EVIDENCE & TRIAL TECHNIQUE
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
MACUA vs. AVENIDO
FACTS:
- Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) , a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground
that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio).
- Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942
in Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town.
- However, due to World War II, records were destroyed. Thus, only a Certification3
was issued by the LCR.
- During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot four (4) children,
namely
o Climaco
o Apolinario
o Editha A. Ausa
o Eustaquio H. Avenido, Jr. (died without issue)
- Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman by the
name of Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be declared null and void
for being bigamous – an action she sought to protect the rights of her children
over the properties acquired by Eustaquio.
- Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with counterclaim,4 essentially
averring that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22
September 1989 in Davao City, their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March
1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao City.
RTC
- Trial ensued
TECLA presented testimonial evidence
o Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido (Climaco) and
Tecla herself
Documentary evidence
a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from 1900 to 1944
issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar, Municipality of Talibon, Bohol;5
b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage to the Office of
the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office (NSO), R. Magsaysay Blvd.,
Sta Mesa, Manila;6
c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and marriages that were
actually filed in the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO Manila, started only
in 1932;7
1
d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of the Civil
Registrar General, NSO, from 1932 to the early part of 1945, were totally destroyed
during the liberation of Manila;8
e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido;9
f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.;
g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido;11
h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by the Parish
Priest of Talibon, Bohol on 30 September 1942;12
i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed by Second
World War issued by the Office of the Municipal Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that
they cannot furnish as requested a true transcription from the Register of Birth of
Climaco Avenido;13
j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on 30 March 1943
to spouses Eustaquio and Tecla;14
k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio and Peregrina
- Peregrina testified on, among others, her marriage to Eustaquio that took place in
Davao City on 3 March 1979; her life as a wife and how she took care of Eustaquio
when he already had poor health, as well as her knowledge that Tecla is not the
legal wife, but was once a common law wife of Eustaquio.
Documentary evidence
1) Marriage Contract17 between Pregrina and the late Eustaquio showing the date
of marriage on 3 March 1979;
2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as single
when he contracted marriage with the petitioner although he had a common law
relation with one Tecla Hoybia with whom he had four (4) children namely:
Climaco, Tiburcio, Editha and Eustaquio, Jr., all surnamed Avenido;18
3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed to the Civil
Registrar of the Municipality of Alegria, Surigao del Norte;19 and
4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in her capacity as
the Civil Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del Norte.20
- In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the case was
initiated in bad faith so as to deprive her of the properties
- Rendered a Decision denying
o Tecla’s petition and
o Peregrina’s counter-claim

- Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the trial court’s alleged disregard of the
evidence on the existence of her marriage to Eustaquio.
CA
- Ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio, while
pronouncing on the other hand, the marriage between Peregrina and Eustaquio to be
bigamous, and thus, null and void
- The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies
of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed
the wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30
September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and
[Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his father,
EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned
at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non, for the
introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very
evidence the trial court has disregarded.
- Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure
of the CA to appreciate the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken cognizance of, without
proof of the execution or existence and the cause of the unavailability of the best evidence, the
original document;
2. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the church has a probative value to prove
the existence of a valid marriage without the priest who issued the same being presented to the
witness stand.
Simply, whether or not the evidence presented during the trial proves the existence of the
marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.
HELD:
AGREED WITH CA
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a
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EVIDENCE & TRIAL TECHNIQUE
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his
parents.
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its
contents, were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused the
evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage.
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or
primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document
is actually produced, its authencity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or
recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document,
when available, to establish its execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but
not the admissibility of such evidence. (Hernaez vs. McGrath)
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing
officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to
whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court has also held that
"[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who
ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where
the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody
the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation
which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was
present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The
subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest,
Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution
and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary
evidence–testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence.
The testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses to the marriage
has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the
solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage."
DANTIS vs. MAGHINANG
FACTS:
- Petitioner filed a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession with
damages against respondent Julio Maghinang, Jr. (Julio, Jr.) before the RTC.
- Rogelio alleged that he was the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of
5,657 square meters, located in Sta. Rita, San Miguel, Bulacan; that he acquired

ownership of the property through a deed of extrajudicial partition of the estate of
his deceased father, Emilio Dantis (Emilio), dated December 22, 1993; that he had
been paying the realty taxes on the said property; that Julio, Jr. occupied and built a
house on a portion of his property without any right at all
- In his Answer,5 Julio, Jr. denied the material allegations of the complaint. By
way of an affirmative defense, he claimed that
o He was the actual owner of the 352 square meters (subject lot) of the
land covered by TCT No. T-125918 where he was living;
o That he had been in open and continuous possession of the property for
almost thirty (30) years;
o The subject lot was once tenanted by his ancestral relatives until it was
sold by Rogelio’s father, Emilio, to his father, Julio Maghinang, Sr.
(Julio, Sr.);
o That later, he succeeded to the ownership of the subject lot after his
father died on March 10, 1968
o That he had been paying the realty taxes on the said property (Tax
Declaration)
o and that he was entitled to a separate registration of the subject lot on
the basis of the documentary evidence of sale and his open and
uninterrupted possession of the property.
- The affidavit, according to affiant Ignacio Dantis, alleged that Emilio Dantis agreed
to sell 352 square meters of the lot to Julio Maghinang on installment. Defendant
was then 11 years old in 1952.
- Defendant Julio Maghinang, Jr. likewise testified for the defendant’s case as
follows:
o He owns that house located at Sta. Rita, San Miguel, Bulacan, on a 352
square meter lot. He could not say that he is the owner because there is
still question about the lot.
o He claimed that his father, Julio Maghinang (Sr.), bought the said lot
from the parents of Rogelio Dantis.
o He admitted that the affidavit was not signed by the alleged vendor,
Emilio Dantis, the father of Rogelio Dantis. The receipt he presented
was admittedly a mere photocopy.
o He spent P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees. Since 1953, he has not declared
the property as his nor paid the taxes thereon because there is a problem.
- RTC RENDERED a decision declaring Rogelio as the true owner of the entire
5,657-square meter lot located in Sta. Rita, San Miguel, Bulacan, as evidenced by
his TCT over the same.
- The RTC did not lend any probative value on the documentary evidence of sale
adduced by Julio, Jr. consisting of:
1) an affidavit allegedly executed by Ignacio Dantis (Ignacio), Rogelio’s
grandfather, whereby said affiant attested, among others, to the sale of the subject
lot made by his son, Emilio, to Julio, Sr. (Exhibit "3")7; and
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EVIDENCE & TRIAL TECHNIQUE
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
2) an undated handwritten receipt of initial downpayment in the amount of ₱100.00
supposedly issued by Emilio to Julio, Sr. in connection with the sale of the subject
lot (Exhibit "4").8 The RTC ruled that even if these documents were adjudged as
competent evidence, still, they would only serve as proofs that the purchase price
for the subject lot had not yet been completely paid and, hence, Rogelio was not
duty-bound to deliver the property to Julio, Jr. The RTC found Julio, Jr. to be a
mere possessor by tolerance.
- Motion for Reconsideration was filed but was subsequently denied
CA
- REVERSED
- It held that Exhibit "4" was an indubitable proof of the sale of the 352-square meter
lot between Emilio and Julio, Sr.
- It also ruled that the partial payment of the purchase price, coupled with the
delivery of the res, gave efficacy to the oral sale and brought it outside the operation
of the statute of frauds
- Rogelio filed a Motion for Reconsideration DENIED
- Rogelio submits that Exhibit "3" and Exhibit "4" are devoid of evidentiary value
and, hence, deserve scant consideration. He stresses that Exhibit "4" is inadmissible
in evidence being a mere photocopy, and the existence and due execution thereof
had not been established.
- He argues that even if Exhibit "4" would be considered as competent and
admissible evidence, still, it would not be an adequate proof of the existence of the
alleged oral contract of sale because it failed to provide a description of the
subject lot, including its metes and bounds, as well as its full price or
consideration.
- Rogelio filed a an appeal thru Rule 45
ISSUE:
Whether or not pieces of evidence, Exhibit "3" and Exhibit "4," cannot prevail over the array of
documentary and testimonial evidence that were adduced by Rogelio
HELD:
IT CANNOT PREVAIL
The affidavit of Ignacio, is hearsay evidence and, thus, cannot be accorded any evidentiary
weight. Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends on the competency and
credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to be produced. The
exclusion of hearsay evidence is anchored on three reasons: 1) absence of cross-examination;
2) absence of demeanor evidence; and 3) absence of oath.

Jurisprudence dictates that an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its affiant/maker did
not take the witness stand.21 The sworn statement of Ignacio is of this kind. The affidavit was
not identified and its averments were not affirmed by affiant Ignacio. Accordingly, Exhibit "3"
must be excluded from the judicial proceedings being an inadmissible hearsay evidence.
The best evidence rule requires that the highest available degree of proof must be produced.
For documentary evidence, the contents of a document are best proved by the production
of the document itself to the exclusion of secondary or substitutionary evidence, pursuant
to Rule 130, Section 322.
A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5, which
states that: when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad
faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. Accordingly, the
offeror of the secondary evidence is burdened to satisfactorily prove the predicates thereof,
namely:
(1) the execution or existence of the original;
(2) the loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and
(3) the unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror.
Proof of the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss would constitute the basis
for the introduction of secondary evidence.
A nexus of logically related circumstance rendered Julio, Jr.’s evidence highly suspect. Also,
his testimony was riddled with improbabilities and contradictions which tend to erode his
credibility and raise doubt on the veracity of his evidence.
First, the claim of Julio, Jr. that Emilio affixed his signature on the original of Exhibit "4" in
1953 is highly improbable because record shows that Emilio died even before that year,
specifically, on November 13, 1952.
Second, Julio, Jr.’s testimony pertinent to the alleged loss of the original of Exhibit "4" is laden
with inconsistencies that detract from his credibility. His testimony bears the earmarks of
falsehood and, hence, not reliable.
apart from the lone testimony of Julio, Jr., no other witness who knew or read Exhibit "4,"
much less saw it executed, was presented. In the absence of any shred of corroborative
evidence, the Court cannot help but entertain doubts on the truthfulness of Julio, Jr.’s naked
assertion.
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EVIDENCE & TRIAL TECHNIQUE
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
Assuming, in gratia argumenti, that Exhibit "4" is admissible in evidence, there will still be no
valid and perfected oral contract for failure of Julio, Jr. to prove the concurrence of the
essential requisites of a contract of sale by adequate and competent evidence.
Seemingly, Julio, Jr. wanted to prove the sale by a receipt when it should be the receipt that
should further corroborate the existence of the sale. At best, his testimony only alleges but does
not prove the existence of the verbal agreement. Julio, Jr. miserably failed to establish by
preponderance of evidence that there was a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the subject
matter and the purchase price.
NOTE:
The concept of "preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or
more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of
truth.
PEOPLE vs. ALCOBER
FACTS:
- Accused-appellant Alcober was charged with rape in the municipality of Tuiiga,
Province of Leyte
PRE-TRIAL
- Accused-appellant admitted that the incident happened on the 20th day of July 1999
in the municipality of Tunga, Leyte, and that he is "the common-law spouse of the
victim’s mother."
- AAA testified that she was around 10 years old and was in Grade 5 when accused-
appellant and her mother started living together as husband and wife. She
considered accused-appellant to be her father and calls him "Tatay."
- On July 20, 1999, her mother left the victim and her siblings to sell bananas.
- While she was busy cooking rice, she did not notice the arrival of accused-
appellant, who suddenly embraced her from her back.
- Accused-appellant unsheathed the long bolo, locally called a sundang, from the
scabbard on his waist and ordered her to go upstairs where the accused succeeded
with his desires
- The sexual advances were thereafter repeated every time AAA’s mother sold
bananas on Wednesdays and Sundays
- On January 8, 2001, accused-appellant ordered AAA to pack and go with him to
Tabontabon, Leyte, threatening once more to kill her siblings if she does not
comply.
- In Tabontabon, accused-appellant once again forced AAA to have sex with him.
- The following day, AAA’s mother, accompanied by police officers of Tunga,
Leyte, arrived, searching for AAA and the accused-appellant.
 EVIDENCE & TRIAL TECHNIQUE
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

- AAA was finally able to talk to her mother, which led to AAA’s filing a complaint HELD
for rape against accused-appellant.
- Dr. Gariando testified that the specimen secured from AAA at around 2:00 p.m. of We disagree.
January 10, 2001 was positive for the presence of spermatozoa.
- On January 8, 2001, when BBB learned that accused-appellant took AAA to In People v. Pruna,33 the Court established the guidelines in appreciating age, either as an
Tabontabon, Leyte, she immediately looked for them in Burauen, Leyte. When she element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, as follows:
failed to find them there, she reported the apparent abduction of AAA to the PNP in
Tunga. 1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy
- Together with an uncle of accused-appellant, she reached Tabontabon at around of the certificate of live birth of such party.
9:30 in the morning, but found only AAA.
- She asked AAA why she went with accused-appellant, to which AAA replied that 2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
she was threatened by accused-appellant that he would kill them all. certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove
- AAA also told her that she was actually raped by accused-appellant on July 20, age.
1999.
- Alcober testified that on October 20, 1999,18 at around 2:00 a.m., he was inside 3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed
their house in Tunga, Leyte, drinking coffee in the kitchen when AAA unzipped her or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a
shirt and told him that "this is the gift that I am offering you that you are longing for member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters
too long." respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to
Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
- Accused-appellant clarified that AAA was not in their house on July 20, 1999 and
circumstances:
that their sexual intercourse occurred on October 20, 1999. Accused-appellant
categorically admitted that he had sex with his 13-year old stepdaughter on October
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she
20, 1999.
is less than 7 years old;
- To prove that the sexual intercourse was consensual, accused-appellant presented in
court what he claimed was the underwear of AAA, alleging that they agreed to
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she
exchange underwear with each other.
is less than 12 years old;
RTC
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 18 years old.
- Found the accused guilty
- The trial court imposed the death penalty upon accused-appellant on the basis of the
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the
fifth paragraph, number 1, of Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code
victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will
suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
CA
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure
- CA affirmed the RTC Decision but modified the decision
of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against
- It found the fifth paragraph of Article 266-B inapplicable. According to the
him.
appellate court, although it is undisputed that accused-appellant is the common-law
spouse of the victim’s mother, the records are bereft of independent evidence to
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.
prove that AAA is a minor, apart from the testimonies of AAA and her mother.
(Emphases supplied, citation omitted.)
ISSUE
In the case at bar, no birth or baptismal certificate or school record showing the date of
birth of AAA was presented.
Whether or not the CA was correct in finding that the paragraph of Article 266-B inapplicable.

5

Pursuant to number 4 of the guidelines, however, in the absence of the foregoing documents
(certificate of live birth or authentic document), the complainant’s testimony will suffice
provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. In the case at bar, AAA
testified that she was 13 years old on July 20, 1999 and that her birthday was in February.34
Accused-appellant, who insists that the incident occurred on October 20, 1999, expressly and
clearly admitted that AAA was still 13 years old on that date.
Furthermore, BBB categorically testified that AAA was 13 years old at the time material to this
case. To be sure, there is no disparity between the evidence for the prosecution and the defense
on the point that the accused had carnal knowledge of AAA when she was only 13 years old.
Taking into account that the minority of the victim and accused-appellant’s being the common-
law spouse of the victim’s mother, this Court finds it proper to appreciate this qualifying
circumstance under the fifth paragraph, item number 1, Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code.
BF SHANGRILA vs. BF CORPORATION
In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 145842, petitioners Edsa Shangri-la Hotel and
Resort, Inc. (ESHRI), Rufo B. Colayco, Rufino L. Samaniego, Kuok Khoon Chen, and Kuok
Khoon Tsen assail the Decision of the CA that ordered them to pay jointly and severally
respondent BF Corporation (BF) a sum of money with interests and damages.
They also assail the CA Resolution dated October 25, 2000 which, apart from setting aside an
earlier Resolution[3] of August 13, 1999 granting ESHRIs application for restitution and
damages against bond, affirmed the aforesaid September 23, 1996 RTC Decision.
In the second petition, docketed as G.R. No. 145873, petitioner Cynthia Roxas-del Castillo
also assails the aforementioned CA Decision of November 12, 1999 insofar at it adjudged her
jointly and severally liable with ESHRI, et al. to pay the monetary award decreed in the RTC
Decision.
FACTS
- Both petitions stemmed from a construction contract denominated as Agreement for
the Execution of Builders Work for the EDSA Shangri-la Hotel Project[4] that
ESHRI and BF executed for the construction of the EDSA Shangri-la Hotel starting
May 1, 1991.
- Under this arrangement, BF shall submit a monthly progress billing to ESHRI
which would then re-measure the work accomplished and prepare a Progress
Payment Certificate for that months progress billing.
- In a memorandum-letter dated August 16, 1991 to BF, ESHRI laid out the
collection procedure BF was to follow, to wit: (1) submission of the progress
billing to ESHRIs Engineering Department; (2) following-up of the preparation
of the Progress Payment Certificate with the Head of the Quantity Surveying
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EVIDENCE & TRIAL TECHNIQUE
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
Department; and (3) following-up of the release of the payment with one Evelyn
San Pascual.
- From May 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992, BF submitted a total of 19 progress billings
following the procedure agreed upon.
- According to BF, however, ESHRI, for Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, did not re-
measure the work done, did not prepare the Progress Payment Certificates, let alone
remit payment for the inclusive periods covered.
- After several futile attempts to collect the unpaid billings, BF filed, on July 26,
1993, before the RTC a suit for a sum of money and damages.
- In its defense, ESHRI claimed having overpaid BF for Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 13
and, by way of counterclaim with damages
RTC
- Ruled on favor of BF
- According to the RTC, ESHRIs refusal to pay BFs valid claims constituted evident
bad faith entitling BF to moral damages and attorneys fees.
- ESHRI filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied
- ESHRI to appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 57399
Pending the resolution of CA-G.R. CV No. 57399, the following events and/or
incidents transpired:
- (1) The trial court, by Order dated January 21, 1997, granted BFs motion for
execution pending appeal. ESHRI assailed this order before the CA via a petition
for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 43187.[9] Meanwhile, the branch sheriff
garnished from ESHRIs bank account in the Philippine National Bank (PNB) the
amount of PhP 35 million.
- (2) On March 7, 1997, the CA issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 43187 a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the trial court from carrying out its January 21,
1997 Order upon ESHRIs posting of a PhP 1 million bond.
- BF filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied
- BF filed before this Court a petition for review of the CA Decision which affirmed
the RTC
- We denied the motions for reconsideration of ESHRI and BF.
- (5) Forthwith, ESHRI filed, and the CA by Resolution of August 13, 1999 granted,
an application for restitution or damages against BFs bond.
- Apropos ESHRIs entitlement to the remedy of restitution or reparation arising from
the execution of the RTC Decision pending appeal, the CA held that such remedy
may peremptorily be allowed only if the executed judgment is reversed, a situation
not obtaining in this case.
- Following the denial by the CA, per its Resolution[13] dated October 25, 2000, of
their motion for reconsideration, petitioners are now before the Court, petitioner del
Castillo opting, however, to file a separate recourse.

ISSUE
Whether or not the [CA] committed grave abuse of discretion in disregarding issues of law
raised by petitioners in their appeal [particularly in admitting in evidence photocopies of
Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, PMIs and WVOs].
HELD
We agree with BF. The only actual rule that the term best evidence denotes is the rule requiring
that the original of a writing must, as a general proposition, be produced[17] and secondary
evidence of its contents is not admissible except where the original cannot be had. Rule 130,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court enunciates the best evidence rule:
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad
faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; (Emphasis added.)
Complementing the above provision is Sec. 6 of Rule 130, which reads:
SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse partys custody or control. If the document is in
the custody or under control of the adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it.
If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the
document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of loss.
Secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument or document refers to evidence
other than the original instrument or document itself.[18] A party may present secondary
evidence of the contents of a writing not only when the original is lost or destroyed, but also
when it is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party. In either instance, however,
certain explanations must be given before a party can resort to secondary evidence.
In our view, the trial court correctly allowed the presentation of the photocopied documents in
question as secondary evidence. Any suggestion that BF failed to lay the required basis for
presenting the photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 instead of their originals has to be
dismissed. The stenographic notes of the following exchanges between Atty. Andres and Atty.
Autea, counsel for BF and ESHRI, respectively, reveal that BF had complied with the
requirements:
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EVIDENCE & TRIAL TECHNIQUE
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
ATTY. ANDRES:
During the previous hearing of this case, your Honor, likewise, the witness testified that certain
exhibits namely, the Progress Payment Certificates and the Progress Billings the originals of
these documents were transmitted to ESHRI, all the originals are in the possession of ESHRI
since these are internal documents and I am referring specifically to the Progress Payment
Certificates. We requested your Honor, that in order that plaintiff [BF] be allowed to present
secondary original, that opposing counsel first be given opportunity to present the originals
which are in their possession. May we know if they have brought the originals and whether
they will present the originals in court, Your Honor. (Emphasis added.)
ATTY. AUTEA:
We have already informed our client about the situation, your Honor, that it has been claimed
by plaintiff that some of the originals are in their possession and our client assured that, they
will try to check. Unfortunately, we have not heard from our client, Your Honor.
Four factual premises are readily deducible from the above exchanges, to wit: (1) the existence
of the original documents which ESHRI had possession of; (2) a request was made on ESHRI
to produce the documents; (3) ESHRI was afforded sufficient time to produce them; and (4)
ESHRI was not inclined to produce them.
Clearly, the circumstances obtaining in this case fall under the exception under Sec. 3(b) of
Rule 130. In other words, the conditions sine qua non for the presentation and reception of the
photocopies of the original document as secondary evidence have been met. These are:
(1) there is proof of the original documents execution or existence;
(2) there is proof of the cause of the original documents unavailability; and
(3) the offeror is in good faith.[19]
While perhaps not on all fours because it involved a check, what the Court said in Magdayao v.
People, is very much apt, thus:
x x x To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of a writing is in
the custody or control of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that the adverse
party must be given reasonable notice, that he fails or refuses to produce the same in court and
that the offeror offers satisfactory proof of its existence.
xxxx
The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or control of the party against
whom it is offered does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The offeror must
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prove that he has done all in his power to secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said
party to produce the document. The notice may be in the form of a motion for the production of
the original or made in open court in the presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena duces
tecum, provided that the party in custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the
same. When such party has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to
produce it or refuses to produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted.[20] (Emphasis
supplied.)
GAW vs. CHUA
FACTS
Respondent filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against the spouses Gaw with the RTC.
In their Answer (with Compulsory Counterclaim), the spouses Gaw contended that the
P200,000.00 was not a loan but petitioners share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber, one of her
familys businesses.
- Petitioners claimed that respondent persuaded petitioner to temporarily forego her
demand as it would offend their mother who still wanted to remain in control of the
family businesses.
- To insure that she will defer her demand, respondent allegedly gave her
P200,000.00 as her share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber.

Spouses Chua Chin and Chan Chi were the founders of three business enterprises[3] namely: In his Reply, respondent insisted that the P200,000.00 was given to and accepted by them as a
loan and not as their share in Hagonoy Lumber.
o Hagonoy Lumber,
o Capitol Sawmill Corporation, and With leave of court, the spouses Gaw filed an Answer (with Amended Compulsory
o Columbia Wood Industries. Counterclaim) wherein they insisted that petitioner, as one of the compulsory heirs, is entitled
to one-sixth (1/6) of Hagonoy Lumber, which the respondent has arrogated to himself. They
The couple had seven children, namely; claimed that, despite repeated demands, respondent has failed and refused to account for the
operations of Hagonoy Lumber and to deliver her share therein.
- Santos Chua;
- Concepcion Chua; In his Answer to Amended Counterclaim, respondent explained that his sister, Chua Sioc
- Suy Ben Chua; Huan, became the sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber when the heirs executed the Deed of
- Chua Suy Phen; Partition on December 8, 1986. In turn, he became the sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber when
- Chua Sioc Huan; he bought it from Chua Sioc Huan, as evidenced by the Deed of Sale dated August 1, 1990.
- Chua Suy Lu;
- and Julita Chua. Defendants, in their reply,[16] countered that the documents on which plaintiff anchors his
claim of ownership over Hagonoy Lumber were not true and valid agreements and do not
On June 19, 1986, Chua Chin died, leaving his wife Chan Chi and his seven children as his express the real intention of the parties. They claimed that these documents are mere paper
only surviving heirs. arrangements which were prepared only upon the advice of a counsel until all the heirs could
reach and sign a final and binding agreement, which, up to such time, has not been executed by
At the time of Chua Chins death, the net worth of Hagonoy Lumber was P415,487.20. the heirs.

In May 1988, petitioner Concepcion Chua Gaw and her husband, Antonio Gaw, asked RTC
respondent, Suy Ben Chua, to lend them P200,000.00 which they will use for the construction
of their house in Marilao, Bulacan. The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent

On August 1, 1990, their sister, Chua Sioc Huan, executed a Deed of Sale over all her rights
and interests in Hagonoy Lumber for a consideration of P255,000.00 in favor of respondent.
Spouses Gaw failed to pay the amount they borrowed from respondent within the designated
period. Respondent sent the couple a demand letter with warning that they will take appropriate
legal actions if they fail to comply
Respondent is entitled to the payment of the amount of P200,000.00 with interest. It noted that
respondent personally issued Check No. 240810 to petitioner and her husband upon their
request to lend them the aforesaid amount.
The trial court further held that the validity and due execution of the Deed of Partition and the
Deed of Sale, evidencing transfer of ownership of Hagonoy Lumber from Chua Sioc Huan to
respondent, was never impugned. Although respondent failed to produce the originals of the

8

documents, petitioner judicially admitted the due execution of the Deed of Partition, and even
acknowledged her signature thereon, thus constitutes an exception to the best evidence rule. As
for the Deed of Sale, since the contents thereof have not been put in issue, the non-presentation
of the original document is not fatal so as to affect its authenticity as well as the truth of its
contents.
CA
Petitioner appealed to the CA, alleging that the trial court erred (1) when it considered the
amount of P200,000.00 as a loan obligation and not Concepcions share in the profits of
Hagonoy Lumber; (2) when it considered as evidence for the defendant, plaintiffs testimony
when he was called to testify as an adverse party under Section 10 (e), Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court; and (3) when it considered admissible mere copies of the Deed of Partition and Deed of
Sale to prove that respondent is now the owner of Hagonoy Lumber.
CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC
The CA agreed with the RTC that the testimony of petitioner regarding the matter was
uncorroborated she should have presented the other heirs to attest to the truth of her allegation.
Instead, petitioner admitted the due execution of the said documents. Since petitioner did not
dispute the due execution and existence of Exhibits H and I, there was no need to produce the
originals of the documents in accordance with the best evidence rule.
CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration
ISSUE
Whether or not there is a palpable legal error has been committed on the requirements and
correct application of the BEST EVIDENCE RULE uder section 3, rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court
HELD
NO ERROR
Petitioner, however, maintains that the RTC erred in admitting in evidence a mere copy of the
Deed of Partition and the Deed of Sale in violation of the best evidence rule. In addition,
petitioner insists that the Deed of Sale was not the result of bona fide negotiations between a
true seller and buyer.
The best evidence rule as encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3,[47] of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure applies only when the content of such document is the subject of the
inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually executed, or exists,
or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does
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EVIDENCE & TRIAL TECHNIQUE
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence is
likewise admissible without need to account for the original.[48] Moreover, production of the
original may be dispensed with, in the trial courts discretion, whenever the opponent does not
bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by
requiring production.[49]
Accordingly, we find that the best evidence rule is not applicable to the instant case. Here,
there was no dispute as to the terms of either deed; hence, the RTC correctly admitted in
evidence mere copies of the two deeds. The petitioner never even denied their due execution
and admitted that she signed the Deed of Partition.[50] As for the Deed of Sale, petitioner
had, in effect, admitted its genuineness and due execution when she failed to specifically
deny it in the manner required by the rules.[51] The petitioner merely claimed that said
documents do not express the true agreement and intention of the parties since they were only
provisional paper arrangements made upon the advice of counsel.[52] Apparently, the
petitioner does not contest the contents of these deeds but alleges that there was a
contemporaneous agreement that the transfer of Hagonoy Lumber to Chua Sioc Huan was only
temporary.
An agreement or the contract between the parties is the formal expression of the parties rights,
duties and obligations. It is the best evidence of the intention of the parties.[53] The parties
intention is to be deciphered from the language used in the contract, not from the unilateral
post facto assertions of one of the parties, or of third parties who are strangers to the
contract.[54] Thus, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is deemed
to contain all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors
in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
DECS vs. DEL ROSARIO
FACTS
- Respondents Julia Del Rosario, Maria Del Rosario, Pacencia Del Rosario and the
Heirs of Santos Del Rosario (respondents) filed before the trial court a complaint
for Recovery of Possession against petitioner Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS).
- Respondents alleged that they own a parcel of land with an area of 1,181 square
meters (Property) situated in Kaypombo,[4] Sta. Maria, Bulacan.
- Respondents alleged that the Kaypombo Primary School Annex (KPPS) under
DECS was occupying a portion of the Property through respondents tolerance and
that of their predecessors-in-interest AND despite repeated demands to vacate they
refused
- In its Answer, DECS countered that KPPSs occupation of a portion of the Property
was with the express consent and approval of respondents father
- Atty. Ely Natividad, now a regional trial court judge (Judge Natividad), prepared
the deed of donation and the acceptance.

- DECS admitted the existence and execution of TCT No. T-222432 (Exhibit A), Tax
Declaration No. 6310 (Exhibit B), and the tax receipts in respondents names for the
years 1991 and 1992 (Exhibits B-1 and B-2).
- On the other hand, respondents admitted the existence of Judge Natividads affidavit
that he prepared the deed of donation (Exhibit 1) and the tax declaration for 1985 in
the Municipalitys name (Exhibit 2).
- Parties agreed to a reverse trial with DECS presenting its evidence
RTC
- RTC ruled in favor of DECS and KPPS
- After a careful consideration of the facts at hand, taking into account the credibility
and reasonableness of the testimonies of the witnesses, the court is of the opinion
that the defense was able to prove the due execution of the deed of donation and its
acceptance, as well as the loss of the same, in accordance with Rule 130[,] Sec. 4.
- It is recalled that Judge Eli Natividad, then a municipal councilor of Sta. Maria,
testified that he was the person who prepared the deed of donation and later
notarized the same, and that said deed was duly executed and signed before him and
in his presence. Likewise, he affirmed that the municipal board of Sta. Maria,
Bulacan, passed a resolution accepting the deed of donation in favor of the said
municipality.
- Noteworthy is the rule that a recantation/recollection of witness is a form of
secondary evidence to prove the existence/content of a document. Since the loss
of the deed subject matter of this case was likewise duly proved by the defense,
exerting the best possible efforts to locate or secure a copy of the same and without
bad faith on its part, this Court is bent to give a greater weight to the secondary
evidence adduced by the defense vis--vis the title in the name of the plaintiff[s],
most particularly in this case, where the plaintiffs failed to make it appear that other
and more secondary evidence is known to the defendant and can be produced by
them.
CA
- REVERSED the decision and ordered DECS to vacate the premises.
o DECS failed to prove the existence and due execution of the deed of
donation as well as the Resolution of the municipal council accepting the
donation. The Court of Appeals was not fully satisfied that DECS or the
Municipality had made a diligent search of the alleged lost deed of
donation
o Before secondary evidence of a writing may be introduced on the ground
that the instrument has been lost there must be proof that a diligent
search has been made in the place where it is most likely to be found and
that the search has not been successful.
o
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EVIDENCE & TRIAL TECHNIQUE
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
- Likewise, respondents MOTION for reconsideration was denied
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in holding the patiitoner failed to prove the due execution or
existence of the Deed of Donation and the Resolution of the Municipal Council accepting the
donation, as well as the loss of the documents as the cause of their unavailability.
HELD
The best or primary evidence of a donation of real property is an authentic copy of the deed of
donation with all the formalities required by Article 749 of the Civil Code. The duty to produce
the original document arises when the subject of the inquiry are the contents of the writing in
which case there can be no evidence of the contents of the writing other than the writing itself.
Simply put, when a party wants to prove the contents of the document, the best evidence is the
original writing itself.
A party may prove the donation by other competent or secondary evidence under the
exceptions in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Section 3 reads:
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad
faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) xxx;
(c) xxx;
(d) xxx.
In relation to this, Section 5 of Rule 130 reads:
SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. When the original document has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence
and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated.
Secondary evidence of the contents of a document refers to evidence other than the
original document itself.[14] A party may introduce secondary evidence of the contents of a
written instrument not only when the original is lost or destroyed, but also when it cannot be
produced in court, provided there is no bad faith on the part of the offeror. However, a party
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must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary evidence before he can resort to
secondary evidence. A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other
satisfactory explanation for non-production of the original instrument.

The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, contents, although the
court in its discretion may change this order if necessary.

The testimony of Ricardo Nicolas may have established to some extent the existence of the
deed of donation since he testified that he was present when Isaias and the mayor talked about
the donation and that he witnessed the signing of the document. However, Ricardo Nicolas
admitted during cross-examination that he did not read and did not have personal knowledge of
the contents of the document that Isaias and the mayor supposedly signed.[16]

In the same vein, Vidal De Jesus testimony does not help to establish the deed of donations
existence, execution and contents. He testified that he never saw the deed of donation. On
cross-examination, Vidal De Jesus admitted that the information that Isaias donated the lot to
the Municipality was only relayed to him by Judge Natividad himself.[17] If at all, DECS
offered Vidal De Jesus testimony to establish the loss of the deed of donation. Vidal de Jesus
testified that the barangay council tried to get a copy of the deed but the Municipality informed
the barangay council that the deed was lost when the municipal office was transferred to a new
building. DECS also made a search in the DECS office in Malolos but this proved futile too.

This leaves us with Judge Natividads testimony. Judge Natividad testified that he prepared and
notarized the deed of donation. He further testified that there was a municipal council
Resolution, signed in the Office of the Secretary and of the Mayor, accepting the donation and
expressing gratitude to the donor. He furnished the municipal government, the DECS Division
Office of Bulacan and the clerk of court of Sta. Maria a copy of the deed of donation.

DECS did not introduce in evidence the municipal council Resolution accepting the donation.
There is also no proof that the donee communicated in writing its acceptance to the donor aside
from the circumstance that DECS constructed the school during Isaias lifetime without
objection on his part. There is absolutely no showing that these steps were noted in both
instruments.

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