In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of

corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of an established rule must
be manifest.13

Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or

standard of behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to
or be connected with the performance of official functions and duties of a public officer.
In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of an established rule must
be manifest.13

It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal from

office of an officer, must have direct relation to and be connected with the performance of
official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and
failure to discharge the duties of the office.44 G.R. No. 167726 July 20, 2006

ROBERTO M. VILLANUEVA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Represented by
ROBERTO P. AZCUNA, NAZARENO,

Falsification of an official document, as an administrative offense, is knowingly making

false statements in official or public documents. Both are grave offenses under the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which carry with it the
penalty of dismissal on the first offense.22G.R. No. 168309 January 29, 2008

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner,

vs.
MARIAN D. TORRES and MARICAR D. TORRES,

Dishonesty is defined as the "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;

untrustworthiness, lack of integrity."21G.R. No. 168309 January 29, 2008

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner,

vs.
MARIAN D. TORRES and MARICAR D. TORRES, r
As to the charge of Falsification and/or Dishonesty, respondents were denounced for
making it appear that the construction of the three (3) classroom buildings at the
Inaclagan Barangay High School was in accordance with the plans and specifications,
when in truth there were substantial deviations in terms of materials, quality of work and
construction methods.

Under Section 52 (A)(1) and (A)(6), Rule IV of the "Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service" (Resolution No. 99-1936 dated August 31, 1999),
respondent’s act of making untruthful declarations in his PDS renders him
administratively liable for falsification of public document and dishonesty which are
classified as grave offenses and, thus, warrant the corresponding penalty of dismissal
from the service even if either of them is respondent’s first offense. Section 58 of Rule IV
thereof states that the penalty of dismissal shall carry with it the cancellation of
eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for
reemployment in the government service, unless otherwise provided in the decision.10

A.M. No. P-10-2833* December 14, 2010

RETIRED EMPLOYEE, Municipal Trial Court, Sibonga, Cebu, Complainant,

vs.
MERLYN G. MANUBAG,

************************************************************

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6770

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE FUNCTIONAL AND

STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as “The

Ombudsman Act of 1989”.

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall maintain

honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive
and effective measures against graft and corruption.

Public office is a public trust and must at all times be

accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice and lead modest lives.

Sec. 3. Office of the Ombudsman. - The Office of the

Ombudsman shall include the Office of the Overall Deputy,
the Office of the Deputy for Luzon, the Office of the Deputy
for Visayas, the Office of the Deputy for Mindanao, the
Office of the Deputy for the Armed Forces, and the Office of
the Special Prosecutor. The President may appoint other
Deputies as the necessity for it may arise, as recommended
by the Ombudsman.

Sec. 4. Appointment. - The Ombudsman and his Deputies,

including the Special Prosecutor, shall be appointed by the
President from a list of at least twenty one (21) nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of
three (3) nominees for each vacancy thereafter, which shall
be filled within three (3) months after it occurs, each of
which list shall be published in a newspaper of general
circulation.

In the organization of the Office of the Ombudsman for

filling up of positions therein, regional, cultural or ethnic
considerations shall be taken into account to the end that
the Office shall be as much as possible representative of the
regional, ethnic and cultural make-up of the Filipino nation.

Sec. 5. Qualifications. - The Ombudsman and his Deputies,

including the Special Prosecutor, shall be natural born
citizens of the Philippines, at least forty (40) years old, of
recognized probity and independence, members of the
Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any
elective national or local office in the immediately
preceding election whether regular or special. The
Ombudsman must have, for ten (10) years or more, been a
judge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.

Sec. 6. Rank and Salary. - The Ombudsman and his

Deputies shall have the same ranks, salaries and privileges
as the Chairman and members, respectively of a
Constitutional Commission. Their salaries shall not be
decreased during their term of office.

The members of the prosecution, investigation and legal

staff of the Office of the Ombudsman shall receive salaries
which shall not be less than those given to comparable
positions in any office in the Government.

Sec. 7. Term of Office. - The Ombudsman and his Deputies,

including the Special Prosecutor, shall serve for a term of
seven (7) years without reappointment.
Sec. 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy. -

(1) In accordance with the provisions of Article XI of the

Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other
high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.

(2) A Deputy, or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed

from office by the President for any of the grounds provided
for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process.

(3) In case of vacancy in the Office of the Ombudsman due

to death, resignation, removal or permanent disability of the
incumbent Ombudsman shall have been appointed for a full
term. In case the Overall Deputy cannot assume the role of
Acting Ombudsman, the President may designate any of the
deputies, or the Special Prosecutor, as Acting Ombudsman.

(4) In case of temporary absence or disability of the

Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy shall perform the duties of
the Ombudsman until the Ombudsman returns or is able to
perform his duties.

Sec. 9. Prohibition and Disqualifications. - The

Ombudsman, his Deputies and the Special Prosecutor shall
not, during their tenure, hold any other office or
employment. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with,
or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid
conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. They shall
not be qualified to run for any office in the election
immediately following their cessation from office. They shall
not be allowed to appear or practice before the Ombudsman
for two (2) years following their cessation from office.

No spouse or relative by consanguinity or affinity within the

fourth civil degree and no law, business or professional
partner or associate of the Ombudsman, his Deputies or
Special Prosecutor within one (1) year preceding the
appointment may appear as counsel or agent on any matter
pending before the Office of the Ombudsman or transact
business directly or indirectly therewith.

This disqualification shall apply during the tenure of the

official concerned. This disqualification likewise extends to
the law, business or professional firm for the same
period.chan robles virtual law library

Sec. 10. Disclosure of Relationship. - It shall be the duty of

the Ombudsman, his Deputies, including the Special
Prosecutor to make under oath, to the best of their
knowledge and/or information, a public disclosure of the
identities of, and their relationship with the persons
referred to in the preceding section.

The disclosure shall be filed with the Office of the President

and the Office of the Ombudsman before the appointee
assumes office and every year thereafter. The disclosures
made pursuant to this section shall form part of the public
records and shall be available to any person or entity upon
request.

Sec. 11. Structural Organization. - The authority and

responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of the Office
of the Ombudsman and for the discharge of its powers and
functions shall be vested in the Ombudsman, who shall have
supervision and control of the said Office.

(1) The Office of the Ombudsman may organize such

directorates for administration and allied services as may be
necessary for the effective discharge of its functions. Those
appointed as directors or heads shall have the rank and
salary of line bureau directors.

(2) The Office of the Overall Deputy shall oversee and

administer the operations of the different offices under the
Office of the Ombudsman. it shall likewise perform such
other functions and duties assigned to it by the
Ombudsman.

(3) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall be composed of

the Special Prosecutor and his prosecution staff. The Office
of the Special Prosecutor shall be an organic component of
the Office of the Ombudsman and shall be under the
supervision and control of the Ombudsman.

(4) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall, under the

supervision and control and upon the authority of the
Ombudsman, have the following powers:

(a) To conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute

criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan;

(b) To enter into plea bargaining agreements; and

(c) To perform such other duties assigned to it by the
Ombudsman.

The Special Prosecutor shall have the rank and salary of a

Deputy Ombudsman.

(5) The position structure and staffing pattern of the Office

of the Ombudsman, including the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, shall be approved and prescribed by the
Ombudsman shall appoint all officers and employees of the
Office of the Special Prosecutor, in accordance with the civil
service law, rules and regulations.

Sec. 12. Official Stations. - The Ombudsman, the Overall

Deputy, the Deputy for Luzon, and the Deputy for the Armed
Forces shall hold office in Metropolitan Manila; the Deputy
for the Visayas, in Cebu City; and the Deputy for Mindanao,
in Davao City. The Ombudsman may transfer their stations
within their respective geographical regions, as public
interest may require.

Sec. 13. Mandate. - The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as

protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints
filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of
the government, or of any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative,
civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence
warrants in order to promote efficient service by the
Government to the people.

Sec. 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued

by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by
the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima
facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is
outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy

against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except
the Supreme Court, on pure question of law. chan robles virtual law
library

Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the

Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and
duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by

any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of his primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of government, the investigation of
such cases;

(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any officer

or employee of the Government, or of any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any
government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by
law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or
impropriety in the performance of duties;chan robles virtual law library

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action

against a public officer or employee at fault or who neglects
to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and
recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith;
or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section
21of this Act: Provided, That the refusal by any officer
without just cause to comply with an order of the
Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or
prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who
neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by
law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said
officer;

(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and

subject to such limitations as it may provide in its rules of
procedures, to furnish it with copies of documents relating
to contracts or transactions entered into by his office
involving the disbursement or use of public funds or
properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on
Audit for appropriate action;

(5) Request any government agency for assistance and

information necessary in the discharge of its
responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent
records and documents;

(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation of the

matters mentioned in paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4) hereof,
when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence:
Provided, that the Ombudsman under its rules and
regulations may determine what cases may not be made
public: Provided further, That any publicity issued by the
Ombudsman shall be balanced, fair and true;

(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape,

mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the government
and make recommendations for their elimination and the
observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency;

(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces

tecum, and take testimony in any investigation or inquiry,
including the power to examine and have access to bank
accounts and records;

(9) Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of

Court and under the same procedure and with the same
penalties provided therein;

(10) Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or

representatives such authority or duty as shall ensure the
effective exercise or performance of the powers, functions,
and duties herein or hereinafter provided;

(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the

recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexpired wealth amassed after
February 25, 1986 and the prosecution of the parties
involved therein.

The Ombudsman shall give priority to complaints filed

against high ranking government officials and/or those
occupying supervisory positions, complaints involving grave
offenses as well as complaints involving large sums of
money and/or properties.

Sec. 16. Applicability. - The provisions of this Act shall

apply to all kinds of malfeasance, and non-feasance that
have been committed by any officer or employee as
mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office.

Sec. 17. Immunities. - In all hearings, inquiries, and

proceedings of the Ombudsman, including preliminary
investigations of offenses, no person subpoenaed to testify
as a witness shall be excused from attending and testifying
or from producing books, papers, correspondence,
memoranda and/or other records on the ground that the
testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required
of him, may tend to incriminate him or subject him to
prosecution: Provided, That no person shall be prosecuted
criminally for or on account of any matter concerning which
he is compelled, after having claimed the privilege against
self-incrimination, to testify and produce evidence,
documentary or otherwise. chan robles virtual law library

Under such terms and conditions as it may determine taking

into account the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court,
the Ombudsman may grant immunity from criminal
prosecution to any person whose possession and production
of documents or other evidence may be necessary to
determine the truth in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding
being conducted by the Ombudsman or under its authority,
in the performance or in the furtherance of its
constitutional functions and statutory objectives. The
immunity granted under this and the immediately preceding
paragraph shall not except the witness from criminal
prosecution for perjury or false testimony nor shall he be
exempt from demotion or removal from office.

Any refusal to appear or testify pursuant to the aforecited

provisions shall be subject to punishment for prompt
contempt and removal of the immunity from criminal
prosecution.

Sec. 18. Rules of Procedure. -

(1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall promulgate its rules

of procedure for the effective exercise or performance of its
powers, functions, and duties.

(2) The rules of procedure shall include a provision whereby

the Rules of Court are made suppletory.

(3) The rules shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in
three (3) newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines, one of which is printed in the national language.

Sec. 19. Administrative Complaints. - The Ombudsman shall

act on all complaints relating, but not limited to acts or
omissions which:
(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;

(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;

(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency’s

functions, though in accordance with law; Proceed from a
mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts; Are in
the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper
purpose; or Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of
justification.

Sec. 20. Exceptions. - The Office of the Ombudsman may not

conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative
act or omission complained of if it believes that:
(1) The complainant has an adequate remedy in another
judicial or quasi-judicial body;

(2) The complaint pertains to a matter outside the

jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman;

(3) The complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in

bad faith;

(4) The complainant has no sufficient personal interest in

the subject matter of the grievance; or

(5) The complaint was filed after one year from the
occurrence of the act or omission complained of.

Sec. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority;

Exceptions. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the Government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the
Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who
may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of
Congress, and the Judiciary.

Sec. 22. Investigatory Power. - The Office of the

Ombudsman shall have the power to investigate any serious
misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials
removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a
verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted.

In all cases of conspiracy between an officer or employee of

the government and a private person, the Ombudsman and
his Deputies shall have jurisdiction to include such private
person in the investigation and proceed against such private
person as the evidence may warrant. The officer or
employee and the private person shall be tried jointly and
shall be subject to the same penalties and liabilities.

Sec. 23. Formal Investigation. -

(1) Administrative investigations conducted by the Office of

the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of
procedure and consistent with due process. chan robles virtual law
library

(2) At its option, the Office of the Ombudsman may refer

certain complaints to the proper disciplinary authority for
the institution of appropriate administrative proceedings
against erring public officers or employees, which shall be
terminated within the period prescribed in the civil service
law. Any delay without just cause in acting on any referral
made by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be a ground for
administrative action against the officers or employees to
whom such referrals are addressed and shall constitute a
graft offense punishable by a fine of not exceeding five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00).

(3) In any investigation under this Act, the Ombudsman may

(a) enter and inspect the premises of any office, agency,
commission or tribunal; (b) examine and have access to any
book, record, file document or paper; and (c) hold private
hearings with both the complaining individual and the
official concerned.

Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. - The Ombudsman or his

Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee
under his authority pending an investigation, if in his
judgment, the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge
against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal
from the service; or (c) the respondent’s continued stay in
office may prejudice the case filed against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is

terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more
than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the
disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is
due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in
which case, the period of such delay shall not be counted in
computing the period of suspension herein provided.

Sec. 25. Penalties. -

(1) In administrative proceedings under Presidential Decree

No. 807, the penalties and rules provided therein shall be
applied.

(2) In other administrative proceedings, the penalty ranging

from suspension without pay for one year to dismissal with
forfeiture of benefits or a fine ranging from five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00) to twice the amount malversed, illegally
taken or lost, or both at the discretion of the Ombudsman,
taking into consideration circumstances that mitigate or
aggravate the liability of the officer or employee found
guilty of the complaint or charges.

Sec. 26. Inquiries. -

(1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall inquire into acts or
omissions of a public officer, employee, office or agency
which, from the reports or complaints it has received, the
Ombudsman or his Deputies consider to be:
(a) contrary to law or regulation;

(b) unreasonable, unfair, oppressive, irregular or

inconsistent with the general course of the operations and
functions of a public officer, employee, office or agency;

(c) an error in the application or interpretation of law, rules

or regulations, or a gross or palpable error in the
appreciation of facts;

(d) based on improper motives or corrupt considerations;

(e) unclear or inadequately explained when reasons should

have been revealed; or

(f) inefficiently performed or otherwise objectionable.

(2) The Office of the Ombudsman shall receive complaints

from any source in whatever form concerning an official act
or omission. It shall act on the complaint immediately and if
it finds the same entirely baseless, it shall dismiss the same
and inform the complainant of such dismissal citing the
reasons therefor. If it finds a reasonable ground to
investigate further, it shall first furnish the respondent
public officer or employee with a summary of the complaint
and require him to submit a written answer within seventy-
two hours from receipt thereof. If the answer is found
satisfactory, it shall dismiss the case.

*** SECOND DIVISION

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 172700

Petitioner,

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

NACHURA,

PERALTA,
 - versus - ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

ROLSON RODRIGUEZ, Promulgated:

Respondent. July 23, 2010

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review of the 8 May 2006 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00528 setting aside for lack of jurisdiction
the 21 September 2004 Decision of the Ombudsman (Visayas) in OMB-V-
A-03-0511-H.
 The Antecedent Facts

On 26 August 2003, the Ombudsman in Visayas received a complaint

for abuse of authority, dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, and
neglect of duty against Rolson Rodriguez, punong barangay in Brgy. Sto.
Rosario, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental. On 1 September 2003, the
sangguniang bayan of Binalbagan, Negros Occidental, through vice-mayor
Jose G. Yulo, received a similar complaint against Rodriguez for abuse of
authority, dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, and neglect of duty.

In its 8 September 2003 notice, the municipal vice-mayor required

Rodriguez to submit his answer within 15 days from receipt of the notice.
On 23 September 2003, Rodriguez filed a motion to dismiss the case filed in
the sangguniang bayan on the ground that the allegations in the complaint
were without factual basis and did not constitute any violation of law. In a
compliance dated 22 October 2003, Rodriguez alleged complainants violated
the rule against forum shopping.

Meanwhile, in its 10 September 2003 order, the Ombudsman required

Rodriguez to file his answer. Rodriguez filed on 24 October 2003 a motion
to dismiss the case filed in the Ombudsman on the grounds of litis pendentia
and forum shopping. He alleged that the sangguniang bayan had already
acquired jurisdiction over his person as early as 8 September 2003.
 The municipal vice-mayor set the case for hearing on 3 October 2003.
Since complainants had no counsel, the hearing was reset to a later date.
When the case was called again for hearing, complainants’ counsel
manifested that complainants would like to withdraw the administrative
complaint filed in the sangguniang bayan. On 29 October 2003,
complainants filed a motion to withdraw the complaint lodged in the
sangguniang bayan on the ground that they wanted to prioritize the
complaint filed in the Ombudsman. Rodriguez filed a comment praying that
the complaint be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping, not on the
ground complainants stated. In their opposition, complainants admitted they
violated the rule against forum shopping and claimed they filed the
complaint in the sangguniang bayan without the assistance of counsel. In his
4 November 2003 Resolution, the municipal vice-mayor dismissed the case
filed in the sangguniang bayan.

In its 29 January 2004 order, the Ombudsman directed both parties to

file their respective verified position papers. Rodriguez moved for
reconsideration of the order citing the pendency of his motion to dismiss. In
its 11 March 2004 order, the Ombudsman stated that a motion to dismiss
was a prohibited pleading under Section 5 (g) Rule III of Administrative
Order No. 17. The Ombudsman reiterated its order for Rodriguez to file his
position paper.

In his position paper, Rodriguez insisted that the sangguniang bayan

still continued to exercise jurisdiction over the complaint filed against him.
He claimed he had not received any resolution or decision dismissing the
complaint filed in the sangguniang bayan. In reply, complainants maintained
there was no more complaint pending in the sangguniang bayan since the
latter had granted their motion to withdraw the complaint. In a rejoinder,
Rodriguez averred that the sangguniang bayan resolution dismissing the
case filed against him was not valid because only the vice-mayor signed it.

The Ruling of the Ombudsman

In its 21 September 2004 Decision, the Ombudsman found Rodriguez

guilty of dishonesty and oppression. It imposed on Rodriguez the penalty of
dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits, disqualification to
hold public office, and forfeiture of civil service eligibilities. Rodriguez filed
a motion for reconsideration. In its 12 January 2005 Order, the Ombudsman
denied the motion for reconsideration. In its 8 March 2005 Order, the
Ombudsman directed the mayor of Binalbagan, Negros Occidental to
implement the penalty of dismissal against Rodriguez.

Rodriguez filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for review with

prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

 In its 8 May 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside for lack of
jurisdiction the Decision of the Ombudsman and directed the sangguniang
bayan to proceed with the hearing on the administrative case. The appellate
court reasoned that the sangguniang bayan had acquired primary jurisdiction
over the person of Rodriguez to the exclusion of the Ombudsman. The Court
of Appeals relied on Section 4, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction over person of respondent, how acquired. – The

court shall acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent by the
service on him of its order or resolution indicating its initial action on the
petition or by his voluntary submission to such jurisdiction.

The appellate court noted that the sangguniang bayan served on

Rodriguez a notice, requiring the latter to file an answer, on 8 September
2003 while the Ombudsman did so two days later or on 10 September 2003.

Petitioner Ombudsman contends that upon the filing of a complaint

before a body vested with jurisdiction, that body has taken cognizance of the
complaint. Petitioner cites Black’s Law Dictionary in defining what “to take
cognizance” means to wit, “to acknowledge or exercise jurisdiction.”
Petitioner points out it had taken cognizance of the complaint against
Rodriguez before a similar complaint was filed in the sangguniang bayan
against the same respondent. Petitioner maintains summons or notices do not
operate to vest in the disciplining body jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent in an administrative case. Petitioner concludes that consistent
with the rule on concurrent jurisdiction, the Ombudsman’s exercise of
jurisdiction should be to the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan.
 Private respondent Rolson Rodriguez counters that when a competent
body has acquired jurisdiction over a complaint and the person of the
respondent, other bodies are excluded from exercising jurisdiction over the
same complaint. He cites Article 124 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 7160, which provides that an elective
official may be removed from office by order of the proper court or the
disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion
of the other. Private respondent insists the sangguniang bayan first acquired
jurisdiction over the complaint and his person. He argues jurisdiction over
the person of a respondent in an administrative complaint is acquired by the
service of summons or other compulsory processes. Private respondent
stresses complainants violated the rule against forum shopping when they
filed identical complaints in two disciplining authorities exercising
concurrent jurisdiction.

The Issues

The issues submitted for resolution are (1) whether complainants

violated the rule against forum shopping when they filed in the Ombudsman
and the sangguniang bayan identical complaints against Rodriguez; and
(2) whether it was the sangguniang bayan or the Ombudsman that first
acquired jurisdiction.

The Court’s Ruling

 The petition has merit.

Paragraph 1, Section 13 of Article XI of the Constitution

provides:

Sec. 13. The Ombudsman shall have the following

powers, functions, and duties:

(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any

person, any act or omission of any public official, employee,
office, or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as

the Ombudsman Act of 1989, states:

Sec. 15. Powers, Functions, and Duties. – The

Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and
duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on

complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the investigations of
such cases.
 The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to
investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee
applies only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. In
cases cognizable by regular courts, the Ombudsman has
concurrent jurisdiction with other investigative agencies of
government. Republic Act No. 8249, otherwise known as An
Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
limits the cases that are cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to
public officials occupying positions corresponding to salary
grade 27 and higher. The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over private respondent who, as punong barangay, is
occupying a position corresponding to salary grade 14 under
Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989.

Under Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the

Local Government Code, the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan has disciplinary authority over any
elective barangay official, to wit:

SEC. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints.

– A verified complaint against any erring elective official shall
be prepared as follows:

xxxx

(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official

shall be filed before the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan concerned whose decision shall be final
and executory.
 Clearly, the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction
with the sangguniang bayan over administrative cases against
elective barangay officials occupying positions below salary
grade 27, such as private respondent in this case.

The facts in the present case are analogous to those in Laxina, Sr. v.
Ombudsman, which likewise involved identical administrative complaints
filed in both the Ombudsman and the sangguniang panlungsod against a
punong barangay for grave misconduct. The Court held therein that the rule
against forum shopping applied only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to
administrative cases. Thus, even if complainants filed in the Ombudsman
and the sangguniang bayan identical complaints against private
respondent, they did not violate the rule against forum shopping because
their complaint was in the nature of an administrative case.

In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or

more disciplining authorities, the body in which the complaint is filed first,
and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the
exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. In this case,
since the complaint was filed first in the Ombudsman, and the Ombudsman
opted to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, the Ombudsman’s exercise
of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan exercising
concurrent jurisdiction.
 It is a hornbook rule that jurisdiction is a matter of law. Jurisdiction,
once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until
the case is terminated. When herein complainants first filed the complaint in
the Ombudsman, jurisdiction was already vested on the latter. Jurisdiction
could no longer be transferred to the sangguniang bayan by virtue of a
subsequent complaint filed by the same complainants.

As a final note, under Section 60 of the Local Government Code, the

sangguniang bayan has no power to remove an elective barangay official.
Apart from the Ombudsman, only a proper court may do so. Unlike the
sangguniang bayan, the powers of the Ombudsman are not merely
recommendatory. The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to directly
remove an erring public official other than members of Congress and the
Judiciary who may be removed only by impeachment.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 8 May

2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00528. We
AFFIRM the 21 September 2004 Decision of the Ombudsman (Visayas) in
OMB-V-A-03-0511-H.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA

Associate Justice
 ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice
 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Rollo, pp. 33-43. Penned by Associate Justice Vicente L. Yap, with Executive
Justice Arsenio J. Magpale and Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.,
concurring.

Id. at 44-50.

Records, pp. 2-60.

CA rollo, p. 53.

Records, p. 69.

CA rollo, pp. 60-63.

Id. at 74-75.

Records, p. 65.

Id. at 66-68.

Id. at 74.

CA rollo, pp. 76-77.

Id. at 78-79.

Id. at 80-82.

Id. at 102-103.

Records, p. 81.

CA rollo, pp. 86-87.

Id. at 88-89.

Id. at 99-101.

Id. at 106-107.

Id. at 26-33.

Id. at 34-48.

Id. at 122-124.

Id. at 144-145.
 Rollo, pp. 33-43.

Otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.

Uy v. Sandiganbayan, 407 Phil. 154 (2001).

As implemented by the Department of Budget and Management. DBM Manual on

Position Classification and Compensation Scheme in Local Government Units.

G.R. No. 153155, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 542.

Id.

Civil Service Commission v. Alfonso, G.R. No. 179452, 11 June 2009, 589 SCRA
88; Enrique v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79072, 10 January 1994, 229 SCRA 180.

Office of the Ombudsman v. Estandarte, G.R. No. 168670, 13 April 2007, 521
SCRA 155.

The Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Don Mariano Marcos v. Martinez, G.R.

No. 170626, 3 March 2008, 547 SCRA 416.

Office of the Ombudsman v. Santiago, G.R. No. 161098, 13 September 2007, 533
SCRA 305.

Section 21, R.A. No.

******************************************

Section 12 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution mandated the Ombudsman to act

promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees
of the Government, or any subdivision, agency, instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Under Section 13, Article XI, the
Ombudsman is empowered to conduct investigations on his own or upon complaint by
any person when such act appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. He is also
given broad powers to take the appropriate disciplinary actions against erring public
officials and employees.

The investigative authority of the Ombudsman is defined in Section 15 of R.A. No. 6770:

SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may
take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation
of such cases;

x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

Such jurisdiction over public officers and employees, however, is not exclusive.

This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution and The
Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized
government agencies, such as the PCGG and judges of municipal trial courts and
municipal circuit trial courts. The power to conduct preliminary investigation on charges
against public employees and officials is likewise concurrently shared with the
Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the Local Government Code in 1991, the
Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the President and the local
Sanggunians to investigate complaints against local elective officials.9

G.R. No. 170146 June 8, 2011

HON. WALDO Q. FLORES, in his capacity as Senior Deputy Executive Secretary

in the Office of the President, HON. ARTHUR P. AUTEA, in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Secretary in the Office of the President, and the PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-
GRAFT COMMISSION (PAGC), Petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. ANTONIO F. MONTEMAYOR,

9
Office of the Ombudsman v. Galicia, G.R. No. 167711, October 10, 2008, 568 SCRA
327, 339, citing Panlilio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 92276, June 26, 1992, 210 SCRA
421; Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. Nos. 92319-
20, October 2, 1990, 190 SCRA 226; Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating
Prosecutors of the Department of Justice, G.R. No. 159747, April 13, 2004, 427 SCRA
46; and Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole, G.R. No. 108072, December 12, 1995, 251 SCRA 242.

**********************

G.R. No. 170626 March 3, 2008

THE SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF BARANGAY DON MARIANO

MARCOS, MUNICIPALITY OF BAYOMBONG PROVINCE OF NUEVA
VISCAYA represented by BARANGAY KAGAWAD JOSE CENEN SANTOS,
MARIO BACUD, WALTER FRANCISCO, ROSITA SEBASTIAN, LAURETA
CABAUATAN, CECILIA ALINDAYU and MELY SIMANGAN, petitioners,
vs.
PUNONG BARANGAY SEVERINO MARTINEZ, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the Orders dated 20 October 20051 and 30 November 20052 of the Regional Trial Court
(trial court), Branch 27, of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, in Special Civil Action No.
6727. In its assailed Orders, the trial court ruled that the Sangguniang Bayan of
Bayombong, Neuva Vizcaya (Sangguniang Bayan), exceeded its jurisdiction when it
imposed upon respondent Severino Martinez the administrative penalty of removal from
office.

Petitioner Sangguniang Barangay is the legislative body of Barangay Don Mariano

Marcos, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, a local government unit created, organized and
existing as such under pertinent laws of the Republic of the Philippines. Respondent
Martinez is the incumbent Punong Barangay of the said local government unit.3

On 5 November 2004, Martinez was administratively charged with Dishonesty and Graft
and Corruption by petitioner through the filing of a verified complaint before the
Sangguniang Bayan as the disciplining authority over elective barangay officials
pursuant to Section 614 of Rep. Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code. Petitioner filed with the Sangguniang Bayan an Amended
Administrative Complaint against Martinez on 6 December 2004 for Dishonesty,
Misconduct in Office and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.5
Petitioner alleged that Martinez committed the following acts:

1. Failure to submit and fully remit to the Barangay Treasurer the income of their
solid waste management project since 2001 particularly the sale of fertilizer
derived from composting.

2. Failure to submit/remit to the barangay treasurer the sale of recyclable

materials taken from garbage collection.

3. Using the garbage truck for other purposes like hauling sand and gravel for
private persons without monetary benefit to the barangay because no income from
this source appears in the year end report even if payments were collected x x x.

4. Using/spending barangay funds for repair, gasoline, lubricants, wheels and

other spare parts of the garbage truck instead of using the money or income of
said truck from the garbage fees collected as income from its Sold Waste
Management Project. x x x.

5. Unliquidated traveling expenses for Seminar/Lakbay-Aral in 2003 because

although a cash advance was made by the respondent for the said purpose, he,
however, did not attend said seminar because on the dates when he was supposed
to be on seminar they saw him in the barangay. x x x.

6. That several attempts to discuss said problem during sessions were all in vain
because respondent declined to discuss it and would adjourn the session.x x x.6

Upon his failure to file an Answer to the Amended Administrative Complaint dated 6
December 2004, Martinez was declared by the Sangguniang Bayan as in default. Pending
the administrative proceedings, Martinez was placed under preventive suspension for 60
days or until 8 August 2005.7
On 28 July 2005, the Sangguniang Bayan rendered its Decision which imposed upon
Martinez the penalty of removal from office.8

The Decision dated 28 July 2005 was conveyed to the Municipal Mayor of Bayombong,
Nueva Ecija, Severino Bagasao, for its implementation. On 3 August 2005, Municial
Mayor Bagasao issued a Memorandum, wherein he stated that the Sanggunaing Bayan is
not empowered to order Martinez’s removal from service. However, the Decision remains
valid until reversed and must be executed by him. For the meantime, he ordered the
indefinite suspension of Martinez since the period of appeal had not yet lapsed.9 The
dispositive portion of the said Memorandum states that:10

The FOREGOING considered come AUGUST 8, 2005, respondent SEVERINO

D. MARTINEZ is hereby directed NOT to ASSUME and DISCHARGE the
functions of the Office of the Punong Barangay of Barangay Don Mariano
Marcos, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and for complainant JOSE CENEN
SANTOS to CONTINUE assuming and discharging the functions of the said
office in ACTING CAPACITY pursuant to the provisions of Sections 67 and 68
of Republic Act No. 7160.

On 26 August 2005, Martinez filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with a prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction before the trial court against
petitioner, the Sangguniang Bayan and Mayor Bagasao questioning the validity of the
Decision dated 28 July 2005 of the Sangguniang Bayan. This case was docketed as
Special Civil Action No. 6727, which was initially heard by Branch 28, but later raffled
to Branch 27 of the trial court.11

On 20 October 2005, the trial court issued an Order declaring the Decision of the
Sangguniang Bayan and the Memorandum of Mayor Bagasao void. It maintained that the
proper courts, and not the petitioner, are empowered to remove an elective local official
from office, in accordance with Section 60 of the Local Government Code. Thus, the
Order of the Sangguniang Bayan removing Martinez from service is void. As a
consequence, Mayor Bagasao cannot prevent Martinez from assuming his office on the
basis of a void order. The trial court further ruled that Martinez properly availed himself
of the remedy of Special Civil Action, where the order assailed was a patent nullity.12

On 10 November 2005, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration13 of the trial court’s
Order dated 10 October 2005. The trial court denied the said motion in another Order
dated 30 November 2005.14

Hence, the present petition was filed.

Although Martinez’s term as Punong Baranggay expired upon the holding of the 29
October 2007 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan elections and, thus,
rendering this petition moot and academic, the Court will nevertheless settle a legal
question that is capable of repetition yet evading review.15

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the Sangguniang Bayan may remove
Martinez, an elective local official, from office. The pertinent legal provisions and cases
decided by this Court firmly establish that the Sanggunaing Bayan is not empowered to
do so.
Section 60 of the Local Government Code conferred upon the courts the power to
remove elective local officials from office:

Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions.—An elective local official may be
disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds:

x x x x.

An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated
above by order of the proper court. (Emphasis provided.)

During the deliberations of the Senate on the Local Government Code,16 the legislative
intent to confine to the courts, i.e., regional trial courts, the Sandiganbayan and the
appellate courts, jurisdiction over cases involving the removal of elective local officials
was evident:

Senator Pimentel. This has been reserved, Mr. President, including the issue of
whether or not the Department Secretary or the Office of the President can
suspend or remove an elective official.

Senator Saguisag. For as long as that is open for some later disposition, may I just
add the following thought: It seems to me that instead of identifying only the
proper regional trial court or the Sandiganbayan, and since we know that in
the case of a regional trial court, particularly, a case may be appealed or may
be the subject of an injunction, in the framing of this later on, I would like to
suggest that we consider replacing the phrase "PROPER REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OR THE SANDIGANBAYAN" simply by "COURTS." Kasi
po, maaaring sabihin nila na mali iyong regional trial court o ang Sandiganbayan.

Senator Pimentel. "OR THE PROPER COURT."

Senator Saguisag. "OR THE PROPER COURT."

Senator Pimentel. Thank you. We are willing to accept that now, Mr. President.

Senator Saguisag. It is to be incorporated in the phraseology that we will craft to

capture the other ideas that have been elevated. (Emphasis provided.)

In Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,17 the Court en banc categorically ruled that the Office of the
President is without any power to remove elected officials, since the power is
exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of
Section 60 of the Local Government Code. It further invalidated Article 125, Rule XIX
of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, which
provided that:

Article 125. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. x x x.

x x x x.

(b) An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds
enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article by order of the proper court or the
 disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the
other.

The Court nullified the aforequoted rule since the Oversight Committee that prepared the
Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code exceeded its authority when it
granted to the "disciplining authority" the power to remove elective officials, a power
which the law itself granted only to the proper courts. Thus, it is clear that under the law,
the Sangguniang Bayan is not vested with the power to remove Martinez.

Petitioner contends that administrative cases involving elective barangay officials may be
filed with, heard and decided by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan
concerned, which can, thereafter, impose a penalty of removal from office. It further
claims that the courts are merely tasked with issuing the order of removal, after the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan finds that a penalty of removal is
warranted.18

The aforementioned position put forward by the petitioner would run counter to the
rationale for making the removal of elective officials an exclusive judicial prerogative. In
Pablico v. Villapando,19 the court declared that:

It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the power to remove erring elective local
officials from service is lodged exclusively with the courts. Hence, Article 124
(sic 125)20 (b), Rule XIX, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code, insofar as it vests power on the "disciplining authority" to
remove from office erring elective local officials, is void for being repugnant to
the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The
law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly
construed and applied, and the authority in whom such power of suspension or
removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good faith, for what is involved is
not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through the
exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be put to
naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Where the
disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend and not the power to
remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power
to remove. (Emphasis supplied.)

The rule which confers to the proper courts the power to remove an elective local
official from office is intended as a check against any capriciousness or partisan activity
by the disciplining authority. Vesting the local legislative body with the power to decide
whether or not a local chief executive may be removed from office, and only relegating
to the courts a mandatory duty to implement the decision, would still not free the
resolution of the case from the capriciousness or partisanship of the disciplining
authority. Thus, the petitioner’s interpretation would defeat the clear intent of the law.

Moreover, such an arrangement clearly demotes the courts to nothing more than an
implementing arm of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, or Sangguniang Bayan. This would
be an unmistakable breach of the doctrine on separation of powers, thus placing the
courts under the orders of the legislative bodies of local governments. The courts would
be stripped of their power of review, and their discretion in imposing the extreme penalty
of removal from office is thus left to be exercised by political factions which stand to
benefit from the removal from office of the local elective official concerned, the very evil
which Congress sought to avoid when it enacted Section 60 of the Local Government
Code.

Congress clearly meant that the removal of an elective local official be done only after a
trial before the appropriate court, where court rules of procedure and evidence can ensure
impartiality and fairness and protect against political maneuverings. Elevating the
removal of an elective local official from office from an administrative case to a court
case may be justified by the fact that such removal not only punishes the official
concerned but also, in effect, deprives the electorate of the services of the official for
whom they voted.

As the law stands, Section 61 of the Local Government Code provides for the
procedure for the filing of an administrative case against an erring elective barangay
official before the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan. However, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan cannot order the removal of an erring
elective barangay official from office, as the courts are exclusively vested with this
power under Section 60 of the Local Government Code. Thus, if the acts allegedly
committed by the barangay official are of a grave nature and, if found guilty, would merit
the penalty of removal from office, the case should be filed with the regional trial court.
Once the court assumes jurisdiction, it retains jurisdiction over the case even if it would
be subsequently apparent during the trial that a penalty less than removal from office is
appropriate. On the other hand, the most extreme penalty that the Sangguniang
Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring elective barangay official is
suspension; if it deems that the removal of the official from service is warranted, then it
can resolve that the proper charges be filed in court.

Petitioner alleged that an interpretation which gives the judiciary the power to remove
local elective officials violates the doctrine of separation of powers. This allegation runs
contrary to the 1987 Constitution itself, as well as jurisprudence.

The 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power. It establishes
the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of acts of the
political departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty.21 Paragraph 2,
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, provides that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis provided.)

The doctrine of separation of powers is not absolute in its application; rather, it should be
applied in accordance with the principle of checks and balances. The removal from office
of elective officials must not be tainted with partisan politics and used to defeat the will
of the voting public. Congress itself saw it fit to vest that power in a more impartial
tribunal, the court. Furthermore, the local government units are not deprived of the right
to discipline local elective officials; rather, they are prevented from imposing the extreme
penalty of dismissal.

Petitioner questions the Decision dated 20 October 2005 of the trial court for allowing the
petition filed before it as an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. If, indeed, the Sangguniang Bayan had no power to remove Martinez from
office, then Martinez should have sought recourse from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
This Court upholds the ruling of the trial court.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the
appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their
jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. Non-
observance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, which is one of the grounds
allowed by the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint.22

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, which is based on sound public

policy and practical consideration, is not inflexible. There are instances when it may be
dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately. Among these
exceptions are: 1) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
2) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; 3) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant; 4) where the amount involved is relatively small
as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; 5) where the question raised is purely
legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; 6) where judicial
intervention is urgent; 7) where its application may cause great and irreparable damage;
8) where the controverted acts violate due process; 9) when the issue of non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; 10) where there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy; 11) when strong public interest is involved; and 13) in quo
warranto proceedings.23

As a general rule, no recourse to courts can be had until all administrative remedies have
been exhausted. However, this rule is not applicable where the challenged administrative
act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction and where the question or
questions involved are essentially judicial.

In this case, it is apparent that the Sangguniang Bayan acted beyond its jurisdiction when
it issued the assailed Order dated 28 July 2005 removing Martinez from office. Such act
was patently illegal and, therefore, Martinez was no longer required to avail himself of an
administrative appeal in order to annul the said Order of the Sangguniang Bayan.24 Thus,
his direct recourse to regular courts of justice was justified.

In addition, this Court in Castro v. Gloria25 declared that where the case involves only
legal questions, the litigant need not exhaust all administrative remedies before such
judicial relief can be sought. The reason behind providing an exception to the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies is that issues of law cannot be resolved with
finality by the administrative officer. Appeal to the administrative officer would only be
an exercise in futility. A legal question is properly addressed to a regular court of justice
rather than to an administrative body.26

In the present case, Martinez raised before the trial court the sole issue of whether the
Sangguniang Bayan has jurisdiction over a case involving the removal of a local elective
official from office.27 In Martinez’s petition before the trial court, only a legal question
was raised, one that will ultimately be resolved by the courts. Hence, appeal to the
administrative officer concerned would only be circuitous and, therefore, should no
longer be required before judicial relief can be sought.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed
Decision of the Bayombong RTC in Special Civil Action No. 6727 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Austria-Martinez,, Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1
Penned by Judge Jose B. Rosales. Rollo, pp. 32-39.
2
Id. at 40-42.
3
Id. at 5-6.
4
Section 61 of the Local Government Code states that:

Section 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. A verified

complaint against any erring local elective official shall be prepared as
follows:

(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly

urbanized city, an independent component city or component city shall be
filed before the Office of the President;

(b) A complaint against any elective official of a municipality shall be

filed before the sangguniang panlalawigan whose decision may be
appealed to the Office of the President; and

(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed before
the sangguniang panglungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned whose
decision shall be final and executory.
5
Rollo, pp. 32-33.
6
Id. at 72.
7
Id. at 33.
8
Id. at 71-77.
9
Id. at 78-79.
10
Id. at 80.
11
Id. at 7-8.
12
Id. at 34-38.
13
Id at 48-63.
14
Id. at 40-42.
 15
Albana v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163302, 23 July 2004, 435
SCRA 98, 105; Brillantes, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163193, 15
June 2004, 432 SCRA 269, 286; and Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary Reyes, 466
Phil. 482, 505-506 (2004).
16
1 August 1990, pp. 39-40, also cited in Pablico v. Villapando, 434 Phil. 853,
859-860 (2002).
17
326 Phil. 847, 904-905 (1996).
18
Rollo, p. 133.
19
Supra note 16 at 860, citing Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., supra note 17.
20
Petitioner alleged that Article 124, and not Article 125, of the Rules and
Regulations of the Local Government Code was annulled by the Court in
Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Pablico v. Villapando. This hardly merits this
Court’s attention. In Salalima, it was categorically stated that the power granted
to the "disciplining authority" in Article 125 was clearly beyond the authority of
the Oversight Committee that drafted it. Citing Article 124, instead of Article 125,
in Villapando, was clearly a clerical error committed wherein no mention was
made of the subject matter of Article 124 and particular portions of Article 125
were quoted therein.
21
Disomangcop v. Datumanong, G.R. No. 149848, 25 November 2004, 444
SCRA 203, 219.
22
Castro v. Gloria, G.R. No.132174, 20 August 2001, 363 SCRA 417, 422.
23
Republic v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253, 2 March 2007, 517 SCRA 255, 265-266.
24
Section 67 of the Local Government Code states that:

Section 67. Administrative Appeals. Decisions in administrative cases

may, within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, be appealed to the
following:

(a) The sangguniang panlalawigan, in the case of decisions of the

sangguniang panlungsod of component cities and the sangguniang bayan;
x x x.
25
Supra note 22.
26
Municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet v. CFI of Baguio-Benguet, 208 Phil. 78,
83 (1983).
27
Rollo, p. 67.

**************************************
The mandate of the Ombudsman to investigate complaints
against erring public officials, derived from both the
Constitution[38] and the law[39] gives it jurisdiction over the
complaint against petitioner. The Constitution has named the
Ombudsman and his Deputies as the protectors of the people
who shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or
manner against public officials or employees of the
government.[40] To fulfill this mandate, R.A. No. 6770, or the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, was enacted, giving the
Ombudsman or his Deputies jurisdiction over complaints on
all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance[41]
against officers or employees of the government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality therefor, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and the
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials,
except those who may be removed only by impeachment or
over members of Congress and the Judiciary.[42] On the
other hand, under R.A. No. 7160 or the Local Government
Code, the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan has
disciplinary authority over any elective barangay official.[43]
Without a doubt, the Office of the Ombudsman has concurrent
jurisdiction with the Quezon City Council over administrative
cases against elective officials such as petitioner.

MANUEL D. LAXINA, SR., G.R. No. 153155

Petitioner,

Present:

- versus -

PUNO, J.,

Chairman,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, CALLEJO, SR.,

EVANGELINE URSAL, HON. TINGA, and

JOSE E. LINA, JR., in his CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

capacity as Secretary of the

Department of Interior and

Local Government (DILG), and

HON. FELICIANO BELMONTE, Promulgated:

JR., in his capacity as City Mayor

of Quezon City, September 30, 2005

Respondents.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

In grave misconduct, x x x the elements of

corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant
disregard of established rule must be manifest.”
(Salazar Vs. Barriaga, 521 SCRA 449; De Jesus Vs.
Office of the Ombudsman, 536 SCRA 547)

12. That in causing the issuance of the Certification (PAGPAPATUNAY),

certifying and attesting therein that the encroached portion of herein
complainant’s property were already removed on April 2008 as shown in the
“PAGPAPATUNAY, when in truth and in fact said encroached portion of the
complainant’s property were not removed, respondents are guilty of Grave
Misconduct, an administrative offense which consists of a corrupt, intentional
wrong, in deliberate violation and flagrant disregard of a rule of law and which
offense committed by the respondents relates to, or is connected with the
performance of their official functions or duties;

13. That in certifying and attesting a Certification or “PAGPAPATUNAY”,

containing utterly false affirmation to the effect that complainant’s property were
already removed on April 2008 as shown in the “PAGPAPATUNAY, when in truth
and in fact said encroached portion of the complainant’s property were not
removed, respondents’ actuations were indeed corrupt and inspired an intention
to violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules which
clearly makes up an administrative offense and guilt for Grave Misconduct;