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 The New Politics of Resentment
Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe

Hans-George Betz

In the decades following the second world war, the liberal democracies of western Europe
enjoyed a remarkabledegree of social and political stability. Sustained economic growth,
growing individual affluence, and the expansion and perfection of the welfare state each
contributedto a social and political climate conducive to political stability while eroding
supportfor extremist solutions on both the left and right. However, stability and consensus
were only short-lived. The resurgence of ideological and political turbulence in the late
1960s, rising social conflicts in the early 1970s, and the spreadof mass protestby new social
movements in the 1980s were symptoms of a profound transformationof West European
politics. Its contours are becoming visible in the early 1990s.
Crucial to this transformationwas the political climate of the 1980s. It was markedby
disenchantmentwith the major social and political institutionsand profounddistrustin their
workings, the weakening and decompositionof electoral alignments, and increasedpolitical
fragmentationand electoralvolatility. New political issues emerged, promotedby new social
actors outside and often against the established political channels. Growing awareness of
environmentaldegradationgeneratedrising ecological protest;advances in general welfare
led to demands for social equality and greateropportunitiesfor political participationfrom
women and minorities.
It was expected that these conflicts would benefit the left, even if the demands of
students, women, and minorities were not necessarily compatible with those of the
traditionalleft. Indeed, the 1980s saw a significant fragmentationof the left. Distancing
themselves from what they considered the growth-oriented"old politics" of socialists and
social democrats, left-libertarianparties established themselves in a number of advanced
West European democracies.' Yet despite significant electoral gains, the left-libertarian
project appearsto have fallen short of the expectations of both supportersand detractors.
However, the stagnation and partial exhaustion of several left-libertarianparties-for
example, in Germany, Sweden, Italy, and Switzerland--have not automaticallybenefited
the traditionalparties. Instead, West Europeanparty systems have increasinglycome under
heavy pressurefrom a radical populist right.
Radical right-wing populist parties are radical in their rejection of the established
socioculturaland sociopolitical system and their advocacy of individualachievement, a free
marketplace,and a drastic reduction of the role of the state. They are right-wing in their
rejection of individual and social equality, in their opposition to the social integrationof
marginalized groups, and in their appeal to xenophobia, if not overt racism. They are
populist in their instrumentalizationof sentimentsof anxiety and disenchantmentand their
appeal to the common man and his allegedly superiorcommon sense. In short, they tend to

413
ComparativePolitics July 1993

combine a classic liberal position on the individualand the economy with the sociopolitical
agenda of the extreme and intellectual new right, and they deliver this amalgam to those
disenchantedwith their individuallife chances and the political system.

The Recent Success of the Radical Populist Right

During the past several years, radicalright-wingpopulist partieshave been able to multiply
both votes and parliamentaryrepresentation. The Austrian FPO (Freedom Party) is a
prominentexample. Owing to a numberof political blunders, the partyhad virtuallyceased
to exist as a relevantpolitical force in Austrianpolitics in the mid 1980s. However, electoral
fortune returnedafter the young charismaticand populist Jorg Haider was elected to the
chair of the party in 1986. In the following general election the partyreceived more than 9
percent of the vote and eighteen seats in parliament.It almost doubled its electoral support
in 1990, receiving thirty-threeparliamentaryseats. Finally, in the 1991 regional election in
Vienna the party received 22.6 percent of the vote and became the second largest party in
Vienna.
Even more dramatichas been the success story of the Lega Lombarda. Founded in the
early 1980s by Umberto Bossi, the party scored 3 percent in the 1987 nationalelection in
Lombardy.This gave Bossi a seat in the Italiansenate. After that the Lega advancedrapidly
in Lombardy.It won 8.1 percent in the Europeanelections, followed by 18.9 percentin the
1990 regional elections. After the Lega Lombardaunited with other leagues to form the
Lega Nord/Lega Lombarda, the party received 24.4 percent of the vote in the 1991 local
election in Brescia. The general election of April 1992 confirmed the Lega's prominent
position in northernItaly. With 20.5 percentin Lombardy,17.3 percentoverall in the North,
and 8.7 percent nationally, it became the fourth largest party in Italy.
Similarly, the Front National, founded in 1972 by right-wing radicals, has established
itself in the Frenchpartysystem. UnderJean-MarieLe Pen it emergedfrom virtuallyzero in
the 1981 general election to 9.6 percentof the vote in 1988. In the presidentialelections Le
Pen even gained more than 14 percentof the vote. However, the regionalelections of March
1992 showed that the advance of the Front National might have reached its limits. With
13.9 percent of the vote, the party remainedconsiderablybelow its own expectations.
Impressive, if less dramatic,have been the recentdevelopmentsin Switzerland,Belgium,
and Sweden. In Switzerland, the Autopartei (Automobile Party), founded in 1985,
succeeded in increasing its parliamentaryrepresentationfrom two seats in 1987 to ten seats
in 1991. In Belgium, the Vlaams Blok, founded in 1978 as a Flemish regionalist party,
increased its parliamentaryrepresentationfrom two seats in 1987 to twelve seats in 1991.
Finally, in Sweden, the Ny Demokrati(New Democracy)party,founded in 1990, gained 6.8
percent of the vote in the 1991 general elections and twenty-five sets in parliament.
Sweden has not been the only Scandinavian democracy with a significant radical
right-wingpresence. In fact, the Danish and Norwegian Progress parties have been among
the established radical right-wing populist parties in western democracies. Founded in the
early 1970s by charismaticnewcomers to politics as antitax and anti-welfare-stateprotest
parties, they initially did ratherwell at the polls, yet lost much of their supportin the early
1980s. However, by the end of the 1980s the political fortunes of both parties began to

414
 Hans-Georg Betz

improve. In the 1988 general elections, the Danish party received 9 percent of the vote,
almost twice as much as in 1987. One year later the Norwegian party became, with 13
percent of the vote, Norway's thirdlargest party.
The electoral history of the German Republikanerhas been similar. Led by a former
television talk show host, the party emerged in the early 1989 elections in Berlin, where it
received 7.5 percent of the vote, followed by 7.1 percent in the European elections.
However, the collapse of East Germanyand quick reunificationleft it without much of its
programor electoral support. In the first all-Germanelections of 1990 the Republikaner
scored a mere 2.1 percentof the vote. After a numberof leading partyfigures defected from
the party, the Republikaner seemed to be at an end. However, the state election in
Baden-Wiirttemberg in April 1992, in which the Republikanerreceived almost 12 percentof
the vote, showed thatthe partymight still representa strongchallenge to the political system
of unified Germany.
This short survey of the rise of radical right-wing populist parties shows the degree to
which these parties have penetratedWest Europeanpolitics. Often led by charismaticand
telegenic leaders, they have successfully mobilized a considerable portion of the West
European electorate. In what follows, we will examine why radical right-wing populist
partieshave been able to make such significantgains at the polls. We will explore whether
the rise of the radical populist right reflects merely temporaryresentmentand single issue
protest or whether it represents a response to structuralproblems of advanced western
democracies. An analysis of the programand social basis of these parties shows that their
success depends on two factors: their ability to mobilize resentmentand protest and their
capability to offer a future-orientedprogram that confronts the challenge posed by the
economic, social, and culturaltransformationof advancedWest Europeandemocracies.

Racism Revisited

It has become commonplaceto attributethe growing appeal of radicalright-wingpopulism

to the recent explosion of hostility towards immigrants in much of western Europe.
According to a 1989 study on racism and xenophobia, between 11 and 14 percent of the
populationin the EuropeanCommunitieswas troubledby the presence of people of other
nationality, race, or religion. Among the citizens of the EC, Belgians, Germans, French,
and Danes were particularlysensitive aboutimmigrants.Overall, 5 percentof the population
of the member states considered immigrants the most important problem facing their
respective countries.2A numberof reasons explains this hostility. For one, there is growing
concern about the dramatic increase in the number of refugees and illegal immigrants
looking for a better life in western Europe. During the 1980s, the number of political
refugees in western Europe grew from some 75,000 in 1983 to almost 320,000 in 1989.3
Since 1989, these numbershave dramaticallyincreased. Switzerlandalone counted 41,000
refugees in 1991, and Germanymore than 250,000. In addition, Germanyhad to deal with
a growing numberof ethnic Germanresettlers from eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union. As a result, the question of how to reduce, if not stop, the influx of refugees has
become one of the most importantpolitical issues throughoutwestern Europe.
Not only the sheer numbersbut also the changing composition of refugee and immigrant

415
ComparativePolitics July 1993

populations has contributedto the xenophobic upswell. Whereas in the past the large
majorityof foreignersin western Europewere other West Europeansor Turks, the majority
of recent arrivals comes from the Third World. As a result, in many West European
countries the proportionof West Europeanforeignershas remainedfairly stable, while the
non-Europeanpopulationhas increased.One of the first to experience this trendwas France.
In 1968, roughly two million Europeanimmigrantslived in France, and 650,000 Africans,
95 percent of whom were from the Maghreb. By 1982, the numberof Africans was almost
as large (1.57 million, 90 percent from the Maghreb) as the number of Europeans(1.75
million).4
By the late 1980s, developments in the rest of western Europe startedto resemble those
earlier in France. In Denmark, for example, between 1982 and 1991 the number of
foreignersfrom Scandinaviaand the EC countriesincreasedslightly from 46,000 to 51,000.
At the same time the numberof Africans and Asians increasedfrom 19,000 to over 45,000.
In 1991, almost 50 percent of all registeredforeignersin Italy and more than 40 percentof
all refugees in Switzerland were from Asia and Africa.5 As a result, West European
countriesare confrontedwith a sizable numberof non-Europeans,whose physical difference
makes an impression far beyond their number. This has contributedto the perception that
Europe is being "invaded"by alien traditions,culture, and religion.6
Against the backgroundof a growing influx and increasing visibility of non-Europeans,
the success of radical right-wing populist parties marks the revival of racism in western
Europe. The success of the Front National in the European elections of 1984 and the
growing electoral success of other radicalpopulist right-wing parties in the late 1980s show
that the growing presenceof a non-Europeanpopulationhas evoked anxiety and resentment.
The radical populist right has been particularlyastute in translatingthese sentiments into
political gains without couching them in outright racist terms. Instead, they have echoed
those critics of the West Europeanrefugee policy who have focused public attentionon the
growing financial burdenthat refugees impose on the host countries.' The central argument
is that the vast majorityof refugees only claim to be political refugees. In reality they are
drivenby economic motives. This hurtsWest Europeansocieties twice. Immigrantsnot only
burden social services with new expenditures,but they also take away scarcejobs from the
native unemployed.8 Therefore, illegal immigration and "asylum tourism" should be
stopped. Instead of "privileging"foreign immigrants,West Europeangovernmentsshould
give preference in regard to employment, housing, and social assistance to natives and
Europeans.9As the GermanRepublikanerput it succinctly: "Eliminateunemployment:Stop
immigration!" 10
The situation of foreign workers in advanced West European democracies shows that
these claims and demandsare seriously flawed. In most of these countries, the vast majority
of the immigrant labor force has low levels of education and performs unskilled or
semiskilled labor which the indigenous population increasingly refuses to do. In 1989 in
Austria, 61 percentof foreignersand 84 percentof Turkishguest workershad no more than
compulsoryeducation, comparedto 28 percent of the Austrianwork force. As a result, the
majority held low level positions.1' The situation was similar in Germanyand in France,
where immigrantworkershad lower levels of educationand fewer chances to advancefrom
unskilled to qualified positions and were considerablymore at risk to lose their jobs than
Frenchworkers.12

416
 Hans-Georg Betz

Not only is the degree to which immigrantworkers deprive natives of job opportunities
ratherquestionable. It is also open to discussion whether they represent a burden or not
rather a net gain for West European societies. Generally, immigrantworkers have made
significant contributionsto these societies. Recruited to fill vacant positions during the
period of high economic growth, they played a vital part in laying the foundation for
affluence and prosperityin western Europe. Furthermore,immigrantworkers representnot
only a work force but also consumers, taxpayers, and contributorsto social security and
pension systems.'3
Particularly the latter aspect assumes increasing importance for Western European
societies. Because of falling birth rates, much of western Europe is experiencing a
significant shift in the age pyramid.This is expected to have serious consequences both for
the labor marketand the social security systems. Populationstatistics show that in order to
keep the labor force stable and to guaranteesocial securityfor a growing older generationit
might be necessary to recruit more foreign labor. Thus, the French have projected that
between 2000 and 2039 they might have to recruit between 165,000 and 315,000 new
immigrantsannuallyto prevent a decline in the active population.14
The Front National, the VlaamsBlok, and the FPO were among the first partiesto draw
a connection between falling birth rates and foreign immigration. In their propaganda
pamphlets the Front National graphicallyconnects rising immigration, an increase in the
numberof mosques, and "emptycradles"to drive home their message that there is "a great
risk that we will no longer be able to pay our pensions and, above all, that we will see
disappear our thousand-year old identity and the French people itself." Immigration
"threatensthe survival of the French nation, the security of its territory,the integrityof its
patrimony,its culture, its language.""5These words and images appeal to diffuse sentiments
of anxiety and growing general insecurityover the fact that in the future western Europe's
well-being might increasingly depend on non-Europeanswhose growing numbersthreaten
its culturaland nationalidentity. UmbertoBossi makes this quite clear when he accuses the
established parties of wanting to transform Italy into a "multiracial [multirazziale],
multiethnic, and multireligioussociety" which "comes closer to hell than to paradise."16
Its success at the polls shows that the radical populist right has become the championof
growing resentment and hostility towards foreigners. Against the prospects of a future
multicultural,multiethnic European society, right-wing populist parties have successfully
promotedthemselves as the advocates and guardiansof an exclusive nationalculture. This
culture is firmly grounded in national identity and a closely circumscribed European
tradition. Xenophobia has proven to be such a powerful political issue that even the
Scandinavian Progress parties have increasingly resorted to mobilizing antiforeigner
sentiments in order to revive their political fortunes.17However, it would be wrong to
attributethe appeal of the radical populist right exclusively to its antiimmigrantprogram.
Success at the polls depends on more than the mobilizationof xenophobia.

The Neo-Liberal Agenda

What distinguishes most radical right-wing populist parties from the established parties is
not only their militantattackson immigrantsbut also their pronouncedneo-liberalprogram.

417
ComparativePolitics July 1993

Although varying in emphasis and importance, radical right-wing populist parties have
tended to hold strong antistatistpositions. They find articulationin a sharpcriticism of high
levels of taxation, of the bureaucraticstate in general, and of welfare outlays. Some of these
parties--in particularthe two Progressparties--trace their origin to the tax-welfarebacklash
of the 1970s. Others, such as the New Democracy party, have emerged out of the more
recent crisis of the welfare state. Their critiqueof the interventioniststate fuses resentment
against the state, the bureaucracy,and politicians with a populist appeal to freedom and
democracy.This appeal is pronouncednot only in the case of the two Progressparties, but
also in those of the Lega, the New Democracy party, and particularlythe FPO and the
Autopartei, which promotes itself as the champion of "Freedom-Prosperity -Joy of
Life. "18
The resulting political program marks a revival of radical liberalism. It calls for a
reductionof some taxes and the abolitionof others, a drasticcurtailingof the role of the state
in the economy and large-scale privatization of the public sector including the state
controlled media, a general deregulation of the private sector, and a restructuringand
streamliningof the public sector. The main beneficiariesof these measuresshould be small
and medium-sized enterprises which are expected to play a central role in the further
developmentof advancedwestern societies, particularlysince new technologies allow them
to compete effectively with largerenterprises.19
However, the radicalpopulistright's neo-liberalprogramis only secondarilyan economic
program.Primarily,it is a political weapon against the establishedpolitical institutionsand
their alleged monopolization of political power which hampers economic progress and
suppresses true democracy. The opponent is the bureaucratic,centralized state which is
living off the work of the productiveforces in society. Bossi has put this most poignantly
when he declares that the political battle in Italy is between Rome and Milan, between "the
capitalof parasitismand clientelism, which is Rome, and the capital of the economy, which
is Milan."20From this perspective, Le Pen's appeal to create "50 million proprietors"in a
"popularcapitalism"takes on an almost revolutionaryspirit.21It would not only loosen the
state's grip on power, but also guaranteethat decisions are made from an economic and
profit-oriented,thus efficiency-conscious perspectiveratherthanon the basis of political and
electoral considerations.
The radical populist right's hostility to the state is equaled by its hostility to the
establishedpolitical parties. ParticularlyUmbertoBossi but also Jean-MarieLe Pen and J6rg
Haider have skilfully translated popular disaffection with the established parties into
poignant attacks against the palazzo, against corruptionand inefficiency, and against the
"arrogance"of the classe politique which refuses to listen to the views of the common
person. Against that Bossi boldly asserts that only with him Italy will have "honesty,
cleanness, transparency,and above all TRUE DEMOCRACY." Under his guidance the
Italianswill recover "everythingof which they have been shamefullyrobbed" during forty
years of rule by the political establishment.22Similarly, Jean-MarieLe Pen charges the
political establishment with having led France into a deep crisis, which threatens the
country's existence, its prosperity,and its freedom.23
The establishedpolitical partiesare accused of having constructed,to the detrimentof the
average citizen, an all-encompassingsystem sustainedby interventionism,clientelism, and
favoritism.24It is against this "system" that the radicalpopulistright goes on the offensive.

418
 Hans-Georg Betz

Behind its strategy is the expectation that the relationship between voters and parties is
profoundlychanging, that voters no longer "function" according to the demands of party
politics. The radical right addresses its appeal for political support to the emerging
"working, sovereign citizen, who carriesresponsibilityfor family and occupation and who
can judge for himself."25
The radical populist right's rise to political prominence has come in the wake of a
profound and diffuse disaffection and disenchantmentwith the established political parties
throughoutwestern Europe. According to a study from 1989, almost half of the Italian
public and 35 percentof the Frenchthoughtthe establishedpartieswere absolutelyincapable
of representingthem on the major issues; 33 percent of the French public thought that the
political partieswere most responsible for the ills affecting French society.26In 1991, more
than half of the Italian public held the political parties incapable of resolving Italy's
institutional and economic crisis; 44 percent thought political parties contributedlittle to
facilitate participationin Italian society.27
Undoubtedly, the general malaise towards politics and political parties and a growing
crisis of political representationhas benefited radical right-wing populist parties.28By
appealing to lingering sentiments of powerlessness, to widespread alienation from the
political process, and to growing resentmentagainst the prevailingpolitical system, radical
populist right-wing parties present themselves as the true "antipartyparties." Regional
studies on the Lega, the Republikaner,and the FPO show that these parties successfully
attractedand mobilized voters who abstainedfrom voting in previouselections.29According
to Italian surveys, protest against the establishedparties was an importantmotive in voting
for the Lega Lombarda, subordinateonly to the desire to express a general discontentwith
"Rome," symbol of the inefficiency of the Italianbureaucracy. 30Survey data from Germany
show that in 1989, at the height of support for the Republikaner,only 11 percent of its
supporterstrustedthe political parties, and 26 percent the government(as comparedto 73
percent of the supporters of the established center-right parties). For 80 percent of
Republikanersupporterspolitics had failed in importantareas.31
These findings suggest that an explanationof the radicalpopulistright's success has to go
beyond xenophobia. Its success can be explained in part as a protest against the established
political partiesand their politics. However, these populistright partiesrepresentmore than
mere vehicles of protest. Behind their seemingly incoherent programs and contradictory
positions stand concrete political objectives. Their antiimmigrantpositions only appearto
contradicttheir neo-liberalprogram.From a liberal position, unemploymentproblems stem
not from immigrantsbut from too much state intervention. "Providedthe properincentives
... immigrantsinvariablyprove to be net contributorsto an economy."32 However, only the
New Democracy party has drawn the consequences. It demands that all immigrants,
including temporaryforeign workers and refugees, be allowed to work in Sweden.33
The otherpartieseither consider xenophobiatoo potent a political weapon to be sacrificed
to programmaticcoherenceor hold it compatiblewith theirneo-liberalprogram.This is only
possible if theirpromotionof a neo-liberalprogramis partof a largerstrategyto combatwhat
particularlythe Front National and the Lega consider the main threatsto the very existence
of the nation or a particularregion. These threatsstem not only from a loss of national or
regional identity, but also from global economic competition which threatensto exacerbate
domestic economic problems and to marginalizeindividualWest Europeancountries. The

419
ComparativePolitics July 1993

radical populist right's programmaticmixtureof xenophobiaand neo-liberalismmight thus

be seen as a response to currentglobal changes which producewinners and losers. It is an
attemptto meet the global challenge by promotingindividualinitiativeand entrepreneurship
while at the same time eliminating whatever might hamperinitiative, drain resources, and
thus impede competitiveness.34 The resulting ideology might be characterized as
neo-isolationismin a future "fortressEurope."35This might explain why radicalright-wing
populist parties have done particularlywell in some of the most prosperous regions of
western Europe (Lombardy, Flanders, Bavaria, Baden-Wtirttemberg),where there is
growing resentmentnot only against immigrantsbut also against fellow countrymenfrom
less advancedregions (for example, southernItaly, Wallonia, and perhapseven formerEast
Germany),both seen as a drain on resources.
If this notion of threatpartly explains the seemingly contradictorynatureof the radical
populistright's program,a second explanationappearsequally plausible. According to this
explanation,differentprogrammaticpositions appealto differentconstituencies. In fact, the
electoralsuccess of the radicalpopulistright can be attributedto the particularmixtureof its
program.This programcombines a populist mobilization of resentmentwith a seemingly
future-orientedresponse to the challenge of a profound social, cultural, and political
transformationof advanced western societies. This transformationhas variously been
described as the coming of an information, consumer, or postindustrialsociety.36Behind
these formulationsis the assumptionthat the present acceleratedprocess of technological
modernization,particularlyin the communicationand informationsector, has led to nothing
less than revolutionarychanges in the social structureof western democracies.

The Social Costs of Accelerated Modernization

Centralto this process are two developments:on the one hand, a shift from modern mass
productionand mass consumption to what has been defined as a new regime of flexible
accumulation,that is, the productionof highly specialized, customized products through
flexible manufacturingsystems supervisedby a highly skilled work force; on the other hand,
a renewed accelerationof the shift from the secondaryto the tertiarysector. As a result of
both the diffusion of high tech productionsystems and the expansionof highly qualifiedjobs
in organizationand management, research and development, and consulting, there is a
growing demandfor higherlevels of formal education,higher skills, and longer training.At
the same time there is a markeddecrease in unskilled and semiskilled jobs in production,
cleaning, transportation,and sales. The result is a growing bifurcationof labor markets.
The social space of the advancedpostindustrialsocieties is similarly characterizedby the
emergence of a "two-thirds society:" on the one hand, an affluent, well-educated, and
secure new middle class of employees, civil servants, and new professionals and a
"polyvalent"blue collar work force employed in the "postfordist"factory;on the other, an
increasinglymarginalizedsectorof unskilledand semiskilledworkers,young people without
complete formal education and training, and the growing mass of the long-term
unemployed. They represent a readily identifiable underclass of the permanently
unemployed, underemployed,or marginally employed who are quickly turning into the
losers of the acceleratedmodernizationprocess.37

420
 Hans-Georg Betz

Finally, the cultural sphere is characterizedby the dominance of consumption, the

fragmentationof taste cultures, and individualityin choice and in life style, made possible
by the new productionregime.38In this view, the high standardof living and high level of
social securitycharacteristicof advancedwestern democracieshave led to the dissipationof
class distinctions and subcultural class identities. The result has been a process of
"individualization"of life styles, which give rise to a new system of social diversification
and stratification.39By rewardingindividual effort, self-promotionand self-advertisement,
and the ability to design one's own existence, it reinforces the trend towards social
bifurcation.
Both the rise and political success of left-libertarianas well as radicalright-wingpopulist
parties have been attributed to the broad transformationof advanced West European
democracies. One side has been the radical populist right as a response of modernization
losers to deprivationand marginalization.40Othershave arguedthat these partiesrepresenta
response to a broadertransformationof the political culture of advanced democracies:the
radical populist right occupies one pole on a new axis of conflict over social values. It
representsa largely materialistreaction to the postmaterialistaspirationsof the libertarian
left and the libertarianleft's promotionof environmentalissues, new concepts of morality,
new ways of political participation,and vision of a multiculturalsociety. The reactionto this
agenda has been an increased emphasis on "old politics": sustained economic growth,
technologicalprogress, economic stability, a tough standon questionsof law and order, and
a returnto traditionalmoral values.41
Neither interpretationsufficiently explains the ambiguities and paradoxesrepresentedby
the radical populist right. One of their most serious deficits is that they see the radical
populist right largely as representing"reactionsagainst change, ratherthan change in a new
direction.'"42However, the radical populist right's central programmaticpositions are only
reactionary(in the sense of the desire to impede or prevent change) as far as they refer to
immigrants and refugees: instead of accepting growing ethnic and cultural heterogeneity
they seek to return to an ethnically and culturally homogeneous past. Their neo-liberal
stance, on the other hand, explicitly anticipates, supports, and endorses radical change and
thus hardlyappealsto those threatenedby these changes. Ratherthan seeking to returnto the
comprehensive corporatist and welfare-state-orientedpolicies of the past, they embrace
social individualizationand fragmentationas a basis for their political programs. In what
follows, we will arguethatone possible explanationof the ambiguitiesof this programis the
particularsocial basis to which the radical populist right appeals for support:an alliance
between losers and winners of the present accelerationof the modernizationprocess.

The Social Basis of Political Resentment

Studies of the social basis of supportfor variousradicalright-wingpopulist partiesshow that

these parties attract voters across the social spectrum. However, in a number of cases
political support is concentratedin particularsocial groups. An exemplary case is the
Norwegian Progress Party. In the 1989 elections, blue collar workers and white collar
workers were overrepresented, and public white collar workers were underrepresented
among its voters. Its supporterswere predominantlymale, and a considerable proportion

421
ComparativePolitics July 1993

was under thirty years of age. A majority of its voters had low and medium incomes.43
Similarlyin Austria, in the 1990 elections the FPO did particularlywell among workersand
employees, but also among pensioners. As in the Norwegian case, the party's voters were
predominantlymale, and a considerableportionwas underthirty.44Althougha large portion
of the supportersof the Front National are from the traditionalmiddle and lower middle
class, the party has also been able to attract a considerable proportionof working class
voters. As a result of the overrepresentationof "farmers,artisans,and small shopkeepersas
well as higher level employees and the self-employed, Le Pen's voters resemble those of
Gaullism and liberalism; as a result of the overrepresentationof medium and lower level
employees, workers, and the unemployed, they resemble those of socialism and
communism."45
The Lega, the Republikaner,and the VlaamsBlok deviate somewhatfrom the Norwegian,
Austrian,and Frenchcases. Unlike the latter, the Lega has attracteda considerablenumber
of young supporterswho distinguish themselves by their high levels of educational and
occupational status.46 The typical leghista has been described as a relatively young,
well-educated male "who tends to occupy a medium-highprofessional position and has an
income thatis higherthanthe nationalor regional average."47 However, recent studies show
that with growing supportfrom working class voters the Lega increasinglyresembles other
radicalright-wingpopulist parties.48The Republikanerand the VlaamsBlok are even more
blue collar parties. At the height of their electoral appeal the Republikanerattracted a
segment of Germansociety that was characterizedby lower levels of education, particularly
among younger voters, and blue collar working class status. In Bavaria and
Baden-Wiirttemberg,the party's strongholds, unskilled and semiskilled workers and, to a
lesser degree, qualified workers were particularlyattractedto the Republikaner.49Finally,
the voters of the VlaamsBlok are characterizedby low levels of education and blue collar
status. Often they are formersocialist voters "disappointedby the promises of growth made
during their youth."50
This brief survey of the social basis of the radical populist right shows that those parties
which have been most successful at the polls have forged an electoral alliance between
segments of the working class and segments of the new middle class. This might have
something to do with the particularmixture of their program. Surveys show that there is a
close relationshipbetween levels of educationand occupationalstatus, on the one hand, and
views on immigrants,on the other. In Austria,for example, a considerablylargerproportion
of those with primary degrees than college entrance and university degrees considers
limiting the numberof immigrantsan "extraordinarilyimportant"question. So do more of
the self-employed, unskilled and semiskilled workers, and skilled workers and pensioners
compared to employees, civil servants, or students.51 In addition, foreign blue collar
workers, who often are Maghrebinsand Turks, tend to be concentratedin working class
areas.52Increasingly,foreignershave also moved into the suburbanareas surroundinglarge
cities like Paris characterizedby low rent housing, a high concentrationof workers, a high
proportion of young people without complete education, and high levels of youth
unemployment.53As Nonna Mayer and othershave shown, it is in these working class areas
that the Front National has attractedconsiderablepolitical support.54
One might suspect thatright-wingradicalpartiesdirecttheir xenophobic message to those
social groups which have to compete with non-Europeanimmigrants.The resultingclimate

422
 Hans-Georg Betz

of insecurity, particularlyamong unskilled or semiskilled workers and unemployed youth

without complete education, is one of the potential breeding grounds of xenophobia and
radical right-wingpopulist support.55However, an exclusive focus on marginalizedgroups
is hardlyenough to increasea party's supportat the polls. Only by appealingto segments of
the new middle class and thus broadening their electoral base have parties like the
NorwegianProgressParty,the Lega, and the FPO become a serious threatto the established
parties.
It appearsthat these partiesattracta considerableportionof the privatesector segment of
the new middle class, particularlynonmanualemployees.56By contrast, the public sector
segmentof the new middle class is underrepresented.This can be explainedin termsof these
parties' vigorous supportof the market against state interventionand their critique of the
inefficiencies of the welfare state. Portionsof the new middle class might also be attracted
at least to some of these partiesby their liberal position on questions of individualmorality,
individualism, and self-determination.57Even in the case of the Front National,
authoritarianpositions that touch upon individual morality, such as abortion, find no clear
majorities.58A recent study of the Lega even finds postmaterialistswith high tolerance
towardsforeign immigrantsamong its supporters.59
These examples show that the radicalpopulist right appeals as much to the modernization
winners within advanced western democracies as to those segments threatened by
marginalization. If one looks at their neo-liberal program, it appears that these parties
attemptto appeal particularlyto emerging groups which accept the marketas the ultimate
arbiterover individual life chances and which, as a result of their relative high level of
education, are well-preparedto play the game of individual effort, self-promotion, and
self-advertisement. To these groups the new populist leaders like Haider and Bossi
increasinglytry to appeal.6

A PostmodernRight?

In this essay we have arguedthat the recent political success of radical right-wing populist
parties is a result of the particularelectoral alliance they have been able to forge. Radical
right-wing populism represents itself as an at first sight paradoxical coalition of rather
heterogeneoussocial groups. On the one hand, it appealsto the losers of the modernization
and individualizationprocess-marginalized blue collar workers, young people with lower
levels of education, and the unemployed. As Frenchand Germanstudies have shown, these
groupstend to live in the anonymoushousing projectson the peripheryof metropolitanareas
which are increasinglybecoming the homes of newly arrivingimmigrants.They are driven
by diffuse fears of encirclementand invasion and by growing resentmentover the fact that
they have been abandonedby the rest of society and can not escape. Disappointedby the
left-wing parties' failure to address their plight and ambiguous positions on immigration,
they vote for the radicalpopulist right out of general frustrationand resentment.
Radical right-wingpopulist parties also appeal to groups which belong to the winners of
the acceleratedmodernizationprocess and benefit from the individualizationprocess which
it has set in motion. Particularlyinterestingare the so-called "new professionals," defined
as young men and women who have created their own jobs. One might assume that this

423
ComparativePolitics July 1993

trend is particularly pronounced in advanced western democracies with large student

populationsand diminishingjob prospectsin the public sector. Thus, Italy in the 1980s saw
the rise of more than 160 new professionswith more than 275,000 people employed.61It has
been arguedthat due to the "determinationof their marketposition" young highly educated
people may be frustratedand politically restless and thereforesupportnew political parties.
The expectation has been that they would support left-libertarianparties.62However, the
growing appeal of partiessuch as the FPO and the Lega to young people suggests that these
groups might be an importantelectoral reservoirfor the radical populist right.63
Ideologically, the radical populist right is still a right-wing phenomenon, although
considerably different from the traditional extreme right. In its liberal commitment to
individual effort but also autonomy and its adaptationto a thanging cultural and political
climate it resembles the libertarianleft. However, whereas the libertarianleft is committed
to equality, the radical populist right's antiforeignerpositions as well as its economic
programstartfrom the assumptionof basic inequality.Not everyone has the same abilities;
the indigenous population should come first and should get the jobs and basic welfare
provisions. This programmaticmixture might partly explain why the radicaipopulist right
has been so successful. Its antiforeignerprogramposes little threat to new middle class
voters, nor does its neo-liberalprogrampose a threatto its workingclass supporters.htfact,
unemployedyouth and marginalizedblue collar workersmight harborresentmentssimilarto
those of the private sector segment of the new middle class. For both, the opponents are
politicians, unions, and the state, which protect the interests of established, organized
groupswhile preventingoutsidersfrom marketingthemselves even if they are eager to work.
The rise and success of radical right-wing populism in western Europe can thus be
interpreted as the result of the increasing social and cultural fragmentation and
differentiationof advancedwestern societies. Both developments are a consequence of the
general individualizationprocess of postindustrialsociety, which is graduallydestroyingthe
basis of the great all-encompassingprojects of modem politics.64In a social, cultural, and
political climate characterizedby fluidity and insecurity,radicalright-wingpopulismappeals
to the new ego-centrismwhich prevails throughoutthe advanced western world and which
finds expression as much in the pictureof the "fortressEurope" and the renewed outbursts
of nationalistseparatismas in the hostility towards foreigners and the denunciationof the
welfare state. If this is correct, then radicalright-wingpopulistpartiesare symptomsas well
as distastefulby-productsof the general turbulenceof the present age.

NOTES

Funds for this researchwere providedin partby the Bradley Institutefor Democracy and Public Values, Marquette
University, and the MarquetteUniversity committee on research. I would like to thank the anonymousreviewers and
the editor for their helpful comments.
1. Herbert Kitschelt, "Left-LibertarianParties: Explaining Innovation in Competitive Party Systems," World
Politics, 40 (1988), 229.
2. Commission of the EuropeanCommunities,Racism and Xenophobia, EurobarometerSpecial (Brussels: 1989),
pp. 6, 58-60.
3. Daten und Faktenzur Auslandersituation,Mitteilungender Beauftragtender Bundesregierungfiir die Integration
der ausliandischenArbeitnehmerund ihrer Familienangeh6rigen(Bonn: 1990), p. 31; Andr6 Lebon, Regard sur

424
 Hans-Georg Betz

l'immigration et la prdsence 6trangbre en France 1989/1990 (Paris: La DocumentationFranqaise, 1990), p. 76;

ReinhardEichwalder, "Lebensbedingungenauslindischer Staatsbiirgerin Osterreich," Statistische Nachrichten, 46
(1991), 166.
4. Michble Tribalat, "La population6trangbreen France, Regards sur l'Actualitd, 118 (February1986), 34-35.
5. "Udenlandskestatsborgereog personerfodt i udlandetpr. 1. januar 1991, samt udenlandskevandringer1990,"
DanmarksStatistik, 12 (1991), 5; Bundesamtftir Fliichtlinge,Asylstatistik1991 (Bern: 1992), p. 9; ISPES, Rapporto
Italia '91 (Rome: Vallecchi Editori, 1991), p. 471.
6. Commission of the EuropeanCommunities, p. 40.
7. Jan Werner, Die Invasion der Armen (Mainz-Munich: V. Hase & Koehler, 1992); Rudolf Wassermann,
"Plaidoyerfuireine neue Asyl- und Auslainderpolitik,"Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Feb. 21, 1992, pp. 13-20.
8. Vlaams Blok, "Zegenwat u denkt" (Deurne:no date), p. 7.
9. Le Front National c'est vous! (Paris:no date), p. 8; Autopartei,Parteiprogramm(1991), pp. 8-9; UmbertoBossi
with Daniele Vimercati, Ventodal Nord-La mia Lega, la mia vita, (Milan: Kupfer& Sperling, 1992), pp. 143-150;
FPO, Heimat-Suche(Vienna: FBW-Dokumentation,1991).
10. Die Republikaner, "Sozialstaat retten: Asylbetriiger ausweisen! Arbeitslosigkeit beseitigen: Einwanderung
stoppen! Verbrechenbeknimpfen:auslindische Straftfiterabschieben!", flyer, 1991.
11. Eichwalder, p. 172.
12. Guy Desplanquesand Nicole Tabard,"La localisationde la population6trangbre,"Economie et Statistique,242
(April 1991), 51-61; Eric Maurin, "Les 6trangers:Une main-d'oeuvreApart?," 242 (April 1991), 39-50; Daten und
Faktenzur Auslandersitation,p. 22; Regine Erichsen, "Zurtickkehren oder bleiben? Zur wirtschaftlichenSituationvon
Auslindern in der BundesrepublikDeutschland,"Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, June 10, 1988, p. 19.
13. Erichsen, p. 23.
14. Didier Blanchet and Olivier Marchand, "Au-delAde I'an 2000, s'adapterA une pOnuriede main-d'oeuvre,"
Economie et Statistique, 243 (May 1991), 63; for Germany, see Bernd Hof, "Arbeitskrliftebedarf der Wirtschaft,
Arbeitsmarktchancen fiir Zuwanderer,"(Bonn: mimeo, 1991).
15. Le Front National c'est vous!, p. 6; AndreasMilzer, Jdrg! Der Eisbrecher (Klagenfurt:Suxxes, 1990), p. 170;
for Belgium, see Fr6d6ricLarsen, "En Belgique, l'extreme droite s'installe dans les coulisses du pouvoir," Le Monde
Diplomatique, 39 (February1992), 8-9.
16. Bossi with Vimercati, p. 148; in a similar vein, M61zer,p. 170; on the political use of xenophobiaby the Lega,
see Daniele Vimercati, I lombardialla nuova crociata (Milan: Mursia, 1990), ch. 18.
17. Tor Bjorklund, "The 1987 Norwegian Local Elections: A Protest Election with a Swing to the Right,"
Scandinavian Political Studies, 11 (1988), 216-217; Ole Borre, "Some Results from the Danish 1987 Election,"
ScandinavianPolitical Studies, 10 (1987), 347.
18. Autopartei, p. 1; for the FPO, see M61zer;for the Lega, see Giulio Savelli, Che cosa vuole la Lega (Milan:
Longanesi, 1992).
19. Bossi with Vimercati, p. 68; interviewwith UmbertoBossi, La Repubblica, Mar. 20, 1992, p. 8; interview with
UmbertoBossi, II Sabato, Nov. 16, 1991, p. 21.
20. Bossi with Vimercati, p. 170; see also Vittorio Moioli, Il tarlo delle leghe (Trezzo sull' Adda: Comedit2000,
1991).
21. Le Pen, Pour la France (Paris: dlitionAlbatros), p. 65.
22. UmbertoBossi in Lega Nord Centro Sud, Mar. 1-7, 1992, pp. 1-2.
23. Le Front National c'est vous!, p. 4.
24. Savelli, pp. 10-17.
25. Autopartei, "Freiheit--Wohlstand--Lebensfreude!Unsere 10 politischen Leitlinien," 1991.
26. Eurobarometer1989, cited in Roberto Biorcio, "La Lega come attore politico: Dal federalismo al populismo
regionalista," in Renato Mannheimer,ed., La Lega Lombarda(Milan: Feltrinelli, 1991), p. 43; L'Express, Nov. 10,
1989, p. 46.
27. Corriere della Sera, Nov. 30, 1991, p. 12; Panorama, Dec. 8, 1991, p. 42.
28. Hugues Portelli, "La crise de la representationpolitique," Regards sur l'Actuialitd, 164 (September-October
1990), 3-10.
29. Hans-WalterKreiler, "Die Europawahlam 18. Juni in Miinchen," MiinchenerStatistik(June 1989), 362; Horst
W. Schmollinger, "Die Wahl zum Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin am 29. Januar 1989," Zeitschrift ftir
Parlamentsfragen,20 (October 1989), 319; Franz Birk, Ernst Gehmacher, and GiintherOgris, "Parteienlandschaft
andertsich?," Zukunft, 11 (1988), 14; Vittorio Moioli, I nuovi razzismi (Rome: Edizioni Associate, 1990).

425
ComparativePolitics July 1993

30. Renato Mannheimer,"Chi vota Lega e perch6?," in Mannheimer,ed., pp. 144-145.

31. EMNID, "Zeitgeschichte," March 1989, Table 7; Hans-Joachim Veen, " 'Programm' und 'Wihler' der
Republikaner-Etablierungnoch offen," Eichholzbrief,4 (1989), 62.
32. Seth Lipsky, "Le Pen: He's on the Right, but He's Wrong," The Wall Street Journal, Apr. 29, 1988, p. 24.
33. Ny Demokrati, Partiprogram,p. IX.
34. See Molzer, p. 169.
35. See Brigitte Busch, "Mauerbauund Rassismus rund um die 'Festung Europa': OsterreichsFremdenpolitikim
auslinderfeindlichenHarmonisierungstrend,"in Gero Fischer and Peter Gstettner,ed., "AmKdrntnerWesen kiinnte
diese Republikgenesen" (Klagenfurt:Drava, 1990), pp. 50-67.
36. Daniel Bell, The Coming of Postindustrial Society (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Mike Featherstone,
Consumer Culture and Postmodernism (Newbury Park: Sage, 1991); Scott Lash, Sociology of Postmodernism
(London:Routledge, 1990).
37. EhrenfriedNatter and Alois Riedlsperger,eds., Zweidrittelgesellschaft(Vienna: Europaverlag,1988).
38. CharlesJencks, WhatIs Postmodernism?(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), p. 49.
39. Featherstone,p. 86; Ulrich Beck, "Jenseitsvon Standund Klasse," Merkur,38 (June 1984), 485-497; Kenneth
J. Gergen, The SaturatedSelf (New York: Basic Books, 1991).
40. GerhardPaul, "Die 'Republikaner':Profile einer neuen Partei," GewerkschaftlicheMonatshefte,40 (September
1989), 544-548. For France, see Jean-MarieVincent, "Pourquoil'extrbme-droite,"Les TempsModernes, 41 (April
1985), 1773-1779).
41. Michael Minkenbergand Ronald Inglehart,"Neoconservatismand Value Change in the USA: Tendencies in the
Mass Public of a PostindustrialSociety," in John R. Gibbins, ed., ContemporaryPolitical Culture (Newbury Park:
Sage, 1989), pp. 82, 91; Russell J. Dalton, Citizen Politics in WesternDemocracies (Chatham:ChathamHouse,
1988), ch. 7.
42. Ronald Inglehart,CultureShift in AdvancedIndustrialSociety (Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press, 1990), p.
11.
43. Henry Valen, Bernt Aardal, and Gunnar Vogt, Endring og Kontinuitet:Stortingvalget 1989 (Oslo: Central
Bureauof Statistics, 1990), Table 6.7.
44. Fritz Plasser and Peter A. Ulram, "Abstieg oder letzte Chance der OVP?," OsterreichischeMonatshefte, 7
(1990), pp. 6-15.
45. Roland Hdhne, "Die Renaissance des Rechtsextremismusin Frankreich,"Politische Vierteljahresschrift,31
(1990), 84-85. See also Pascal Perrineau, "Le Front national et les 61lections:L'exception pr6sidentielleet la rbgle
16glislative,"Revue Politique et Parlementaire, 90 (July-August 1988), 37; Nonna Mayer, "Le Front National," in
Bilan: Politique de la France (Paris:Hachette, 1991), p. 116.
46. Mannheimer,pp. 126-129.
47. Vincenzo Cesareo, MarcoLombardi,and GiancarloRovati, Localismopolitico: Il caso Lega Lombarda(Varese:
ComitatoRegionale LombardoDemocraziaCristiana, 1989), p. 5.
48. Mannheimer,p. 128.
49. Dieter Roth, "Sind die Republikanerdie fiinfte Partei?," Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Oct. 5, 1989, pp.
13-14; Max Kaase and Wolfgang G. Gibowski, "Die Ausgangslage fuirdie Bundestagswahlam 2. Dezember 1990,"
in Max Kaase and Hans-DieterKlingemann,eds., Wahlenund Wdhler:Analysenaus Anlass der Bundestagwahl1987
(Opladen:WestdeutscherVerlag, 1990), pp. 762-764; for the 1992 election, see MatthiasJung and Dieter Roth, "Der
Stimmzettelals Denkzettel," Die Zeit, Apr. 10, 1992, p. 3.
50. ChristianVandermottenand Jean Vanlaer, "Immigrationet vote d'extr8me-droiteen Europe occidentale et en
Belgique" (Brussels: mimeo, Universit6Libre de Bruxelles, 1991), p. 5; Larsen, p. 8.
51. SWS-Rundschau,30 (1990), 570; SWS-Rundschau,31 (1991), 148.
52. For France, see Desplanquesand Tabard.
53. Marc Ambroise-Rendu, "Le 'mal des banlieues' s'6tend," Le Monde, Aug. 8, 1991, p. 20; Frangois Dubet,
Immigrations:Qu'en savons-nous? (Paris:La DocumentationFranqaise, 1989), pp. 71-72.
54. Nonna Mayer, "Le vote FN de Passy A Barb6s (1984-1988)," in Nonna Mayer and Pascal Perrineau,eds., Le
Front National a ddcouvert(Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1989), pp. 249-267;
Franqois-R6gisNavarre, "Clichy: Du rouge au noir," L'Express, Feb. 23, 1990, p. 33. For Germany, see Eike
Hennig, Die Republikanerim Schatten Deutschlands (Frankfurta.M.: Suhrkamp,1991), pp. 150-151, 214.
55. Jorgen Goul Andersen and Tor Bjorklund, "StructuralChanges and New Cleavages," Acta Sociologica, 33
(1990), 204.

426
 Hans-Georg Betz

56. Ibid., p. 204.

57. Ibid., p. 207.
58. Le Point, Apr. 29, 1990, pp. 40-41.
59. Ilvo Diamanti, "Una tipologia dei simpatizzantidella Lega," in Mannheimer,ed., p. 169.
60. FPO, PerspektiveFreiheit (Vienna: FreiheitlichesBildungswerk, 1991), p. 46.
61. XXIVRapportoCensis/1990 sulla situazione sociale del paese (Rome: Franco Angeli, 1990), p. 125.
62. Kitschelt, p. 229.
63. For empiricalevidence, see Moiloli, Il tarlo delle leghe, pp. 306-320.
64. Zygmunt Bauman, "Living without an Alternative,"Political Quarterly, 62 (1991), 35-44.

427