the alleged deed of sale. On record, Atty. Tagatag testified that he himself
registered the original deed with the Register of Deeds.[16] Yet, the original was nowhere to be
found and none could be presented at the trial. Also, the carbon copy on file, which is
allegedly a duplicate original, shows intercalations and discrepancies when compared to
purported copies in existence. The intercalations were allegedly due to blanks left unfilled by
Atty. Tagatag at the time of the deeds registration. The blanks were allegedly filled in much
later by a representative of the Register of Deeds. In addition, the alleged other copies of the
document bore different dates of entry: May 16, 1966, 10:20 A.M. [17] and June 10, 1966, 3:16
P.M.,[18] and different entry numbers: 66246, 74389[19] and 64369.[20] The deed was apparently
registered long after its alleged date of execution and after Paulinas death on March 20,
1966.[21]Admittedly, the alleged vendor Paulina Rigonan was not given a copy. [22]
Furthermore, it appears that the alleged vendor was never asked to vacate the premises
she had purportedly sold. Felipe testified that he had agreed to let Paulina stay in the house
until her death.[23] In Alcos v. IAC, 162 SCRA 823 (1988), the buyers immediate possession
and occupation of the property was deemed corroborative of the truthfulness and authenticity
of the deed of sale. The alleged vendors continued possession of the property in this case
throws an inverse implication, a serious doubt on the due execution of the deed of
sale. Noteworthy, the same parcels of land involved in the alleged sale were still included in
the will subsequently executed by Paulina and notarized by the same notary public, Atty.
Tagatag.[24] These circumstances, taken together, militate against unguarded acceptance of the
due execution and genuineness of the alleged deed of sale.
Thirdly, we have to take into account the element of consideration for the sale. The price
allegedly paid by private respondents for nine (9) parcels, including the three parcels in
dispute, a house and a warehouse, raises further questions. Consideration is the why of a
contract, the essential reason which moves the contracting parties to enter into the
contract.[25] On record, there is unrebutted testimony that Paulina as landowner was financially
well off. She loaned money to several people.[26] We see no apparent and compelling reason
for her to sell the subject parcels of land with a house and warehouse at a meager price of
P850 only.
In Rongavilla vs. CA, 294 SCRA 289 (1998), private respondents were in their advanced
years, and were not in dire need of money, except for a small amount of P2,000 which they
said were loaned by petitioners for the repair of their houses roof. We ruled against petitioners,
and declared that there was no valid sale because of lack of consideration.
In the present case, at the time of the execution of the alleged contract, Paulina Rigonan was
already of advanced age and senile. She died an octogenarian on March 20, 1966, barely over a year when
the deed was allegedly executed on January 28, 1965, but before copies of the deed were entered in the
registry allegedly on May 16 and June 10, 1966. The general rule is that a person is not incompetent to
contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities. [27] However, when such
age or infirmities have impaired the mental faculties so as to prevent the person from properly,
intelligently, and firmly protecting her property rights then she is undeniably incapacitated. The
unrebutted testimony of Zosima Domingo shows that at the time of the alleged execution of the deed,
Paulina was already incapacitated physically and mentally. She narrated that Paulina played with her
waste and urinated in bed. Given these circumstances, there is in our view sufficient reason to seriously
doubt that she consented to the sale of and the price for her parcels of land. Moreover, there is no receipt
to show that said price was paid to and received by her. Thus, we are in agreement with the trial courts
finding and conclusion on the matter:

The whole evidence on record does not show clearly that the fictitious P850.00 consideration was ever
delivered to the vendor. Undisputably, the P850.00 consideration for the nine (9) parcels of land including
the house and bodega is grossly and shockingly inadequate, and the sale is null and void ab initio.[28]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated August 29, 1996 and December 11, 1996, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte, Branch 17, dated March 23, 1994, is
REINSTATED.

Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 143370. February 6, 2002]
MARIO J. MENDEZONA and TERESITA M. MENDEZONA, LUIS J. MENDEZONA
and MARICAR L. MENDEZONA and TERESITA ADAD VDA. DE
MENDEZONA, petitioners, vs. JULIO H. OZAMIZ, ROBERTO J.
MONTALVAN, JOSE MA. OZAMIZ, CARMEN H. OZAMIZ, PAZ O.
MONTALVAN, MA. TERESA O.F. ZARRAGA, CARLOS O. FORTICH,
JOSE LUIS O. ROS, PAULITA O. RODRIGUEZ, and LOURDES O.
LON, respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] and the
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals dated July 27, 1998 and May 19, 2000,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 39752 which reversed and set aside the
Decision[3] dated September 23, 1992 rendered in favor of the petitioners by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 6 in Civil Case No. CEB-10766.
Civil Case No. CEB-10766 is a suit for quieting of title. It was instituted
on September 25, 1991 by petitioner spouses Mario
J. Mendezona and Teresita M. Mendezona as initial plaintiffs,[4] and in the amended
complaint filed on October 7, 1991, herein co-petitioner spouses Luis
J. Mendezona and Maricar L. Mendezona and Teresita Adad Vda.
de Mendezonajoined as co-plaintiffs.[5]
In their complaint, the petitioners, as plaintiffs therein, alleged that petitioner
spouses Mario J. Mendezona and Teresita M. Mendezona, petitioner spouses Luis
J. Mendezona and Maricar L. Mendezona, and petitioner Teresita Adad Vda.
de Mendezona own a parcel of land each in the Banilad Estate, Lahug, Cebu City
with almost similar areas of 3,462 square meters, 3,466 square meters and 3,468
square meters, covered and described in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos.
116834, 116835, and 116836 respectively, of the Registry of Deeds of Cebu City.[6]
The petitioners ultimately traced their titles of ownership over their respective
properties from a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale[7] dated April 28, 1989 executed in
their favor by Carmen Ozamiz for and in consideration of the sum of One Million Forty
Thousand Pesos (P1,040,000.00).
The petitioners initiated the suit to remove a cloud on their said respective titles
caused by the inscription thereon of a notice of lis pendens, which came about as a
result of an incident in Special Proceeding No. 1250 of the RTC of Oroquieta City.
Special Proceeding No. 1250 is a proceeding for guardianship over the person and
properties of Carmen Ozamiz initiated by the respondents Julio H. Ozamiz, Jose
Ma. Ozamiz, Carmen H. Ozamiz,[8] Paz O. Montalvan, Ma. Teresa O.F. Zarraga,
Carlos O. Fortich, Jose Luis O. Ros, Paulita O. Rodriguez and Lourdes O. Lon.[9]
It appears that on January 15, 1991, the respondents instituted the petition for
guardianship with the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, alleging therein that
Carmen Ozamiz, then 86 years old, after an illness in July 1987, had become
disoriented and could not recognize most of her friends; that she could no longer take
care of herself nor manage her properties by reason of her failing health, weak mind
and absent-mindedness. Mario Mendezona and Luis Mendezona, herein petitioners
who are nephews of Carmen Ozamiz, and Pilar Mendezona, a sister of
Carmen Ozamiz, filed an opposition to the guardianship petition.
In the course of the guardianship proceeding, the petitioners and
the oppositors thereto agreed that Carmen Ozamiz needed a guardian over her
person and her properties, and thus respondent Paz O. Montalvan was designated as
guardian over the person of Carmen Ozamiz while petitioner Mario J. Mendezona,
respondents Roberto J. Montalvan and Julio H. Ozamizwere designated as joint
guardians over the properties of the said ward.
As guardians, respondents Roberto J. Montalvan and Julio H. Ozamiz filed on
August 6, 1991 with the guardianship court their inventories and Accounts,[10] listing
therein Carmen Ozamizs properties, cash, shares of stock, vehicles and fixed assets,
including a 10,396 square meter property known as the Lahug property.
Said Lahug property is the same property covered by the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated April 28, 1989 executed by Carmen Ozamiz in favor of the petitioners.
Respondents Roberto J. Montalvan and Julio H. Ozamiz caused the inscription on the
titles of petitioners a notice of lis pendens,[11] regarding Special Proceeding No. 1250,
thus giving rise to the suit for quieting of title, Civil Case No. CEB-10766, filed by
herein petitioners.
In their Answer[12] in Civil Case No. CEB-10766 the respondents opposed the
petitioners claim of ownership of the Lahug property and alleged that the titles issued
in the petitioners names are defective and illegal, and the ownership of the said
property was acquired in bad faith and without value inasmuch as the consideration
for the sale is grossly inadequate and unconscionable. Respondents further alleged
that at the time of the sale on April 28, 1989 Carmen Ozamiz was already ailing and
not in full possession of her mental faculties; and that her properties having been
placed in administration, she was in effect incapacitated to contract with petitioners.
The issues for resolution were delimited in the pre-trial to: (a) the propriety of
recourse to quieting of title; (b) the validity or nullity of the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated April 28, 1989 executed by Carmen Ozamiz in favor of herein petitioners; (c)
whether the titles over the subject parcel of land in plaintiffs names be maintained or
should they be cancelled and the subject parcels of land reconveyed; and (d)
damages and attorneys fees.[13]
Trial on the merits ensued with the parties presenting evidence to prove their
respective allegations. Petitioners Mario Mendezona, Teresita Adad Vda.
de Mendezona and Luis Mendezona, as plaintiffs therein, testified on the
circumstances surrounding the sale. Carmencita Cedeno and Martin Yungco,
instrumental witnesses to the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989, and, Atty.
Asuncion Bernades, the notary public who notarized the said document, testified that
on the day of execution of the said contract that Carmen Ozamiz was of sound mind
and that she voluntarily and knowingly executed the said deed of sale.
For the defendants, the testimonies of respondent Paz O. Montalvan, a sister of
Carmen Ozamiz; Concepcion Agac-ac, an assistant of Carmen Ozamiz; respondent
Julio Ozamiz; Carolina Lagura, a househelper of Carmen Ozamiz; Joselito Gunio, an
appraiser of land; Nelfa Perdido, a part-time bookkeeper of Carmen Ozamiz, and the
deposition of Dr. Faith Go, physician of Carmen Ozamiz, were offered in evidence.
The petitioners presented as rebuttal witnesses petitioners
Mario Mendezona and Luis Mendezona, to rebut the testimony of respondent Julio
H. Ozamiz; and, Dr. William Buot, a doctor of neurology to rebut aspects of the
deposition of Dr. Faith Go on the mental capacity of Carmen Ozamiz at the time of
the sale.
During the trial, the trial court found that the following facts have been duly
established:[14]
(1) On April 28, 1989, Carmen Ozamiz sold to her nephews, Mario, Antonio and Luis, all
surnamed Mendezona, three (3) parcels of residential land in Cebu City, per a Deed of
Absolute Sale (Exh. D) for a consideration of P1,040,000.00, in which deed
the usufructuary rights were reserved during her lifetime.
(2) The three parcels of land were subsequently transferred to the names of the three vendees
per TCTs Nos. 108729, 108730 and 108731 (Exhs. J, K & L, respectively). A partition
agreement was entered into by the three vendees (Exh. 3) and the parcels of land are now titled
in the names of the plaintiffs.
Mario Mendezona TCT No. 116834 (Exh. A);
Luis Mendezona TCT No. 116835 (Exh. B);
Antonio Mendezona TCT No. 116836 (Exh. C);
(3) The reservation of the usufructuary rights to the vendor Carmen Ozamiz during her
lifetime was confirmed by the plaintiffs-spouses Mario Mendezona and Teresita Moraza and
plaintiffs spouses Luis Mendezona and Maricar Longa in a sworn statement (Exh. I) executed
on October 15, 1990, which was duly annotated on the titles of the property;
(4) The capital gains tax was paid (Exh. H) on May 5, 1989 and a certificate (Exh. H-1) was
issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue authorizing the Register of Deeds to transfer the
property to the vendees;
(5) A petition for guardianship over the person and properties of Carmen Ozamiz (Exh. E) was
filed by all the defendants, (except the defendant Roberto Montalvan) on January 15, 1991
with the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, denominated as Spec. Proc. No. 1250 and
subsequently, an Inventories and Accounts (Exh. F) was filed by court-appointed guardians
Roberto Montalvan and Julio Ozamiz, in which the property was listed (Exh. F-1) and a
Notice of Lis Pendens was filed with the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on August 13,
1991 by said joint guardians. Plaintiff Mario Mendezona, as another joint guardian over
Carmen Ozamiz, filed his opposition (Exh. R) to the Inventories and Accounts, with
the Oroquieta Court as to the inclusion of the property (Exh.R-1).
(6) Prior to his death, the deceased husband of plaintiff Teresita Adad Mendezona was granted
a General Power of Attorney (Exh. 1) by Carmen Ozamiz on March 23, 1988 and after his
demise, Carmen Ozamiz granted Mario Mendezona a General Power of Attorney (Exh. 2.)
on August 11, 1990. Both powers of attorney relate to the administration of the property,
subject of this action, in Cebu City.
On September 23, 1992 the trial court rendered its decision in favor of the
petitioners, the dispositive portion of which reads, to wit:
Wherefore, premises considered, the Court is of the opinion and so declares that:
1. The property described in the complaint was sold, with reservation of usufructuary rights by
Carmen Ozamiz to the plaintiffs under a valid contract, voluntarily and deliberately entered
into while she was of sound mind, for sufficient and good consideration, and without fraud,
force, undue influence or intimidation having been exercised upon her, and consequently, the
Court orders the defendants herein to acknowledge and recognize the plaintiffs title to
the aforecited property and to refrain from further clouding the same;
2. That the one-third (1/3) share erroneously titled to Antonio Mendezona should be titled in
the name of Teresita Adad vda. de Mendezona as her paraphernal property and the Register of
Deeds of Cebu City is hereby ordered to do so;
3. The Notice of Lis Pendens affecting the property should be eliminated from the record and
the Register of Deeds of Cebu City is ordered to expunge the same.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court reversed the factual
findings of the trial court and ruled that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28,
1989 was a simulated contract since the petitioners failed to prove that the
consideration was actually paid, and, furthermore, that at the time of the execution of
the contract the mental faculties of Carmen Ozamiz were already seriously impaired.
Thus, the appellate court declared that the Deed of Absolute Sale of April 28, 1989 is
null and void. It ordered the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the
petitioners names and directed the issuance of new certificates of title in favor of
Carmen Ozamiz or her estate.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the appellate
court. Subsequent thereto, the petitioners filed a motion for a new trial and/or for
reception of evidence. They contended, among other things, that the appellate court
totally ignored the testimony of Judge Teodorico Durias regarding the mental
condition of Carmen Ozamiz a month before the execution of the Deed of Absolute
Sale in question. The said testimony was taken in the Special Proceeding No. 1250 in
the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City. However, Judge Duriaswas not presented
as a witness in Civil Case No. CEB-10766 in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.
Petitioners alleged that Judge Duriass testimony is a newly-discovered evidence
which could not have been discovered prior to the trial in the court below by the
exercise of due diligence.
 The appellate court denied both motions in its Resolution dated May 19, 2000.
Hence, the instant petition anchored on the following grounds:[15]
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE APRIL 28, 1989
DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE WAS A SIMULATED CONTRACT.
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN IGNORING THE STATUTORY
PRESUMPTIONS OF ACTUAL AND SUFFICIENT CONSIDERATION FOR, AND OF
THE REGULARITY AND TRUTHFULNESS OF, THE NOTARIZED DEED OF
ABSOLUTE SALE.
B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING ON THE PETITIONERS
THE BURDEN OF PROVING PAYMENT, AND IN REFUSING TO RECOGNIZE AND
RULE THAT IT WAS THE RESPONDENTS - AS THE PARTIES ASSAILING THE DEED
OF ABSOLUTE SALE - WHO HAD FAILED TO DISCHARGE THEIR BURDEN OF
PROVING THAT THERE WAS NO CONSIDERATION FOR THE TRANSACTION.
C.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REFUSING TO RECEIVE IN
EVIDENCE THE THREE (3) CHECKS, WHICH PROVED BEYOND ANY DOUBT THAT
THE PURCHASE PRICE FOR THE LAHUG PROPERTY HAD BEEN PAID TO CARMEN
OZAMIZ, AFTER ASKING FOR THEM AND HAVING THEM PRESENTED TO IT IN
OPEN COURT, THUS COOPERATING WITH RESPONDENTS EFFORTS TO SUPPRESS
THE CHECKS (WHICH THE COURT ITSELF AND RESPONDENTS CHALLENGED
PETITIONERS TO PRODUCE).
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT CARMEN OZAMIZS
MENTAL FACULTIES WERE SERIOUSLY IMPAIRED WHEN SHE EXECUTED THE
DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE ON APRIL 28, 1989.
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN IGNORING THE STATUTORY
PRESUMPTION THAT CARMEN OZAMIZ WAS OF SOUND MIND AND HAD THE
REQUISITE CAPACITY TO CONTRACT WHEN SHE EXECUTED THE DEED OF
ABSOLUTE SALE, AND IN REFUSING TO RULE THAT IT WAS THE RESPONDENTS
- AS THE PARTIES ALLEGING MENTAL INCAPACITY- WHO HAD FAILED TO
DISCHARGE THEIR BURDEN OF REBUTTING THAT PRESUMPTION.
B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REFUSING TO ACCEPT AND GIVE
DUE AND PREPONDERANT WEIGHT TO UNREFUTED EVIDENCE, INCLUDING
THE UNREFUTED TESTIMONIES OF THE INSTRUMENTAL WITNESSES AND OF
THE NOTARY PUBLIC, THAT CARMEN OZAMIZ EXECUTED THE DEED OF
ABSOLUTE SALE FREELY, VOLUNTARILY, KNOWINGLY, AND INTELLIGENTLY.
C.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE
HEARSAY TESTIMONY OF DR. FAITH GO ON THE MENTAL CONDITION OF
CARMEN OZAMIZ ON THE DATE SHE EXECUTED THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE.
D.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN IGNORING, AND IN REFUSING TO
RECEIVE IN EVIDENCE, JUDGE TEODORICO DURIASS TESTIMONY (THAT
CARMEN OZAMIZ WAS OF SOUND MIND WHEN SHE EXECUTED ANOTHER
CONTRACT BARELY A MONTH BEFORE SHE EXECUTED THE DEED OF
ABSOLUTE SALE) ON THE GROUND THAT THATTESTIMONY WAS FORGOTTEN
EVIDENCE.
We shall first rule on the issue of whether to consider the testimony of
Judge Durias as newly discovered evidence. A motion for new trial upon the ground
of newly discovered evidence is properly granted only where there is concurrence of
the following requisites, namely: (a) the evidence had been discovered after trial; (b)
the evidence could not have been discovered and produced during trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material and not merely
corroborative, cumulative or impeaching and is of such weight that if admitted, would
probably alter the result. All three (3) requisites must characterize the evidence
sought to be introduced at the new trial.
We find that the requirement of reasonable diligence has not been met by the
petitioners. As early as the pre-trial of the case at bar, the name of Judge Durias has
already cropped up as a possible witness for the defendants, herein respondents.
That the respondents chose not to present him is not an indicia per se of suppression
of evidence, since a party in a civil case is free to choose who to present as his
witness. Neither can Judge Durias testimony in another case be considered as newly
discovered evidence since the facts to be testified to by Judge Durias which were
existing before and during the trial, could have been presented by the petitioners at
the trial below.[16] The testimony of Judge Durias has been in existence waiting only to
be elicited from him by questioning.[17]
It has been held that a lack of diligence is exhibited where the newly discovered
evidence was necessary or proper under the pleadings, and its existence must have
occurred to the party in the course of the preparation of the case, but no effort was
made to secure it; there is a failure to make inquiry of persons who were likely to
know the facts in question, especially where information was not sought from co-
parties; there is a failure to seek evidence available through public records; there is a
failure to discover evidence that is within the control of the complaining party; there is
a failure to follow leads contained in other evidence; and, there is a failure to utilize
available discovery procedures.[18] Thus, the testimony of Judge Duriascannot be
considered as newly discovered evidence to warrant a new trial.
In this petition at bench, herein petitioners essentially take exception to two (2)
main factual findings of the appellate court, namely, (a) that the notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989 was a simulated contract, and (b) that
Carmen Ozamizs mental faculties were seriously impaired when she executed the
said contract on April 28, 1989. The petitioners allege that both conclusions are
contrary or opposed to well-recognized statutory presumptions of regularity enjoyed
by a notarized document and that a contracting party to a notarized contract is of
sound and disposing mind when she executes the contract.
The respondents posit a different view. They contend that clear and convincing
evidence refuted the presumptions on regularity of execution of the Deed of Absolute
Sale and existence of consideration thereof. Relying upon the testimonies of Paz
O. Montalvan, Concepcion Agac-ac, Carolina Lagura and Dr. Faith Go, they aver that
they were able to show that Carmen Ozamiz was already physically and mentally
incapacitated since the latter part of 1987 and could not have executed the said Deed
of Absolute Sale on April 28, 1989 covering the disputed Lahug property. They also
alleged that no error is ascribable to the appellate court for not considering the
allegedly rehearsed testimonies of the instrumental witnesses and the notary public.
Factual findings of the appellate court are generally conclusive on this Court
which is not a trier of facts. It is not the function of the Supreme Court to analyze or
weigh evidence all over again. However, this rule is not without exception. If there is a
showing that the appellate courts findings of facts complained of are totally devoid of
support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave
abuse of discretion, this Court must discard such erroneous findings of facts. [19] We
find that the exception applies in the case at bench.
Simulation is defined as the declaration of a fictitious will, deliberately made by
agreement of the parties, in order to produce, for the purposes of deception, the
appearances of a juridical act which does not exist or is different from what that which
was really executed.[20] The requisites of simulation are: (a) an outward declaration of
will different from the will of the parties; (b) the false appearance must have been
intended by mutual agreement; and (c) the purpose is to deceive third
persons.[21] None of these were clearly shown to exist in the case at bar.
Contrary to the erroneous conclusions of the appellate court, a simulated
contract cannot be inferred from the mere non-production of the checks. It was not
the burden of the petitioners to prove so. It is significant to note that the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989 is a notarized document duly acknowledged
before a notary public. As such, it has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and it
carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. It is
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity and is entitled to full
faith and credit upon its face.[22]
Payment is not merely presumed from the fact that the notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989 has gone through the regular procedure as
evidenced by the transfer certificates of title issued in petitioners names by the
Register of Deeds. In other words, whosoever alleges the fraud or invalidity of a
notarized document has the burden of proving the same by evidence that is clear,
convincing, and more than merely preponderant.[23] Therefore, with this well-
recognized statutory presumption, the burden fell upon the respondents to prove their
allegations attacking the validity and due execution of the said Deed of Absolute Sale.
Respondents failed to discharge that burden; hence, the presumption in favor of the
said deed stands. But more importantly, that notarized deed shows on its face that
the consideration of One Million Forty Thousand Pesos (P1,040,000.00) was
acknowledged to have been received by Carmen Ozamiz.
Simulation cannot be inferred from the alleged absence of payment based on
the testimonies of Concepcion Agac-ac, assistant of Carmen Ozamiz,
and Nelfa Perdido, part-time bookkeeper of Carmen Ozamiz. The testimonies of
these two (2) witnesses are unreliable and inconsistent.
While Concepcion Agac-ac testified that she was aware of all the transactions of
Carmen Ozamiz, she also admitted that not all income of Carmen Ozamiz passed
through her since Antonio Mendezona, as appointed administrator, directly reported
to Carmen Ozamiz.[24] With respect to Nelfa Perdido, she testified that most of the
transactions that she recorded refer only to rental income and expenses, and the
amounts thereof were reported to her by Concepcion Agac-ac only, not by
Carmen Ozamiz. She does not record deposits or withdrawals in the bank accounts
of Carmen Ozamiz.[25] Their testimonies hardly deserve any credit and, hence, the
appellate court misplaced reliance thereon.
Considering that Carmen Ozamiz acknowledged, on the face of the notarized
deed, that she received the consideration at One Million Forty Thousand Pesos
(P1,040,000.00), the appellate court should not have placed too much emphasis on
the checks, the presentation of which is not really necessary. Besides, the burden to
prove alleged non-payment of the consideration of the sale was on the respondents,
not on the petitioners. Also, between its conclusion based on inconsistent oral
testimonies and a duly notarized document that enjoys presumption of regularity, the
appellate court should have given more weight to the latter. Spoken words could be
notoriously unreliable as against a written document that speaks a uniform
language.[26]
Furthermore, the appellate court erred in ruling that at the time of the execution
of the Deed of Absolute Sale on April 28, 1989 the mental faculties of
Carmen Ozamiz were already seriously impaired.[27] It placed too much reliance upon
the testimonies of the respondents witnesses. However, after a thorough scrutiny of
the transcripts of the testimonies of the witnesses, we find that the respondents core
witnesses all made sweeping statements which failed to show the true state of mind
of Carmen Ozamiz at the time of the execution of the disputed document. The
testimonies of the respondents witnesses on the mental capacity of
Carmen Ozamiz are far from being clear and convincing, to say the least.
Carolina Lagura, a househelper of Carmen Ozamiz, testified that when
Carmen Ozamiz was confronted by Paz O. Montalvan in January 1989 with the sale
of the Lahug property, Carmen Ozamiz denied the same. She testified that
Carmen Ozamiz understood the question then.[28] However, this declaration is
inconsistent with her (Carolinas) statement that since 1988 Carmen Ozamiz could not
fully understand the things around her, that she was physically fit but mentally could
not carry a conversation or recognize persons who visited her.[29]Furthermore, the
disputed sale occurred on April 28, 1989 or three (3) months after this alleged
confrontation in January 1989. This inconsistency was not explained by the
respondents.
The revelation of Dr. Faith Go did not also shed light on the mental capacity of
Carmen Ozamiz on the relevant day - April 28, 1989 when the Deed of Absolute Sale
was executed and notarized. At best, she merely revealed that Carmen Ozamiz was
suffering from certain infirmities in her body and at times, she was forgetful, but there
was no categorical statement that Carmen Ozamiz succumbed to what the
respondents suggest as her alleged second childhood as early as 1987. The
petitioners rebuttal witness, Dr. William Buot, a doctor of neurology, testified that no
conclusion of mental incapacity at the time the said deed was executed can be
inferred from Dr. Faith Gos clinical notes nor can such fact be deduced from the mere
prescription of a medication for episodic memory loss.
It has been held that a person is not incapacitated to contract merely because of
advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities. Only when such age or infirmities
impair her mental faculties to such extent as to prevent her from properly, intelligently,
and fairly protecting her property rights, is she considered incapacitated. [30] The
respondents utterly failed to show adequate proof that at the time of the sale on April
28, 1989 Carmen Ozamiz had allegedly lost control of her mental faculties.
We note that the respondents sought to impugn only one document, namely, the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989, executed by Carmen Ozamiz. However,
there are nine (9) other important documents that were, signed by
Carmen Ozamiz either before or after April 28, 1989 which were not assailed by the
respondents.[31] Such is contrary to their assertion of complete incapacity of
Carmen Ozamiz to handle her affairs since 1987. We agree with the trial courts
assessment that it is unfair for the [respondents] to claim soundness of mind of
Carmen Ozamiz when it benefits them and otherwise when it disadvantages
them.[32] A person is presumed to be of sound mind at any particular time and the
condition is presumed to continue to exist, in the absence of proof to the
contrary.[33] Competency and freedom from undue influence, shown to have existed in
the other acts done or contracts executed, are presumed to continue until the contrary
is shown.[34]
All the foregoing considered, we find the instant petition to be meritorious and
the same should be granted.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision dated September 23, 1992 of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. CEB-10766 is
REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-5426 May 29, 1953
RAMON JOAQUIN, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO C. NAVARRO, respondent.
Agrava, Peralta & Agrava for petitioner.
Leonardo Abola for respondent.
TUASON, J.:
This three proceedings was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila in the
summary settlement of states of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife Angela Joaquin de
Navarro, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Pilar Navarro, deceased. All of them having been
heard jointly, Judge Rafael Amparo handed down a single decision which was
appealed to the Court of Appeals, whose decision, modifying that the Court of First
Instance, in turn was elevated to the Supreme Court for review.
The main question represented in the first two courts related to the sequence of the
deaths of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife, and their children, all of whom were killed in
the massacre of civilians by Japanese troops in Manila in February 1945. The trial
court found the deaths of this persons to have accurred in this order: 1st. The Navarro
girls, named Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad; 2nd. Joaquin Navarro, Jr.; 3rd. Angela
Joaquin de Navarro, and 4th, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. The Court of Appeals concurred
with the trial court except that, with regard to Angela Joaquin de Navarro and Joaquin
Navarro, Jr., the latter was declared to have survived his mother.
It is this modification of the lower court's finding which is now being contested by the
petitioner. The importance of the question whether Angela Joaquin de Navarro died
before Joaquin Navarro, Jr., or vice versa, lies in the fact that it radically affects the
rights of succession of Ramon Joaquin, the present petitioner who was an
acknowledged natural child of Angela Joaquin and adopted child of the deceased
spouses, and Antonio C. Navarro, respondent, son of Joaquin Navarro, Sr. by first
marriage.
The facts, which is not disputed, are outlined in the statement in the decision of the
Court of Appeals as follows:
"On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging, the
spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Angela Joaquin, together with their three
daughters, Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, and their son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and
the latter's wife, Adela Conde, sought refuge in the ground floor of the building known
as the German Club, at the corner of San Marcelino and San Luis Streets of this City.
During their stay, the building was packed with refugees, shells were exploding
around, and the Club was set on fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese started shooting
at the people inside the building, especially those who were trying to escape. The
three daughters were hit and fell of the ground near the entrance; and Joaquin
Navarro, Sr., and his son decided to abandon the premises to seek a safer heaven.
They could not convince Angela Joaquin who refused to join them; and son Joaquin
Navarro, Sr., his son, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Angela Conde, and a
friend and former neighbor, Francisco Lopez, dashed out of the burning edifice. As
they came out, Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot in the head by a Japanese soldier and
immediately dropped. The others lay flat on the ground in front of the Club premises
to avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the German Club, already on fire, collapsed,
trapping many people inside, presumably including Angela Joaquin.
"Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Francisco Lopez managed to
reach an air raid shelter nearby, the stayed there about three days, until February 10,
1915, when they were forced to leave the shelter be- cause the shelling tore it open.
They flied toward the St. Theresa Academy in San Marcelino Street, but unfortunately
met Japanese Patrols, who fired at the refugees, killing Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his
daughter-in-law.
"At the time of the masaccre, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. was aged 70; his wife Angela
Joaquin was about 67 years old; Joaquin Navarro, Jr., about 30; Pilar Navarro was
two or three years older than her brother; while the other sisters, Concepcion and
Natividad Navarro y Joaquin, were between 23 and 25."
The Court of Appeals' finding were all taken from the testimony of Francisco Lopez,
who miraculously survived the holocaust, and upon them the Court of Appeals opined
that, "as between the mother Angela Joaquin and the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the
evidence of the survivorship is uncertain and insufficient" and the statutory
presumption must be applied. The appellate Court's reasoning for its conclusion is
thus stated:
"It does not require argument to show that survivorship cannot be established by
proof of the death of only one of the parties; but that there must be adequate proof
that one was alive when the other had already died. Now in this case before us, the
testimony of the sole witness Lopez is to the effect that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot
and died shortly after the living the German Club in the company of his father and the
witness, and that the burning edified entirely collapsed minutes after the shooting of
the son; but there is not a scintilla of evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which we
may infer the condition of the mother, Angela Joaquin, during the appreciable interval
from the instant his son turned his back to her, to dash out to the Club, until he died.
All we can glean from the evidence is that Angela Joaquin was unhurt when her son
left her to escape from the German Club; but she could have died almost immediately
after, from a variety of causes. She might have been shot by the Japanese, like her
daughters, killed by falling beams from the burning edifice, overcome by the fumes, or
fatally struck by splinters from the exploding shells. We cannot say for certain. No
evidence is available on the point. All we can decide is that no one saw her alive after
her son left her aside, and that there is no proof when she died. Clearly, this
circumstance alone cannot support a finding that she died latter than her son, and we
are thus compelled to fall back upon the statutory presumption. In deed, it could be
said that the purpose of the presumption of survivorship would be precisely to afford a
solution to uncertainties like these. Hence the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr. aged 30, must
be deemed to have survived his mother, Angela Joaquin, who was admittedly above
60 years of age (Rule 123, sec. 69, subsec. (ii), Rules of Court).
"The total lack of evidence on how Angela Joaquin died likewise disposes of the
question whether she and her deceased children perished in the same calamity.
There being no evidence to the contrary, the only guide is the occasion of the deaths,
which is identical for all of them; that battle for the liberation of Manila. A second
reason is that the law, in declaring that those fallen in the same battle are to be
regarded as perishing in the same calamity, could not overlooked that a variety of
cause of death can ( and usually do) operate in the source of combats. During the
same battle, some may die from wounds, other from gages, fire, or drowning. It is
clear that the law disregards episodic details, and treats the battle as an overall cause
of death in applying the presumption of survivorship.
"We are thus led the conclusion that the order in which the members of the Navarro-
Joaquin family met their end is as follows: first, the three daughters Pilar, Concepcion,
and Natividad; then the mother Angela Joaquin; then the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr.,
and days later (of which there is no doubt), the father Joaquin Navarro, Sr."
Much space in the briefs is taken in a discussion of whether section 334(37) of Act
No. 129, now section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, has repealed article 33
of the civil code of 1889, now article 43 of the New Civil Code. It is the contention of
the petitioner that it did not, and that on the assumption that there is total lack of
evidence, as the Court of Appeals said, then Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro,
Jr. should, under article 33, be held to have died at the same time.
The point is not of much if any relevancy and will be left open for the consideration
when obsolute necessity there for arises. We say irrelevant because our opinion is
that neither of the two provisions is applicable for the reasons to be presently set
forth.
Rule 123, section 69 (ii) of the Revised Rules of Court, reads:
When two person perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle or
conflagration, and it is not (1) shown who died first, and there are no (2)
particular circumstances from when it can be inferred, the survivorship is
presumed from the probabilities resulting from the strength and ages of the
sexes, according to the following rules:
xxx xxx xxx
Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889 of the following tenor:
Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die to the two or more
persons who would inherent one from the other, the persons who alleges the
prior death of either must prove the allegation; in the absence of proof the
presumption shall be that they died at the same time, and no transmission of
rights from one to the other shall take place.
Most provisions, as their language plainly implies, are intended as a substitute for
lacks and so are not to be available when there are facts. With particular reference to
section 69 (ii) of Rule 123, "the situation which it present is one in which the facts are
not only unknown but unknowable. By hypothesis, there is no specific evidence as to
the time of death . . . ." . . . it is assumed that no evidence can be produced. . . . Since
the facts are unknown and unknowable, the law may apply the law of fairness
appropriate to the different legal situation that arises." (IX Wigmore on Evidence,
1940 ed., 483.)
In In re Wallace's Estate, 220 Pac. 683, which the Court of Appeals cited the applied
with the respect to the deaths of the Navarro girls, pointing out that "our rule is taken
from the Fourth Division of sec. 1936 of the California Code of Civil Procedure," the
Supreme Court of California said:
When the statue speaks of "particular circumstances from which it can be
inferred" that one died before the other it means that there are
circumstances from which the fact of death by one before the other may be
inferred as a relation conclusion from the facts proven. The statue does not
mean circumstances which would shown, or which would tend to show,
probably that one died before the other. Grand Lodge A.O.W.W. vs. Miller, 8
Cal. App. 28, 96 Pac. 22. When by circumstantial evidence alone, a party
seeks to prove a survivorship contrary to the statutory presumption, the
circumstances by which it is sought to prove the survivorship must be such
as are competent and sufficient when tested by the general rules of
evidence in civil cases. The inference of survivorship cannot rest upon mere
surmise, speculation, or conjecture. As was said in Grand
Lodge vs. Miller, supra, "if the matter is left to probably, then the statue of
the presumption."
It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 and of that of the
foregoing decision that the evidence of the survivorship need not be direct; it may be
indirect, circumstantial, or inferential. Where there are facts, known or knowable, from
which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in, and the
rule of preponderance of evidence controls.
Are there particular circumstances on record from which reasonable inference of
survivorship between Angela Joaquin and her son can be drawn? Is Francisco Lopez'
testimony competent and sufficient for this purpose? For a better appreciation of this
issue, it is convenient and necessary to detail the testimony, which was described by
the trial court as "disinterested and trustworthy" and by the Court of Appeals as
"entitled to credence."
Lopez testified:
Q. You said you were also heat at that time as you leave the German Club
with Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and the latter's wife?- A.
Yes, sir.
Q. Did you fall? — A. I fell down.
Q. And you said you fell down close to Joaquin Navarro, Jr.? A. Yes, sir.
Q. When the German Club collapsed where were you? — A. We were out
15 meters away from the building but I could see what was going on.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Could there have been an interval of fifteen minutes between the two
events, that is the shooting of Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and the collapse of the
German Club? — A. Yes, sir, I could not say exactly, Occasions like that,
you know, you are confused.
Q. Could there (have) been an interval of an hour instead of fifteen minutes?
— A. Possible, but not probable.
Q. Could it have been 40 minutes? — A. Yes, sir, about 40 minutes.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. You also know that Angela Joaquin is already dead? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Can you tell the Honorable Court when did Angela Joaquin die? — A.
Well, a few minutes after we have dashed out, the German Club, which was
burning, collapsed over them, including Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. From your testimony it would appear that while you can give positive
evidence to the fact that Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad Navarro, and
Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died, you can not give the same positive evidence to
the fact that Angela Joaquin also died? — A. Yes, sir, in the sense that I did
not see her actually die, but when the building collapsed over her I saw and I
am positive and I did not see her come out of that building so I presumed
she died there.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Why did you have to dash out of the German Club, you, Mr. Joaquin
Navarro, Sr. and Mr. Joaquin Navarro Jr. and the latter's wife? — A.
Because the Japanese had set fire to the Club and they were shooting
people outside, so we thought of running away rather than be roasted.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. You mean to say that before you jumped out of the German Club all the
Navarro girls, Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, were already wounded? —
A. to my knowledge, yes.
Q. They were wounded? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were they lying on the ground or not? — A. On the ground near the
entrance, because most of the people who were shot by the Japanese were
those who were trying to escape, and as far as I can remember they were
among those killed.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. So you noticed that they were killed or shot by the Japanese a few
minutes before you left the place? — A. That is what I think, because those
Japanese soldiers were shooting the people inside especially those trying to
escape.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. And none of them was not except the girls, is that what you mean? A — .
There were many people shot because they were trying to escape.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. How come that these girls were shot when they were inside the building,
can you explain that? — A. They were trying to escape probably.
It is our opinion that the preceding testimony contains facts quite adequate to solve
the problem of survivorship between Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and
keep the statutory presumption out of the case. It is believed that in the light of the
conditions painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable inference can be arrived at,
namely: that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died before his mother.
While the possibility that the mother died before the son can not be ruled out, it must
be noted that this possibility is entirely speculative and must yield to the more rational
deduction from proven facts that it was the other way around. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., it
will be recalled, was killed, while running, in front of, and 15 meters from, the German
Club. Still in the prime of life, 30, he must have negotiated that distance in five
seconds or less, and so died within that interval from the time he dashed out of the
building. Now, when Joaquin Navarro, Jr. with his father and wife started to flee from
the clubhouse, the old lady was alive and unhurt, so much so that the Navarro father
and son tried hard to have her come along. She could have perished within those five
or fewer seconds, as stated, but the probabilities that she did seem very remote.
True, people in the building were also killed but these, according to Lopez, were
mostly refugees who had tried to slip away from it and were shot by Japanese troops.
It was not very likely that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr. made an attempt to escape. She
even made frantic efforts to dissuade her husband and son from leaving the place
and exposing themselves to gun fire.
This determination of Mrs. Angela Joaquin to stay where she was may well give an
idea, at the same time, of a condition of relative safety in the clubhouse at the
moment her husband, son, and daughter-in-law left her. It strongly tends to prove
that, as the situation looked to her, the perils of death from staying were not so
imminent. And it lends credence to Mr. Lopez' statement that the collapse of the
clubhouse occurred about 40 minutes after Joaquin Navarro the son was shot in the
head and dropped dead, and that it was the collapse that killed Mrs. Angela Navarro.
The Court of Appeals said the interval between Joaquin Navarro's death and the
breaking down of the edifice was "minutes". Even so, it was much longer than five
seconds, long enough to warrant the inference that Mrs. Angela Joaquin was sill alive
when her son expired
The Court of Appeals mentioned several causes, besides the collapse of the building,
by which Mrs. Navarro could have been killed. All these are speculative , and the
probabilities, in the light of the known facts, are against them. Dreading Japanese
sharpshooters outside as evidenced by her refusal to follow the only remaining living
members of her family, she could not have kept away form protective walls. Besides,
the building had been set on fire trap the refugees inside, and there was no necessity
for the Japanese to was their ammunition except upon those who tried to leave the
premises. Nor was Angela Joaquin likely to have been killed by falling beams
because the building was made of concrete and its collapse, more likely than not, was
sudden. As to fumes, these do not cause instantaneous death; certainly not within the
brief space of five seconds between her son's departure and his death.
in consequence of the fright." (1 Moore on Facts, 63, citing Wilkinson vs. Payne, 4 T.
R. 468.)
It is said that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which the appellant
impugns, and which has been discussed, involves findings of fact which can not be
disturbed. The point is not, in our judgment, well considered. The particular
circumstances from which the parties and the Court of Appeals drew conclusions are,
as above seen, undisputed, and this being the case, the correctness or incorrectness
of those conclusions raises a question of law, not of fact, which the Supreme Court
has jurisdiction to look into. As was said in 1 Moran Commentaries on the Rules of
?Court, 3rd Ed. 856, 857, "Undisputed evidence is one thing, and contradicted
evidence is another. An incredible witness does not cease to be such because he is
not impeached or contradicted. But when the evidence is purely documentary, the
authenticity of which is not questioned and the only issue is the construction to be
placed thereon, or where a case is submitted upon an agreement of facts, or where
all the facts are stated in the judgment and the issue is the correctness of the
conclusions drawn therefrom, the question is one of law which may be reviewed by
the Supreme Court."

It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not conclusive. Section The question of whether upon given facts the operation of the statutory presumption
69(ii) of Rule 123 does not require that the inference necessary to exclude the is to be invoked is a question of law.
presumption therein provided be certain. It is the "particular circumstances from which
it (survivorship) can be inferred" that are required to be certain as tested by the rules The prohibition against intermeddling with decisions on questions of evidence refers
of evidence. In speaking of inference the rule can not mean beyond doubt, for to decisions supported by substantial evidence. By substantial evidence is meant real
"inference is never certainty, but if may be plain enough to justify a finding of fact." (In evidence or at least evidence about which reasonable men may disagree. Findings
re Bohenko's Estate, 4 N.Y.S. 2nd. 427, citing Tortora vs. State of New York, 269 grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures come within the
N.Y. 199 N.E. 44; Hart vs. Hudson River Bridge Co., 80 N.Y.). 622.) As the California exception to the general rule.
courts have said, it is enough that "the circumstances by which it is sought to prove
the survivorship must be such as are competent and sufficient when tested by the
general rules of evidence in civil cases." (In re Wallace's Estate, supra.) "Juries must We are constrained to reverse the decision under review, and hold that the
often reason," says one author, "according to probabilities, drawing an inference that distribution of the decedents' estates should be made in accordance with the decision
the main fact in issue existed from collateral facts not directly proving, but strongly of the trial court. This result precludes the necessity of passing upon the question of
tending to prove, its existence. The vital question in such cases is the cogency of the "reserva troncal" which was put forward on the hypothetical theory that Mrs. Joaquin
proof afforded by the secondary facts. How likely, according to experience, is the Navarro's death preceded that of her son. Without costs.
existence of the primary fact if certain secondary facts exist?" (1 Moore on Facts,
Sec. 596.) The same author tells us of a case where "a jury was justified in drawing
the inference that the person who was caught firing a shot at an animal trespassing
on his land was the person who fired a shot about an hour before at the same animal
also trespassing." That conclusion was not airtight, but rational. In fact, the
circumstances in the illustration leave greater room for another possibility than do the
facts of the case at hand.

In conclusion the presumption that Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before her son is
based purely on surmises, speculations, or conjectures without any sure foundation in
the evidence. the opposite theory — that the mother outlived her son — is deduced
from established facts which, weighed by common experience, engender the
inference as a very strong probability. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of
evidence by, which civil cases are decided, this inference ought to prevail. It can not
be defeated as in an instance, cited by Lord Chief Justice Kenyon, "bordering on the
ridiculous, where in an action on the game laws it was suggested that the gun with
which the defendant fired was not charged with shot, but that the bird might have died