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Economics of Education Review 53 (2016) 296–310

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Economics of Education Review


journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/econedurev

Are college costs worth it? How ability, major, and debt affect
the returns to schooling
Douglas A. Webber∗
Temple University Department of Economics and IZA, 1301 Cecil B. Moore Ave. Ritter Annex 883., Philadelphia, PA 19102, United States

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: This paper examines the financial value over the course of a lifetime of pursuing a college
Received 7 July 2015 degree under a variety of different settings (e.g. major, student loan debt, individual abil-
Revised 25 March 2016
ity). I account for ability/selection bias and the probability that entering freshmen will not
Accepted 22 April 2016
eventually graduate.
Available online 6 May 2016
I find the financial proposition of attending college is a sound investment for most individ-
JEL Classification: uals and cost scenarios, although some scenarios do not pay off until late in life, or ever. I
I23 estimate the present discounted value of attending college for the median student to vary
I22 between $85,0 0 0 and $30 0,0 0 0 depending on the student’s major. Most importantly, the
I26
results of this paper emphasize the role that risk (e.g. the nontrivial chance that a stu-
Keywords: dent will not eventually graduate) plays in the cost-benefit analysis of obtaining a college
Student loans degree.
Returns to education
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
College major

1. Introduction and the implications these returns have for paying off costs
associated with attending college.
Personal debt arising from student loans has steadily In order to do this, I extend the lifecycle earnings sim-
risen in recent years. The most recent graduating college ulation model developed by Webber (2014a) to examine
cohort is burdened by an average of roughly $30,0 0 0 in the expected returns to attending college to a hypotheti-
student loan debt, while the national total has surpassed cal high school senior. This approach allows me to estimate
$1.2 trillion, a figure that some claim represents an eco- the length of time it takes for a college degree to become
nomic bubble which could have substantial negative effects a positive financial proposition (taking into account the ex-
for future generations. plicit costs associated with attending college as well as the
These numbers beg the question: Is taking on substan- implicit opportunity cost and uncertainty associated with
tial student loan debt to (possibly) obtain a college degree completing the degree) under a wide variety of scenar-
a sound financial proposition? Unsurprisingly, this simple ios including different majors, student loan amounts, and
question has a complicated answer which depends on a ability levels. This approach allows me to correct for vari-
variety of factors, such as the student’s major, ability level, ous types of selection/ability bias, as well as the fact that
and probability of completing a degree, among many oth- approximately 40% of students will not graduate within 6
ers. This paper seeks to provide the most comprehensive years of beginning college (a critical, but often overlooked
statistics to date on the lifecycle returns to various majors, factor when evaluating the financial value of attending
college).
From the perspective of a high school senior decid-

Tel.: +1 2152045025. ing whether to attend college, what to major in, and how
E-mail address: douglas.webber@temple.edu much to pay for such an education, I find that college is

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2016.04.007
0272-7757/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
D.A. Webber / Economics of Education Review 53 (2016) 296–310 297

almost always the right financial decision in terms of the a conditional logit model of college choice, and are found
expected value of lifetime earnings. For students with aver- to be a significant factor in students’ decisions. For an ex-
age levels of debt, the anticipated returns will, in expecta- cellent review of the recent work on college major choice,
tion, outpace any costs by middle age or considerably ear- see Altonji. et al. (2012).
lier. The decision becomes much less clear, however, when Arcidiacono (2004) uses a dynamic discrete-choice
college costs and subsequent debt are high, and in particu- framework to estimate the impact of expected earnings on
lar when examining students at the lower end of the abil- major choice. While Arcidiacono (2004) concludes that ex-
ity distribution. For this group of students, a college degree pected earnings do play a role in major choice, the esti-
may not pay for itself until much later in life, and depend- mates are smaller in magnitude than the results of Berger
ing on the major, it may never be a good financial propo- (1988), a finding attributed to invalid exclusion restric-
sition. I estimate that the net present discounted value tions in the Berger (1988) Heckman model. In a more re-
for the median student ranges from $85,0 0 0 to $30 0,0 0 0 cent study of Duke University undergraduates, Arcidiacono,
across the various major categories, exceeding the costs Hotz, and Kang (2012) conclude that much of the selection
of attending the typical public institution, but potentially into majors is due to comparative advantage. Additionally,
falling short of the more expensive private institutions. Montmarquette, Cannings, and Mahseredjian (2002) find a
These findings translate to a number of policy impli- strong impact of expected earnings upon graduation from
cations. Most important among them is transparency and college in their model of major choice, which also accounts
dissemination of the expected financial returns to recent for relative major premiums and the likelihood of complet-
high school graduates who are making decisions about ing a given major. Wiswall and Zafar (2015) conclude, via
their educational future. The ethos surrounding postsec- experimental evidence, that both expected earnings and
ondary education has increasingly become akin to “A col- subjective tastes play a large role in major choice, but fail-
lege degree is the best outcome for everyone regardless of ing to account for subjective tastes may upwardly bias the
cost”. While true for most students, the results of this pa- importance of expected earnings.
per show that this does not apply to everyone, especially Another branch of the college premium literature fo-
when it concerns degrees with low financial returns and/or cuses on the differential returns to specific skills learned in
high levels of debt. Furthermore, the results presented be- college rather than majors. For example, Grogger and Eide
low make clear that importance of policies aimed at reduc- (1995) document the importance of math ability in ex-
ing or eliminating the risk of financing higher education plaining earnings differences, decomposing this effect into
(for example via an expansion of income-based repayment both the return to math ability and the change in the com-
policies or income share agreements) and programs which position of college graduates’ field of degree. Hamermesh
improve the completion rates of students. and Donald (2008) demonstrate that holding college ma-
The paper is constructed as follows: Section 2 discusses jor constant, there are substantial returns to taking upper-
the previous literature. Section 3 describes the data used to division science and math courses.
construct the lifetime earnings trajectories. Section 4 de- Robst (2007) provides evidence that there can be signif-
tails the empirical methodology used in the simulations. icant wage penalties for workers employed in fields differ-
Section 5 provides a discussion of the findings and their ent from their college major. This could lead to differences
implications, and Section 6 concludes. in the returns to college majors if there are differential
shifts in the supply/demand for each major, thus forcing
2. Previous literature some majors to work in outside fields more than others.
Many studies which examine the returns to specific ma-
This paper contributes to three related literatures: the jors have focused on the returns at a specific point in
returns to education, major choice, and student loans. This time rather than across the lifecycle - typically early career
section focuses mainly on the major choice and student earnings. A notable exception is Walker and Zhu (2011),
loan literatures due to the large scope and scale of the who decompose lifetime earnings by major, but due to
work focusing on the returns to education. For an overview data constraints, they are unable to account for endoge-
of the general returns to education, see Card (1999) or nous major choice. The empirical model in the current
Heckman, Lochner, Todd, (2006a). For work specifically paper extends the work of Webber (2014a), which docu-
dealing with the returns to a college degree, see Averett mented stark differences in lifetime earnings premia across
and Burton (1996), Brewer, Eide, and Ehrenberg (1999), majors after accounting for selection based on both cogni-
Dillon (2012), Goldin and Katz (2008), Grogger and Eide tive and noncognitive factors. A more detailed description
(1995) to name just a few. For recent reviews of hetero- of the model is given in Section 4.
geneous returns to human capital, see Altonji., Blom, and With regard to the literature on student loans, much of
Meghir (2012) or Webber (2014b). the work in this field – on loans and the relative value of
Much of the literature on college major choice focuses obtaining a college degree – is summarized in the excel-
on the role of expected earnings in students’ decisions. lent Journal of Economic Perspectives article by Avery and
Berger (1988) uses a Heckman selection framework, using Turner (2012). They provide a detailed history of student
family background characteristics as exclusion restrictions loan programs in the U.S., and a wealth of statistics on stu-
from the earnings equation to control for self-selection into dent debt. The chief aim of this manuscript is to provide a
majors and produces an estimate of the short-term ex- more formal and in depth treatment of the helpful back-of-
pected future earnings from each degree. The predicted fu- the-envelope calculations on the made in Avery and Turner
ture earnings for each major are subsequently included in (2012).
298 D.A. Webber / Economics of Education Review 53 (2016) 296–310

The student loan market in the U.S. is dominated by The NLSY79 is a panel dataset which began surveying
federally-backed loans 1 , with private student loans mak- 12,686 individuals annually between 1979 and 1994 and
ing up slightly less than ten percent of the market. The biennially between 1994 and the present. All respondents
logic behind this substantial federal investment is often were between the ages of 14 and 22 during the initial sur-
taught in most microeconomics principles courses: college- vey year of 1979. The NLSY is quite broad in its scope
educated labor produces substantial positive externalities of survey questions, and has been used countless times
(i.e. public health, crime), and therefore should be subsi- in the economics literature. It was designed in part to
dized. 2 Furthermore, human capital is not a viable form track the transition from school to work, and thus is well-
of collateral, leading private lending markets to undersup- suited for the current study. One of the most appealing at-
ply funds for human capital investment. tributes of the NLSY is the availability of cognitive ability
Students face a wide variety of options which govern measures. The Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) is a
the total cost and duration of a loan depending on the composite percentile rank of four subsections of the Armed
type and source (federal or private). These include inter- Forces Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB): word knowl-
est rates, borrowing caps, and repayment flexibility. Re- edge, paragraph comprehension, arithmetic reasoning, and
payment plans typically vary between 10 and 25 years, mathematics knowledge. Given its construction, the AFQT
with repayment schedules that can be fixed, graduated, or is comparable to standard college entrance test scores. The
income-contingent. 3 NLSY79 also contains data on two commonly used mea-
Another strand of the student loan literature exam- sures of noncognitive ability, the Rotter Scale which gauges
ines the impact of financial aid policy on college persis- locus of control and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Score. An
tence and the transition into the labor market. DesJardins, individual with a high score on the Rotter Scale believes
Ahlburg, and McCall (2002) estimate the impact of a num- their actions have little impact on the quality of their life,
ber of different student loan/scholarship policies on reten- and has commonly been used as a measure of noncogni-
tion and graduation. Rothstein and Rouse (2011) analyze tive skill in the labor literature (Heckman, Stixrud, & Urzua,
a natural experiment arising from one university’s finan- 2006b; Osborne-Groves, 2005). The Rosenberg Scale rep-
cial aid policies. They note that high levels of student debt resents an individual’s assessment of their self-esteem or
cause graduates to alter their occupational choices, choos- self worth. While it is less commonly used than the Rotter
ing higher paying jobs over “public interest” jobs. Scale, it is also seen as a viable measure of noncognitive
Related to the question of whether, and for whom, abilities in the education and labor literatures (Heckman
college is worth the investment is the question of who et al., 2006b; Murnane, Willett, Braatz, & Duhaldeborde,
defaults on student loans. Dynarski (1994) provided the 2001). As discussed in Heckman et al. (2006b), these vari-
first detailed evidence on this subject, finding unsurpris- ables are important components of the education selection
ingly that borrowers from low-income households, college mechanism. Since the measures of cognitive and noncog-
dropouts, and those with the lowest post-college earnings nitive ability were measured only once for each individual
were the most likely to default on their student loans. The between 1979 and 1981, I must make the assumption that
more recent study by Hillman (2014) finds many of the the economic impact of these qualities remains relatively
same results as Dynarski (1994) for the current cohort of constant over time. Fortunately, recent research supports
college students. Ionescu, (2009) tests the impact of var- this assumption (Cobb-Clark & Schurer, 2013).
ious student loan policies (e.g. repayment flexibility, eli- The NLSY97 is constructed in a similar way to the
gibility requirements) on schooling decisions and default NLSY79 except that it focuses on a more recent cohort (12–
rates using a structural model of human capital accumu- 16 years old as of December 31, 1996). The NLSY97 does
lation. not contain the Rotter or Rosenberg results, but instead in-
cludes substantially more information on personality traits,
3. Data attitudes, and expectations about life. The models which
use the NLSY97 data use each item of the Ten Item Per-
The data used in the lifecycle earnings simulation are sonality Inventory 4 to control for noncognitive skills.
collected from several sources: the National Longitudi- The ACS is a large-scale nationally representative sur-
nal Survey of Youth 1979 and 1997 waves (NLSY79 and vey which is designed to replace the decennial long-form
NLSY97); the 2014 American Community Survey (ACS); se- Census. It provides data on more than 3 million individu-
lect March Current Population Surveys (CPS) and the 1993 als every year, and allows for much finer geographic iden-
and 2003 waves of the National Survey of College Gradu- tifiers than any other national survey. The appeal of using
ates (NSCG). the ACS as opposed to other national surveys is twofold.
First, the ACS recently began asking respondents their ma-
1
jor field of study if they attended college. Second, the large
The four primary types are subsidized and unsubsidized Stafford
loans, Perkins loans, and Parent Loans for Undergraduates (PLUS). See
sample sizes for even the narrowest age group and major
Avery and Turner (2012) for a detailed description of each category of category bins allows for the precise estimation of regres-
loan. sion coefficients. The data for the current study are taken
2
Although not all studies conclude that enhanced student loan avail- from the 2012 ACS.
ability has a large impact on college enrollment (Nielsen, Sorensen, Taber,
2010).
3
For a thorough treatment of income-contingent loans in particular,
see Krueger and Bowen (1993), as well as Avery and Turner (2012) for
4
a broad overview of the various repayment types. See Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann (2003) for further details.
D.A. Webber / Economics of Education Review 53 (2016) 296–310 299

The NSCG is a survey of individuals with at least a In essence, I wish to estimate, for each year of an in-
bachelors degree conducted by the National Science Foun- dividual’s working life, what the returns to a given major
dation. I utilize the 1993 and 2003 waves of the NSCG to are. The NLSY samples allow me to (arguably) get close to
obtain information on the relative returns to different ma- such estimates by controlling for detailed personal charac-
jors at points in time not covered by the ACS. teristics and skills. The problem here is that the samples
Six educational outcomes examined in this paper: high are of only modest size, and I am constrained to a specific
school graduates with no college experience, some college cohort. By contrast, the ACS and NSCG samples are very
but no four-year degree, and four-year degrees in science, large, and provide more recent data. But in these datasets
technology, engineering, or math (STEM), business, social I do not have access to the detailed controls of the NLSY,
science, and arts/humanities. These categories are chosen and estimates of the returns to majors from the ACS and
to be broad enough to estimate precise differences in both NSCG are certainly (upwardly) biased due to selection into
the NLSY, NSCG, and ACS parameters. A complete account- college and into certain majors. My solution is to estimate
ing of each major can be found in the NLSY documentation the degree of selection bias from the NLSY samples, and
5 . Below are the major category groupings which I include then to use those bias estimates to adjust the coefficients I
in each bin for the purposes of this paper: estimate from the larger and more recent datasets.
STEM - Biological Sciences, Computer and Information The goal is to produce an expected lifetime earnings
Sciences, Engineering, Mathematics, Physical Sciences trajectory for each educational outcome for the most re-
Business - Business and Management cent cohort of graduates possible. This is difficult because
Social Science - Social Sciences, Psychology the oldest of individuals born between, say, 1975–84 are
Arts and Humanities - Theology, Letters, Library Sci- only 40. But pooling together all birth cohorts obscures
ence, Fine and Applied Arts, Foreign Languages, Architec- the fact that the returns to different majors and selection
ture into college and majors have likely changed drastically over
This list is certainly not collectively exhaustive, and time, and would therefore be less useful to policymakers
thus all majors not included in the above fields are cate- who care about current students.
gorized as “other” and included in each regression model I deal with this issue by using the NLSY97 to estimate
as such. The “other” category includes majors such as mil- the selection parameters and taking only those born after
itary science, education 6 , area studies, or interdisciplinary 1975 from the ACS and NSCG data to estimate the unad-
studies. This paper does not report results for the “other” justed earnings premia up to age 40. I then use older co-
category because of the dissimilar nature of the degrees horts age profiles and selection parameters to estimate the
contained in that group, however it is important to include shape of lifetime earnings after age 40 (i.e. peak, rate of
this outcome as a regressor in each model so that each of increase, rate of decline), but keep the young cohorts level
the college-level educational outcomes are collectively ex- trajectory.
haustive.
March CPS data from 1993 to 2003 are utilized because Magnitude of self-selection
the NSCG only contains data on college graduates. The CPS
is thus used to fill in data for those who have only a high Both cognitive and noncognitive abilities play a large
school dipoloma or some college but no degree. role in the choice of college major (Heckman et al., 2006b).
Given the strong positive link between these factors and
4. Empirical methodology
wages, failure to account for cognitive and noncognitive
This paper constructs a lifecycle earnings simulation measures will lead to an overstatement of the returns to
model which allows for the computation of estimates of education. The NLSY’s detailed set of variables provides
the age where a particular college degree’s value overtakes the ideal setting to measure the magnitude of this self-
the explicit (tuition and student loans) and implicit (oppor- selection.
tunity cost of time spent in college) costs of getting that Using both the NLSY79 and NLSY97 samples, the fol-
degree. Further, the model takes into account selection into lowing regressions are estimated:
college and specific majors based on cognitive and noncog- yi j = α0 + α1 Agei j + α2 Blacki + α3 Hispi + α4 Genderi
nitive factors and allows for one to look at heterogeneity
+ Educi γ + εi j (1)
across different levels of cognitive ability. The model is an
extension of the approach by Webber (2014a). Since the
process described below contains a number of steps and yi j = β0 + β1 Agei j + β2 Blacki + β3 Hispi + β4 Genderi
datasets, I begin with a broad overview of the procedure. + β5 AF QTi + Noncognitivei π + Educi δ + εi j (2)

5
The subscript i indexes individuals while j indexes age
http://www.nlsinfo.org/content/cohorts/nlsy79/other-documentation/
groupings. Thus, separate regressions are run for each of
codebook- supplement/nlsy79- attachment- 4- fields- study. Access date
4/20/2014 the following 6 age groups: 18–25, 26–30, 31–35, 36–40,
6
Education was not studied as a major category in this paper be- 41–45, 45+ in the NLSY79 and 4 age groups: 18–25, 26–30,
cause many states require some postgraduate work to be certified as a 31–35, and 36–40 in the NLSY97. The regressions are run
teacher long-term. Including individuals with post-graduate work would separately by age grouping rather than by each individual
introduce a large degree of endogeneity into the estimates due to selec-
tion. Not including these individuals but still looking at education majors
age to more precisely estimate each coefficient. The depen-
would produce a substantial underestimate of the returns to an education dent variable is the natural log of the prior year’s income
degree. from wages and salary. The variable age enters linearly into
300 D.A. Webber / Economics of Education Review 53 (2016) 296–310

each regression to account for earnings growth or decline has been utilized elsewhere in the literature on the returns
within each age category. Since the objective of this paper to college and ability, notably in Taber (2001).
is to quantify the lifetime earnings premium of obtaining The use of the AFQT percentile is attractive because
a given type of college degree (in other words to get as of its straightforward construction and interpretation (e.g.
close as possible to the value of obtaining a given degree moving up one percentile in the ability distribution). While
if a high school graduate on the margin of going to college this measure is certainly not a perfect barometer of cogni-
exogenously received that degree) all individuals without tive ability, it explains roughly ten percent of the variation
a high school diploma or with any postgraduate work are in yearly income all by itself 8 and is a mainstay in the
excluded from all analyses. As a result of these sample re- education literature.
strictions, having a high school diploma but never attend- I estimate two other models on the NLSY sample which
ing college is the omitted education category. Thus, educ is yield information on several types of selection which can
a vector of mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive be built into the simulation model. First, an ordered logit
(except for the base category: high school graduates) edu- which estimates the contribution of AFQT percentile to the
cational outcomes. This includes indicators for college at- likelihood of attending and completing college:
tendance but no degree, and a full compliment of college
P (educi = k ) = P (ck−1 < Xi β < ck ) (3)
degree types (STEM, Social Sciences, Business, Arts and Hu-
manities, and Other). AFQT represents the percentile rank Where education may take on three values (high school
of the individual’s score on the Armed Forces Qualifying diploma without any college, some college without a de-
Test 7 . Since the focus of this paper is on the returns to gree, any college degree), X is a vector consisting of race,
four-year degrees, individuals with an Associate’s Degree ethnicity, AFQT score, Rotter Scale, Rosenberg Self-Esteem
are not included in any estimation sample. Noncognitive Score, and mother’s education. Each ck represents a cut-
is a vector of variables measuring noncognitive skills in- point (by convention, c0 = −∞ and ck = ∞).
cluding the Rotter Scale, Rosenberg Scale, mother’s educa- Second, I estimate a multinomial logit of the contri-
tion, and the Ten Item Personality Inventory (See the data bution of AFQT percentile to major choice conditional on
section for a more detailed discussion of these measures). earning a college degree:
These controls are meant to proxy for traditionally unob- (k )
eX β
served ability, both cognitive and noncognitive, and repre- P (ma jor = k ) = 5 (4)
sent the only difference between the two equations. These 1+ k=1 eX β ( k ) )
variables are all potentially important since both cognitive where in this case k varies between the 5 major choices
and noncognitive abilities have been found to play a large studied (Social Sciences, Business, STEM, Arts and Human-
role in the choice of college major (Heckman et al., 2006b). ities, and Other), X is a vector consisting of race, ethnic-
As previously noted, the cognitive and noncognitive ability ity, AFQT score, Rotter Scale, Rosenberg Self-Esteem Score,
scores were measured only once, and thus these variables and mother’s education. As in all multinomial logit estima-
are assumed to remain relatively constant over time (an tions9 , the coefficients for one outcome (in this case Other)
assumption supported by Cobb-Clark & Schurer (2013)). are normalized to zero.
Additionally, the AFQT scores are normalized by the age at The results from these two models are used in the
which the test was taken to account for age-related bias earnings simulation to determine the level and major (if
(Heckman et al. (2006b)). the individual is assigned to be a college graduate) of each
The relatively parsimonious nature of Eqs. (1) and (2) is individual. This allows ability to impact future earnings
intentional, and is meant to avoid controlling for factors through a number of flexible pathways.
which are outcomes of educational choice but also influ-
ence earnings. For example, industry and occupation are Unadjusted earnings paths
often outcomes of major choice, and their inclusion in the
model would therefore bias the estimated major premia. Using the 2014 ACS, 1993 NSCG, and 2003 NSCG,
Thus, only a basic set of pre-market factors are included in Eq. (5) is run for each of 9 age groups (18–25, 26–30, 31–
each model. 35, 36–40, 41–45, 46–50, 51–55, 56–60, 61–65):
Taking the difference of the corresponding educa-
tion coefficients from each model (i.e. δSelection = γST EM, j −
ST EM, j yi j = β̌0 + β̌1( j ) agei j + β̌2 Blacki + β̌3 Hispi + β̌4 Genderi
δST EM, j ) yields an estimate of the selection bias usually + δ̌ educi + εi j (5)
present when we estimate education earnings premia.
These selection biases are used later to adjust estimated where the dependent variable is the natural log of prior
earnings premiums from the ACS, which have no suitable year earnings, and all independent variables are defined as
proxies for ability. This method of estimating selection bias described above. The coefficient on each education cate-
gory within each age grouping, as well as the variance of
residual log earnings, σeduc,
2
j
, for each education category
7
I experiment with the control variables entering into the model in
various less parametric functional forms (e.g. including higher order poly-
8
nomials, dummy variables for each AFQT decile, etc.). There is little dif- Author’s calculation based on regression sample used for this paper.
9
ference in the estimated education parameters across these specifications. The multinomial logit estimator also imposes the well-known In-
The results presented in this paper are therefore based on the most parsi- dependence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption. Montmarquette
monious model where each variable enters linearly into the log earnings et al. (2002) provides evidence that this assumption is satisfied for ap-
regressions. plications to college major choice.
D.A. Webber / Economics of Education Review 53 (2016) 296–310 301

and age grouping are saved. Additionally, I save the mean NSCG samples. Since the NLSY79 has very few respondents
and variance of log wages for workers with only a high over the age of 50, the selection parameters for the oldest
school diploma to use as a baseline to compare the major age group are estimated on a pooled sample of all obser-
premia. vations age 45 and up. This set of parameters is then ap-
plied to each of the four oldest ACS and NSCG age groups.
Life-cycle earnings simulation As described above, I use only those estimated parameters
generated from a sample born after 1975 for to populate
Normal cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) are earnings for ages 35 and below. For ages above 35, I use
generated for each educational outcome (High school grad- the older cohorts to determine the shape of the earnings
uate without any college, some college without degree, and paths and the differences between the pre-35 parameters
each major type) and age grouping is based on the coeffi- to set the level of earnings. Essentially, this makes the as-
cients from Eq. (5) and the variance of the residuals from sumption that the slope and peak of the earnings paths are
each group. similar across cohorts.
Finally, a dataset is populated with 10 0,0 0 0 simulated Once simulated earnings paths are generated, it is triv-
workers who are randomly assigned an ability level (1– ial to add other features to the model such as tuition costs,
100) and two uniform random shocks (one to go with the student loan repayments, or discounted future earnings. I
ordered logit and one for the multinomial logit). model student loan repayment according to the President
An individual is assigned a schooling level (high school, Obama’s June, 2014 executive order which sets student
some college, or college degree) based on the parameters loan monthly payments at ten percent of discretionary in-
estimated from the conditional logit as well as the ability come 10 .
and the first random shock values. Those with conditional One final important point to consider is that when eval-
logit scores in percentiles 64–100 of the distribution are uating the decision of whether to attend college, simply
assigned to have completed their degree in 4 years, 54– comparing the expected college or major premia (even if
64 in 5 years, and 44–54 in 6 years. These numbers were able to convincingly adjust for selection bias) to the earn-
chosen to match recent four, five, and six-year graduation ings of an individual with only a high school diploma will
rates from U.S. four-year institutions (National Center for necessarily overstate the value of attending college. This
Education Statistics). is because less than 60%11 of full-time first-year freshman
For those assigned to be college graduates, the coef- will graduate with a degree within six years of beginning
ficients on AFQT from the multinomial logit run on the college. A more useful statistic would calculate the ex-
NLSY sample are used in conjunction with the other ran- pected value of attending college, which is the average of
dom shock to assign a major to each graduate. earnings from those individuals who complete their college
Log earnings are then simulated for each year of labor degrees and those who do not, weighted by their respec-
force participation (18–64 for high school graduates, 20– tive shares in the population. As shown in Chen (2013),
64 for those with some college, and between 22–64 and dropout rates across different majors are quite similar.
24–64 for those with a college degree depending on the Thus, the results presented below, which incorporate un-
ordered logit score) based on the following equation: certainty around graduating, assume that the college non-
( j)
completion rate is constant across degrees. When factor-
j + δ̌ j − δSelection + β̌age (t − age
¯ j)
educ, j
yˆit = ȳHS educ
ing in debt and time outside of the labor force, students
( j) with “some college” are assumed to have attended school
+ β̌AF QT
(ability − 50 ) + f −1 (σeduc,
2
j) ∀t ∈ j (6)
for two years.
Eq. (6) describes the simulated log earnings for individ-
ual i at each age t. The first term on the right hand side is 5. Results
the average log earnings of high school graduates with no
college enrollment in age group j. The second term, δ̌ educ
j
, Table 1 reports summary statistics for the NLSY, ACS,
represents the estimated premium from the ACS and NSCG and NSCG samples. The large discrepancies in observable
for each educational category other than high school grad- characteristics, particularly education, are due to the NLSY
uates (some college, and each of the major categories) in survey being administered on average at younger ages,
age group j. δSelection represents the magnitude of selection
educ, j
and to an earlier cohort than the ACS/NSCG sample. This
for each educational category in age group j as estimated is not problematic for my estimation strategy, as described
via the NLSY. The fourth term adjusts the simulated earn- above, since I use data on the most recent birth cohort
ings for age differences within each age group j. This sim- (1975–84) to estimate the level of lifecycle earnings, and
ply accounts for the fact that there are returns (positive only rely on older cohorts to construct the shape of
or negative) to age/experience within small age groupings earnings paths for predicted earnings in later ages (which
without the loss of precision associated with estimating cannot be observed since they have not yet occurred).
age effects for every age. The next term creates dispersion Table 2 shows the expected value of lifetime earnings
based on the assigned ability score and the estimated co- of the median individual with various types of education
efficient on AFQT from each age-group specific regression
on the NLSY sample. The final term, the inverse normal 10
The difference between current income and the poverty line. For the
CDF for each educational category and age grouping, gen- purposes of this paper, I use the poverty line for single adults with no
erates dispersion in the simulated log earnings distribution dependents, or $11,670 in 2014 dollars.
based on the observed residual variation from the ACS and 11
Source: Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS)
302 D.A. Webber / Economics of Education Review 53 (2016) 296–310

Table 1 The final two rows illustrate how expected earnings


Summary statistics.
decrease once college costs are included in the simula-
NLSY NSCG ACS tion model. Average college costs include $30,0 0 0 of debt
at graduation subject to a 4.3% interest rate, and roughly
Black .263 .060 .099
Hispanic .162 .068 .105
$70 0 0 per year spent in college as costs which were not
High school .548 0 .355 financed by a student loan. These figures are chosen to
Some college .299 0 .385 match recent debt, government student loan rates, and
STEM .043 .406 .066 average public net tuition/fee statistics from the College
Business .047 .200 .068
Board (2015). The high college costs include $60,0 0 0 in
Social sciences .012 .106 .027
Arts and humanities .012 .116 .034 average debt at graduation subject to an interest rate of
Age 18–25 .228 .020 .106 11%, and roughly $20,0 0 0 per year spent in college as costs
Age 26–30 .233 .115 .102 which were not financed by a student loan. This level of
Age 31–35 .176 .160 .100 debt corresponds roughly to the 90th percentile of student
Age 36–40 .112 .160 .106
loan debt with an interest rate offered by a private bank,
Age 41–45 .104 .153 .118
Age 46–50 .102 .125 .140 and the costs correspond to a school with a net cost of
Age 51–55 .045 .093 .142 $30,0 0 0 per year.
Age 56–60 0 .068 .118 Notably, all major categories have an expected return
Age 61–64 0 .051 .065
considerably greater than a high school degree, even after
Observations 104,773 135,516 921,897
considering the uncertainty of completing a degree. This
The unit of observation in each sample is a person-year. Only individu- holds for virtually the entire domain of college costs indi-
als who have at least a high school diploma but no postgraduate work
viduals could face. Fig. 3 shows expected cumulative earn-
are retained in the sample. Individuals who are currently enrolled in
college or the military, or who have no positive earnings over the past ings of the median individual under the average college
year, are excluded. costs scenario, and Fig. 4 depicts the high cost simulation.
While Table 2 indicates that attending college is clearly
a good financial proposition for the median individual,
and under a variety of different circumstances. As pre- those lower in the ability distribution may face a more
viously noted, these figures do not represent the actual uncertain decision. Table 3 displays expected earnings for
earnings that a college graduate would make over his or those at the 25th percentile of the ability distribution 14 .
her career 12 , but rather expected values, which take into Each major category is still a better proposition than a
account the possibility that roughly 40% of students will high school diploma alone, however the magnitude of the
not graduate from college in six years. These figures are premia is significantly smaller. The expected value premia
therefore of much greater relevance to a hypothetical high range from $220,0 0 0 for Arts/Humanities to ˜$40 0,0 0 0 for
school senior deciding whether to attend college and what STEM/Business majors assuming average college costs. As-
to major in than the simple college/major premia which suming high costs, however, leads to only a very small life-
are typically reported. The second row in Table 2 presents time premia for Arts/Humanities majors.
expected lifetime earnings with the estimated ability The results from Table 3 imply that on average, most
premium removed 13 . The difference between earnings in college degrees are a good financial proposition for even
columns (2)–(5) and column (1) represent the additional relatively low ability individuals. However, a number of
expected value of each educational outcome over a high factors may swing this calculation in the other direction.
school diploma for the median individual in the popu- First and foremost, as illustrated in Table 3, is costs. The
lation, assuming that a college education is completely relationship between cost and college quality can be fairly
free. Figs. 1 and 2 show cumulative earnings (assuming tenuous, particularly among some private colleges. Among
no explicit college costs) without and with the selection lower ability workers, taking out substantial debt to
correction.

14
The proportion of students who graduate is altered for these models
12
See Webber (2014a) for these figures. based on the relationship between AFQT and the probability of graduating
13
See Webber (2014a) for robustness checks and a more thorough treat- college conditional on having some college experience in the NLSY97. The
ment of the relationship between ability/selection bias and major choice. assumed graduation rate for these students is 44%.

Table 2
Simulated expected lifetime earnings for the median individual.

High school Some college STEM Business Social sciences Arts/Humanities

No selection correction 1,418,436 1,832,346 2,259,873 2,330,740 2,137,496 1,927,236


(1) With selection correction 1,418,436 1,709,833 2,063,462 2,116,338 1,901,562 1,687,794
(2) With average college expenses 1,418,436 1,693,442 2,044,635 2,088,476 1,877,473 1,662,208
(2) With high college expenses 1,418,436 1,585,997 1,844,026 1,902,298 1,666,269 1,434,531

Each value in the first four rows represents the median cumulative lifetime earnings as estimated from Eq. (6)associated with each
educational outcome given the assumptions listed in the first column. The results are obtained from a simulated sample of 10 0,0 0 0
individuals. All inputs to Eq. (6)are obtained by estimating Eqs. (1)–(5) with the conditions described in the first column. Bootstrapped
standard errors for each model are small (roughly $10,0 0 0–$20,0 0 0), and are available upon request.
D.A. Webber / Economics of Education Review 53 (2016) 296–310 303

Fig. 1. Cumulative Earnings Paths without Ability Correction.

Fig. 2. Cumulative Earnings Paths with Ability Correction.


304 D.A. Webber / Economics of Education Review 53 (2016) 296–310

Fig. 3. Cumulative Earnings Paths with Average College Costs and Debt.

Fig. 4. Cumulative Earnings Paths with High College Costs and Debt.
D.A. Webber / Economics of Education Review 53 (2016) 296–310 305

Table 3
Simulated expected lifetime earnings for an individual at the 25th percentile of the ability distribution.

High school Some college STEM Business Social sciences Arts/Humanities

No selection correction 1,270,208 1,629,102 1,790,741 1,847,677 1,753,111 1,694,265


(1) With selection correction 1,270,208 1,516,643 1,661,115 1,689,910 1,606,987 1,517,325
(2) With average college expenses 1,270,208 1,500,281 1,636,408 1,671,878 1,589,812 1,490,017
(2) With high college expenses 1,270,208 1,380,162 1,485,378 1,522,607 1,423,919 1,316,112

Each value in the first four rows represents the median cumulative lifetime earnings as estimated from Eq. (6)associated with each
educational outcome given the assumptions listed in the first column. The results are obtained from a simulated sample of 10 0,0 0 0
individuals. All inputs to Eq. (6)are obtained by estimating Eqs. (1)–(5) with the conditions described in the first column. Bootstrapped
standard errors for each model are small (roughly $10,0 0 0-$20,0 0 0), and are available upon request.

finance a college degree, particularly one without large fi- As with Tables 2 and 3, the decision of whether to fi-
nancial returns, does not have the financial payoff likely nance a college degree becomes murky when the costs are
hoped for. Majoring in a STEM field while also paying high high, especially for those with lower innate ability. A col-
college costs has an expected premium of only a little lege degree does not become a positive proposition for the
more than $20 0,0 0 0, while the expected return on a sim- median individual until middle age when paying relatively
ilar Arts/Humanities degree is substantively zero for those high college costs, with breakeven ages of 42, 41, 46, and
at the 25th percentile of the ability distribution. 64 for STEM, Business, Social Science, and Arts/Humanities
Furthermore, there is substantial heterogeneity in the majors respectively. For those at the 25th percentile of the
returns of specific majors within the broad groups pre- ability distribution, the breakeven ages are 45, 45, and 50
sented in this paper. Biology majors earn premia that is in for STEM, Business, and Social Science (the prospect of an
line with Arts/Humanities majors, and Economists are out- Arts/Humanities degree never reaches the breakeven point
earned only by select STEM engineering/computer science under the high cost scenario).
majors. Additionally, there are likely heterogeneous returns Moderate discounting of future earnings (or virtually
across school quality or institution type (Dale & Krueger, any discounting in the case of Arts/Humanities) would ap-
2011; Hoekstra, 2009) which make the decision to heavily pear to eliminate most or all of the college major pre-
finance college a losing proposition at an institution with mium when having to pay substantial college costs. As a
lower returns. 15 To the extent that such heterogeneous re- caveat to these results, remember that all numbers in this
turns exist, individuals at the lower end of the academic manuscript represent expected values, and thus some in-
ability distribution would certainly benefit less from a col- dividuals will do better (those who graduate), while others
lege degree, meaning that the estimates presented above will do much worse (those who fail to graduate). Further,
for those at the 25th percentile of the ability distribution these numbers only reflect returns in the form of salary.
should be thought of as upper bounds. To the degree that there are greater nonmonetary returns
Another point to consider when evaluating the decision (i.e. better benefits, more favorable workplace characteris-
of whether, and how much, to pay for a college education, tics, etc.) to a college degree over high school, these re-
is how long it takes for the expected value of a college sults will understate the value of a degree. Furthermore, it
degree to exceed that of a high school diploma. Tables 4 should be noted that the results presented represent only
presents the age at which each major category’s cumu- the returns to the individual. Given that attending college
lative expected earnings equate to the expected value of gives individuals access to the college marriage market, the
a high school diploma (net of all college costs). Average financial returns to a household are larger than those pre-
and high college costs are defined in the same way as in sented here.
Tables 2 and 3. It is certainly true that different people will receive
Assuming low to average college costs, most degrees vastly different levels of satisfaction from the careers that
pay for themselves by a fairly early age. An individual at each degree opens up to them. The results in this paper are
the median of the ability distribution is expected to have meant to capture only the financial returns, and are thus
made up for all college costs (explicit costs plus oppor- of the greatest benefit to those whose nonmonetary pref-
tunity cost of time spent in college and not in the labor erences are similar between given educational choices. The
force) by their early to mid thirties, regardless of degree. results are similar when the models are estimated sepa-
The expected breakeven age for an Arts/Humanities major rately by gender as shown in Appendix Tables 1–3 (Males)
at the 25th percentile of the ability distribution is 40, as- and Appendix Tables 4–6 (Females).
suming average costs. Thus, even with a high degree of dis- To get a sense of how discounting affects the finan-
counting for future earnings, the average cost of college is cial value of each major category, Table 5 reports the net
more than made up for early in life for the vast majority present discounted value at age 65 of each degree rela-
of the population. tive to the typical high school graduate. A discount rate
of three percent is chosen to correspond roughly to the
current expected inflation rate. The present values for the
median individual range between $85 thousand for an
15
It should be noted that while those at the lower end of the academic
Arts/Humanities diploma to ˜$300 for STEM/Business de-
ability distribution are less likely to graduate from college, those who do
still appear to receive premia similar to the average college graduate Ost,
grees. Notably, these values are all substantially greater
Pan, and Webber (2016). than the cost of attending the typical public university, and
306 D.A. Webber / Economics of Education Review 53 (2016) 296–310

Table 4
Breakeven ages with selection correction.

STEM Business Social Arts/Humanities


sciences

Median ability
No college expenses 31 31 32 35
Average college expenses 31 32 33 41
High college expenses 42 41 46 64
25th percentile ability
No college expenses 31 31 33 37
Average college expenses 33 33 36 40
High college expenses 45 45 50 –

Each entry represents the expected age at which in which cumulative earnings (subtracting off college
costs) of individuals with a given degree at either the median or 25th percentile of the ability distri-
bution exceeds the cumulative earnings for a similar high school graduate with no college experience.
Average college costs include $30,0 0 0 of debt at graduation subject to a 4.3% interest rate, and roughly
$70 0 0 per year spent in college as costs which were not financed by a student loan. These figures are
chosen to match recent debt, government student loan rates, and average public net tuition/fee statistics
from the College Board. The high college costs include $60,0 0 0 in average debt at graduation subject to
an interest rate of 11%, and roughly $20,0 0 0 per year spent in college as costs which were not financed
by a student loan. This level of debt corresponds roughly to the 90th percentile of student loan debt
with an interest rate offered by a private bank, and the costs correspond to a school with a net cost of
$35,0 0 0 per year. Bootstrapped standard errors for each model are small (roughly .2–.3 years), and are
available upon request.

Table 5
Present discounted value of degree.

STEM Business Social sciences Arts/Humanities

Median ability
No correction 532,190 571,480 391,023 204,166
Correct for graduation uncertainty 361,973 394,506 315,003 194,190
Correct for graduation uncertainty & ability 276,127 296,237 217,069 84,658
25th percentile ability
No correction 463,968 530,189 340,536 204,037
Correct for graduation uncertainty 219,391 242,245 210,044 167,703
Correct for graduation uncertainty & ability 159,130 179,277 136,280 80,028

Each entry represents the present discounted value assuming a discount rate of 3%. The graduation
uncertainty correction incorporates the probability that an individual attending college will not actually
graduate (roughly 40% on average). The ability correction implements the procedure described in the
text and are obtained by estimating Eqs. (1)–(5).

all but Arts/Humanities diplomas are worth more than the Chen (2013). 17 The differences between Tables 5 and 6 are
cost of attending an expensive private institution. The esti- predictable, but interesting nonetheless. Beginning STEM
mated values for individuals at the 25th ability percentile and Business majors are less lucrative because there is now
are lower, ranging from $80 thousand to $170 thousand, a possibility that these students will end up with degrees
but are still clearly worth a modest investment. Looking having somewhat lower earning potential (and the reverse
within each panel, the importance of accounting for both is true for those who begin college as Arts/Humanities ma-
ability/selection bias and the likelihood of not graduating is jors).
noticeable. Failing to incorporate these corrections leads to It is also important to note that, in many of the sce-
a sizable overestimate of the value of a degree ($120,0 0 0– narios illustrated in the tables, college is clearly a sound
$270,0 0 0 depending on the major). Comparing the top and financial investment because of the long time horizon as-
bottom panels, it becomes clear that the value of a college sumed in this model. The financial calculus is likely to be
degree is increasing in ability 16 . much different when analyzing the education decisions of
In addition to students facing uncertainty over whether non-traditional students who are entering or returning to
they will eventually obtain a college degree, there is also
uncertainty over whether they will finish the major that 17
While a full transition matrix between every major category is not
they begin their college careers with. Table 6 reports available, an examination of Figs. 2 and 3, along with Table 2, yields many
present discounted values for beginning one’s college ca- of the necessary probabilities. Based on these figures, I let 28% of students
reer in each of four major categories, but not necessar- switch their major, and among the switchers use the following transi-
ily finishing with the same major. Hypothetical students tion probabilities: STEM to Business – 50%, STEM to Social Sciences – 30%
STEM to Arts/Humanities – 20%, Business to Social Sciences – 50% Busi-
switch majors according to transition probabilities from
ness to Arts/Humanities – 30%, Business to STEM – 20%, Social Sciences to
Business – 50%, Social Sciences to Arts/Humanities – 30% Social Sciences
to STEM – 20%, Arts/Humanities to Social Sciences – 50%, Arts/Humanities
16
This is not a new finding; see, for instance Martins and Pereira (2004) to Business – 30%, and Art/Humanities to STEM – 20%.
D.A. Webber / Economics of Education Review 53 (2016) 296–310 307

Table 6
Present discounted value of degree (Allowing for major switching).

STEM Business Social sciences Arts/Humanities

Median ability
No correction 494,350 525,473 389,560 318,673
Correct for graduation uncertainty 355,348 343,294 265,446 235,746
Correct for graduation uncertainty & ability 264,596 242,444 173,557 123,314
25th percentile ability
No correction 456,393 496,132 351,953 272,047
Correct for graduation uncertainty 201,405 209,155 177,607 161,072
Correct for graduation uncertainty & ability 140,626 145,510 109,970 88,488

Each entry represents the present discounted value assuming a discount rate of 3%. The graduation uncertainty correc-
tion incorporates the probability that an individual attending college will not actually graduate (roughly 40% on aver-
age). The ability correction implements the procedure described in the text and are obtained by estimating Eqs. (1)–(5).
In this set of simulations, students are allowed to switch majors according to the transition probabilities described in
the text. Each value thus represents the net present discounted value of beginning, but not necessarily finishing in the
associated major category.

Fig. 5. Likelihood of Educational Choice Being a Winning Financial Proposition (High College Costs).

college later in life, and thus have a shorter period of time with prospective Social Science degrees paying for them-
to recoup their costs. selves 63% of the time, and Arts/Humanities only 50%.
A final way to analyze the financial risk/return associ-
ated with educational choices is to examine the likelihood 6. Conclusion
that a given degree will pay itself off. This is important
given the substantial heterogeneity in returns we observe This paper attempts to provide some of the most com-
in the labor market due to a variety of factors (e.g. school prehensive evidence to date on the question of whether,
quality, specific major, luck). Fig. 5 plots the probability of and for whom, a college degree is worth the invest-
cumulative earnings (net of costs) being greater than the ment. I evaluate the role of innate ability, student debt,
median earnings of a high school graduate under the high and major choice on the expected value of a college de-
cost scenario (The median high school graduate is included gree. Using a methodology which simulates lifetime earn-
in the figure as a reference). The proposition of the aver- ings trajectories, while also addressing selection bias into
age STEM or Business degree is predicted to be a positive college and across majors, I produce estimates of the
financial proposition for roughly 73% of prospective stu- expected value of a college degree under various sce-
dents. The other major groupings do not fare quite as well, narios which are relevant to a graduating high school
308 D.A. Webber / Economics of Education Review 53 (2016) 296–310

Table A.1
Simulated expected lifetime earnings for the median individual (Males only).

High school Some college STEM Business Social sciences Arts/Humanities

No selection correction 1,470,064 1,878,089 2,362,282 2,511,763 2,314,780 2,066,705


(1) With selection correction 1,470,064 1,747,305 2,168,258 2,279,710 2,067,954 1,822,043
(2) With average college expenses 1,470,064 1,734,977 2,144,540 2,250,010 2,044,771 1,786,932
(2) With high college expenses 1,470,064 1,623,910 1,943,409 2,039,029 1,816,959 1,565,775

Each value in the first four rows represents the median cumulative lifetime earnings as estimated from Eq. (6) associated with each
educational outcome given the assumptions listed in the first column. The results are obtained from a simulated sample of 10 0,0 0 0
individuals. All inputs to Eq. (6) are obtained by estimating Eqs. (1)–(5) with the conditions described in the first column. Bootstrapped
standard errors for each model are small (roughly $10,0 0 0–$20,0 0 0), and are available upon request.

Table A.2
Simulated expected lifetime earnings for an individual at the 25th percentile of the ability distribution (Males only).

High school Some college STEM Business Social sciences Arts/Humanities

No selection correction 1,317,140 1,669,212 1,823,406 1,891,248 1,841,518 1,761,657


(1) With selection correction 1,317,140 1,554,084 1,697,969 1,747,270 1,693,814 1,602,880
(2) With average college expenses 1,317,140 1,537,207 1,682,974 1,727,012 1,661,658 1,576,567
(2) With high college expenses 1,317,140 1,417,060 1,537,592 1,578,889 1,501,505 1,387,580

Each value in the first four rows represents the median cumulative lifetime earnings as estimated from Eq. (6) associated with each
educational outcome given the assumptions listed in the first column. The results are obtained from a simulated sample of 10 0,0 0 0
individuals. All inputs to Eq. (6) are obtained by estimating Eqs. (1)–(5) with the conditions described in the first column. Bootstrapped
standard errors for each model are small (roughly $10,0 0 0–$20,0 0 0), and are available upon request.

Table A.3
Breakeven ages with selection correction (Males only).

STEM Business Social sciences Arts/Humanities

Median ability
No college expenses 31 31 33 37
Average college expenses 32 32 35 41
High college expenses 42 41 45 56
25th percentile ability
No college expenses 32 32 34 38
Average college expenses 34 34 36 40
High college expenses 46 44 48 54

Each entry represents the expected age at which in which cumulative earnings (subtracting off college costs) of individuals
with a given degree at either the median or 25th percentile of the ability distribution exceeds the cumulative earnings for a
similar high school graduate with no college experience. Average college costs include $30,0 0 0 of debt at graduation subject
to a 4.3% interest rate, and roughly $70 0 0 per year spent in college as costs which were not financed by a student loan.
These figures are chosen to match recent debt, government student loan rates, and average public net tuition/fee statistics
from the College Board. The high college costs include $60,0 0 0 in average debt at graduation subject to an interest rate of
11%, and roughly $20,0 0 0 per year spent in college as costs which were not financed by a student loan. This level of debt
corresponds roughly to the 90th percentile of student loan debt with an interest rate offered by a private bank, and the
costs correspond to a school with a net cost of $35,0 0 0 per year. Bootstrapped standard errors for each model are small
(roughly .2–.3 years), and are available upon request.

Table A.4
Simulated expected lifetime earnings for the median individual (Females only).

High school Some college STEM Business Social sciences Arts/Humanities

No selection correction 1,333,077 1,849,806 2,238,312 2,246,242 2,031,439 1,853,213


(1) With selection correction 1,333,077 1,725,128 2,046,368 2,032,990 1,830,900 1,626,317
(2) With average college expenses 1,333,077 1,710,999 2,022,752 2,010,979 1,805,118 1,600,916
(2) With high college expenses 1,333,077 1,601,156 1,810,039 1,797,807 1,566,246 1,368,172

Each value in the first four rows represents the median cumulative lifetime earnings as estimated from Eq. (6) associated with each
educational outcome given the assumptions listed in the first column. The results are obtained from a simulated sample of 10 0,0 0 0
individuals. All inputs to Eq. (6) are obtained by estimating Eqs. (1)–(5) with the conditions described in the first column. Bootstrapped
standard errors for each model are small (roughly $10,0 0 0–$20,0 0 0), and are available upon request.

senior making college decisions. Furthermore, I produce I find that attending college is a good financial propo-
estimates of the breakeven age, the age at which the sition under most scenarios, even when taking into ac-
added value of a college degree outweighs the explicit count the uncertainty of actually completing a degree. For
(e.g. tuition, debt, etc.) and implicit (opportunity cost an individual with average ability, the value added of the
of time spent out of the labor force) costs of attend- vast majority of majors is worth well beyond the typical
ing college, under a variety of ability, debt, and major costs associated with a four-year public institution. Even
permutations. for students at lower levels of ability (25th percentile),
D.A. Webber / Economics of Education Review 53 (2016) 296–310 309

Table A.5
Simulated expected lifetime earnings for an individual at the 25th percentile of the ability distribution (Females only).

High school Some college STEM Business Social sciences Arts/Humanities

No selection correction 1,180,984 1,639,716 1,789,042 1,819,188 1,722,468 1,663,203


(1) With selection correction 1,180,984 1,525,568 1,648,065 1,673,546 1,572,352 1,489,012
(2) With average college expenses 1,180,984 1,509,487 1,630,633 1,649,734 1,554,423 1,472,698
(2) With high college expenses 1,180,984 1,385,255 1,472,650 1,482,913 1,353,838 1,295,916

Each value in the first four rows represents the median cumulative lifetime earnings as estimated from Eq. (6) associated with
each educational outcome given the assumptions listed in the first column. The results are obtained from a simulated sample of
10 0,0 0 0 individuals. All inputs to Eq. (6) are obtained by estimating Eqs. (1)–(5) with the conditions described in the first column.
Bootstrapped standard errors for each model are small (roughly $10,0 0 0–$20,0 0 0), and are available upon request.

Table A.6
Breakeven ages with selection correction (Females only).

STEM Business Social sciences Arts/Humanities

Median ability
No college expenses 30 30 32 34
Average college expenses 31 31 33 39
High college expenses 42 41 50 –
25th percentile ability
No college expenses 31 31 33 38
Average college expenses 32 32 37 40
High college expenses 46 46 53 64

Each entry represents the expected age at which in which cumulative earnings (subtracting off college
costs) of individuals with a given degree at either the median or 25th percentile of the ability distri-
bution exceeds the cumulative earnings for a similar high school graduate with no college experience.
Average college costs include $30,0 0 0 of debt at graduation subject to a 4.3% interest rate, and roughly
$70 0 0 per year spent in college as costs which were not financed by a student loan. These figures are
chosen to match recent debt, government student loan rates, and average public net tuition/fee statistics
from the College Board. The high college costs include $60,0 0 0 in average debt at graduation subject to
an interest rate of 11%, and roughly $20,0 0 0 per year spent in college as costs which were not financed
by a student loan. This level of debt corresponds roughly to the 90th percentile of student loan debt
with an interest rate offered by a private bank, and the costs correspond to a school with a net cost of
$35,0 0 0 per year. Bootstrapped standard errors for each model are small (roughly .2–.3 years), and are
available upon request.

most degrees are worth the usual investment. However, likelihood of persistence and graduation on college cam-
those lower ability students who pay substantially more puses. Proposals of the first type typically involve either a
than the average college costs may not see their invest- broad expansion of income-based repayment programs or
ment pay off until much later in life, and depending on the implementation of income share agreements in which
their major the degree may never pay itself off. a college education would be fully financed by an investor
The figures presented above imply a variety of poten- in exchange for a percentage of a student’s future earnings.
tial policy implications. First and foremost is the need Policies of the second type would focus on the factors
to provide added transparency and information to stu- which drive degree noncompletion. A recent proliferation
dents. The substantial heterogeneity in outcomes across of remedial class requirements, particularly at two-year
the hypothetical scenarios examined underscores that colleges, is aimed at noncompletion driven by poor prior
decisions made by students at age 18 can have drastic and academic preparation. Despite this widespread growth of
far-reaching effects on their financial well-being later in such courses, there is little evidence of increased degree
life. Young adults are often told that college is the best attainment (Long & Boatman, 2013). While much of the fo-
path to financial success, but nothing about how that cus of policymakers is typically trained on programs pro-
potential success varies by degree and ability, or whether moting college access, they will be of little longterm value
taking out massive debt might not be worth it. without the development and evaluation of policies which
Moreover, the estimates presented above make the improve the retention and graduation of students already
point that in an age of increasing college attendance but enrolled.
stagnant graduation rates, policymakers should go beyond
the returns to higher education and focus on the signifi-
cant risk which is inherent in the decision to attend col- Acknowledgment
lege. Even if obtaining a college degree is still a “good bet”
in purely financial terms, it is nowhere near the windfall I have greatly benefited from the advice of Ron Ehren-
it is portrayed as once the risks of not graduating are ac- berg, Matthew Freedman, J. Catherine Maclean, and Moritz
counted for. Ritter. I would also like to sincerely thank seminar partic-
I see this arguing in favor of two broad sets of policies, ipants at Temple University and the Industrial and Labor
those which reduce or eliminate the risk to the student Relations Section at Princeton University for their many
of pursuing an education, and those which increase the helpful comments.
310 D.A. Webber / Economics of Education Review 53 (2016) 296–310

Appendix Heckman, J., Stixrud, J., & Urzua, S. (2006b). The effects of cognitive and
noncognitive abilities on labor market outcomes and social behavior.
Journal of Labor Economics, 24(3), 411–482.
See Tables A.1–A.6. Hillman, N. (2014). College on credit: a multilevel analysis of student loan
default. The Review of Higher Education, 37(2), 169–195.
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