Critical Thinking by Example

Critical thinking by example
1. Elemetary standardizing
Material covered in this chapter
 1.1 Two Conventions for Standardizing
 1.2 Five argument Types
1.1 Two Conventions for Standardizing

To standardize an argument is to break it down into its components in a manner that shows
the logical relationships between the parts. An argument, in our technical sense, is a reason
or reasons offered in support of a conclusion. So, for anything to qualify as an argument it
must have two components: at least one reason and one conclusion. Standardizing involves
identifying these component parts. Thus with respect to example 1.1:
Example 1.1: A simple argument

John is over two meters tall, so he is tall.
The conclusion is "he is tall", and the reason to believe the conclusion is "John is over 2
meters tall".
If all arguments were as elementary as example 1.1, there would be little call to develop
standardization conventions, but arguments can be quite complex, and so we need to
develop some notation to keep track of everything. One variant, 'standard notation',
designates reasons or premises with a 'P' and an associated numeral, and a conclusion or
conclusions with a 'C' and an associated numeral. Thus, example 1.1 in standard notation
would be presented as follows:
Example 1.2: A simple argument in standard notation

P1: John is over two meters tall.
C: John is tall.
The premise, 'P1', is offered in support of the conclusion, 'C'. A second convention involves
diagramming. We can insert numerals into 1.1 like so:
Example 1.3: A simple argument with numerals inserted

[1] John is over two meters tall, [2] so he is tall.
The associated diagram is given in 1.4:
We read diagrams from the bottom up, with each arrow representing 'therefore'. In other
words, we read 1.3 as 1, therefore 2, and substitute in the propositions for 1 and 2, that is,
[1] John is over two meters tall, therefore [2] John is tall.
1.2 Five Argument Types

The arguments we will discuss in this work are either one of the five types given in
example 1.5, or a combination of two or more of these five argument types.
We have seen a simple argument above (example 1.1). Here are examples of the remaining
four:
Notice that the numbers function merely like names, their order or size make no
difference. We could have just as easily written '157' as opposed to '1'. Also, look at 1 in
the argument. It is a main premise because it supports the main conclusion, but 1 is also
a conclusion, since 2 supports it. We will term this a 'subconclusion'. Something that is
both a conclusion and a premise for a further conclusion is a subconclusion. 2 is a
subpremise, since it supports a subconclusion, not the main conclusion. In other words,
any premise that does not directly support a main conclusion is a subpremise.
Notice how in a linked argument the premises must work together to support the
conclusion. [3] on its own does not support the conclusion without the knowledge that
Lassie is a dog, and [2] does not support the conclusion without the knowledge that
dogs are mammals. So, [2] and [3] need each other to provide any reason to believe the
conclusion.
Notice that both [2] and [3] on their own provide some reason to believe the
conclusion. The two independent reasons converge on the same conclusion.
Premise [1] is offered in support of two distinct conclusions: [2] and [3]. o:p>
2. Basic Argument Evaluation
 2.1 The definition of a good argument

 2.2 Three Fallacies
2.1 The Definition of a Good Argument
A good argument is one that meets these three conditions: (1) The premise set is
relevant to the conclusion, (2) the premise set is sufficient for the conclusion, and (3)
the premises are acceptable.
Example 2.1: A good argument.

[1] All humans are mortal. [2] Socrates is a human. [3] So,
Socrates is mortal.
The premises [1] and [2] are acceptable, since they are true. The premises are relevant
to the conclusion [3] and sufficient, so this is a good argument.
2.2 Three Fallacies

It may help to understand the definition of a good argument by considering bad
arguments, that is, arguments that fail to meet one of the three conditions for a good
argument. We will define three fallacies, characteristic ways people make bad
arguments, to illustrate failure of each conditions.
Fallacy of Irrelevant Reason Example 2.2: An argument that

commits the fallacy of Irrelevant
Reason
Definition: An argument contains this P1: Some people are worried about the
fallacy if the premise set is irrelevant to fate of polar bears with the melting of the
the question of whether we should accept arctic ice.
the conclusion. C: Therefore, all polar bears are white.
Note: example 2.2 is purposely

ridiculous to exemplify the underlying
pattern. Even though the premise is true,
it provides us no reason to believe that
the conclusion is true. The premise is
irrelevant to the conclusion. Most
arguments that commit the fallacy of
irrelevant reason are more subtle than
this, but the underlying pattern is the
same.
Fallacy of Hasty Conclusion: An Example 2.3: An argument that

argument contains this fallacy if the commits the fallacy of Hasty
premise set is insufficient to warrant the Conclusion
acceptance of the conclusion.
P1: All the polar bears we saw at the zoo
today are white.
C: So, all polar bears are white.
The conclusion is hasty because even if
the premise is acceptable it does not
provide sufficient support for the
conclusion. The premise does not address
the question of the color of polar bears
that are not in the zoo. In other words, a
good argument for the conclusion would
include evidence about the color of polar
bears wherever polar bears are found.
Fallacy of Problematic Premise: An Example 2.4: An argument that
argument contains this fallacy if the commits the fallacy of Problematic
premise set contains a premise that Premise
cannot be granted (accepted by the
audience) without further support. P1: All the polar bears we saw at the zoo
today were brown and small.
C: Not all polar bears are whi
Notice that with example 2.4 the premise

is relevant; it gives us some reason to
believe the conclusion. Indeed, if the
premise is true, it provides all the reason
we need to believe the conclusion. To see
the problem with this argument, imagine
a friend of yours made this argument to
you. Would you believe the premise?
You probably wouldn’t without further
evidence. You might ask your friend to
convince you that she had not mistaken
brown bears for polar bears. Perhaps
your friend might convince you that this
did not happen, but still this means that
P1 requires more evidence for it to be
acceptable. As it stands, it is an
unacceptable premise.
3. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

 3.1 The meaning of necessary and sufficient conditions
 3.2 Conditionals and necessary and sufficient conditions
 3.3 The relationship between conditionals and disguised
conditionals
 3.4 Contrapositive
3.1 The Meaning of Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

‘P is necessary for Q’ is equivalent to ‘P is required for Q’. In other words, for our
purposes, necessary = required. ‘P is sufficient for Q’ is equivalent to ‘P is enough for Q’.
In other words, for our purposes, sufficient = enough.
Example 3.1: An example of a necessary and a sufficient

condition.
Being a bachelor is sufficient for being a male. Being male is

necessary for being a bachelor.
Being a bachelor is sufficient for being a male, since being a bachelor is enough to be a
male. Being a male is necessary for being a bachelor, since being a male is required for
being a bachelor.
3.2 Conditionals and Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
Conditionals are sentences of this form: If p, then q. In the sentence, ‘If p then q’, ‘p’ is the
antecedent and ‘q’ is the consequent. P is sufficient for Q. Q is necessary for P.
Example 3.2: A true conditional.
If it is rainy, then it is cloudy.
The antecedent, it is rainy, is sufficient for the consequent, it is cloudy, since it is enough
for it to be cloudy that it is rainy. The consequent, it is cloudy, is necessary for the
antecedent, it is rainy, because a requirement for rain is cloudiness. The conditional does
not tell us the relationship between not P (it not being rainy) and Q (it being cloudy).
Consider that it is not necessary for it to be not rainy for it to be cloudy (because there are
cloudy rainy days), and it is not sufficient because sunny days are non-rainy days.
Likewise, not being cloudy is neither necessary nor sufficient for it being rainy.
Example 3.3: A false conditional.
If it is cloudy, then it is rainy.
This conditional says that being cloudy is sufficient for it to be rainy. Clearly this is false,
since it can be cloudy without it being rainy. Likewise, it says that being rainy is necessary
for it being cloudy—again this is false. We can prove this by constructing a
counterexample. A counterexample is a cloudy day with no rain. This counterexample
shows that being cloudy is not enough for it to be rainy, which demonstrates that the
conditional is false.
3.3 Disguised Conditionals

There are a number of sentences that do not appear to be conditional sentence, but which in
fact have the same logical structure as conditional sentences. The table below lists a
number of these disguised conditionals.
Disguised
Example P= Q= Relation Rewritten
Conditional
It is not rainy Q is Not P is

not If not P,
Q unless P unless it is cloudy necessary sufficient
rainy then Q
cloudy. for not P for Q
Q is P is
It is cloudy, if If P, then
Q, if P rainy cloudy necessary sufficient
it is rainy. Q
for P for Q
It is cloudy Q is P is
Q provided If P, then
provided that rainy cloudy necessary sufficient
that P Q
it is rainy. for P for Q
It is rainy Q is P is
If P, then
P only if Q only if it is rainy cloudy necessary sufficient
Q
cloudy. for P for Q
When it is Q is P is
When P then If P, then
rainy, it is rainy cloudy necessary sufficient
Q Q
cloudy. for P for Q
All rainy days Q is P is

rainy cloudy If P, then
All Ps are Qs are cloudy necessary sufficient
days days Q
days. for P for Q
4. Contrapositive Being a bachelor is sufficient for being a male, since being a bachelor is
enough to be a male. Being a male is necessary for being a bachelor, since it is required that
to be a bachelor one is male.
3.4 Contrapositive
The contrapositive of ‘If P then Q = ‘If not Q then not P’. The two sentences are logically
equivalent. This tells us that not-Q is sufficient for not-P, and not-P is necessary for not-Q.
Example 3.4: Contrapositive
The contrapositive of “If it is rainy, then it is cloudy” is “If it is not

cloudy, then it is not rainy”.
Notice that in constructing a contrapositive you must perform two operations: (1) switch
the consequent and the antecedent, and (2) put negations in front of the antecedent and the
consequent. Students often forget to do one or the other.
4. Validity
Valid and Invalid arguments
Definitions of validity:
Definition 1: An argument is valid if the premises are (or were) true, then the conclusion must
be true.
Definition 2: An argument is valid if it is not possible that the premises of the argument are
true, while the conclusion is false.
Example 4.1: Example of a valid argument.
P1: I am over 50ft tall.

C: So, I am over 40ft tall.
Students struggle with validity because there is a temptation to claim that an argument is invalid
because it has a false premise. Notice, however, that the definition of validity specifically
rejects requiring establishing the truth of the premise set: we are asked to ASSUME that the
premises are true. So, to evaluate the validity of an argument requires that you sometimes let
your imagination run wild. In example 4.1 we must imagine something very implausible: that
the author is 50ft tall. Of course no human is that tall. But imagine someone were that tall. If
someone were that tall, then it would have to be the case that he or she is over 40ft tall. That is,
if the premise is true, then the conclusion must be true. Alternatively, we can see how the
second definition of validity applies: if we imagine that the premise is true, then it is not
possible that the conclusion is false. If someone is over 50ft tall, then it is not possible that they
are not over 40ft tall.
Example 4.2: Example of a invalid argument.
P1: I am over 1ft tall.

C: So, I am over 2ft tall.
We can see why 4.2 is invalid: if the premise is true, it does not follow that the conclusion must
be true. The author could be taller than 1ft and less than 2ft tall. So, the argument is invalid.
Hint: not everyone is helped by this hint, but enough that it is worth saying: to judge the validity
of an argument it might help to imagine an “empty universe”. Next, imagine the universe is
described only in the ways that the premises say. In example 4.1, we might imagine a universe
with a single person over 50ft. tall. In the second case we imagine a single person over 1ft. In
this way you can focus on what is at issue: whether the conclusion must be true in your
imaginary universe.
5. Intermediate Standardizing

 5.1 Premise and conclusion indicators
 5.2 Missing premises
5.1 Premise and Conclusion Indicator Words
Thus far we have dealt with fairly simple and straightforward arguments. In this chapter you will
learn techniques for standardizing more complex arguments. The task of standardizing requires us
to “get inside the heads” of the persons making the argument. We want to figure out what point they
intend to support (the conclusion), and what reasons (premises) they intend to offer. There is no
infallible way of ascertaining intentions. We have all had the experience of misinterpreting others,
e.g., not realizing that someone was joking. One good indicator of the authors’ intentions is premise
and conclusion indicators: words used to signal premises and conclusions. Here is a list of some
conclusion indicators:
Therefore For all these reasons
Thus On these grounds it is clear that
So Consequently
Hence Proves that
Then Shows that
It follows that Indicates that
In conclusion We can conclude that
Accordingly Means that
Demonstrates that Suggests that
Here is a list of premise indicator words:
Since On the grounds that
Because For the reason that
For As indicated by
Follows from May be inferred from
As shown by May be derived from
Given that May be deduced from
A word of warning: sometimes the words in these lists may be used in other ways. Consider the
following two examples:
Example 5.1: The word ‘since’ as a premise indicator
You should go to class today since there is a quiz.
Example 5.2: The word ‘since’ not used as a premise indicator
There has been no good music since the great music of the 1960s.
The word ‘since’ is on our premise indicator list. This suggests that we might standardize 5.1 thus:
P1: There will be a quiz today.
C: You should go to class.
This is a good reconstruction of the author’s thinking. The same can’t be said of the same
reconstruction of 5.2:
P1: The great music of the 1960s.
C: There has been no good music.
There are obvious problems with this reconstruction, including the fact that P1 is not even a
complete thought. The difference in the two examples is that the word ‘since’ is used as a premise
indicator in 5.1 but in a temporal (i.e., time) sense in 5.2. A good trick to see if words on these lists
are being used as premise or conclusion indicators is to try substituting a different word from the
lists. If you can do so without altering the meaning of the passage, then it probably is a premise or
conclusion indicator. If not, then it is probably not a premise or conclusion indicator. Thus, in 5.1
we can take out ‘since’ and substitute ‘because’ with no change in meaning. However, in 5.2 this
same substitution will not work (in fact the sentence does not even make sense with this
substitution).
5.2 Missing Premises and Conclusions
Premises and conclusions are sometimes not stated in an argument. Standardization requires that we
identify any missing premises or conclusions, for only in this way can we properly evaluate an
argument. Consider example 5.3:
Example 5.3: An argument with a missing premise.
Donald Trump is a capitalist. So, Donald Trump must die.
We can standardize the stated premise and conclusion thus:

P1: Donald Trump is a capitalist.
C: Donald Trump must die.
It is clear that there is a missing premise in this argument, for the stated premise seems to offer no
support for the conclusion. Clearly the author must have some further thought in mind; something
along the lines of: “All capitalists must die”. So, a complete standardization is as follows:
P1: Donald Trump is a capitalist.
MP2: All capitalists must die.
C: Donald Trump must die.
‘MP’, of course, stands for ‘missing premise’. The importance of supplying the missing premise
clearly helps with the evaluation of this argument: the premises are relevant and sufficient for the
conclusion, but MP2 is clearly problematic. By supplying the missing premise we are able to see
exactly what is wrong with the argument.
Similarly, if the author had said: “Donald Trump is a capitalist, and all capitalists must die” we
should construe this as an argument with a missing conclusion: MC: Donald Trump must die.
Arguments may have missing premises and conclusions; consider example 5.4:
Example 5.3: An argument with a missing premise and missing

conclusion.
Background: Local government officials are considering changing the

legislation to make all elective abortions illegal. Smith wrote a letter to the
editor in support of changing the legislation. Jones responds with her own
letter to the editor, a single sentence:
Argument: “If the government makes all elective abortions illegal, we will
live in a less just society.”
This single sentence is best understood as an argument with a missing premise: “We don’t want to
live in a less just society”; and a missing conclusion: “The government should not make all elective
abortions illegal”. We would standardize it thus:
MP1: We do not want to live in a less justice society.
P2: If the government makes all elective abortions illegal, we will live in a less just society.
MC: The government should not make all elective abortions illegal.
 6.1 Twelve fallacies of relevance.
With a good argument, it is possible to answer “yes” to each of these

questions:
1. Assuming that the premise set is acceptable, is the premise set relevant
to the conclusion?
2. Assuming that the premise set is acceptable, does the premise set
provide sufficient support for the conclusion?
3. Is the premise set acceptable?
A bad argument is one which answers “no” to one or more of these
questions. In this chapter we will examine arguments where the answer to
question 1 is “no” by examining twelve fallacies of relevancy:
6.1 Twelve Fallacies of Relevance
Fallacy of Irrelevant Reason Example 6.1

An argument contains this fallacy if the
premise set is irrelevant to the question of "Mark's shoes are black.
whether we should accept the conclusion. Therefore, all polar bears
are white.”
Note: the remaining eleven fallacies are
specific forms of this fallacy. On quiz
material, if you detect an argument that
involves irrelevant reasons you should
choose this fallacy only if none of the other
eleven fallacies are appropriate.
Red Herring Fallacy Example 6.2

This fallacy is committed when an unrelated
issue is introduced into an argumentative Andy: "The war in Iraq
exchange, as if it were relevant, in such a is not justified, since the
way as to shift the focus away from the US only went there for
original issue. oil."
Carol: "Wars are started
Notice in example 6.2 how the topic quickly
for all sorts of reasons.
changes. Andy is arguing about the issue of
The important point here
whether the war was justified; Carlos is
is that the US has tried
arguing about whether the US has done the
hard to help the Iraqi
morally right thing subsequently. The
question of what the US did subsequently is people after the war. The
irrelevant to whether the US was justified in US did not just up and
the first instance. leave, but has invested
billions of dollars
rebuilding the nation of
Iraq."
Strawperson Fallacy Example 6.3

This fallacy is committed when an
opponent’s position is substituted for a Juan: "We should have
position that is weaker and easier to criticize universal health care."
than the opponent’s actual position. Juanita: "I don't know
how you can say that
In example 6.3, Juanita misrepresents Juan's
Juan. Universal health
position: universal health care is normally
care violates individual
understood as a theory about access to
liberty. We have every
health care; in particular, a government
right to refuse medical
funded scheme for making available health
treatment: we don't want
care services. Juanita makes it sound as if
the state telling us what
universal health care means that not only
medical treatments we
would the services be provided, but that
must receive—as if we
they would be forced upon those who
are children."
would refuse such services. The question of
whether we have a right to refuse medical
treatment is irrelevant to the question of
how access to medical services ought to be
distributed.
Notice too that the Strawperson fallacy

diverts attention from the issue at hand, just
as the Red Herring fallacy does. But it does
so in a particular way: it does so by
attributing a position not held by the
argumentative opponent. So, the
Strawperson fallacy is a specific type of the
Red Herring fallacy. In other words, all
Strawperson fallacies are Red Herring
fallacies, but not vice versa.
Ad Hominem Fallacy Example 6.4

This fallacy occurs when (i) an opponent’s
“Bob Fox's rant in favor
person, character or circumstance is
of anarchism is just the
attacked rather than the opponent’s
sort of thing you would
argument, and (ii) the attack has not been
expect from someone
shown to be relevant to the acceptability of who has had his driver's
the opponent’s argument. license taken away by
the court and who can’t
In example 6.4 the author attacks both
seem to get along with
Fox’s circumstances—Fox had his license
anyone.”
suspended—and his character—he has
trouble getting along with others. The
author says nothing about what reasons Fox
offers for anarchism, nor why Fox’s
circumstances or character are relevant to
the viability of anarchism as a political
doctrine.
Tu Quoque Fallacy Example 6.5

This fallacy is committed when (i) an “You gotta fight for your
opponent is accused of an inconsistency right to party
between position and actions, and (ii) the
Your Pop caught you
inconsistency has not been shown to be
smoking, and he said,
relevant to the assessment of the opponent’s
“No Way!”
position.
That hypocrite smokes
In example 6.5 the Beastie Boys do not
two packs a day.”
address Pop’s reasons for not smoking, but
simply point out the inconsistency of his
recommendation (don’t smoke) and his (The Beastie Boys)
actions (he’s a smoker). Suppose Pop’s
reason for the conclusion, “don’t smoke”, is
that smoking causes cancer. The fact that
Pop smokes does not show that this
reasoning is wrong.
Fallacy of Appeal to Ignorance Example 6.6

This fallacy is committed when (i) a Big Foot, a completely
position P is asserted to be true (or false) different species of
based on the fact that there is no evidence hominid, exists, since no
for not-P, and (ii) the fact that there is no researcher has been able
evidence for not-P is irrelevant to the truth to show conclusively
(or falsity) of P. that Big Foot does not
exist.
Fallacy of Guilt by Association Example 6.7

This fallacy occurs when a position P (or “I can’t believe you
person) is attacked on the basis of an support vegetarianism.
association to Q, where the association to Q Did you know that Hitler
is not relevant to the acceptability of P. was a vegetarian?”
In example 6.7 the author tries to impugn
vegetarianism by associating it with Hitler.
The fact that Hitler did or believed X is not
in itself relevant to whether we ought to
believe or do X. After all, Hitler breathed
oxygen, and presumably this is not
something we ought to renounce.
Fallacy of Appeal to the Majority Example 6.8

This fallacy occurs when a position P is said “You should believe in
to be true because the majority believes that God, the vast majority of
P, and the fact that the majority believes P people in this great
is irrelevant to whether we should believe P. country do.”
Fallacy of Appeal to the Select Few Example 6.9

This fallacy occurs when a position P is said “Most people simply
to be true because not everyone believes P, believe in the religion of
and the fact that not everyone believes P is their parents. It is a rare,
irrelevant to the acceptability of P. stronger type, who is
capable of seeing the
truth of atheism.”
The Gambler’s Fallacy Example 6.10

This fallacy is committed when it is argued “I can’t possibly leave
that the past has an influence on a random my slot machine now!
event I’ve been losing for two
hours straight—it has to
get hot soon.”
Fallacy of Appeal to Tradition Example 6.11

This fallacy occurs when it is asserted that a “Of course it is right to
position P is true because it has always been spank your children
believed, and the tradition is not relevant to when they misbehave.
the acceptability of P. My parents spanked me;
their parents spanked
them, and so on.”
Fallacy of Improper Appeal to an Example 6.12

Epistemic Authority “We need to genetically
This fallacy occurs when one or more of the engineer humans to be
following conditions are not met. much smarter. Don’t
take my word for it, I
1. The authority must be identified.
saw a famous British
2. The authority must be respected in her physicist make this claim
field. on television last night.”
3. The authority must be speaking about a
matter in her field of expertise.
4. The matter must be one in which there is
a reasonable consensus amongst the
relevant experts.
In example 6.12 the first condition is not
met: the authority is not identified
sufficiently to identify him or her (there is
more than one famous British physicist).
Without knowing the identity of the
physicist, it is impossible to ascertain
whether he or she is respected in the field.
The third condition is not met, since the
question of whether we ought to genetically
engineer humans is an ethical question, and
there is no indication that the physicist is an
expert in the realm of ethics. Finally, the
fourth condition is not met, since there is no
consensus amongst ethicists as to whether
we ought to genetically engineer humans.
7. Sufficiency

 7.1 Sufficiency and deductive and inductive arguments
 7.2 Fallacies of Sufficiency
Recall that we said that with good arguments it is possible to answer “yes” to
each of these questions:
1. Assuming that the premise set is acceptable, is the premise set relevant to
the conclusion?
2. Assuming that the premise set is acceptable, does the premise set provide
sufficient support for the conclusion?
With bad arguments it is not possible to answer “yes” to each. In this chapter
we will examine arguments where the answer to question 2 is “no”.
It is important to emphasize that in evaluating whether a premise set is
sufficient to warrant the acceptance of a conclusion, we assume that the
premise set is acceptable. In other words, to say that the premise set is
sufficient is to say that, if true, the premise set provides good reason to believe
the conclusion.
7.1 Sufficiency and Deductive and Inductive Arguments
Arguments are often divided into two types: deductive and inductive. With
deductive arguments, the intention is to make the conclusion certain given that
the premises are true. With inductive arguments, the intention is to make the
conclusion probable, given the premises are true.
Example 7.1: Example of a deductive argument.
All humans are less than 8ft tall. Socrates is a human. So,
Socrates is less than 8ft tall.
Example 7.2: Example of an inductive argument.

99.99% of all humans are less than 8ft tall. Socrates is
human. So, Socrates is less than 8ft tall.
Example 7.1 is a deductive argument because the intention is to make the

conclusion certain, if the premises are true. Example 7.2 is an inductive
argument because even if the premises are true, they only make the conclusion
highly probable, not certain.
Assessing sufficiency in a deductive argument is a relatively straightforward
matter: in a deductive argument a premise set is sufficient only if the argument
is valid. If a deductive argument is invalid, then the premise set is insufficient.
Sufficiency is harder to assess with inductive arguments. In part this is because
of the fact that, unlike certainty, probability comes in degrees. It will help to
examine first why inductive arguments do not claim certainty for the
conclusion. Suppose there are 20,000 students at your university, and you
randomly survey 9,999 of them. To your surprise, they all answer your
questionnaire to the effect that marijuana should be legalized. You use this as a
premise in an argument that concludes that the majority of students at your
university believe that marijuana should be legalized. Despite the strength of
your evidence, your argument is not valid; the conclusion is not certain even if
the premises are true. In other words, it is possible that the premise is true and
the conclusion is false. For example, suppose the other 10,001 students believe
that marijuana should not be legalized, and you were very, very unlucky in
whom you randomly sampled. You just happened to get exactly all and only
those students who think it should be legalized. On the other hand, even
though your argument is not valid, it is still a good argument. Assuming the
premise is true, it gives us very strong reason to believe the conclusion is true.
How probable does the premise set have to be to support the conclusion? In
practice we often accept different degrees of probability depending on the
situation. In some legal jurisdictions (the U.S., for instance) different standards
are applied in legal arguments in civil and criminal proceedings to meet the
burden of proof. In civil proceedings the standard of proof is often the
“preponderance of evidence”. If I am seeking financial compensation from you
for my expensive garden gnome collection that I allege you destroyed, I would
need to show that it is more probable than not that you were the responsible
party. So, in effect, 51% probability that you are guilty is sufficient in civil
court. In a criminal trial, the standard is often “beyond a reasonable doubt” and
so 51% is not sufficient. In part, the difference in standards is explained by the
severity of the penalties attached. In civil trials, the stakes are usually
monetary, whereas in criminal proceedings at issue may be prison time, or
even capital punishment. Since the costs of a wrongful conviction may be quite
different in the two types of cases, we can see why it is good that there are
different standards of probability.
Often it is possible to gain more evidence to strengthen an argument. This is
not to say that we should always insist on doing everything we can to
strengthen the premise set before accepting the conclusion of an argument.
Suppose you argue that the best way to leave a building is by taking the east
stairs and jumping from the second story. The fact that we could obtain further
evidence for your argument by looking up the architectural plans of the
building online is irrelevant if the extra time spent doing so would mean that
we are engulfed by flames.
In general, we may say that the more probable the premises make the
conclusion, the better the argument meets the sufficiency requirement.
Whether an argument meets the sufficiency requirement will depend on a
number of practical matters such as the consequences of accepting an
argument, and the cost of obtaining additional evidence.
7.2 Fallacies of Sufficiency
Fallacy of Hasty Conclusion Example 7.3

An argument contains this fallacy if the “All the polar bears we
premise set (even if true) is insufficient to saw at the zoo today are
warrant the acceptance of the conclusion. white. So, many polar
bears are white.”
Note: the remaining fallacies of sufficiency are
specific forms of this fallacy. On quiz material,
you should choose this fallacy only if none of
the other six fallacies are appropriate.
Fallacy of Hasty Generalization Example 7.4

An argument contains this fallacy if the “All the polar bears we
premise set (even if true) is insufficient to saw at the zoo today are
warrant the acceptance of the generalization. white. So, all polar bears
are white.”
Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent Example 7.5

This fallacy is committed when the necessary P1: If it is rainy, then it is
condition in a conditional argument is cited as cloudy.
sufficient for the conclusion.
P2: It is cloudy.
Note that the fact that it is cloudy is relevant to
C: So, it is rainy.
the conclusion that it is rainy. Imagine
someone trying to prove to you that it is rainy.
The fact that it is cloudy would provide some
evidence that it is rainy, even though the
presence of clouds is not in itself sufficient
evidence.
Fallacy of Denying the Antecedent Example 7.6

This fallacy is present when the denial of the P1: If it is rainy, then it is
sufficient condition in a conditional argument cloudy.
is cited as sufficient for the conclusion.
P2: It is not rainy.
Note that the premise set is relevant to the
C: It is not cloudy.
conclusion in example 7.4 The fact that it is
not rainy provides some evidence that it is not
cloudy, even though the absence of rain is not
sufficient for it not being cloudy.
Post Hoc Fallacy Example 7.5

This fallacy occurs when the fact that event A P1: I washed my car.
precedes event B in time is said to be sufficient
P2: It then rained.
evidence that A causes B.
C: Washing my car
Although causes typically proceed effects in
caused it to rain.
time, we can see in example 7.5 that
establishing that one event proceeds the other
in time is not sufficient to show that there is a
causal relationship; in particular, it may simply
be a coincident that I washed my car and then
it rained.
Fallacy of Jumping from Correlation to Example 7.6

Causation
P1: Every time the
This fallacy occurs when the correlation of two Democrats win,
event types, A and B, is cited as sufficient unemployment goes
evidence that A causes B. down.
As example 7.6 illustrates, even if two events C: The Democrats being
are perfectly correlated, if unemployment in power causes lower
always goes down after the Democrats win, unemployment rates.
this in itself does not show that a Democratic
victory is the cause of reduced employment.
For example, it might be the case that there is a
business cycle where unemployment regularly
goes up and down, and that high
unemployment causes the Democrats to win.
Fallacy of Improper Sampling Example 7.7

This fallacy occurs when the sample cited in P1: In a random telephone
the premise set does not properly represent the survey of subscribers,
population cited in the conclusion. Women’s Good
Housekeeping Magazine
In example 7.7 we can see that the population
found that 93% of all
described in the conclusion is women, that is,
married women believe
the conclusion says something about how
that their husbands do an
women in general view their husbands’
equal amount of the
contribution to household chores. The sample,
household chores.
however, is taken from subscribers of Women’s
Good Housekeeping Magazine. We have no C: It is false that women
evidence that those that subscribe to this think that men do not do
magazine are representative of women in an equal amount of the
general. Perhaps subscribers are wealthier than household chores.
average, or they are in more “progressive”
relationships. A better way to support the
conclusion would be to take a random sample
of women in general.
8. Accepting Premises: Considerations of Logic and

Language

 8.1 Fallacies in accepting premises
 8.2 Logical considerations in accepting premises
 8.3 Considerations of language in accepting premises
Recall that we said that with good arguments it is possible to answer “yes” to
each of these questions:
1. Assuming that the premise set is acceptable, is the premise set relevant to
the conclusion?
2. Assuming that the premise set is acceptable, does the premise set provide
sufficient support for the conclusion?
A bad argument is one that answers “no” to one or more of these questions. In
this chapter and the next we will examine arguments where the answer to
question 3 is “no”. Since question 3 is so broad, I propose that we subdivide it
into these two questions:
Is the premise set logically and linguistically acceptable?
Is the premise set evidentially acceptable?
In this chapter we will deal with the former question. I will first list some
fallacies, and then discuss some general strategies for thinking about whether
premises are logically and linguistically acceptable.
8.1 Logical and Linguistic Fallacies in Accepting Premises
Fallacy of Begging the Question Example 8.1

This fallacy is present when the conclusion is “You should believe in
the same as a premise. Darwinianism because the
theory of natural selection
In example 8.1, the conclusion and the premise
is true.”
are the same despite the different wording:
‘Darwinianism’ is simply another name for the
‘theory of natural selection’.
Fallacy of False Dilemma Example 8.2

This fallacy is present when a premise fails to “Detective Colombo: here
mention all the relevant alternatives. is what happened. Only
five of us were on the
In example 8.2 the author conveniently
island: me, the victim,
neglects the alternative that he or she may be
Andy, Betty and Charlie.
the guilty party.
So, the guilty party must
be Andy, Betty or
Charlie.”
Fallacy of Equivocation Example 8.3

This fallacy is present when an argument “I heard on the radio that
appears successful only because of an the rains have swelled the
ambiguous premise. river so much that the
banks have been flooded.
In example 8.3, the premise only appears to
So, your money in the
adequately support the conclusion because of
bank must be soaked.”
the ambiguity of the word ‘bank’. In one sense
it may refer to a type of financial institution, in
another sense it refers to the land adjacent to
rivers. Presumably the radio report refers to the
latter sense of the term, and the conclusion
about wet money to the former sense of the
term.
Fallacy of Vagueness Example 8.4

This fallacy is present when an argument “The intern said that all
appears successful because of the vagueness of the actors auditioning are
the premise set. bald. So, we won’t need
to worry about how their
In example 8.4, the term ‘bald’ is vague. It can
hair looks, since they have
mean anything from some loss of hair, to
none.”
having no hair on one’s head. Since the
premise is not more precise, it does not tell us
whether the actors have some or no hair, we
can’t adequately assess whether the premise
supports the conclusion.
Fallacy of Persuasive Definition Example 8.5

This fallacy is present when a term is “We are all anarchists
surreptitiously redefined to make an argument because anarchists are
appear stronger. people who break the law,
and we have all broken
In example 8.5, the author redefines the word
the law at one time or
‘anarchist’ without letting the audience know
another. For example,
that the term has been redefined. (Normally it
who among us can say
refers to the view that there is no legitimate that they have never gone
political authority). over the speed limit?”
8.2 Logical Considerations in Accepting Premises
One logical consideration in accepting premises is the prescription that we

ought to reject circular arguments. It is perhaps best to explain why we
shouldn’t accept circular reasoning with an example. Suppose I argue,
“Socrates is the greatest teacher because Socrates is the greatest teacher.” If
you doubt the conclusion, “Socrates is the greatest teacher”, then you have
reason to doubt the premise, “Socrates is the greatest teacher”. After all, the
premise and the conclusion are the same; the premise adds nothing in way of
support of the conclusion. On the other hand, if you believe the premise, then
you have no additional reason to believe the conclusion, since the conclusion
and the premise are one and the same. Rarely do circular arguments appear in
such an obvious fashion; often the premise and conclusion express the same
idea with different words. In the above example, the premise might be stated
differently as: “No teacher equals or exceeds Socrates in terms of teaching
ability.” The circularity in this instance would be a little less obvious, but the
argument still commits the fallacy of begging the question, since the
conclusion and premise express the same idea in different words.
As we have said, arguments attempt to give us reasons to believe or do
something. Whether we ought to believe or do X will often depend on how
plausible the alternatives are, and arguments that do not consider all the
alternatives, in effect, rig the outcome. The associated fallacy is called “False
Dilemma”, because often arguments that commit this fallacy offer only two
choices when there are in fact more options that should be considered, e.g.,
either you are a friend or an enemy, either you are a Republican or Democrat,
either you are an atheist or a theist. In these instances there are other
alternatives that might be considered: you might be an acquaintance, a social
democrat, or agnostic.
In some cases there are only two relevant alternatives. The premise, either you
are a friend or you are not a friend, covers all the possibilities. For not being a
friend covers the case where you are an enemy, an acquaintance, or unknown
to me. Note too that just because more than two alternatives have been given in
an argument does not mean that all the relevant alternatives are present. In
example 8.2 the author mentions three possible suspects but neglects to
mention him or herself as a possible suspect.
8.3 Considerations of Language in Accepting Premises
Turning to considerations of language, it is important to note that almost every

argument will contain instances of vague and ambiguous language. The reason
is that arguments are made in human languages, and human languages are
brimming with vague and ambiguous terms. For example, most terms that refer
to material objects in our environment are vague. You might think the term
‘chair’ is not vague, since it is clear when something is a chair, and when it is
not: we are not likely to confuse a chair with a refrigerator, for example. But
think about this. Imagine your favourite four legged chair and then imagine
cutting a centimetre off of each leg of the chair. Is it still a chair? Probably.
Now imagine cutting another centimeter, and another centimeter, and each
time asking whether it is a chair. At some point it may be hard to say whether
it is a chair or not. It is not clear where exactly something stops being a chair.
The same is true of ambiguity. If you flip through a dictionary, you will see
that many terms have multiple meanings.
So, it should not be surprising then that the mere presence of vagueness or
ambiguity is not sufficient to demonstrate that the fallacies of vagueness or
equivocation are present. Consider this argument: “John has no hair, so John is
bald. The announcer said that anyone who is bald is eligible for a prize. So
John is eligible for a prize.” The fact that a premise of this argument, John is
bald, is both vague and ambiguous does not make this a bad argument. The
term ‘bald’ is vague because it is not clear where baldness starts. Despite this
vagueness, there are clear examples of when someone is bald, including John:
he has no hair. The term ‘bald’ is also ambiguous as it can mean (among other
things) ‘forthright’ or ‘blunt’. It would be very uncharitable to think that the
author is arguing that John is blunt because he has no hair. So, although ‘bald’
is ambiguous, this ambiguity presents no problem in the above example.
Again, vagueness and ambiguity are common phenomena, and the associated
fallacies only come into play when these phenomena are exploited to make a
weak argument appear stronger.
Since language is often vague and ambiguous, arguments will sometimes
employ definitions to clarify matters. There are different types of definitions.
A reportive definition seeks to report how a term is commonly used;
dictionaries are prime examples of repositories of reportive definitions. They
tell us how words are typically used. Two common problems with reportive
definitions is that they are too wide or too narrow. A reportive definition is too
wide if it includes individuals that are not normally included under the term. A
definition is too narrow if it excludes individuals that are normally included
under the term. Consider this example: the definition of “bachelor” is “an
unmarried person”. This definition is too wide because if it were true, then it
would include females as part of the definition of bachelors. Since no female is
a bachelor, the definition is too wide. Now consider the definition an
“unmarried person” is a bachelor. This definition is too narrow: it excludes
females. Females are among unmarried persons. It sometimes helps students to
visualize definitions as lassoes. A good reportive definition of X will lasso all
and only the things that X refers to. In the first example, the definitional lasso
“bachelor means unmarried person” captures females in the lasso. The lasso is
too wide, the definition captures too much, because it captures females. In the
second case the lasso is too narrow, because it captures only males. A good
definition of “unmarried person” should also capture females.
Sometimes a definition can both be too wide and too narrow. Consider this
definition: “A Professor is someone who gives final exams.” This lasso is too
wide because it will capture some non-professors, e.g., high school teachers
often give final exams, but they are not professors. On the other hand, the lasso
is too narrow because it excludes those professors who do not give their
classes final exams. (I’m told this happens). So, this definition is both too wide
and too narrow.
Stipulative definitions are redefinitions of existing terms, or definitions for
newly introduced terms. Often a stipulative definition is used to clarify
ambiguity or vagueness in our ordinary terms. In some legal jurisdictions, for
example, a ‘child’ is defined as a person under the age of 21. This clarifies the
vagueness of the term ‘child’ as it is used in common parlance: it is not clear at
what age someone stops being a child in our ordinary use of the term. It also
clarifies an ambiguity: one sense of ‘child’ means ‘offspring’, e.g., “I am my
mother and father’s child.”
Persuasive definitions pass themselves off as reportive definitions when in fact
they are disguised stipulative definitions. In example 8.5, it looks like the
author has reached a rather remarkable conclusion: we all unwittingly hold a
very unpopular political philosophy: anarchism. Once we realize that the
author has stipulated a new meaning for ‘anarchism’ the conclusion is not
particularly impressive.
9. Accepting Premises: The Question of Evidence

 9.1 Premises based on common knowledge of the target
audience.
 9.2 Premises based on experience
 9.3 Premises based on epistemic authority
We have seen one line of support for premises. In serial arguments a

subconclusion works as a premise for a further conclusion, while the
subconclusion itself has a subpremise set offered in support of it. It is clear that
this cannot be a general model for accepting all premises. For if every premise
itself requires a further premise in support, then either this process will go on
forever, e.g., P1 requires P2 for support, and P2 requires P3 for support, and so
on; or we will end up repeating ourselves (arguing in a circle). A good
argument must have at least one “bottom level” premise—a premise that is not
supported by further premises. Bottom level premises can be either main
premises that are not supported by further premises, or subpremises that are
not supported by further premises. Our question then is: When should we
accept bottom level premises? We will examine three instances: common
knowledge, experience and appeals to experts.
9.1 Premises Based on Common Knowledge of the Target Audience

For the most part, we have been thinking about evaluating the arguments of
others. In thinking about when premises are acceptable it will help to turn the
exercise around: let us think about constructing good arguments with
acceptable bottom level premises. Consider these examples:
Examples 9.1-9.7: Candidate premises based on common

knowledge.
9.1 The earth is moving thousands of miles per hour.

9.2 The earth is billions of years old.
9.3 Government officials should not steal public money.
9.4 A fetus deserves the same moral consideration as an
adult person.
9.5 Marijuana should be legal.
9.6 The earth is the center of the universe.
9.7 There is a new pizza place in town.
Imagine the target audience is a typical university undergraduate class and you
are asked to debate some topic. Premises 9.1-9.3 would be appropriate bottom
level premises that would be accepted on the basis of common knowledge.
Premises that are common knowledge do not require any additional support.
On the other hand, premises 9.4-9.7 will require some other form of support.
There is significant disagreement about the moral status of the fetus, that is, its
moral status is not a matter of common knowledge in the typical undergraduate
class. The same is true of 9.5. Example 9.6 is an extraordinary claim that
would take some very extraordinary evidence to convince people: you are not
likely to find a single person in a university class who thinks 9.6 is true.
Finally, 9.7 is probably not a matter of common knowledge: the fact that the
restaurant is new probably means the existence of the pizza joint is not a matter
of common knowledge.
The qualification that common knowledge is based on the target audience
should not be overlooked. In societies with little contact with science and
advanced technology, 9.1 and 9.2 may require additional support, that is, they
could not be assumed to be common knowledge. On the other hand, these
same cultures may accept 9.6. In a meeting of the amoralist club, 9.3 may not
be common knowledge and require further support. Similarly, if you were
giving an argument to the marijuana legalization club, you could safely assume
that 9.5 was common knowledge. It would probably be safe to assume that 9.4
is common knowledge if you were presenting an argument at a Catholic
Bishop’s convention.
It should be emphasized that just because some of these premises would not be
accepted as common knowledge, does not mean that they could not be
premises in an argument, and even a bottom level premise. 9.7, as we shall see,
might be an acceptable bottom level premise if based on experience. A
controversial premise like 9.4 or 9.5 will probably require additional
arguments to be acceptable, so they are not likely to be accepted as bottom
level premises in many contexts.
9.2 Premises Based on Experience
Evidence obtained from our sense organs can be the evidential support for a
bottom level premise. The fact that someone has seen, heard, tasted, felt, or
smelt X is often good evidence that X is true. Consider this argument: “Juan
and Juanita said they saw a new pizza place in town. You know John loves
pizza, we should take him there for lunch.” The acceptability of the premise,
there is a new pizza place in town, is based on the experience of Juan and
Juanita: they saw a new pizza place in town. Although it is not explicitly
mentioned, it seems plausible that the premise, John loves pizza, is something
you gained from experience: you have seen him enjoy pizza.
Of course not every premise that is said to be justified by experience is
acceptable. Consider a similar issue: the question of creditability of eye-
witness testimony often arises in courts of law. In both cases, the acceptability
of what the experiencer reports will depend on a number of factors including:
 the general reliability of the witness
 the witness’ ability to experience what is being reported
 how many witnesses there are
 whether their reports are independent
 the plausibility of the claim
The ‘general reliability of the witness’ refers to things like whether the witness
is known to be honest and sober. As for the ‘ability to experience what is being
reported’, the question here is whether the experiencer might plausibly be
thought to have had the opportunity to experience what is reported. We should
probably doubt someone’s experiential report that they identified (with
unaided vision) a person five miles away in a large crowd. Similarly, someone
who claims to have eaten the best pizza in the world has probably overstepped
the bounds of what they can experience: it is pretty hard to try all the pizza in
the world. In general, the more witnesses who see something, the more
confidence we should have that the premise is acceptable. In the example
above, the fact that both Juan and Juanita saw the same thing should give us
more confidence that it is true, than if we only had the testimony of one or the
other. Independent reports are ones where those experiencing something do so
separately, and where the witnesses do not confer with one another about what
they saw. If Juan and Juniata drove in different vehicles at different times and
both report to you the existence of a new pizza place, you can be more
confident that it is true than if they saw the place while driving together.
Another general constraint on accepting premises based on experience is the
plausibility of the claim being made. The more extraordinary a claim, the more
extraordinary the evidence must be to support the claim. A new pizza
restaurant in town is not something that unusual. Martians landing in the city
square is unusual (to say the least). Juan’s testimony to the effect that he saw
the new restaurant is sufficient in the former case; in the latter case it would
probably be wise to hold off accepting Juan’s testimony about Martians until
further evidence can be obtained.
9.3 Premises Based on Epistemic Authority
An epistemic authority is someone who has specialized knowledge about a

particular area. (‘Epistemic’ means of, or related to, knowledge). Many
students are familiar with this concept from writing academic papers. If you
are writing for your anthropology class, and you claim that humans have
occupied North America for more than 40,000 years, you might cite an
epistemic authority to support this claim. In practice, this usually would be a
reference to a paper published in a reputable academic journal. Appeals to
epistemic authorities do not happen only in academic settings. An argument
made to your spouse that your house needs new wiring might be based on a
premise that the existing wiring is a fire hazard. This premise, let us suppose,
is based on a report from an electrician. Most of us are not competent to make
such judgments. Electricians, with years of training and practical experience,
are in a position to make such judgments: they are epistemic authorities on the
matter.
We identified some of the conditions for appealing to an epistemic authority
in Chapter 6 in the fallacy of improper appeal to an epistemic authority above.
Here are the conditions again:
 The authority must be identified.
 The authority must be respected in her field.
 The matter must be one in which there is a reasonable consensus amongst
the relevant experts.
 The authority must be speaking about a matter in her field of expertise.
A premise that is accepted based on epistemic authority is only as good as the
authority, hence the need to identify the authority. Identifying the authority
makes it possible for your audience to check the authority’s credentials.
Consider cases where the authority is not identified. You may rightly wonder
whether you should believe the premise, since it is possible that the author
simply made up the claim. Don’t take my word for it; there is good evidence to
back up this claim. A recent study by a noted sociologist shows that 78.43% of
all undergraduate essays simply make up epistemic authorities. You should not
believe the appeal to an epistemic authority in the previous sentence because
no authority has been identified. And in fact, I just made this statistic up out of
thin air. If I had said, Professor Smith showed this in a study published in 2010
in the Journal of Better Sociology Statistics, then you could have checked my
appeal to an epistemic authority. You would quickly find there is no such
journal, and so have very good reason to doubt my appeal to an epistemic
authority.
The condition that the authority must be respected in her field is perhaps
obvious. If someone is not respected in their field it does not mean what they
say is wrong. It does, however, point to the fact that we cannot accept a
knowledge claim simply because they are in the field. It is possible, after all,
for someone to get professional accreditation, to get a PhD or to become a
licensed electrician, for example, and then lose his or her mind. On the other
hand, the fact that someone is respected in their field shows that they have
demonstrated their epistemic reliability to their colleagues.
The reason that there must be a reasonable consensus amongst the experts can
be seen from the following example. You want to make an argument that
appeals to the premise that abortion is immoral. You can find a number of
experts that have claimed it immoral, but also a large number who deny that it
is immoral. Choosing one expert over another is arbitrary in this instance.
Rarely is there complete consensus in any field. You may find a few professors
of biology that doubt that humans are descended from apelike ancestors, but
the overwhelming majority of university biologists believe that we are
descended from apes. There are a few climate scientists who deny that the
earth is warming, or think that humans are not responsible for some of the
global warming pattern. But the overwhelming majority of climate scientists
believe that the earth is warming, and that humans are a major contributor to
this pattern. (The popular press gives the few dissenters far more attention than
the scientific community does).
A couple more comments about appeal to epistemic authority are warranted.
The first is a matter of quantity: more is better (within reason, of course).
Citing one author who concludes that humans are causing global warming is
not as strong as citing three. At least as important is the quality of the citation:
a statement made in a peer reviewed journal is more trustworthy, other things
being equal, than popular press accounts of scientific research, or something
overheard at a cocktail party. The peer review process ensures a greater
likelihood that errors have been eliminated. Print books and journals tend also
to be more reliable than most web-based material, since the former tend more
often to be peer-reviewed than the latter. For example, there are many fine
print books on critical thinking, and other things being equal, they would be
more reliable than a website on critical thinking which is not peer reviewed.
(Ahem).
10. Advanced Standardizing
10.1 Identifying Arguments

Thus far, we have primarily looked at arguments, but of course we use
language to do more than argue. We use language to describe, to command,
explain, tell jokes, to promise, and so on. This presents a problem, since people
rarely explicitly announce their intention to argue. So one of the first tasks we
face in applying our critical thinking skills to some piece of text or speech is to
determine whether something is an argument or not.
We know that arguments are attempts to persuade us to accept a conclusion on
the basis of reasons. This tells us that if we think some passage or speech is an
argument we should be able to identify at least one premise and one
conclusion. If we can’t, then we should revise our estimation that we are
dealing with an argument. But this is not sufficient for identifying an
argument. We must also be sure that the author’s intention is to argue.
Consider this passage: “Mark said that all humans are immortal, so Socrates is
not human”. The author of this passage is not making an argument, but
describing an argument made by Mark.
Arguments are easily confused with explanations. To help us understand
explanations, it will be helpful to have a little bit of vocabulary. Like
arguments, explanations can be divided into two components. The
explicandum is the thing being explained, and the explanans is the thing that
does the explaining. So, in the passage, “The tide goes in and out because of
the gravitational pull of the moon”, the explicandum is “the tide goes in and
out” and the explanans is “the gravitational pull of the moon.” The pull of the
moon explains why the tide goes in and out.
The primary difference between arguments and explanations is the speaker’s
intentions. In arguments the intention is to persuade. With explanations, the
intention is to make understandable why something is the case. We can exploit
this difference to help us think about tricky cases where a passage might be
interpreted as either an argument or an explanation. Consider this example:
“Car engines get hot because there is exploding gas inside.” Understood as an
explanation, the explicandum is “Car engines get hot”. The explanans is
“There is exploding gas inside”. Understood as an argument, the premise
“There is exploding gas inside” is offered in support of the conclusion, “Car
engines get hot.” Imagine a child asking why car engines get hot. If we think
of the parent saying the above in response, then we should understand the
passage as an explanation. The parent is not attempting to persuade that car
engines are hot, but trying to make understandable why they are. Suppose a
parent was trying to convince a child that things other than the stove get hot.
The parent asserts the premise, “There is exploding gas inside” to support the
conclusion, “Car engines get hot”.
Often a passage will contain several different uses of language, e.g., a single
paragraph might contain a description, an explanation and an argument. I’m
afraid that there is no easy decision-rule for deciding on any particular passage
how it is best identified. In general, we should try to be as charitable as
possible: we should look for a reconstruction that makes the most sense. As
noted, this will involve correctly interpreting the author’s intentions—and this
is not easy. We have all had the experience of misunderstanding someone’s
joke as a serious statement.
10.2 Individuating Propositions
Standardizing requires identifying individual premises and conclusions. In this

subsection we learn how to individuate, how to “chop up”, a passage into
individual premises and conclusions. Many of the examples above provided
the individuation of premises and conclusions, e.g., sometimes numbers were
assigned to individual premises and conclusions in a passage. Obviously,
rarely will authors number or otherwise “chop up” the premises and
conclusions for you. Hence, this is an important skill to learn.
Each premise and conclusion we may think of as a ‘proposition’: the smallest
unit of argumentation suitable for logical reconstruction. It will help to clarify
propositions by contrasting them with sentences.
Some propositions are not presented as declarative sentences. For example, a
rhetorical question is a declarative statement in disguise. Thus in the example
“We should go to the concert tonight. Who wouldn’t want to see the greatest
rock and roll band ever?” the second sentence has the surface appearance of
being a question, but clearly the author intends to communicate the idea that
everyone wants to see the greatest rock and roll band ever. So, for the purposes
of standardization, we would rewrite the argument thus:
P1: Everyone wants to see the greatest rock and roll band ever.
C: We should go to the concert tonight.
Sometimes sentences and propositions are one and the same thing. Consider
this argument once again: “All humans are mortal. Socrates is human. Socrates
is mortal.” This argument contains three sentences, and each is a proposition.
Sometimes a single sentence contains two or more propositions. There are two
cases we should consider. The first is where a sentence contains both a premise
and a conclusion. Thus, the single sentence, “You should go to class today
since there is a quiz today”, contains two propositions, “You should go to class
today”, and “There is a quiz today.” The second serves as a premise for the
first. The second case where a sentence contains more than one proposition is
when there are two premises in a single sentence. Consider this example: “It is
likely that Karl Marx did not own a factory. He was poor, and a communist.”
The sentence “He was poor and a communist can be broken down into two
separate premises and standardized thus:
P1: Karl Marx was a communist.
P2: Karl Marx was poor.
C: It is unlikely that he owned a factory.
The reason the sentence can be broken down in this way is that in saying “P
and Q” we are committed to the truth of both P and Q.
The same cannot be said for conditional sentences or disjunctive sentences
(sentences with an ‘or’). If I say, “If it is rainy, then it is cloudy”, this cannot
be broken down into two propositions “It is rainy” and “It is cloudy”. This
would have the absurd consequence that every time I assert the conditional “If
it is rainy, then it is cloudy” I am committed to it being rainy and cloudy. This
is clearly false. Imagine a beautiful sunny summer day. When I say, “If it is
rainy, then it is cloudy”, I am saying something true even though it is perfectly
sunny outside. As we saw in Chapter 3, a conditional merely asserts that the
antecedent is sufficient for the consequent, and the consequent necessary for
the antecedent; not that the antecedent and the consequent are true.
Similar remarks apply to sentences with an ‘or’. If I say, “He is flying to
London on Friday or Saturday”, this cannot be broken down into, “He is flying
to London on Friday”, and “He is flying to London on Saturday.” For our
purposes, conditional and disjunctive propositions cannot be broken down
further.
10.3 Counter Considerations and Counter Arguments

Counter considerations are claims provided by an author that provide reasons
not to believe the argument. Here is an example.
Example 10.1 Example with counter considerations
Although Senator Smith got caught having affairs, and

despite the fact that he is drunk half the time, you should
still vote for him. He is a member of the Labor Party, and
this country needs every Labor senator it can get.
The author is attempting to persuade us that we should vote for Smith. The
author begins with two counter considerations (CC): claims that work against
this conclusion:
CC1: Senator Smith got caught having affairs.
CC2: Senator Smith is drunk half the time.
The words ‘although’ and ‘despite’ indicate that these claims are
acknowledged by the author to count against the argument. It is a good idea to
put the counter considerations at the beginning to keep track of their role in the
argument. A complete standardization of the above passage is as follows:
CC1: Senator Smith got caught having affairs.
CC2: Senator Smith is drunk half the time.
MP1: The counter considerations do not outweigh the main argument.
P2: Senator Smith is a member of the Labor Party.
P3: This country needs every Labor senator it can get.
C: You should vote for Senator Smith.
It is clear a charitable understanding of the argument says that the author does
not believe that the counter considerations outweigh the strength of the main
argument, hence the missing premise (MP1). Any argument that puts forward
counter considerations will have a premise (either stated or missing) to the
effect that the counter considerations do not outweigh the main argument.
A counter argument is an argument that concludes that some other argument is
defective.
Example 10.2: An example of a counter argument
I can’t believe you think we should vote for Senator Smith.

The man is a moral degenerate: you admit he is a drunk and
a philanderer. We should not have moral degenerates in
parliament.
This argument challenges the previous argument. Specifically, it questions the

missing premise: it argues that drunkenness and philandering are sufficient
reason not to vote for the candidate.
It can be confusing when an author states both the argument and the
counterargument in a single place. For example:
Example 10.3: Argument and Counter argument in a

single passage
Some say that we should not vote for Smith because he is a

moral degenerate. I agree that he is a moral degenerate, but
parliament members are supposed to represent all types of
people: men, women, tall, short, able-bodied, disabled, all
skin colors and moral degenerates. So, drunks and
philanders also need a voice in Parliament, and Smith is just
the representative for them.
In standardizing this we must be careful to separate out the argument and the
counterargument.
Argument:
P1: Smith is a moral degenerate.
C: We should not vote for Smith.
Counterargument:
P1: All types of people should have representatives in parliament.
P2: Being a philanderer and a drunk is to be a type of person.
P3: Smith is a philanderer and a drunk.
C: We should vote for Smith.
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Critical Thinking by Example

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Critical thinking by example

Material covered in this chapter

 1.1 Two Conventions for Standardizing

 1.2 Five argument Types

1.1 Two Conventions for Standardizing

Example 1.1: A simple argument

Example 1.2: A simple argument in standard notation

Example 1.3: A simple argument with numerals inserted

The associated diagram is given in 1.4:

1.2 Five Argument Types

2. Basic Argument Evaluation

Material covered in this chapter

 2.1 The definition of a good argument

2.1 The Definition of a Good Argument

Example 2.1: A good argument.

2.2 Three Fallacies

Fallacy of Irrelevant Reason Example 2.2: An argument that

Note: example 2.2 is purposely

Fallacy of Hasty Conclusion: An Example 2.3: An argument that

Notice that with example 2.4 the premise

3. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

Material covered in this chapter

3.1 The Meaning of Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

Example 3.1: An example of a necessary and a sufficient

Being a bachelor is sufficient for being a male. Being male is

3.2 Conditionals and Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

Example 3.2: A true conditional.

If it is rainy, then it is cloudy.

Example 3.3: A false conditional.

If it is cloudy, then it is rainy.

3.3 Disguised Conditionals

It is not rainy Q is Not P is

All rainy days Q is P is

Example 3.4: Contrapositive

The contrapositive of “If it is rainy, then it is cloudy” is “If it is not

Valid and Invalid arguments

Example 4.1: Example of a valid argument.

P1: I am over 50ft tall.

Example 4.2: Example of a invalid argument.

P1: I am over 1ft tall.

Material covered in this chapter

5.1 Premise and Conclusion Indicator Words

Therefore For all these reasons

Thus On these grounds it is clear that

Hence Proves that

Then Shows that

It follows that Indicates that

In conclusion We can conclude that

Accordingly Means that

Demonstrates that Suggests that

Here is a list of premise indicator words:

Since On the grounds that

Because For the reason that

As shown by May be derived from

Given that May be deduced from

Example 5.1: The word ‘since’ as a premise indicator

You should go to class today since there is a quiz.

Example 5.2: The word ‘since’ not used as a premise indicator

5.2 Missing Premises and Conclusions

Donald Trump is a capitalist. So, Donald Trump must die.

We can standardize the stated premise and conclusion thus:

Example 5.3: An argument with a missing premise and missing

Background: Local government officials are considering changing the

With a good argument, it is possible to answer “yes” to each of these