572666

research-article2015
MAC0010.1177/0020294015572666Human Factors in Control Room ModernizationHuman Factors in Control Room Modernization

Themed Paper

Human Factors in Control

Measurement and Control
2015, Vol. 48(3) 92­–96
© The Institute of Measurement

Room Modernisation
and Control 2015
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DOI: 10.1177/0020294015572666
mac.sagepub.com

Chiuhsiang Joe Lin

Department of Industrial Management, National Taiwan University of Science and Technology,
Taipei, Taiwan
Tsung-Ling Hsieh
Department of Industrial Management, National Taiwan University of Science and Technology,
Taipei, Taiwan
bm1129@gmail.com
Chih-Wei Yang
Institute of Nuclear Energy Research, Lungtan, Taiwan

In view of the benefits of human factors engineering for nuclear power plants, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
published a series of Nuclear Regulatory documents to describe the systematic methodologies and processes of
human factors engineering on functional requirements analysis and function allocation, task analysis, human–system
interface design, training program development, and so forth of the main control room of the nuclear power plant. The
purpose of this paper is to introduce the application of human factors engineering to evaluate the usability and safety
of the hybrid human–system interfaces developed for the conventional main control room during the process of mod-
ernisation. A comprehensive checklist with human factors guidelines was adopted to evaluate the usability of the
hybrid human–system interfaces. Expert interview was adopted to collect data on task performance, workload, situa-
tion awareness, communication, and coordination based on operators’ experiences. The results provide guidance
and a technical basis that should help plant staff with planning changes to the human–system interfaces of main con-
trol rooms that address issues that arise during control room modernisation.

I. Introduction usability of HSIs is essential and
critical.2–4
The nuclear power plant (NPP) is In view of the benefits of HFE for NPPs,
required to provide low-cost and stable the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
electricity for the population under the tasked with protecting public health and
premise of “safety first” due to the safety related to nuclear energy published
catastrophic damage that could be a series of Nuclear Regulatory (NUREG)
caused by accidents. However, the documents to describe the systematic
operators in the main control room methodologies and processes of HFE on
(MCR) of a NPP are required to deal functional requirements analysis and
with complex tasks, such as monitoring function allocation, task analysis, HSI
and manipulating system information, design, training program development,
which can lead to a high workload for and so forth of the MCR in the NPP. For
operators.1 For optimization of the instance, NUREG-07115 is provided for
workload to reduce the human error of review of the HFE programs of applicants
operators, in addition to the technical for construction permits, operating
development of the digital human– licenses, standard design certifications,
system interfaces (HSIs) in the MCR of a combined operating licenses, and license
NPP, the application of human factors amendments. The purpose of these
engineering (HFE) to confirm the reviews is to verify that the applicant’s HFE
program incorporates HFE practices and
guidelines as described within the HFE
program. The staff of the plant can refer to
NUREG-0711 to draw up plans with
comprehensive dimensions and strict
procedures for HFE evaluation. Moreover,
NUREG-07006 is focused on providing the
details of HFE guidelines necessary to
perform HSI evaluations. The HFE
guidelines are organized into four basic
parts, which are divided into sections. The
first part of the guidelines concerns the
basic HSI elements, such as displays,
user-interface interactions and
management, and controls. The second
part of the guidelines covers alarm
systems, group-view display systems, soft
control systems, computer-based
procedure systems, computerized
operator support systems, and

92  Measurement and Control  l  April 2015  Vol 48  No 3


Figure 1.  The MCR of a conventional nuclear power plant
MCR: main control room.
Figure 2.  Cabinet of the MCR with a hybrid HSI
MCR: main control room; HIS: human–system interface.
communication systems. The third part of
the guidelines was developed for the
review of workstations and workplaces.
The fourth part of the guidelines provides a
Human Factors in Control Room Modernisation
review of HSI support, such as the
maintainability of digital systems. The staff
can select the adaptive items from the
HFE guidelines to organize a checklist
April 2015  Vol 48 No 3  l  Measurement and Control  93
Themed Paper
according to the features or characteristics
for targeting HSIs for evaluation.7
Accordingly, even though the conditions of
the equipment, system, and HSIs in the
MCR would be obviously distinct in
different life cycle stages of NPPs or
manufacturers, the staff of a plant still can
refer to these documents to evaluate these
factors based on HFE aspects.
Modernisation is a transition stage, during
which the equipment and system are
upgraded in the MCR of a conventional
NPP. Formerly, the MCR of a conventional
NPP (Figure 1) was equipped with cabinets
for analog HSIs, such as plant parameter
gauges, indicators, knobs, levers, and alarm
tiles. The operators needed to walk along
the cabinets to take readings of the system
information and adjust the controllers.
Today, most of the conventional NPPs still
operate with a substantial amount of the
original analog instrumentation, control
systems, and equipment, even though they
are approaching their life expectancies.
However, the steadily deteriorating
availability of replacement components and
the infrastructure of manufacturers that
sustain analog technology have increased
operation and maintenance costs. In
addition, the possibilities for adding new
useful capabilities to the NPP systems and
HSIs are restricted by outdated technology.
Thus, modernising components of the
original instrumentation, control system, and
equipment to digital types is a current
feasible approach that can address
obsolescence and the lack of spare parts,
improve plant performance and HSI
functionality, and enhance operator
performance and reliability throughout the
world.8
A hybrid HSI is a specific feature of a
conventional MCR after modernisation.
That is, some of the analog HSIs
mounted in the cabinet will be replaced
with digital HSIs, so different styles of
HSIs might be combined. Figure 2 shows
a cabinet with a typical hybrid HSI. The
video display units, marked by circles, are
the digital interfaces that display digital
information to operators for monitoring
the system. Although the replacement of
the original analog HSIs is expected to
enhance operator performance and
 Themed Paper
Human Factors in Control Room Modernisation
reliability after strict operator training, the
new HSIs might pose new challenges for
operators, such as coordination demands
on operational teams (e.g. the need for
communication to promote situation
awareness), leading to new interaction
situations of operators and systems.
Recent studies of human factors and
ergonomics have made it clear that
changing an MCR design from
conventional to advanced technologies
(e.g. levels of automation, digital HSIs, and
computer-based procedures) can affect
the situation awareness, performance, and
workload of operators.9–13 Such effects will
continue to change until the entire
modernisation process is completed.
During the process, the operators have to
try to adapt themselves to the upgraded
HSIs. However, if the new digital HSIs and
hybrid MCRs are not designed and
evaluated correctly from a human factors
perspective, the potential for human error
will increase, and the benefits of the new
technology will not be realized. In this
regard, the objective of this study is to
present a regulatory approach based on
human factors for evaluating the hybrid
HSIs of the conventional MCR. To verify
the practicability of the approach, a case
of a NPP in Taiwan was analyzed and is
discussed using the approach.
II. Methods
For evaluation of the digital HSIs in the
conventional MCR subjectively and
objectively, two methods, including a
checklist based on NUREG-07006 and an
Interview Questionnaire from NUREG/
CR-6749,14 were applied in this study. The
methods are introduced in detail as follows.
A. Checklist based on NUREG-0700
NUREG-0700,6 the Human–System
Interface Design Review Guideline, was
developed to provide HFE guidance to the
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. It
describes those aspects of the HSI design
review process that are important to the
identification and resolution of human
engineering discrepancies that could
adversely affect plant safety. NUREG-
07006 also provides detailed HFE
94  Measurement and Control  l  April 2015  Vol 48  No 3
guidelines for the assessment of HSI
design implementation. In the development
of NUREG-0700,15 revision 1, published in
1996, several topics were identified as
“gaps” due to insufficient technical bases
upon which to develop guidance. One
such topic was the integration of advanced
HSI technology into conventional MCRs.
Therefore, NUREG-0700,6 revision 2,
published in 2002, included additional
topics (e.g. Safety Function and Parameter
Monitoring System, Soft Control System,
Computer-based Procedure System, and
Maintainability of Digital Systems)
addressing advanced HSI technology in
order to eliminate these gaps.
There are thousands of guidelines
distributed among 13 topics in NUREG-
0700,6 revision 2, but not all of the
guidelines are suitable for evaluating hybrid
HSIs of the conventional MCR. Therefore,
selecting guidelines according to the type
of HSI for developing a checklist is
necessary, and then experts on HFE can
evaluate the digital HSIs via the checklist
based on NUREG-0700,6 revision 2. The
results of such an evaluation can indicate
aspects needing to be re-designed based
on the human factors perspective.
B. Interview questionnaire
The Interview Questionnaire, adopted
from NUREG/CR-6749,14 was conducted
to collect the actual operators’ concerns
about modernisation. The topics of the
questionnaire are “Opinions on the New
Control Room Systems,” “Impact on
Operations/Crew Performance,”
“Training,” and “Operator Input to Design
and Transition.” The operators were
interviewed in crews. The primary
purpose of the interviews was to obtain
the operators’ perspectives on how they
used the new digital HSIs and how the
digital HSIs had affected their
performance as individuals and as a
team. The questions investigate the
perceived impact of the digital HSIs on
operator workload, situation awareness,
and communication and coordination
among the team members. Furthermore,
it was hoped that the questionnaire would
uncover design faults that the results of
the checklist based on NUREG-07006
could not identify. The complete set of
interview questions is provided in Table 1.
III. Results
A case of a NPP in Taiwan was examined
with the evaluative approach in this study.
This NPP, with boiling water reactors, was
designed and built in the 1970s, and
problems were foreseen with obtaining
spare parts, increased maintenance
costs, and a lack of competence related
to operation with the old analog HSIs. In
response to these threats, the NPP was
upgraded with new digital display HSIs
for the power range neutron monitor,
which provides critical information for
operators during the procedure of reactor
startup and shutdown tasks, as
replacements for analog indicators for the
average power range monitor. Analysis of
the results is provided below.
C. NUREG-0700
Focused on the digital HSIs in the
conventional MCR, a checklist including
582 items selected from NUREG-07006
was developed. Most items on the
checklist addressed display and alarm
topics. Experts in HFE or with operating
experience of the digital HSIs were
invited to fill out the checklist. The results
indicated a total of five failing items for
the digital HSIs. The fail rate of the
checklist was about 0.86%. The failing
items were as follows:
•• Abbreviations should be avoided
(except when terms are commonly
referred to by their initials).
•• The use of the letters O and I in a
non-meaningful code should be
avoided because they are easily
confused with the numbers 0 (zero)
and 1 (one), respectively.
•• A maximum limit on the number and
rate of unsuccessful LOG-ON
attempts should be imposed.
•• If there are pending actions and the
user requests a log-off, the system
should inform the user that these
actions will be lost and allow the user
to cancel either the pending actions
or the log-off.

Table 1.  Interview questions
Category
Opinions on the New Control Room Systems
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Impact on Operations/Crew Performance
 
Training
 
Operator Input to Design and Transition
VDU: video display unit.
•• An audible signal should be
presented at specified intervals prior
to automatic log-off.
D. Interview questionnaire
Most of the responses of the operators
were positive and constructive across
all of the topics of the questionnaire. A
summary of the operators’ responses is
provided below. First, regarding
“Opinions on the New Control Room
Systems,” operators noted that the
Themed Paper
Human Factors in Control Room Modernisation
Question
Now that you have experienced all digital systems, overall what features do you think will make a
difference in how you do your job?
What do you see as the major impact of the new alarm system on operator performance?
What do you see as the major impact of the new display system on operator performance?
When do operators use the VDU displays and who uses them?
How well are the digital systems integrated with each other and the existing controls and displays?
Much of the information provided by the new systems was presented on VDUs. Was the viewing area
provided by VDUs sufficient?
Information presented by the new systems involves software processing. Is it easy to understand how the
software processes data and what the displayed information means? How confident are you in the
accuracy of the information provided by the new systems?
If you were designing the next version of this system, what improvements would you recommend?
In what situations do you think this system is most useful (e.g. normal plant conditions, minor
abnormalities, plant faults that result in a trip, complex multiple fault situations)?
Do you have any concerns about using this new system? Things that you worry about?
Do you think that the digital systems change how you work as a team to respond to incidents? In what
ways? Do you think these changes make you better able to handle an incident? Do you have any
concerns?
You ran one simulated scenario where none of the computerized systems were available (simulating a
computer system failure). The following questions relate to the differences between the handling the event
with and without the new systems.
Do you think based on the training you have gotten so far, that you would feel confident using these new
systems in an actual incident?
What additional activities or training do you think is needed before you will feel confident in using these
new systems in an actual incident?
We are trying to study how control rooms are being updated (how operator input is obtained and used, the
transition process for introducing the new systems) in order to provide recommendations for future
upgrades to insure that operator concerns are taken into account. What are some things you think have
been good about the upgrade process for your control room that you would recommend to other plants?
Are there things you would recommend be done differently?
digital display could show grouped and operators demonstrated that although
integrated information on the system, the frequency of communication
so monitoring information was decreased due to the digital HSIs, the
convenient and efficient. Next, they also quality of communication increased;
emphasized that digital information had that is, the operator teamwork was
higher readability than analog better while they were using digital
information, such as that from a dial HSIs. Third, regarding “Training,”
indicator. In addition, operators noted operators commented that simulators
that digital HSIs could record historical of digital HSIs needed to be provided
data of abnormal conditions for for training before the digital HSIs were
diagnosis of operating problems. installed in the MCR. Finally, regarding
Second, regarding “Impact on “Operator Input to Design and
Operations/Crew Performance,” Transition,” the operators suggested
April 2015  Vol 48 No 3  l  Measurement and Control  95
 Themed Paper
Human Factors in Control Room Modernisation
that the digital HSIs that were upgraded
in the MCR had to be proven in terms
of usability and reliability in overseas
NPPs that had been modernised.
IV. Discussion and Conclusion
Obsolescence issues with existing analog
instrumentation, control systems, and
equipment mean that the operators of
NPPs face significant challenges in
designing and modifying the HSIs and
systems of MCRs, which will be produced
through various processes of
instrumentation and control modernisation.
Even though the result of modernisation
should be more efficient operations and lead
to improvements in NPP availability and
safety, the operators have to try to adapt to
the tasks when HSIs are updated. For
instance, in the modernisation of a MCR
with hybrid HSIs, the operators need to shift
their operation modes according to the
plant control system. Namely, the operators
are likely to need to use analog and digital
HSIs at the same time. However, human
error may occur during operation of a hybrid
HSI due to the significant differences
between analog and digital HSIs. For
instance, the information presented on
video display units is always integrated into
pages, so the operators need to navigate to
specific pages to find desired information. If
the operators do not remember which page
holds the specific information, they cannot
find it rapidly in response to actual situation
demands and then make decisions safely.
Therefore, the HFE goals for conventional
NPP modernisation, evaluation, and
validation must be applied in all processes;
that is, HFE should be used to help meet
this challenge and to ensure that the
benefits of the new digital technology are
realized, while potential operating problems
are avoided.16
Accordingly, this study attempted to
explore the potential issues of hybrid HSIs in
the conventional MCR during the
modernisation process via a human factors
approach employing a checklist and an
interview questionnaire for reciprocal
examination. The results of the checklist
indicated only five failing items related to
display topics. In short, the HSI
modernisation in the case almost met HFE
96  Measurement and Control  l  April 2015  Vol 48  No 3
suggestions. The positive results were also
clearly supported by the operators’ opinions
expressed in the interview. The operators
commented that the digital HSIs could
provide more detailed and accurate
information, which enhanced
communication and problem diagnosis.
Furthermore, integrating digital HSIs into
cabinets with analog HSIs did not appear to
cause problems with shifting operations
between different types of HSIs, according
to the operators. Although inadequate
aspects of HSI design (e.g. abbreviations,
code format, and warning messages) were
identified by the checklist but not mentioned
directly by the operators, this does not mean
that the navigation effects of HSI design on
system operation have been minimized
enough to ignore. The operators merely
expressed that such usability problems
could be solved via training. That is why they
emphasized the importance of a simulator
for training before the installation of digital
HSIs in the MCR. In conclusion, although the
operators approved the modernisation in the
case examined in this study and indicated
that modernisation was conducive to
operating performance, the digital HSIs in
the conventional MCR have not been
perfected, according to the results of a
checklist based on NUREG-0700.6 Ensuring
the operating safety of NPPs is a serious
issue, so modifications aimed at eliminating
such defects are strongly recommended.
Acknowledgements
The author is grateful to the candidate
operators of the Kuosheng Nuclear Power
Plant for providing information on the
modernisation of the conventional main
control room examined in the study.
Funding
This research received no specific grant
from any funding agency in the public,
commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
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