Republic of the Philippines under the provisions of the Act constitute a prosecution of
SUPREME COURT appellant without due process of law.
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 17584 March 8, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
GREGORIO SANTIAGO, defendant-appellant.
L. Porter Hamilton for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
Having caused the death of Porfirio Parondo, a boy 7 years old,
by striking him with automobile that he was driving, the herein
appellant was prosecuted for the crime of homicide by reckless
negligence and was sentenced to suffer one year and one day
of prision correccional, and to pay the costs of the trial.
Not agreeable with that sentence he now comes to this court
alleging that the court below committed four errors, to wit:
1. The trial court erred in not taking judicial notice of the
fact that the appellant was being prosecuted in conformity
with Act No. 2886 of the Philippine Legislature and that
the Act is unconstitutional and gave no jurisdiction in this
case.
2. The lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint
after the presentation of the evidence in the case, if not
before, for the reason that said Act No. 2886 is
unconstitutional and the proceedings had in the case
3. The court a quo erred in not finding that it lacked
jurisdiction over the person of the accused and over the
subject- matter of the complaint.
4. The trial court erred in finding the appellant guilty of the
crime charged and in sentencing him to one year and one
day of prison correccional and to the payment of costs.
With regard to the questions of fact, we have to say that we have
examined the record and find that the conclusions of the trial
judge, as contained in his well-written decision, are sufficiently
sustained by the evidence submitted.
The accused was driving an automobile at the rate of 30 miles an
hour on a highway 6 meter wide, notwithstanding the fact that he
had to pass a narrow space between a wagon standing on one
side of the road and a heap of stones on the other side where the
were two young boys, the appellant did not take the precaution
required by the circumstances by slowing his machine, and did
not proceed with the vigilant care that under the circumstances an
ordinary prudent man would take in order to avoid possible
accidents that might occur, as unfortunately did occur, as his
automobile ran over the boy Porfirio Parondo who was instantly
killed as the result of the accident.
These facts are so well established in the records that there
cannot be a shade of doubt about them.
Coming now to the other assignments of error, it will be seen that
they deal with the fundamental questions as to whether or not Act
No. 2886, under which the complaint in the present case was
filed, is valid and constitutional.
This Act is attacked on account of the amendments that it
introduces in General Orders No. 58, the defense arguing that the
Philippine Legislature was, and is, not authorized to amend
General Orders No. 58, as it did by amending section 2 thereof
because its provisions have the character of constitutional law.
Said section 2 provides as follows:
All prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name
of the United States against the persons charged with the
offenses. (G. O. No. 58, sec. 2 ).
Act No. 2886, which amends it, by virtue of which the People of
the Philippine Island is made the plaintiff in this information,
contains the following provisions in section 1:
SECTION 1. Section two of General Orders, Numbered
Fifty-eight, series of nineteen hundred, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 2. All prosecutions for public offenses shall
be in the name of the People of the Philippine
Islands against the persons charged with the
offense."
Let us examine the question.
For practical reasons, the procedure in criminal matters is not
incorporated in the Constitutions of the States, but is left in the
hand of the legislatures, so that it falls within the realm of public
statutory law.
As has been said by Chief Justice Marshall:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the
Subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of
all the means by which they may be carried into
execution, would partake of a prolixity of a legal code, and
could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would
probably never be understood by the public. (M'Culloch
vs. Maryland [1819], 4 Wheat., 316, 407; 4 L. ed., 579.)
That is why, in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States,
each States, each State has the authority, under its police power,
to define and punish crimes and to lay down the rules of criminal
procedure.
The states, as a part of their police power, have a large
measure of discretion in creating and defining criminal
offenses. . . .
A Statute relating to criminal procedure is void as a denial
of the equal protection of the laws if it prescribes a
different procedure in the case of persons in like situation.
Subject to this limitation, however, the legislature has
large measure of discretion in prescribing the modes of
criminal procedure. . . . (12 C.J., 1185, 1186. See Collins
vs. Johnston, 237 U.S., 502; 35 s. Ct. Rep. 649; 59 L. ed.,
1071; Shevlin-Carpenter Co. vs. Minnesota, 218 U.S., 57;
30 S. Ct. Rep., 663; 54 L. ed., 930; Lynn vs. Flancders,
141 Ga., 500; 81 S.E., 205.)
This power of the States of the North American Union was also
granted to its territories such as the Philippines:
The plenary legislative power which Congress possesses
over the territories and possessions of the United States
may be exercised by that body itself, or, as is much more
often the case, it may be delegated to a local agency,
such as a legislature, the organization of which proceeds
upon much the same lines as in the several States or in
Congress, which is often taken as a model, and whose
powers are limited by the Organic Act; but within the
scope of such act is has complete authority to legislate, . .
 . and in general, to legislate upon all subjects within the
police power of the territory. (38 Cyc., 205-207.)
The powers of the territorial legislatures are derived from
Congress. By act of Congress their power extends "to all
rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States;" and this
includes the power to define and punish crimes. (16 C. J.,
62.)
And in the exercise of such powers the military government of the
army of occupation, functioning as a territorial legislature, thought
it convenient to establish new rules of procedure in criminal
matters, by the issuance of General Orders No. 58, the preamble
of which reads:
In the interests of justice, and to safeguard the civil
liberties of the inhabitants of these Islands, the criminal
code of procedure now in force therein is hereby
amended in certain of its important provisions, as
indicated in the following enumerated sections. (Emphasis
ours.)
Its main purpose is, therefore, limited to criminal procedure and
its intention is to give to its provisions the effect of law in criminal
matters. For that reason it provides in section 1 that:
The following provisions shall have the force and effect of
law in criminal matters in the Philippine Islands from and
after the 15th day of May, 1900, but existing laws on the
same subjects shall remain valid except in so far as
hereinafter modified or repealed expressly or by
necessary implication.
From what has been said it clearly follows that the provisions of
this General Order do not the nature of constitutional law either
by reason of its character or by reason of the authority that
enacted it into law.
It cannot be said that it has acquired this character because this
order was made its own by the Congress of the United States for,
as a mater of fact, this body never adopted it as a law of its own
creation either before the promulgation of Act No. 2886, herein
discussed, or, to our knowledge, to this date.
Since the provisions of this General Order have the character of
statutory law, the power of the Legislature to amend it is self-
evident, even if the question is considered only on principle. Our
present Legislature, which has enacted Act No. 2886, the subject
of our inquiry, is the legal successor to the Military Government
as a legislative body.
Since the advent of the American sovereignty in the Philippines
the legislative branch of our government has undergone
transformations and has developed itself until it attained its
present form. Firstly, it was the Military Government of the army
of occupation which, in accordance with international law and
practice, was vested with legislative functions and in fact did
legislate; afterwards, complying with the instructions of President
McKinley which later were ratified by Congress (sec. 1 of the Act
of July 1, 1902) the legislative powers of the Military Government
were transferred to the Philippine Commission; then, under the
provisions of section 7 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, the
Philippine Assembly was created and it functioned as a
colegislative body with the Philippine Commission. Finally, by
virtue of the provisions of sections 12 of the Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916, known as the Jones Law, the Philippine
Commission gave way to the Philippine Senate, the Philippine
Assembly became the House of Representatives, and thus was
formed the present Legislature composed of two Houses which
has enacted the aforesaid Act No. 2886.
As a matter of fact, Act No. 2886 is not the first law that amends
General Orders No. 58. The Philippine Commission, at various
times, had amended it by the enactment of laws among which we
may cite Act No. 194, regarding preliminary investigation, Act No.
440 relating to counsels de oficio and Act No. 590 about
preliminary investigations by justices of the peace of provincial
capitals. Later on, and before the enactment of Act No. 2886,
herein controverted, the Legislature had also amended this
General Orders No. 58 by the enactment of Act No. 2677
regarding appeals to the Supreme Court of causes originating in
the justice of the peace courts and by Act No. 2709 which deals
with the exclusion of accused persons from the information in
order to be utilized as state's witnesses.
These amendments repeatedly made by the Philippine
Commission as well as by our present Legislature are perfectly
within the scope of the powers of the said legislative bodies as
the successors of the Military Government that promulgated
General Orders No. 58.
No proof is required to demonstrate that the present Legislature
had, and had, the power to enact and amend laws. (U.S. vs. Bull.
15 Phil., 7.) That it has the power to legislate on criminal matters
is very evident from the wording of section 7 of the Jones Law
which says:
That the legislative authority herein provided shall have
power, when not inconsistent with this Act, by due
enactment to amend, alter, modify, or repeal any law, civil
or criminal, continued in force by this Act as it may from
time to time see fit.
It is urged the right to prosecute and punish crimes is an
attributed of sovereignty. This assertion is right; but it is also true
that by reason of the principle of territoriality as applied in the
supression, of crimes, such power is delegated to subordinate
government subdivisions such as territories. As we have seen in
the beginning, the territorial legislatures have the power to define
and punish crimes, a power also possessed by the Philippine
Legislature by virtue of the provisions of sections 7, already
quoted, of the Jones Law. These territorial governments are local
agencies of the Federal Government, wherein sovereignty
resides; and when the territorial government of the Philippines
prosecutes and punishes public crimes it does so by virtue of the
authority delegated to it by the supreme power of the Nation.
This delegation may be made either expressly as in the case of
the several States of the Union and incorporated territories like
Porto Rico and Hawaii, or tacitly as is the case with the
Philippines, which is an organized territory though not
incorporated with the Union. (Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional
Law, 181-205.)
This tacit delegation to our Government needs no demonstration.
As a matter of fact, the crimes committed within our territory, even
before section 2 of General Orders No. 58 was amended, were
prosecuted and punished in this jurisdiction as is done at present;
but then as now the repression of crimes was done, and is still
done, under the sovereign authority of the United States, whose
name appears as the heading in all pleadings in criminal causes
and in other judicial papers and notarial acts.
The use of such a heading is prescribed for civil cases in form 1
of section 784 of the Code of Civil Procedure; in criminal causes
the constant practice followed in this jurisdiction established its
use; and in notarial matters its use is provided by section 127 of
Act No. 496. This long continued practice in criminal matters and
the legal provision relating to civil cases and notarial acts have
not been amended by any law, much less by Act No. 2886, the
subject of the present inquiry.
There is not a single constitutional provision applicable to the
Philippines prescribing the name to be used as party plaintiff in
criminal cases.
The fact that the political status of this country is as yet
undetermined and in a transitory stage, is, in our opinion,
responsible for the fact that there is no positive provision in our
constitutional law regarding the use of the name of the People of
the Philippine Islands, as party plaintiff, in criminal prosecutions,
as is otherwise the case in the respective constitutional charters
of the States of the Union and incorporated territories — a
situation which must not be understood as depriving the
Government of the Philippines of its power, however delegated,
to prosecute public crimes. The fact is undeniable that the
present government of the Philippines, created by the Congress
of the United States, is autonomous.
This autonomy of the Government of the Philippines reaches all
judicial actions, the case at bar being one of them; as an example
of such autonomy, this Government, the same as that of Hawaii
and Porto Rico (People of Porto Rico vs. Rosaly y Castillo [1913],
227 U.S., 270; 57 L. ed., 507; 33 Sup. Ct. Rep., 352) cannot be
sued without its consent. (Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine
Islands, 34 Phil., 311; L. S. Moon & Co. vs. Harrison, p. 27, ante.)
The doctrine, laid down in these cases, acknowledges the
prerogative of personality in the Government of the Philippines,
which, if it is sufficient to shield it from any responsibility in court
in its own name unless it consents thereto, it should be also, as
sufficiently authoritative in law, to give that government the right
to prosecute in court in its own name whomsoever violates within
its territory the penal laws in force therein.
However, limiting ourselves to the question relative to the form of
the complaint in criminal matters, it is within the power of the
Legislature to prescribe the form of the criminal complaint as long
as the constitutional provision of the accused to be informed of
the nature of the accusation is not violated.
Under the Constitution of the United States and by like
provisions in the constitutions of the various states, the
accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him . . .
It is within the power of the legislatures under such a
constitutional provision to prescribe the form of the
indictment or information, and such form may omit
averments regarded as necessary at common law. (22
Cyc., 285.)
All these considerations a priori are strengthened a posteriori by
the important reason disclosed by the following fact — that the
Congress has tacitly approved Act No. 2886. Both the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, section 86, and the Jones Law, last
paragraph of section 19, provide that all the laws enacted by the
Government of the Philippines or its Legislature shall be
forwarded to the Congress of the United States, which body
reserves the right and power to annul them. And presuming, as
legally we must, that the provisions of these laws have been
complied with, it is undisputed that the Congress of the United
States did not annul any of those acts already adverted to — Nos.
194, 440, 490 (of the Philippine Commission), and 2677, 2709
and the one now in question No. 2886 (of the present Legislature)
— all of which were amendatory of General Orders No. 58. The
Act now under discussion (No. 2886) took effect on February 24,
1920, and the criminal complaint in this case was filed on May 10,
1920. The silence of Congress regarding those laws amendatory
of the said General Order must be considered as an act of
approval.
If Congress fails to notice or take action on any territorial
legislation the reasonable inference is that it approves
such act. (26 R.C.L., 679; vide Clinton vs. Englebrcht, 13
Wall., 434; 20 [L. ed.] 659; Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S.,
549; 33 S. Ct. Rep., 585; 57 [L. ed.], 960; Nixon vs. Reid,
8 S.d., 507; 67 N.W., 57; 32 L.R.A., 315.)
Furthermore, supposing for the sake of argument, that the
mention of the People of the Philippine Islands as plaintiff in the
title of the information constitutes a vice or defect, the same is not
fatal when, as in the present case, it was not objected to in the
court below.
 An indictment must, in many states under express
statutory or constitutional provision, show by its title or by
proper recitals in the caption or elsewhere that the
prosecution is in the name and by the authority of the
state, the commonwealth, or the people of the state,
according to the practice in the particular jurisdictions; but
omissions or defects in this respect may be supplied or
cured by other parts of the records, and the omissions of
such a recital or defects therein, even when required by
the constitution or by statute, is a defect of form within a
statute requiring exceptions for defect of form to be made
before trial. (23 Cyc., 237, 238.)
We hold that the provisions of sections 2 of General Orders No.
58, as amended by Act No. 2886, do not partake of the same
character as the provisions of a constitution; that the said Act No.
2886 is valid and is not violative of any constitutional provisions
and that the court a quo did not commit any of the errors
assigned.
The sentence appealed from is hereby affirmed, the appellant
being furthermore sentenced to the accessory penalties
prescribed in article 61 of the Penal Code, and to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000 and to the payment of
the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ.,
concur.
Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur in the result.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11676 October 17, 1916
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANDRES PABLO, defendant-appellant.
Alfonso E. Mendoza for appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
At about noon of the 21st of October, 1915, Andres Pablo, a
policeman of the municipality of Balanga, went by order of his
chief to the barrio of Tuyo to raid a jueteng game which,
according to the information lodged, was being conducted in that
place; but before the said officer arrived there the players,
perhaps advised of his approach by a spy, left and ran away;
however, on his arrival at a vacant lot the defendant there found
Francisco Dato and, at a short distance away, a low table. After a
search of the premises he also found thereon
a tambiolo (receptacle) and 37 bolas (balls). Notwithstanding that
the officer had seen the men Maximo Malicsi and Antonio
Rodrigo leave the said lot, yet, as at first he had seen no material
proof that the game was being played, he refrained from arresting
them, and on leaving the place only arrested Francisco Daro, who
had remained there.
In reporting to his chief what had occurred, the policeman
presented a memorandum containing the following statement: "In
the barrio of Tuyo I raided a jueteng na bilat game, seized
a tambiolo and bolas, and saw the cabecillas Maximo MAlicsi and
Antonio Rodrigo and the gambler Francisco Dato. I saw the
two cabecillas escape."
In consequence, chief of police Jose D. Reyes, on October 22,
1915, filed a complaint in the court of justice of the peace
charging the said Rodrigo, Malicsi, and Dato with having gambled
at jueteng, in violation of municipal ordinance No. 5. As a result of
this complaint the accused were arrested, but were afterwards
admitted to bail.
At the hearing of the case Francisco Dato pleaded guilty. The
other two accused, Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo, pleaded
not guilty; therefore, during the trial the chief of police presented
the memorandum exhibited by the policeman Andres Pablo, who
testified under oath that on the date mentioned he and Tomas de
Leon went to the said barrio to raid a jueteng game, but that
before they arrived there they saw from afar that some persons
started to run toward the hills; that when witness and his
companion arrived at a vacant lot they saw Francisco Dato and a
low table there, and the table caused them to suspect that
a jueteng game was being carried on; that in fact they did find on
one side of the lot a tambiolo and 37 bolas, but that they did not
see the accused Rodrigo and Malicsi on the said lot, nor did they
see them run; and that only afterwards did the witness learn that
these latter were the cabecillas or ringleaders in
the jueteng game, from information given him by an unknown
person. In view of this testimony by the police officer who made
the arrest and of the other evidence adduced at the trial the court
acquitted the defendants Antonio Rodrigo and Maximo Malicsi
and sentenced only Francisco Dato, as a gambler.
Before the case came to trial in the justice of the peace court the
policeman Andres Pablo had an interview and conference with
the accused Malicsi and ROdrigo in the house of Valentin Sioson.
On this occasion he was instructed not to testify against Malicsi
and Rodrigo, and in fact received through Gregorio Ganzon the
sum of P5.
By reason of the foregoing and after making a preliminary
investigation the provincial fiscal, on December 1, 1915, filed an
information in the Court of First Instance of Bataan charging
Andres Pablo with the crime of perjury, under the provisions of
section 3 of Act No. 1697. The following is an extract from the
complaint:
That on or about November 6, 1915, in the municipality of
Balanga, Bataan, P.I., and within the jurisdiction of this
court, the said accused, Andres Pablo, during the hearing
in the justice of the peace court of Balanga of the criminal
cause No. 787, entitled the United States vs. Antonio
Rodrigo and Maximo Malicsi, for violation of Municipal
Ordinance No. 5 of the municipality of Balanga, did,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously affirm and swear in
legal form before the justice of the peace court as follow:
`We did not there overtake the accused Antonio Rodrigo
and Maximo Malicsi, nor did we even see them run,' the
said statement being utterly false, as the accused well
knew that it was, and material to the decision of the said
criminal cause No. 787, United States vs. Antonio Rodrigo
and Maximo Malicsi. An act committed with violation of
law.
The case came to trial and on December 28, 1915, the court
rendered judgment therein sentencing the defendant to the
penalty of two years' imprisonment, to pay a fine of P100 and, in
case of insolvency, to the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment, and to pay the costs. The defendant was also
disqualified from thereafter holding any public office and from
testifying in the courts of the Philippine Islands until the said
disqualification should be removed. From this judgment he
appealed.
Francisco Dato, on testifying as a witness, said that when the
policemen Andres Pablo and Tomas de Leon arrived at the place
where the jueteng was being played, they found the defendant
gamblers, Malicsi and Rodrigo; that, prior to the hearing of the
case in the justice of the peace court, Malicsi and Rodrigo
ordered him to call Andres Pablo, who, together with witness,
went to the house of Valentin Sioson, where they held a
conference; that witness pleaded guilty in the justice of the peace
court, in fulfillment of his part of an agreement made between
himself and his two coaccused, Malicsi and Rodrigo, who
promised him that they would support his family during the time
he might be a prisoner in jail; that Andres Pablo did not know that
they were gamblers, because he did not find them in the place
where the game was in progress, but that when witness was
being taken to the municipal building by the policemen he told
them who the gamblers were who had run away and whom
Andres Pablo could have seen.
Maximo Malicsi corroborated the foregoing testimony and further
stated that, on the arrival of the policemen who made the arrest
and while they were looking for the tambiolo, he succeeded in
escaping; that Andres Pablo had known him for a long time and
could have arrested him had he wished to do so; that prior to the
hearing he and his codefendants, ROdrigo and Dato, did in fact
meet in the house of Valentin Sioson, on which occasion they
agreed that they would give the policemen Andres Pablo P20,
provided witness and Rodrigo were excluded from the charge;
and that only P15 was delivered to the said Pablo, through
Gregorio Ganzon. This statement was corroborated by the latter,
though he said nothing about what amount of money he delivered
to the policeman Pablo.
The defendant Andres Pablo testified under oath that, on his
being asked by the justice of the peace how he could have seen
Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo, he replied that he did not
see them at the place where the game was being conducted nor
did he see them run away from there, for he only found the table,
the tambiolo, the bolas, and Francisco Dato; that he did not
surprise the game because the players ran away before he
arrived on the lot where, after fifteen minutes' search, he found
only the tambiolo and the bolas; that on arriving at the place
where the game was played, they found only Francisco Dato and
some women in the Street, and as Dato had already gone away,
witness' companion, the policeman Tomas de Leon, got on his
bicycle and went after him; and that he found the tambiolo at a
distance of about 6 meters from a low table standing on the lot.
From the facts above related, it is concluded that the defendant
Andres Pablo, who pleaded not guilty, falsely testified under oath
in the justice of the peace court of Balanga, Bataan, in saying he
had not seen the alleged gamblers Maximo Malicsi and Antonio
Rodrigo in the place where, according to the complaint filed, the
game of jueteng was being played and where the defendant and
his companion, the policeman Tomas de Leon, had found a
table, tambiolo and bolas, used in the game of jueteng, while it
was proved at the trial that he did not them and did overtake them
while they were still in the place where the game was being
played. But notwithstanding his having seen them there, upon
testifying in the cause prosecuted against these men and another
for gambling, he stated that he had not seen them there, knowing
that he was not telling the truth and was false to the oath he had
taken, and he did so willfully and deliberately on account of his
agreement with the men, Malicsi and Rodrigo, and in
consideration of a bribe of P15 which he had received in payment
for his false testimony he afterwards gave.
Francisco Dato and Gregorio Ganzon corroborated the assertion
that the policeman Andres Pablo undertook to exclude the
gamblers, Malicsi and Rodrigo, from the charge and from his
testimony in consideration for P15 which he received through
Gregorio Ganzon.
Andres Pablo was charged with the crime of perjury and was
afterwards convicted under Act No. 1697, which (according to the
principle laid down by this court in various decisions that are
already well-settled rules of law) repealed the provisions
contained in articles 318 to 324 of the Penal Code relative to false
testimony.
By the second paragraph of the final section of the last article of
the Administrative Code, or Act No. 2657, there was repealed,
among the other statutes therein mentioned, the said Act No.
1697 relating to perjury, and the repealing clause of the said
Administrative Code does not say under what other penal law in
force the crime of false testimony, at least, if not that of perjury,
shall be punished.
Under these circumstances, may the crime of perjury or of false
testimony go unpunished, and is there no penal sanction
whatever in this country for this crime? May the truth be freely
perverted in testimony given under oath and which, for the very
reason that it may save a guilty person from punishment, may
also result in the conviction and punishment of an innocent
person? If all this is not possible and is not right before the law
and good morals in a society of even mediocre culture, it must be
acknowledged that it is imperatively necessary to punish the
crime of perjury or of false testimony — a crime which can
produce incalculable and far-reaching harm to society and cause
infinite disturbance of social order.
The right of prosecution and punishment for a crime is one of the
attributes that by a natural law belongs to the sovereign power
instinctively charged by the common will of the members of
society to look after, guard and defend the interests of the
community, the individual and social rights and the liberties of
every citizen and the guaranty of the exercise of his rights.
The power to punish evildoers has never been attacked or
challenged, as the necessity for its existence has been
recognized even by the most backward peoples. At times the
criticism has been made that certain penalties are cruel,
barbarous, and atrocious; at other, that they are light and
inadequate to the nature and gravity of the offense, but the
imposition of punishment is admitted to be just by the whole
human race, and even barbarians and savages themselves, who
are ignorant of all civilization, are no exception.lawphil.net
Notwithstanding that the said Act No. 1697 (which, as interpreted
by this court in its decisions, was deemed to have repealed the
aforementioned article of the Penal Code relating to false
testimony, comprised within the term of perjury) did not expressly
repeal the said articles of the Penal Code; and as the said final
article of the Administrative Code, in totally repealing Act No.
1697, does not explicitly provide that the mentioned articles of the
Penal Code are also repealed, the will of the legislation not being
expressly and clearly stated with respect to the complete or
partial repeal of the said articles of the Penal Code, in the manner
that it has totally repealed the said Act No. 1697 relating its
perjury; and, furthermore, as it is imperative that society punish
those of its members who are guilty of perjury or false testimony,
and it cannot be conceived that these crimes should go
unpunished or be freely committed without punishment of any
kind, it must be conceded that there must be in this country some
prior, preexistent law that punishes perjury or false testimony.
There certainly are laws which deal with perjury or false
testimony, like Law 7 et seq. of Title 2, third Partida.
However, since the Penal Code went into force, the crime of false
testimony has been punished under the said articles of the said
Code, which as we have already said, have not been specifically
repealed by the said Act No. 1697, but since its enactment, have
not been applied, by the mere interpretation given to them by this
court in its decisions; yet, from the moment that Act was repealed
by the Administrative Code, the needs of society have made it
necessary that the said articles 318 to 324 should be deemed to
be in force, inasmuch as the Administrative Code, in repealing the
said Act relating to perjury, has not explicitly provided that the
said articles of the Penal Code have likewise been repealed.
This manner of understanding and construing the statutes
applicable to the crime of false testimony or perjury is in harmony
with the provision of Law 11, Title 2, Book 3, of the Novisima
Recopilacion which says::
All the laws of the kingdom, not expressly repealed by
other subsequent laws, must be literally obeyed and the
excuse that they are not in use cannot avail; for the
Catholic kings and their successors so ordered in
numerous laws, and so also have I ordered on different
 occasions, and even though they were repealed, it is seen
that they have been revived by the decree which I issued
in conformity with them although they were not expressly
designated. The council will be informed thereof and will
take account of the importance of the matter.
It is, then, assumed that the said articles of the Penal Code are in
force and are properly applicable to crimes of false testimony.
Therefore, in consideration of the fact that in the case at bar the
evidence shows it to have been duly proven that the defendant,
Andres Pablo, in testifying in the cause prosecuted for gambling
at jueteng, perverted the truth, for the purpose of favoring the
alleged gamblers, Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo, with the
aggravating circumstance of the crime being committed through
bribery, for it was also proved that the defendant Pablo received
P15 in order that he should make no mention of the said two
gamblers in his sworn testimony, whereby he knowingly perverted
the truth, we hold that, in the commission of the crime of false
testimony, there concurred the aggravating circumstance of price
or reward, No. 3 of article 10 of the Code, with no mitigating
circumstance to offset the effects of the said aggravating one;
wherefore the defendant has incurred the maximum period of the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree to prision
correccional in its medium degree, and a fine.
For the foregoing reasons, we hereby reverse the judgment
appealed from and sentence Andres Pablo to the penalty of two
years four months and one day of prision correccional, to pay a
fine of 1,000 pesetas, and, in case of insolvency, to suffer the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, which shall not exceed
one-third of the principal penalty. He shall also pay the costs of
both instances. So ordered.
Johnson, Carson, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Moreland, J., concurs in the result .
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 96132 June 26, 1992
ORIEL MAGNO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court, from the decision* of the respondent Court of Appeals
which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 104 finding the accused petitioner, guilty of
violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, in Criminal Cases Q-35693
to 35696 before they were elevated on appeal to the respondent
appellate Court under CA-G.R. CR No. 04889.
The antecedent facts and circumstances of the four (4) counts of
the offense charged, have been clearly illustrated, in the
Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General as official counsel
for the public respondent, thus:
Petitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair shop
sometime in April 1983, but a did not have complete equipment
that could make his venture workable. He also had another
problem, and that while he was going into this entrepreneurship,
he lacked funds with which to purchase the necessary equipment
to make such business operational. Thus, petitioner, representing
Ultra Sources International Corporation, approached Corazon
Teng, (private complainant) Vice President of Mancor Industries
(hereinafter referred to as Mancor) for his needed car repair
service equipment of which Mancor was a distributor, (Rollo, pp.
40-41)
Having been approached by petitioner on his predicament, who
fully bared that he had no sufficient funds to buy the equipment
needed, the former (Corazon Teng) referred Magno to LS
Finance and Management Corporation (LB Finance for brevity)
advising its Vice-President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing
and able to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance
could accommodate petitioner and provide him credit facilities.
(Ibid., P. 41)
The arrangement went through on condition that petitioner has to
put up a warranty deposit equivalent to thirtyper centum (30%) of
the total value of the pieces of equipment to be purchased,
amounting to P29,790.00. Since petitioner could not come up with
such amount, he requested Joey Gomez on a personal level to
look for a third party who could lend him the equivalent amount of
the warranty deposit, however, unknown to petitioner, it was
Corazon Teng who advanced the deposit in question, on
condition that the same would be paid as a short term loan at 3%
interest (Ibid., P. 41)
The specific provision in the Leasing Agreement, reads:
1.1. WARRANTY DEPOSIT — Before or upon
delivery of each item of Equipment, the Lessee
shall deposit with the Lessor such sum or sums
specified in Schedule A to serve as security for
the faithful performance of its obligations.
This deposit shall be refunded to the Lessee upon
the satisfactory completion of the entire period of
Lease, subject to the conditions of clause 1.12 of
this Article. (Ibid., p. 17)
As part of the arrangement, petitioner and LS Finance entered
into a leasing agreement whereby LS Finance would lease the
garage equipments and petitioner would pay the corresponding
rent with the option to buy the same. After the documentation was
completed, the equipment were delivered to petitioner who in turn
issued a postdated check and gave it to Joey Gomez who,
unknown to the petitioner, delivered the same to Corazon Teng.
When the check matured, Petitioner requested through Joey
Gomez not to deposit the check as he (Magno) was no longer
banking with Pacific Bank.
To replace the first check issued, petitioner issued another set of
six (6) postdated checks. Two (2) checks dated July 29, 1983
were deposited and cleared while the four (4) others, which were
the subject of the four counts of the aforestated charges subject
of the petition, were held momentarily by Corazon Teng, on the
request of Magno as they were not covered with sufficient funds.
These checks were a) Piso Bank Check Nos. 006858, dated
August 15, 1983, 006859 dated August 28, 1983 and 006860
dated September 15, 1983, all in the amount of P5,038.43 and
No. 006861 dated September 28, 1983, in the amount of
P10,076.87. (Ibid., pp. 42 & 43).
Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the monthly
rentals, thus it pulled out the garage equipments. It was then on
this occasion that petitioner became aware that Corazon Teng
was the one who advanced the warranty deposit. Petitioner with
his wife went to see Corazon Teng and promised to pay the latter
but the payment never came and when the four (4) checks were
deposited they were returned for the reason "account closed."
(Ibid., p. 43)
After joint trial before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 104, the accused-petitioner was convicted for violations of
BP Blg. 22 on the four (4) cases, as follows:
 . . . finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of violations of
B.P. Blg. 22 and sentencing the accused to
imprisonment for one year in each Criminal Case
Nos. Q-35693, Q-35695 and Q-35696 and to pay
to complainant the respective amounts reflected in
subject checks. (Ibid., pp. 25, 27)
Reviewing the above and the affirmation of the above-stated
decision of the court a quo, this Court is intrigued about the
outcome of the checks subject of the cases which were intended
by the parties, the petitioner on the one hand and the private
complainant on the other, to cover the "warranty deposit"
equivalent to the 30% requirement of the financing company.
Corazon Teng is one of the officers of Mancor, the supplier of the
equipment subject of the Leasing Agreement subject of the high
financing scheme undertaken by the petitioner as lessee of the
repair service equipment, which was arranged at the instance of
Mrs. Teng from the very beginning of the transaction.
By the nature of the "warranty deposit" amounting to P29,790.00
corresponding to 30% of the "purchase/lease" value of the
equipments subject of the transaction, it is obvious that the "cash
out" made by Mrs. Teng was not used by petitioner who was just
paying rentals for the equipment. It would have been different if
petitioner opted to purchase the pieces of equipment on or about
the termination of the lease-purchase agreement in which case
he had to pay the additional amount of the warranty deposit which
should have formed part of the purchase price. As the transaction
did not ripen into a purchase, but remained a lease with rentals
being paid for the loaned equipment, which were pulled out by the
Lessor (Mancor) when the petitioner failed to continue paying
possibly due to economic constraints or business failure, then it is
lawful and just that the warranty deposit should not be charged
against the petitioner.
To charge the petitioner for the refund of a "warranty deposit"
which he did not withdraw as it was not his own account, it having
remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust
"debt", to say the least, since petitioner did not receive the
amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the
safekeeping of the financing company, which is managed,
supervised and operated by the corporation officials and
employees of LS Finance. Petitioner did not even know that the
checks he issued were turned over by Joey Gomez to Mrs. Teng,
whose operation was kept from his knowledge on her instruction.
This fact alone evoke suspicion that the transaction is irregular
and immoral per se, hence, she specifically requested Gomez not
to divulge the source of the "warranty deposit".
It is intriguing to realize that Mrs. Teng did not want the petitioner
to know that it was she who "accommodated" petitioner's request
for Joey Gomez, to source out the needed funds for the "warranty
deposit". Thus it unfolds the kind of transaction that is shrouded
with mystery, gimmickry and doubtful legality. It is in simple
language, a scheme whereby Mrs. Teng as the supplier of the
equipment in the name of her corporation, Mancor, would be able
to "sell or lease" its goods as in this case, and at the same time,
privately financing those who desperately need petty
accommodations as this one. This modus operandi has in so
many instances victimized unsuspecting businessmen, who
likewise need protection from the law, by availing of the
deceptively called "warranty deposit" not realizing that they also
fall prey to leasing equipment under the guise of a lease-
purchase agreement when it is a scheme designed to skim off
business clients.
This maneuvering has serious implications especially with respect
to the threat of the penal sanction of the law in issue, as in this
case. And, with a willing court system to apply the full harshness
of the special law in question, using the "mala prohibitia" doctrine,
the noble objective of the law is tainted with materialism and
opportunism in the highest, degree.
This angle is bolstered by the fact that since the petitioner or
lessee referred to above in the lease agreement knew that the
amount of P29,790.00 subject of the cases, were mere
accommodation-arrangements with somebody thru Joey Gomez,
petitioner did not even attempt to secure the refund of said
amount from LS Finance, notwithstanding the agreement
provision to the contrary. To argue that after the termination of the
lease agreement, the warranty deposit should be refundable in
full to Mrs. Teng by petitioner when he did not cash out the
"warranty deposit" for his official or personal use, is to stretch the
nicety of the alleged law (B.P. No, 22) violated.
For all intents and purposes, the law was devised to safeguard
the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public
checking account user. It did not intend to shelter or favor nor
encourage users of the system to enrich themselves through
manipulations and circumvention of the noble purpose and
objective of the law. Least should it be used also as a means of
jeopardizing honest-to-goodness transactions with some color of
"get-rich" scheme to the prejudice of well-meaning businessmen
who are the pillars of society.
Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law,
"affirms that the primary function of punishment is the protective
(sic) of society against actual and potential wrongdoers." It is not
clear whether petitioner could be considered as having actually
committed the wrong sought to be punished in the offense
charged, but on the other hand, it can be safely said that the
actuations of Mrs. Carolina Teng amount to that of potential
wrongdoers whose operations should also be clipped at some
point in time in order that the unwary public will not be failing prey
to such a vicious transaction (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code,
1987 Edition, Vol. I, P. 11)
Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that
"criminal law is founded upon that moral disapprobation . . . of
actions which are immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or
dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence
and progress of human society. This disappropriation is inevitable
to the extent that morality is generally founded and built upon a
certain concurrence in the moral opinions of all. . . . That which
we call punishment is only an external means of emphasizing
moral disapprobation the method of punishment is in reality the
amount of punishment," (Ibid., P. 11, citing People v. Roldan
Zaballero, CA 54 O.G. 6904, Note also Justice Pablo's view in
People v. Piosca and Peremne, 86 Phil. 31).
Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the
punishment imposed upon the accused, the objective of
retribution of a wronged society, should be directed against the
"actual and potential wrongdoers." In the instant case, there is no
doubt that petitioner's four (4) checks were used to collateralize
an accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of an actual
"account or credit for value" as this was absent, and therefore
petitioner should not be punished for mere issuance of the checks
in question. Following the aforecited theory, in petitioner's stead
the "potential wrongdoer", whose operation could be a menace to
society, should not be glorified by convicting the petitioner.
While in case of doubt, the case should have been resolved in
favor of the accused, however, by the open admission of the
appellate court below, oven when the ultimate beneficiary of the
"warranty deposit" is of doubtful certainty, the accused was
convicted, as shown below:
Nor do We see any merit in appellant's claim that
the obligation of the accused to complainant had
been extinguished by the termination of the
leasing agreement — by the terms of which the
warranty deposit advanced by complainant was
refundable to the accused as lessee — and that
as the lessor L.S. Finance neither made any
liquidation of said amount nor returned the same
to the accused, it may he assumed that the
amount was already returned to the complainant.
For these allegations, even if true, do not change
the fact, admitted by appellant and established by
the evidence, that the four checks were originally
 issued on account or for value. And as We have
already observed, in order that there may be a
conviction under the from paragraph of Section 2
of B.P. Blg 22 — with respect to the element of
said offense that the check should have been
made and issued on account or for value — it is
sufficient, all the other elements of the offense
being present, that the check must have been
drawn and issued in payment of an obligation.
Moreover, even granting, arguendo, that the
extinguishment, after the issuance of the checks,
of the obligation in consideration of which the
checks were issued, would have resulted in
placing the case at bar beyond the purview of the
prohibition in Section 1 of BP Blg. 22, there is no
satisfactory proof that there was such an
extinguishment in the present case. Appellee aptly
points out that appellant had not adduced any
direct evidence to prove that the amount
advanced by the complainant to cover the
warranty deposit must already have been returned
to her. (Rollo, p. 30)
It is indubitable that the respondent Court of Appeals even
disregarded the cardinal rule that the accused is presumed
innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On the
contrary, the same court even expected the petitioner-appellant to
adduce evidence to show that he was not guilty of the crime
charged. But how can be produce documents showing that the
warranty deposit has already been taken back by Mrs. Teng
when she is an officer of Mancor which has interest in the
transaction, besides being personally interested in the profit of
her side-line. Thus, even if she may have gotten back the value of
the accommodation, she would still pursue collecting from the
petitioner since she had in her possession the checks that
"bounced".
That the court a quo merely relied on the law, without looking into
the real nature of the warranty deposit is evident from the
following pronouncement:
And the trail court concluded that there is no
question that the accused violated BP Blg. 22,
which is a special statutory law, violations of
which are mala prohibita. The court relied on the
rule that in cases of mala prohibita, the only
inquiry is whether or not the law had been
violated, proof of criminal intent not being
necessary for the conviction of the accused, the
acts being prohibited for reasons of public policy
and the defenses of good faith and absence of
criminal intent being unavailing in prosecutions for
said offenses." (Ibid., p. 26)
The crux of the matter rests upon the reason for the drawing of
the postdated checks by the petitioner, i.e.,whether they were
drawn or issued "to apply on account or for value", as required
under Section 1 of B.P. Blg, 22. When viewed against the
following definitions of the catch-terms "warranty" and "deposit",
for which the postdated checks were issued or drawn, all the
more, the alleged crime could not have been committed by
petitioner:
a) Warranty — A promise that a proposition of fact
is true. A promise that certain facts are truly as
they are represented to be and that they will
remain so: . . . (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth
Edition, (1979) p. 1423)
A cross-reference to the following term shows:
Fitness for Particular Purpose: —
 Where the seller at the time of contracting has
reason to know any particular purpose for which
the goods are required and that the buyer is
relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or
furnish suitable goods, there is, unless excluded
or modified, an implied warranty that the goods
shall be fit for such purpose, (Ibid., p. 573)
b) Deposit: — Money lodged with a person as an
earnest or security for the performance of some
contract, to be forfeited if the depositor fails in his
undertaking. It may be deemed to be part
payment and to that extent may constitute the
purchaser the actual owner of the estate.
To commit to custody, or to lay down; to place; to
put. To lodge for safe- keeping or as a pledge to
intrust to the care of another.
The act of placing money in the custody of a bank
or banker, for safety or convenience, to be
withdrawn at the will of the depositor or under
rules and regulations agreed on. Also, the money
so deposited, or the credit which the depositor
receives for it. Deposit, according to its commonly
accepted and generally understood among
bankers and by the public, includes not only
deposits payable on demand and for which
certificates, whether interest-bearing or not, may
be issued, payable on demand, or on certain
notice or at a fixed future time. (Ibid., pp. 394-395)
Furthermore, the element of "knowing at the time of issue that he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which
check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for
the same reason . . . is inversely applied in this case. From the
very beginning, petitioner never hid the fact that he did not have
the funds with which to put up the warranty deposit and as a
matter of fact, he openly intimated this to the vital conduit of the
transaction, Joey Gomez, to whom petitioner was introduced by
Mrs. Teng. It would have been different if this predicament was
not communicated to all the parties he dealt with regarding the
lease agreement the financing of which was covered by L.S.
Finance Management.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the
accused-petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J.,, concurs in the result.
Nocon, J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 167011 April 30, 2008
SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ and ERLINDA R.
ROMUALDEZ, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DENNIS
GARAY, respondents.
 DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This treats of the Petition for Review on Certiorari with a prayer
for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction filed by petitioners Spouses Carlos S.
Romualdez and Erlinda R. Romualdez seeking to annul and set
aside the Resolutions, dated 11 June 20041 and 27 January
20052 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in E.O. Case
No. 2000-36. In the Resolution of 11 June 2004, the
COMELEC En Banc directed the Law Department to file the
appropriate Information with the proper court against petitioners
Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez for violation of
Section 10(g) and (j)3 in relation to Section 45(j)4 of Republic Act
No. 8189, otherwise known as The Voter’s Registration Act of
1996.5 Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration thereon was
denied.
The factual antecedents leading to the instant Petition are
presented hereunder:
On 12 July 2000, private respondent Dennis Garay, along with
Angelino Apostol6 filed a Complaint-Affidavit7 with the COMELEC
thru the Office of the Election Officer in Burauen, Leyte, charging
petitioners with violation of Section 261(y)(2)8 and Section
261(y)(5)9 of the Omnibus Election Code, similarly referred to as
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881; and Section 1210 of Republic Act No.
8189.
Private respondent deposed, inter alia, that: petitioners are of
legal ages and residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street,
Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City; on 9 May 2000 and 11
May 2000, petitioners Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda R.
Romualdez, applied for registration as new voters with the Office
of the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte, as evidenced by Voter
Registration Record Nos. 42454095 and 07902952, respectively;
in their sworn applications, petitioners made false and untruthful
representations in violation of Section 1011 of Republic Act Nos.
8189, by indicating therein that they are residents of 935 San
Jose Street, Burauen, Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they were
and still are residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street,
Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City, and registered voters of
Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City,
Precinct No. 4419-A, as evidenced by Voter Registration Record
Nos. 26195824 and 26195823; and that petitioners, knowing fully
well said truth, intentionally and willfully, did not fill the blank
spaces in said applications corresponding to the length of time
which they have resided in Burauen, Leyte. In fine, private
respondent charged petitioners, to wit:
Respondent-spouses, Carlos Sison Romualdez and
Erlinda Reyes Romualdez committed and consummated
election offenses in violation of our election laws,
specifically, Sec. 261, paragraph (y), subparagraph (2),
for knowingly making any false or untruthful statements
relative to any data or information required in the
application for registration, and of Sec. 261, paragraph
(y), subparagraph (5), committed by any person who,
being a registered voter, registers anew without filing an
application for cancellation of his previous registration,
both of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881), and of
Sec. 12, RA 8189 (Voter Registration Act) for failure to
apply for transfer of registration records due to change of
residence to another city or municipality."12
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary
investigation be conducted by the COMELEC, and if the evidence
so warrants, the corresponding Information against petitioners be
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the prosecution of
the same.
Petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to
Dismiss13 dated 2 April 2001. They contended therein that they
did not make any false or untruthful statements in their application
for registration. They avowed that they intended to reside in
Burauen, Leyte, since the year 1989. On 9 May 2000, they took
actual residence in Burauen, Leyte, by leasing for five (5) years,
the house of Juanito and Fe Renomeron at No. 935, San Jose
Street in Burauen, Leyte. On even date, the Barangay District III
Council of Burauen passed a Resolution of Welcome, expressing
therein its gratitude and appreciation to petitioner Carlos S.
Romualdez for choosing the Barangay as his official residence.14
On 28 November 2003, Atty. Maria Norina S. Tangaro-Casingal,
COMELEC Investigating Officer, issued a Resolution,
recommending to the COMELEC Law Department (Investigation
and Prosecution Division), the filing of the appropriate Information
against petitioners, disposing, thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Law Department
(Investigation and Prosecution Division), RECOMMENDS
to file the necessary information against Carlos Sison
Romualdez before the proper Regional Trial Court for
violation of Section 10 (g) and (j) in relation to Section 45
(j) of Republic Act 8189 and to authorize the Director IV of
the Law Department to designate a Comelec Prosecutor
to handle the prosecution of the case with the duty to
submit periodic report after every hearing of the case.15
On 11 June 2004, the COMELEC En Banc found no reason to
depart from the recommendatory Resolution of 28 November
2003, and ordered, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Law
Department is hereby directed to file the appropriate
information with the proper court against respondents
CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ AND ERLINDA ROMUALDEZ
for violation of Section 10 (g) and (j) in relation to Section
45 (j) of the Republic Act No. 8189.16
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon.
Acting on the Motion, the COMELEC found no cogent reason to
disturb the assailed En Banc Resolution of 11 June
2004,17 rationalizing, thus:
However, perusal of the records reveal (sic) that the
arguments and issues raised in the Motion for
Reconsideration are merely a rehash of the arguments
advanced by the Respondents in [their] Memorandum
received by the Law Department on 17 April 2001, the
same [w]as already considered by the Investigating
Officer and was discussed in her recommendation which
eventually was made as the basis for the En Banc’s
resolution.
As aptly observed by the Investigating Officer, the filing of
request for the cancellation and transfer of Voting
Registration Record does not automatically cancel the
registration records. The fact remains that at the time of
application for registration as new voter of the herein
Respondents on May 9 and 11, 2001 in the Office of
Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte their registration in
Barangay 4419-A, Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame
Quezon City was still valid and subsisting.18
On 12 January 2006, Alioden D. Dalaig, Director IV, Law
Department of the COMELEC filed with the RTC, Burauen, Leyte,
separate Informations against petitioner Carlos S.
Romualdez19 for violation of Section 10(g), in relation to Section
45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, and against petitioner Erlinda R.
Romualdez20 for violation of Section 10(g), in relation to Section
45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, subsequently docketed as Crim.
Case No. BN-06-03-4185 and Crim. Case No. BN-06-03-4183,
respectively. Moreover, separate Informations for violation of
Section 10(j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189
were filed against petitioners.21
Hence, petitioners come to us via the instant Petition, submitting
the following arguments:
 I Petitioners contend that the election offenses for which they are
RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION; and
II
COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT PREMISED ITS RESOLUTION ON A
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND FAILED TO
CONSIDER CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS THAT
WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION.22
On 4 May 2006, petitioners filed a Motion Reiterating Prayer for
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to Cite for Indirect
Contempt,23 alleging that two separate Informations, both dated
12 January 2006, were filed with the RTC by the COMELEC
against petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez for violation of Section
10(j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, in
Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9184; and for violation of Section
10(g), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, in
Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9185. Similarly, the Motion alleged
that the COMELEC filed with the RTC, two separate Informations,
both dated 12 January 2006, against petitioner Erlinda R.
Romualdez, charging her with the same offenses as those
charged against petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez, and thereafter,
docketed as Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9182, and No. BN-06-
03-9183.
On 20 June 2006, this Court issued a Resolution24 denying for
lack of merit petitioners’ Motion Reiterating Prayer for Issuance of
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to Cite for Indirect Contempt.
We shall now resolve, in seriatim, the arguments raised by
petitioners.
charged by private respondent are entirely different from those
which they stand to be accused of before the RTC by the
COMELEC. According to petitioners, private respondent’s
complaint charged them for allegedly violating, to wit: 1) Section
261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code,
and 2) Section 12 of the Voter’s Registration Act; however, the
COMELEC En Banc directed in the assailed Resolutions, that
they be charged for violations of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation
to Section 45(j) of the Voter’s Registration Act. Essentially,
petitioners are of the view that they were not accorded due
process of law. Specifically, their right to refute or submit
documentary evidence against the new charges which
COMELEC ordered to be filed against them. Moreover,
petitioners insist that Section 45(j) of the Voter’s Registration Act
is vague as it does not refer to a definite provision of the law, the
violation of which would constitute an election offense; hence, it
runs contrary to Section 14(1)25 and Section 14(2),26 Article III of
the 1987 Constitution.
We are not persuaded.
First. The Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the
COMELEC is couched in a language which embraces the
allegations necessary to support the charge for violation of
Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act
No. 8189.
A reading of the relevant laws is in order, thus:
Section 10(g) and Section 10(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, provide
as follows:
SEC. 10 – Registration of Voters. - A qualified voter shall
be registered in the permanent list of voters in a precinct
of the city or municipality wherein he resides to be able to
vote in any election. To register as a voter, he shall
 personally accomplish an application form for registration
as prescribed by the Commission in three (3) copies
before the Election Officer on any date during office hours
after having acquired the qualifications of a voter.
The application shall contain the following data:
xxxx
(g) Periods of residence in the Philippines and in the
place of registration;
xxxx
(j) A statement that the application is not a registered
voter of any precinct;
The application for registration shall contain three (3)
specimen signatures of the applicant, clear and legible
rolled prints of his left and right thumbprints, with four
identification size copies of his latest photograph,
attached thereto, to be taken at the expense of the
Commission.
Before the applicant accomplishes his application for
registration, the Election Officer shall inform him of the
qualifications and disqualifications prescribed by law for a
voter, and thereafter, see to it that the accomplished
application contains all the data therein required and that
the applicant’s specimen signatures, fingerprints, and
photographs are properly affixed in all copies of the
voter’s application.
Moreover, Section 45(j) of the same Act, recites, thus:
SEC. 45. Election Offense. – The following shall be
considered election offenses under this Act:
xxxx
(j) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act.
Significantly, the allegations in the Complaint-Affidavit which was
filed with the Law Department of the COMELEC, support the
charge directed by the COMELEC En Banc to be filed against
petitioners with the RTC. Even a mere perusal of the Complaint-
Affidavit would readily show that Section 10 of Republic Act No.
8189 was specifically mentioned therein. On the matter of the
acts covered by Section 10(g) and (j), the Complaint-Affidavit,
spells out the following allegations, to wit:
5. Respondent-spouses made false and untruthful
representations in their applications (Annexes "B" and
"C") in violation of the requirements of Section 10, RA
8189 (The Voter’s Registration Act):
5.1 Respondent-spouses, in their sworn
applications (Annexes "B" and "C", claimed to be
residents of 935 San Jose [S]treet, Burauen,
Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they were and still
are residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa
[S]treet, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City
and registered voters of Barangay Bagong
Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City,
Precinct No. 4419-A, a copy of the Certification
issued by Hon. Emmanuel V. Gozon, Punong
Barangay, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon
City is hereto attached and made an integral part
hereof, as Annex "D";
5.2 Respondent-spouses knowing fully well said
truth, intentionally and willfully, did not fill the
blank spaces in their applications (Annexes "B"
and "C") corresponding to the length of time they
have resided in Burauen, Leyte;
6. Respondent-spouses, in (sic) all intents and purposes,
were and still are residents and registered voters of
Quezon City, as evidenced by Voter Registration Record
Nos. 26195824 and 26195823, respectively; photocopies
of which are hereto attached as Annexes "E" and "F"[.]
Likewise, attached is a "Certification" (Annex "G") of Ms.
Evelyn B. Bautista, Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the
Election Officer, Fourth District, Quezon City, dated May
31, 2000, together with a certified copy of the computer
print-out of the list of voters of Precinct No. 4419-A
(Annex "G-1" ) containing the names of voters Carlos
Romualdez and Erlinda Reyes Romualdez. The
Certification reads as follows:
"THIS IS TO CERTIFY that as per office record
MR. CARLOS ROMUALDEZ and MS. ERLINDA
REYES ROMUALDEZ are registered voters of
Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV,
Quezon City, Precinct Number 4419A with voters
affidavit serial nos. 26195824 and 26195823,
respectively.
This certification is issued for whatever legal
purpose it may serve."
7. Respondent-spouses, registered as new voters of the
Municipality of Burauen, Leyte, [in spite of] the fact that
they were and still are, registered voters of Quezon City
as early as June 22, 1997;
7.1 That, Double Registration is an election
offense.
A person qualified as a voter is only allowed to
register once.
If a person registers anew as a voter in spite of a
subsisting registration, the new application for
registration will be disapproved. The registrant is
also liable not only for an election offense of
double registration, but also for another election
offense of knowingly making any false or
untruthful statement relative to any data or
information required in the application for
registration.
In fact, when a person applies for registration as a
voter, he or she fills up a Voter Registration
Record form in his or her own handwriting, which
contains a Certification which reads:
"I do solemnly swear that the above statements
regarding my person are true and correct; that I
possess all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications of a voter; that the thumbprints,
specimen signatures and photographs appearing
herein are mine; and that I am not registered as a
voter in any other precinct."27
Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on
the claim that the election offenses charged against them by
private respondent are entirely different from those for which they
stand to be accused of before the RTC, as charged by the
COMELEC. In the first place, there appears to be no incongruity
between the charges as contained in the Complaint-Affidavit and
the Informations filed before the RTC, notwithstanding the
denomination by private respondent of the alleged violations to be
covered by Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the
Omnibus Election Code and Section 12 of Republic Act No. 8189.
Evidently, the Informations directed to be filed by the COMELEC
against petitioners, and which were, in fact, filed with the RTC,
were based on the same set of facts as originally alleged in the
private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit.
Petitioners buttress their claim of lack of due process by relying
on the case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary.28Citing Lacson,
petitioners argue that the real nature of the criminal charge is
determined by the actual recital of facts in the Complaint or
Information; and that the object of such written accusations was
to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge
against him, as will enable him to make his defense. Let it be said
that, in Lacson, this court resolved the issue of whether under the
allegations in the subject Informations therein, it is the
Sandiganbayan or the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction
over the multiple murder case against therein petitioner and
intervenors. In Lacson, we underscored the elementary rule that
the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the
Complaint or Information, and not by the evidence presented by
the parties at the trial.29 Indeed, in Lacson, we articulated that the
real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the
caption or preamble of the Information nor from the specification
of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the
Complaint or Information.30
Petitioners’ reliance on Lacson, however, does not support their
claim of lack of due process because, as we have said, the
charges contained in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and
the charges as directed by the COMELEC to be filed are based
on the same set of facts. In fact, the nature of the criminal
charges in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and that of
the charges contained in the Informations filed with the RTC,
pursuant to the COMELEC Resolution En Banc are the same,
such that, petitioners cannot claim that they were not able to
refute or submit documentary evidence against the charges that
the COMELEC filed with the RTC. Petitioners were afforded due
process because they were granted the opportunity to refute the
allegations in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit. On 2 April
2001, in opposition to the Complaint-Affidavit, petitioners filed a
Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss with the Law
Department of the COMELEC. They similarly filed a
Memorandum before the said body. Finding that due process was
not dispensed with under the circumstances in the case at bar,
we agree with the stance of the Office of the Solicitor General that
petitioners were reasonably apprised of the nature and
description of the charges against them. It likewise bears
stressing that preliminary investigations were conducted whereby
petitioners were informed of the complaint and of the evidence
submitted against them. They were given the opportunity to
adduce controverting evidence for their defense. In all these
stages, petitioners actively participated.
The instant case calls to our minds Orquinaza v.
People,31 wherein the concerned police officer therein designated
the offense charged as sexual harassment; but, the prosecutor
found that there was no transgression of the anti-sexual
harassment law, and instead, filed an Information charging
therein petitioner with acts of lasciviousness. On a claim that
there was deprivation of due process, therein petitioner argued
that the Information for acts of lasciviousness was void as the
preliminary investigation conducted was for sexual harassment.
The court held that the designation by the police officer of the
offense is not conclusive as it is within the competence of the
prosecutor to assess the evidence submitted and determine
therefrom the appropriate offense to be charged.
Accordingly, the court pronounced that the complaint contained
all the allegations to support the charge of acts of lasciviousness
under the Revised Penal Code; hence, the conduct of another
preliminary investigation for the offense of acts of lasciviousness
would be a futile exercise because the complainant would only be
presenting the same facts and evidence which have already been
studied by the prosecutor.32 The court frowns upon such
superfluity which only serves to delay the prosecution and
disposition of the criminal complaint.33
Second. Petitioners would have this court declare Section 45(j) of
Republic Act No. 8189 vague, on the ground that it contravenes
the fair notice requirement of the 1987 Constitution, in particular,
Section 14(1) and Section 14(2), Article III of thereof. Petitioners
submit that Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 makes no
reference to a definite provision of the law, the violation of which
would constitute an election offense.
We are not convinced.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid
if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application.34 However, this Court has
imposed certain limitations by which a criminal statute, as in the
challenged law at bar, may be scrutinized. This Court has
declared that facial invalidation35 or an "on-its-face" invalidation of
criminal statutes is not appropriate.36 We have so enunciated in
no uncertain terms in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 37 thus:
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and
vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on
their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are
called in American law, First Amendment cases. They
cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a
criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the
established rule is that 'one to whom application of a
statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the
statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken
as applying to other persons or other situations in which
its application might be unconstitutional.' As has been
pointed out, 'vagueness challenges in the First
Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically
produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as
a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as
applied' to a particular defendant.'" (underscoring
supplied)
"To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law
unconstitutional on the ground of ambiguity." While
mentioned in passing in some cases, the void-for-
vagueness concept has yet to find direct application in our
jurisdiction. In Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, the Bookkeeping
Act was found unconstitutional because it violated the
equal protection clause, not because it was
vague. Adiong v. Comelec decreed as void a mere
Comelec Resolution, not a statute. Finally, Santiago v.
Comelec held that a portion of RA 6735 was
unconstitutional because of undue delegation of
legislative powers, not because of vagueness.
Indeed, an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal
statutes would result in a mass acquittal of parties
whose cases may not have even reached the courts.
Such invalidation would constitute a departure from
the usual requirement of "actual case and
controversy" and permit decisions to be made in a
sterile abstract context having no factual
concreteness. In Younger v. Harris, this evil was aptly
pointed out by the U.S. Supreme Court in these words:
"[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its
deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies
before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an
appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the
relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the
legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the
speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-
line analysis of detailed statutes, x x x ordinarily results in
a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding
constitutional questions, whichever way they might be
decided."
For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face
invalidation of statutes, described as a "manifestly
strong medicine" to be employed "sparingly and only
as a last resort." In determining the constitutionality
of a statute, therefore, its provisions that have
allegedly been violated must be examined in the light
of the conduct with which the defendant has been
charged. (Emphasis supplied.)
At the outset, we declare that under these terms, the opinions of
the dissent which seek to bring to the fore the purported
ambiguities of a long list of provisions in Republic Act No. 8189
can be deemed as a facial challenge. An appropriate "as applied"
challenge in the instant Petition should be limited only to Section
45 (j) in relation to Sections 10 (g) and (j) of Republic Act No.
8189—the provisions upon which petitioners are charged. An
expanded examination of the law covering provisions which are
alien to petitioners’ case would be antagonistic to the rudiment
that for judicial review to be exercised, there must be an existing
case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination,
and not conjectural or anticipatory.
We further quote the relevant ruling in David v. Arroyo on the
proscription anent a facial challenge:38
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for
testing the validity of a law that "reflects legitimate state
interest in maintaining comprehensive control over
harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct."
Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion
are considered "harmful" and "constitutionally unprotected
conduct." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, it was held:
It remains a matter of no little difficulty to determine when
a law may properly be held void on its face and when
such summary action is inappropriate. But the plain
import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial
overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our
traditional rules of practice and that its function, a
limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise
unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to
sanction moves from pure speech toward
conduct and that conduct even if expressive falls
within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that
reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining
comprehensive controls over harmful,
constitutionally unprotected conduct.
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in
cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to
regulate only "spoken words" and again, that
"overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws
that are sought to be applied to protected conduct."
Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017
pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which
is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as
"manifestly strong medicine," to be used "sparingly
and only as a last resort," and is "generally
disfavored;" The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in
the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication
is the principle that a person to whom a law may be
applied will not be heard to challenge a law on the ground
that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to
others, i.e., in other situations not before the Court. A
writer and scholar in Constitutional Law explains further:
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth
technique is that it marks an exception to some of the
usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a
particular litigant claims that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the
litigant prevails, the courts carve away the
unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its
improper applications on a case to case basis.
Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to
raise the rights of third parties and can only assert
their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those
rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the
rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the
entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so
that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a
properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The
factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal
adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;"
deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties
not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes
that an overbroad laws "very existence may cause others
not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is
designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of
those third parties.
In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth
doctrine will require the Court to examine PP 1017 and
pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual
operation to petitioners, but on the assumption or
prediction that its very existence may cause others not
before the Court to refrain from constitutionally protected
speech or expression.
Xxx xxx xxx
And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth
is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since
the challenger must establish that there can be no
instance when the assailed law may be valid. Here,
petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this
situation exists.
Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on
the ground of vagueness. This, too, is unwarranted.
Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the "void for
vagueness doctrine" which holds that "a law is facially
invalid if men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application." It is subject to the same principles
governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an
analytical tool for testing "on their faces" statutes in free
speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a
litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it
is vague in all its possible applications.
Be that as it may, the test in determining whether a criminal
statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and practice.39 This Court
has similarly stressed that the vagueness doctrine merely
requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be
upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.40
As structured, Section 4541 of Republic Act No. 8189 makes a
recital of election offenses under the same Act. Section 45(j) is,
without doubt, crystal in its specification that a violation of any of
the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189 is an election offense.
The language of Section 45(j) is precise. The challenged
provision renders itself to no other interpretation. A reading of the
challenged provision involves no guesswork. We do not see
herein an uncertainty that makes the same vague.
Notably, herein petitioners do not cite a word in the challenged
provision, the import or meaning of which they do not understand.
This is in stark contrast to the case of Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan42 where therein petitioner sought for statutory
definition of particular words in the challenged statute. Even then,
the Court in Estrada rejected the argument.
This Court reasoned:
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A
statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely
because general terms are used therein, or because
of the employment of terms without defining them;
much less do we have to define every word we use.
Besides, there is no positive constitutional or
statutory command requiring the legislature to define
each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not
 restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its
inability to so define the words employed in a statute will
not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the
law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can
be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly
expressed in the Plunder Law."
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal
hermeneutics that words of a statute will be
interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that
the legislature intended a technical or special legal
meaning to those words. The intention of the lawmakers
who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and
lexicographers to use statutory phraseology in such a
manner is always presumed.
Perforce, this Court has underlined that an act will not be held
invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its
wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because
of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the
details in advance as in all other statutes.43
The evident intent of the legislature in including in the catena of
election offenses the violation of any of the provisions of Republic
Act No. 8189, is to subsume as punishable, not only the
commission of proscribed acts, but also the omission of acts
enjoined to be observed. On this score, the declared policy of
Republic Act No. 8189 is illuminating. The law articulates the
policy of the State to systematize the present method of
registration in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent
and updated list of voters. A reading of Section 45 (j) conjointly
with the provisions upon which petitioners are charged, i.e.,
Sections 10 (g) and (j) would reveal that the matters that are
required to be set forth under the aforesaid sections are crucial to
the achievement of a clean, complete, permanent and updated
list of voters. The factual information required by the law is sought
not for mere embellishment.
There is a definitive governmental purpose when the law requires
that such facts should be set forth in the application. The periods
of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration
delve into the matter of residency, a requisite which a voter must
satisfy to be deemed a qualified voter and registered in the
permanent list of voters in a precinct of the city or municipality
wherein he resides. Of even rationality exists in the case of the
requirement in Section 10 (j), mandating that the applicant should
state that he/she is not a registered voter of any precinct. Multiple
voting by so-called flying voters are glaring anomalies which this
country strives to defeat. The requirement that such facts as
required by Section 10 (g) and Section 10 (j) be stated in the
voter’s application form for registration is directly relevant to the
right of suffrage, which the State has the right to regulate.
It is the opportune time to allude to the case of People v.
Gatchalian44 where the therein assailed law contains a similar
provision as herein assailed before us. Republic Act No. 602 also
penalizes any person who willfully violates any of the provisions
of the Act. The Court dismissed the challenged, and declared the
provision constitutional. The Court in Gatchalian read the
challenged provision, "any of the provisions of this [A]ct"
conjointly with Section 3 thereof which was the pertinent portion
of the law upon which therein accused was prosecuted.
Gatchalian considered the terms as all-embracing; hence, the
same must include what is enjoined in Section 3 thereof which
embodies the very fundamental purpose for which the law has
been adopted. This Court ruled that the law by legislative fiat
intends to punish not only those expressly declared unlawful but
even those not so declared but are clearly enjoined to be
observed to carry out the fundamental purpose of the
law.45Gatchalian remains good law, and stands unchallenged.
It also does not escape the mind of this Court that the
phraseology in Section 45(j) is employed by Congress in a
number of our laws.46 These provisions have not been declared
unconstitutional.
Moreover, every statute has in its favor the presumption of
validity.47 To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is
doubtful, speculative or argumentative.48We hold that petitioners
failed to overcome the heavy presumption in favor of the law. Its
constitutionality must be upheld in the absence of substantial
grounds for overthrowing the same.
A salient point. Courts will refrain from touching upon the issue of
constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis
mota. In the case at bar, the lis mota is the alleged grave abuse
of discretion of the COMELEC in finding probable cause for the
filing of criminal charges against petitioners.
Third. Petitioners maintain that the COMELEC En Banc,
premised its finding on a misapprehension of facts, and
committed grave abuse of discretion in directing the filing of
Informations against them with the RTC.
We are once again unimpressed.
The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the COMELEC
finds statutory expression under Section 26549of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code.50 The
task of the COMELEC whenever any election offense charge is
filed before it is to conduct the preliminary investigation of the
case, and make a determination of probable cause. Under
Section 8(b), Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the
investigating officer makes a determination of whether there is a
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed.51 In Baytan v. COMELEC,52 this Court, sufficiently
elucidated on the matter of probable cause in the prosecution of
election offenses, viz:
It is also well-settled that the finding of probable cause in
the prosecution of election offenses rests in the
COMELEC's sound discretion. The COMELEC exercises
the constitutional authority to investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases for violation of election laws,
including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offense and malpractices. Generally, the Court will not
interfere with such finding of the COMELEC absent a
clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. This principle
emanates from the COMELEC's exclusive power to
conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses
punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the
same, except as may otherwise be provided by law.53
It is succinct that courts will not substitute the finding of
probable cause by the COMELEC in the absence of grave
abuse of discretion. The abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility.54
According to the COMELEC En Banc, the investigating officer, in
the case at bar, held that there was sufficient cause for the filing
of criminal charges against petitioners, and found no reason to
depart therefrom. Without question, on May 9 and 11 of 2001,
petitioners applied for registration as new voters with the Office of
the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte, notwithstanding the
existence of petitioners’ registration records as registered voters
of Precinct No. 4419-A of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame,
District IV, Quezon City. The directive by the COMELEC which
affirmed the Resolution55 of 28 November 2000 of Investigating
Officer Atty. Tangaro-Casingal does not appear to be wanting in
factual basis, such that a reasonably prudent man would
conclude that there exists probable cause to hold petitioners for
trial. Thus, in the aforesaid Resolution, the Investigating Officer,
found:
A violation therefore of Section 10 of Republic Act No.
8189 is an election offense.
In the instant case, when respondents Carlos Romualdez
and Erlinda Romualdez filed their respective applications
for registration as new voters with the Office of the
Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte on May 9 and 11, 2001,
respectively, they stated under oath that they are not
registered voters in other precinct (VRR Nos. 42454095
and 07902941). However, contrary to their statements,
records show they are still registered voters of Precinct
No. 4419-A, barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District
IV, Quezon City, as per VRR Nos. 26195825 and
26195823. In other words, respondents’ registration
records in Quezon City is (sic) still in existence.
While it may be true that respondents had written the City
Election Officer of District IV, Quezon City for cancellation
of their voter’s registration record as voter’s (sic) therein,
they cannot presume that the same will be favorably
acted upon. Besides, RA 8189 provides for the procedure
in cases of transfer of residence to another
city/municipality which must be complied with, to wit:
"Section 12. Change of Residence to Another City or
Municipality. – Any registered voter who has transferred
residence to another city or municipality may apply with
the Election Officer of his new residence for the transfer of
his registration records.
The application for transfer of registration shall be subject
to the requirements of notice and hearing and the
approval of the Election Registration Board, in
accordance with this Act. Upon approval, of the
application for transfer, and after notice of such approval
to the Election Officer of their former residence of the
voter, said Election Officer shall transmit by registered
mail the voter’s registration record to the Election Officer
of the voter’s new residence."
They cannot claim ignorance of the abovestated provision
on the procedure for transfer of registration records by
reason of transferred new residence to another
municipality. Based on the affidavit executed by one
Eufemia S. Cotoner, she alleged that the refusal of the
Assistant Election Officer Ms. Estrella Perez to accept the
letter of respondents was due to improper procedure
because respondents should have filed the required
request for transfer with the Election Officer of Burauen,
Leyte. Despite this knowledge, however, they proceeded
to register as new voters of Burauen, Leyte,
notwithstanding the existence of their previous
registrations in Quezon City.
In their subsequent affidavit of Transfer of Voters
Registration under Section 12 of Republic Act 8189,
respondents admitted that they erroneously filed an
application as a new voter (sic) with the office of the
Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte, by reason of an honest
mistake, which they now desire to correct. (underscoring
ours).
Respondents lose sight of the fact that a statutory
offense, such as violation of election law, is mala
prohibita. Proof of criminal intent is not necessary. Good
faith, ignorance or lack of malice is beside the point.
Commission of the act is sufficient. It is the act itself that
is punished.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, the Law Department respectfully
submits that there is probable cause to hold respondents
Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez for trial in
violation of Section 10(g) and (j) in relation to Section 45(j)
of Republic Act No. 8189. There is no doubt that they
applied for registration as new voters of Burauen, Leyte
consciously, freely and voluntarily.56
We take occasion to reiterate that the Constitution grants to the It may be recalled that petitioners prayed for the issuance of a
COMELEC the power to prosecute cases or violations of election Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
laws. Article IX (C), Section 2 (6) of the 1987 Constitution, before this Court to restrain the COMELEC from executing its
provides: Resolutions of 11 June 2004 and 27 January 2005. In a
Resolution dated 20 June 2006, this Court En Banc denied for
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, lack of merit petitioners’ Motion Reiterating Prayer for Issuance of
petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to Cite for Indirect Contempt.
investigate and where appropriate, prosecute cases or Logically, the normal course of trial is expected to have continued
violations of election laws, including acts or omissions in the proceedings a quo.
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed Resolutions,
This power to prosecute necessarily involves the power to dated 11 June 2004 and 27 January 2005 of the COMELEC En
determine who shall be prosecuted, and the corollary right to Banc are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
decide whom not to prosecute.57 Evidently, must this power to
prosecute also include the right to determine under which laws SO ORDERED.
prosecution will be pursued. The courts cannot dictate the
prosecution nor usurp its discretionary powers. As a rule, courts MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
cannot interfere with the prosecutor’s discretion and control of the Associate Justice
criminal prosecution.58 Its rationale cannot be doubted. For the
business of a court of justice is to be an impartial tribunal, and not
to get involved with the success or failure of the prosecution to
prosecute.59 Every now and then, the prosecution may err in the
selection of its strategies, but such errors are not for neutral
courts to rectify, any more than courts should correct the blunders WE CONCUR:
of the defense.60
REYNATO S. PUNO
Fourth. In People v. Delgado,61 this Court said that when the Chief Justice
COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the
preliminary investigation of an election offense and upon a prima LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
facie finding of a probable cause, files the Information in the Associate Justice Associate Justice
proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the
case. Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case Dissenting Opinion
must be subject to the approval of the court. The records show ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
that Informations charging petitioners with violation of Section Associate Justice Associate Justice
10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189
had been filed with the RTC. The case must, thus, be allowed to *RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
take its due course. Associate Justice Associate Justice
 Dissenting Opinion
2Penned by Commissioner Virgilio O. Garcillano with the
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA concurrence of Commissioners Mehol K. Sadain,
Resurreccion Z. Borra, Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., and
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA and Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier took no part. Rollo,
Associate Justice Associate Justice pp. 28-30.

RUBEN T. REYES TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO 3SEC. 10. Registration of Voters. – A qualified voter shall
Associate Justice Associate Justice be registered in the permanent list of voters in a precinct
of the city or municipality wherein he resides to be able to
ARTURO D. BRION vote in any election. To register as a voter, he shall
Associate Justice personally accomplish an application form for registration
as prescribed by the Commission in three (3) copies
before the Election Officer on any date during office hours
after having acquired the qualifications of a voter.
CERTIFICATION
The application shall contain the following data:
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby
a) Name, surname, middle name, and/or maternal
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached
surname;
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
b) Sex;
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice c) Date, and place of birth;

d) Citizenship;

e) Civil status, if married, name of spouse;

Footnotes f) Profession, occupation or work;

* On leave. g) Periods of residence in the Philippines and in

1 Penned by Commissioner Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. with
the concurrence of Commissioners Rufino S. B. Javier,
Mehol K. Sadain, Resurreccion Z. Borra, Virgilio O.
Garcillano and Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr.; Rollo, pp. 23-27.
the place of registration;
h) Exact address with the name of the street and
house number for location in the precinct maps
maintained by the local office of the Commission,
 or in case there is none, a brief description of his
residence sitio and Barangay;
i) A statement that the applicant possesses all the
qualifications of a voter;
j) A statement that the application is not a
registered voter of any precinct; and
k) Such information or data as may be required by
the Commission.
The application for registration shall contain three
(3) specimen signatures of the applicant, clear
and legible rolled prints of his left and right
thumbprints, with four identification size copies of
his latest photograph, attached thereto, to be
taken at the expense of the Commission.
Before the applicant accomplishes his application
for registration, the Election Officer shall inform
him of the qualifications and disqualifications
prescribed by law for a voter, and thereafter, see
to it that the accomplished application contains all
the data therein required and that the applicant’s
specimen signatures, fingerprints, and
photographs are properly affixed in all copies of
the voter’s application.
4SEC. 45. Election Offense. – The following shall be
considered election offenses under this Act.
a) to deliver, hand over, entrust or give, directly or
indirectly, his voter’s identification card to another
in consideration of money or other benefit or
promise; or take or accept such voter’s
identification card, directly or indirectly, by giving
or causing the giving of money or other benefit or
making or causing the making of a promise
therefor;
b) to fail, without cause, to post or give any of the
notices or to make any of the reports required
under this Act;
c) to issue or cause the issuance of a voter’s
identification number to cancel or cause the
cancellation thereof in violation of the provisions
of this Act; or to refuse the issuance of registered
voters their voter’s identification card;
d) to accept an appointment, to assume office and
to actually serve as a member of the Election
Registration Board although ineligible thereto; to
appoint such ineligible person knowing him to be
ineligible;
e) to interfere with, impede, abscond for purposes
of gain or to prevent the installation or use of
computers and devices and the processing,
storage, generation and transmission of
registration data or information;
f) to gain, cause access to, use, alter, destroy, or
disclose any computer data, program, system
software, network, or any computer-related
devices, facilities, hardware or equipment,
whether classified or declassified;
g) failure to provide certified voters and
deactivated voters list to candidates and heads or
representatives of political parties upon written
request as provided in Section 30 hereof;
 h) failure to include the approved application form
for registration of a qualified voter in the book of
voters of a particular precinct or the omission of
the name of a duly registered voter in the certified
list of voters of the precinct where he is duly
registered resulting in his failure to cast his vote
during an election, plebiscite, referendum,
initiative and/or recall. The presence of the former
name in the book of voters or certified list of
voters in precincts other than where he is duly
registered shall not be an excuse hereof;
i) The posting of a list of voters outside or at the
door of a precinct on the day of an election,
plebiscite, referendum, initiative and/or recall and
which list is different in contents from the certified
list of voters being used by the Board of Election
Inspectors; and
j) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act.
(Italics supplied.)
5Entitled, "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A GENERAL
REGISTRATION OF VOTERS, ADOPTING A SYSTEM
OF CONTINUING REGISTRATION, PRESCRIBING THE
PROCEDURES THEREOF AND AUTHORIZING THE
APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS THEREFOR."
6Angelino Apostol indicated in the Complaint-Affidavit that
he is the Municipal Chairman of the Lakas-NUCD, a duly
registered political party in the Municipality of Burauen,
Leyte. However, on 5 March 2001, he withdrew as
complainant due to medical reasons. See rollo, pp. 81,
108-111.
7 Id. at 81-88.
8Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. – The following shall be guilty
of an election offense:
(y) On Registration of Voters:
xxxx
(2) Any person who knowingly makes any false or
untruthful statement relative to any of the data or
information required in the application for
registration.
9Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. – The following shall be guilty
of an election offense;
(y) On Registration of Voters:
xxxx
(5) Any person who, being a registered voter,
registers anew without filing an application for
cancellation of his previous registration.
10SEC. 12. Change of Residence to Another City or
Municipality. – Any registered voter who has transferred
residence to another city or municipality may apply with
the Election Officer of his new residence for the transfer of
his registration records.
The application for transfer of registration shall be
subject to the requirements of notice and hearing
and the approval of the Election Registration
Board, in accordance with this Act. Upon approval
of the application for transfer, and after notice of
such approval to the Election Officer of the former
residence of the voter, said Election Officer shall
transmit by registered mail the voter’s registration
 record to the Election Officer of the voter’s new Honorable Court, the above-named
residence. accused, did, then and there, willfully and
unlawfully, fail to fill up the required period
11 Supra note 3. of residence in the place of registration in
his Voter Registration Record (VRR) No.
12 Rollo, p. 87. 42454095 before the Election Registration
Board (ERB) of said municipality, which
constitute (sic) material misrepresentation
13 Id. at 31-39.
in his application for registration as a new
registrant at Precinct No. 11-A, Barangay
14 The Resolution of Welcome states, in part, to wit: District No. 3, in said municipality. (Id. at
221.)
WHEREAS, Mr. Carlos "Caloy" S. Romualdez has
established his official residence at No. 935 San Jose 20 The Information, states, to wit:
Street, Barangay District III, Burauen, Leyte, effective
today, May 9th 2000. (Rollo, p. 44.)
The undersigned accuses ERLINDA REYES
ROMUALDEZ, for violation of Section 10 (g), in
15 Id. at 26-27; 149. relation to Section 45 (j) of Republic Act No. 8189,
committed as follows:
16 Id. at 27.
That on or about May 11, 2000 during the
17 Id. at 28-30. continuing Registration of Voters under
Republic Act No. 8189, in the Municipality
18 Id. at 29. of Burauen, Province of Leyte, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this
19 The pertinent portion of the Information, reads, thus: Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did, then and there, willfully and
The undersigned accuses CARLOS SISON unlawfully, fail to fill up the required period
ROMUALDEZ, for violation of Section 10(g), in of residence in the place of registration in
relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, her Voter Registration Record (VRR) No.
committed as follows: 07902952 before the Election Registration
Board (ERB) of said municipality, which
That on or about May 9, 2000 during the constitute (sic) material misrepresentation
continuing Registration of Voters under in her application for registration as a new
Republic Act No. 8189, in the Municipality registrant at Precinct No. 11-A, Barangay
of Burauen, Province of Leyte, Philippines, District No. 3, in said municipality. (Id. at
and within the jurisdiction of this 227.)
 The Information against petitioner CARLOS SISON
21
ROMUALDEZ, reads, in part:
The undersigned accuses CARLOS SISON
ROMUALDEZ, for violation of Section 10(j), in
relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189,
committed as follows:
That on or about May 9, 2000 during the
continuing Registration of Voters, under
Republic Act No. 8189, in the Municipality
of Burauen, Province of Leyte, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, a registered voter at Precinct
No. 4419A of Barangay Bagong Lipunan
ng Crame, Quezon City, with Voter
Registration Record (VRR) No. 26195824,
did, then and there, willfully and
unlawfully, file an application for
registration on May 9, 2000 at Precinct
No. 11-A of Barangay District III, Burauen,
Leyte, as evidenced by Voter Registration
Record (VRR) No. 42454095, where he
declared under oath constituting material
misrepresentation that he is not a
registered voter in any precinct in the
municipality, when in truth and in fact, he
is a registered voter at Precinct No. 4419A
of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame,
Quezon City under Voter Registration
Record (VRR) No. 26195824 dated June
22, 1997.
The Information against petitioner
ERLINDA REYES ROMUALDEZ, for
violation of Section 10(j), in relation to
Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189,
committed as follows:
That on or about May 11, 2000 during the
continuing Registration of Voters under
Republic Act No. 8189, in the Municipality
of Burauen, Province of Leyte, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, a registered voter at Precinct
No. 4419A of Barangay Bagong Lipunan
ng Crame, Quezon City, with Voter
Registration Record (VRR) No. 26195832,
did, then and there, willfully and
unlawfully, file an application for
registration on May 11, 2000 in Barangay
District III, Burauen, Leyte, as evidenced
by Voter Registration Record (VRR) No.
07902952, where she declared under oath
constituting material misrepresentation
that she is not a registered voter in any
precinct in the municipality, when in truth
and in fact, she is a registered voter in
Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame,
Quezon City under Voter Registration
Record (VRR) No. 26195823 dated June
22, 1997. (Id. at 224-225.)
22 Id. at 182, 187.
23
Id. at 215.
24 Id. at 235.
25Section 14 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
provides, thus:
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law.
26 Section 14 (2). Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
Section 14 (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial,
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the
accused provided that he has been duly notified
and his failure to appear is unjustifiable,
27 Rollo, pp. 82-83.
28 G.R. No. 128096, 20 January 1999, 301 SCRA 298.
29 Id. at 325.
30 Id. at 327.
31 G.R. No. 165596, 17 November 2005, 475 SCRA 341.
32 Id. at 349.
33 Id.
34David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409,
171485, 171483, 171400, 171489, and 171424, 3 May
2006, 489 SCRA 160, 239.
35A facial invalidation or a line-by-line scrutiny is an
examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and
defects, not only on the basis of its actual operations to
the parties involved, but on the assumption or prediction
that its very existence may cause others not before the
court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech, or
on the ground that they may be applied to others not
before the court whose activities are constitutionally
protected. See David, supra.
36 See Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152259,
29 July 2004, 435 SCRA 371, 381-382. The Court in
Romualdez, restated the void-for-vagueness doctrine,
thus: "The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act
in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to the
application, violates the first essential of due process,"
citing the Separate Opinion of Mr. Justice Mendoza in
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290, 429-430
(2001), citing Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S.
385, 391, 70 L. Ed. 328 (1926); in turn cited in Ermita-
Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. City
Mayor, G.R. No. L-24693, 31 July 1967, 20 SCRA 849,
867.
37 Id.
38 Supra note 34.
39
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, id. at 352, citing State v.
Hill, 189 Kan 403, 369 P2d 365, 91 ALR2d 750.
40 Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, supra.
41 Section 45 of Republic Act No. 8189, reads, in full, viz:
SEC. 45. Election Offenses. - The following shall
be considered election offenses under this Act
a. to deliver, hand over, entrust or give, directly or
indirectly, his voter's identification card to another
in consideration of money or other benefit of
promise; or take or accept such voter's
identification card, directly or indirectly, by giving
or causing the giving of money or other benefit or
making or causing the making of a promise
therefor;
b. to fail, without cause, to post or give any of the
notices or to make any of the reports required
under this Act;
c. to issue or cause the issuance of a voter's
identification number or to cancel or cause the
cancellation thereof in violation of the provisions
of this Act; or to refuse the issuance of registered
voters their voter's identification card;
d. to accept an appointment, to assume office and
to actually serve as a member of the Election
Registration Board although ineligible thereto; to
appoint such ineligible person knowing him to be
ineligible;
e. to interfere with, impede, abscond for purpose
of gain or to prevent the installation or use of
computers and devices and the processing,
storage, generation, and transmission of
registration data or information;
f. to gain, cause access to, use, alter, destroy, or
disclose any computer data, program, system
software, network, or any computer-related
devices, facilities, hardware or equipment,
whether classified or declassified;
g. failure to provide certified voters and
deactivated voters list to candidates and heads of
representatives of political parties upon written
request as provided in Section 30 hereof;
h. failure to include the approved application form
for registration of a qualified voter in the book of
voters of a particular precinct or the omission of
the name of a duly registered voter in the certified
list of voters of the precinct where he is duly
registered resulting in his failure to cast his vote
during an election, plebiscite, referendum,
initiative and/or recall. The presence of the form or
name in the book of voters or certified list of
voters in precincts other than where he is duly
registered shall not be an excuse hereof;
i. the posting of a list of voters outside or at the
door of a precinct on the day of an election,
plebiscite, referendum, initiative and/or recall, and
which list is different in contents from the certified
list of voters being used by the Board of Election
Inspectors; and
j. Violation of any of the provisions of this Act.
42 G.R. No. 148560, 421 Phil. 290 (2001).
43 Supra Note 35 at 353.
44 G.R. No. L-12011-14, 104 Phil. 664 (1958).
45 Id. at 672.
46Section 124 (4) of Republic Act No. 6938, otherwise
known as the Cooperative Code, reads:
"Any violation of any provision of this Code for
which no penalty is imposed shall be punished by
imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor
more than one (1) year and a fine of not less than
One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) or both at the
discretion of the Court."
Section 72 of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise
known as The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act,
provides:
"Any person who commits violation of any of the
provisions of this Act, such as, but not limited
toxxx"
Section 12 of Republic Act No. 8762, otherwise
known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act,
states:
"Any person who would be found guilty of violation
of any provisions of this Act shall be punished by
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and
one (1) day but not more than eight (8) years, and
a fine of at least One Million (P1,000,000.00) but
not more than Twenty Million (P20,000,000.00).
47See Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, G.R. No.
105371, 11 November 1993, 227 SCRA 703,705.
48 Arceta v. Mangrobang, G.R. No. 152895, 15 June 2004.
49 Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, reads:
SEC. 265. Prosecution. – The Commission shall,
through its duly authorized legal officers, have the
exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable
under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The
Commission may avail of the assistance of other
prosecuting arms of the government: Provided,
however, That in the event that the Commission
fails to act on any complaint within four months
from his filing, the complainant may file the
complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the
Department of Justice for proper investigation and
prosecution, if warranted.
50 Kilosbayan v. COMELEC, 345 Phil. 1141, 1168 (1997).
51Section 8(b), Rule 34, COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
states as follows:
SEC. 8. Duty of Investigating Officer.- The
preliminary investigation must be terminated
within twenty (20) days after receipt of the
counter-affidavits and other evidence of the
respondents, and resolution thereof shall be made
within five (5) days thereafter.
xxxx
(b) If the investigating officer finds cause to hold
the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the
resolution, and the corresponding information
wherein he shall certify under oath that he has
examined the complainant and his witnesses, that
there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime
has been committed and that the accused was
informed of the complaint and of the evidence
 submitted against him and that he was given an SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC.,
opportunity to submit controverting evidence. on behalf of the South-South Network (SSN) for Non-State
Armed Group Engagement, and ATTY. SOLIMAN M.
52 444 Phil. 812, 820 (2003). SANTOS, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
53 Id. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
54 Duero v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 12, 20 (2002).
DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE
55 Records, pp. 199-215. NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE CHIEF
56 Rollo, pp. 25-26. OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.
57Mapa v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100295, 26 April x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
1994, 231 SCRA 783.
G.R. No. 178554
58Alonzo v. Concepcion, A.M. No. RTC-04-1879, 17
January 2005, citing People v. Moll, 68 Phil. 626 (1939). KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU), represented by its
Chairperson Elmer Labog, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
Tanchanco v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 141675-96, 25
59
LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU),
November 2005. represented by its National President Joselito V. Ustarez and
Secretary General Antonio C. Pascual, and CENTER FOR
60 Id. TRADE UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS, represented by its
Executive Director Daisy Arago, Petitioners,
61G.R. Nos. 93419-32, 18 September 1990, 189 SCRA vs.
715, 722. HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, NORBERTO GONZALES, in his capacity as Acting
Republic of the Philippines Secretary of National Defense, HON. RAUL GONZALES, in
SUPREME COURT his capacity as Secretary of Justice, HON. RONALDO PUNO,
Manila in his capacity as Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity
EN BANC as AFP Chief of Staff, and DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR
CALDERON, in his capacity as PNP Chief of
Staff, Respondents.
G.R. No. 178552 October 5, 2010
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 178581
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), GENERAL
ALLIANCE BINDING WOMEN FOR REFORMS, INTEGRITY,
EQUALITY, LEADERSHIP AND ACTION (GABRIELA),
KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), MOVEMENT
OF CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES (MCCCL),
CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND
ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
(COURAGE), KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP
(KADAMAY), SOLIDARITY OF CAVITE WORKERS, LEAGUE
OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), ANAKBAYAN,
PAMBANSANG LAKAS NG KILUSANG MAMAMALAKAYA
(PAMALAKAYA), ALLIANCE OF CONCERNED TEACHERS
(ACT), MIGRANTE, HEALTH ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY
(HEAD), AGHAM, TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR., DR.
BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR.,
SISTER MARY JOHN MANANSAN OSB, DEAN CONSUELO
PAZ, ATTY. JOSEFINA LICHAUCO, COL. GERRY CUNANAN
(ret.), CARLITOS SIGUION-REYNA, DR. CAROLINA
PAGADUAN-ARAULLO, RENATO REYES, DANILO RAMOS,
EMERENCIANA DE LESUS, RITA BAUA, REY CLARO
CASAMBRE, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as
President and Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO,
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING
SECRETARY NORBERTO GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECRETARY
RONALDO PUNO. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY
MARGARITO TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER
NORBERTO GONZALES, THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE NATIONAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION,
THE OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
(ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC),
THE PHILIPPINE CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE
CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR
CALDERON, THE PNP, including its intelligence and
investigative elements, AFP CHIEF GEN. HERMOGENES
ESPERON, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 178890
KARAPATAN, ALLIANCE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
PEOPLE'S RIGHTS, represented herein by Dr. Edelina de la
Paz, and representing the following organizations:
HUSTISYA, represented by Evangeline Hernandez and also
on her own behalf; DESAPARECIDOS, represented by Mary
Guy Portajada and also on her own behalf, SAMAHAN NG
MGA EX-DETAINEES LABAN SA DETENSYON AT PARA SA
AMNESTIYA (SELDA), represented by Donato Continente
and also on his own behalf, ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT FOR
JUSTICE AND PEACE (EMJP), represented by Bishop Elmer
M. Bolocon, UCCP, and PROMOTION OF CHURCH PEOPLE'S
RESPONSE, represented by Fr. Gilbert Sabado,
OCARM, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as
President and Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARTY EDUARDO ERMITA, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ, DEPARTMENT OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO,
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING
SECRETARY NORBERTO GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECRETARY
RONALDO PUNO, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY
MARGARITO TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER
NORBERTO GONZALES, THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE NATIONAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION,
THE OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
(ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC),
THE PHILIPPINE CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE
CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR
CALDERON, THE PNP, including its intelligence and
investigative elements, AFP CHIEF GEN. HERMOGENES
ESPERON, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179157
THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP),
represented by Atty. Feliciano M. Bautista, COUNSELS FOR
THE DEFENSE OF LIBERTY (CODAL), SEN. MA. ANA
CONSUELO A.S. MADRIGAL and FORMER SENATORS
SERGIO OSMEÑA III and WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA AND THE
MEMBERS OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL
(ATC), Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179461
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN-SOUTHERN TAGALOG
(BAYAN-ST), GABRIELA-ST, KATIPUNAN NG MGA
SAMAHYANG MAGSASAKA-TIMOG KATAGALUGAN
(KASAMA-TK), MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR
CIVIL LIBERTIES (MCCCL), PEOPLES MARTYRS,
ANAKBAYAN-ST, PAMALAKAYA-ST, CONFEDERATION FOR
UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE-ST),
PAGKAKAISA'T UGNAYAN NG MGA MAGBUBUKID SA
LAGUNA (PUMALAG), SAMAHAN NG MGA MAMAMAYAN SA
TABING RILES (SMTR-ST), LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS
(LFS), BAYAN MUNA-ST, KONGRESO NG MGA
MAGBUBUKID PARA SA REPORMANG AGRARYO KOMPRA,
BIGKIS AT LAKAS NG MGA KATUTUBO SA TIMOG
KATAGALUGAN (BALATIK), SAMAHAN AT UGNAYAN NG
MGA MAGSASAKANG KABABAIHAN SA TIMOG
KATAGALUGAN (SUMAMAKA-TK), STARTER, LOSÑOS
RURAL POOR ORGANIZATION FOR PROGRESS &
EQUALITY, CHRISTIAN NIÑO LAJARA, TEODORO REYES,
FRANCESCA B. TOLENTINO, JANNETTE E. BARRIENTOS,
OSCAR T. LAPIDA, JR., DELFIN DE CLARO, SALLY P.
ASTRERA, ARNEL SEGUNE BELTRAN, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as
President and Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ, DEPARTMENT OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO,
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING
SECRETARY NORBERTO GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMEN T SECRETARY
RONALDO PUNO, DEPARTMENT OF FINCANCE
SECRETARY MARGARITO TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES, THE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF CIVIL
DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE CENTER
ON TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR CALDERON,
THE PNP, including its intelligence and investigative
elements, AFP CHIEF GEN. HERMOGENES
ESPERON, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), "An Act to Secure the State
and Protect our People from Terrorism," otherwise known as the
Human Security Act of 2007,1 signed into law on March 6, 2007.
Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007,2 petitioner
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., a non-
government organization, and Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr., a
concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer, filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition on July 16, 2007 docketed as G.R. No.
178552. On even date, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU),
National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno
(NAFLU-KMU), and Center for Trade Union and Human Rights
(CTUHR), represented by their respective officers3 who are also
bringing the action in their capacity as citizens, filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178554.
The following day, July 17, 2007, organizations Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), General Alliance Binding
Women for Reforms, Integrity, Equality, Leadership and Action
(GABRIELA), Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP),
Movement of Concerned Citizens for Civil Liberties (MCCCL),
Confederation for Unity, Recognition and Advancement of
Government Employees (COURAGE), Kalipunan ng Damayang
Mahihirap (KADAMAY), Solidarity of Cavite Workers (SCW),
League of Filipino Students (LFS), Anakbayan, Pambansang
Lakas ng Kilusang Mamamalakaya (PAMALAKAYA), Alliance of
Concerned Teachers (ACT), Migrante, Health Alliance for
Democracy (HEAD), and Agham, represented by their respective
officers,4 and joined by concerned citizens and taxpayers Teofisto
Guingona, Jr., Dr. Bienvenido Lumbera, Renato Constantino, Jr.,
Sister Mary John Manansan, OSB, Dean Consuelo Paz, Atty.
Josefina Lichauco, Retired Col. Gerry Cunanan, Carlitos Siguion-
Reyna, Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Danilo
Ramos, Emerenciana de Jesus, Rita Baua and Rey Claro
Casambre filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed
as G.R. No. 178581.
On August 6, 2007, Karapatan and its alliance member
organizations Hustisya, Desaparecidos, Samahan ng mga Ex-
Detainees Laban sa Detensyon at para sa Amnestiya (SELDA),
Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace (EMJP), and
Promotion of Church People’s Response (PCPR), which were
represented by their respective officers5 who are also bringing
action on their own behalf, filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178890.
On August 29, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
Counsels for the Defense of Liberty (CODAL),6Senator Ma. Ana
Consuelo A.S. Madrigal, Sergio Osmeña III, and Wigberto E.
Tañada filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as
G.R. No. 179157.
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog (BAYAN-ST),
other regional chapters and organizations mostly based in the
Southern Tagalog Region,7 and individuals8 followed suit by filing
on September 19, 2007 a petition for certiorari and prohibition
docketed as G.R. No. 179461 that replicates the allegations
raised in the BAYAN petition in G.R. No. 178581.
Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-
Terrorism Council9 composed of, at the time of the filing of the
petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson,
Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and
Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense
Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales,
Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and
Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions,
except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and
Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.
The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise
impleaded President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the support
agencies for the Anti-Terrorism Council like the National
Intelligence Coordinating Agency, National Bureau of
Investigation, Bureau of Immigration, Office of Civil Defense,
Intelligence Service of the AFP, Anti-Money Laundering Center,
Philippine Center on Transnational Crime, and the PNP
intelligence and investigative elements.
The petitions fail.
Petitioners’ resort to certiorari is improper
Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do
not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court is clear:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there
is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum
of particularity how respondents acted without or in excess of
their respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside, the petitions fail
just the same.
In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited
by four exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case
or controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis
mota of the case.10
In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites,
which are the most essential, renders the discussion of the last
two superfluous.
Petitioners lack locus standi
Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.11
Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive
Secretary12 summarized the rule on locus standi, thus:
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal
and substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the
question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.
[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a
direct and personal interest. It must show not only that the law or
any governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in
immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of
its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to be
denied some right or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that
it is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute or act complained of.
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional
question, it must show that (1) it has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being
suspected "communist fronts" by the government, especially the
military; whereas individual petitioners invariably invoke the
"transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens
and taxpayers.
While Chavez v. PCGG13 holds that transcendental public
importance dispenses with the requirement that petitioner has
experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal
injury, cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation
belong to an altogether different genus of constitutional litigation.
Compelling State and societal interests in the proscription of
harmful conduct, as will later be elucidated, necessitate a closer
judicial scrutiny of locus standi.
Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA
9372.
KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and
PCR, petitioners in G.R. No. 178890, allege that they have been
subjected to "close security surveillance by state security forces,"
their members followed by "suspicious persons" and "vehicles
with dark windshields," and their offices monitored by "men with
military build." They likewise claim that they have been branded
as "enemies of the [S]tate."14
Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) correctly points out that petitioners have
yet to show any connection between the
purported "surveillance" and the implementation of RA 9372.
BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY,
SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD
and Agham, petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581, would
like the Court to take judicial notice of respondents’ alleged action
of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing,
the National People’s Army (NPA). The tagging, according to
petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription without
following the procedure under the law.15 The petition of BAYAN-
ST, et al. in G.R. No. 179461 pleads the same allegations.
The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged "tagging" of
petitioners.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material
requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general
knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not
doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the
limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in
determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is
that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is
limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not
subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2)
capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial
matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course
of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which
are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of
ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are
universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias,
dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided,
they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood
that they may be regarded as forming part of the common
knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man
ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been
judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a
court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is
dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which
the court has no constructive knowledge.16 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking
of judicial notice. Petitioners’ apprehension is insufficient to
substantiate their plea. That no specific charge or proscription
under RA 9372 has been filed against them, three years after its
effectivity, belies any claim of imminence of their perceived threat
emanating from the so-called tagging.
The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in
G.R. No. 178554, who merely harp as well on their supposed
"link" to the CPP and NPA. They fail to particularize how the
implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would result in
direct injury to their organization and members.
While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist
organization, the United States of America17(US) and the
European Union18 (EU) have both classified the CPP, NPA and
Abu Sayyaf Group as foreign terrorist organizations. The Court
takes note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo
Administration would adopt the US and EU classification of the
CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations.19 Such statement
notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before the courts an
application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as
domestic terrorist or outlawed organizations under RA 9372.
Again, RA 9372 has been in effect for three years now. From July
2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations have conducted
their activities fully and freely without any threat of, much less an
actual, prosecution or proscription under RA 9372.
Parenthetically, the Fourteenth Congress, in a resolution initiated
by Party-list Representatives Saturnino Ocampo, Teodoro
Casiño, Rafael Mariano and Luzviminda Ilagan,20 urged the
government to resume peace negotiations with the NDF by
removing the impediments thereto, one of which is the adoption
of designation of the CPP and NPA by the US and EU as foreign
terrorist organizations. Considering the policy statement of the
Aquino Administration21 of resuming peace talks with the NDF,
the government is not imminently disposed to ask for the judicial
proscription of the CPP-NPA consortium and its allied
organizations.
More important, there are other parties not before the Court
with direct and specific interests in the questions being
raised.22 Of recent development is the filing of the first case for
proscription under Section 1723 of RA 9372 by the Department of
Justice before the Basilan Regional Trial Court against the Abu
Sayyaf Group.24Petitioner-organizations do not in the least allege
any link to the Abu Sayyaf Group.
Some petitioners attempt, in vain though, to show the imminence
of a prosecution under RA 9372 by alluding to past rebellion
charges against them.
In Ladlad v. Velasco,25 the Court ordered the dismissal of
rebellion charges filed in 2006 against then Party-List
Representatives Crispin Beltran and Rafael Mariano of
Anakpawis, Liza Maza of GABRIELA, and Joel Virador, Teodoro
Casiño and Saturnino Ocampo of Bayan Muna. Also named in
the dismissed rebellion charges were petitioners Rey Claro
Casambre, Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Rita
Baua, Emerencia de Jesus and Danilo Ramos; and accused of
being front organizations for the Communist movement were
petitioner-organizations KMU, BAYAN, GABRIELA,
PAMALAKAYA, KMP, KADAMAY, LFS and COURAGE.26
The dismissed rebellion charges, however, do not save the day
for petitioners. For one, those charges were filed in 2006, prior to
the enactment of RA 9372, and dismissed by this Court. For
another, rebellion is defined and punished under the Revised
Penal Code. Prosecution for rebellion is not made more imminent
by the enactment of RA 9372, nor does the enactment thereof
make it easier to charge a person with rebellion, its elements not
having been altered.
Conversely, previously filed but dismissed rebellion charges bear
no relation to prospective charges under RA 9372. It cannot be
overemphasized that three years after the enactment of RA 9372,
none of petitioners has been charged.
Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157 base their claim
of locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold the Constitution. The
IBP zeroes in on Section 21 of RA 9372 directing it to render
assistance to those arrested or detained under the law.
The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does
not, however, suffice to clothe the IBP or any of its members with
standing.27 The IBP failed to sufficiently demonstrate how its
mandate under the assailed statute revolts against its
constitutional rights and duties. Moreover, both the IBP and
CODAL have not pointed to even a single arrest or detention
effected under RA 9372.
Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims to have
been the subject of "political surveillance," also lacks locus standi.
Prescinding from the veracity, let alone legal basis, of the claim of
"political surveillance," the Court finds that she has not shown
even the slightest threat of being charged under RA 9372.
Similarly lacking in locus standi are former Senator Wigberto
Tañada and Senator Sergio Osmeña III, who cite their being
respectively a human rights advocate and an oppositor to the
passage of RA 9372. Outside these gratuitous statements, no
concrete injury to them has been pinpointed.
Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and Atty.
Soliman Santos Jr. in G.R. No. 178552 also conveniently state
that the issues they raise are of transcendental importance,
"which must be settled early" and are of "far-reaching
implications," without mention of any specific provision of RA
9372 under which they have been charged, or may be charged.
Mere invocation of human rights advocacy has nowhere been
held sufficient to clothe litigants with locus standi. Petitioners
must show an actual, or immediate danger of sustaining, direct
injury as a result of the law’s enforcement. To rule otherwise
would be to corrupt the settled doctrine of locus standi, as every
worthy cause is an interest shared by the general public.
Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual petitioners
as taxpayers and citizens. A taxpayer suit is proper only when
there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of
Congress,28 whereas citizen standing must rest on direct and
personal interest in the proceeding.29
RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any
appropriation from Congress for its implementation, while none of
the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and
personal interest in the implementation of the law.
It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied
by the assertion of a public right, do not establish locus standi.
Evidence of a direct and personal interest is key.
Petitioners fail to present an actual case or controversy
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is
an actual case or controversy.
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.30(emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
As early as Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 the Court ruled
that the power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by
the parties. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would
amount to an advisory opinion.32
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v.
COMELEC33 cannot be more emphatic:
[C]ourts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to
satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The
controversy must be justiciable—definite and concrete, touching
on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In
other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic
assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof
on the other hand; that is, it must concern a real and not merely a
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and
substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a
decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion
advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, a petition to declare unconstitutional a law converting the
Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City was held to be
premature as it was tacked on uncertain, contingent
events.34 Similarly, a petition that fails to allege that an application
for a license to operate a radio or television station has been
denied or granted by the authorities does not present a justiciable
controversy, and merely wheedles the Court to rule on a
hypothetical problem.35
The Court dismissed the petition in Philippine Press Institute v.
Commission on Elections36 for failure to cite any specific
affirmative action of the Commission on Elections to implement
the assailed resolution. It refused, in Abbas v. Commission on
Elections,37 to rule on the religious freedom claim of the therein
petitioners based merely on a perceived potential conflict
between the provisions of the Muslim Code and those of the
national law, there being no actual controversy between real
litigants.
The list of cases denying claims resting on purely hypothetical or
anticipatory grounds goes on ad infinitum.
The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the
occurrence of a perceived threat to any constitutional interest
suffices to provide a basis for mounting a constitutional challenge.
This, however, is qualified by the requirement that there must
be sufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate
the issues.38
Very recently, the US Supreme Court, in Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project,39 allowed the pre-enforcement review of a criminal
statute, challenged on vagueness grounds, since plaintiffs faced
a "credible threat of prosecution" and "should not be required to
await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of
seeking relief."40 The plaintiffs therein filed an action before a
federal court to assail the constitutionality of the material support
statute, 18 U.S.C. §2339B (a) (1),41 proscribing the provision of
material support to organizations declared by the Secretary of
State as foreign terrorist organizations. They claimed that they
intended to provide support for the humanitarian and political
activities of two such organizations.
Prevailing American jurisprudence allows an adjudication on the
merits when an anticipatory petition clearly shows that the
challenged prohibition forbids the conduct or activity that a
petitioner seeks to do, as there would then be a justiciable
controversy.42
Unlike the plaintiffs in Holder, however, herein petitioners have
failed to show that the challenged provisions of RA 9372 forbid
constitutionally protected conduct or activity that they seek to do.
No demonstrable threat has been established, much less a real
and existing one.
Petitioners’ obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and
supposedly being tagged as "communist fronts" in no way
approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From these
allegations, the Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion,
which is not its function.43
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become
pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by
"double contingency," where both the activity the petitioners
intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public
official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of
ripeness.44
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does
not avail to take the present petitions out of the realm of the
surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to
RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be
abused.45 Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events
before courts may step in to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.
A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free
speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional
litigation are rightly excepted
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly
broad the definition of the crime of terrorism46under RA 9372 in
that terms like "widespread and extraordinary fear and panic
among the populace" and "coerce the government to give in to an
unlawful demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement
agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.
Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of
void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the
present case since these doctrines apply only to free speech
cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.
For a jurisprudentially guided understanding of these doctrines, it
is imperative to outline the schools of thought on whether the
void-for-vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are equally
applicable grounds to assail a penal statute.
Respondents interpret recent jurisprudence as slanting toward
the idea of limiting the application of the two doctrines to free
speech cases. They particularly cite Romualdez v. Hon.
Sandiganbayan47 and Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.48
The Court clarifies.
At issue in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan was whether the word
"intervene" in Section 549 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act was intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad. The Court
stated that "the overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have
special application only to free-speech cases," and are "not
appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes."50 It added
that, at any rate, the challenged provision, under which the
therein petitioner was charged, is not vague.51
While in the subsequent case of Romualdez v. Commission on
Elections,52 the Court stated that a facial invalidation of criminal
statutes is not appropriate, it nonetheless proceeded to conduct a
vagueness analysis, and concluded that the therein subject
election offense53 under the Voter’s Registration Act of 1996, with
which the therein petitioners were charged, is couched in precise
language.54
The two Romualdez cases rely heavily on the Separate
Opinion55 of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in the Estradacase,
where the Court found the Anti-Plunder Law (Republic Act No.
7080) clear and free from ambiguity respecting the definition of
the crime of plunder.
The position taken by Justice Mendoza in Estrada relates these
two doctrines to the concept of a "facial" invalidation as opposed
to an "as-applied" challenge. He basically postulated that
allegations that a penal statute is vague and overbroad do not
justify a facial review of its validity. The pertinent portion of the
Concurring Opinion of Justice Mendoza, which was quoted at
length in the main Estrada decision, reads:
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to
one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon
protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or
proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests
itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing
attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the
person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could
not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The
possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech
to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived
grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of
overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes
have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence,
and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State
may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially
harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take
chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special
application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing
the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in
an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized
an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that
"claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases
involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained
at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal
laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this
reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative
act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid." As for the vagueness
doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its
face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff
who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of
others."
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and
vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their
faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to
do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With
respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom
application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack
the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to other persons or other situations in which its
application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out,
"vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like
overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation,
while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically
are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant."
Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this
Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking
them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to
parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally
protected. It constitutes a departure from the case and
controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions
to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile
abstract contexts. But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out
in Younger v. Harris
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its
deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before
the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task
for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of
the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief
sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of
the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . .
ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for
deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be
decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been
described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed
"sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally
disfavored. In determining the constitutionality of a statute,
therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated
in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which
the defendant is charged.56 (Underscoring supplied.)
The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking relation of
the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines as grounds for a facial
or as-applied challenge against a penal statute (under a claim of
violation of due process of law) or a speech regulation (under a
claim of abridgement of the freedom of speech and cognate
rights).
To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of
overbreadth do not operate on the same plane.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1)
it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially
the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and
(2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.57 The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved
by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade
the area of protected freedoms.58
As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth
doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a statute
prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even
though some of it is protected.59
A "facial" challenge is likewise different from an "as-applied"
challenge.
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers
only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facialinvalidation is an
examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects,
not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also
on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or activities.60
Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle61 in his
concurring opinion that the vagueness and overbreadth
doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to
penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount
a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness
or overbreadth grounds.
The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is
justified by the aim to avert the "chilling effect" on protected
speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be
abridged.62 As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to
plain penal statutes that generally bear an "in terrorem effect" in
deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may
even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and
lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the
exercise of constitutionally protected rights.63
The Court reiterated that there are "critical limitations by which a
criminal statute may be challenged" and "underscored that an ‘on-
its-face’ invalidation of penal statutes x x x may not be allowed."64
[T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free
speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be
facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes
be subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a
facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of
crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A
strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case
of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go
against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and
concrete controversy before judicial power may be appropriately
exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best,
amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court
to consider third parties who are not before it. As I have said in
my opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack
penal statutes, such a test will impair the State’s ability to deal
with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder
an accused from defeating the State’s power to prosecute on a
mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is
vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as
applied to him.65 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the
overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge
and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge,
applicable only to free speech cases.
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a
facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected
speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the
court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad
regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly
analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines
itself only to facts as applied to the litigants.
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it
marks an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional
litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails,
the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by
invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis.
Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the
rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In
overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are
permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court
invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied
for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a
properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor
that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules
is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad
statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The
Court assumes that an overbroad law’s "very existence may
cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is
designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those
third parties.66 (Emphasis in the original omitted; underscoring
supplied.)
In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the
Court, in at least two cases,67 observed that the US Supreme
Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the
limited context of the First Amendment,68 and that claims of facial
overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes
which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken
words.69 In Virginia v. Hicks,70 it was held that rarely, if ever, will
an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation
that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related
conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the
"transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression."71
Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being
vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of
the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally impermissible
absent an actual or imminent chargeagainst them
While Estrada did not apply the overbreadth doctrine, it did not
preclude the operation of the vagueness test on the Anti-Plunder
Law as applied to the therein petitioner, finding, however, that
there was no basis to review the law "on its face and in its
entirety."72 It stressed that "statutes found vague as a matter of
due process typically are invalidated only 'as applied' to a
particular defendant."73
American jurisprudence74 instructs that "vagueness challenges
that do not involve the First Amendment must be examined in
light of the specific facts of the case at hand and not with regard
to the statute's facial validity."
For more than 125 years, the US Supreme Court has evaluated
defendants’ claims that criminal statutes are unconstitutionally
vague, developing a doctrine hailed as "among the most
important guarantees of liberty under law."75
In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted
under the due process clause has been utilized in examining the
constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at least three cases,76 the
Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance
penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the
crime of illegal recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of the
Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of
the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in these three
cases, similar to those in the two Romualdez and Estrada cases,
were actually charged with the therein assailed penal statute,
unlike in the present case.
There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so
as to permit a facial analysis of its validity
From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited
Section 3 of RA 9372, the following elements may be culled: (1)
the offender commits an act punishable under any of the cited
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under any of the
enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the
predicate crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3) the
offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to
give in to an unlawful demand.
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law
penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the element of
"unlawful demand" in the definition of terrorism77 must necessarily
be transmitted through some form of expression protected by the
free speech clause.
The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize
is conduct, not speech.
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there
must first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the
operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of
the crime, including the coercion of the government to accede to
an "unlawful demand." Given the presence of the first element,
any attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative
component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected
conduct into a protected speech.
Petitioners’ notion on the transmission of message is entirely
inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an element
of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails some
mincing of words on the part of the offender like in declaring to
launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the
amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful
transaction. An analogy in one U.S. case78 illustrated that the fact
that the prohibition on discrimination in hiring on the basis of race
will require an employer to take down a sign reading "White
Applicants Only" hardly means that the law should be analyzed
as one regulating speech rather than conduct.
Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of
the criminal conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish
socially harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole act as
conduct and not speech. This holds true a fortiori in the present
case where the expression figures only as an inevitable incident
of making the element of coercion perceptible.
[I]t is true that the agreements and course of conduct here were
as in most instances brought about through speaking or writing.
But it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of
speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely
because the conduct was, in part, initiated, evidenced, or carried
out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.
Such an expansive interpretation of the constitutional guaranties
of speech and press would make it practically impossible ever to
enforce laws against agreements in restraint of trade as well as
many other agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to
society.79 (italics and underscoring supplied)
Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected
conduct, because they merely evidence a prohibited
conduct.80 Since speech is not involved here, the Court cannot
heed the call for a facial analysis.
1avv phi1
IN FINE, Estrada and the other cited authorities engaged in a
vagueness analysis of the therein subject penal statute as
applied to the therein petitioners inasmuch as they were actually
charged with the pertinent crimes challenged on vagueness
grounds. The Court in said cases, however, found no basis to
review the assailed penal statute on its face and in its entirety.
In Holder, on the other hand, the US Supreme Court allowed the
pre-enforcement review of a criminal statute, challenged on
vagueness grounds, since the therein plaintiffs faced a "credible
threat of prosecution" and "should not be required to await and
undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking
relief."
As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual
charge nor a credible threat of prosecutionunder RA 9372. Even
a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of
"terrorism" is thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds
litigants that judicial power neither contemplates speculative
counseling on a statute’s future effect on hypothetical scenarios
nor allows the courts to be used as an extension of a failed
legislative lobbying in Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL JOSE CATRAL
PEREZ MENDOZA
WE CONCUR: Associate Justice Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CERTIFICATION
VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. writer of the opinion of the Court.
ARTURO D. BRION
NACHURA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

TERESITA J.
DIOSDADO M.
LEONARDO-DE
PERALTA
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL MARTIN S.

CASTILLO VILLARAMA, JR. EN BANC
Associate Justice Associate Justice
G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full
fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the individual from the
vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But
even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on
individuality beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting that
"individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very little
regard to social interference - he veritably acknowledges that the
exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation,
which society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against those
who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says -
The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can
be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of
the State to self-preservation. With the end of maintaining the
integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the
State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance
to its collective wisdom and inflict punishment for non-
observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic
collectivism wrought changes in the social order, carrying with it a
new formulation of fundamental rights and duties more attuned to
the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the
process, the web of rights and State impositions became tangled
and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and
colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often outright
collision, between the law as the expression of the will of the
State, and the zealous attempts by its members to preserve their
individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual
rights are pitted against State authority that judicial conscience is
put to its severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to
be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing
the Crime of Plunder),1 as amended by RA 7659,2 wishes to
impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned
that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid
from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent
call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of
constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers
from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable
doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the
element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The
Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations
of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by
petitioner to have transgressed constitutional boundaries are
Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset,
property, business, enterprise or material possession of any
person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by
him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or
series of the following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or
malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury;
 (2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission,
gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of
pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by
reason of the office or position of the public office
concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition
of assets belonging to the National Government or any of
its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or
government owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or
indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of
interest or participation including the promise of future
employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation
of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular
persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich
himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage
and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of
the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any
public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of
his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination
or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d)
hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty
million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death.
Any person who participated with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder
shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of
penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by the
Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The court
shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and
other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of
stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in
favor of the State (underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the
crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and
every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the
Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations, docketed as: (a)
Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by
RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for
violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e),
of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively;
(c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA
6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury
(Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No.
26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by
RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the
remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary
investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the
Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for
reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under
specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity
to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove
lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were only
lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of
offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The
purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law
under which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus
Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of
the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a
Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable
cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance
of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001
petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the
Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in
Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged
therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on
which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that
the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1)
offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to
the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001
petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001
the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments
on 18 September 2001, the issues for resolution in the instant
petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional
for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for
proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the
rights of the accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as
defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is
within the power of Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the
validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a
legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the
Constitution.3 Courts invariably train their sights on this
fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a
constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional
adjudication. This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its
bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the
government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another.
Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the
deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch -
the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may
firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever
conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and
has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the
purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of
the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the
legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should
proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and
forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by
the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a
measure of last resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a
statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is
fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon4 we held that as
long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the
constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and the
case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of
the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally
deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course,
where the law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed
domain of the organic law, it must be struck down on sight lest
the positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs
heavily on the party challenging the validity of the statute. He
must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed
an infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing,
there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if
well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice
Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."5 And petitioner has miserably
failed in the instant case to discharge his burden and overcome
the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards
and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to
determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently
explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions
required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime
with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus -
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself
or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by
affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of the following
overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation,
conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or
raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or
indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage,
kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any
person and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of
the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent
conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the
National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies
or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining,
receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of
stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing
agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and
orders intended to benefit particular persons or special
interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position,
authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly
enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the
damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-
gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at
least ₱50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule
that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would
render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It
must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in
defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly,
the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct.
Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the
assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing
or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least ₱50,000,000.00
through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1,
par. (d), of the Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language
of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various
elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have
committed:
"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director,
EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses
former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a.
'JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie
'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro,
JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr.
Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does,
of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No.
7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as
follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-
accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES
BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS
ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS,
BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL
POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR
INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount
or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION
EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS(₱4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY
UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE
EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE
AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR
A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR
SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly,
on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE
AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-
FIVE MILLION PESOS (₱545,000,000.00), MORE OR
LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF
GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY
FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR in connection with co-accused CHARLIE
'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR
PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating,
converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,
for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public
funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY
MILLION PESOS (₱130,000,000.00), more or less,
representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION
PESOS (₱200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share
allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No.
7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused
Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE
a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a.
Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES;
(italic supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS
PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE
351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS,
and the Social Security System (SSS),
329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF
THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF
MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO
MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
(₱1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN
HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED
TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY
PESOS (₱744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A
TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS
AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (₱1,847,578,057.50); AND BY
COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE
 WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS
OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID
PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE
AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION
SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(₱189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE
CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE
DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE
ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS,
GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR
ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO
HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED
FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
(₱3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME
UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT
THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous -
as there is obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his
defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions
clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood
and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the
prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is
completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable
him to prepare for an intelligent defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for
the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in
the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts"
found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in
Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the
Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and
overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his
fundamental right to due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is
not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms
are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without
defining them;6 much less do we have to define every word we
use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory
command requiring the legislature to define each and every word
in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of
expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words
employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness
or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at
least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly
expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that
words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and
ordinary acceptation and signification,7 unless it is evident that the
legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those
words.8 The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily,
untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory
phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus,
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following
commonly accepted definition of the words "combination" and
"series:"
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or
process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close
relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming
one after another in spatial and temporal succession.
That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to
be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident from
the legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually became
RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:
DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON
JUSTICE, 7 May 1991
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of
plunder. We say THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF
OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION
ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually
mean to say, if there are two or more means, we mean to say that
number one and two or number one and something else are
included, how about a series of the same act? For example,
through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be
included also?
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.
REP. ISIDRO: Series.
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -
REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the
enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination,
two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, that’s it. When we say
combination, we mean, two different acts. It cannot be a repetition
of the same act.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there
are two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.
REP. ISIDRO: That’s not series. Its a combination. Because
when we say combination or series, we seem to say that two or
more, di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary
crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good suggestion
because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but
we have here a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So
xxxx
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term "series?"
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two
misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be
combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that
sometimes "one" or maybe even "two" acts may already result in
such a big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider
deleting the words "a series of overt or," to read, therefore: "or
conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as." Remove the
idea of necessitating "a series." Anyway, the criminal acts are in
the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or
more of the acts mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because "a series" implies several or
many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be
prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say "acts of
plunder" there should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by
existing laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is
referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories
of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the
public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent
conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government
under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or
more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of
enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation,
malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall
under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature
intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and
"series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing
for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the
Sandiganbayan9 that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in
relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -
x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in
subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2
of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards
a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there
must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to
achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term
'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or
method' which the principal accused and public officer and others
conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal.
In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the
schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or
criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common
goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not
give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to
penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the
"void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The
doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most
commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a
criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient
definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand
what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked
against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face,
i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by
construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In
such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two
(2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to
avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying
out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.10 But the doctrine does not apply as against
legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but
which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased;
or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to
certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper
construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the
second whenever directed against such activities.11 With more
reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute
is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practice.12 It must be stressed,
however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a
reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not
absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner
seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is
permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are
clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because
it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its
provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it
would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all
other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of
Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the deliberations of the
Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and
overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity -
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential
of due process of law."13 The overbreadth doctrine, on the other
hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."14
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to
one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon
protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or
proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests
itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing
attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the
person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could
not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity."15 The
possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech
to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived
grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of
overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes
have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence,
and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State
may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially
harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take
chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special
application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing
the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in
an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized
an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment."16 In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,17 the Court ruled that
"claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases
involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained
at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal
laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this
reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative
act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid."18 As for the vagueness
doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its
face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff
who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of
others."19
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and
vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their
faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to
do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With
respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom
application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack
the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to other persons or other situations in which its
application might be unconstitutional."20 As has been pointed out,
"vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like
overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while
statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are
invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular
defendant."21 Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim
that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its
entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking
them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to
parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally
protected.22 It constitutes a departure from the case and
controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions
to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile
abstract contexts.23 But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out
in Younger v. Harris24
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its
deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before
the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task
for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of
the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief
sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of
the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . .
ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for
deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be
decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been
described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed
"sparingly and only as a last resort,"25 and is generally
disfavored.26 In determining the constitutionality of a statute,
therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated
in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which
the defendant is charged.27
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported
ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued
at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity,
where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and
words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the
want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision of the law
should be construed in relation and with reference to every other
part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the
well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality and validity of the
Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what
the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who
voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was
extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate
committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative
vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound
constitutional anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan28 must be
mentioned if only to illustrate and emphasize the point that courts
are loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law
itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible
of no reasonable construction that will support and give it effect.
In that case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the
constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited, among others,
that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no
common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or
administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par.
(e), violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or
sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further
argued that the Information charged them with three (3) distinct
offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through
manifest partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through
evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits
through gross inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of
their official function and that their right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them was violated
because they were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if
not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e),
of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from
the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest
partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable
negligence" merely describe the different modes by which the
offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be
committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same
Information does not mean that the indictment charges three (3)
distinct offenses.
The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking
adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized (Webster,
Third International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification or
adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of
Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and
Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual
Pocket Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act consider a corrupt practice and make unlawful the act of the
public officer in:
x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section
3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as amended).
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted
penal provisions penalize is the act of a public officer, in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions, in
giving any private party benefits, advantage or preference which
is unjustified, unauthorized or without justification or adequate
reason, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.
In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or
ambiguous in the use of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par.
(e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was
understood in its primary and general acceptation. Consequently,
in that case, petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate to
declare the section unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched
theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable
obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it
requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing
unlawful scheme or conspiracy -
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the
crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and
every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a
pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the
simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all
other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the
presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof
beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is
entitled to an acquittal.29 The use of the "reasonable doubt"
standard is indispensable to command the respect and
confidence of the community in the application of criminal law. It
is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a
standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent
men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society
that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has
confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a
criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt
with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has
acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as
it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
he is charged.30 The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo
Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during the
deliberations in the floor of the House of Representatives are
elucidating -
DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON
RA 7080, 9 October 1990
MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our
criminal law that what is alleged in the information must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act
and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated in the
information, does that not work against the right of the accused
especially so if the amount committed, say, by falsification is less
than ₱100 million, but the totality of the crime committed is ₱100
million since there is malversation, bribery, falsification of public
document, coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the
information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What
is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every
element of the crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is
an enumeration of the things taken by the robber in the
information – three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need
not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not
prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was charged just
because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the
prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering
that in the crime of plunder the totality of the amount is very
important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be
taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to
accumulate only ₱50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was
only able to accumulate ₱1 million. Now, when we add the totality
of the other acts as required under this bill through the
interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so
how can we now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of
proving an essential element of the crime, there is a need to
prove that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one
essential element of the crime is that the amount involved is ₱100
million. Now, in a series of defalcations and other acts of
corruption in the enumeration the total amount would be ₱110 or
₱120 million, but there are certain acts that could not be proved,
so, we will sum up the amounts involved in those transactions
which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these
transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt, is ₱100 million,
then there is a crime of plunder (underscoring supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in
any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime
of plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove
beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to
constitute the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every
component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of
the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove
beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to
form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and
involving an amount of at least ₱50,000,000.00. There is no need
to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to
have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire
ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is
charged in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty
(50) raids on the public treasury. The prosecution need not prove
all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at
least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only
that they amounted to at least ₱50,000,000.00.31
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the
logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative
of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very
acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth.
Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is
able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as
defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the
proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with
reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation
for a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts to stash ₱50,000,000.00 or more, than "a
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten
wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a
deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily
follows with the establishment of a series or combination of the
predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of
Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a very important
element of the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged,
(as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of
the crime," such that without it the accused cannot be convicted
of plunder -
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be
convicted under the Plunder Law without applying Section 4 on
the Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of
the commission of the acts complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual
crimes enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the
crime are proved beyond reasonable doubt without applying
Section 4, can you not have a conviction under the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of
Sec. 4 in convicting an accused charged for violation of the
Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays
down a substantive element of the law x x x x
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of
Section 4 when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt on the
acts charged constituting plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two
pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and it contains a
substantive element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way
by which we can avoid Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable
doubt insofar as the predicate crimes charged are concerned that
you do not have to go that far by applying Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4
contains a very important element of the crime of plunder and that
cannot be avoided by the prosecution.32
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the
essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from
its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern"
is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of
Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the
crime of plunder x x x x
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for
the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely
procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any
substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in
furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to
substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a
conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the
prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that
moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for
the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the
reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from
the rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the
demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can
supplant Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080
provides for a separability clause -
Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or
the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held
invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of
such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be
affected thereby.
Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from
being declared invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its
provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really
so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated
independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the
objectives of the statute can best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza
that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal
intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion -
x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the
element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder.
It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the
crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and
criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of
petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the
requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the
statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator
Tañada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
SENATOR TAÑADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to
convict him would not be evidence for each and every individual
criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the
conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder.33
However, Senator Tañada was discussing §4 as shown by the
succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels
that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the
Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedier and faster
process of attending to this kind of cases?
SENATOR TAÑADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .34
Senator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is
conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove
each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or
conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt
a pattern of overt or ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern
are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be
proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, §2 provides that -
Any person who participated with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder
shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of
penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the
Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in
the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder
Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder
since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by
his criminal intent. It is true that §2 refers to "any person who
participates with the said public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason
to believe, however, that it does not apply as well to the public
officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We
agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with
what they omit, but there is no canon against using common
sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."35
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum
in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by
the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous
crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous
crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No.
7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court
held in People v. Echegaray:36
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that
are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was
callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly
dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or
her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital
crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom
resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured,
or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in
death; and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the
death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder,
rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal
detention, where the victim is detained for more than three days
or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats
to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with
homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and
carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped
vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion
perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the
significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the
scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in
which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide
for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of
corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and
impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must
muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption,
dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply
entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the
populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to
provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of
misappropriation or misapplication of government funds
translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government,
and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs
over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and
repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson
resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government
officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not be
allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a
heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the
acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they
are mala in se37 and it does not matter that such acts are punished
in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the
predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be
absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere
prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg.
22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the
inherent wrongness of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the
amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it
to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to
resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally
consigned by People v. Echegaray38 to the archives of
jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that
RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the
State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the
Constitution now as an integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and
obscene profligacy of officials in high places which have shaken
its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has
become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous
people relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk
the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are
imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily
methodical and economically catastrophic looting of the national
treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to
disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which,
if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately
consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The
Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the
legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure
society against the avarice and other venalities in public office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of
this nation, few issues of national importance can equal the
amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's
ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual
prosecution and trial under a virginal statute. This continuing saga
has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may
linger for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for
patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall we
emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080
otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is
CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law
unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr. C.J., Melo, Quisumbing, JJ., join concurring opinion of
J. Mendoza.
Puno, Vitug, JJ., concurred and joins J. Mendoza's concurring
opinion.
Kapunan, Pardo, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Ynares-Santiago, JJ., see
dissenting opinion.
Mendoza, J., please see concurring opinion.
Panganiban J., please see separate concurring opinion.
Carpio, J., no part. Was one of the complainants before
Ombudsman.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45127 May 5, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Provincial
Fiscal of Leyte, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY, CELESTINO S.
MATONDO, SEGUNDINO A, CAVAL and CIRILO M.
ZANORIA, respondents.
The Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
Adelino B. Sitoy for private respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Involved in this special civil action is the unique situation, to use
an euphemistic phrase, of an alternative penal sanction of
imprisonment imposed by law but without a specification as to the
term or duration thereof.
As a consequence of such legislative faux pas or oversight, the
petition at bar seeks to set aside the decision of the then Court of
First Instance of Leyte, Branch IV, dated September
8,1976, 1 penned by herein respondent judge and granting the
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
filed by herein private respondents and docketed therein as Civil
Case No. 5428, as well as his resolution of October 19,
1976 2denying the motions for reconsideration filed by the parties
therein. Subject of said decision were the issues on jurisdiction
over violations of Republic Act No. 4670, otherwise known as the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, and the constitutionality
of Section 32 thereof.
In a complaint filed by the Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte on
April 4, 1975, herein private respondents Celestino S. Matondo,
Segundino A. Caval and Cirilo M. Zanoria, public school officials
of Leyte, were charged before the Municipal Court of Hindang,
Leyte in Criminal Case No. 555 thereof for violation of Republic
Act No. 4670. The case was set for arraignment and trial on May
29, 1975. At the arraignment, the herein private respondents, as
the accused therein, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Immediately thereafter, they orally moved to quash the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction over the offense allegedly due to the
correctional nature of the penalty of imprisonment prescribed for
the offense. The motion to quash was subsequently reduced to
writing on June 13, 1975. 3 On August 21, 1975, the municipal
court denied the motion to quash for lack of merit. 4 On
September 2, 1975, private respondents filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the aforesaid denial order on the same ground
of lack of jurisdiction, but with the further allegation that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense considering that Section 32
of Republic Act No. 4670 is null and void for being
unconstitutional. In an undated order received by the counsel for
private respondents on October 20,1975, the motion for
reconsideration was denied. 5
On October 26, 1975, private respondents filed a petitions 6 for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction before the
former Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch VIII, where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. B-622, to restrain the Municipal
Judge, Provincial Fiscal and Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte
from proceeding with the trial of said Criminal Case No. 555 upon
the ground that the former Municipal Court of Hindang had no
jurisdiction over the offense charged. Subsequently, an amended
petition 7 alleged the additional ground that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense since the penal provision, which is
Section 32 of said law, is unconstitutional for the following
reasons: (1) It imposes a cruel and unusual punishment, the term
of imprisonment being unfixed and may run to reclusion perpetua;
and (2) It also constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment being solely
left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative
department of the Government.
On March 30, 1976, having been advised that the petition of
herein private respondents was related to Criminal Case No.
1978 for violation of Presidential Decree No. 442 previously
transferred from Branch VIII to Branch IV of the erstwhile Court of
First Instance of Leyte, Judge Fortunate B. Cuna of the former
branch transferred the said petition to the latter branch for further
proceedings and where it was subsequently docketed therein as
Civil Case No. 5428. 8 On March 15, 1976, the petitioner herein
filed an opposition to the admission of the said amended
petitions 9 but respondent judge denied the same in his resolution
of April 20, 1976. 10 On August 2, 1976, herein petitioner filed a
supplementary memorandum in answer to the amended
petition. 11
On September 8, 1976, respondent judge rendered the aforecited
challenged decision holding in substance that Republic Act No.
4670 is valid and constitutional but cases for its violation fall
outside of the jurisdiction of municipal and city courts, and
remanding the case to the former Municipal Court of Hindang,
Leyte only for preliminary investigation.
As earlier stated, on September 25, 1976, petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration. 12 Likewise, private respondents filed a motion
for reconsideration of the lower court's decision but the same was
limited only to the portion thereof which sustains the validity of
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670. 13 Respondent judge denied
both motions for reconsideration in a resolution dated October 19,
1976. 14
The instant petition to review the decision of respondent judge
poses the following questions of law: (1) Whether the municipal
and city courts have jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act
No. 4670; and (2) Whether Section 32 of said Republic Act No.
4670 is constitutional.
We shall resolve said queries in inverse order, since prior
determination of the constitutionality of the assailed provision of
the law involved is necessary for the adjudication of the
jurisdictional issue raised in this petition.
 1. The disputed section of Republic Act No. 4670
provides:
Sec. 32. Penal Provision. — A person who shall
wilfully interfere with, restrain or coerce any
teacher in the exercise of his rights guaranteed by
this Act or who shall in any other manner commit
any act to defeat any of the provisions of this Act
shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of
not less than one hundred pesos nor more than
one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment, in the
discretion of the court. (Emphasis supplied).
Two alternative and distinct penalties are consequently imposed,
to wit: (a) a fine ranging from P100.00 to P1,000.00; or (b)
imprisonment. It is apparent that the law has no prescribed period
or term for the imposable penalty of imprisonment. While a
minimum and maximum amount for the penalty of fine is
specified, there is no equivalent provision for the penalty of
imprisonment, although both appear to be qualified by the phrase
"in the discretion of the court.
Private respondents contend that a judicial determination of what
Congress intended to be the duration of the penalty of
imprisonment would be violative of the constitutional prohibition
against undue delegation of legislative power, and that the
absence of a provision on the specific term of imprisonment
constitutes that penalty into a cruel and unusual form of
punishment. Hence, it is vigorously asserted, said Section 32 is
unconstitutional.
The basic principle underlying the entire field of legal concepts
pertaining to the validity of legislation is that in the enactment of
legislation a constitutional measure is thereby created. In every
case where a question is raised as to the constitutionality of an
act, the court employs this doctrine in scrutinizing the terms of the
law. In a great volume of cases, the courts have enunciated the
fundamental rule that there is a presumption in favor of the
constitutionality of a legislative enactment. 15
It is contended that Republic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional on
the ground that the imposable but indefinite penalty of
imprisonment provided therein constitutes a cruel and unusual
punishment, in defiance of the express mandate of the
Constitution. This contention is inaccurate and should be
rejected.
We note with approval the holding of respondent judge that —
The rule is established beyond question that a
punishment authorized by statute is not cruel or
unusual or disproportionate to the nature of the
offense unless it is a barbarous one unknown to
the law or so wholly disproportionate to the nature
of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community. Based on the principle, our Supreme
Court has consistently overruled contentions of
the defense that the punishment of fine or
imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is
cruel and unusual. (Legarda vs. Valdez, 1 Phil.
146; U.S. vs. Pico, 18 Phil. 386; People vs. Garay,
2 ACR 149; People vs. Estoista 93 Phil. 647;
People vs. Tiu Ua. 96 Phil. 738; People vs.
Dionisio, 22 SCRA 1299). The language of our
Supreme Court in the first of the cases it decided
after the last world war is appropriate here:
The Constitution directs that
'Excessive fines shall not be
imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishment inflicted.' The
prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments is generally aimed at
the form or character of the
punishment rather than its severity
 in respect of duration or amount,
and apply to punishments which
never existed in America, or which
public sentiment has regarded as
cruel or obsolete (15 Am. Jur., p.
172), for instance there (sic)
inflicted at the whipping post, or in
the pillory, burning at the stake,
breaking on the wheel,
disemboweling, and the like (15
Am. Jur. Supra, Note 35 L.R.A. p.
561). Fine and imprisonment
would not thus be within the
prohibition.' (People vs. de la
Cruz, 92 Phil. 906). 16
The question that should be asked, further, is whether the
constitutional prohibition looks only to the form or nature of the
penalty and not to the proportion between the penalty and the
crime.
The answer thereto may be gathered from the pronouncement
in People vs. Estoista, 17 where an "excessive" penalty was
upheld as constitutional and was imposed but with a
recommendation for executive clemency, thus:
... If imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is out of
proportion to the present case in view of certain
circumstances, the law is not to be declared
unconstitutional for this reason. The
constitutionality of an act of the legislature is not
to be judged in the light of exceptional cases.
Small transgressors for which the heavy net was
not spread are, like small fishes, bound to be
caught, and it is to meet such a situation as this
that courts are advised to make a
recommendation to the Chief Executive for
clemency or reduction of the penalty...
That the penalty is grossly disproportionate to the crime is an
insufficient basis to declare the law unconstitutional on the ground
that it is cruel and unusual. The fact that the punishment
authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel or
unusual. 18 In addition, what degree of disproportion the Court will
consider as obnoxious to the Constitution has still to await
appropriate determination in due time since, to the credit of our
legislative bodies, no decision has as yet struck down a penalty
for being "cruel and unusual" or "excessive."
We turn now to the argument of private respondents that the
entire penal provision in question should be invalidated as an 49
"undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of penalty of
imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if
the lattter were the legislative department of the government."
Petitioner counters that the discretion granted therein by the
legislature to the courts to determine the period of imprisonment
is a matter of statutory construction and not an undue delegation
of legislative power. It is contended that the prohibition against
undue delegation of legislative power is concerned only with the
delegation of power to make laws and not to interpret the same. It
is also submitted that Republic Act No. 4670 vests in the courts
the discretion, not to fix the period of imprisonment, but to choose
which of the alternative penalties shall be imposed.
Respondent judge sustained these theses of petitioner on his
theory that "the principle of separation of powers is not violated by
vesting in courts discretion as to the length of sentence or amount
of fine between designated limits in sentencing persons convicted
of crime. In such instance, the exercise of judicial discretion by
the courts is not an attempt to use legislative power or to
prescribe and create a law but is an instance of the administration
of justice and the application of existing laws to the facts of
particular cases." 19 What respondent judge obviously overlooked
is his own reference to penalties "between designated limits."
In his commentary on the Constitution of the United States,
Corwin wrote:
.. At least three distinct ideas have contributed to
the development of the principle that legislative
power cannot be delegated. One is the doctrine of
separation of powers: Why go to the trouble of
separating the three powers of government if they
can straightway remerge on their own motion?
The second is the concept of due process of laws
which precludes the transfer of regulatory
functions to private persons. Lastly, there is the
maxim of agency "Delegata potestas non potest
delegari." 20
An apparent exception to the general rule forbidding the
delegation of legislative authority to the courts exists in cases
where discretion is conferred upon said courts. It is clear,
however, that when the courts are said to exercise a discretion, it
must be a mere legal discretion which is exercised in discerning
the course prescribed by law and which, when discerned, it is the
duty of the court to follow. 21
So it was held by the Supreme Court of the United States that the
principle of separation of powers is not violated by vesting in
courts discretion as to the length of sentence or the amount of
fine between designated limits in sentencing persons convicted of
a crime. 22
In the case under consideration, the respondent judge
erronneously assumed that since the penalty of imprisonment has
been provided for by the legislature, the court is endowed with the
discretion to ascertain the term or period of imprisonment. We
cannot agree with this postulate. It is not for the courts to fix the
term of imprisonment where no points of reference have been
provided by the legislature. What valid delegation presupposes
and sanctions is an exercise of discretion to fix the length of
service of a term of imprisonment which must be encompassed
within specific or designated limits provided by law, the absence
of which designated limits well constitute such exercise as an
undue delegation, if not-an outright intrusion into or assumption,
of legislative power.
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an
indeterminable period of imprisonment, with neither a minimum
nor a maximum duration having been set by the legislative
authority. The courts are thus given a wide latitude of discretion to
fix the term of imprisonment, without even the benefit of any
sufficient standard, such that the duration thereof may range, in
the words of respondent judge, from one minute to the life span of
the accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be allowed. It vests in the
courts a power and a duty essentially legislative in nature and
which, as applied to this case, does violence to the rules on
separation of powers as well as the non-delegability of legislative
powers. This time, the preumption of constitutionality has to yield.
On the foregoing considerations, and by virtue of the separability
clause in Section 34 of Republic Act No. 4670, the penalty of
imprisonment provided in Section 32 thereof should be, as it is
hereby, declared unconstitutional.
It follows, therefore, that a ruling on the proper interpretation of
the actual term of imprisonment, as may have been intended by
Congress, would be pointless and academic. It is, however, worth
mentioning that the suggested application of the so-called rule or
principle of parallelism, whereby a fine of P1,000.00 would be
equated with one year of imprisonment, does not merit judicial
acceptance. A fine, whether imposed as a single or as an
alternative penalty, should not and cannot be reduced or
converted into a prison term; it is to be considered as a separate
and independent penalty consonant with Article 26 of the Revised
Penal Code. 23 It is likewise declared a discrete principal penalty in
the graduated scales of penalties in Article 71 of said Code.
There is no rule for transmutation of the amount of a fine into a
term of imprisonment. Neither does the Code contain any
provision that a fine when imposed in conjunction with
imprisonment is subordinate to the latter penalty. In sum, a fine is
as much a principal penalty as imprisonment. Neither is
subordinate to the other. 24
2. It has been the consistent rule that the criminal jurisdiction of
the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. 25
With the deletion by invalidation of the provision on imprisonment
in Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670, as earlier discussed, the
imposable penalty for violations of said law should be limited to a
fine of not less than P100.00 and not more than P1,000.00, the
same to serve as the basis in determining which court may
properly exercise jurisdiction thereover. When the complaint
against private respondents was filed in 1975, the pertinent law
then in force was Republic Act No. 296, as amended by Republic
Act No. 3828, under which crimes punishable by a fine of not
more than P 3,000.00 fall under the original jurisdiction of the
former municipal courts. Consequently, Criminal Case No. 555
against herein private respondents falls within the original
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte.
WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of respondent judge
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 555
filed against private respondents herein is hereby ordered to be
remanded to the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte for trial
on the merits.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,
Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-64279 April 30, 1984
ANSELMO L. PESIGAN and MARCELINO L.
PESIGAN, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE DOMINGO MEDINA ANGELES, Regional Trial Court,
Caloocan City Branch 129, acting for REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT of Camarines Norte, now presided over by JUDGE
NICANOR ORIÑO, Daet Branch 40; DRA. BELLA S.
MIRANDA, ARNULFO V. ZENAROSA, ET AL., respondents.
Quiazon, De Guzman Makalintal and Barot for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
AQUINO, J.: ñé+ .£ª wph!1
At issue in this case is the enforceability, before publication in the
Official Gazette of June 14, 1982, of Presidential Executive Order
No. 626-A dated October 25, 1980, providing for the confiscation
and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from
one province to another.
Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelo L. Pesigan, carabao dealers,
transported in an Isuzu ten-wheeler truck in the evening of April 2,
1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Sipocot, Camarines Sur
with Padre Garcia, Batangas, as the destination.
They were provided with (1) a health certificate from the
provincial veterinarian of Camarines Sur, issued under the
Revised Administrative Code and Presidential Decree No. 533,
the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974; (2) a permit to transport
large cattle issued under the authority of the provincial
commander; and (3) three certificates of inspection, one from the
Constabulary command attesting that the carabaos were not
included in the list of lost, stolen and questionable animals; one
from the LIvestock inspector, Bureau of Animal Industry of
Libmanan, Camarines Sur and one from the mayor of Sipocot.
In spite of the permit to transport and the said four certificates, the
carabaos, while passing at Basud, Camarines Norte, were
confiscated by Lieutenant Arnulfo V. Zenarosa, the town's police
station commander, and by Doctor Bella S. Miranda, provincial
veterinarian. The confiscation was basis on the aforementioned
Executive Order No. 626-A which provides "that henceforth, no
carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose
and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to
another. The carabaos or carabeef transported in violation of this
Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the government to be distributed ... to deserving
farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may
see fit, in the case of carabaos" (78 OG 3144).
Doctor Miranda distributed the carabaos among twenty-five
farmers of Basud, and to a farmer from the Vinzons municipal
nursery (Annex 1).
The Pesigans filed against Zenarosa and Doctor Miranda an
action for replevin for the recovery of the carabaos allegedly
valued at P70,000 and damages of P92,000. The replevin order
could not be executed by the sheriff. In his order of April 25, 1983
Judge Domingo Medina Angeles, who heard the case at Daet
and who was later transferred to Caloocan City, dismissed the
case for lack of cause of action.
The Pesigans appealed to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court and section 25 of the Interim Rules and pursuant to
Republic Act No. 5440, a 1968 law which superseded Rule 42 of
the Rules of Court.
We hold that the said executive order should not be enforced
against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted,
it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in
the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only
fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code
and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code)
includes circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties.
Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of
the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the
persons affected thereby. (People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640;
Lim Hoa Ting vs. Central Bank of the Phils., 104 Phil. 573;
Balbuna vs. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150.)
The Spanish Supreme Court ruled that "bajo la denominacion
generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos,
Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordenes
dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso
de su potestad (1 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., p. 146.)
Thus, in the Que Po Lay case, a person, convicted by the trial
court of having violated Central Bank Circular No. 20 and
sentenced to six months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P1,000, was acquitted by this Court because the circular was
published in the Official Gazette three months after his
conviction. He was not bound by the circular.
That ruling applies to a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A
because its confiscation and forfeiture provision or sanction
makes it a penal statute. Justice and fairness dictate that the
public must be informed of that provision by means of publication
in the Gazette before violators of the executive order can be
bound thereby.
The cases of Police Commission vs. Bello, L-29960, January 30,
1971, 37 SCRA 230 and Philippine Blooming Mills vs. Social
Security System, 124 Phil. 499, cited by the respondents, do not
involve the enforcement of any penal regulation.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal and the
confiscation and dispersal of the carabaos are reversed and set
aside. Respondents Miranda and Zenarosa are ordered to restore
the carabaos, with the requisite documents, to the petitioners,
who as owners are entitled to possess the same, with the right to
dispose of them in Basud or Sipocot, Camarines Sur. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 1äw phï1.ñët

Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential

executive orders having general applicability should be published Makasiar, (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, and Escolin,
in the Official Gazette. It provides that "every order or document JJ., concur.
which shag prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have general
applicability and legal effect." De Castro, J., took no part.

Indeed, the practice has always been to publish executive orders

in the Gazette. Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code
provides that even bureau "regulations and orders shall become
effective only when approved by the Department Head and
published in the Official Gazette or otherwise publicly
promulgated". (See Commissioner of Civil Service vs. Cruz, 122
Phil. 1015.)

In the instant case, the livestock inspector and the provincial

veterinarian of Camarines Norte and the head of the Public FIRST DIVISION
Affairs Office of the Ministry of Agriculture were unaware of
Executive Order No. 626-A. The Pesigans could not have been G.R. No. 142396 February 11, 2003
expected to be cognizant of such an executive order.
KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner,
It results that they have a cause of action for the recovery of the vs.
carabaos. The summary confiscation was not in order. The HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR
recipients of the carabaos should return them to the Pesigans. SCALZO, respondents.
However, they cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas
because they are now bound by the said executive order. Neither DECISION
can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda and Zenarosa acted
in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the VITUG, J.:
carabaos.
Sometime in May 1986, an Information for violation of Section 4
of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise also known as the
"Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," was filed against petitioner
Khosrow Minucher and one Abbas Torabian with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 151, of Pasig City. The criminal charge
followed a "buy-bust operation" conducted by the Philippine
police narcotic agents in the house of Minucher, an Iranian
national, where a quantity of heroin, a prohibited drug, was said
to have been seized. The narcotic agents were accompanied by
private respondent Arthur Scalzo who would, in due time, become
one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution. On 08 January
1988, Presiding Judge Eutropio Migrino rendered a decision
acquitting the two accused.
On 03 August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case No. 88-45691
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, of Manila for
damages on account of what he claimed to have been trumped-
up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. The Manila
RTC detailed what it had found to be the facts and circumstances
surrounding the case.
"The testimony of the plaintiff disclosed that he is an Iranian
national. He came to the Philippines to study in the University of
the Philippines in 1974. In 1976, under the regime of the Shah of
Iran, he was appointed Labor Attaché for the Iranian Embassies
in Tokyo, Japan and Manila, Philippines. When the Shah of Iran
was deposed by Ayatollah Khomeini, plaintiff became a refugee
of the United Nations and continued to stay in the Philippines. He
headed the Iranian National Resistance Movement in the
Philippines.
"He came to know the defendant on May 13, 1986, when the
latter was brought to his house and introduced to him by a certain
Jose Iñigo, an informer of the Intelligence Unit of the military.
Jose Iñigo, on the other hand, was met by plaintiff at the office of
Atty. Crisanto Saruca, a lawyer for several Iranians whom plaintiff
assisted as head of the anti-Khomeini movement in the
Philippines.
"During his first meeting with the defendant on May 13, 1986,
upon the introduction of Jose Iñigo, the defendant expressed his
interest in buying caviar. As a matter of fact, he bought two kilos
of caviar from plaintiff and paid P10,000.00 for it. Selling caviar,
aside from that of Persian carpets, pistachio nuts and other
Iranian products was his business after the Khomeini government
cut his pension of over $3,000.00 per month. During their
introduction in that meeting, the defendant gave the plaintiff his
calling card, which showed that he is working at the US Embassy
in the Philippines, as a special agent of the Drug Enforcement
Administration, Department of Justice, of the United States, and
gave his address as US Embassy, Manila. At the back of the card
appears a telephone number in defendant’s own handwriting, the
number of which he can also be contacted.
"It was also during this first meeting that plaintiff expressed his
desire to obtain a US Visa for his wife and the wife of a
countryman named Abbas Torabian. The defendant told him that
he [could] help plaintiff for a fee of $2,000.00 per visa. Their
conversation, however, was more concentrated on politics,
carpets and caviar. Thereafter, the defendant promised to see
plaintiff again.
"On May 19, 1986, the defendant called the plaintiff and invited
the latter for dinner at Mario's Restaurant at Makati. He wanted to
buy 200 grams of caviar. Plaintiff brought the merchandize but for
the reason that the defendant was not yet there, he requested the
restaurant people to x x x place the same in the refrigerator.
Defendant, however, came and plaintiff gave him the caviar for
which he was paid. Then their conversation was again focused on
politics and business.
"On May 26, 1986, defendant visited plaintiff again at the latter's
residence for 18 years at Kapitolyo, Pasig. The defendant wanted
to buy a pair of carpets which plaintiff valued at $27,900.00. After
some haggling, they agreed at $24,000.00. For the reason that
defendant did not yet have the money, they agreed that
defendant would come back the next day. The following day, at
1:00 p.m., he came back with his $24,000.00, which he gave to
the plaintiff, and the latter, in turn, gave him the pair of carpets. 1awphi 1.nét
"At about 3:00 in the afternoon of May 27, 1986, the defendant
came back again to plaintiff's house and directly proceeded to the
latter's bedroom, where the latter and his countryman, Abbas
Torabian, were playing chess. Plaintiff opened his safe in the
bedroom and obtained $2,000.00 from it, gave it to the defendant
for the latter's fee in obtaining a visa for plaintiff's wife. The
defendant told him that he would be leaving the Philippines very
soon and requested him to come out of the house for a while so
that he can introduce him to his cousin waiting in a cab. Without
much ado, and without putting on his shirt as he was only in his
pajama pants, he followed the defendant where he saw a parked
cab opposite the street. To his complete surprise, an American
jumped out of the cab with a drawn high-powered gun. He was in
the company of about 30 to 40 Filipino soldiers with 6 Americans,
all armed. He was handcuffed and after about 20 minutes in the
street, he was brought inside the house by the defendant. He was
made to sit down while in handcuffs while the defendant was
inside his bedroom. The defendant came out of the bedroom and
out from defendant's attaché case, he took something and placed
it on the table in front of the plaintiff. They also took plaintiff's wife
who was at that time at the boutique near his house and likewise
arrested Torabian, who was playing chess with him in the
bedroom and both were handcuffed together. Plaintiff was not
told why he was being handcuffed and why the privacy of his
house, especially his bedroom was invaded by defendant. He
was not allowed to use the telephone. In fact, his telephone was
unplugged. He asked for any warrant, but the defendant told him
to `shut up.’ He was nevertheless told that he would be able to
call for his lawyer who can defend him.
"The plaintiff took note of the fact that when the defendant invited
him to come out to meet his cousin, his safe was opened where
he kept the $24,000.00 the defendant paid for the carpets and
another $8,000.00 which he also placed in the safe together with
a bracelet worth $15,000.00 and a pair of earrings worth
$10,000.00. He also discovered missing upon his release his 8
pieces hand-made Persian carpets, valued at $65,000.00, a
painting he bought for P30,000.00 together with his TV and
betamax sets. He claimed that when he was handcuffed, the
defendant took his keys from his wallet. There was, therefore,
nothing left in his house.
"That his arrest as a heroin trafficker x x x had been well
publicized throughout the world, in various newspapers,
particularly in Australia, America, Central Asia and in the
Philippines. He was identified in the papers as an international
drug trafficker. x x x
In fact, the arrest of defendant and Torabian was likewise on
television, not only in the Philippines, but also in America and in
Germany. His friends in said places informed him that they saw
him on TV with said news.
"After the arrest made on plaintiff and Torabian, they were
brought to Camp Crame handcuffed together, where they were
detained for three days without food and water."1
During the trial, the law firm of Luna, Sison and Manas, filed a
special appearance for Scalzo and moved for extension of time to
file an answer pending a supposed advice from the United States
Department of State and Department of Justice on the defenses
to be raised. The trial court granted the motion. On 27 October
1988, Scalzo filed another special appearance to quash the
summons on the ground that he, not being a resident of the
Philippines and the action being one in personam, was beyond
the processes of the court. The motion was denied by the court,
in its order of 13 December 1988, holding that the filing by Scalzo
of a motion for extension of time to file an answer to the complaint
was a voluntary appearance equivalent to service of summons
which could likewise be construed a waiver of the requirement of
formal notice. Scalzo filed a motion for reconsideration of the
court order, contending that a motion for an extension of time to
file an answer was not a voluntary appearance equivalent to
service of summons since it did not seek an affirmative relief.
Scalzo argued that in cases involving the United States
government, as well as its agencies and officials, a motion for
extension was peculiarly unavoidable due to the need (1) for both
the Department of State and the Department of Justice to agree
on the defenses to be raised and (2) to refer the case to a
Philippine lawyer who would be expected to first review the case.
The court a quo denied the motion for reconsideration in its order
of 15 October 1989.
Scalzo filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, there
docketed CA-G.R. No. 17023, assailing the denial. In a decision,
dated 06 October 1989, the appellate court denied the petition
and affirmed the ruling of the trial court. Scalzo then elevated the
incident in a petition for review on certiorari, docketed G.R. No.
91173, to this Court. The petition, however, was denied for its
failure to comply with SC Circular No. 1-88; in any event, the
Court added, Scalzo had failed to show that the appellate court
was in error in its questioned judgment.
Meanwhile, at the court a quo, an order, dated 09 February 1990,
was issued (a) declaring Scalzo in default for his failure to file a
responsive pleading (answer) and (b) setting the case for the
reception of evidence. On 12 March 1990, Scalzo filed a motion
to set aside the order of default and to admit his answer to the
complaint. Granting the motion, the trial court set the case for pre-
trial. In his answer, Scalzo denied the material allegations of the
complaint and raised the affirmative defenses (a) of Minucher’s
failure to state a cause of action in his complaint and (b) that
Scalzo had acted in the discharge of his official duties as being
merely an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the
United States Department of Justice. Scalzo interposed a
counterclaim of P100,000.00 to answer for attorneys' fees and
expenses of litigation.
Then, on 14 June 1990, after almost two years since the
institution of the civil case, Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of the United
States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to
diplomatic immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note
No. 414 of the United States Embassy, dated 29 May 1990,
addressed to the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines
and a Certification, dated 11 June 1990, of Vice Consul Donna
Woodward, certifying that the note is a true and faithful copy of its
original. In an order of 25 June 1990, the trial court denied the
motion to dismiss.
On 27 July 1990, Scalzo filed a petition for certiorari with
injunction with this Court, docketed G.R. No. 94257 and entitled
"Arthur W. Scalzo, Jr., vs. Hon. Wenceslao Polo, et al.," asking
that the complaint in Civil Case No. 88-45691 be ordered
dismissed. The case was referred to the Court of Appeals, there
docketed CA-G.R. SP No. 22505, per this Court’s resolution of 07
August 1990. On 31 October 1990, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision sustaining the diplomatic immunity of
Scalzo and ordering the dismissal of the complaint against him.
Minucher filed a petition for review with this Court, docketed G.R.
No. 97765 and entitled "Khosrow Minucher vs. the Honorable
Court of Appeals, et. al." (cited in 214 SCRA 242), appealing the
judgment of the Court of Appeals. In a decision, dated 24
September 1992, penned by Justice (now Chief Justice) Hilario
Davide, Jr., this Court reversed the decision of the appellate court
and remanded the case to the lower court for trial. The remand
was ordered on the theses (a) that the Court of Appeals erred in
granting the motion to dismiss of Scalzo for lack of jurisdiction
over his person without even considering the issue of the
authenticity of Diplomatic Note No. 414 and (b) that the complaint
contained sufficient allegations to the effect that Scalzo
committed the imputed acts in his personal capacity and outside
the scope of his official duties and, absent any evidence to the
contrary, the issue on Scalzo’s diplomatic immunity could not be
taken up.
The Manila RTC thus continued with its hearings on the case. On
17 November 1995, the trial court reached a decision; it
adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing considerations,
judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff, who successfully
established his claim by sufficient evidence, against the
defendant in the manner following:
"`Adjudging defendant liable to plaintiff in actual and
compensatory damages of P520,000.00; moral damages in the
sum of P10 million; exemplary damages in the sum of
P100,000.00; attorney's fees in the sum of P200,000.00 plus
costs.
`The Clerk of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, is ordered to take
note of the lien of the Court on this judgment to answer for the
unpaid docket fees considering that the plaintiff in this case
instituted this action as a pauper litigant.’"2
While the trial court gave credence to the claim of Scalzo and the
evidence presented by him that he was a diplomatic agent
entitled to immunity as such, it ruled that he, nevertheless, should
be held accountable for the acts complained of committed outside
his official duties. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court and sustained the defense of Scalzo
that he was sufficiently clothed with diplomatic immunity during
his term of duty and thereby immune from the criminal and civil
jurisdiction of the "Receiving State" pursuant to the terms of the
Vienna Convention.
Hence, this recourse by Minucher. The instant petition for review
raises a two-fold issue: (1) whether or not the doctrine of
conclusiveness of judgment, following the decision rendered by
this Court in G.R. No. 97765, should have precluded the Court of
Appeals from resolving the appeal to it in an entirely different
manner, and (2) whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to
diplomatic immunity.
The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, or its kindred rule of
res judicata, would require 1) the finality of the prior judgment, 2)
a valid jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties on the
part of the court that renders it, 3) a judgment on the merits, and
4) an identity of the parties, subject matter and causes of
action.3 Even while one of the issues submitted in G.R. No. 97765
- "whether or not public respondent Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that private respondent Scalzo is a diplomat immune from
civil suit conformably with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations" - is also a pivotal question raised in the instant petition,
the ruling in G.R. No. 97765, however, has not resolved that point
with finality. Indeed, the Court there has made this observation -
"It may be mentioned in this regard that private respondent
himself, in his Pre-trial Brief filed on 13 June 1990, unequivocally
states that he would present documentary evidence consisting of
DEA records on his investigation and surveillance of plaintiff and
on his position and duties as DEA special agent in Manila. Having
thus reserved his right to present evidence in support of his
position, which is the basis for the alleged diplomatic immunity,
the barren self-serving claim in the belated motion to dismiss
cannot be relied upon for a reasonable, intelligent and fair
resolution of the issue of diplomatic immunity."4
Scalzo contends that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, to which the Philippines is a signatory, grants him
absolute immunity from suit, describing his functions as an agent
of the United States Drugs Enforcement Agency as "conducting
surveillance operations on suspected drug dealers in the
Philippines believed to be the source of prohibited drugs being
shipped to the U.S., (and) having ascertained the target, (he then)
would inform the Philippine narcotic agents (to) make the actual
arrest." Scalzo has submitted to the trial court a number of
documents -
1. Exh. '2' - Diplomatic Note No. 414 dated 29 May 1990;
2. Exh. '1' - Certification of Vice Consul Donna K.
Woodward dated 11 June 1990;
 3. Exh. '5' - Diplomatic Note No. 757 dated 25 October
1991;
4. Exh. '6' - Diplomatic Note No. 791 dated 17 November
1992; and
5. Exh. '7' - Diplomatic Note No. 833 dated 21 October
1988.
6. Exh. '3' - 1st Indorsement of the Hon. Jorge R. Coquia,
Legal Adviser, Department of Foreign Affairs, dated 27
June 1990 forwarding Embassy Note No. 414 to the Clerk
of Court of RTC Manila, Branch 19 (the trial court);
7. Exh. '4' - Diplomatic Note No. 414, appended to the 1st
Indorsement (Exh. '3'); and
8. Exh. '8' - Letter dated 18 November 1992 from the
Office of the Protocol, Department of Foreign Affairs,
through Asst. Sec. Emmanuel Fernandez, addressed to
the Chief Justice of this Court.5
The documents, according to Scalzo, would show that: (1) the
United States Embassy accordingly advised the Executive
Department of the Philippine Government that Scalzo was a
member of the diplomatic staff of the United States diplomatic
mission from his arrival in the Philippines on 14 October 1985
until his departure on 10 August 1988; (2) that the United States
Government was firm from the very beginning in asserting the
diplomatic immunity of Scalzo with respect to the case pursuant
to the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations; and (3) that the United States Embassy repeatedly
urged the Department of Foreign Affairs to take appropriate
action to inform the trial court of Scalzo’s diplomatic immunity.
The other documentary exhibits were presented to indicate that:
(1) the Philippine government itself, through its Executive
Department, recognizing and respecting the diplomatic status of
Scalzo, formally advised the "Judicial Department" of his
diplomatic status and his entitlement to all diplomatic privileges
and immunities under the Vienna Convention; and (2) the
Department of Foreign Affairs itself authenticated Diplomatic Note
No. 414. Scalzo additionally presented Exhibits "9" to "13"
consisting of his reports of investigation on the surveillance and
subsequent arrest of Minucher, the certification of the Drug
Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of
Justice that Scalzo was a special agent assigned to the
Philippines at all times relevant to the complaint, and the special
power of attorney executed by him in favor of his previous
counsel6 to show (a) that the United States Embassy, affirmed by
its Vice Consul, acknowledged Scalzo to be a member of the
diplomatic staff of the United States diplomatic mission from his
arrival in the Philippines on 14 October 1985 until his departure
on 10 August 1988, (b) that, on May 1986, with the cooperation of
the Philippine law enforcement officials and in the exercise of his
functions as member of the mission, he investigated Minucher for
alleged trafficking in a prohibited drug, and (c) that the Philippine
Department of Foreign Affairs itself recognized that Scalzo during
his tour of duty in the Philippines (14 October 1985 up to 10
August 1988) was listed as being an Assistant Attaché of the
United States diplomatic mission and accredited with diplomatic
status by the Government of the Philippines. In his Exhibit 12,
Scalzo described the functions of the overseas office of the
United States Drugs Enforcement Agency, i.e., (1) to provide
criminal investigative expertise and assistance to foreign law
enforcement agencies on narcotic and drug control programs
upon the request of the host country, 2) to establish and maintain
liaison with the host country and counterpart foreign law
enforcement officials, and 3) to conduct complex criminal
investigations involving international criminal conspiracies which
affect the interests of the United States.
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was a
codification of centuries-old customary law and, by the time of its
ratification on 18 April 1961, its rules of law had long become
stable. Among the city states of ancient Greece, among the
peoples of the Mediterranean before the establishment of the
Roman Empire, and among the states of India, the person of the
herald in time of war and the person of the diplomatic envoy in
time of peace were universally held sacrosanct.7 By the end of the
16th century, when the earliest treatises on diplomatic law were
published, the inviolability of ambassadors was firmly established
as a rule of customary international law.8Traditionally, the
exercise of diplomatic intercourse among states was undertaken
by the head of state himself, as being the preeminent
embodiment of the state he represented, and the foreign
secretary, the official usually entrusted with the external affairs of
the state. Where a state would wish to have a more prominent
diplomatic presence in the receiving state, it would then send to
the latter a diplomatic mission. Conformably with the Vienna
Convention, the functions of the diplomatic mission involve, by
and large, the representation of the interests of the sending state
and promoting friendly relations with the receiving state.9
The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions
to include (a) ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of
state,10 (b) envoys,11 ministers or internuncios accredited to the
heads of states; and (c) charges d' affairs12 accredited to the
ministers of foreign affairs.13 Comprising the "staff of the
(diplomatic) mission" are the diplomatic staff, the administrative
staff and the technical and service staff. Only the heads of
missions, as well as members of the diplomatic staff, excluding
the members of the administrative, technical and service staff of
the mission, are accorded diplomatic rank. Even while the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides for immunity to the
members of diplomatic missions, it does so, nevertheless, with an
understanding that the same be restrictively applied. Only
"diplomatic agents," under the terms of the Convention, are
vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal
suits. The Convention defines "diplomatic agents" as the heads of
missions or members of the diplomatic staff, thus impliedly
withholding the same privileges from all others. It might bear
stressing that even consuls, who represent their respective states
in concerns of commerce and navigation and perform certain
administrative and notarial duties, such as the issuance of
passports and visas, authentication of documents, and
administration of oaths, do not ordinarily enjoy the traditional
diplomatic immunities and privileges accorded diplomats, mainly
for the reason that they are not charged with the duty of
representing their states in political matters. Indeed, the main
yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled
to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs
duties of diplomatic nature.
Scalzo asserted, particularly in his Exhibits "9" to "13," that he
was an Assistant Attaché of the United States diplomatic mission
and was accredited as such by the Philippine Government. An
attaché belongs to a category of officers in the diplomatic
establishment who may be in charge of its cultural, press,
administrative or financial affairs. There could also be a class of
attaches belonging to certain ministries or departments of the
government, other than the foreign ministry or department, who
are detailed by their respective ministries or departments with the
embassies such as the military, naval, air, commercial,
agricultural, labor, science, and customs attaches, or the like.
Attaches assist a chief of mission in his duties and are
administratively under him, but their main function is to observe,
analyze and interpret trends and developments in their respective
fields in the host country and submit reports to their own
ministries or departments in the home government.14 These
officials are not generally regarded as members of the diplomatic
mission, nor are they normally designated as having diplomatic
rank.
In an attempt to prove his diplomatic status, Scalzo presented
Diplomatic Notes Nos. 414, 757 and 791, all issued post litem
motam, respectively, on 29 May 1990, 25 October 1991 and 17
November 1992. The presentation did nothing much to alleviate
the Court's initial reservations in G.R. No. 97765, viz:
"While the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, the public
respondent gravely abused its discretion in dismissing Civil Case
No. 88-45691 on the basis of an erroneous assumption that
simply because of the diplomatic note, the private respondent is
clothed with diplomatic immunity, thereby divesting the trial court
of jurisdiction over his person.
"x x x x x x x x x
"And now, to the core issue - the alleged diplomatic immunity of
the private respondent. Setting aside for the moment the issue of
authenticity raised by the petitioner and the doubts that surround
such claim, in view of the fact that it took private respondent one
(1) year, eight (8) months and seventeen (17) days from the time
his counsel filed on 12 September 1988 a Special Appearance
and Motion asking for a first extension of time to file the Answer
because the Departments of State and Justice of the United
States of America were studying the case for the purpose of
determining his defenses, before he could secure the Diplomatic
Note from the US Embassy in Manila, and even granting for the
sake of argument that such note is authentic, the complaint for
damages filed by petitioner cannot be peremptorily dismissed.
"x x x x x x x x x
"There is of course the claim of private respondent that the acts
imputed to him were done in his official capacity. Nothing
supports this self-serving claim other than the so-called
Diplomatic Note. x x x. The public respondent then should have
sustained the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss. Verily, it
should have been the most proper and appropriate recourse. It
should not have been overwhelmed by the self-serving Diplomatic
Note whose belated issuance is even suspect and whose
authenticity has not yet been proved. The undue haste with which
respondent Court yielded to the private respondent's claim is
arbitrary."
A significant document would appear to be Exhibit No. 08, dated
08 November 1992, issued by the Office of Protocol of the
Department of Foreign Affairs and signed by Emmanuel C.
Fernandez, Assistant Secretary, certifying that "the records of the
Department (would) show that Mr. Arthur W. Scalzo, Jr., during
his term of office in the Philippines (from 14 October 1985 up to
10 August 1988) was listed as an Assistant Attaché of the United
States diplomatic mission and was, therefore, accredited
diplomatic status by the Government of the Philippines." No
certified true copy of such "records," the supposed bases for the
belated issuance, was presented in evidence.
Concededly, vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a
prerogative of the executive branch of the government. In World
Health Organization vs. Aquino,15 the Court has recognized that, in
such matters, the hands of the courts are virtually tied. Amidst
apprehensions of indiscriminate and incautious grant of immunity,
designed to gain exemption from the jurisdiction of courts, it
should behoove the Philippine government, specifically its
Department of Foreign Affairs, to be most circumspect, that
should particularly be no less than compelling, in its post litem
motam issuances. It might be recalled that the privilege is not an
immunity from the observance of the law of the territorial
sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity
from the exercise of territorial jurisdiction.16 The government of the
United States itself, which Scalzo claims to be acting for, has
formulated its standards for recognition of a diplomatic agent. The
State Department policy is to only concede diplomatic status to a
person who possesses an acknowledged diplomatic title and
"performs duties of diplomatic nature."17 Supplementary criteria for
accreditation are the possession of a valid diplomatic passport or,
from States which do not issue such passports, a diplomatic note
formally representing the intention to assign the person to
diplomatic duties, the holding of a non-immigrant visa, being over
twenty-one years of age, and performing diplomatic functions on
an essentially full-time basis.18 Diplomatic missions are requested
to provide the most accurate and descriptive job title to that which
currently applies to the duties performed. The Office of the
Protocol would then assign each individual to the appropriate
functional category.19
But while the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain
contentious, it was sufficiently established that, indeed, he
worked for the United States Drug Enforcement Agency and was
tasked to conduct surveillance of suspected drug activities within
the country on the dates pertinent to this case. If it should be
ascertained that Arthur Scalzo was acting well within his assigned
functions when he committed the acts alleged in the complaint,
the present controversy could then be resolved under the related
doctrine of State Immunity from Suit.
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a
foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international
law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign
sovereign from suit20and, with the emergence of democratic
states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of state,
or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its
sovereign capacity.21 If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a
foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not
necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official
capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the
foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a
representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the
state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an
individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the
maxim - par in parem, non habet imperium - that all states are
sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one
another.22 The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment
against an official would require the state itself to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of
the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the
suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it
has not been formally impleaded.23
In United States of America vs. Guinto,24 involving officers of the
United States Air Force and special officers of the Air Force
Office of Special Investigators charged with the duty of preventing
the distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs, this
Court has ruled -
"While the doctrine (of state immunity) appears to prohibit only
suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to
complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly
performed by them in the discharge of their duties. x x x. It cannot
for a moment be imagined that they were acting in their private or
unofficial capacity when they apprehended and later testified
against the complainant. It follows that for discharging their duties
as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded
for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its
consent to be sued. x x x As they have acted on behalf of the
government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that
government, and not the petitioners personally, [who were]
responsible for their acts."25
This immunity principle, however, has its limitations. Thus, Shauf
vs. Court of Appeals26 elaborates:
"It is a different matter where the public official is made to account
in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the
rights of the plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in
Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al., vs. Aligaen,
et al. (33 SCRA 368): `Inasmuch as the State authorizes only
legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials
or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the
officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or
violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit
against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit.
In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in
equity against a State officer or the director of a State department
on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates
or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under
an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which
he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the
constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its
consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state
immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice.
 "x x x x x x x x x Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job
description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on
"(T)he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target,
be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to
and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on
protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust
removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal
This situation usually arises where the public official acts without case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted
authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well- beyond the scope of his official function or duties.
settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his
personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur
caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith or beyond the Scalzo, an agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency
scope of his authority and jurisdiction."27 allowed by the Philippine government to conduct activities in the
country to help contain the problem on the drug traffic, is entitled
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with to the defense of state immunity from suit.
immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that
he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the petition is
of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic DENIED. No costs.
courtesy between the two sovereigns. Guinto and Shauf both
involve officers and personnel of the United States, stationed SO ORDERED.
within Philippine territory, under the RP-US Military Bases
Agreement. While evidence is wanting to show any similar Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and
agreement between the governments of the Philippines and of Azcuna, JJ., concur
the United States (for the latter to send its agents and to conduct
surveillance and related activities of suspected drug dealers in
the Philippines), the consent or imprimatur of the Philippine
government to the activities of the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the facts
heretofore elsewhere mentioned. The official exchanges of
communication between agencies of the government of the two
countries, certifications from officials of both the Philippine
Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as
well as the participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics
Command in the "buy-bust operation" conducted at the residence
of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to
support the "diplomatic status" of the latter but they give enough
indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, FIRST DIVISION
if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent
G.R. No. 125865 March 26, 2001
JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This resolves petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of our
Decision dated January 28, 2000, denying the petition for review.
The Motion is anchored on the following arguments:
1) THE DFA'S DETERMINATION OF IMMUNITY IS A
POLITICAL QUESTION TO BE MADE BY THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT AND IS
CONCLUSIVE UPON THE COURTS.
2) THE IMMUNITY OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS IS ABSOLUTE.
3) THE IMMUNITY EXTENDS TO ALL STAFF OF THE
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB).
4) DUE PROCESS WAS FULLY AFFORDED THE
COMPLAINANT TO REBUT THE DFA PROTOCOL.
5) THE DECISION OF JANUARY 28, 2000
ERRONEOUSLY MADE A FINDING OF FACT ON THE
MERITS, NAMELY, THE SLANDERING OF A PERSON
WHICH PREJUDGED PETITIONER'S CASE BEFORE
THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT (MTC)-
MANDALUYONG.
6) THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.
This case has its origin in two criminal Informations1 for grave oral
defamation filed against petitioner, a Chinese national who was
employed as an Economist by the Asian Development Bank
(ADB), alleging that on separate occasions on January 28 and
January 31, 1994, petitioner allegedly uttered defamatory words
to Joyce V. Cabal, a member of the clerical staff of ADB. On April
13, 1994, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City,
acting pursuant to an advice from the Department of Foreign
Affairs that petitioner enjoyed immunity from legal processes,
dismissed the criminal Informations against him. On a petition for
certiorari and mandamus filed by the People, the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 160, annulled and set aside the order
of the Metropolitan Trial Court dismissing the criminal cases.2
Petitioner, thus, brought a petition for review with this Court. On
January 28, 2000, we rendered the assailed Decision denying the
petition for review. We ruled, in essence, that the immunity
granted to officers and staff of the ADB is not absolute; it is
limited to acts performed in an official capacity. Furthermore, we
held that the immunity cannot cover the commission of a crime
such as slander or oral defamation in the name of official duty.
On October 18, 2000, the oral arguments of the parties were
heard. This Court also granted the Motion for Intervention of the
Department of Foreign Affairs. Thereafter, the parties were
directed to submit their respective memorandum.
For the most part, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration deals
with the diplomatic immunity of the ADB, its officials and staff,
from legal and judicial processes in the Philippines, as well as the
constitutional and political bases thereof. It should be made clear
that nowhere in the assailed Decision is diplomatic immunity
denied, even remotely. The issue in this case, rather, boils down
to whether or not the statements allegedly made by petitioner
were uttered while in the performance of his official functions, in
order for this case to fall squarely under the provisions of Section
45 (a) of the "Agreement Between the Asian Development Bank
and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Regarding
the Headquarters of the Asian Development Bank," to wit:
Officers and staff of the Bank, including for the purpose of
this Article experts and consultants performing missions
for the Bank, shall enjoy the following privileges and
immunities:
(a) Immunity from legal process with respect to
acts performed by them in their official capacity
except when the Bank waives the immunity.
After a careful deliberation of the arguments raised in petitioner's
and intervenor's Motions for Reconsideration, we find no cogent
reason to disturb our Decision of January 28, 2000. As we have
stated therein, the slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot be
considered as falling within the purview of the immunity granted
to ADB officers and personnel. Petitioner argues that the Decision
had the effect of prejudging the criminal case for oral defamation
against him. We wish to stress that it did not. What we merely
stated therein is that slander, in general, cannot be considered as
an act performed in an official capacity. The issue of whether or
not petitioner's utterances constituted oral defamation is still for
the trial court to determine.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motions for
Reconsideration filed by petitioner and intervenor Department of
Foreign Affairs are DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
Kapunan and Pardo, JJ ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., I also join concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Puno.
Puno, J., Please see concurring opinion.
Concurring Opinions
PUNO, J., concurring:
For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner
Jeffrey Liang of this Court's decision dated January 28, 2000
which denied the petition for review. We there held that: the
protocol communication of the Department of Foreign Affairs to
the effect that petitioner Liang is covered by immunity is only
preliminary and has no binding effect in courts; the immunity
provided for under Section 45(a) of the Headquarters Agreement
is subject to the condition that the act be done in an "official
capacity"; that slandering a person cannot be said to have been
done in an "official capacity" and, hence, it is not covered by the
immunity agreement; under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is such, enjoys
immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in
the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial
activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state
outside his official functions; the commission of a crime is not part
of official duty; and that a preliminary investigation is not a matter
of right in cases cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration is anchored on the
following arguments:
1. The DFA's determination of immunity is a political
question to be made by the executive branch of the
government and is conclusive upon the courts;
2. The immunity of international organizations is absolute;
3. The immunity extends to all staff of the Asian
Development Bank (ADB);
 4. Due process was fully accorded the complainant to
rebut the DFA protocol;
5. The decision of January 28, 2000 erroneously made a
finding of fact on the merits, namely, the slandering of a
person which prejudged petitioner's case before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) Mandaluyong; and
6. The Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations is not
applicable to this case.
Petitioner contends that a determination of a person's diplomatic
immunity by the Department of Foreign Affairs is a political
question. It is solely within the prerogative of the executive
department and is conclusive upon the courts. In support of his
submission, petitioner cites the following cases: WHO vs.
Aquino;1 International Catholic Migration Commission vs.
Calleja;2 The Holy See vs. Rosario, Jr.;3 Lasco vs. United
Nations;4 and DFA vs. NLRC.5
It is further contended that the immunity conferred under the ADB
Charter and the Headquarters Agreement is absolute. It is
designed to safeguard the autonomy and independence of
international organizations against interference from any authority
external to the organizations. It is necessary to allow such
organizations to discharge their entrusted functions effectively.
The only exception to this immunity is when there is an implied or
express waiver or when the immunity is expressly limited by
statute. The exception allegedly has no application to the case at
bar.
Petitioner likewise urges that the international organization's
immunity from local jurisdiction empowers the ADB alone to
determine what constitutes "official acts" and the same cannot be
subject to different interpretations by the member states. It
asserts that the Headquarters Agreement provides for remedies
to check abuses against the exercise of the immunity. Thus,
Section 49 states that the "Bank shall waive the immunity
accorded to any person if, in its opinion, such immunity would
impede the course of justice and the waiver would not prejudice
the purposes for which the immunities are accorded." Section 51
allows for consultation between the government and the Bank
should the government consider that an abuse has occurred. The
same section provides the mechanism for a dispute settlement
regarding, among others, issues of interpretation or application of
the agreement.
Petitioner's argument that a determination by the Department of
Foreign Affairs that he is entitled to diplomatic immunity is a
political question binding on the courts, is anchored on the ruling
enunciated in the case of WHO, et al. vs. Aquino, et al.,6 viz:
"It is a recognized principle of international law and under
our system of separation of powers that diplomatic
immunity is essentially a political question and courts
should refuse to look beyond a determination by the
executive branch of the government, and where the plea
of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the
executive branch of the government as in the case at bar,
it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of
immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law
officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this
case, or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in
adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so
exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of
property, as to embarrass the executive arm of the
government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted
doctrine that in such cases the judicial department of the
government follows the action of the political branch and
will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic
jurisdiction."
This ruling was reiterated in the subsequent cases of International
Catholic Migration Commission vs. Calleja;7The Holy See vs.
Rosario, Jr.;8 Lasco vs. UN;9 and DFA vs. NLRC.10
The case of WHO vs. Aquino involved the search and seizure of
personal effects of petitioner Leonce Verstuyft, an official of the
WHO. Verstuyft was certified to be entitled to diplomatic immunity
pursuant to the Host Agreement executed between the
Philippines and the WHO.
ICMC vs. Calleja concerned a petition for certification election
filed against ICMC and IRRI. As international organizations,
ICMC and IRRI were declared to possess diplomatic immunity. It
was held that they are not subject to local jurisdictions. It was
ruled that the exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor
over the case would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which
is to shield the affairs of international organizations from political
pressure or control by the host country and to ensure the
unhampered performance of their functions.
Holy See v. Rosario, Jr. involved an action for annulment of sale
of land against the Holy See, as represented by the Papal
Nuncio. The Court upheld the petitioner's defense of sovereign
immunity. It ruled that where a diplomatic envoy is granted
immunity from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the
receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable
property situated in the territory of the receiving state, which the
envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the
mission, with all the more reason should immunity be recognized
as regards the sovereign itself, which in that case is the Holy See.
In Lasco vs. United Nations, the United Nations Revolving Fund
for Natural Resources Exploration was sued before the NLRC for
illegal dismissal. The Court again upheld the doctrine of
diplomatic immunity invoked by the Fund.
Finally, DFA v. NLRC involved an illegal dismissal case filed
against the Asian Development Bank. Pursuant to its Charter and
the Headquarters Agreement, the diplomatic immunity of the
Asian Development Bank was recognized by the Court.
It bears to stress that all of these cases pertain to the diplomatic
immunity enjoyed by international organizations. Petitioner
asserts that he is entitled to the same diplomatic immunity and he
cannot be prosecuted for acts allegedly done in the exercise of
his official functions.
The term "international organizations" —
"is generally used to describe an organization set up by
agreement between two or more states. Under
contemporary international law, such organizations are
endowed with some degree of international legal
personality such that they are capable of exercising
specific rights, duties and powers. They are organized
mainly as a means for conducting general international
business in which the member states have an interest."11
International public officials have been defined as:
". . . persons who, on the basis of an international treaty
constituting a particular international community, are
appointed by this international community, or by an organ
of it, and are under its control to exercise, in a continuous
way, functions in the interest of this particular international
community, and who are subject to a particular personal
status."12
"Specialized agencies" are international organizations
having functions in particular fields, such as posts,
telecommunications, railways, canals, rivers, sea transport,
civil aviation, meteorology, atomic energy, finance, trade,
education and culture, health and refugees.13
Issues
 1. Whether petitioner Liang, as an official of an
international organization, is entitled to diplomatic
immunity;
2. Whether an international official is immune from
criminal jurisdiction for all acts, whether private or official;
3. Whether the authority to determine if an act is official or
private is lodged in the courts;
4. Whether the certification by the Department of Foreign
Affairs that petitioner is covered by immunity is a political
question that is binding and conclusive on the courts.
Discussion
I and, in respect of words spoken or written and all acts
A perusal of the immunities provisions in various international
conventions and agreements will show that the nature and
degree of immunities vary depending on who the recipient is.
Thus:
1. Charter of the United Nations
"Article 105 (1): The Organization shall enjoy in the
territory of each of its Members such privileges and
immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its
purposes.
Article 105 (2): Representatives of the Members of the
United Nations and officials of the Organization shall
similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are
necessary for the independent exercise of their functions
in connection with the Organization."
2. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations
"Section 2: The United Nations, its property and assets
wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy
immunity from every form of legal process except insofar
as in any particular case it has expressly waived its
immunity. It is, however, understood that no waiver of
immunity shall extend to any measure of execution.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 11 (a): Representatives of Members to the
principal and subsidiary organs of the United Nations . .
shall . . . enjoy . . . immunity from personal arrest or
detention and from seizure of their personal baggage,
done by them in their capacity as representatives,
immunity from legal process of every kind.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 14: Privileges and immunities are accorded to the
representatives of Members not for the personal benefit of
the individuals themselves, but in order to safeguard the
independent exercise of their functions in connection with
the United Nations. Consequently, a Member not only has
the right but is under a duty to waive the immunity of its
representative in any case where in the opinion of the
Member the immunity would impede the course of justice,
and it can be waived without prejudice to the purpose for
which the immunity is accorded.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 18 (a): Officials of the United Nations shall be
immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or
written and all acts performed by them in their official
capacity.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 19: In addition to the immunities and privileges
specified in Section 18, the Secretary-General and all
Assistant Secretaries-General shall be accorded in
respect of themselves, their spouses and minor children,
the privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities
accorded to diplomatic envoys, in accordance with
international law.
Section 20: Privileges and immunities are granted to
officials in the interest of the United Nations and not for
the personal benefit of the individuals themselves. The
Secretary-General shall have the right and the duty to
waive the immunity of any official in any case where, in
his opinion, the immunity would impede the course of
justice and can be waived without prejudice to the
interests of the United Nations.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 22: Experts . . . performing missions for the
United Nations . . . shall be accorded: (a) immunity from
personal arrest or detention and from seizure of their
personal baggage; (b) in respect of words spoken or
written and acts done by them in the course of the
performance of their mission, immunity from legal process
of every kind."
3. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
"Article 29: The person of a diplomatic agent shall be
inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or
detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due
respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any
attack on his person, freedom, or dignity.
xxx xxx xxx
Article 31 (1): A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity
from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He
shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative
jurisdiction, except in certain cases.
xxx xxx xxx
Article 38 (1): Except in so far as additional privileges and
immunities may be granted by the receiving State, a
diplomatic agent who is a national of or permanently a
resident in that State shall enjoy only immunity from
jurisdiction, and inviolability, in respect of official acts
performed in the exercise of his functions."
4. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
"Article 41 (1): Consular officials shall not be liable to
arrest or detention pending trial, except in the case of a
grave crime and pursuant to a decision by the competent
judicial authority.
xxx xxx xxx
Article 43 (1): Consular officers and consular employees
shall not be amenable to the jurisdiction of the judicial or
administrative authorities of the receiving State in respect
of acts performed in the exercise of consular functions.
Article 43 (2): The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article
shall not, however, apply in respect of a civil action either:
(a) arising out of a contract concluded by a consular
officer or a consular employee in which he did not
contract expressly or impliedly as an agent of the sending
State; or (b) by a third party for damage arising from an
accident in the receiving State caused by a vehicle,
vessel or aircraft."
5. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
Specialized Agencies
"Section 4: The specialized agencies, their property and
assets, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall
enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except in
so far as in any particular case they have expressly
waived their immunity. It is, however, understood that no
waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of
execution.
Section 13 (a): Representatives of members at meetings
convened by a specialized agency shall, while exercising
their functions and during their journeys to and from the
place of meeting, enjoy immunity from personal arrest or
detention and from seizure of their personal baggage, and
in respect of words spoken or written and all acts done by
them in their official capacity, immunity from legal process
of every kind.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 19 (a): Officials of the specialized agencies shall
be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken
or written and all acts performed by them in their official
capacity.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 21: In addition to the immunities and privileges
specified in sections 19 and 20, the executive head of
each specialized agency, including a any official acting on
his behalf during his absence from duty, shall be
accorded in respect of himself, his spouse and minor
children, the privileges and immunities, exemptions and
facilities accorded to diplomatic envoys, in accordance
with international law."
6. Charter of the ADB
"Article 50 (1): The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every
form of legal process, except in cases arising out of or in
connection with the exercise of its powers to borrow
money, to guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or
underwrite the sale of securities, in which cases actions
may be brought against the Bank in a court of competent
jurisdiction in the territory of a country in which the Bank
has its principal or a branch office, or has appointed an
agent for the purpose of accepting service or notice of
process, or has issued or guaranteed securities.
xxx xxx xxx
Article 55 (i): All Governors, Directors, alternates, officers
and employees of the Bank, including experts performing
missions for the Bank shall be immune from legal process
with respect to acts performed by them in their official
capacity, except when the Bank waives the immunity."
7. ADB Headquarters Agreement
"Section 5: The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every
form of legal process, except in cases arising out of or in
connection with the exercise of its powers to borrow
money, to guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or
underwrite the sale of securities, in which cases actions
may be brought against the Bank in a court of competent
jurisdiction in the Republic of the Philippines.
 xxx xxx xxx
Section 44: Governors, other representatives of Members,
Directors, the President, Vice-President and executive
officers as may be agreed upon between the Government
and the Bank shall enjoy, during their stay in the Republic
of the Philippines in connection with their official duties
with the Bank: (a) immunity from personal arrest or
detention and from seizure of their personal baggage; (b)
immunity from legal process of every kind in respect of
words spoken or written and all acts done by them in their
official capacity; and (c) in respect of other matters not
covered in (a) and (b) above, such other immunities,
exemptions, privileges and facilities as are enjoyed by
members of diplomatic missions of comparable rank,
subject to corresponding conditions and obligations.
Section 45 (a): Officers and staff of the Bank, including for
the purposes of this Article experts and consultants
performing missions for the Bank, shall enjoy . . .
immunity from legal process with respect to acts
performed by them in their official capacity, except when
the Bank waives the immunity."
II
There are three major differences between diplomatic and
international immunities. Firstly, one of the recognized limitations
of diplomatic immunity is that members of the diplomatic staff of a
mission may be appointed from among the nationals of the
receiving State only with the express consent of that State; apart
from inviolability and immunity from jurisdiction in respect of
official acts performed in the exercise of their functions, nationals
enjoy only such privileges and immunities as may be granted by
the receiving State. International immunities may be specially
important in relation to the State of which the official is a national.
Secondly, the immunity of a diplomatic agent from the jurisdiction
of the receiving State does not exempt him from the jurisdiction of
the sending State; in the case of international immunities there is
no sending State and an equivalent for the jurisdiction of the
Sending State therefore has to be found either in waiver of
immunity or in some international disciplinary or judicial
procedure. Thirdly, the effective sanctions which secure respect
for diplomatic immunity are the principle of reciprocity and the
danger of retaliation by the aggrieved State; international
immunities enjoy no similar protection.14
The generally accepted principles which are now regarded as the
foundation of international immunities are contained in the ILO
Memorandum, which reduced them in three basic propositions,
namely: (1) that international institutions should have a status
which protects them against control or interference by any one
government in the performance of functions for the effective
discharge of which they are responsible to democratically
constituted international bodies in which all the nations concerned
are represented; (2) that no country should derive any financial
advantage by levying fiscal charges on common international
funds; and (3) that the international organization should, as a
collectivity of States Members, be accorded the facilities for the
conduct of its official business customarily extended to each other
by its individual member States. The thinking underlying these
propositions is essentially institutional in character. It is not
concerned with the status, dignity or privileges of individuals, but
with the elements of functional independence necessary to free
international institutions from national control and to enable them
to discharge their responsibilities impartially on behalf of all their
members.15
III
Positive international law has devised three methods of granting
privileges and immunities to the personnel of international
organizations. The first is by simple conventional stipulation, as
was the case in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.
The second is by internal legislation whereby the government of a
state, upon whose territory the international organization is to
carry out its functions, recognizes the international character of
the organization and grants, by unilateral measures, certain
privileges and immunities to better assure the successful
functioning of the organization and its personnel. In this situation,
treaty obligation for the state in question to grant concessions is
lacking. Such was the case with the Central Commission of the
Rhine at Strasbourg and the International Institute of Agriculture
at Rome. The third is a combination of the first two. In this third
method, one finds a conventional obligation to recognize a certain
status of an international organization and its personnel, but the
status is described in broad and general terms. The specific
definition and application of those general terms are determined
by an accord between the organization itself and the state
wherein it is located. This is the case with the League of Nations,
the Permanent Court of Justice, and the United Nations.16
The Asian Development Bank and its Personnel fall under this
third category.
There is a connection between diplomatic privileges and
immunities and those extended to international officials. The
connection consists in the granting, by contractual provisions, of
the relatively well-established body of diplomatic privileges and
immunities to international functionaries. This connection is purely
historical. Both types of officials find the basis of their special
status in the necessity of retaining functional independence and
freedom from interference by the state of residence. However, the
legal relationship between an ambassador and the state to which
he is accredited is entirely different from the relationship between
the international official and those states upon whose territory he
might carry out his functions.17
The privileges and immunities of diplomats and those of
international officials rest upon different legal foundations.
Whereas those immunities awarded to diplomatic agents are a
right of the sending state based on customary international law,
those granted to international officials are based on treaty or
conventional law. Customary international law places no
obligation on a state to recognize a special status of an
international official or to grant him jurisdictional immunities. Such
an obligation can only result from specific treaty provisions.18
The special status of the diplomatic envoy is regulated by the
principle of reciprocity by which a state is free to treat the envoy
of another state as its envoys are treated by that state. The
juridical basis of the diplomat's position is firmly established in
customary international law. The diplomatic envoy is appointed by
the sending State but it has to make certain that the agreement of
the receiving State has been given for the person it proposes to
accredit as head of the mission to that State.19
The staff personnel of an international organization — the
international officials — assume a different position as regards
their special status. They are appointed or elected to their
position by the organization itself, or by a competent organ of it;
they are responsible to the organization and their official acts are
imputed to it. The juridical basis of their special position is found
in conventional law,20 since there is no established basis of usage
or custom in the case of the international official. Moreover, the
relationship between an international organization and a member-
state does not admit of the principle of reciprocity,21 for it is
contradictory to the basic principle of equality of states. An
international organization carries out functions in the interest of
every member state equally. The international official does not
carry out his functions in the interest of any state, but in serving
the organization he serves, indirectly, each state equally. He
cannot be, legally, the object of the operation of the principle of
reciprocity between states under such circumstances. It is
contrary to the principle of equality of states for one state member
of an international organization to assert a capacity to extract
special privileges for its nationals from other member states on
the basis of a status awarded by it to an international
organization. It is upon this principle of sovereign equality that
international organizations are built.
It follows from this same legal circumstance that a state called
upon to admit an official of an international organization does not
have a capacity to declare him persona non grata.
The functions of the diplomat and those of the international official
are quite different. Those of the diplomat are functions in the
national interest. The task of the ambassador is to represent his
state, and its specific interest, at the capital of another state. The
functions of the international official are carried out in the
international interest. He does not represent a state or the interest
of any specific state. He does not usually "represent" the
organization in the true sense of that term. His functions normally
are administrative, although they may be judicial or executive, but
they are rarely political or functions of representation, such as
those of the diplomat.
There is a difference of degree as well as of kind. The interruption
of the activities of a diplomatic agent is likely to produce serious
harm to the purposes for which his immunities were granted. But
the interruption of the activities of the international official does
not, usually, cause serious dislocation of the functions of an
international secretariat.22
On the other hand, they are similar in the sense that acts
performed in an official capacity by either a diplomatic envoy or
an international official are not attributable to him as an individual
but are imputed to the entity he represents, the state in the case
of the diplomat, and the organization in the case of the
international official.23
IV
Looking back over 150 years of privileges and immunities granted
to the personnel of international organizations, it is clear that they
were accorded a wide scope of protection in the exercise of their
functions — The Rhine Treaty of 1804 between the German
Empire and France which provided "all the rights of neutrality" to
persons employed in regulating navigation in the international
interest; The Treaty of Berlin of 1878 which granted the European
Commission of the Danube "complete independence of territorial
authorities" in the exercise of its functions; The Covenant of the
League which granted "diplomatic immunities and privileges."
Today, the age of the United Nations finds the scope of protection
narrowed. The current tendency is to reduce privileges and
immunities of personnel of international organizations to a
minimum. The tendency cannot be considered as a lowering of
the standard but rather as a recognition that the problem on the
privileges and immunities of international officials is new. The
solution to the problem presented by the extension of diplomatic
prerogatives to international functionaries lies in the general
reduction of the special position of both types of agents in that the
special status of each agent is granted in the interest of function.
The wide grant of diplomatic prerogatives was curtailed because
of practical necessity and because the proper functioning of the
organization did not require such extensive immunity for its
officials. While the current direction of the law seems to be to
narrow the prerogatives of the personnel of international
organizations, the reverse is true with respect to the prerogatives
of the organizations themselves, considered as legal entities.
Historically, states have been more generous in granting
privileges and immunities to organizations than they have to the
personnel of these organizations.24
Thus, Section 2 of the General Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations states that the UN shall enjoy
immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in
any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity. Section
4 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
Specialized Agencies likewise provides that the specialized
agencies shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process
subject to the same exception. Finally, Article 50(1) of the ADB
Charter and Section 5 of the Headquarters Agreement similarly
provide that the bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of
legal process, except in cases arising out of or in connection with
the exercise of its powers to borrow money, to guarantee
obligations, or to buy and sell or underwrite the sale of securities.
The phrase "immunity from every form of legal process" as used
in the UN General Convention has been interpreted to mean
absolute immunity from a state's jurisdiction to adjudicate or
enforce its law by legal process, and it is said that states have not
sought to restrict that immunity of the United Nations by
interpretation or amendment. Similar provisions are contained in
the Special Agencies Convention as well as in the ADB Charter
and Headquarters Agreement. These organizations were
accorded privileges and immunities in their charters by language
similar to that applicable to the United Nations. It is clear
therefore that these organizations were intended to have similar
privileges and immunities.25 From this, it can be easily deduced
that international organizations enjoy absolute immunity similar to
the diplomatic prerogatives granted to diplomatic envoys.
Even in the United States this theory seems to be the prevailing
rule. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was passed adopting
the "restrictive theory" limiting the immunity of states under
international law essentially to activities of a kind not carried on
by private persons. Then the International Organizations
Immunities Act came into effect which gives to designated
international organizations the same immunity from suit and every
form of judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign governments.
This gives the impression that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act has the effect of applying the restrictive theory also to
international organizations generally. However, aside from the
fact that there was no indication in its legislative history that
Congress contemplated that result, and considering that the
Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations
exempts the United Nations "from every form of legal process,"
conflict with the United States obligations under the Convention
was sought to be avoided by interpreting the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, and the restrictive theory, as not applying to suits
against the United Nations.26
On the other hand, international officials are governed by a
different rule. Section 18(a) of the General Convention on
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations states that
officials of the United Nations shall be immune from legal process
in respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by
them in their official capacity. The Convention on Specialized
Agencies carries exactly the same provision. The Charter of the
ADB provides under Article 55(i) that officers and employees of
the bank shall be immune from legal process with respect to acts
performed by them in their official capacity except when the Bank
waives immunity. Section 45 (a) of the ADB Headquarters
Agreement accords the same immunity to the officers and staff of
the bank. There can be no dispute that international officials are
entitled to immunity only with respect to acts performed in their
official capacity, unlike international organizations which enjoy
absolute immunity.
Clearly, the most important immunity to an international official, in
the discharge of his international functions, is immunity from local
jurisdiction. There is no argument in doctrine or practice with the
principle that an international official is independent of the
jurisdiction of the local authorities for his official acts. Those acts
are not his, but are imputed to the organization, and without
waiver the local courts cannot hold him liable for them. In strict
law, it would seem that even the organization itself could have no
right to waive an official's immunity for his official acts. This
permits local authorities to assume jurisdiction over an individual
for an act which is not, in the wider sense of the term, his act at
all. It is the organization itself, as a juristic person, which should
waive its own immunity and appear in court, not the individual,
except insofar as he appears in the name of the organization.
Provisions for immunity from jurisdiction for official acts appear,
aside from the aforementioned treatises, in the constitution of
most modern international organizations. The acceptance of the
principle is sufficiently widespread to be regarded as declaratory
of international law.27
V
What then is the status of the international official with respect to
his private acts?
Section 18 (a) of the General Convention has been interpreted to
mean that officials of the specified categories are denied
immunity from local jurisdiction for acts of their private life and
empowers local courts to assume jurisdiction in such cases
without the necessity of waiver.28 It has earlier been mentioned
that historically, international officials were granted diplomatic
privileges and immunities and were thus considered immune for
both private and official acts. In practice, this wide grant of
diplomatic prerogatives was curtailed because of practical
necessity and because the proper functioning of the organization
did not require such extensive immunity for its officials. Thus, the
current status of the law does not maintain that states grant
jurisdictional immunity to international officials for acts of their
private lives.29 This much is explicit from the Charter and
Headquarters Agreement of the ADB which contain substantially
similar provisions to that of the General Convention.
VI
Who is competent to determine whether a given act is private or
official?
This is an entirely different question. In connection with this
question, the current tendency to narrow the scope of privileges
and immunities of international officials and representatives is
most apparent. Prior to the regime of the United Nations, the
determination of this question rested with the organization and its
decision was final. By the new formula, the state itself tends to
assume this competence. If the organization is dissatisfied with
the decision, under the provisions of the General Convention of
the United States, or the Special Convention for Specialized
Agencies, the Swiss Arrangement, and other current dominant
instruments, it may appeal to an international tribunal by
procedures outlined in those instruments. Thus, the state
assumes this competence in the first instance. It means that, if a
local court assumes jurisdiction over an act without the necessity
of waiver from the organization, the determination of the nature of
the act is made at the national level.30
It appears that the inclination is to place the competence to
determine the nature of an act as private or official in the courts of
the state concerned. That the prevalent notion seems to be to
leave to the local courts determination of whether or not a given
act is official or private does not necessarily mean that such
determination is final. If the United Nations questions the decision
of the Court, it may invoke proceedings for settlement of disputes
between the organization and the member states as provided in
Section 30 of the General Convention. Thus, the decision as to
whether a given act is official or private is made by the national
courts in the first instance, but it may be subjected to review in
the international level if questioned by the United Nations.31
A similar view is taken by Kunz, who writes that the "jurisdiction of
local courts without waiver for acts of private life empowers the
local courts to determine whether a certain act is an official act or
an act of private life," on the rationale that since the determination
of such question, if left in the hands of the organization, would
consist in the execution, or non-execution, of waiver, and since
waiver is not mentioned in connection with the provision granting
immunities to international officials, then the decision must rest
with local courts.32
Under the Third Restatement of the Law, it is suggested that
since an international official does not enjoy personal inviolability
from arrest or detention and has immunity only with respect to
official acts, he is subject to judicial or administrative process and
must claim his immunity in the proceedings by showing that the
act in question was an official act. Whether an act was performed
in the individual's official capacity is a question for the court in
which a proceeding is brought, but if the international organization
disputes the court's finding, the dispute between the organization
and the state of the forum is to be resolved by negotiation, by an
agreed mode of settlement or by advisory opinion of the act or omission underlying the process was in the performance of
International Court of Justice.33 his official functions. The issue has not been authoritatively
determined, but apparently the burden is on the consular officer
Recognizing the difficulty that by reason of the right of a national to prove his status as well as his exemption in the circumstances.
court to assume jurisdiction over private acts without a waiver of In the United States, the US Department of State generally has
immunity, the determination of the official or private character of a left it to the courts to determine whether a particular act was
particular act may pass from international to national control, within a consular officer's official duties.35
Jenks proposes three ways of avoiding difficulty in the matter.
The firstwould be for a municipal court before which a question of Submissions
the official or private character of a particular act arose to accept
as conclusive in the matter any claim by the international On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, I submit the following
organization that the act was official in character, such a claim conclusions:
being regarded as equivalent to a governmental claim that a
particular act is an act of State. Such a claim would be in effect a First, petitioner Liang, a bank official of ADB, is not entitled to
claim by the organization that the proceedings against the official diplomatic immunity and hence his immunity is not absolute.
were a violation of the jurisdictional immunity of the organization
itself which is unqualified and therefore not subject to delimitation
Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a
in the discretion of the municipal court. The second would be for a
diplomatic envoy is immune from criminal jurisdiction of the
court to accept as conclusive in the matter a statement by the
receiving State for all acts, whether private or official, and hence
executive government of the country where the matter arises
he cannot be arrested, prosecuted and punished for any offense
certifying the official character of the act. The third would be to
he may commit, unless his diplomatic immunity is waived.36 On
have recourse to the procedure of international arbitration. Jenks
the other hand, officials of international organizations enjoy
opines that it is possible that none of these three solutions would
"functional" immunities, that is, only those necessary for the
be applicable in all cases; the first might be readily acceptable
exercise of the functions of the organization and the fulfillment of
only in the clearest cases and the second is available only if the
its purposes.37 This is the reason why the ADB Charter and
executive government of the country where the matter arises
Headquarters Agreement explicitly grant immunity from legal
concurs in the view of the international organization concerning
process to bank officers and employees only with respect to acts
the official character of the act. However, he surmises that taken
performed by them in their official capacity, except when the Bank
in combination, these various possibilities may afford the
waives immunity. In other words, officials and employees of the
elements of a solution to the problem.34
ADB are subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts for their
private acts, notwithstanding the absence of a waiver of immunity.
One final point. The international official's immunity for official
acts may be likened to a consular official's immunity from arrest,
Petitioner cannot also seek relief under the mantle of "immunity
detention, and criminal or civil process which is not absolute but
from every form of legal process" accorded to ADB as an
applies only to acts or omissions in the performance of his official
international organization. The immunity of ADB is absolute
functions, in the absence of special agreement. Since a consular
whereas the immunity of its officials and employees is restricted
officer is not immune from all legal process, he must respond to
only to official acts. This is in consonance with the current trend in
any process and plead and prove immunity on the ground that the
international law which seeks to narrow the scope of protection
and reduce the privileges and immunities granted to personnel of
international organizations, while at the same time aims to
increase the prerogatives of international organizations.
Second, considering that bank officials and employees are
covered by immunity only for their official acts, the necessary
inference is that the authority of the Department of Affairs, or
even of the ADB for that matter, to certify that they are entitled to
immunity is limited only to acts done in their official capacity.
Stated otherwise, it is not within the power of the DFA, as the
agency in charge of the executive department's foreign relations,
nor the ADB, as the international organization vested with the
right to waive immunity, to invoke immunity for private acts of
bank officials and employees, since no such prerogative exists in
the first place. If the immunity does not exist, there is nothing to
certify.
As an aside, ADB cannot even claim to have the right to waive
immunity for private acts of its officials and employees. The
Charter and the Headquarters Agreement are clear that the
immunity can be waived only with respect to official acts because
this is only the extent to which the privilege has been granted.
One cannot waive the right to a privilege which has never been
granted or acquired.
Third, I choose to adopt the view that it is the local courts which
have jurisdiction to determine whether or not a given act is official
or private. While there is a dearth of cases on the matter under
Philippine jurisprudence, the issue is not entirely novel.
The case of M.H. Wylie, et al. vs. Rarang, et al.38 concerns the
extent of immunity from suit of the officials of a United States
Naval Base inside the Philippine territory. Although a motion to
dismiss was filed by the defendants therein invoking their
immunity from suit pursuant to the RP-US Military Bases
Agreement, the trial court denied the same and, after trial,
rendered a decision declaring that the defendants are not entitled
to immunity because the latter acted beyond the scope of their
official duties. The Court likewise applied the ruling enunciated in
the case of Chavez vs. Sandiganbayan39 to the effect that a mere
invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the
charges being automatically dropped. While it is true that the
Chavez case involved a public official, the Court did not find any
substantial reason why the same rule cannot be made to apply to
a US official assigned at the US Naval Station located in the
Philippines. In this case, it was the local courts which ascertained
whether the acts complained of were done in an official or
personal capacity.
In the case of The Holy See vs. Rosario, Jr.,40 a complaint for
annulment of contract of sale, reconveyance, specific
performance and damages was filed against petitioner. Petitioner
moved to dismiss on the ground of, among others, lack of
jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, which was
denied by the trial court. A motion for reconsideration, and
subsequently, a "Motion for a Hearing for the Sole Purpose of
Establishing Factual Allegation for Claim of Immunity as a
Jurisdictional Defense" were filed by petitioner. The trial court
deferred resolution of said motions until after trial on the merits.
On certiorari, the Court there ruled on the issue of petitioner's
non-suability on the basis of the allegations made in the
pleadings filed by the parties. This is an implicit recognition of the
court's jurisdiction to ascertain the suability or non-suability of the
sovereign by assessing the facts of the case. The Court hastened
to add that when a state or international agency wishes to plead
sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, in some
cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly
to the local courts by the respondents through their private
counsels, or where the foreign states bypass the Foreign Office,
the courts can inquire into the facts and make their own
determination as to the nature of the acts and transactions
involved.
Finally, it appears from the records of this case that petitioner is a
senior economist at ADB and as such he makes country project
profiles which will help the bank in deciding whether to lend
money or support a particular project to a particular
country.41 Petitioner stands charged of grave slander for allegedly
uttering defamatory remarks against his secretary, the private
complainant herein. Considering that the immunity accorded to
petitioner is limited only to acts performed in his official capacity,
it becomes necessary to make a factual determination of whether
or not the defamatory utterances were made pursuant and in
relation to his official functions as a senior economist.
I vote to deny the motion for reconsideration.
Davide, Jr., C.J., concurs.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 149453 October 7, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR
JOVENCITO ZUÑO, STATE PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG
and RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND ASSISTANT CITY
PROSECUTOR CONRADO M. JAMOLIN and CITY
PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY CLARO
ARELLANO, petitioners,
vs.
PANFILO M. LACSON, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court are the following motions of the respondent, to
wit: (a) Omnibus Motion;1 (b) Motion for Reconsideration;2 (c)
Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration;3 (d) Motion To Set for
Oral Arguments.4
The Omnibus Motion
The respondent seeks the reconsideration of the April 29, 2003
Resolution of this Court which granted the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration. The respondent thereafter prays to allow
Associate Justices Renato C. Corona, Ma. Alicia Austria-
Martinez, Conchita C. Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and Adolfo
S. Azcuna to voluntary inhibit themselves or, absent their
consent, rule that such inhibition is in order and to recuse them
from further deliberating, discussing or, in any manner,
participating in the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration
and the Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration. The
respondent points out that the aforenamed members of the Court
were appointed by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo after the
February 19, 2002 oral arguments and after the case at bar was
submitted for the decision of the Court. He asserts that although
A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC5specifically provides that it applies only to
the divisions of the Court, it should likewise apply to this case, in
light of the April 1, 2003 Resolution of this Court which set aside
its Resolution dated May 28, 2002, apart from the constitutional
issues raised by the respondent in his motion for reconsideration
and its supplement. As such, according to the respondent, the
instant case should be unloaded by Justice Callejo, Sr. and re-
raffled to any other member of the Court.
The Court resolves to deny the respondent’s motion for lack of
merit.
The records show that as early as May 24, 2002, the respondent
filed an urgent motion for the recusation of Justices Renato C.
Corona and Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez for the reason that they
were appointed to the Court after the February 19, 2002 oral
arguments and did not participate in the integral portions of the
proceedings. Justices Corona and Austria-Martinez refused to
inhibit themselves and decided to participate in the deliberation
on the petition.6 On March 18, 2003, the respondent filed a motion
with the Court for the recusation of Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.
on account of his voluntary inhibition when the case was pending
before the Court of Appeals.
On March 25, 2003, this Court issued a resolution denying the
respondent’s Motion dated March 18, 2003. The respondent
thereafter filed his motion for reconsideration of the April 1, 2003
Resolution of the Court in which he prayed, inter alia, for the
inhibition of Justice Callejo, Sr. under A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC and
that the case be re-raffled to another member of the Court who
had actually participated in the deliberation and the rendition of its
May 28, 2002 Resolution. The respondent likewise sought the
inhibition of Justices Conchita C. Morales and Adolfo S. Azcuna,
again for the reason that they were appointed to the Court after
the oral arguments on February 19, 2002 and after the case had
already been submitted for decision.
On April 29, 2003, this Court issued a resolution denying the
aforesaid motions of the respondent.7 The Court ruled that A.M.
No. 99-8-09-SC is applicable only to cases assigned to the
divisions of the Court:
The respondent’s reliance on Supreme Court Circular No. 99-8-
09 is misplaced. As admitted by the respondent, the said circular
is applicable only to motions for reconsideration in cases
assigned to the Divisions of the Court. For cases assigned to the
Court En Banc, the policy of the Court had always been and still
is, if the ponente is no longer with the Court, his replacement will
act upon the motion for reconsideration of a party and participate
in the deliberations thereof. This is the reason why Justice
Callejo, Sr. who had replaced retired Justice De Leon, prepared
the draft of the April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court.8
The Court also ruled that there was no need for its newest
members to inhibit themselves from participating in the
deliberation of the respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration:
Although Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales, Romeo J. Callejo,
Sr., and Adolfo S. Azcuna were not yet members of the Court
during the February 18, 20029 oral arguments before the Court,
nonetheless they were not disqualified to participate in the
deliberations on the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the
May 28, 2002 Resolution of the Court or of the instant motion for
reconsideration. Neither is Justice Callejo, Sr. disqualified to
prepare the resolution of the Court on the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent. When the Court deliberated on
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, Justices Conchita Carpio-
Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. and Adolfo S. Azcuna were
already members of the Court.
It bears stressing that transcripts of stenographic notes taken
during the February 18, 2002 hearing and oral arguments of the
parties are parts of the records of this case. Said transcripts are
available to the parties or to any member of the Court. Likewise,
Attys. Rene A.V. Saguisag and Felix Carao, Jr. may not yet have
been the counsel of the respondent on February 18, 2002 but by
reading the said transcripts and the records of this case they are
informed of what transpired during the hearing and oral
arguments of the parties.10
It is thus clear that the grounds cited by the respondent in his
omnibus motion had already been passed upon and resolved by
this Court. The respondent did not make any new substantial
arguments in his motion to warrant a reconsideration of the
aforesaid resolutions.
Besides, the respondent sought the inhibition of Justices
Conchita C. Morales and Adolfo S. Azcuna only after they had
already concurred in the Court’s Resolution dated April 1, 2003.
Case law has it that a motion for disqualification must be denied
when filed after a member of the Court has already given an
opinion on the merits of the case, the rationale being that a
litigant cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of the
Court, only to raise an objection of this sort after a decision has
been rendered.11
The Motion to Set the Case for Oral Arguments
The Court denies the motion of the respondent. The parties have
already extensively discussed the issues involved in the case.
The respondent’s motion for reconsideration consists of no less
than a hundred pages, excluding the supplement to his motion for
reconsideration and his reply to the petitioners’ comment on his
motion. There is no longer a need to set the instant case for oral
arguments.
The Issue as to the Application of the Time-bar under Section 8,
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure – Whether
Prospective or Retroactive
The respondent seeks the reconsideration of the April 1, 2003
Resolution of the Court and thereafter reinstate its Resolution of
May 28, 2002.
He asserts that pursuant to a long line of jurisprudence and a
long-standing judicial practice in applying penal law, Section 8,
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (RRCP)
should be applied prospectively and retroactively without
reservations, only and solely on the basis of its being favorable to
the accused. He asserts that case law on the retroactive
application of penal laws should likewise apply to criminal
procedure, it being a branch of criminal law. The respondent
insists that Section 8 was purposely crafted and included as a
new provision to reinforce the constitutional right of the accused
to a speedy disposition of his case. It is primarily a check on the
State to prosecute criminal cases diligently and continuously, lest
it loses its right to prosecute the accused anew. The respondent
argues that since Section 8 is indubitably a rule of procedure,
there can be no other conclusion: the rule should have retroactive
application, absent any provision therein that it should be applied
prospectively. Accordingly, prospective application thereof would
in effect give the petitioners more than two years from March 29,
1999 within which to revive the criminal cases, thus violating the
respondent’s right to due process and equal protection of the law.
The respondent asserts that Section 8 was meant to reach back
in time to provide relief to the accused. In this case, the State had
been given more than sufficient opportunity to prosecute the
respondent anew after the March 29, 1999 dismissal of the cases
by then Judge Wenceslao Agnir, Jr. and even before the RRCP
took effect on December 1, 2000. According to the respondent,
the petitioners filed the Informations with the RTC in Criminal
Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 beyond the two-year bar, in
violation of his right to a speedy trial, and that such filing was
designed to derail his bid for the Senate.
In their comment on the respondent’s motions, the petitioners
assert that the prospective application of Section 8 is in keeping
with Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides in part that the rules of procedure which the Court may
promulgate shall not diminish, increase or modify substantial
rights. While Section 8 secures the rights of the accused, it does
not and should not preclude the equally important right of the
State to public justice. If such right to public justice is taken away,
then Section 8 can no longer be said to be a procedural rule.
According to the petitioners, if a procedural rule impairs a vested
right, or would work injustice, the said rule may not be given a
retroactive application. They contend that the right of the accused
to a speedy trial or disposition of the criminal cases applies only
to outstanding and pending cases and not to cases already
dismissed. The petitioners assert that the "refiling of the cases"
under Section 8 should be taken to mean as the filing of the
criminal complaint with the appropriate office for the purpose of
conducting a preliminary investigation, and not the actual filing of
the criminal complaint or information in court for trial.
Furthermore, according to the petitioners, the offended parties
must be given notices of the motion for provisional dismissal of
the cases under Section 8 since the provision so expressly
states. Thus, if the requisite notices to the heirs of the deceased
would be taken into consideration, the two-year period had not
yet even commenced to run.
In his consolidated reply to the comment of the petitioners, the
respondent asserts that the State is proscribed from refiling a
criminal case if it can be shown that the delay resulted in a
violation of the right of the accused to due process. In this case,
there was an inordinate delay in the revival of the cases,
considering that the witnesses in the criminal cases for the State
in March 1999 are the same witnesses in 2001. The State had
reasonable opportunity to refile the cases before the two-year bar
but failed to do so because of negligence; and perhaps
institutional indolence. Contrary to the petitioners’ contention, the
respondent posits that the revival of the cases contemplated in
Section 8 refers to the filing of the Informations or complaints in
court for trial. The operational act then is the refiling of the
Informations with the RTC, which was done only on June 6, 2001,
clearly beyond the two-year bar.
The Court finds the respondent’s contentions to be without merit.
First. The Court approved the RRCP pursuant to its power under
Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 5 of the Constitution which
reads:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar,
and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court.
The Court is not mandated to apply Section 8 retroactively simply
because it is favorable to the accused. It must be noted that the
new rule was approved by the Court not only to reinforce the
constitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the
case. The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to
excise the malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal
justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for
the accused only. The Court emphasized in its assailed resolution
that:
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has
fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal
cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the
accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-
bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to
the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal
interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy
disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State
and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both
the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed
that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive
provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused
and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the
Court must be respected unless it is shown that the period is
manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of
justice.12
In criminal litigations concerning constitutional issue claims, the
Court, in the interest of justice, may make the rule prospective
where the exigencies of the situation make the rule prospective.
The retroactivity or non-retroactivity of a rule is not automatically
determined by the provision of the Constitution on which the
dictate is based. Each constitutional rule of criminal procedure
has its own distinct functions, its own background or precedent,
and its own impact on the administration of justice, and the way in
which these factors combine must inevitably vary with the dictate
involved.13
Matters of procedure are not necessarily retrospective in
operation as a statute.14 To paraphrase the United States
Supreme Court per Justice Benjamin Cardozo, the Court in
defining the limits of adherence may make a choice for itself
between the principle of forward operation and that of relating
forward.15
The Court approved Section 8 pursuant to its power under Article
VIII, Section 5, paragraph 5 of the Constitution. This constitutional
grant to promulgate rules carries with it the power, inter alia, to
determine whether to give the said rules prospective or
retroactive effect. Moreover, under Rule 144 of the Rules of
Court, the Court may not apply the rules to actions pending
before it if in its opinion their application would not be feasible or
would work injustice, in which event, the former procedure shall
apply.16
The absence of a provision in Section 8 giving it prospective
application only does not proscribe the prospective application
thereof; nor does it imply that the Court intended the new rule to
be given retroactive and prospective effect. If the statutory
purpose is clear, the provisions of the law should be construed as
is conducive to fairness and justice, and in harmony with the
general spirit and policy of the rule. It should be construed so as
not to defeat but to carry out such end or purpose.17 A statute
derives its vitality from the purpose for which it is approved. To
construe it in a manner that disregards or defeats such purpose is
to nullify or destroy the law.18 In Cometa v. Court of Appeals,19 this
Court ruled that "the spirit rather than the letter of the statute
determines its construction; hence, a statute must be read
according to its spirit or intent."20 While we may not read into the
law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to
read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer
not to the "letter that killeth" but to the "spirit that vivifieth, to give
effect to the lawmaker’s will."21
In this case, when the Court approved Section 8, it intended the
new rule to be applied prospectively and not retroactively, for if
the intention of the Court were otherwise, it would defeat the very
purpose for which it was intended, namely, to give the State a
period of two years from notice of the provisional dismissal of
criminal cases with the express consent of the accused. It would
be a denial of the State’s right to due process and a travesty of
justice for the Court to apply the new rule retroactively in the
present case as the respondent insists, considering that the
criminal cases were provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr.
on March 29, 1999 before the new rule took effect on December
1, 2000. A retroactive application of the time-bar will result in
absurd, unjust and oppressive consequences to the State and to
the victims of crimes and their heirs.
Consider this scenario: the trial court (RTC) provisionally
dismissed a criminal case with the express consent of the
accused in 1997. The prosecution had the right to revive the case
within the prescriptive period, under Article 90 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. On December 1, 2000, the time-bar
rule under Section 8 took effect, the prosecution was unable to
revive the criminal case before then.
If the time-bar fixed in Section 8 were to be applied retroactively,
this would mean that the State would be barred from reviving the
case for failure to comply with the said time-bar, which was yet to
be approved by the Court three years after the provisional
dismissal of the criminal case. In contrast, if the same case was
dismissed provisionally in December 2000, the State had the right
to revive the same within the time-bar. In fine, to so hold would
imply that the State was presumed to foresee and anticipate that
three years after 1997, the Court would approve and amend the
RRCP. The State would thus be sanctioned for its failure to
comply with a rule yet to be approved by the Court. It must be
stressed that the institution and prosecution of criminal cases are
governed by existing rules and not by rules yet to exist. It would
be the apex of injustice to hold that Section 8 had a platonic or
ideal existence before it was approved by the Court. The past
cannot be erased by a capricious retroactive application of the
new rule.
In holding that the petitioners had until December 1, 2002 within
which to revive the criminal cases provisionally dismissed by
Judge Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999, this Court explained, thus:
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar
retroactively so that the two-year period commenced to run on
March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of
the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is
inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving
the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the
State had considerably less than two years to do so. Thus, Judge
Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689 on March 29, 1999. The new rule took effect on December
1, 2000. If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the
State would have only one year and three months or until March
31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases. The period
is short of the two-year period fixed under the new rule. On the
other hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State
would have two years from December 1, 2000 or until December
1, 2002 within which to revive the cases. This is in consonance
with the intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus
prevent injustice to the State and avoid absurd, unreasonable,
oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the administration of
justice.
The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 199922 should be
excluded in the computation of the two-year period because the
rule prescribing it was not yet in effect at the time and the State
could not be expected to comply with the time-bar. It cannot even
be argued that the State waived its right to revive the criminal
cases against respondent or that it was negligent for not reviving
them within the two-year period under the new rule. As the
1a\^/phi 1.net
United States Supreme Court said, per Justice Felix Frankfurter,
in Griffin v. People, 351 US 12 (1956):
We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced
has always been the law and, therefore, that those who did not
avail themselves of it waived their rights …
The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both
the State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and
reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar
therein provided merely to benefit the accused. For to do so
would cause an "injustice of hardship" to the State and adversely
affect the administration of justice in general and of criminal laws
in particular.23
Further quoting Justice Felix Frankfurter’s opinion in Griffin v.
People,24 he said, "it is much more conducive to law’s self-respect
to recognize candidly the considerations that give prospective
content to a new pronouncement of law. That this is consonant
with the spirit of our law and justified by those considerations of
reason which should dominate the law has been luminously
expounded by Mr. Justice Cardozo shortly before he came here
and in an opinion which he wrote for the Court."
Parenthetically, the respondent himself admitted in his motion for
reconsideration that Judge Agnir, Jr. could not have been
expected to comply with the notice requirement under the new
rule when it yet had to exist:
99. Respondent submits that the records are still in the same
state of inadequacy and incompletion. This however is not
strange considering that Section 8, Rule 117 had not existed on
March 29, 1999, when the criminal cases were dismissed, and
then Judge Agnir did not have its text to guide his actions. How
could the good judge have complied with the mandate of Section
8, Rule 117 when it yet had to exist?25
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed
as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage. In that sense and to that extent, procedural laws
are retroactive.26Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689
had long been dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. before the new rule
took effect on December 1, 2000. When the petitioners filed the
Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 on
June 6, 2001, Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 and Q-99-81689
had long since been terminated. The two-year bar in the new rule
should not be reckoned from the March 29, 1999 dismissal of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 but from
December 1, 2000 when the new rule took effect. While it is true
that the Court applied Section 8 of Rule 11027 of the RRCP
retroactively, it did so only to cases still pending with this Court
and not to cases already terminated with finality.
The records show that after the requisite preliminary investigation
conducted by the petitioners in accordance with existing rules,
eleven Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-
101112 were filed with the RTC on June 6, 2001, very well within
the time-bar therefor. The respondent cannot argue that his right
to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases as
enshrined in the Constitution had been violated.28
The respondent’s plaint that he was being singled out by the
prospective application of the new rule simply because before the
Court issued its April 1, 2003 Resolution, he announced his
candidacy for the presidency of the Republic for the 2004
elections has no factual basis whatsoever.29 The bare and
irrefutable fact is that it was in this case where the issue of the
retroactive/prospective application of the new rule was first raised
before the Court. The ruling of the Court in its April 1, 2003
Resolution and its ruling today would be the same, regardless of
who the party or parties involved are, whether a senator of the
Republic or an ordinary citizen.
The respondent’s contention that the prospective application of
the new rule would deny him due process and would violate the
equal protection of laws is barren of merit. It proceeds from an
erroneous assumption that the new rule was approved by the
Court solely for his benefit, in derogation of the right of the State
to due process. The new rule was approved by the Court to
enhance the right of due process of both the State and the
accused. The State is entitled to due process in criminal cases as
much as the accused.
Due process has never been and perhaps can never be precisely
defined. It is not a technical conception with a fixed content
1a\^/phi 1.net
unrelated to time, place and circumstances. The phrase
expresses the requirement of fundamental fairness, a requisite
whose meaning can be as opaque as its importance is lofty.30 In
determining what fundamental fairness consists of in a particular
situation, relevant precedents must be considered and the
interests that are at stake; private interests, as well as the
interests of the government must be assessed. In this case, in
holding that the new rule has prospective and not retroactive
application, the Court took into consideration not only the
interests of the respondent but all other accused, whatever their
station in life may be. The interest of the State in the speedy,
impartial and inexpensive disposition of criminal cases was
likewise considered.
The Respondent Failed to Comply with the Essential
Prerequisites of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure
The respondent argues that the issue involved in the Court of
Appeals is entirely different from the issue involved in the present
recourse; hence, any admissions he made in the court below are
not judicial admissions in this case. He asserts that the issue
involved in the CA was whether or not he was placed in double
jeopardy when he was charged with murder in Criminal Cases
Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 despite the dismissal of Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689; whereas the issue in this
Court is whether the prosecution of Criminal Cases Nos. 01-
101102 to 01-101112 was barred by Section 8, Rule 117 of the
RRCP. The respondent avers that the proceedings in the
appellate court are different from those in this Court.
The respondent posits that this Court erred in giving considerable
weight to the admissions he made in his pleadings and during the
proceedings in the CA. He stresses that judicial admissions may
only be used against a party if such admissions are (a) made in
the course of the proceedings in the same case; and (b) made
regarding a relevant fact, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 129 and
Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence. He contends that
contrary to the ruling of the Court, when he filed his motion for the
judicial determination of probable cause in Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, he thereby prayed for the dismissal
of the said cases. His motion carried with it, at the very least, the
prayer for the dismissal of the criminal cases. Absent a finding of
probable cause, Judge Agnir, Jr. had no recourse but to dismiss
the criminal cases. Moreover, the respondent avers that his
motion included the general prayer "for such other reliefs as may
be equitable in the premises." The respondent also points out that
the public prosecutor agreed to the averments in his motion as
the latter did not even file any motion for the reconsideration of
Judge Agnir, Jr.’s order dismissing the cases.
The respondent further contends that the Court is not a trier of
facts. It has no means to ascertain or verify as true the
contrasting claims of the parties on the factual issues, a function
best left to the trial court as the trier of facts. He posits that there
is a need for the case to be remanded to the RTC to enable him
to present evidence on whether or not Judge Agnir, Jr. complied
with the notice requirements of Section 8. Echoing the May 28,
2002 ruling of this Court, the respondent contends that it is not
fair to expect the element of notice under Section 8 to be litigated
before Judge Agnir, Jr., for the said rule was not yet in existence
at the time he filed his motion for a determination of probable
cause.
The respondent avers that the requirement for notices to the
offended parties under Section 8 is a formal and not an essential
requisite. In criminal cases, the offended party is the State and
the role of the private complainant is limited to the determination
of the civil liability of the accused. According to the respondent,
notice to the prosecution provides sufficient safeguard for the
private complainant to recover on the civil liability of the accused
based on the delicts; after all, the prosecution of the offense is
under the control and direction of the public prosecutor.
The contentions of the respondent have no merit.
First. The issue posed by the respondent in the CA and in this
Court are the same. To recall, in Civil Case No. 01-100933,31 the
respondent32 sought injunctive relief from the RTC of Manila on his
claim that in conducting a preliminary investigation in Criminal
Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112, the petitioners thereby
placed him in double jeopardy under Section 7, Rule 117 of the
RRCP.33 When the RTC denied his plea for injunctive relief, the
respondent filed his petition for certiorari in the CA, again invoking
his right against double jeopardy, praying that:
13. Inasmuch as the case subject of the "preliminary
investigation" was dismissed for the reasons mentioned, there
currently exists no complaint upon which a valid investigation can
be had in light of the clear provisions of Rule 110 which requires
the existence of a "sworn written statement charging a person
with an offense" as basis for the commencement of a preliminary
investigation under Rule 112. 1aw phi 1.nét
For petitioner, the investigation covers exactly the same offenses
over which he had been duly arraigned and a plea validly entered
before the Sandiganbayan (in Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 57)
before its remand to the QC RTC. Hence, to proceed therewith on
similar charges will put him in jeopardy of being twice punished
therefor (Article III, §21, Constitution).34
The respondent (petitioner therein) contended that the dismissal Let us see your reason for it?
of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 by Judge
Agnir, Jr. amounted to a judgment of acquittal; hence, he could ATTY. FORTUN:36
no longer be charged and prosecuted anew for the same offense
without violating his right against double jeopardy. However, the First, are you saying that double jeopardy applies or not?
respondent filed a second amended petition wherein he invoked
for the first time Section 8 of Rule 117 of the RRCP:
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:37
(e) the new criminal cases for Murder filed by respondents
Allow me to qualify the effects of double jeopardy occur
against petitioner and the other accused on June 6, 2001
with permanent dismissal that is my submission.
(docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112) and
pending before respondent Judge Yadao (Annex B) is dismissible
on its face as they involve exactly the same accused, facts, and ATTY. FORTUN:38
offenses which had previously been dismissed by the QC RTC in
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 on March 29, 1999, No, no, I am not talking of the effects, I am talking of the
hence, can no longer be revived two (2) years after such doctrine, you are not invoking the doctrine of double
dismissal in accordance with the clear provisions of Section 8, jeopardy?
Rule 117.35
ATTY. FORTUN:
Indeed, the CA granted the respondent’s petition based on
Section 8, Rule 117 of the RRCP. In this case, the respondent Your Honor, double jeopardy does not apply Section 8,
invoked the same rule and the Constitution. Thus, during the oral 117 they are (interrupted)
arguments in this Court, the respondent, through counsel,
admitted that he was indeed invoking Section 8 anew and the JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
provisions of the Constitution on double jeopardy:
That is right.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
ATTY. FORTUN:
You are saying that Sen. Lacson can no longer be
prosecuted forever for that crime, for the killing of the 11 They are two different claims.
in 1995?
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is what I am trying to rule out so that we do not have
That is my submission, Your Honor. to discuss it.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: ATTY. FORTUN:

Very well, Your Honor. What you are saying is the effects, I am not asking about
the effects, I will ask that later.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
ATTY. FORTUN:
You are not invoking double jeopardy?
They are two different (interrupted)
ATTY. FORTUN:
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
As I mentioned we are saying that the effects of a
permanent dismissal vest the effects (interrupted) Later, I am asking about doctrines. Since you are not
invoking the doctrine of double jeopardy you are resting
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: your case win or lose, sink or sail on the application of
8,117?
No, I am not talking of the effects, I am asking about the
application, you are not asking the Court to apply the ATTY. FORTUN:
doctrine of double jeopardy to prevent a prosecution of
Mr. Lacson? On the constitutional right of the accused under Section
16 of Article 3 which is speedy disposition of cases which
ATTY. FORTUN: implemented 8,817, that is our arguments in this bar.

Because the element of double jeopardy cannot apply 8, JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

117.
Are you not resting on 8,117?
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
ATTY. FORTUN:
So, the answer is yes?
That and the constitutional provision, Your Honor.
ATTY. FORTUN:
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
No, Your Honor, we were saying that precisely a
permanent dismissal vests the rights of double jeopardy So, you are resting on 8,117?
upon the accused who invokes it.
ATTY. FORTUN:
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Not exclusive, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Do we get it from you that it is your stand that this is
applicable to the case at bar?
And the Constitution?
ATTY. FORTUN:
ATTY. FORTUN:
It is my submission, that it is, Your Honor. In addition, of
The Constitution which gave life to 8,117. course, to my proposition that Mr. Lacson is covered by
the rule on double jeopardy as well, because he had
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: already been arraigned before the Sandiganbayan prior to
the case being remanded to the RTC.
To speedy disposition?
JUSTICE SALONGA:
ATTY. FORTUN:
You are referring to those cases which were dismissed by
the RTC of Quezon City.
Yes, Your Honor.
ATTY. FORTUN:
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Yes, Your Honor.
Can a Court, let us see your theory then – your theory
rest on two provisions: first, the Rules of Court 8,117 and
Second, the Constitution on speedy disposition? JUSTICE SALONGA:

ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.39
Second. The respondent’s answers to the questions of
Madame Justice Josefina Salonga during the hearing in
the CA where he admitted, through counsel, that he gave
no express conformity to the dismissal of the cases by
Judge Agnir, Jr., were in relation to Section 8 of Rule 117
and not to Section 7 of Rule 117 on double jeopardy,
thus:
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And it is your stand that the dismissal made by the Court
was provisional in nature?
ATTY. FORTUN:
It was in that the accused did not ask for it. What they
wanted at the onset was simply a judicial determination of
probable cause for warrants of arrest issued. Then Judge
Agnir, [Jr.] upon the presentation by the parties of their
witnesses, particularly those who had withdrawn their
affidavits, made one further conclusion that not only was
this case lacking in probable cause for purposes of the
issuance of an arrest warrant but also it did not justify
proceeding to trial.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And it is expressly provided under Section 8 that a case
shall not be provisionally dismissed except [if] it is with the
express conformity of the accused.
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And with notice to the offended party.
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
Was there an express conformity on the part of the
accused?
ATTY. FORTUN:
There was none, Your Honor. We were not asked to sign
any order, or any statement which would normally be
required by the Court on pre-trial or on other matters,
including other provisional dismissal. My very limited
practice in criminal courts, Your Honor, had taught me
that a judge must be very careful on this matter of
provisional dismissal. In fact, they ask the accused to
come forward, and the judge himself or herself explains
the implications of a provisional dismissal.40
The respondent, through counsel, even admitted that
despite his plea for equitable relief in his motion for a
judicial determination of probable cause in the RTC, he
did not agree to a provisional dismissal of the cases. The
respondent insisted that the only relief he prayed for
before Judge Agnir, Jr. was that warrants for his arrest be
withheld pending a finding of probable cause. He asserted
that the judge did not even require him to agree to a
provisional dismissal of the cases:
JUSTICE ROSARIO:
You were present during the proceedings?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE ROSARIO:
You represented the petitioner in this case?
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor. And there was nothing of
that sort which the good Judge Agnir, [Jr.] who is
most knowledgeable in criminal law, had done in
respect of provisional dismissal or the matter of Mr.
Lacson agreeing to the provisional dismissal of the
case.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Now, you filed a motion, the other accused then filed a
motion for a judicial determination of probable cause?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Did you make any alternative prayer in your motion that if
there is no probable cause what should the Court do?
ATTY. FORTUN:
That the arrest warrants only be withheld. That was
the only prayer that we asked. In fact, I have a copy of
that particular motion, and if I may read my prayer before
the Court, it said: "Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that
(1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution be conducted, and
for this purpose, an order be issued directing the
prosecution to present private complainants and their
witnesses at the scheduled hearing for that purpose; and
(2) the warrants for the arrest of the accused be withheld,
or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until resolution of
this incident."
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
There is no general prayer for any further relief?
ATTY. FORTUN:
There is but it simply says other equitable reliefs are
prayed for.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Don’t you surmise Judge Agnir, [Jr.] now a member of this
Court, precisely addressed your prayer for just and
equitable relief to dismiss the case because what would
be the net effect of a situation where there is no warrant
of arrest being issued without dismissing the case?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor. I will not second say (sic) yes the
Good Justice, but what is plain is we did not agree to
the provisional dismissal, neither were we asked to
sign any assent to the provisional dismissal.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
If you did not agree to the provisional dismissal, did you
not file any motion for reconsideration of the order of
Judge Agnir, [Jr.] that the case should be dismissed?
ATTY. FORTUN:
I did not, Your Honor, because I knew fully well at that
time that my client had already been arraigned, and
the arraignment was valid as far as I was concerned.
So, the dismissal, Your Honor, by Judge Agnir
operated to benefit me, and therefore I did not take
any further step in addition to rocking the boat or
clarifying the matter further because it probably could
prejudice the interest of my client.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Continue.41
In his memorandum, in lieu of the oral argument filed with the
Court of Appeals, the respondent declared in no uncertain terms
that:
Soon thereafter, the SC in early 1999 rendered a decision
declaring the Sandiganbayan without jurisdiction over the cases.
The records were remanded to the QC RTC. Upon raffle, the
case was assigned to Branch 91. Petitioner and the others
promptly filed a motion for judicial determination of probable
cause (Annex B). He asked that warrants for his arrest not be
issued. He did not move for the dismissal of the Informations,
contrary to respondent OSG’s claim.42
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. – An admission, verbal or written,
made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same
case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted
only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or
that no such admission was made.
A judicial admission is a formal statement made either by a party
or his or her attorney, in the course of judicial proceeding which
removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy. It is a
voluntary concession of fact by a party or a party’s attorney
during such judicial proceedings, including admissions in
pleadings made by a party.43 It may occur at any point during the
litigation process. An admission in open court is a judicial
admission.44 A judicial admission binds the client even if made by
his counsel.45 As declared by this Court:
... [I]n fact, "judicial admissions are frequently those of counsel or
of attorney of record, who is, for the purpose of the trial, the agent
of his client. When such admissions are made ... for the purpose
of dispensing with proof of some fact, ... they bind the client,
whether made during, or even after the trial."46
When the respondent admitted that he did not move for the
dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 in
his motion for a judicial determination of probable cause, and that
he did not give his express consent to the provisional dismissal of
the said cases, he in fact admitted that one of the essential
requisites of Section 8, Rule 117 was absent.
The respondent’s contention that his admissions made in his
pleadings and during the hearing in the CA cannot be used in the
present case as they were made in the course of a different
proceeding does not hold water. It should be borne in mind that
the proceedings before the Court was by way of an appeal under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, from the proceedings
in the CA; as such, the present recourse is but a mere
continuation of the proceedings in the appellate court. This is not
a new trial, but a review of proceedings which commenced from
the trial court, which later passed through the CA. The
respondent is bound by the judicial admissions he made in the
CA, and such admissions so hold him in the proceedings before
this Court. As categorically stated in Habecker v. Clark
Equipment Company:47
... [J]udicial admissions on issues of fact, including those made by
counsel on behalf of a client during a trial, are binding "for the
purpose of the case ... including appeals."
While it may be true that the trial court may provisionally dismiss
a criminal case if it finds no probable cause, absent the express
consent of the accused to such provisional dismissal, the latter
cannot thereafter invoke Section 8 to bar a revival thereof.
Neither may the accused do so simply because the public
prosecutor did not object to a motion of the accused for a judicial
determination of probable cause or file a motion for the
reconsideration of the order of dismissal of the case. Even a
cursory reading of the respondent’s motion for a judicial
determination of probable cause will show that it contained no
allegation that there was no probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant for the respondent’s arrest as a prayer for the dismissal
of the cases. The respondent was only asking the court to
determine whether or not there was probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest and in the meantime, to hold
in abeyance the issuance of the said warrant. Case law has it that
a prayer for equitable relief is of no avail, unless the petition
states facts which will authorize the court to grant such relief.48 A
court cannot set itself in motion, nor has it power to decide
questions except as presented by the parties in their pleadings. to 01-101112 and to RE-RAFFLE the same with dispatch to one
Anything that is resolved or decided beyond them is coram non of the branches of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
judice and void.49 designated as a special court, exclusively to try and decide
heinous crimes.
Third. There is no need for the Court to remand the instant case
to the trial court to enable the respondent to adduce post facto SO ORDERED.
evidence that the requisite notices under Section 8 had been
complied with by Judge Agnir, Jr. The Court has thoroughly Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Austria-
examined the voluminous records from the Sandiganbayan and Martinez, Carpio-Morales, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
the RTC50 and found no proof that the requisite notices were even
served on all the heirs of the victims. The respondent himself Puno, J., maintains his dissent.
admitted that, as held by this Court, in its May 28, 2002
Resolution, "Judge Agnir, Jr. could not have complied with the
Vitug, J., maintains his dissent and reiterate his opinion on the
mandate under Section 8 because said rule had yet to exist."51
Court’s resolution of 28 May 2002.
One final matter. The records show that Criminal Cases Nos. 01-
Ynares-Santiago, J., see separate dissenting opinion.
101102 to 01-101112 were assigned, through the customary
raffle of cases, to Branch 81 of the RTC of Quezon City, the same
branch which dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 99-81679 to 99- Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., see dissenting opinion.
81689.52 In the April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court, the Presiding
Judge of Branch 81 of the RTC of Quezon City was directed to try Carpio, J., no part.
and decide Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 with
reasonable dispatch. The Court notes, however, that in Corona, J., on leave.
Administrative Order No. 104-96, it designated six branches of
the RTC of Quezon City53 as special courts, exclusively to try and Tinga, J., no part.
decide heinous crimes under Rep. Act No. 7659. Since the
accused in the said cases are charged with murder, which under
Rep. Act No. 7659, is classified as a heinous crime, the above
cases should be consolidated and re-raffled by the Executive
Judge of the RTC of Quezon City to a branch thereof designated
as a special court, exclusively to try and decide heinous crimes.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent Panfilo M.

Lacson’s Omnibus Motion and Motion to Set for Oral Arguments
are DENIED. The respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration and
its Supplement are DENIED WITH FINALITY. The Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is hereby
DIRECTED to CONSOLIDATE Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 151876 June 21, 2005
SUSAN GO and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
FERNANDO L. DIMAGIBA, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Administrative Circular 12-2000, as clarified by Administrative
Circular 13-2001, merely establishes a rule of preference in
imposing penalties for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP
22), the "Bouncing Checks Law." When the circumstances of both
the offense and the offender indicate good faith or a clear mistake
of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone --
instead of imprisonment -- is the preferred penalty. As the
Circular requires a review of the factual circumstances of a given
case, it applies only to pending or future litigations. It is not a
penal law; hence, it does not have retroactive effect. Neither may
it be used to modify final judgments of conviction.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the October 10, 20012 and the October 11,
20013 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) (Branch 5),
Baguio City.4 The October 10, 2001 Order released Respondent
Fernando L. Dimagiba from confinement and required him to pay
a fine of ₱100,000 in lieu of imprisonment. The October 11, 2001
Order disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, [in] applying the doctrine as held in the above-
entitled cases in this case, the instant petition for Habeas Corpus
should be, as it is hereby, GRANTED. The Baguio City Jail
Warden is hereby ordered to IMMEDIATELY RELEASE the
petitioner from confinement unless he is being held for some
other lawful cause other than by virtue of the Sentence Mittimus
dated September 28, 2001 issued by CESAR S. VIDUYA, Clerk
of Court, MTC 4, Baguio City. Further, the petitioner is required to
pay a fine in the amount of ₱100,000.00 in lieu of his
imprisonment, in addition to the civil aspect of the Joint Judgment
rendered by MTC 4 dated July 16, 1999."5
The Facts
The pertinent facts are not disputed. Respondent Fernando L.
Dimagiba issued to Petitioner Susan Go thirteen (13) checks
which, when presented to the drawee bank for encashment or
payment on the due dates, were dishonored for the reason
"account closed."6 Dimagiba was subsequently prosecuted for 13
counts of violation of BP 227 under separate Complaints filed with
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Baguio City.8 After a
joint trial, the MTCC (Branch 4) rendered a Decision on July 16,
1999, convicting the accused in the 13 cases. The dispositive
portion reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition, this Court
finds the evidence of the prosecution to have established the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged
and imposes upon the accused the penalty of 3 months
imprisonment for each count (13 counts) and to indemnify the
offended party the amount of One Million Two Hundred Ninety
Five Thousand Pesos (₱1,295,000.00) with legal interest per
annum commencing from 1996 after the checks were dishonored
by reason ‘ACCOUNT CLOSED’ on December 13, 1995, to pay
attorney’s fees of ₱15,000.00 and to pay the costs."9
The appeal of Dimagiba was raffled to Branch 4 of the RTC in
Baguio City.10 On May 23, 2000, the RTC denied the appeal and
sustained his conviction.11 There being no further appeal to the
Court of Appeals (CA), the RTC issued on February 1, 2001, a
Certificate of Finality of the Decision.12
Thus, on February 14, 2001, the MTCC issued an Order directing
the arrest of Dimagiba for the service of his sentence as a result
of his conviction. The trial court also issued a Writ of Execution to
enforce his civil liability.13
On February 27, 2001, Dimagiba filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the MTCC Order. He prayed for the recall of
the Order of Arrest and the modification of the final Decision,
arguing that the penalty of fine only, instead of imprisonment also,
should have been imposed on him.14 The arguments raised in that
Motion were reiterated in a Motion for the Partial Quashal of the
Writ of Execution filed on February 28, 2001.15
In an Order dated August 22, 2001, the MTCC denied the Motion
for Reconsideration and directed the issuance of a Warrant of
Arrest against Dimagiba.16 On September 28, 2001, he was
arrested and imprisoned for the service of his sentence.
On October 9, 2001, he filed with the RTC of Baguio City a
Petition17 for a writ of habeas corpus. The case was raffled to
Branch 5, which scheduled the hearing for October 10, 2001.
Copies of the Order were served on respondent’s counsels and
the city warden.18
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Right after hearing the case on October 10, 2001, the RTC issued
an Order directing the immediate release of Dimagiba from
confinement and requiring him to pay a fine of ₱100,000 in lieu of
imprisonment. However, the civil aspect of the July 16, 1999
MTCC Decision was not touched upon.19 A subsequent Order,
explaining in greater detail the basis of the grant of the writ of
habeas corpus, was issued on October 11, 2001.20
In justifying its modification of the MTCC Decision, the RTC
invoked Vaca v. Court of Appeals21 and Supreme Court
Administrative Circular (SC-AC) No. 12-2000,22 which allegedly
required the imposition of a fine only instead of imprisonment also
for BP 22 violations, if the accused was not a recidivist or a
habitual delinquent. The RTC held that this rule should be
retroactively applied in favor of Dimagiba.23 It further noted that
(1) he was a first-time offender and an employer of at least 200
workers who would be displaced as a result of his imprisonment;
and (2) the civil liability had already been satisfied through the
levy of his properties.24
On October 22, 2001, Petitioner Go filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the RTC Orders dated October 10 and 11,
2001.25 That Motion was denied on January 18, 2002.26
Hence, this Petition filed directly with this Court on pure questions
of law.27
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for this Court’s
consideration:
"1. [The RTC] Judge was utterly devoid of jurisdiction in
amending a final and conclusive decision of the Municipal
Trial Court, Branch 4, dated July 16, 1999, in nullifying the
Sentence Mittimus, dated September 28, 2001, issued by
x x x [the] Municipal Trial Court, Branch 4, Baguio City,
 and in ordering the release of [Dimagiba] from
confinement in jail for the service of his sentence under
the said final and conclusive judgment;
"2. Assuming only for the sake of argument that habeas
corpus is the proper remedy, the Petition for Habeas
Corpus is utterly devoid of merit as [Dimagiba was] not
entitled to the beneficent policy enunciated in the Eduardo
Vaca and Rosa Lim cases and reiterated in the Supreme
Court Circular No. 12-2000; x x x
"3. Granting for the sake of argument that [Dimagiba was]
entitled to the beneficent policy enunciated in the Eduardo
Vaca and Rosa Lim cases and reiterated in the Supreme
Court Circular No. 12-2000, the minimum fine that should
be imposed on [Dimagiba] is one million and two hundred
ninety five thousand pesos (₱1,295,000.00) up to double
the said amount or (₱2,590,000), not just the measly
amount of ₱100,000; and
"4. [The RTC] judge committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in hearing and
deciding [Dimagiba’s] Petition for Habeas Corpus without
notice and without affording procedural due process to the
People of the Philippines through the Office of [the] City
Prosecutor of Baguio City or the Office of the Solicitor
General."28
In the main, the case revolves around the question of whether the
Petition for habeas corpus was validly granted. Hence, the Court
will discuss the four issues as they intertwine with this main
question.29
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue:
Propriety of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention in which individuals are deprived of
liberty.30 It was devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint; or, more specifically, to
obtain immediate relief for those who may have been illegally
confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause and thus deliver
them from unlawful custody.31 It is therefore a writ of inquiry
intended to test the circumstances under which a person is
detained.32
The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is
under a judicial process or by virtue of a valid
judgment.33 However, as a post-conviction remedy, it may be
allowed when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, any of
the following exceptional circumstances is attendant: (1) there
has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the
restraint of a person; (2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose
the sentence; or (3) the imposed penalty has been
excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess.34
In the present case, the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was
anchored on the ruling in Vaca and on SC-AC No. 12-2000,
which allegedly prescribed the imposition of a fine, not
imprisonment, for convictions under BP 22. Respondent sought
the retroactive effect of those rulings, thereby effectively
challenging the penalty imposed on him for being excessive.
From his allegations, the Petition appeared sufficient in form to
support the issuance of the writ.
However, it appears that respondent has previously sought the
modification of his sentence in a Motion for Reconsideration35 of
the MTCC’s Execution Order and in a Motion for the Partial
Quashal of the Writ of Execution.36 Both were denied by the
MTCC on the ground that it had no power or authority to amend a
judgment issued by the RTC.
In his Petition for habeas corpus, respondent raised the same
arguments that he had invoked in the said Motions. We believe
that his resort to this extraordinary remedy was a procedural
infirmity. The remedy should have been an appeal of the MTCC
Order denying his Motions, in which he should have prayed that
the execution of the judgment be stayed. But he effectively
misused the action he had chosen, obviously with the intent of
finding a favorable court. His Petition for a writ of habeas corpus
was clearly an attempt to reopen a case that had already become
final and executory. Such an action deplorably amounted to forum
shopping. Respondent should have resorted to the proper,
available remedy instead of instituting a different action in another
forum.
The Court also finds his arguments for his release insubstantial to
support the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Preference in the Application of Penalties for Violation of BP 22
The following alternative penalties are imposable under BP 22:
(1) imprisonment of not less than 30 days, but not more than one
year; (2) a fine of not less or more than double the amount of the
check, a fine that shall in no case exceed ₱200,000; or (3) both
such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.37
SC-AC No. 12-2000, as clarified by SC-AC No. 13-
2001,38 established a rule of preference in imposing the above
penalties.39 When the circumstances of the case clearly indicate
good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence,
the imposition of a fine alone may be considered as the preferred
penalty.40 The determination of the circumstances that warrant the
imposition of a fine rests upon the trial judge only.41 Should the
judge deem that imprisonment is appropriate, such penalty may
be imposed.42
SC-AC No. 12-2000 did not delete the alternative penalty of
imprisonment. The competence to amend the law belongs to the
legislature, not to this Court.43
Inapplicability of SC-AC No. 12-2000
Petitioners argue that respondent is not entitled to the benevolent
policy enunciated in SC-AC No. 12-2000, because he is not a
"first time offender."44 This circumstance is, however, not the sole
factor in determining whether he deserves the preferred penalty
of fine alone. The penalty to be imposed depends on the peculiar
circumstances of each case.45 It is the trial court’s discretion to
impose any penalty within the confines of the law. SC-AC No. 13-
2001 explains thus:
"x x x. Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of
preference in the application of the penal provisions of BP 22
such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the
offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact
without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should
be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say,
the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the
imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. x x x.
It is, therefore, understood that:
xxxxxxxxx
"2. The Judges concerned, may in the exercise of sound
discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar
circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of
a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice, or whether
forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the
seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or
otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice;"
The Court notes that the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus
relied mainly on the alleged retroactivity of SC-AC No. 12-2000,
which supposedly favored BP 22 offenders.46 On this point,
Dimagiba contended that his imprisonment was violative of his
right to equal protection of the laws, since only a fine would be
imposed on others similarly situated.47
The rule on retroactivity states that criminal laws may be applied
retroactively if favorable to the accused. This principle, embodied
in the Revised Penal Code,48 has been expanded in certain
instances to cover special laws.49
The issue of retroactivity of SC-AC No. 12-2000 was settled in De
Joya v. Jail Warden of Batangas City,50 which we quote:
"Petitioner's reliance of our ruling in Ordoñez v. Vinarao that a
convicted person is entitled to benefit from the reduction of
penalty introduced by the new law, citing People v. Simon, is
misplaced. Thus, her plea that as provided for in Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 as
modified by SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001 should benefit her
has no basis.
"First. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence,
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable. The
circular applies only to those cases pending as of the date of its
effectivity and not to cases already terminated by final judgment.
"Second. As explained by the Court in SC Admin. Circular No. 13-
2001, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely lays down a rule of
preference in the application of the penalties for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22. It does not amend B.P. Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative
intent behind the law. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely
urges the courts to take into account not only the purpose of the
law but also the circumstances of the accused -- whether he
acted in good faith or on a clear mistake of fact without taint of
negligence -- and such other circumstance which the trial court or
the appellate court believes relevant to the penalty to be
imposed."51
Because the Circular merely lays down a rule of preference, it
serves only as a guideline for the trial courts. Thus, it is
addressed to the judges, who are directed to consider the factual
circumstances of each case prior to imposing the appropriate
penalty. In other words, the Administrative Circular does not
confer any new right in favor of the accused, much less those
convicted by final judgment.
The competence to determine the proper penalty belongs to the
court rendering the decision against the accused.52 That decision
is subject only to appeal on grounds of errors of fact or law, or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Another trial court may not encroach upon this
authority. Indeed, SC-AC No. 12-2000 necessarily requires a
review of all factual circumstances of each case. Such a review
can no longer be done if the judgment has become final and
executory.
In the present case, the MTCC of Baguio City had full knowledge
of all relevant circumstances from which respondent’s conviction
and sentence were based. The penalty imposed was well within
the confines of the law. Upon appeal, the conviction was
sustained by RTC-Branch 4 of Baguio City. Eventually, the
Decision attained finality. Hence, RTC-Branch 5 did not have the
jurisdiction to modify the lawful judgment in the guise of granting
a writ of habeas corpus.
The doctrine of equal protection of laws53 does not apply for the
same reasons as those on retroactivity. Foremost of these
reasons is that the Circular is not a law that deletes the penalty of
imprisonment. As explained earlier, it is merely a rule of
preference as to which penalty should be imposed under the
peculiar circumstances of a case. At any rate, this matter
deserves scant consideration, because respondent failed to raise
any substantial argument to support his contention.54
Modification of Final Judgment Not Warranted
The Court is not unmindful of So v. Court of Appeals,55 in which
the final judgment of conviction for violation of BP 22 was
modified by the deletion of the sentence of imprisonment and the
imposition of a fine. That case proceeded from an "Urgent
Manifestation of an Extraordinary Supervening Event,"56 not from
an unmeritorious petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as in the
present case. The Court exercised in that case its authority to
suspend or to modify the execution of a final judgment when
warranted or made imperative by the higher interest of justice or
by supervening events.57 The supervening event in that case was
the petitioner’s urgent need for coronary rehabilitation for at least
one year under the direct supervision of a coronary care
therapist; imprisonment would have been equivalent to a death
sentence.58
The peculiar circumstances of So do not obtain in the present
case. Respondent’s supposed "unhealthy physical condition due
to a triple by-pass operation, and aggravated by hypertension,"
cited by the RTC in its October 10, 2001 Order,59 is totally bereft
of substantial proof. The Court notes that respondent did not
make any such allegation in his Petition for habeas corpus.
Neither did he mention his physical state in his Memorandum and
Comment submitted to this Court.
Respondent seeks the retroactive application of SC-AC No. 12-
2000 in his favor on the basis alone of the alleged settlement of
his civil liability.60 Citing Griffith v. Court of Appeals,61 he theorizes
that answering for a criminal offense is no longer justified after the
settlement of the debt.
Respondent, however, misreads Griffith. The Court held in that
case that convicting the accused who, two years prior to the filing
of the BP 22 cases, had already paid his debt (from which the
checks originated) was contrary to the basic principles of fairness
and justice.62 Obviously, that situation is not attendant here.
The civil liability in the present case was satisfied through the levy
and sale of the properties of respondent only after the criminal
case had been terminated with his conviction.63 Apparently, he
had sufficient properties that could have been used to settle his
liabilities prior to his conviction. Indeed, such an early settlement
would have been an indication that he was in good faith, a
circumstance that could have been favorably considered in
determining his appropriate penalty.
At any rate, civil liability differs from criminal liability.64 What is
punished in the latter is not the failure to pay the obligation, but
the issuance of checks that subsequently bounced or were
dishonored for insufficiency or lack of funds.65 The Court
reiterates the reasons why the issuance of worthless checks is
criminalized:
"The practice is prohibited by law because of its deleterious
effects on public interest. The effects of the increase of worthless
checks transcend the private interest of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the
community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to
the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful
practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation
multiplied a thousand-fold can very well pollute the channels of
trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually
hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The law
punishes the act not as an offense against property but an
offense against public order."66
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed
Orders NULLIFIED. Respondent’s Petition for habeas corpus is
hereby DENIED. Let this case be REMANDED to MTCC of
Baguio City for the re-arrest of respondent and the completion of
his sentence.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. Section 2. Without prejudice to the rights of the Republic of the
Philippines over it territorial sea and continental shelf, it shall
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., have and exercise in the exclusive economic zone established
concur. herein the following;

MALACAÑANG (a) Sovereignty rights for the purpose of exploration and

Manila exploitation, conservation and management of the natural
resources, whether living or non-living, both renewable
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1599 and non-renewable, of the sea-bed, including the subsoil
and the superjacent waters, and with regard to other
activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of
ESTABLISHING AN EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE AND FOR
the resources of the zone, such as the production of
OTHER PURPOSES
energy from the water, currents and winds;
WHEREAS, an exclusive economic zone extending to a distance
(b) Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with respect to the
of two hundred nautical miles from the baselines from which the
establishment and utilization of artificial islands, off-shore
territorial sea is measured is vital to the economic survival and
terminals, installations and structures, the preservation of
development of the Republic of the Philippines;
the marine environment, including the prevention and
control of pollution, and scientific research;
WHEREAS, such a zone is now a recognized principle of
international law;
(c) Such other rights as are recognized by international
law or state practice.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of
the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Section 3. Except in accordance with the terms of any agreement
Constitution, do hereby decree and order:
entered into with the Republic of the Philippines or of any license
granted by it or under authority by the Republic of the Philippines,
Section 1. There is hereby established a zone to be known as no person shall, in relation to the exclusive economic zone:
the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines. The exclusive
economic zone shall extend to a distance of two hundred nautical
(a) explore or exploit any resources;
miles beyond and from the baselines from which the territorial sea
is measured: Provided, That, where the outer limits of the zone as
thus determined overlap the exclusive economic zone of an (b) carry out any search, excavation or drilling operations:
adjacent or neighboring state, the common boundaries shall be
determined by agreement with the state concerned or in (c) conduct any research;
accordance with pertinent generally recognized principles of
international law on delimitation. (d) construct, maintain or operate any artificial island, off-
shore terminal, installation or other structure or device; or
 (e) perform any act or engage in any activity which is
contrary to, or in derogation of, the sovereign rights and
jurisdiction herein provided.
Nothing herein shall be deemed a prohibition on a citizen of the
Philippines, whether natural or juridical, against the performance
of any of the foregoing acts, if allowed under existing laws.
Section 4. Other states shall enjoy in the exclusive economic
zone freedoms with respect to navigation and overflight, the
laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other
internationally lawful uses of the sea relating to navigation and
communications.
Section 5. (a) The President may authorize the appropriate
government office/agency to make and promulgate such rules
and regulations which may be deemed proper and necessary for
carrying out the purposes of this degree.
(b) Any person who shall violate any provision of this
decree or of any rule or regulation promulgated hereunder
and approved by the President shall be subject to a fine
which shall not be less than two thousand pesos
(P2,000.00) nor be more than one hundred thousand
pesos (100,000.00) or imprisonment ranging from six (6)
months to ten (10) years, or both such fine and
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. Vessels and
other equipment or articles used in connection therewith
shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture.
Section 6. This Decree shall take effect thirty (30) days after
publication in the Official Gazette.
Done in the City of Manila, this 11th day of June, in the year of
Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-eight.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13005 October 10, 1917
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH SING, defendant-appellant.
Antonio Sanz for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu finding the defendant guilty of a violation of section 4 of Act
No. 2381 (the Opium Law), and sentencing him to two years
imprisonment, to pay a fine of P300 or to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The following facts are fully proven: The defendant is a subject of
China employed as a fireman on the steamship Shun Chang.
The Shun Chang is a foreign steamer which arrived at the port of
Cebu on April 25, 1917, after a voyage direct from the port of
Saigon. The defendant bought eight cans of opium in Saigon,
brought them on board the steamship Shun Chang, and had them
in his possession during the trip from Saigon to Cebu. When the
steamer anchored in the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, the
authorities on making a search found the eight cans of opium
above mentioned hidden in the ashes below the boiler of the
steamer's engine. The defendant confessed that he was the
owner of this opium, and that he had purchased it in Saigon. He
did not confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the opium.
He did not say that it was his intention to import the prohibited
drug into the Philippine Islands. No other evidence direct or
indirect, to show that the intention of the accused was to import
illegally this opium into the Philippine Islands, was introduced.
Has the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine
Islands been proven?
Two decisions of this Court are cited in the judgment of the trial
court, but with the intimation that there exists inconsistently
between the doctrines laid down in the two cases. However,
neither decision is directly a precedent on the facts before us.
In the case of United States vs. Look Chaw ([1910], 18 Phil.,
573), in the opinion handed down by the Chief Justice, it is found
—
That, although the mere possession of a thing of
prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in
transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule,
constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on
account of such vessel being considered as an extension
of its own nationality, the same rule does no apply when
the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine
Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed
from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an
open violation of the laws of the land, with respect to
which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the
place of the commission of the crime, only the court
established in the said place itself has competent
jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an
international treaty.
1awphil.net
A marked difference between the facts in the Look Chaw case
and the facts in the present instance is readily observable. In the
Look Chaw case, the charge case the illegal possession and sale
of opium — in the present case the charge as illegal importation
of opium; in the Look Chaw case the foreign vessel was in transit
— in the present case the foreign vessel was not in transit; in the
Look Chaw case the opium was landed from the vessel upon
Philippine soil — in the present case of United States vs. Jose
([1916], 34 Phil., 840), the main point, and the one on which
resolution turned, was that in a prosecution based on the illegal
importation of opium or other prohibited drug, the Government
must prove, or offer evidence sufficient to raise a presumption,
that the vessel from which the drug is discharged came into
Philippine waters from a foreign country with the drug on board.
In the Jose case, the defendants were acquitted because it was
not proved that the opium was imported from a foreign country; in
the present case there is no question but what the opium came
from Saigon to Cebu. However, in the opinion in the Jose case,
we find the following which may be obiter dicta, but which at least
is interesting as showing the view of the writer of the opinion:
The importation was complete, to say the least, when the
ship carrying it anchored in Subic Bay. It was not
necessary that the opium discharged or that it be taken
from the ship. It was sufficient that the opium was brought
into the waters of the Philippine Islands on a boat
destined for a Philippine port and which subsequently
anchored in a port of the Philippine Islands with intent to
discharge its cargo.
Resolving whatever doubt was exist as to the authority of the
views just quoted, we return to an examination of the applicable
provisions of the law. It is to be noted that section 4 of Act No.
2381 begins, "Any person who shall unlawfully import or bring any
prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands." "Import" and "bring"
are synonymous terms. The Federal Courts of the United States
have held that the mere act of going into a port, without breaking
bulk, is prima facie evidence of importation. (The Mary [U. S.], 16
Fed. Cas., 932, 933.) And again, the importation is not the
making entry of goods at the custom house, but merely the
bringing them into port; and the importation is complete before
entry of the Custom House. (U. S. vs. Lyman [U. S.], 26, Fed.
Cas., 1024, 1028; Perots vs. U. S., 19 Fed. Cas., 258.) As
applied to the Opium Law, we expressly hold that any person
unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine
Islands, when the prohibited drug is found under this person's
control on a vessel which has come direct from a foreign country
and is within the jurisdictional limits of the Philippine Islands. In
such case, a person is guilty of illegal importation of the drug
unless contrary circumstances exist or the defense proves
otherwise. Applied to the facts herein, it would be absurb to think
that the accused was merely carrying opium back and forth
between Saigon and Cebu for the mere pleasure of so doing. It
would likewise be impossible to conceive that the accused
needed so large an amount of opium for his personal use. No
better explanation being possible, the logical deduction is that the
defendant intended this opium to be brought into the Philippine
Islands. We accordingly find that there was illegal importation of
opium from a foreign country into the Philippine Islands. To
anticipate any possible misunderstanding, let it be said that these
statements do not relate to foreign vessels in transit, a situation
not present.
The defendant and appellant, having been proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt as charged and the sentence of the trial court
being within the limits provided by law, it results that the judgment
must be affirmed with the costs of this instance against the
appellant. So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1988 February 24, 1948
JESUS MIQUIABAS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMANDING GENERAL, PHILIPPINE-RYUKYUS
COMMAND, UNITED STATES ARMY, respondents.
Lorenzo Sumulong and Esteban P. Garcia for petitioner.
J. A. Wolfson for respondent.
MORAN, C.J.:
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Jesus
Miquiabas against the Commanding General Philippine-Ryukyus
Command, United States Army, who is alleged to have petitioner
under custody and to have appointed a General Court-Martial to
try petitioner in connection with an offense over which the said
court has no jurisdiction.
Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the
United States Army in the Philippines, who has been charged
with disposing in the Port of Manila Area of things belonging to
the United States Army, in violation of the 94th Article of War of
the United States. He has been arrested for that reason and a
General Court-Martial appointed by respondent tried and found
him guilty and sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment. This
sentence, however, is not yet final for it is still subject to review.
It may be stated as a rule that the Philippines, being a sovereign
nation, has jurisdiction over all offenses committed within its
territory, but it may, by treaty or by agreement, consent that the
United States or any other foreign nation, shall exercise
jurisdiction over certain offenses committed within certain portions
of said territory. On March 11, 1947, the Republic of the
Philippines and the Government of the United States of America,
entered into an agreement concerning military bases, and Article
XIII thereof is as follows:
JURISDICTION
1. The Philippines consents that the United States shall
have the right to exercise jurisdiction over the following
offenses:
(a) Any offense committed by any person within
any base except where the offender and offended
parties are both Philippine citizens (not members
of the armed forces of the United States on active
duty) or the offense is against the security of the
Philippines;
(b) Any offense committed outside the bases by
any member of the armed forces of the United
States in which the offended party is also a
member of the armed forces of the United States;
and
(c) Any offense committed outside the bases by
any member of the armed forces of the United
States against the security of the United States.
2. The Philippines shall have the right to exercise
jurisdiction over all other offenses committed outside the
bases by any member of the armed forces of the United
States.
3. Whenever for special reasons the United States may
desire not to exercise the jurisdiction reserved to it in
paragraphs 1 and 6 of this Article, the officer holding the
offender in custody shall so notify the fiscal (prosecuting
attorney) of the city or province in which the offense has
been committed within ten days after his arrest, and in
such case the Philippines shall exercise jurisdiction.
4. Whenever for special reasons the Philippines may
desire not to exercise the jurisdiction reserved to it in
paragraph 2 of this Article, the fiscal (prosecuting
attorney) of the city or province where the offense has
been committed shall so notify the officer holding the
offender in custody within ten days after his arrest, and in
such a case the United States shall be free to exercise
jurisdiction. If any offense falling under paragraph 2 of this
article is committed by any member of the armed forces of
the United States.
(a) While engaged in the actual performance of a
specific military duty, or
(b) during a period of national emergency
declared by either Government and the fiscal
(prosecuting attorney) so finds from the evidence,
he shall immediately notify the officer holding the
offender in custody that the United States is free
to exercise jurisdiction. In the event the fiscal
(prosecuting attorney) finds that the offense was
not committed in the actual performance of a
specific military duty, the offender's commanding
officer shall have the right to appeal from such
finding to the Secretary of Justice within ten days
from the receipt of the decision of the fiscal and
the decision of the Secretary of Justice shall be
final.
5. In all cases over which the Philippines exercises
jurisdiction the custody of the accused, pending trial and
final judgment, shall be entrusted without delay to the
commanding officer of the nearest base, who shall
acknowledge in writing that such accused has been
delivered to him for custody pending trial in a competent
court of the Philippines and that he will be held ready to
appear and will be produced before said court when
required by it. The commanding officer shall be furnished
by the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) with a copy of the
information against the accused upon the filing of the
original in the competent court.
 6. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, it is naturally
agreed that in time of war the United States shall have the
right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over any offenses
which may be committed by members of the armed forces
of the United States in the Philippines.
7. The United States agrees that it will not grant asylum in
any of the bases to any person fleeing from the lawful
jurisdiction of the Philippines. Should such person be
found in any base, he will be surrendered on demand to
the competent authorities of the Philippines.
8. In every case in which jurisdiction over an offense is
exercised by the United States, the offended party may
institute a separate civil action against the offender in the
proper court of the Philippines to enforce the civil liability
which under the laws of the Philippines may arise from
the offense.
Under paragraph 1 (a), the General Court-Martial would have
jurisdiction over the criminal case against petitioner if the offense
had been committed within a base. Under paragraph 1 (b), if the
offense had been committed outside a base, still the General
Court-Martial would have jurisdiction if the offense had been
committed by a "member of the armed forces of the United
States" there being no question that the offended party in this
case is the United States. It is not necessary therefore, to
consider whether the offense is against "the security of the United
States" under paragraph 1 (c), or whether petitioner committed it
in "the actual performance of a specific military duty" or in time of
a declared "national emergency" under paragraph 4, or whether
we are still in a state of war under paragraph 6, for in all these
instances the military jurisdiction depends also upon whether the
offender is a member of the armed forces of the United States.
We shall then determine in this case (1) whether the offense has
been committed within or without a base, and, in the second
instance, (2) whether the offender is or is not a member of the
armed forces of the United States.
As to the first question, Article XXVI of the Agreement provides
that "bases are those area named in Annex A and Annex B and
such additional areas as may be acquired for military purposes
pursuant to the terms of this Agreement." Among the areas
specified in Annexes A and B, there is none that has reference to
the Port Area of Manila where the offense has allegedly been
committed. On the contrary, it appears in Annex A that "army
communications system" is included, but with "the deletion of all
stations in the Port of Manila Area."
Paragraph 2 of Article XXI is invoked by respondent. The whole
article is as follows:
TEMPORARY INSTALLATIONS
1. It is mutually agreed that the United States shall retain
the right to occupy temporary quarters and installations
now existing outside the bases mentioned in Annex A and
Annex B, for such reasonable time, not exceeding two
years, as may be necessary to develop adequate facilities
within the bases for the United States armed forces. If
circumstances require an extension of time, such a period
will be fixed by mutual agreement of the two
Governments; but such extension shall not apply to the
existing temporary quarters and installations within the
limits of the City of Manila and shall in no case exceed a
period of three years.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding
paragraph, the Port of Manila reservation with boundaries
as of 1941 will be available for use to the United States
armed forces until such time as other arrangements can
be made for the supply of the bases by mutual agreement
of the two Governments.
3. The terms of this agreement pertaining to bases shall
be applicable to temporary quarters and installations
 referred to in paragraph 1 of this article while they are so
occupied by the armed forces of the United States;
provided, that offenses committed within the temporary
quarters and installations located within the present limits
of the City of Manila shall not be considered as offenses
within the bases but shall be governed by the provisions
of Article XIII, paragraphs 2 and 4, except that the election
not to exercise the jurisdiction reserved to the Philippines
shall be made by the Secretary of Justice. It is agreed that
the United States shall have full use and full control of all
these quarters and installations while they are occupied
by the armed forces of the United States, including the
exercise of such measures as may be necessary to police
said quarters for the security of the personnel and
property therein.
The subject matter of this article, as indicated by its heading, is
"Temporary Installations." Paragraph 1 refers to temporary
quarters and installations existing outside the bases specified in
Annex A and Annex B, which may be retained by the United
States armed forces for such reasonable time as may be
necessary not exceeding two years in duration, extendible fro not
more than three years, the extension not being applicable to
existing temporary quarters and installations within the limits of
the City of Manila.
Paragraph 2, of Article XXI, refers to the Port of Manila
Reservation, which will be available for use to the United States
armed forces, also as a temporary quarters and installations, its
temporariness not being for a definite period of time, but "until
such time as other arrangements can be made for supply of the
bases by mutual agreement of the two Governments." There is in
paragraph 2 absolutely nothing that may be construed as placing
the Port of Manila Reservation in the category of a permanent
base.
Paragraph 3, of Article XXI, provides "that offenses committed
within the temporary quarters and installations located within the
present limits of the City of Manila shall not be considered as
offenses within the bases but shall be governed by the provisions
of Article XIII, paragraphs 2 and 4." Therefore, the offense at bar
cannot be considered as committed within, but without, a base,
since it has been committed in the Port of Manila Area, which is
not one of the bases mentioned in Annexes A and B to the
Agreement, and is merely temporary quarters located within the
present limits of the City of Manila.
The next inquiry is whether or not the offender may be considered
as a member of the armed forces of the United States under
Article XIII, paragraph 1 (b). As above stated, petitioner is a
Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the United States Army
in the Philippines. Under the terms of the Agreement, a civilian
employee cannot be considered as a member of the armed
forces of the United States. Articles XI, XVI and XVIII of the
Agreement make mention of civilian employees separately from
members of the armed forces of the United States, which is a
conclusive indication that under said Agreement armed forces do
not include civilian employees.
Respondent invokes Articles II of the Articles of War of the United
States, which enumerates, among the persons subject to military
law, persons accompanying or serving with the armies of the
United States. But this case should be decided not under the
Articles of War, but under the terms of the Base Agreement
between the United States and the Philippines. And not because
a person is subject to military law under the Articles of War does
he become, for that reason alone, a member of the armed forces
under the Base Agreement. And even under the Articles of War,
the mere fact that a civilian employee is in the service of the
United States Army does not make him a member of the armed
forces of the United States. Otherwise, it would have been
necessary for said Article to enumerate civilian employees
separately from members of the armed forces of the United
States.
Respondent maintains that petitioner has no cause of action
because the Secretary of Justice had not notified the officer
holding the petitioner in custody whether or not the Philippines
desired to retain jurisdiction under Article XXI, paragraph 3, of the
Military Base Agreement. It is sufficient to state in this connection
that in cases like the present where the offender is a civilian
employee and not a member of the Unites States armed forces,
no waiver can be made either by the prosecuting attorney of by
the Secretary of Justice, under paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article XIII
in connection with paragraph 3 of Article XXI, of the Agreement.
We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold, that the General
Court-Martial appointed by respondent has no jurisdiction to try
petitioner for the offense allegedly committed by him and,
consequently, the judgment rendered by said court sentencing
the petitioner to 15 years' imprisonment is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction.
It is ordered that petitioner be released immediately by
respondent without prejudice to any criminal action which may be
instituted in the proper court of the Philippines.
Let a copy of this decision be sent immediately to the Honorable,
Secretary of Justice.
Paras, Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and
Tuason, JJ, concur.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring:
One of the attributes of national sovereignty is the power to try
and punish offenses, criminal and otherwise. The exercise of that
power is, by virtue of express provision of our Constitution, vested
in the Supreme Court and in inferior courts established by law.
(Sec. 1, Art. VIII) The fundamental law refers to inferior courts
created by an enactment of a national legislature, Assembly or
Congress, not to foreign courts martial, created by foreign
countries.
All this is in accordance with elemental principles of political law.
If petitioner is liable for a criminal offense, according to our laws,
the jurisdiction to try him belongs to a justice of the peace or
municipal court or to a court of first instance.
The jurisdiction can be transferred to other courts by virtue of a
law that may be enacted to said effect. The law, to be effective,
must not violate the constitutional Bill of Rights, among them the
guarantee of fair trial in favor of an accused, the equal protection
of the law, the due process of law, the guarantees against illegal
detentions and searches, and others.
Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the U. S.
Army, rendering services in the Philippines. He attacks the power
of the Commanding General, Philippine Ryukus Command, U.S.
Army, to have him under military custody and tried by a general
court-martial of said army. Respondent invokes, in opposing the
petition, the provisions of the agreement on military Bases
entered into by the Republic of the Philippines and the
government of the United States of America on March 14, 1947.
The agreement appears to be a concession to two weaknesses:
the American distrust in Philippine tribunals and Filipino yielding
to much distrust; on one hand, undisguised prejudice, — national,
racial, or otherwise, — on the other, meek submission to the
natural consequences of an unreasonable prejudice; on one side,
the haughtiness of a powerful nation, proud in the consciousness
of its power, on the other, the moral surrender of a new nation,
not yet so sure in the exercise to their fullness of sovereign
prerogatives. Extra-territoriality is wrongper se.
It is, therefore, assailable on two opposing fronts. On
constitutional ground, it is hardly defensible.
The Bill of Rights has been embodied in the Constitution for the
protection of all human beings within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Philippines. All persons covered by the waivers made in the
agreement, whether Americans or Filipinos, whether citizens or
aliens, are denied the constitutional guarantee of the equal
protection of the law. Their fundamental rights are safeguarded
by the Constitution, and the agreement places them outside the
Constitution.
Our conclusion is, therefore, that the agreement in question, so
far as it stipulates waiver of the jurisdiction of our courts of justice
on the class of persons mentioned therein, is null and void, being
in open conflict with clear provisions of our fundamental law.
Upon this ground, petitioner is entitled to be released by
respondent and by the court martial which tried him.
Even in the erroneous hypothesis that the waiver clauses of the
agreement are valid, we concur in the reasoning of the Chief
Justice in support of the position that petitioner is not
comprehended in said waiver clauses. With more reason,
respondent has no power nor jurisdiction to hold petitioner in
confinement, nor to have him tried by a U.S. army court-martial.
Notice must be served to the whole world that, in rendering the
decision in this case, the Supreme Court, in the fullness of judicial
maturity, acted not as a mere agency of national sovereignty, but
in the consciousness that the administration of justice, more than
national, is a human function, untethered by the narrow
provincialism of the points of view of a country, but founded on
the universal and permanent interests of mankind, as expressed
in principles with equal value regardless of the hemisphere of the
latitude where a person may be placed.
There is a suggestion that, because it has not found articulate
expression in this case, it should be ignored, when it is boiling in
many minds, and it is that respondent, shielded by his military
power and the overwhelming national power of his country, may
ignore our decision, and we will be powerless to enforce it. The
fact that respondent appeared before us, through counsel,
without any reservation, answers the suggestion, and gives full
justice to the sense of moral values of the respondent.
Besides, in the present state of international affairs, when
America is engaged in the noble task of making a reality the ideal
of one world, it can not compromise its moral leadership by any
showing of reckless disregard to the decision of a court of justice.
The cry that there must be one world or none can receive but one
satisfactory answer; the reality of world justice. Only in justice
hinges the salvation of humanity. Only justice can give real peace
and provide the basis for contentment and happiness.
We concur in the decision, ordering the immediate release of the
petitioner.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5270 January 15, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
H. N. BULL, defendant-appellant.
Bruce & Lawrence, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
ELLIOTT, J.:
The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a
violation of section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of
Act No. 275, and from the judgment entered thereon appealed to
this court, where under proper assignments of error he contends:
(1) that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court; (2) that under the evidence the trial
court was without jurisdiction to hear and determine the case; (3)
that Act No. 55 as amended is in violation of certain provisions of
the Constitution of the United States, and void as applied to the
facts of this case; and (4) that the evidence is insufficient to
support the conviction.
The information alleges:
That on and for many months prior to the 2d day of
December, 1908, the said H. N. Bull was then and there
master of a steam sailing vessel known as the
steamship Standard, which vessel was then and there
engaged in carrying and transporting cattle, carabaos,
and other animals from a foreign port and city of Manila,
Philippine Islands; that the said accused H. N. Bull, while
master of said vessel, as aforesaid, on or about the 2d
day of December, 1908, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport, and bring into the
port and city of Manila, aboard said vessel, from the port
of Ampieng, Formosa, six hundred and seventy-seven
(677) head of cattle and carabaos, without providing
suitable means for securing said animals while in transit,
so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the
said animals, in this, to wit, that the said H. N. Bull,
master, as aforesaid, did then and there fail to provide
stalls for said animals so in transit and suitable means for
trying and securing said animals in a proper manner, and
did then and there cause some of said animals to be tied
by means of rings passed through their noses, and allow
and permit others to be transported loose in the hold and
on the deck of said vessel without being tied or secured in
stalls, and all without bedding; that by reason of the
aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide
suitable means for securing said animals while so in
transit, the noses of some of said animals were cruelly
torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon
the decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly wounded,
bruised, and killed.
All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275
of the Philippine Commission.
Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901,
provides that —
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels,
carrying or transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other
animals, from one port in the Philippine Islands to
another, or from any foreign port to any port within the
Philippine Islands, shall carry with them, upon the vessels
carrying such animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to
provide for the suitable sustenance of such animals
during the ordinary period occupied by the vessel in
passage from the port of shipment to the port of
debarkation, and shall cause such animals to be provided
with adequate forage and fresh water at least once in
every twenty-four hours from the time that the animals are
embarked to the time of their final debarkation.
By Act No. 275, enacted October 23, 1901, Act No. 55 was
amended by adding to section 1 thereof the following:
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels,
carrying or transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other
 animals from one port in the Philippine Islands to another,
or from any foreign port to any port within the Philippine
Islands, shall provide suitable means for securing such
animals while in transit so as to avoid all cruelty and
unnecessary suffering to the animals, and suitable and
proper facilities for loading and unloading cattle or other
animals upon or from vessels upon which they are
transported, without cruelty or unnecessary suffering. It is
hereby made unlawful to load or unload cattle upon or
from vessels by swinging them over the side by means of
ropes or chains attached to the thorns.
Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that —
Any owner or master of a vessel, or custodian of such
animals, who knowingly and willfully fails to comply with
the provisions of section one, shall, for every such failure,
be liable to pay a penalty of not less that one hundred
dollars nor more that five hundred dollars, United States
money, for each offense. Prosecution under this Act may
be instituted in any Court of First Instance or any provost
court organized in the province or port in which such
animals are disembarked.
1. It is contended that the information is insufficient because it
does not state that the court was sitting at a port where the cattle
were disembarked, or that the offense was committed on board a
vessel registered and licensed under the laws of the Philippine
Islands.
Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created thereby
on Courts of First Instance or any provost court organized in the
province or port in which such animals are disembarked, and
there is nothing inconsistent therewith in Act No. 136, which
provides generally for the organization of the courts of the
Philippine Islands. Act No. 400 merely extends the general
jurisdiction of the courts over certain offenses committed on the
high seas, or beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or within any
of the waters of the Philippine Islands on board a ship or water
craft of any kind registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands, in
accordance with the laws thereof. (U.S. vs. Fowler, 1 Phil. Rep.,
614.) This jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court of First
Instance in any province into which such ship or water upon
which the offense or crime was committed shall come after the
commission thereof. Had this offense been committed upon a
ship carrying a Philippine registry, there could have been no
doubt of the Jurisdiction of the court, because it is expressly
conferred, and the Act is in accordance with well recognized and
established public law. But the Standard was a Norwegian vessel,
and it is conceded that it was not registered or licensed in the
Philippine Islands under the laws thereof. We have then the
question whether the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this
character, committed on board a foreign ship by the master
thereof, when the neglect and omission which constitutes the
offense continued during the time the ship was within the
territorial waters of the United States. No court of the Philippine
Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or crime committed on
the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country,
but when she came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the
headlines which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was
within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became
applicable. (Wheaton, Int. Law (Dana ed.), p. 255, note 105;
Bonfils, Le Droit Int., sec 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.)
The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the
territorial sovereign subject through the proper political agency.
This offense was committed within territorial waters. From the line
which determines these waters the Standard must have traveled
at least 25 miles before she came to anchor. During that part of
her voyage the violation of the statue continued, and as far as the
jurisdiction of the court is concerned, it is immaterial that the
same conditions may have existed while the vessel was on the
high seas. The offense, assuming that it originated at the port of
departure in Formosa, was a continuing one, and every element
necessary to constitute it existed during the voyage across the
territorial waters. The completed forbidden act was done within
American waters, and the court therefore had jurisdiction over the
subject-matter of the offense and the person of the offender.
The offense then was thus committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court, but the objection to the jurisdiction raises
the further question whether that jurisdiction is restricted by the
fact of the nationality of the ship. Every. Every state has complete
control and jurisdiction over its territorial waters. According to
strict legal right, even public vessels may not enter the ports of a
friendly power without permission, but it is now conceded that in
the absence of a prohibition such ports are considered as open to
the public ship of all friendly powers. The exemption of such
vessels from local jurisdiction while within such waters was not
established until within comparatively recent times. In 1794,
Attorney-General Bradford, and in 1796 Attorney-General Lee,
rendered opinions to the effect that "the laws of nations invest the
commander of a foreign ship of war with no exemption from the
jurisdiction of the country into which he comes." (1, Op. U.S.
Attys. Gen., 46, 87.) This theory was also supported by Lord
Stowell in an opinion given by him to the British Government as
late as 1820. In the leading case of the Schooner Exchange
vs. McFadden (7 Cranch (U.S.), 116, 144), Chief Justice Marshall
said that the implied license under which such vessels enter a
friendly port may reasonably be construed as "containing
exemption from the jurisdiction of the sovereign within whose
territory she claims the rights of hospitality." The principle was
accepted by the Geneva Arbitration Tribunal, which announced
that "the priviledge of exterritoriality accorded to vessels of war
has been admitted in the law of nations; not as an absolute right,
but solely as a proceeding founded on the principle of courtesy
and mutual deference between nations."
(2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., secs. 252 and 254; Hall, Int. Law, sec.
55; Taylor, Int. Law, sec. 256; Ortolan, Dip de la Mer, 2. C.X.)
Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of peace to
come and go freely. Local official exercise but little control over
their actions, and offenses committed by their crew are justiciable
by their own officers acting under the laws to which they primarily
owe allegiance. This limitation upon the general principle of
territorial sovereignty is based entirely upon comity and
convenience, and finds its justification in the fact that experience
shows that such vessels are generally careful to respect local
laws and regulation which are essential to the health, order, and
well-being of the port. But comity and convenience does not
require the extension of the same degree of exemption to
merchant vessels. There are two well-defined theories as to
extent of the immunities ordinarily granted to them, According to
the French theory and practice, matters happening on board a
merchant ship which do not concern the tranquillity of the port or
persons foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by the court of the
country to which the vessel belongs. The French courts therefore
claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on board
French merchant vessels in foreign ports by one member of the
crew against another. (See Bonfils, Le Droit Int. (quat. ed.), secs.
624-628; Martens, Le Droit Int., tome 2, pp. 338, 339; Ortolan,
Dip. de la Mer, tit. 1, p. 292; Masse, Droit Int., tome 2, p. 63.)
Such jurisdiction has never been admitted or claim by Great
Britain as a right, although she has frequently conceded it by
treaties. (Halleck, Int. Law (Baker's ed.), vol. 1, 231; British
Territorial Waters Act, 1878.) Writers who consider exterritoriality
as a fact instead of a theory have sought to restrict local
jurisdiction, but Hall, who is doubtless the leading English
authority, says that —
It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing asserters of the
territoriality of merchant vessels that so soon as the latter
enter the ports of a foreign state they become subject to
the local jurisdiction on all points in which the interests of
the country are touched. (Hall, Int. Law, p. 263.)
The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when
a merchant vessel enters a foreign port it is subject to the
jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless the local sovereignty
has by act of acquiescence or through treaty arrangements
consented to waive a portion of such jurisdiction. (15 Op. Attys.
Gen., U. S., 178; 2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 204; article by Dean
Gregory, Mich. Law Review, Vol. II, No. 5.) Chief Justice
Marshall, in the case of the Exchange, said that —
When merchant vessels enter for the purpose of trade, in
would be obviously in convinient and dangerous to society
and would subject the laws to continual infraction and the
government to degradation if such individual merchants
did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not
amendable to the jurisdiction of the country.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that
the merchant vessels of one country visiting the ports of another
for the purpose of trade, subject themselves to the laws which
govern the ports they visit, so long as they remain; and this as
well in war as in peace, unless otherwise provided by treaty. (U.
S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S., 520-525.)
Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local courts are
imposed by article 13 of the treaty of commerce and navigation
between Sweden and Norway and the United States, of July 4,
1827, which concedes to the consul, vice-consuls, or consular
agents of each country "The right to sit as judges and arbitrators
in such differences as may arise between the captains and crews
of the vessels belonging to the nation whose interests are
committed to their charge, without the interference of the local
authorities, unless the conduct of the crews or of the captains
should disturb the order or tranquillity of the country." (Comp. of
Treaties in Force, 1904, p. 754.) This exception applies to
controversies between the members of the ship's company, and
particularly to disputes regarding wages. (2 Moore, Int. Law Dig.,
sec. 206, p. 318; Tellefsen vs. Fee, 168 Mass., 188.) The order
and tranquillity of the country are affected by many events which
do not amount to a riot or general public disturbance. Thus an
assault by one member of the crew upon another, committed
upon the ship, of which the public may have no knowledge
whatever, is not by this treaty withdrawn from the cognizance of
the local authorities.
In 1876 the mates of the Swedish bark Frederike and
Carolina engaged in a "quarrel" on board the vessel in the port of
Galveston, Texas. They were prosecuted before a justice of the
peace, but the United States district attorney was instructed by
the Government to take the necessary steps to have the
proceedings dismissed, and the aid of the governor of Texas was
invoked with the view to "guard against a repetition of similar
proceedings." (Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, to Mr. Grip, Swedish
and Norwegian charged, May 16, 1876; Moore, Int. Law Dig.) It
does not appear that this "quarrel" was of such a nature as to
amount to a breach of the criminal laws of Texas, but when in
1879 the mate for the Norwegian bark Livingston was prosecuted
in the courts of Philadelphia County for an assault and battery
committed on board the ship while lying in the port of
Philadelphia, it was held that there was nothing in the treaty
which deprived the local courts of jurisdiction.
(Commonwealth vs. Luckness, 14 Phila. (Pa.), 363.)
Representations were made through diplomatic channels to the
State Department, and on July 30, 1880, Mr. Evarts, Secretary of
State, wrote to Count Lewenhaupt, the Swedish and Norwegian
minister, as follows:
I have the honor to state that I have given the matter
careful consideration in connection with the views and
suggestion of your note and the provisions of the
thirteenth article of the treaty of 1827 between the United
States and Sweden and Norway. The stipulations
contained in the last clause of that article . . . are those
under which it is contended by you that jurisdiction is
conferred on the consular officers, not only in regard to
such differences of a civil nature growing out of the
contract of engagement of the seamen, but also as to
disposing of controversies resulting from personal
violence involving offense for which the party may be held
amenable under the local criminal law.
This Government does not view the article in question as
susceptible of such broad interpretation. The jurisdiction
 conferred upon the consuls is conceived to be limited to
their right to sit as judges or abitrators in such differences
as may arise between captains and crews of the vessels,
where such differences do not involve on the part of the
captain or crew a disturbance of the order or tranquillity of
the country. When, however, a complaint is made to a
local magistrate, either by the captain or one or more of
the crew of the vessel, involving the disturbance of the
order or tranquillity of the country, it is competent for such
magistrate to take cognizance of the matter in furtherance
of the local laws, and under such circumstances in the
United States it becomes a public duty which the judge or
magistrate is not at liberty voluntarily to forego. In all such
cases it must necessarily be left to the local judicial
authorities whether the procedure shall take place in the
United States or in Sweden to determine if in fact there
had been such disturbance of the local order and
tranquillity, and if the complaint is supported by such proof
as results in the conviction of the party accused, to visit
upon the offenders such punishment as may be defined
against the offense by the municipal law of the place."
(Moore, Int. Law Dig., vol. 2, p. 315.)
The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts of
jurisdiction over offenses committed on board a merchant vessel
by one member of the crew against another which amount to a
disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country, and a fair
and reasonable construction of the language requires un to hold
that any violation of criminal laws disturbs the order or traquillity
of the country. The offense with which the appellant is charged
had nothing to so with any difference between the captain and the
crew. It was a violation by the master of the criminal law of the
country into whose port he came. We thus find that neither by
reason of the nationality of the vessel, the place of the
commission of the offense, or the prohibitions of any treaty or
general principle of public law, are the court of the Philippine
Islands deprived of jurisdiction over the offense charged in the
information in this case.
It is further contended that the complaint is defective because it
does not allege that the animals were disembarked at the port of
Manila, an allegation which it is claimed is essential to the
jurisdiction of the court sitting at that port. To hold with the
appellant upon this issue would be to construe the language of
the complaint very strictly against the Government. The
disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in order to
constitute the completed offense, and a reasonable construction
of the language of the statute confers jurisdiction upon the court
sitting at the port into which the animals are bought. They are
then within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the mere
fact of their disembarkation is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is
concerned. This might be different if the disembarkation of the
animals constituted a constitutional element in the offense, but it
does not.
It is also contended that the information is insufficient because it
fails to allege that the defendant knowingly and willfully failed to
provide suitable means for securing said animals while in transit,
so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering. The allegation
of the complaint that the act was committed willfully includes the
allegation that it was committed knowingly. As said in
Woodhouse vs. Rio Grande R.R. Company (67 Texas, 416), "the
word 'willfully' carries the idea, when used in connection with an
act forbidden by law, that the act must be done knowingly or
intentionally; that, with knowledge, the will consented to,
designed, and directed the act." So in Wong vs. City of Astoria
(13 Oregon, 538), it was said: "The first one is that the complaint
did not show, in the words of the ordinance, that the appellant
'knowingly' did the act complained of. This point, I think, was fully
answered by the respondent's counsel — that the words 'willfully'
and 'knowingly' conveyed the same meaning. To 'willfully' do an
act implies that it was done by design — done for a certain
purpose; and I think that it would necessarily follow that it was
'knowingly' done." To the same effect is Johnson vs. The
People (94 Ill., 505), which seems to be on all fours with the
present case.
The evidence shows not only that the defendant's acts were
knowingly done, but his defense rests upon the assertion that
"according to his experience, the system of carrying cattle loose
upon the decks and in the hold is preferable and more secure to
the life and comfort of the animals." It was conclusively proven
that what was done was done knowingly and intentionally.
In charging an offense under section 6 of General Orders, No. 58,
paragraph 3, it is only necessary to state the act or omission
complained of as constituting a crime or public offense in ordinary
and concise language, without repitition. It need not necessarily
be in the words of the statute, but it must be in such form as to
enable a person of common understanding to know what is
intended and the court to pronounce judgment according to right.
A complaint which complies with this requirement is good.
(U.S. vs. Sarabia, 4 Phil. Rep., 556.)
The Act, which is in the English language, impose upon the
master of a vessel the duty to "provide suitable means for
securing such animals while in transit, so as to avoid all cruelty
and unnecessary suffering to the animals." The allegation of the
complaint as it reads in English is that the defendant willfully,
unlawfully, and wrongfully carried the cattle "without providing
suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to
avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said animals in this
. . . that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the
accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals
were cruelty torn, and many of said animals were tossed about
upon the decks and hold of said vessels, and cruelty wounded,
bruised, and killed."
The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of
the information does not charge him with failure to provide
"sufficient" and "adequate" means. The words used are "medios
suficientes" and "medios adecuados." In view of the fact that the
original complaint was prepared in English, and that the word
"suitable" is translatable by the words "adecuado," "suficiente,"
and "conveniente," according to the context and circumstances,
we determine this point against the appellant, particularly in view
of the fact that the objection was not made in the court below, and
that the evidence clearly shows a failure to provide "suitable
means for the protection of the animals."
2. The appellant's arguments against the constitutionality of Act
No. 55 and the amendment thereto seems to rest upon a
fundamentally erroneous conception of the constitutional law of
these Islands. The statute penalizes acts and ommissions
incidental to the transportation of live stock between foreign ports
and ports of the Philippine Islands, and had a similar statute
regulating commerce with its ports been enacted by the
legislature of one of the States of the Union, it would doubtless
have been in violation of Article I, section 3, of the Constitution of
the United States. (Stubbs vs. People (Colo.), 11 L. R. A., N. S.,
1071.)
But the Philippine Islands is not a State, and its relation to the
United States is controlled by constitutional principles different
from those which apply to States of the Union. The importance of
the question thus presented requires a statement of the principles
which govern those relations, and consideration of the nature and
extent of the legislative power of the Philippine Commission and
the Legislature of the Philippines. After much discussion and
considerable diversity of opinion certain applicable constitutional
doctrines are established.
The Constitution confers upon the United States the express
power to make war and treaties, and it has the power possessed
by all nations to acquire territory by conquest or treaty. Territory
thus acquired belongs to the United States, and to guard against
the possibility of the power of Congress to provide for its
government being questioned, the framers of the Constitution
provided in express terms that Congress should have the power
"to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations
respecting territory and other property belonging to the United
States." (Art. IV, sec. 3, par. 3.) Upon the acquisition of the
territory by the United States, and until it is formally incorporated
into the Union, the duty of providing a government therefor
devolves upon Congress. It may govern the territory by its direct
acts, or it may create a local government, and delegate thereto
the ordinary powers required for local government. (Binns vs. U.
S., 194 U. S., 486.) This has been the usual procedure. Congress
has provided such governments for territories which were within
the Union, and for newly acquired territory not yet incorporated
therein. It has been customary to organize a government with the
ordinary separation of powers into executive, legislative, and
judicial, and to prescribe in an organic act certain general
conditions in accordance with which the local government should
act. The organic act thus became the constitution of the
government of the territory which had not been formally
incorporated into the Union, and the validity of legislation enacted
by the local legislature was determined by its conformity with the
requirements of such organic act. (National Bank vs. Yankton, 11
Otto (U. S.), 129.) To the legislative body of the local government
Congress has delegated that portion of legislative power which in
its wisdom it deemed necessary for the government of the
territory, reserving, however, the right to annul the action of the
local legislature and itself legislate directly for the territory. This
power has been exercised during the entire period of the history
of the United States. The right of Congress to delegate such
legislative power can no longer be seriously questioned.
(Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; U. S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U. S.,
370, 385.)
The Constitution of the United States does not by its own force
operate within such territory, although the liberality of Congress in
legislating the Constitution into contiguous territory tended to
create an impression upon the minds of many people that it went
there by its own force. (Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 289.) In
legislating with reference to this territory, the power of Congress
is limited only by those prohibitions of the Constitution which go to
the very root of its power to act at all, irrespective of time or place.
In all other respects it is plenary. (De Lima vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S.,
1; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 244; Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190
U. S., 197; Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; Rassmussen vs. U. S.,
197 U. S., 516.)
This power has been exercised by Congress throughout the
whole history of the United States, and legislation founded on the
theory was enacted long prior to the acquisition of the present
Insular possessions. Section 1891 of the Revised Statutes of
1878 provides that "The Constitution and all laws of the United
States which are not locally inapplicable shall have the same
force and effect within all the organized territories, and in every
Territory hereafter organized, as elsewhere within the United
States." When Congress organized a civil government for the
Philippines, it expressly provided that this section of the Revised
Statutes should not apply to the Philippine Islands. (Sec. 1, Act of
1902.)
In providing for the government of the territory which was
acquired by the United States as a result of the war with Spain,
the executive and legislative authorities have consistently
proceeded in conformity with the principles above state. The city
of Manila was surrendered to the United States on August 13,
1898, and the military commander was directed to hold the city,
bay, and harbor, pending the conclusion of a peace which should
determine the control, disposition, and government of the Islands.
The duty then devolved upon the American authorities to
preserve peace and protect person and property within the
occupied territory. Provision therefor was made by proper orders,
and on August 26 General Merritt assumed the duties of military
governor. The treaty of peace was signed December 10, 1898.
On the 22d of December, 1898, the President announced that the
destruction of the Spanish fleet and the surrender of the city had
practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the
suspension of the Spanish sovereignty therein, and that by the
treaty of peace the future control, disposition, and government of
the Islands had been ceded to the United States. During the
periods of strict military occupation, before the treaty of peace
was ratified, and the interim thereafter, until Congress acted
(Santiago vs. Noueral, 214 U.S., 260), the territory was governed
under the military authority of the President as commander in
chief. Long before Congress took any action, the President
organized a civil government which, however, had its legal
justification, like the purely military government which it gradually
superseded, in the war power. The military power of the President
embraced legislative, executive personally, or through such
military or civil agents as he chose to select. As stated by
Secretary Root in his report for 1901 —
The military power in exercise in a territory under military
occupation includes executive, legislative, and judicial
authority. It not infrequently happens that in a single order
of a military commander can be found the exercise of all
three of these different powers — the exercise of the
legislative powers by provisions prescribing a rule of
action; of judicial power by determination of right; and the
executive power by the enforcement of the rules
prescribed and the rights determined.
President McKinley desired to transform military into civil
government as rapidly as conditions would permit. After full
investigation, the organization of civil government was initiated by
the appointment of a commission to which civil authority was to
be gradually transferred. On September 1, 1900, the authority to
exercise, subject to the approval of the President. "that part of the
military power of the President in the Philippine Islands which is
legislative in its character" was transferred from the military
government to the Commission, to be exercised under such rules
and regulations as should be prescribed by the Secretary of War,
until such time as complete civil government should be
established, or congress otherwise provided. The legislative
power thus conferred upon the Commission was declared to
include "the making of rules and orders having the effect of law
for the raising of revenue by taxes, customs duties, and imposts;
the appropriation and expenditure of public funds of the Islands;
the establishment of an educational system to secure an efficient
civil service; the organization and establishment of courts; the
organization and establishment of municipal and departmental
government, and all other matters of a civil nature which the
military governor is now competent to provide by rules or orders
of a legislative character." This grant of legislative power to the
Commission was to be exercised in conformity with certain
declared general principles, and subject to certain specific
restrictions for the protection of individual rights. The Commission
were to bear in mind that the government to be instituted was "not
for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views,
but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the
Philippine Island, and the measures adopted should be made to
conforms to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices,
to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the
indispensable requisites of just and effective government." The
specific restrictions upon legislative power were found in the
declarations that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law; that private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation; that in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him,
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense; that
excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted; that no person shall
be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense or be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself; that the right to
be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated; that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall
exist except as a punishment for crime; that no bill of attainder
or ex post facto law shall be passed; that no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of
the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government
for a redress of grievances; that no law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof, and that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship without discrimination or preference shall
forever be allowed."
To prevent any question as to the legality of these proceedings
being raised, the Spooner amendment to the Army Appropriation
Bill passed March 2, 1901, provided that "all military, civil, and
judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands . . .
shall until otherwise provided by Congress be vested in such
person and persons, and shall be exercised in such manner, as
the President of the United States shall direct, for the
establishment of civil government, and for maintaining and
protecting the inhabitants of said Islands in the free enjoyment of
their liberty, property, and religion." Thereafter, on July 4, 1901,
the authority, which had been exercised previously by the military
governor, was transferred to that official. The government thus
created by virtue of the authority of the President as Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy continued to administer the affairs
of the Islands under the direction of the President until by the Act
of July 1, 1902, Congress assumed control of the situation by the
enactment of a law which, in connection with the instructions of
April 7, 1900, constitutes the organic law of the Philippine Islands.
The Act of July 1, 1902, made no substancial changes in the form
of government which the President had erected. Congress
adopted the system which was in operation, and approved the
action of the President in organizing the government.
Substantially all the limitations which had been imposed on the
legislative power by the President's instructions were included in
the law, Congress thus extending to the Islands by legislative act
nor the Constitution, but all its provisions for the protection of the
rights and privileges of individuals which were appropriate under
the conditions. The action of the President in creating the
Commission with designated powers of government, in creating
the office of the Governor-General and Vice-Governor-General,
and through the Commission establishing certain executive
departments, was expressly approved and ratified. Subsequently
the action of the President in imposing a tariff before and after the
ratification of the treaty of peace was also ratified and approved
by Congress. (Act of March 8, 1902; Act of July 1, 1902;
U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.S., 370; Lincoln vs. U.S., 197 U.S.,
419.) Until otherwise provided by law the Islands were to continue
to be governed "as thereby and herein provided." In the future the
enacting clause of all statutes should read "By authority of the
United States" instead of "By the authority of the President." In
the course of time the legislative authority of the Commission in
all parts of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or non-Christian
tribes was to be transferred to a legislature consisting of two
houses — the Philippine Commission and the Philippine
Assembly. The government of the Islands was thus assumed by
Congress under its power to govern newly acquired territory not
incorporated into the United States.
This Government of the Philippine Islands is not a State or a
Territory, although its form and organization somewhat resembles
that of both. It stands outside of the constitutional relation which
unites the States and Territories into the Union. The authority for
its creation and maintenance is derived from the Constitution of
the United States, which, however, operates on the President and
Congress, and not directly on the Philippine Government. It is the
creation of the United States, acting through the President and
Congress, both deriving power from the same source, but from
different parts thereof. For its powers and the limitations thereon
the Government of the Philippines looked to the orders of the
President before Congress acted and the Acts of Congress after
it assumed control. Its organic laws are derived from the formally
and legally expressed will of the President and Congress, instead
of the popular sovereign constituency which lies upon any subject
relating to the Philippines is primarily in Congress, and when it
exercise such power its act is from the viewpoint of the
Philippines the legal equivalent of an amendment of a constitution
in the United States.
Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippines
is a complete governmental organism with executive, legislative,
and judicial departments exercising the functions commonly
assigned to such departments. The separation of powers is as
complete as in most governments. In neither Federal nor State
governments is this separation such as is implied in the abstract
statement of the doctrine. For instance, in the Federal
Government the Senate exercises executive powers, and the
President to some extent controls legislation through the veto
power. In a State the veto power enables him to exercise much
control over legislation. The Governor-General, the head of the
executive department in the Philippine Government, is a member
of the Philippine Commission, but as executive he has no veto
power. The President and Congress framed the government on
the model with which Americans are familiar, and which has
proven best adapted for the advancement of the public interests
and the protection of individual rights and priviliges.
In instituting this form of government of intention must have been
to adopt the general constitutional doctrined which are inherent in
the system. Hence, under it the Legislature must enact laws
subject to the limitations of the organic laws, as Congress must
act under the national Constitution, and the States under the
national and state constitutions. The executive must execute such
laws as are constitutionally enacted. The judiciary, as in all
governments operating under written constitutions, must
determine the validity of legislative enactments, as well as the
legality of all private and official acts. In performing these
functions it acts with the same independence as the Federal and
State judiciaries in the United States. Under no other
constitutional theory could there be that government of laws and
not of men which is essential for the protection of rights under a
free and orderly government.
Such being the constitutional theory of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, it is apparent that the courts must consider the
question of the validity of an act of the Philippine Commission or
the Philippine Legislature, as a State court considers an act of the
State legislature. The Federal Government exercises such
powers only as are expressly or impliedly granted to it by the
Constitution of the United States, while the States exercise all
powers which have not been granted to the central government.
The former operates under grants, the latter subject to
restrictions. The validity of an Act of Congress depends upon
whether the Constitution of the United States contains a grant of
express or implied authority to enact it. An act of a State
legislature is valid unless the Federal or State constitution
expressly or impliedly prohibits its enaction. An Act of the
legislative authority of the Philippines Government which has not
been expressly disapproved by Congress is valid unless its
subject-matter has been covered by congressional legislation, or
its enactment forbidden by some provision of the organic laws.
The legislative power of the Government of the Philippines is
granted in general terms subject to specific limitations. The
general grant is not alone of power to legislate on certain
subjects, but to exercise the legislative power subject to the
restrictions stated. It is true that specific authority is conferred
upon the Philippine Government relative to certain subjects of
legislation, and that Congress has itself legislated upon certain
other subjects. These, however, should be viewed simply as
enactments on matters wherein Congress was fully informed and
ready to act, and not as implying any restriction upon the local
legislative authority in other matters. (See Opinion of Atty. Gen. of
U. S., April 16, 1908.)
The fact that Congress reserved the power to annul specific acts
of legislation by the Government of the Philippine tends strongly
to confirm the view that for purposes of construction the
Government of the Philippines should be regarded as one of
general instead of enumerated legislative powers. The situation
was unusual. The new government was to operate far from the
source of its authority. To relieve Congress from the necessity of
legislating with reference to details, it was thought better to grant
general legislative power to the new government, subject to broad
and easily understood prohibitions, and reserve to Congress the
power to annul its acts if they met with disapproval. It was
therefore provided "that all laws passed by the Government of the
Philippine Islands shall be reported to Congress, which hereby
reserves the power and authority to annul the same." (Act of
Congress, July 1, 1902, sec. 86.) This provision does not
suspend the acts of the Legislature of the Philippines until
approved by Congress, or when approved, expressly or by
acquiescence, make them the laws of Congress. They are valid
acts of the Government of the Philippine Islands until annulled.
(Miners Bank vs. Iowa, 12 How. (U. S.), 1.)
In order to determine the validity of Act No. 55 we must then
ascertain whether the Legislature has been expressly or
implication forbidden to enact it. Section 3, Article IV, of the
Constitution of the United States operated only upon the States of
the Union. It has no application to the Government of the
Philippine Islands. The power to regulate foreign commerce is
vested in Congress, and by virtue of its power to govern the
territory belonging to the United States, it may regulate foreign
commerce with such territory. It may do this directly, or indirectly
through a legislative body created by it, to which its power in this
respect if delegate. Congress has by direct legislation determined
the duties which shall be paid upon goods imported into the
Philippines, and it has expressly authorized the Government of
the Philippines to provide for the needs of commerce by
improving harbors and navigable waters. A few other specific
provisions relating to foreign commerce may be found in the Acts
of Congress, but its general regulation is left to the Government
of the Philippines, subject to the reserved power of Congress to
annul such legislation as does not meet with its approval. The
express limitations upon the power of the Commission and
Legislature to legislate do not affect the authority with respect to
the regulation of commerce with foreign countries. Act No. 55 was
enacted before Congress took over the control of the Islands, and
this act was amended by Act No. 275 after the Spooner
amendment of March 2, 1901, was passed. The military
government, and the civil government instituted by the President,
had the power, whether it be called legislative or administrative,
to regulate commerce between foreign nations and the ports of
the territory. (Cross vs. Harrison, 16 How. (U.S.), 164, 190;
Hamilton vs. Dillin, 21 Wall. (U.S.), 73, 87.) This Act has
remained in force since its enactment without annulment or other
action by Congress, and must be presumed to have met with its
approval. We are therefore satisfied that the Commission had,
and the Legislature now has, full constitutional power to enact
laws for the regulation of commerce between foreign countries
and the ports of the Philippine Islands, and that Act No. 55, as
amended by Act No. 275, is valid.
3. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable within
the meaning of the Act can not be left to the judgment of the
master of the ship. It is a question which must be determined by
the court from the evidence. On December 2, 1908, the
defendant Bull brought into and disembarked in the port and city
of Manila certain cattle, which came from the port of Ampieng,
Formosa, without providing suitable means for securing said
animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary
suffering to said animals, contrary to the provisions of section 1 of
Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275. The trial
court found the following facts, all of which are fully sustained by
the evidence:
That the defendant, H. N. Bull, as captain and master of
the Norwegian steamer known as the Standard, for a
period of six months or thereabouts prior to the 2d day of
December, 1908, was engaged in the transportation of
cattle and carabaos from Chines and Japanese ports to
and into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.
That on the 2d day of December, 1908, the defendant, as
such master and captain as aforesaid, brought into the
city of Manila, aboard said ship, a large number of cattle,
which ship was anchored, under the directions of the said
defendant, behind the breakwaters in front of the city of
Manila, in Manila Bay, and within the jurisdiction of this
court; and that fifteen of said cattle then and there had
broken legs and three others of said cattle were dead,
having broken legs; and also that said cattle were
transported and carried upon said ship as aforesaid by
the defendant, upon the deck and in the hold of said ship,
without suitable precaution and care for the transportation
of said animals, and to avoid danger and risk to their lives
and security; and further that said cattle were so
transported abroad said ship by the defendant and
brought into the said bay, and into the city of Manila,
without any provisions being made whatever upon said
decks of said ship and in the hold thereof to maintain said
cattle in a suitable condition and position for such
transportation.
That a suitable and practicable manner in which to
transport cattle abroad steamship coming into Manila Bay
and unloading in the city of Manila is by way of individual
stalls for such cattle, providing partitions between the
cattle and supports at the front sides, and rear thereof,
and cross-cleats upon the floor on which they stand and
are transported, of that in case of storms, which are
common in this community at sea, such cattle may be
able to stand without slipping and pitching and falling,
individually or collectively, and to avoid the production of
panics and hazard to the animals on account or cattle
were transported in this case. Captain Summerville of the
steamship Taming, a very intelligent and experienced
seaman, has testified, as a witness in behalf of the
Government, and stated positively that since the
introduction in the ships with which he is acquainted of the
stall system for the transportation of animals and cattle he
has suffered no loss whatever during the last year. The
defendant has testified, as a witness in his own behalf,
that according to his experience the system of carrying
cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is preferable
and more secure to the life and comfort of the animals,
but this theory of the case is not maintainable, either by
the proofs or common reason. It can not be urged with
logic that, for instance, three hundred cattle supports for
the feet and without stalls or any other protection for them
individually can safely and suitably carried in times of
storm upon the decks and in the holds of ships; such a
theory is against the law of nature. One animal falling or
pitching, if he is untied or unprotected, might produce a
serious panic and the wounding of half the animals upon
the ship if transported in the manner found in this case.
The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of
two hundred and fifty pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The sentence and judgment
is affirmed. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson and Moreland,
JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18924 October 19, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-
appellant,
vs.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellant.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the
order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, sustaining the
demurrer presented by the defendant to the information that
initiated this case and in which the appellee is accused of having
illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of
English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay
two and a half miles from the shores of the city.
The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower
court, which so held and dismissed the case.
The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether
such ruling is erroneous or not; and it will or will not be erroneous
according as said court has or has no jurisdiction over said
offense.
The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have
jurisdiction over crime, like the one herein involved, committed
aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters. 1awph!l.net
There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in
connection with International Law; to wit, the French rule,
according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant
vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country
within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless
their commission affects the peace and security of the territory;
and the English rule, based on the territorial principle and
followed in the United States, according to which, crimes
perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the
courts of the country within territory they were committed. Of this
two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction,
because at present the theories and jurisprudence prevailing in
the United States on this matter are authority in the Philippines
which is now a territory of the United States.
In the cases of The Schooner Exchange vs. M'Faddon and
Others (7 Cranch [U. S.], 116), Chief Justice Marshall said:
. . . When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of
trade, it would be obviously inconvenient and dangerous
to society, and would subject the laws to continual
infraction, and the government to degradation, if such
individuals or merchants did not owe temporary and local
allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction of
the country. . . .
In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held:
. . . No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over
an offense or crime committed on the high seas or within
the territorial waters of any other country, but when she
came within three miles of a line drawn from the
headlands, which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay,
she was within territorial waters, and a new set of
principles became applicable. (Wheaton, International
Law [Dana ed.], p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int.,
secs. 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship
and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the
territorial sovereign subject to such limitations as have
been conceded by that sovereignty through the proper
political agency. . . .
It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed,
as in Mali and Wildenhus vs. Keeper of the Common Jail (120
U.., 1), wherein it was said that:
. . . The principle which governs the whole matter is this:
Disorder which disturb only the peace of the ship or those
on board are to be dealt with exclusively by the
sovereignty of the home of the ship, but those which
disturb the public peace may be suppressed, and, if need
be, the offenders punished by the proper authorities of the
local jurisdiction. It may not be easy at all times to
determine which of the two jurisdictions a particular act of
disorder belongs. Much will undoubtedly depend on the
attending circumstances of the particular case, but all
must concede that felonious homicide is a subject for the
local jurisdiction, and that if the proper authorities are
proceeding with the case in the regular way the consul
has no right to interfere to prevent it.
Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court
held that:
 Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited
use in the Philippine Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in
transit in any local port, does not, as a general rule,
constitute a crime triable by the courts of the Islands, such
vessels being considered as an extension of its own
nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article,
the use of which is prohibited in the Islands, is landed
from the vessels upon Philippine soil; in such a case an
open violation of the laws of the land is committed with
respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in
force at the place of the commission of the crime, no court
other than that established in the said place has
jurisdiction of the offense, in the absence of an agreement
under an international treaty.
As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or
otherwise to renouncing such jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find
nothing to this effect so far as England is concerned, to which
nation the ship where the crime in question was committed
belongs. Besides, in his work "Treaties, Conventions, etc.,"
volume 1, page 625, Malloy says the following:
There shall be between the territories of the United States
of America, and all the territories of His Britanic Majesty in
Europe, a reciprocal liberty of commerce. The inhabitants
of the two countries, respectively, shall have liberty freely
and securely to come with their ships and cargoes to all
such places, ports and rivers, in the territories aforesaid,
to which other foreigners are permitted to come, to enter
into the same, and to remain and reside in any parts of
the said territories, respectively; also to hire and occupy
houses and warehouses for the purposes of their
commerce; and, generally, the merchants and traders of
each nation respectively shall enjoy the most complete
protection and security for their commerce, but subject
always to the laws and statutes of the two countries,
respectively. (Art. 1, Commerce and Navigation
Convention.)
We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a
foreign vessel in transit was held by this court not triable by or
courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to
protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous
effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in
such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not being
about in the said territory those effects that our statute
contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not
considered a disturbance of the public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though
aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public
order here established, because it causes such drug to produce
its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes
the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the
aforesaid repressive statute. Moreover, as the Attorney-General
aptly observes:
. . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on
board a foreign vessel at anchor in the port of Manila in
open defiance of the local authorities, who are impotent to
lay hands on him, is simply subversive of public order. It
requires no unusual stretch of the imagination to conceive
that a foreign ship may come into the port of Manila and
allow or solicit Chinese residents to smoke opium on
board.
The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in
accordance with law, without special findings as to costs. So
ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand and
Johns, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5887 December 16, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOOK CHAW (alias LUK CHIU), defendant-appellant.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.
ARELLANO, C. J.:
The first complaint filed against the defendant, in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, stated that he "carried, kept, possessed
and had in his possession and control, 96 kilogrammes of opium,"
and that "he had been surprised in the act of selling 1,000 pesos
worth prepared opium."
The defense presented a demurrer based on two grounds, the
second of which was the more than one crime was charged in the
complaint. The demurrer was sustained, as the court found that
the complaint contained two charges, one, for the unlawful
possession of opium, and the other, for the unlawful sale of
opium, and, consequence of that ruling, it ordered that the fiscal
should separated one charge from the other and file a complaint
for each violation; this, the fiscal did, and this cause concerns
only the unlawful possession of opium. It is registered as No. 375,
in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and as No. 5887 on the
general docket of this court.
The facts of the case are contained in the following finding of the
trial court:
The evidence, it says, shows that between 11 and 12
o'clock a. m. on the present month (stated as August 19,
1909), several persons, among them Messrs. Jacks and
Milliron, chief of the department of the port of Cebu and
internal-revenue agent of Cebu, respectively, went abroad
the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its cargo, and
found, first in a cabin near the saloon, one sack (Exhibit
A) and afterwards in the hold, another sack (Exhibit B).
The sack referred to as Exhibit A contained 49 cans of
opium, and the other, Exhibit B, the larger sack, also
contained several cans of the same substance. The hold,
in which the sack mentioned in Exhibit B was found, was
under the defendant's control, who moreover, freely and
of his own will and accord admitted that this sack, as well
as the other referred to in Exhibit B and found in the
cabin, belonged to him. The said defendant also stated,
freely and voluntarily, that he had bought these sacks of
opium, in Hongkong with the intention of selling them as
contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that, as his hold
had already been searched several times for opium, he
ordered two other Chinamen to keep the sack. Exhibit A.
It is to be taken into account that the two sacks of opium,
designated as Exhibits A and B, properly constitute the corpus
delicti. Moreover, another lot of four cans of opium, marked, as
Exhibit C, was the subject matter of investigation at the trial, and
with respect to which the chief of the department of the port of
Cebu testified that they were found in the part of the ship where
the firemen habitually sleep, and that they were delivered to the
first officer of the ship to be returned to the said firemen after the
vessel should have left the Philippines, because the firemen and
crew of foreign vessels, pursuant to the instructions he had from
the Manila custom-house, were permitted to retain certain
amounts of opium, always provided it should not be taken shore.
And, finally, another can of opium, marked "Exhibit D," is
also corpus delicti and important as evidence in this cause. With
regard to this the internal-revenue agent testified as follows:
itc-alf
FISCAL. What is it?
WITNESS. It is a can opium which was bought from the
defendant by a secret-service agent and taken to the
office of the governor to prove that the accused had
opium in his possession to sell.
On motion by the defense, the court ruled that this answer might
be stricken out "because it refers to a sale." But, with respect to
this answer, the chief of the department of customs had already
given this testimony, to wit:
FISCAL. Who asked you to search the vessel?
WITNESS. The internal-revenue agent came to my office
and said that a party brought him a sample of opium and
that the same party knew that there was more opium on
board the steamer, and the agent asked that the vessel
be searched.
The defense moved that this testimony be rejected, on the ground
of its being hearsay evidence, and the court only ordered that the
part thereof "that there was more opium, on board the vessel" be
stricken out.
The defense, to abbreviate proceedings, admitted that the
receptacles mentioned as Exhibits A, B, and C, contained opium
and were found on board the steamship Erroll, a vessel of English
nationality, and that it was true that the defendant stated that
these sacks of opium were his and that he had them in his
possession.
According to the testimony of the internal-revenue agent, the
defendant stated to him, in the presence of the provincial fiscal, of
a Chinese interpreter (who afterwards was not needed, because
the defendant spoke English), the warden of the jail, and four
guards, that the opium seized in the vessel had been bought by
him in Hongkong, at three pesos for each round can and five
pesos for each one of the others, for the purpose of selling it, as
contraband, in Mexico and Puerto de Vera Cruz; that on the 15th
the vessel arrived at Cebu, and on the same day he sold opium;
that he had tried to sell opium for P16 a can; that he had a
contract to sell an amount of the value of about P500; that the
opium found in the room of the other two Chinamen prosecuted in
another cause, was his, and that he had left it in their stateroom
to avoid its being found in his room, which had already been
searched many times; and that, according to the defendant, the
contents of the large sack was 80 cans of opium, and of the small
one, 49, and the total number, 129.
It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English
nationality, that it came from Hongkong, and that it was bound for
Mexico, via the call ports of Manila and Cebu.
The defense moved for a dismissal of the case, on the grounds
that the court had no jurisdiction to try the same and the facts
concerned therein did not constitute a crime. The fiscal, at the
conclusion of his argument, asked that the maximum penalty of
the law be imposed upon the defendant, in view of the
considerable amount of opium seized. The court ruled that it did
not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the crime had been committed
within its district, on the wharf of Cebu.
The court sentenced the defendant to five years' imprisonment, to
pay a fine of P10,000, with additional subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, though not to exceed one third of the principal
penalty, and to the payment of the costs. It further ordered the
confiscation, in favor of the Insular Government, of the exhibits
presented in the case, and that, in the event of an appeal being
taken or a bond given, or when the sentenced should have been
served, the defendant be not released from custody, but turned
over to the customs authorities for the purpose of the fulfillment of
the existing laws on immigration.
From this judgment, the defendant appealed to this court. lawphi1.net
The appeal having been heard, together with the allegations
made therein by the parties, it is found: That, although the mere
possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a
foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a
general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this
country, on account of such vessel being considered as an
extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply
when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine
Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed from the
vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of
the laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a violation of
the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime,
only the court established in that said place itself had competent
jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an
international treaty.
It is also found: That, even admitting that the quantity of the drug
seized, the subject matter of the present case, was considerable,
it does not appear that, on such account, the two penalties fixed
by the law on the subject, should be imposed in the maximum
degree.
Therefore, reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to six
months and P1,000, respectively, we affirm in all other respects
the judgment appealed from, with the costs of this instance
against the appellant. So ordered.
Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque
buccaneers like Captain Avery and Captain Kidd and
Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when grostesque
brutes like Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of
history and romance. Nevertheless, the record before us tells a
tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas, but stripped of
all touches of chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a horrible
case of rapine and near murder.
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch
possession, for Peta, another Dutch possession. In one of the
boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat
eleven men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland.
After a number of days of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the
evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang
and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was
surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed.
The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too
for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and
brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to the
described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the
exception of the two young women, were again placed on it and
holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although
as a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship
and privation, were succored violating them, the Moros finally
arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro
marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and
Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian,
Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and
were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime
of piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the
Moros, based on the grounds that the offense charged was not
within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any
court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute
a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands.
After the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, trial was had,
and a judgment was rendered finding the two defendants guilty
and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment (cadena
perpetua), to return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis,
defendants in another case, to the offended parties, the thirty-
nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to indemnify
them in the amount of 924 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of
the costs.
A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by
the attorney de officio. By a process of elimination, however,
certain questions can be quickly disposed of.
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the
crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible
depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and
done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal
hostility.
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in
the lover court and as is again done in this court, that the Court of
First Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in
law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any
particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the
competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be
found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy
unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all
so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime
was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign
state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to
crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
The most serious question which is squarely presented to this
court for decision for the first time is whether or not the provisions
of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in
force. Article 153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against
Spaniards, or the subjects of another nation not at war
with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging
from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects
of another nation at war with Spain, it shall be punished
with the penalty of presidio mayor.
ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the
first paragraph of the next preceding article shall suffer
the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those who
commit the crimes referred to in the second paragraph of
the same article, from cadena temporal to cadena
perpetua:
1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by
boarding or firing upon the same.
 2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by
murder, homicide, or by any of the physical
injuries specified in articles four hundred and
fourteen and four hundred and fifteen and in
paragraphs one and two of article four hundred
and sixteen.
3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the
offenses against chastity specified in Chapter II,
Title IX, of this book.
4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any
persons without means of saving themselves.
5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the
pirates.
ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as
well as all others of this code, when Spain is mentioned it
shall be understood as including any part of the national
territory.
ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of
this code, every person, who, according to the
Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard
shall be considered as such.
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the
United States relating to the effect of a transfer of territory from
another State to the United States are well-known. The political
law of the former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The
municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution, the
laws of the United States, or the characteristics and institutions of
the government, remains in force. As a corollary to the main
rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure
good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a
municipal character, continue until by direct action of the new
government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands,
etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.)
These principles of the public law were given specific application
to the Philippines by the Instructions of President McKinley of
May 19, 1898, to General Wesley Meritt, the Commanding
General of the Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he
said:
Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute
and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political
condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the
conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person
and property, and provide for the punishment of crime,
are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are
compatible with the new order of things, until they are
suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent;
and practice they are not usually abrogated, but are
allowed to remain in force, and to be administered by the
ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the
occupations. This enlightened practice is so far as
possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.
(Official Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1.
See also General Merritt Proclamation of August 14,
1898.)
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal
Code dealing with piracy were meant to include the Philippine
Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the
Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the
provisions of the Code applicable not only to Spaniards but to
Filipinos.
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the
same thing as piracy by the civil law, and he has never been
disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar in
tenor to statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the
public law. This must necessarily be so, considering that the
Penal Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the Novelas,
the Partidas, and the Novisima Recopilacion.
The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress
shall have the power to define and punish piracies and felonies
committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of
nations. (U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in
putting on the statute books the necessary ancillary legislation,
provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of
piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought
into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life.
(U.S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.S. Rev.
Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers of the Constitution and the
members of Congress were content to let a definition of piracy
rest on its universal conception under the law of nations.
It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in
the Philippines relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the
corresponding provisions in force in the United States.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the
United States. A logical construction of articles of the Penal Code,
like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that
wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the
words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned,
the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the
United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands." somewhat
similar reasoning led this court in the case of United States vs.
Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority" as
found in the Penal Code a limited meaning, which would no
longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers, but
only public officers in the Government of the Philippine Islands.
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal
Code would read as follows:
The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the
United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands, or the
subjects of another nation not at war with the United
States, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from
cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects
of another nation at war with the United States, it shall be
punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the
crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in
the Philippines.
The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the
Penal Code in relation to article 154. There are present at least
two of the circumstances named in the last cited article as
authorizing either cadena perpetuaor death. The crime of piracy
was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the
abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving
themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine as
to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be
imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding present the
one aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating
the same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction
provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code,
sentenced the accused to life imprisonment. At least three
aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the
commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing
other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage
was taken of superior strength, and that means were employed
which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also
be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty. Considering,
therefore, the number and importance of the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances here present, which cannot be offset
by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and the
horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to
impose capital punishment.
The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the
propriety of the imposition of the death penalty upon the
defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the accused who raped on of the
women), but is not unanimous with regard to the court, Mr.
Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In accordance
with provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the
judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and appellant
Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and
appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is
sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and place
as shall be fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth
Judicial District. The two appellants together with Kinawalang and
Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly and
severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees,
and shall pay a one-half part of the costs of both instances. So
ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and
Romualdez, JJ., concur.
RULE 110
Prosecution of Offense
Section 15. Place where action is to be instituted. —
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action
shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory where the offense was
committed or where any of its essential
ingredients occurred.
(b) Where an offense is committed in a train,
aircraft, or other public or private vehicle while in
the course of its trip, the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of any
municipality or territory where such train, aircraft
or other vehicle passed during such its trip,
including the place of its departure and arrival.
(c) Where an offense is committed on board a
vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal
action shall be instituted and tried in the court of
the first port of entry or of any municipality or
territory where the vessel passed during such
voyage, subject to the generally accepted
principles of international law.
(d) Crimes committed outside the Philippines but
punishable under Article 2 of the Revised Penal
Code shall be cognizable by the court where the
criminal action is first filed. (15a)
Article 3. Definition Of Felony
A. Dolo v. Culpa
 People v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 257
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital
facts in this case is limited to the testimony of the
accused himself, because from the very nature of
these facts and from the circumstances
surrounding the incident upon which these
proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these
facts was available either to the prosecution or to
the defense. We think, however, that, giving the
accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight
of the evidence touching those details of the
incident as to which there can be said to be any
doubt, the following statement of the material
facts disclose by the record may be taken to be
substantially correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a
cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc
Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place
Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a
house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No.
27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters
from the nearest building, and in August, 19087,
was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club.
No one slept in the house except the two servants,
who jointly occupied a small room toward the
rear of the building, the door of which opened
upon a narrow porch running along the side of
the building, by which communication was had
with the other part of the house. This porch was
covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire
length and height. The door of the room was not
furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and
occupants, as a measure of security, had attached
a small hook or catch on the inside of the door,
and were in the habit of reinforcing this
somewhat insecure means of fastening the door
by placing against it a chair. In the room there
was but one small window, which, like the door,
opened on the porch. Aside from the door and
window, there were no other openings of any
kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10
o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the
night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to
force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed
and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard
no answer and was convinced by the noise at the
door that it was being pushed open by someone
bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to
the heavy growth of vines along the front of the
porch, the room was very dark, and the
defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber
or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If
you enter the room, I will kill you." At that
moment he was struck just above the knee by the
edge of the chair which had been placed against
the door. In the darkness and confusion the
defendant thought that the blow had been
inflicted by the person who had forced the door
open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though
in the light of after events, it is probable that the
chair was merely thrown back into the room by
the sudden opening of the door against which it
rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he
kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out
wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned
out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out
upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a
desperately wounded condition, followed by the
defendant, who immediately recognized him in
the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded,
he called to his employers who slept in the next
house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure
bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort
McKinley not long prior to the date of the
incident just described, one of which took place
in a house in which the defendant was employed
as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because
of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under
his pillow for his personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed
together and who appear to have on friendly and
amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an
understanding that when either returned at night,
he should knock at the door and acquiant his
companion with his identity. Pascual had left the
house early in the evening and gone for a walk
with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and
Mariano Ibañez, servants employed at officers'
quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess
hall. The three returned from their walk at about
10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at
their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his
room at No. 27. A few moments after the party
separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for
assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found
Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally wounded
in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back
to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and
Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the
wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he
had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it
under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron"
because he forced open the door of their sleeping
room, despite defendant's warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable
conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself,
unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief
was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and
sought to frightened him by forcing his way into
the room, refusing to give his name or say who
he was, in order to make Ah Chong believe that
he was being attacked by a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and
Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital,
where he died from the effects of the wound on
the following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of
assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial
court of simple homicide, with extenuating
circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one
day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty
prescribed by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant
admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual
Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal
blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in
the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —
The following are not delinquent and are
therefore exempt from criminal liability:
xxx xxx xxx
4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights,
provided there are the following attendant
circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be
no doubt that defendant would be entitle to
complete exception from criminal liability for the
death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the
intruder who forced open the door of his room
had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as
the defendant believed him to be. No one, under
such circumstances, would doubt the right of the
defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion,
and the thief having forced open the door
notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated
warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill
the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will
not be questioned that in the darkness of the
night, in a small room, with no means of escape,
with the thief advancing upon him despite his
warnings defendant would have been wholly
justified in using any available weapon to defend
himself from such an assault, and in striking
promptly, without waiting for the thief to
discover his whereabouts and deliver the first
blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the
intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That
neither the defendant nor his property nor any of
the property under his charge was in real danger
at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That
there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the
part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed
he was repelling and resisting, and that there was
no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to
defend his person or his property or the property
under his charge.
The question then squarely presents it self,
whether in this jurisdiction one can be held
criminally responsible who, by reason of a
mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he
would be exempt from criminal liability if the
facts were as he supposed them to be, but which
would constitute the crime of homicide or
assassination if the actor had known the true state
of the facts at the time when he committed the
act. To this question we think there can be but
one answer, and we hold that under such
circumstances there is no criminal liability,
provided always that the alleged ignorance or
mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad
faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if
such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to
negative a particular intent which under the law is
a necessary ingredient of the offense charged
(e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder,
malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the
presumption of intent," and works an acquittal;
except in those cases where the circumstances
demand a conviction under the penal provisions
touching criminal negligence; and in cases where,
under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal
Code one voluntarily committing a crime or
misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any
wrongful act committed by him, even though it
be different from that which he intended to
commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and
cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and
cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240;
Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596;
Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State,
38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met.,
500.)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits
of discussion, and the only question worthy of
consideration is whether malice or criminal intent
is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes
of homicide and assassination as defined and
penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that
since the definitions there given of these as well
as most other crimes and offense therein defined,
do not specifically and expressly declare that the
acts constituting the crime or offense must be
committed with malice or with criminal intent in
order that the actor may be held criminally liable,
the commission of the acts set out in the various
definitions subjects the actor to the penalties
described therein, unless it appears that he is
exempted from liability under one or other of the
express provisions of article 8 of the code, which
treats of exemption. But while it is true that
contrary to the general rule of legislative
enactment in the United States, the definitions of
crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code
rarely contain provisions expressly declaring that
malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient
of the crime, nevertheless, the general provisions
of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that
malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an
essential requisite of all crimes and offense
therein defined, in the absence of express
provisions modifying the general rule, such as are
those touching liability resulting from acts
negligently or imprudently committed, and acts
done by one voluntarily committing a crime or
misdemeanor, where the act committed is
different from that which he intended to commit.
And it is to be observed that even these
exceptions are more apparent than real, for
"There is little distinction, except in degree,
between a will to do a wrongful thing and
indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore
carelessness is criminal, and within limits
supplies the place of the affirmative criminal
intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s.
313); and, again, "There is so little difference
between a disposition to do a great harm and a
disposition to do harm that one of them may very
well be looked upon as the measure of the other.
Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in
the disposition to do harm, which the criminal
shows by committing it, and since this disposition
is greater or less in proportion to the harm which
is done by the crime, the consequence is that the
guilt of the crime follows the same proportion; it
is greater or less according as the crime in its own
nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C.
18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the
thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid,
is to be viewed the same whether the corruption
was of one particular form or another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and
ommissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always
presumed to be voluntarily unless the contrary
shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or
misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even
though the wrongful act committed be different
from that which he had intended to commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing
the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in
this article, say that a voluntary act is a free,
intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly
asserts that without intention (intention to do
wrong or criminal intention) there can be no
crime; and that the word "voluntary" implies and
includes the words "con malicia," which were
expressly set out in the definition of the word
"crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the
code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their
use in the former code was redundant, being
implied and included in the word "voluntary."
(Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)
Viada, while insisting that the absence of
intention to commit the crime can only be said to
exempt from criminal responsibility when the act
which was actually intended to be done was in
itself a lawful one, and in the absence of
negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits
and recognizes in his discussion of the provisions
of this article of the code that in general without
intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p.
16.) And, as we have shown above, the
exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more
apparent than real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid
down, says:
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first
article, which declared that where there is no
intention there is no crime . . . in order to affirm,
without fear of mistake, that under our code there
can be no crime if there is no act, an act which
must fall within the sphere of ethics if there is no
moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio
169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of
the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its
sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use
of the following language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a
crime, involve all the malice which is supposed
from the operation of the will and an intent to
cause the injury which may be the object of the
crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892,
wherein it held that "considering that, whatever
may be the civil effects of the inscription of his
three sons, made by the appellant in the civil
registry and in the parochial church, there can be
no crime because of the lack of the necessary
element or criminal intention, which
characterizes every action or ommission punished
by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of
December 30, 1896, it made use of the following
language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the
crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence in
the commission of an act defined and punished
by law as criminal, is not a necessary question of
fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and
decision of the trial court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed
criminal intent or malice to be an essential
element of the various crimes and misdemeanors
therein defined becomes clear also from an
examination of the provisions of article 568,
which are as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence
an act that, if done with malice, would constitute
a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum degree,
to prision correccional in its minimum degrees if
it shall constitute a less grave crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall
commit a crime through simple imprudence or
negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto
mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.
In the application of these penalties the courts
shall proceed according to their discretion,
without being subject to the rules prescribed in
article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be
applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime
is equal to or less than those contained in the first
paragraph thereof, in which case the courts shall
apply the next one thereto in the degree which
they may consider proper.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly
substantially equivalent to the words "criminal
intent," and the direct inference from its
provisions is that the commission of the acts
contemplated therein, in the absence of malice
(criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence,
does not impose any criminal liability on the
actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the
Penal Code would seem to approximate in
meaning the word "willful" as used in English
and American statute to designate a form of
criminal intent. It has been said that while the
word "willful" sometimes means little more than
intentionally or designedly, yet it is more
frequently understood to extent a little further and
approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal
malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without
justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to
mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation,
"wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without
reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful."
And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a
statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but with
a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In
English and the American statutes defining
crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and
"malice aforethought" are words indicating
intent, more purely technical than "willful" or
willfully," but "the difference between them is
not great;" the word "malice" not often being
understood to require general malevolence
toward a particular individual, and signifying
rather the intent from our legal justification.
(Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428
and 429, and cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a
statute, setting out a condition in the definition of
a crime that it be committed "voluntarily,"
willfully," "maliciously" "with malice
aforethought," or in one of the various modes
generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we
think that reasoning from general principles it
will always be found that with the rare exceptions
hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil
intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop,
who supports his position with numerous
citations from the decided cases, thus forcely
present this doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ
more from civil than in the rule as to the intent. In
controversies between private parties the quo
animo with which a thing was done is sometimes
important, not always; but crime proceeds only
from a criminal mind. So that —
There can be no crime, large or small, without an
evil mind. In other words, punishment is the
sentence of wickedness, without which it can not
be. And neither in philosophical speculation nor
in religious or mortal sentiment would any people
in any age allow that a man should be deemed
guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore a
principle of our legal system, as probably it is of
every other, that the essence of an offense is the
wrongful intent, without which it can not exists.
We find this doctrine confirmed by —
Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law,
equally with the modern, is distinct on this
subject. It consequently has supplied to us such
maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea,
"the act itself does not make man guilty unless
his intention were so;" Actus me incito factus non
est meus actus, "an act done by me against my
will is not my act;" and others of the like sort. In
this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs
from civil. So also —
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the
same thing. "By reference to the intention, we
inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without
any respect to the happiness or misery actually
produced. Let the result of an action be what it
may, we hold a man guilty simply on the ground
of intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold him
innocent." The calm judgment of mankind keeps
this doctrine among its jewels. In times of
excitement, when vengeance takes the place of
justice, every guard around the innocent is cast
down. But with the return of reason comes the
public voice that where the mind is pure, he who
differs in act from his neighbors does not offend.
And —
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from
the nature given by God to man, no one deems
another to deserve punishment for what he did
from an upright mind, destitute of every form of
evil. And whenever a person is made to suffer a
punishment which the community deems not his
due, so far from its placing an evil mark upon
him, it elevates him to the seat of the martyr.
Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want
of bad intent in justification of what has the
appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence
that the plea, if its truth is credited, will be
accepted as good. Now these facts are only the
voice of nature uttering one of her immutable
truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior
to all other doctrines, because first in nature from
which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to
be punished as a criminal unless his intent is
wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs.
286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all
things," an apparent departure from this doctrine
of abstract justice result from the adoption of the
arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non
excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"),
without which justice could not be administered
in our tribunals; and compelled also by the same
doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized
the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited
class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to
make their commission criminal without regard
to the intent of the doer. Without discussing these
exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to
say that the courts have always held that unless
the intention of the lawmaker to make the
commission of certain acts criminal without
regard to the intent of the doer is clear and
beyond question the statute will not be so
construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158,
notes 76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance of
the law excuses no man has been said not to be a
real departure from the law's fundamental
principle that crime exists only where the mind is
at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to
break the law, and if suffices if it is simply to do
the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's
New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical
rule, and no pressing necessity therefore,
requiring mistake in fact to be dealt with
otherwise that in strict accord with the principles
of abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim
here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or
mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of
supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's
Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable
element in every crime, any such mistake of fact
as shows the act committed to have proceeded
from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily
relieves the actor from criminal liability provided
always there is no fault or negligence on his part;
and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of
the accused must depend on the circumstances as
they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den.
C., 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65;
P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N.
Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625;
Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55
Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.)
That is to say, the question as to whether he
honestly, in good faith, and without fault or
negligence fell into the mistake is to be
determined by the circumstances as they
appeared to him at the time when the mistake was
made, and the effect which the surrounding
circumstances might reasonably be expected to
have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal
or other wise, upon which he acted.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one
has reasonable cause to believe the existence of
facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms
more nicely in accord with the principles on
which the rule is founded, if without fault or
carelessness he does believe them — he is legally
guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the
facts, and so the life of an innocent person is
unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and
with reference to the right of self-defense and the
not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine
of reason and sufficiently sustained in
adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions
apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes
self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts
as they appear to him. If, without fault or
carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and
defends himself correctly according to what he
thus supposes the facts to be the law will not
punish him though they are in truth otherwise,
and he was really no occassion for the extreme
measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305,
and large array of cases there cited.)
The common illustration in the American and
English textbooks of the application of this rule is
the case where a man, masked and disguised as a
footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up"
his friends in a spirit of mischief, and with
leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but
is killed by his friend under the mistaken belief
that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled
at his head is loaded, and that his life and
property are in imminent danger at the hands of
the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts
were such as the slayer believed them to be he
would be innocent of the commission of any
crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability,
although if he knew the real state of the facts
when he took the life of his friend he would
undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide or
assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of
his innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the
presumption of malice or criminal intent, and
(since malice or criminal intent is a necessary
ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases
of homicide or assassination) overcomes at the
same time the presumption established in article
1 of the code, that the "act punished by law" was
committed "voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once
said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for
believing that the person slain had a felonious
design against him, and under that supposition
killed him, although it should afterwards appear
that there was no such design, it will not be
murder, but it will be either manslaughter or
excusable homicide, according to the degree of
caution used and the probable grounds of such
belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's
case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of
the case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury,
enforced the doctrine as follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B
rushing rapidly toward him, with an outstretched
arms and a pistol in his hand, and using violent
menaces against his life as he advances. Having
approached near enough in the same attitude, A,
who has a club in his hand, strikes B over the
head before or at the instant the pistol is
discharged; and of the wound B dies. It turns out
the pistol was loaded with powder only, and that
the real design of B was only to terrify A. Will
any reasonable man say that A is more criminal
that he would have been if there had been a bullet
in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must
require that a man so attacked must, before he
strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the
pistol is loaded — a doctrine which would
entirely take away the essential right of self-
defense. And when it is considered that the jury
who try the cause, and not the party killing, are to
judge of the reasonable grounds of his
apprehension, no danger can be supposed to flow
from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the
supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of
which are here set out in full because the facts are
somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the
accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in
company only of his wife, without other light
than reflected from the fire, and that the man with
his back to the door was attending to the fire,
there suddenly entered a person whom he did not
see or know, who struck him one or two blows,
producing a contusion on the shoulder, because
of which he turned, seized the person and took
from his the stick with which he had undoubtedly
been struck, and gave the unknown person a
blow, knocking him to the floor, and afterwards
striking him another blow on the head, leaving
the unknown lying on the floor, and left the
house. It turned out the unknown person was his
father-in-law, to whom he rendered assistance as
soon as he learned his identity, and who died in
about six days in consequence of cerebral
congestion resulting from the blow. The accused,
who confessed the facts, had always sustained
pleasant relations with his father-in-law, whom
he visited during his sickness, demonstrating
great grief over the occurrence. Shall he be
considered free from criminal responsibility, as
having acted in self-defense, with all the
circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of
the Penal Code? The criminal branch of
the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an
illegal aggressor, without sufficient provocation,
and that there did not exists rational necessity for
the employment of the force used, and in
accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal
Code condemned him to twenty months of
imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs.
Upon appeal by the accused, he was acquitted by
the supreme court, under the following sentence:
"Considering, from the facts found by the
sentence to have been proven, that the accused
was surprised from behind, at night, in his house
beside his wife who was nursing her child, was
attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able
to distinguish with which they might have
executed their criminal intent, because of the
there was no other than fire light in the room, and
considering that in such a situation and when the
acts executed demonstrated that they might
endanger his existence, and possibly that of his
wife and child, more especially because his
assailant was unknown, he should have defended
himself, and in doing so with the same stick with
which he was attacked, he did not exceed the
limits of self-defense, nor did he use means
which were not rationally necessary, particularly
because the instrument with which he killed was
the one which he took from his assailant, and was
capable of producing death, and in the darkness
of the house and the consteration which naturally
resulted from such strong aggression, it was not
given him to known or distinguish whether there
was one or more assailants, nor the arms which
they might bear, not that which they might
accomplish, and considering that the lower court
did not find from the accepted facts that there
existed rational necessity for the means
employed, and that it did not apply paragraph 4
of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc."
(Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February
28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to
his house, which was situated in a retired part of
the city, upon arriving at a point where there was
no light, heard the voice of a man, at a distance of
some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you
money!" because of which, and almost at the
same money, he fired two shots from his pistol,
distinguishing immediately the voice of one of
his friends (who had before simulated a different
voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and
hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying
upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel,
speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing
that he had been the victim of a joke, and not
receiving a reply, and observing that his friend
was a corpse, he retired from the place. Shall he
be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as
the author of this homicide, as having acted in
just self-defense under the circumstances defined
in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The
criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did
not so find, but only found in favor of the
accused two of the requisites of said article, but
not that of the reasonableness of the means
employed to repel the attack, and, therefore,
condemned the accused to eight years and one
day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court
acquitted the accused on his appeal from this
sentence, holding that the accused was acting
under a justifiable and excusable mistake of fact
as to the identity of the person calling to him, and
that under the circumstances, the darkness and
remoteness, etc., the means employed were
rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence
supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I,
p. 136.)
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in
a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a large
stone thrown against his window — at this, he
puts his head out of the window and inquires
what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery of
all of his money, otherwise his house would be
burned" — because of which, and observing in an
alley adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of
whom addressed him with blasphemy, he fired
his pistol at one the men, who, on the next
morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall
this man be declared exempt from criminal
responsibility as having acted in just self-defense
with all of the requisites of law? The criminal
branch of the requisites of law? The criminal
branch of the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that
there existed in favor of the accused a majority of
the requisites to exempt him from criminal
responsibility, but not that of reasonable
necessity for the means, employed, and
condemned the accused to twelve months
of prision correctional for the homicide
committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court
acquitted the condemned, finding that the
accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack
his mill at night in a remote spot by threatening
robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just self-
defense of his person, property, and family.
(Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in
the case at bar convinces us that the defendant
Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the
information in the firm belief that the intruder
who forced open the door of his sleeping room
was a thief, from whose assault he was in
imminent peril, both of his life and of his
property and of the property committed to his
charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as
they must have presented themselves to the
defendant at the time, he acted in good faith,
without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief
that he was doing no more than exercising his
legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts
been as he believed them to be he would have
been wholly exempt from criminal liability on
account of his act; and that he can not be said to
have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or
even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to
the facts, or in the means adopted by him to
defend himself from the imminent danger which
he believe threatened his person and his property
and the property under his charge.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence
imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and
the defendant acquitted of the crime with which
he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with
the costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.
Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.
Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.
Source:
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1910/mar191
0/gr_l-5272_1910.html
 People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257
G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943
THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO
GALANTA, defendants-appellants.
Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf.
Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta.
Acting Solicitor-General Ibañez and Assistant
Attorney Torres for appellee.
MORAN, J.:
Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio
Tecson, the accused Antonio Z. Oanis and
Alberto Galanta, chief of police of Cabanatuan
and corporal of the Philippine Constabulary,
respectively, were, after due trial, found guilty by
the lower court of homicide through reckless
imprudence and were sentenced each to an
indeterminate penalty of from one year and six
months to two years and two months of prison
correccional and to indemnify jointly and
severally the heirs of the deceased in the amount
of P1,000. Defendants appealed separately from
this judgment.
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain
Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial
Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received
from Major Guido a telegram of the following
tenor: "Information received escaped convict
Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in
Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain
Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant
and asked that he be given four men. Defendant
corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates
Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D.
Fernandez, upon order of their sergeant, reported
at the office of the Provincial Inspector where
they were shown a copy of the above-quoted
telegram and a newspaper clipping containing a
picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to arrest
Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the
instruction contained in the telegram. The same
instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis
who was likewise called by the Provincial
Inspector. When the chief of police was asked
whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he
answered that he knew one of loose morals of the
same name. Upon request of the Provincial
Inspector, the chief of police tried to locate some
of his men to guide the constabulary soldiers in
ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and failing to
see anyone of them he volunteered to go with the
party. The Provincial Inspector divided the party
into two groups with defendants Oanis and
Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route
to Rizal street leading to the house where Irene
was supposedly living. When this group arrived
at Irene's house, Oanis approached one Brigida
Mallare, who was then stripping banana stalks,
and asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida
indicated the place and upon further inquiry also
said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour.
Brigida trembling, immediately returned to her
own room which was very near that occupied by
Irene and her paramour. Defendants Oanis and
Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an
seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the
door where they were, simultaneously or
successively fired at him with their .32 and .45
caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots,
Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and
looking at the door where the shots came, she
saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by
the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later
that the person shot and killed was not the
notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a
peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio
Tecson, Irene's paramour. The Provincial
Inspector, informed of the killing, repaired to the
scene and when he asked as to who killed the
deceased. Galanta, referring to himself and to
Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The corpse was
thereafter brought to the provincial hospital and
upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple
gunshot wounds inflicted by a .32 and a .45
caliber revolvers were found on Tecson's body
which caused his death.
These are the facts as found by the trial court and
fully supported by the evidence, particularly by
the testimony of Irene Requinea. Appellants
gave, however, a different version of the tragedy.
According to Appellant Galanta, when he and
chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the
latter asked Brigida where Irene's room was.
Brigida indicated the place, and upon further
inquiry as to the whereabouts of Anselmo
Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the
same room. Oanis went to the room thus
indicated and upon opening the curtain covering
the door, he said: "If you are Balagtas, stand up."
Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, and Irene woke
up and as the former was about to sit up in bed.
Oanis fired at him. Wounded, Tecson leaned
towards the door, and Oanis receded and shouted:
"That is Balagtas." Galanta then fired at Tecson.
On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he
had opened the curtain covering the door and
after having said, "if you are Balagtas stand up."
Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the supposed
Balagtas, while the latter was still lying on bed,
and continued firing until he had exhausted his
bullets: that it was only thereafter that he, Oanis,
entered the door and upon seeing the supposed
Balagtas, who was then apparently watching and
picking up something from the floor, he fired at
him.
The trial court refused to believe the appellants.
Their testimonies are certainly incredible not only
because they are vitiated by a natural urge to
exculpate themselves of the crime, but also
because they are materially contradictory. Oasis
averred that be fired at Tecson when the latter
was apparently watching somebody in an
attitudes of picking up something from the floor;
on the other hand, Galanta testified that Oasis
shot Tecson while the latter was about to sit up in
bed immediately after he was awakened by a
noise. Galanta testified that he fired at Tecson,
the supposed Balagtas, when the latter was
rushing at him. But Oanis assured that when
Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying on
bed. It is apparent from these contradictions that
when each of the appellants tries to exculpate
himself of the crime charged, he is at once belied
by the other; but their mutual incriminating
averments dovetail with and corroborate
substantially, the testimony of Irene Requinea. It
should be recalled that, according to Requinea,
Tecson was still sleeping in bed when he was
shot to death by appellants. And this, to a certain
extent, is confirmed by both appellants
themselves in their mutual recriminations.
According, to Galanta, Oanis shot Tecson when
the latter was still in bed about to sit up just after
he was awakened by a noise. And Oanis assured
that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still
lying in bed. Thus corroborated, and considering
that the trial court had the opportunity to observe
her demeanor on the stand, we believe and so
hold that no error was committed in accepting her
testimony and in rejecting the exculpatory
pretensions of the two appellants. Furthermore, a
careful examination of Irene's testimony will
show not only that her version of the tragedy is
not concocted but that it contains all indicia of
veracity. In her cross-examination, even
misleading questions had been put which were
unsuccessful, the witness having stuck to the
truth in every detail of the occurrence. Under
these circumstances, we do not feel ourselves
justified in disturbing the findings of fact made
by the trial court.
The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while
Tecson was sleeping in his room with his back
towards the door, Oanis and Galanta, on sight,
fired at him simultaneously or successively,
believing him to be Anselmo Balagtas but
without having made previously any reasonable
inquiry as to his identity. And the question is
whether or not they may, upon such fact, be held
responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson. It
is contended that, as appellants acted in innocent
mistake of fact in the honest performance of their
official duties, both of them believing that Tecson
was Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability.
Sustaining this theory in part, the lower court
held and so declared them guilty of the crime of
homicide through reckless imprudence. We are of
the opinion, however, that, under the
circumstances of the case, the crime committed
by appellants is murder through specially
mitigated by circumstances to be mentioned
below.
In support of the theory of non-liability by
reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely
on the case of U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488.
The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this
applies only when the mistake is committed
without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong
case, defendant therein after having gone to bed
was awakened by someone trying to open the
door. He called out twice, "who is there," but
received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was
a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out
again., "If you enter the room I will kill you." But
at that precise moment, he was struck by a chair
which had been placed against the door and
believing that he was then being attacked, he
seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally
wounded the intruder who turned out to be his
room-mate. A common illustration of innocent
mistake of fact is the case of a man who was
marked as a footpad at night and in a lonely road
held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and with
leveled, pistol demanded his money or life. He
was killed by his friend under the mistaken belief
that the attack was real, that the pistol leveled at
his head was loaded and that his life and property
were in imminent danger at the hands of the
aggressor. In these instances, there is an innocent
mistake of fact committed without any fault or
carelessness because the accused, having no time
or opportunity to make a further inquiry, and
being pressed by circumstances to act
immediately, had no alternative but to take the
facts as they then appeared to him, and such facts
justified his act of killing. In the instant case,
appellants, unlike the accused in the instances
cited, found no circumstances whatsoever which
would press them to immediate action. The
person in the room being then asleep, appellants
had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his
identity without hazard to themselves, and could
even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable
effort to that end had been made, as the victim
was unarmed, according to Irene Requinea. This,
indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for
appellants to follow even if the victim was really
Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill
Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him
dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is
offered by him.
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is
justified in using such force as is reasonably
necessary to secure and detain the offender,
overcome his resistance, prevent his escape,
recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself
from bodily harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil,
738), yet he is never justified in using
unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton
violence, or in resorting to dangerous means
when the arrest could be effected otherwise (6
C.J.S., par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine is restated in
the new Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or
unreasonable force shall be used in making an
arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject
to any greater restraint than is necessary for his
detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a peace
officer cannot claim exemption from criminal
liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence
in making an arrest (5 C.J., p. 753;
U.S. vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true
that Anselmo Balagtas was a notorious criminal,
a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a menace
to the peace of the community, but these facts
alone constitute no justification for killing him
when in effecting his arrest, he offers no
resistance or in fact no resistance can be offered,
as when he is asleep. This, in effect, is the
principle laid down, although upon different
facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).
It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal
"must be taken by storm" without regard to his
right to life which he has by such notoriety
already forfeited. We may approve of this
standard of official conduct where the criminal
offers resistance or does something which places
his captors in danger of imminent attack.
Otherwise we cannot see how, as in the present
case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the life
of a criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the
officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a
basis for redoubled official alertness and
vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at
the cost of human life. Where, as here, the
precipitate action of the appellants has cost an
innocent life and there exist no circumstances
whatsoever to warrant action of such character in
the mind of a reasonably prudent man,
condemnation — not condonation — should be
the rule; otherwise we should offer a premium to
crime in the shelter of official actuation.
The crime committed by appellants is not merely
criminal negligence, the killing being intentional
and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the
injury caused to another should be unintentional,
it being simply the incident of another act
performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55
Phil., 939). In the words of Viada, "para que se
celifique un hecho de imprudencia es preciso que
no haya mediado en el malicia ni intencion
alguna de dañar; existiendo esa intencion, debera
calificarse el hecho del delito que ha producido,
por mas que no haya sido la intencion del agente
el causar un mal de tanta gravedad como el que
se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo Penal
Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as once held by
this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful
act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of
reckless imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43
Phil., 232; People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and
where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a
mistake in the identity of the intended victim
cannot be considered as reckless imprudence
(People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea
of mitigated liability.
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the
crime committed is murder with the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia. There is, however, a
mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in
the incomplete justifying circumstance defined in
article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code.
According to such legal provision, a person
incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the
fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right or office. There are two requisites in order
that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying
one: (a) that the offender acted in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of
a right; and (b) that the injury or offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the
due performance of such duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office. In the instance
case, only the first requisite is present —
appellants have acted in the performance of a
duty. The second requisite is wanting for the
crime by them committed is not the necessary
consequence of a due performance of their duty.
Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him
dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and
they are overpowered. But through impatience or
over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances,
they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such
duty by killing the person whom they believed to
be Balagtas without any resistance from him and
without making any previous inquiry as to his
identity. According to article 69 of the Revised
Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or two
degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such
case, be imposed.
For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified
and appellants are hereby declared guilty of
murder with the mitigating circumstance above
mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years
of prision correctional to fifteen (15) years
of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the
law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Serapio
Tecson jointly and severally an indemnity of
P2,000, with costs.
Yulo, C.J., Bocobo, Generoso and Lopez Vito,
A., concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., dissenting:
Anselmo Balagtas, a life termer and notorious
criminal, managed to escape and flee form
Manila to the provinces. Receiving information
to the effect that he was staying with one Irene in
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, the office of the
Constabulary in Manila ordered the Provincial
Inspector in Cabanatuan by telegram dispatched
on December 25, 1938, to get Balagtas "dead or
alive". Among those assigned to the task of
carrying out the said order, were Antonio Z.
Oanis, chief of police of Cabanatuan, and Alberto
Galanta, a Constabulary corporal, to whom the
telegram received by the Provincial Inspector and
a newspaper picture of Balagtas were shown.
Oanis, Galanta and a Constabulary private, after
being told by the Provincial Inspector to gather
information about Balagtas, "to arrest him and, if
overpowered, to follow the instructions contained
in the telegram," proceeded to the place where
the house of Irene was located. Upon arriving
thereat, Oanis approached Brigida Mallari, who
was then gathering banana stalks in the yard, and
inquired for the room of Irene. After Mallari had
pointed out the room, she was asked by Oanis to
tell where Irene's paramour, Balagtas, was,
whereupon Mallari answered that he was sleeping
with Irene. Upon reaching the room indicated,
Oanis and Galanta, after the former had shouted
"Stand up, if you are Balagtas," started shooting
the man who was found by them lying down
beside a woman. The man was thereby killed, but
Balagtas was still alive, for it turned out that the
person shot by Oanis and Galanta was one
Serapio Tecson.
Consequently, Oanis and Galanta were charged
with having committed murder. The Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija, however, convicted
them only of homicide through reckless
imprudence and sentenced them each to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of from 1 year and 6
months to 2 years and 2 months of prision
correctional, to jointly and severally indemnify
the heirs of Serapio Tecson in the amount of
P1,000, and to pay the costs. Oanis and Galanta
have appealed.
In accomplishing the acts with which the
appellants were charged, they undoubtedly
followed the order issued by the Constabulary
authorities in Manila requiring the Provincial
Inspector in Cabanatuan to get Balagtas dead or
alive, in the honest belief that Serapio Tecson
was Anselmo Balagtas. As the latter became a
fugitive criminal, with revolvers in his possession
and a record that made him extremely dangerous
and a public terror, the Constabulary authorities
were justified in ordering his arrest, whether dead
or alive. In view of said order and the danger
faced by the appellants in carrying it out, they
cannot be said to have acted feloniously in
shooting the person honestly believed by them to
be the wanted man. Conscious of the fact that
Balagtas would rather kill than be captured, the
appellants did not want to take chances and
should not be penalized for such prudence. On
the contrary, they should be commended for their
bravery and courage bordering on recklessness
because, without knowing or ascertaining
whether the wanted man was in fact asleep in his
room, they proceeded thereto without hesitation
and thereby exposed their lives to danger.
The Solicitor-General, however, contends that the
appellants were authorized to use their revolvers
only after being overpowered by Balagtas. In the
first place, the alleged instruction by the
Provincial Inspector to that effect, was in
violation of the express order given by the
Constabulary authorities in Manila and which
was shown to the appellants. In the second place,
it would indeed be suicidal for the appellants or,
for that matter, any agent of the authority to have
waited until they have been overpowered before
trying to put our such a character as Balagtas. In
the third place, it is immaterial whether or not the
instruction given by the Provincial Inspector was
legitimate and proper, because the facts exist that
the appellants acted in conformity with the
express order of superior Constabulary
authorities, the legality or propriety of which is
not herein questioned.
The theory of the prosecution has acquired some
plausibility, though quite psychological or
sentimental, in view only of the fact that it was
not Balagtas who was actually killed, but an
"innocent man . . . while he was deeply asleep."
Anybody's heart will be profoundly grieved by
the trade, but in time will be consoled by the
realization that the life of Serapio Tecson was not
vainly sacrificed, for the incident will always
serve as a loud warning to any one desiring to
follow in the footsteps of Anselmo Balagtas that
in due time the duly constituted authorities will,
upon proper order, enforce the summary
forfeiture of his life.
In my opinion, therefore, the appellants are not
criminally liable if the person killed by them was
in fact Anselmo Balagtas for the reason that they
did so in the fulfillment of their duty and in
obedience to an order issued by a superior for
some lawful purpose (Revised Penal Code, art.
11, pars. 5 and 6). They also cannot be held
criminally liable even if the person killed by them
was not Anselmo Balagtas, but Serapio Tecson,
because they did so under an honest mistake of
fact not due to negligence or bad faith.
(U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488).
It is true that, under article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person
committing a felony although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended;
but said article is clearly inapplicable since the
killing of the person who was believed to be
Balagtas was, as already stated, not wrongful or
felonious.
The case of U.S. vs. Mendieta (34 Phil., 242),
cited by the Solicitor-General, is not in point,
inasmuch as the defendant therein, who intended
to injure Hilario Lauigan with whom he had a
quarrel, but killed another by mistake, would not
be exempted from criminal liability if he actually
injured or killed Hilario Lauigan, there being a
malicious design on his part. The other case
involved by the prosecution is U.S. vs. Donoso (3
Phil., 234). This is also not in point, as it appears
that the defendants therein killed one Pedro
Almasan after he had already surrendered and
allowed himself to be bound and that the said
defendants did not have lawful instructions from
superior authorities to capture Almasan dead or
alive.
The appealed judgment should therefore be
reversed and the appellants, Antonio Z. Oanis and
Alberto Galanta, acquitted, with costs de oficio.
HONTIVEROS, J., dissenting:
According to the opinion of the majority, it is
proper to follow the rule that a notorious criminal
"must be taken by storm without regard to his life
which he has, by his conduct, already forfeited,"
whenever said criminal offers resistance or does
something which places his captors in danger of
imminent attack. Precisely, the situation which
confronted the accused-appellants Antonio Z.
Oanis and Alberto Galanta in the afternoon of
December 24, 1938, was very similar to this. It
must be remembered that both officers received
instructions to get Balagtas "dead or alive" and
according to the attitude of not only the said
appellants but also of Capt. Monsod,
constabulary provincial inspector of Nueva Ecija,
it may be assumed that said instructions gave
more emphasis to the first part; namely, to take
him dead. It appears in the record that after the
shooting, and having been informed of the case,
Capt. Monsod stated that Oanis and Galanta
might be decorated for what they had done. That
was when all parties concerned honestly believed
that the dead person was Balagtas himself, a
dangerous criminal who had escaped from his
guards and was supposedly armed with a .45
caliber pistol Brigida Mallari, the person whom
the appellants met upon arriving at the house of
Irene Requinea, supposed mistress of Balagtas,
informed them that said Balagtas was upstairs.
Appellants found there asleep a man closely
resembling the wanted criminal. Oanis said: If
you are Balagtas stand up," But the supposed
criminal showed his intention to attack the
appellants, a conduct easily explained by the fact
that he should have felt offended by the intrusion
of persons in the room where he was peacefully
lying down with his mistress. In such
predicament, it was nothing but human on the
part of the appellants to employ force and to
make use of their weapons in order to repel the
imminent attack by a person who, according to
their belief, was Balagtas It was unfortunate,
however that an innocent man was actually
killed. But taking into consideration the facts of
the case, it is, according to my humble opinion,
proper to apply herein the doctrine laid down in
the case of U.S. vs. Ah Chong (15 Phil., 488). In
the instant case we have, as in the case supra, an
innocent mistake of fact committed without any
fault or carelessness on the part of the accused,
who having no time to make a further inquiry,
had no alternative but to take the facts as they
appeared to them and act immediately.
The decision of the majority, in recognition of the
special circumstances of this case which favored
the accused-appellants, arrives at the conclusion
that an incomplete justifying circumstance may
be invoked, and therefore, according to Article 69
of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty
should be one which is lower by one or two
degrees than that prescribed by law. This
incomplete justifying circumstance is that defined
in Article 11, No. 5 of the Revised Penal Code, in
favor of "a person who acts in the fulfillment of a
duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office."
I believe that the application of this circumstance
is not proper. Article 69 of the Revised Penal
Code provides as follows:
Art. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime
committed is not wholly excusable. — A penalty
lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed
by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly
excusable by reason of the lack of some of the
conditions required to justify the same or to
exempt from criminal liability in the several cases
mentioned in articles 11 and 12, provided that the
majority of such conditions be present. The
courts shall impose the penalty in the period
which may be deemed proper, in view of the
number and nature of the conditions of
exemption present or lacking.
This provision has been copied
almost verbatim from Article 84 of the old Penal
Code of the Philippines, and which was also
taken from Article 87 of the Spanish Penal Code
of 1870.
Judge Guillermo Guevara, one of the members of
the Committee created by Administrative Order
No. 94 of the Department of Justice for the
drafting of the Revised Penal Code, in
commenting on Article 69, said that the justifying
circumstances and circumstances exempting from
liability which are the subject matter of this
article are the following: self-defense, defense of
relatives, defense of strangers, state of necessity
and injury caused by mere accident. Accordingly,
justifying circumstance No. 5 of Article 11
dealing with the fulfillment of a duty or the
lawful exercise of a right, calling or office,
cannot be placed within its scope.
The eminent treatiser of criminal law Mr.
Groizard, in his commentary of Article 87 of the
Spanish Penal Code of 1870 which is the source
of Article 69 of our Code says:
Ni tratandose de la imbecilidad, ni de la locura, ni
de la menor edad, ni del que obra violentado por
una fuerza inrresistible o impulsado por miedo
insuperable de un mal igual o mayor, o en
cumplimiento de un deber, o en el ejercito
legitimo de un derecho, oficio o cargo, o en
virtud de obediencia debida, ni del que incurre en
alguna omision hallandose impedido por causa
legitima o insuperable, puede tener aplicacion al
articulo que comentamos. Y la razon es obvia. En
ninguna de estas execiones hay pluralidad de
requisitos. La irrespondabilidad depende de una
sola condicion. Hay o no perturbacion de la
razon; el autor del hecho es o no menor de nueve
años; existe o no violencia material o moral
irresistible, etc., etc.; tal es lo que
respectivamente hay que examinar y resolver
para declarar la culpabilidad o inculpabilidad. Es,
por lo tanto, imposible que acontezca lo que el
texto que va al frente de estas lineas rquiere, para
que se imponga al autor del hecho la penalidad
excepcional que establece; esto es, que
falten algunos requisitos de los que la ley exige
para eximir de responsabilidad, y que concurran
el mayor numero de ellos, toda vez que, en los
casos referidos, la ley no exige multiples
condiciones.
It must be taken into account the fact according to
Article 69 a penalty lower by one or two degrees
than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if
the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the
lack of some of the conditions required by the
law to justify the same or exempt from criminal
liability. The word "conditions" should not be
confused with the word "requisites". In dealing
with justifying circumstance No. 5 Judge
Guevara states: "There are two requisites in order
that this circumstance may be taken into account:
(a) That the offender acted in the performance of
his duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and
(b) That the injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the performance of a
duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office." It
is evident that these two requisites concur in the
present case if we consider the intimate
connection between the order given to the
appellant by Capt. Monsod, the showing to them
of the telegram from Manila to get Balagtas who
was with a bailarina named Irene, the conduct of
said appellants in questioning Brigida Mallari and
giving a warning to the supposed criminal when
both found him with Irene, and the statement
made by Capt. Monsod after the shooting.
If appellant Oanis is entitled to a reversal of the
decision of the court below, there are more
reasons in favor of the acquittal of appellant
Galanta. According to the evidence no bullet
from the gun fired by this accused ever hit
Serapio Tecson. Galanta was armed in the
afternoon of December 24, 1938, with a .45
caliber revolver (Exhibit L). He so testified and
was corroborated by the unchallenged testimony
of his superior officer Sgt. Valeriano Serafica.
According to this witness, since Galanta was
made a corporal of the Constabulary he was
given, as part of his equipment, revolver Exhibit
L with a serial No. 37121. This gun had been
constantly used by Galanta, and, according to
Sgt. Pedro Marasigan, who accompanied said
accused when he took it from his trunk in the
barracks on the night of December 24, 1938,
upon order of Captain Monsod, it was the same
revolver which was given to the witness with five
.45 caliber bullets and one empty shell. Fourteen
unused bullets were also taken from Galanta by
Sergeant Serafica, thus completing his regular
equipment of twenty bullets which he had on the
morning of December 24, 1938, when Sergeant
Serafica made the usual inspection of the firearms
in the possession of the non-commissioned
officers and privates of the constabulary post at
Cabanatuan. Galanta stated that he had fired only
one shot and missed. This testimony is
corroborated by that of a ballistic expert who
testified that bullets exhibits F and O, — the first
being extracted from the head of the deceased,
causing wound No. 3 of autopsy report Exhibit C
and the second found at the place of the shooting,
— had not been fired from revolver Exhibit L nor
from any other revolver of the constabulary
station in Cabanatuan. It was impossible for the
accused Galanta to have substituted his revolver
because when Exhibit L was taken from him
nobody in the barracks doubted that the deceased
was none other than Balagtas. Moreover, Exhibit
L was not out of order and therefore there was no
reason why Galanta should carry along another
gun, according to the natural course of things. On
the other hand, aside from wound No. 3 as above
stated, no other wound may be said to have been
caused by a .45 caliber revolver bullet. Doctor
Castro's record gives the conclusion that wound
No. 2 must have been caused by a .45 caliber
revolver bullet. Doctor Castro's record gives the
conclusion that wound No. 2 must have been
caused by a .45 caliber bullet, but inasmuch as
the diameter of the wound's entrance was only 8
mm., the caliber should be .32 and not .45,
because according to the medico-legal expert
who testified in this case, a bullet of a .45 caliber
will produce a wound entrance with either 11
mm. or 12 mm. diameter. All other wounds found
by the surgeon who performed the autopsy
appeared to have been caused by bullets of a
lesser caliber. In consequence, it can be stated
that no bullet fired by Galanta did ever hit or kill
Serapio Tecson and therefore there is no reason
why he should be declared criminally responsible
for said death.
Sources:
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1943/jul1943
/gr_l-47722_1943.html
 People v. Pugay, GR L-74324 Nov. 17, 1988
G.R. No. L-74324 November 17, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, &
BENJAMIN SAMSON y
MAGDALENA, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-
appellants.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate,
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA and
BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA were
charged with the crime of MURDER in Criminal
Case No. L-175-82 of the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Cavite, under an
information which reads as follows:
That on or about May 19, 1982 at the town plaza
of the Municipality of Rosario, Province of
Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
and assisting one another, with treachery and
evident premeditation, taking advantage of their
superior strength, and with the decided purpose to
kill, poured gasoline, a combustible liquid to the
body of Bayani Miranda and with the use of fire
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, burn the whole body of said Bayani
Miranda which caused his subsequent death, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
aforenamed Bayani Miranda.
That the crime was committed with the
qualifying circumstance of treachery and the
aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and superior strength, and the
means employed was to weaken the defense; that
the wrong done in the commission of the crime
was deliberately augmented by causing another
wrong, that is the burning of the body of Bayani
Miranda.
CONTRARY TO LAW (p. 1, Records).
Upon being arraigned, both accused pleaded not
guilty to the offense charged. After trial, the trial
court rendered a decision finding both accused
guilty on the crime of murder but crediting in
favor of the accused Pugay the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit so
grave a wrong, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused Fernando Pugay y
Balcita and Benjamin Samson y Magdalena are
pronounced guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principals by direct participation of the crime of
murder for the death of Bayani Miranda, and
appreciating the aforestated mitigating
circumstance in favor of Pugay, he is sentenced
to a prison term ranging from twelve (12) years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and
Samson to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua together with the accessories of the law
for both of them. The accused are solidarily held
liable to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
amount of P13,940.00 plus moral damages of
P10,000.00 and exemplary damages of
P5,000.00.
Let the preventive imprisonment of Pugay be
deducted from the principal penalty.
Cost against both accused.
SO ORDERED (p. 248, Records).
Not satisfied with the decision, both accused
interposed the present appeal and assigned the
following errors committed by the court a quo:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN UTILIZING
THE STATEMENTS OF ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS IN ITS APPRECIATION OF
FACTS DESPITE ITS ADMISSION THAT
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE NOT
ASSISTED BY A COUNSEL DURING THE
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT THE SUPPRESSION BY THE
PROSECUTION OF SOME EVIDENCE IS
FATAL TO ITS CASE.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN LENDING
CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE
TESTIMONY OF EDUARDO GABION WHO
WAS ONE OF THE MANY SUSPECTS
ARRESTED BY THE POLICE (Accused-
appellants' Brief, p. 48, Rollo).
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate,
and the accused Pugay were friends. Miranda
used to run errands for Pugay and at times they
slept together. On the evening of May 19, 1982, a
town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza of
Rosario, Cavite. There were different kinds of
ride and one was a ferris wheel.
Sometime after midnight of the same date,
Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel
and reading a comic book with his friend Henry.
Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with
several companions arrived. These persons
appeared to be drunk as they were all happy and
noisy. As the group saw the deceased walking
nearby, they started making fun of him. They
made the deceased dance by tickling him with a
piece of wood.
Not content with what they were doing with the
deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly took a can
of gasoline from under the engine of the ferns
wheel and poured its contents on the body of the
former. Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the
latter was already in the process of pouring the
gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set Miranda
on fire making a human torch out of him.
The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused
with water the burning body of the deceased.
Some people around also poured sand on the
burning body and others wrapped the same with
rags to extinguish the flame.
The body of the deceased was still aflame when
police officer Rolando Silangcruz and other
police officers of the Rosario Police Force arrived
at the scene of the incident. Upon inquiring as to
who were responsible for the dastardly act, the
persons around spontaneously pointed to Pugay
and Samson as the authors thereof.
The deceased was later rushed to the Grace
Hospital for treatment. In the meantime, the
police officers brought Gabion, the two accused
and five other persons to the Rosario municipal
building for interrogation. Police officer
Reynaldo Canlas took the written statements of
Gabion and the two accused, after which Gabion
was released. The two accused remained in
custody.
After a careful review of the records, We find the
grounds relied upon by the accused-appellants for
the reversal of the decision of the court a quo to
be without merit.
It bears emphasis that barely a few hours after the
incident, accused-appellants gave their written
statements to the police. The accused Pugay
admitted in his statement, Exhibit F, that he
poured a can of gasoline on the deceased
believing that the contents thereof was water and
then the accused Samson set the deceased on fire.
The accused Samson, on the other hand, alleged
in his statement that he saw Pugay pour gasoline
on Miranda but did not see the person who set
him on fire. Worthy of note is the fact that both
statements did not impute any participation of
eyewitness Gabion in the commission of the
offense.
While testifying on their defense, the accused-
appellants repudiated their written statements
alleging that they were extracted by force. They
claimed that the police maltreated them into
admitting authorship of the crime. They also
engaged in a concerted effort to lay the blame on
Gabion for the commission of the offense.
Thus, while it is true that the written statements
of the accused-appellants were mentioned and
discussed in the decision of the court a quo, the
contents thereof were not utilized as the sole
basis for the findings of facts in the decision
rendered. The said court categorically stated that
"even without Exhibits 'F' and 'G', there is still
Gabion's straightforward, positive and convincing
testimony which remains unaffected by the
uncorroborated, self-serving and unrealiable
testimonies of Pugay and Samson" (p.
247, Records).
Accused-appellants next assert that the
prosecution suppressed the testimonies of other
eyewitnesses to the incident. They claim that
despite the fact that there were other persons
investigated by the police, only Gabion was
presented as an eyewitness during the trial of the
case. They argue that the deliberate non-
presentation of these persons raises the
presumption that their testimonies would be
adverse to the prosecution.
There is no dispute that there were other persons
who witnessed the commission of the crime. In
fact there appears on record (pp. 16-17, Records)
the written statements of one Abelardo Reyes and
one Monico Alimorong alleging the same facts
and imputing the respective acts of pouring of
gasoline and setting the deceased on fire to the
accused-appellants as testified to by Gabion in
open court. They were listed as prosecution
witnesses in the information filed. Considering
that their testimonies would be merely
corroborative, their non-presentation does not
give rise to the presumption that evidence
wilfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced. This presumption does not apply to the
suppression of merely corroborative evidence
(U.S. vs. Dinola, 37 Phil.
797).<äre||anº•1àw> Besides, the matter as to
whom to utilize as witness is for the prosecution
to decide.
Accused-appellants also attack the credibility of
the eyewitness Gabion alleging that not only was
the latter requested by the mother of the deceased
to testify for the prosecution in exchange for his
absolution from liability but also because his
testimony that he was reading a comic book
during an unusual event is contrary to human
behavior and experience.
Gabion testified that it was his uncle and not the
mother of the deceased who asked him to testify
and state the truth about the incident. The mother
of the deceased likewise testified that she never
talked to Gabion and that she saw the latter for
the first time when the instant case was tried.
Besides, the accused Pugay admitted that Gabion
was his friend and both Pugay and the other
accused Samson testified that they had no
previous misunderstanding with Gabion. Clearly,
Gabion had no reason to testify falsely against
them.
In support of their claim that the testimony of
Gabion to the effect that he saw Pugay pour
gasoline on the deceased and then Samson set
him on fire is incredible, the accused-appellants
quote Gabion's testimony on cross-examination
that, after telling Pugay not to pour gasoline on
the deceased, he (Gabion) resumed reading
comics; and that it was only when the victim's
body was on fire that he noticed a commotion.
However, explaining this testimony on re-direct
examination, Gabion stated:
Q. Mr. Gabion, you told the Court on cross-
examination that you were reading comics when
you saw Pugay poured gasoline unto Bayani
Miranda and lighted by Samson. How could you
possibly see that incident while you were reading
comics?
A. I put down the comics which I am reading and
I saw what they were doing.
Q. According to you also before Bayani was
poured with gasoline and lighted and burned later
you had a talk with Pugay, is that correct?
A. When he was pouring gasoline on Bayani
Miranda I was trying to prevent him from doing
so.
Q. We want to clarify. According to you a while
ago you had a talk with Pugay and as a matter of
fact, you told him not to pour gasoline. That is
what I want to know from you, if that is true?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Aside from Bayani being tickled with a stick
on his ass, do you mean to say you come to know
that Pugay will pour gasoline unto him?
A. I do not know that would be that incident.
Q. Why did you as(k) Pugay in the first place not
to pour gasoline before he did that actually?
A. Because I pity Bayani, sir.
Q. When you saw Pugay tickling Bayani with a
stick on his ass you tried according to you to ask
him not to and then later you said you asked not
to pour gasoline. Did Pugay tell you he was going
to pour gasoline on Bayani?
A. I was not told, sir.
Q. Did you come to know..... how did you come
to know he was going to pour gasoline that is
why you prevent him?
A. Because he was holding on a container of
gasoline. I thought it was water but it was
gasoline.
Q. It is clear that while Pugay was tickling
Bayani with a stick on his ass, he later got hold of
a can of gasoline, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when he pick up the can of gasoline, was
that the time you told him not to pour gasoline
when he merely pick up the can of gasoline.
A. I saw him pouring the gasoline on the body of
Joe.
Q. So, it is clear when you told Pugay not to pour
gasoline he was already in the process of pouring
gasoline on the body of Bayani?
A. Yes, sir (Tsn, July 30, 1983, pp. 32-33).
It is thus clear that prior to the incident in
question, Gabion was reading a comic book; that
Gabion stopped reading when the group of Pugay
started to make fun of the deceased; that Gabion
saw Pugay get the can of gasoline from under the
engine of the ferris wheel; that it was while
Pugay was in the process of pouring the gasoline
on the body of the deceased when Gabion warned
him not to do so; and that Gabion later saw
Samson set the deceased on fire.
However, there is nothing in the records showing
that there was previous conspiracy or unity of
criminal purpose and intention between the two
accused-appellants immediately before the
commission of the crime. There was no animosity
between the deceased and the accused Pugay or
Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the
incident was accidental. It is also clear that the
accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to
make fun of the deceased. Hence, the respective
criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson
arising from different acts directed against the
deceased is individual and not collective, and
each of them is liable only for the act committed
by him (U.S. vs. Magcomot, et. al. 13, Phil. 386;
U.S. vs. Abiog, et. al. 37 Phil. 1371).
The next question to be determined is the
criminal responsibility of the accused Pugay.
Having taken the can from under the engine of
the ferris wheel and holding it before pouring its
contents on the body of the deceased, this
accused knew that the can contained gasoline.
The stinging smell of this flammable liquid could
not have escaped his notice even before pouring
the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the
diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable
consequence arising from any act that may be
committed by his companions who at the time
were making fun of the deceased. We agree with
the Solicitor General that the accused is only
guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence
defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended. In U.S. vs. Maleza, et. al. 14 Phil.
468, 470, this Court ruled as follows:
A man must use common sense and exercise due
reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be
cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from
instinct, then through fear of incurring
punishment. He is responsible for such results as
anyone might foresee and for acts which no one
would have performed except through culpable
abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and
property, all those of his fellow-beings, would
ever be exposed to all manner of danger and
injury.
The proper penalty that the accused Pugay must
suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from four
(4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum. With respect to the
accused Samson, the Solicitor General in his brief
contends that "his conviction of murder, is proper
considering that his act in setting the deceased on
fire knowing that gasoline had just been poured
on him is characterized by treachery as the victim
was left completely helpless to defend and protect
himself against such an outrage" (p. 57, Rollo).
We do not agree.
There is entire absence of proof in the record that
the accused Samson had some reason to kill the
deceased before the incident. On the contrary,
there is adequate evidence showing that his act
was merely a part of their fun-making that
evening. For the circumstance of treachery to
exist, the attack must be deliberate and the culprit
employed means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from any defense which the
offended party might make.
There can be no doubt that the accused Samson
knew very well that the liquid poured on the body
of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable
substance for he would not have committed the
act of setting the latter on fire if it were
otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it call
be conceded that as part of their fun-making he
merely intended to set the deceased's clothes on
fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of
criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of the
victim would cause at the very least some kind of
physical injuries on his person, a felony defined
in the Revised Penal Code. If his act resulted into
a graver offense, as what took place in the instant
case, he must be held responsible therefor. Article
4 of the aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that
criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the Both accused shall be jointly and severally liable
wrongful act done be different from that which he for the aforesaid amount plus the P10,000.00 as
intended. moral damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary
damages as found by the court a quo.
As no sufficient evidence appears in the record
establishing any qualifying circumstances, the Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed with the
accused Samson is only guilty of the crime of modifications above-indicated. Costs against the
homicide defined and penalized in Article 249 of accused-appellants.
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. We are
disposed to credit in his favor the ordinary SO ORDERED.
mitigating circumstance of no intention to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed as Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ.,
there is evidence of a fact from which such concur.
conclusion can be drawn. The eyewitness Gabion
testified that the accused Pugay and Samson were Sources:
stunned when they noticed the deceased burning
(Tsn, June 1, 1983, pp. 16-17).<äre||anº•1àw> https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/nov198
8/gr_l_74324_1988.html
The proper penalty that the accused Samson must
suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from eight
(8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
 People v. Garcia, GR 153591 Feb 23, 2004
fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.

The lower court held the accused solidarily liable FIRST DIVISION
for P13,940.00, the amount spent by Miranda's
parents for his hospitalization, wake and G.R. No. 153591 February 23, 2004
interment. The indemnity for death is P30,000.00.
Hence, the indemnity to the heirs of the deceased
Miranda is increased to P43,940.00.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee
vs.
RENATO GARCIA y ROMANO, appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Appellant Renato Garcia y Romano was charged
with Murder before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 87, in Criminal Case No.
Q-98-79961 in an Information1 which reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of May, 1998, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, being
then the driver and/or person in charge of an
Isuzu Jitney bearing Plate No. NPJ-948 did then
and there unlawfully and feloniously drive,
manage and operate the same along Zabarte Road
in said City, in a careless, reckless, negligent and
impudent manner, by then and there making the
said vehicle run at a speed greater than was
reasonable and proper without taking the
necessary precaution to avoid accident to
person/s of the traffic at said place at the time,
causing as consequence of his said carelessness,
negligence, impudence and lack of precaution,
the said vehicle so driven, managed and operated
by him to hit and bump, as in fact it hit and
bumped Sanily Billon y Trinidad, a pedestrian,
thereafter, with intent to kill, qualified by evident
premeditation and use of motor vehicle, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
ran said vehicle over the victim thereby causing
her serious and mortal wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of her untimely death,
to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
said Sanily Billon y Trinidad.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On arraignment, appellant pleaded "not guilty".
Thereafter, trial on the merits followed.
The prosecution alleged that at around 12:00
noon of May 22, 1998, Bentley Billon and his
younger sister, Sanily, boarded a passenger
jeepney on their way to Sacred Heart School in
Barangay Kaligayahan, Novaliches, Quezon City
to attend remedial classes. They alighted on
Zabarte Road in front of the school. Bentley
crossed the street and waited on the center island
for Sanily to cross. While Sanily was crossing the
street, a passenger jeepney driven by appellant,
coming from Camarin and heading towards
Quirino Highway, hit her on the left side of the
body. Sanily fell and was thrown to the ground a
meter away from the vehicle. The jeepney
stopped. But as Bentley was running towards his
sister, the vehicle suddenly accelerated with its
front tire running over Sanily’s stomach. Bentley
and appellant pulled Sanily, who was writhing in
excruciating pain, from underneath the vehicle
and brought her to the Sta. Lucia Hospital but due
to lack of medical facilities, she was transferred
to the Quezon City General Hospital (QCGH)
where she was operated. However, she died four
days later.
Dr. Emmanuel Reyes,2 Medico-legal of the
Southern Police District, Fort Bonifacio, testified
that the attending physician, Dr. Santiago C.
Sagad, noted lacerations in Sanily’s liver and
spleen which was caused by a blunt/strong force
on the victim’s body, resulting to her death due to
internal bleeding. He opined that the blunt force
may have also caused lacerations in the victim’s
intestine and the abrasions on the arm, from the
elbow to the shoulder could be the result of the
skin’s contact with a rough surface.
Appellant admitted having ran over the victim,
but claimed that it was an accident. He narrated
that at around noon on May 22, 1998, while
driving his passenger jeepney along Zabarte
Road, he saw a boy crossing the street followed
by the victim. While the vehicle was running, he
heard a thud. He immediately applied his breaks
and alighted to check what it was. He saw to his
horror a girl sprawled underneath his vehicle
between the front and the rear tires. He and the
victim’s brother rushed the girl to the Sta. Lucia
Hospital, but they transferred her to the Quezon
City General Hospital which has better facilities.
A week later, he learned that the victim died.
On May 2, 2002, the trial court rendered
judgment,3 finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the
dispositive portion of which reads:4
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Murder, for which, said RENATO
GARCIA y ROMANO is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of Sanily Billon the sum of
One Hundred and Twenty Three Thousand and
Five Hundred Pesos (P123,500.00) as actual
damages including attorney’s fees; Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity
for the death of Sanily and Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as moral
damages.
Cost against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
The trial court held that appellant is guilty of
murder qualified by evident premeditation
because he deliberately ran over the slumped
body of the victim.
Hence this appeal, raising the following errors, to
wit:
I was doing.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
APPRECIATING AGAINST ACCUSED-
APPELLANT THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF EVIDENT
PREMEDITAION
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER AS
CHARGED.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not
appellant is guilty of murder or reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide.
Appellant argues that the trial court gravely erred
in finding that the qualifying circumstance of
evident premeditation attended the commission
of the offense. He contends that the mere
allegation by the prosecution that he bumped the
victim and intentionally ran over her body is not
sufficient to establish evident premeditation. He
claims that he did not intentionally run over the
victim when his vehicle bumped her because he
was rattled and was no longer aware of what he
We find from a careful review of the facts on
record that the unfortunate incident was more the
result of reckless imprudence than of malicious
intent. Therefore, the trial court erred in
convicting appellant of the crime of murder
qualified by evident premeditation.
The elements of evident premeditation are: (1) a
previous decision by the appellant to commit the
crime; (2) an overt act/acts manifestly indicating
that the appellant clung to his determination; and
(3) a lapse of time between the decision to
commit the crime and its actual execution
sufficient to allow appellant to reflect upon the
consequences of his acts.
The victim’s brother, Bentley, testified that the
vehicle stopped after it bumped the victim, but it
moved forward and ran over the prostrate body of
her sister. From his narration, we find that no
sufficient time elapsed for appellant to decide to
commit the crime and reflect on its consequences.
Moreover, there was no showing that appellant
performed other overt acts to show that he was
determined to commit murder. The essence of
evident premeditation is that the execution of the
criminal act must be preceded by cool thought
and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the
criminal intent, during the space of time
sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.5 These
circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar.
Appellant could have reacted on instinct and
relied on sheer impulse to respond to the situation
at hand. While it is possible that appellant
deliberately ran over the victim, it is equally
possible, if not more probable, that the vehicle
moved forward because appellant failed to
control its momentum. Indeed, this is more
consistent with the unrebutted evidence that the
jeepney, which had no handbrake, was moving
fast and that appellant became confused when the
accident occurred. Furthermore, appellant’s act of
bringing the victim to the hospital despite
numerous opportunities to flee from the scene is
more compatible with a state of mind devoid of
criminal intent.
In view of the gravity of the offense involved, the
trial court should have been more circumspect in
weighing the evidence of both parties. Our own
evaluation of the evidence reveals that appellant
had no intention to kill the victim. As such, he
cannot be held liable for an intentional felony. All
reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate
negligence, and not criminal intent, must be
resolved in favor of appellant.6
Thus, appellant is guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide defined in Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In U.S. v.
Maleza,7 we explained the rationale behind this
crime as follows:
A man must use common sense, and exercise due
reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be
cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from
instinct, then through fear of incurring
punishment. He is responsible for such results as
anyone might foresee and for acts which no one
would have performed except through culpable
abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and
property, all those of his fellow-beings, would
ever be exposed to all manner of danger and
injury.
In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in
negligence or imprudence, what is principally
penalized is the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack
of care or foresight, the imprudencia
punible.8 Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, states that reckless imprudence
consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing
or failing to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing
such act. Compared to intentional felonies, such
as homicide or murder, what takes the place of
the element of malice or intention to commit a
wrong or evil is the failure of the offender to take
precautions due to lack of skill taking into
account his employment, or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition, and other
circumstances regarding persons, time, and
place.9
Appellant showed an inexcusable lack of
precaution when he disregarded a traffic sign
cautioning motorists to slow down10 and drove
his vehicle in full speed despite being aware that
he was traversing a school zone and pedestrians
were crossing the street. He should have observed
due diligence of a reasonably prudent man by
slackening his speed and proceeding cautiously
while passing the area.
The imposable penalty, under Art. 365 (2)11 of
the Revised Penal Code, homicide resulting from
reckless imprudence in the use of motor vehicle
is prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, which ranges from two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years. Under Article 65 of the Revised Penal
Code, the penalty shall be divided into three
equal portions of time, each of which shall form
one period. There being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty shall
be within the medium period, which is three (3)
years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days to
four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days.
Applying the provisions of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, appellant is entitled to a minimum
term to be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree, which is arresto mayor, maximum to
prision correccional, minimum. Accordingly,
appellant should be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum.12
The trial court correctly awarded P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity. However, the award of moral
damages in the amount of P500,000.00 should be
reduced to P50,000.00.13 The award of
P30,000.00 as actual damages must likewise be
modified. The mother of the victim presented
receipts that they, in fact, spent P58,257.9014 for
hospital bills and funeral expenses. The fact that
she received P40,000.00 from insurance will not
affect the award of actual damages.15 The award
of exemplary damages is deleted for lack of
factual basis.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-98-79961,
convicting appellant of the crime of murder is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Renato
Garcia y Romano is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, and he is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term
of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as maximum.
Appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P58,257.90 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as
moral damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban,
Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Sources:
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/feb200
4/gr_153591_2004.html
 Garcia v. CA , GR 157171 March 14, 2006
G.R. No. 157171 March 14, 2006
ARSENIA B. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition seeks the review of the judgment of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
245471that affirmed the conviction of petitioner
by the Regional Trial Court2of Alaminos City,
Pangasinan, Branch 54, for violation of Section
27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646.3
Based on the complaint-affidavit of Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr., who ran in the 1995 senatorial
elections, an information dated March 30, 1998,
was filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Alaminos, charging Herminio R. Romero, Renato
R. Viray, Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera,
and petitioner, with violation of Section 27(b).
The information reads:
That on or about May 11, 1995, which was
within the canvassing period during the May 8,
1995 elections, in the Municipality of Alaminos,
Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, Election Officer Arsenia
B. Garcia, Municipal Treasurer Herminio R.
Romero, Public School District Supervisor
Renato R. Viray, Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and
Member-Secretary, respectively, of the Municipal
Board of Canvassers of Alaminos, Pangasinan,
tabulators Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera,
conspiring with, confederating together and
mutually helping each other, did, then and there,
willfully, and unlawfully decrease[d] the votes
received by senatorial candidate Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr. from six thousand nine hundred
ninety-eight (6,998) votes, as clearly disclosed in
the total number of votes in the one hundred
fifty-nine (159) precincts of the Statement of
Votes by Precincts of said municipality, with
Serial Nos. 008417, 008418, 008419, 008420,
008421, 008422 and 008423 to one thousand nine
hundred twenty-one (1,921) votes as reflected in
the Statement of Votes by Precincts with Serial
No. 008423 and Certificate of Canvass with
Serial No. 436156 with a difference of five
thousand seventy-seven (5,077) votes.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
In a Decision dated September 11, 2000, the RTC
acquitted all the accused for insufficiency of
evidence, except petitioner who was convicted as
follows:
xxx
5. And finally, on the person of Arsenia B.
Garcia, the Court pronounces her GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime defined
under Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b) for
decreasing the votes of Senator Pimentel in the
total of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881,
considering that this finding is a violation of
Election Offense, she is thus sentenced to suffer
an imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS as
maximum, but applying the INDETERMINATE
SENTENCE LAW, the minimum penalty is the
next degree lower which is SIX (6) MONTHS;
however, accused Arsenia B. Garcia is not
entitled to probation; further, she is sentenced to
suffer disqualification to hold public office and
she is also deprived of her right of suffrage.
The bailbond posted by her is hereby ordered
cancelled, and the Provincial Warden is ordered
to commit her person to the Bureau of
Correctional Institution for Women, at Metro
Manila, until further orders from the court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.5
Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals
which affirmed with modification the RTC
Decision, thus,
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the
appealed decision is hereby affirmed with
modification, increasing the minimum penalty
imposed by the trial court from six (6) months to
one (1) year.
SO ORDERED.6
The Court of Appeals likewise denied the motion
for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal assigning
the following as errors of the appellate court:
I THAT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE
ON THE FIRST AND SECOND GROUNDS
RELIED UPON BY THE RESPONDENT
COURT, NAMELY, THAT IT COULD NOT
HAVE BEEN SECRETARY VIRAY WHO
DECREASED THE VOTES OF
COMPLAINANT PIMENTEL SINCE HE
MERELY RELIED ON WHAT THE
PETITIONER DICTATED, AND THAT IT
COULD NOT HAVE ALSO BEEN THE
TABULATORS BECAUSE PETITIONER WAS
THE ONE WHO READ THE ADDING
[MACHINE] TAPE.
II
ON THE THIRD GROUND, NAMELY, THAT
PETITIONER DID NOT PRODUCE THE
TAPES DURING THE TRIAL BECAUSE IF
PRODUCED, IT IS GOING TO BE ADVERSE
TO HER.
III
ON THE FOURTH GROUND, NAMELY,
THAT THE PETITIONER WAS THE ONE
WHO ENTERED THE REDUCED FIGURE OF
1,921 IN THE CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS
(COC), Exh. "7", WHEN THE DUTY WAS
BOARD.
IV
THE REDUCTION OF THE VOTES OF
CANDIDATE PIMENTEL WAS CLEARLY
NOT WILLFUL OR INTENTIONAL.7
Petitioner contends that (1) the Court of Appeals’
judgment is erroneous, based on speculations,
surmises and conjectures, instead of substantial
evidence; and (2) there was no motive on her part
to reduce the votes of private complainant.
Respondent on the other hand contends that good
faith is not a defense in the violation of an
election law, which falls under the class of mala
prohibita.
The main issue is, Is a violation of Section 27(b)
of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in
se or mala prohibita? Could good faith and lack
of criminal intent be valid defenses?
Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and
penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the
acts complained of are inherently immoral, they
are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished
by a special law.8Accordingly, criminal intent
must be clearly established with the other
elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is
committed. On the other hand, in crimes that
are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not
inherently immoral but become punishable only
because the law says they are forbidden. With
these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has
been violated.9Criminal intent is not necessary
where the acts are prohibited for reasons of
public policy.10
Section 27(b) of Republic Act No.
664611provides:
SEC. 27. Election Offenses.- In addition to the
prohibited acts and election offenses enumerated
in Sections 261 and 262 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881, as amended, the following shall be guilty of
an election offense:
xxx
(b) Any member of the board of election
inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers,
increases, or decreases the votes received by a
candidate in any election or any member of the
board who refuses, after proper verification and
hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such
tampered votes.
xxx
Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b)
are mala in se.12For otherwise, even errors and
mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue
would be punishable. Given the volume of votes
to be counted and canvassed within a limited
amount of time, errors and miscalculations are
bound to happen. And it could not be the intent of
the law to punish unintentional election canvass
errors. However, intentionally increasing or
decreasing the number of votes received by a
candidate is inherently immoral, since it is done
with malice and intent to injure another.
Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of
the person who executes an act which the law
punishes, unless the contrary shall appear.13Thus,
whoever invokes good faith as a defense has the
burden of proving its existence.
Records show that the canvassing of votes on
May 11, 1995 before the Board of Canvassers of
the Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan was
conducted as follows:
1. After the votes in the 159 precincts of the
municipality of Alaminos were tallied, the results
thereof were sealed and forwarded to the
Municipal Board of Canvassers for canvassing;
2. The number of votes received by each
candidate in each precinct was then recorded in
the Statement of Votes with appellant, in her
capacity as Chairman, reading the figures
appearing in the results from the precincts and
accused Viray, in his capacity as secretary of the
Board, entering the number in the Statements of
Votes as read by the appellant. Six Statements of
Votes were filled up to reflect the votes received
by each candidate in the 159 precincts of the
Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan.
3. After the number of votes received by each
candidate for each precincts were entered by
accused Viray in the Statements of Votes, these
votes were added by the accused Palisoc and de
Vera with the use of electrical adding machines.
4. After the tabulation by accused Palisoc and de
Vera, the corresponding machine tapes were
handed to appellant who reads the subtotal of
votes received by each candidate in the precincts
listed in each Statement of Votes. Accused Viray
[then] records the subtotal in the proper column
in the Statement of Votes.
5. After the subtotals had been entered by
accused Viray, tabulators accused Palisoc and de
Vera added all the subtotals appearing in all
Statement of Votes.
6. After the computation, the corresponding
machine tape on which the grand total was
reflected was handed to appellant who reads the
same and accused Viray enters the figure read by
appellant in the column for grand total in the
Statement of Votes.14
Neither the correctness of the number of votes
entered in the Statement of Votes (SOV) for each
precinct, nor of the number of votes entered as
subtotals of votes received in the precincts listed
in SOV Nos. 008417 to 008422 was raised as an
issue.
At first glance, however, there is a noticeable
discrepancy in the addition of the subtotals to
arrive at the grand total of votes received by each
candidate for all 159 precincts in SOV No.
008423.15The grand total of the votes for private
complainant, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, was
only 1,921 instead of 6,921, or 5,000 votes less
than the number of votes private complainant
actually received. This error is also evident in the
Certificate of Canvass (COC) No. 436156 signed
by petitioner, Viray and Romero.16
During trial of this case, petitioner admitted that
she was indeed the one who announced the figure
of 1,921, which was subsequently entered by then
accused Viray in his capacity as secretary of the
board.17Petitioner likewise admitted that she was
the one who prepared the COC (Exhibit A-7),
though it was not her duty. To our mind,
preparing the COC even if it was not her task,
manifests an intention to perpetuate the erroneous
entry in the COC.18
Neither can this Court accept petitioner’s
explanation that the Board of Canvassers had no
idea how the SOV (Exhibit "6") and the COC
reflected that private complainant had only 1,921
votes instead of 6,921 votes. As chairman of the
Municipal Board of Canvassers, petitioner’s
concern was to assure accurate, correct and
authentic entry of the votes. Her failure to
exercise maximum efficiency and fidelity to her
trust deserves not only censure but also the
concomitant sanctions as a matter of criminal
responsibility pursuant to the dictates of the
law.19
The fact that the number of votes deducted from
the actual votes received by private complainant,
Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. was not added to any
senatorial candidate does not relieve petitioner of
liability under Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No.
6646. The mere decreasing of the votes received
by a candidate in an election is already
punishable under the said provision.20
At this point, we see no valid reason to disturb
the factual conclusions of the appellate court. The
Court has consistently held that factual findings
of the trial court, as well as of the Court of especially when the error results from the mere
Appeals are final and conclusive and may not be transfer of totals from one document to another.
reviewed on appeal, particularly where the
findings of both the trial court and the appellate WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.
court on the matter coincide.21 The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
sustaining petitioner’s conviction but increasing
Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence the minimum penalty in her sentence to one year
should be exercised by the members of the board instead of six months is AFFIRMED.
of canvassers in canvassing the results of the
elections. Any error on their part would result in SO ORDERED.
the disenfranchisement of the voters. The
Certificate of Canvass for senatorial candidates LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
and its supporting statements of votes prepared Associate Justice
by the municipal board of canvassers are
sensitive election documents whose entries must WE CONCUR:
be thoroughly scrutinized.22
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
In our review, the votes in the SOV should total Associate Justice
6,998.23
CONCHITA DANTE O.
As between the grand total of votes alleged to CARPIO TINGA
have been received by private complainant of MORALES Asscociate
6,921 votes and statement of his actual votes Associate Justice Justice
received of 6,998 is a difference of 77 votes. The
discrepancy may be validly attributed to mistake ATTESTATION
or error due to fatigue. However, a decrease of
5,000 votes as reflected in the Statement of Votes I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
and Certificate of Canvass is substantial, it cannot had been reached in consultation before the case
be allowed to remain on record unchallenged, was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING DECISION
Associate Justice
Chairperson CALLEJO, SR., J.:

CERTIFICATION Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR No. 26877, affirming the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting Eduardo P.
Manuel of bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-
R.
Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an
Information filed on November 7, 2001, the
accusatory portion of which reads:

Sources: That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar200
6/gr_157171_2006.html
 Manuel v. People, GR 165842 Nov. 29, 2005
G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being
then previously and legally married to
RUBYLUS [GAÑA] and without the said
marriage having been legally dissolved, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
contract a second marriage with TINA
GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein complainant,
who does not know the existence of the first
marriage of said EDUARDO P. MANUEL to
Rubylus [Gaña].
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
The prosecution adduced evidence that on July
28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaña
before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati, which
was then still a municipality of the Province of
Rizal.4 He met the private complainant Tina B.
Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January
1996. She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City for
two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21
years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while
Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to
Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing
led to another, they went to a motel where,
despite Tina’s resistance, Eduardo succeeded in
having his way with her. Eduardo proposed
marriage on several occasions, assuring her that
he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents
to Baguio City to meet Tina’s parents, and was
assured by them that their son was still single.
Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime
in the first week of March 1996. They were
married on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio
C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of
Baguio City, Branch 61.5 It appeared in their
marriage contract that Eduardo was "single."
The couple was happy during the first three years
of their married life. Through their joint efforts,
they were able to build their home in Cypress
Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting
1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and
went to their house only twice or thrice a year.
Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money
from Eduardo, he would slap her.6 Sometime in
January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left,
and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving
financial support.
Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious
and made inquiries from the National Statistics
Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that
Eduardo had been previously married. She
secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage
contract.7 She was so embarrassed and humiliated
when she learned that Eduardo was in fact
already married when they exchanged their own
vows.8
For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina
sometime in 1995 in a bar where she worked as a
Guest Relations Officer (GRO). He fell in love
with her and married her. He informed Tina of
his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaña, but she
nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital
relationship was in order until this one time when
he noticed that she had a "love-bite" on her neck.
He then abandoned her. Eduardo further testified
that he declared he was "single" in his marriage
contract with Tina because he believed in good
faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did
not know that he had to go to court to seek for the
nullification of his first marriage before marrying
Tina.
Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced
to marry his first wife because she threatened to
commit suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was
charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter
imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three
months and never saw her again. He insisted that
he married Tina believing that his first marriage
was no longer valid because he had not heard
from Rubylus for more than 20 years.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2,
2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of bigamy. He was sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and
ten (10) months, as minimum, to ten (10) years,
as maximum, and directed to indemnify the
private complainant Tina Gandalera the amount
of ₱200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus
costs of suit.9
The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able
to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. It declared that Eduardo’s
belief, that his first marriage had been dissolved
because of his first wife’s 20-year absence, even
if true, did not exculpate him from liability for
bigamy. Citing the ruling of this Court in People
v. Bitdu,10 the trial court further ruled that even if
the private complainant had known that Eduardo
had been previously married, the latter would still
be criminally liable for bigamy.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He
alleged that he was not criminally liable for
bigamy because when he married the private
complainant, he did so in good faith and without
any malicious intent. He maintained that at the
time that he married the private complainant, he
was of the honest belief that his first marriage no
longer subsisted. He insisted that conformably to
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must
be malice for one to be criminally liable for a
felony. He was not motivated by malice in
marrying the private complainant because he did
so only out of his overwhelming desire to have a
fruitful marriage. He posited that the trial court
should have taken into account Article 390 of the
New Civil Code. To support his view, the
appellant cited the rulings of this Court in United
States v. Peñalosa11 and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals.12
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
averred that Eduardo’s defense of good faith and
reliance on the Court’s ruling in United States v.
Enriquez13 were misplaced; what is applicable is
Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended
Article 390 of the Civil Code. Citing the ruling of
this Court in Republic v. Nolasco,14 the OSG
further posited that as provided in Article 41 of
the Family Code, there is a need for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse to enable the present spouse to marry.
Even assuming that the first marriage was void,
the parties thereto should not be permitted to
judge for themselves the nullity of the marriage;
the matter should be submitted to the proper court
for resolution. Moreover, the OSG maintained,
the private complainant’s knowledge of the first
marriage would not afford any relief since
bigamy is an offense against the State and not
just against the private complainant.
However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that
the penalty imposed by the trial court was
erroneous and sought the affirmance of the
decision appealed from with modification.
On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment
affirming the decision of the RTC with
modification as to the penalty of the accused. It
ruled that the prosecution was able to prove all
the elements of bigamy. Contrary to the
contention of the appellant, Article 41 of the
Family Code should apply. Before Manuel could
lawfully marry the private complainant, there
should have been a judicial declaration of Gaña’s
presumptive death as the absent spouse. The
appellate court cited the rulings of this Court
in Mercado v. Tan15 and Domingo v. Court of
Appeals16 to support its ruling. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the
Decision promulgated on July 31, 2002 is
hereby MODIFIED to reflect, as it hereby
reflects, that accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional,
as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision
mayor as maximum. Said Decision
is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.17
Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant
petition for review on certiorari, insisting that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT
RULED THAT PETITIONER’S FIRST WIFE
CANNOT BE LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD
UNDER ARTICLE 390 OF THE CIVIL CODE
AS THERE WAS NO JUDICIAL
DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH
AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF
THE FAMILY CODE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE AWARD OF PHP200,000.00
AS MORAL DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO
BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW.18
The petitioner maintains that the prosecution
failed to prove the second element of the
felony, i.e., that the marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
under the Civil Code. He avers that when he
married Gandalera in 1996, Gaña had been
"absent" for 21 years since 1975; under Article
390 of the Civil Code, she was presumed dead as
a matter of law. He points out that, under the first
paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code, one
who has been absent for seven years, whether or
not he/she is still alive, shall be presumed
dead for all purposes except for succession, while
the second paragraph refers to the rule on legal
presumption of death with respect to succession.
The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death
of the absent spouse arises by operation of law
upon the satisfaction of two requirements: the
specified period and the present spouse’s
reasonable belief that the absentee is dead. He
insists that he was able to prove that he had not
heard from his first wife since 1975 and that he
had no knowledge of her whereabouts or whether
she was still alive; hence, under Article 41 of the
Family Code, the presumptive death of Gaña had
arisen by operation of law, as the two
requirements of Article 390 of the Civil Code are
present. The petitioner concludes that he should
thus be acquitted of the crime of bigamy.
The petitioner insists that except for the period of
absences provided for in Article 390 of the Civil
Code, the rule therein on legal presumptions
remains valid and effective. Nowhere under
Article 390 of the Civil Code does it require that
there must first be a judicial declaration of death
before the rule on presumptive death would
apply. He further asserts that contrary to the
rulings of the trial and appellate courts, the
requirement of a judicial declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code is only a requirement for the validity of the
subsequent or second marriage.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court
and the CA erred in awarding moral damages in
favor of the private complainant. The private
complainant was a "GRO" before he married her,
and even knew that he was already married. He
genuinely loved and took care of her and gave her
financial support. He also pointed out that she
had an illicit relationship with a lover whom she
brought to their house.
In its comment on the petition, the OSG
maintains that the decision of the CA affirming
the petitioner’s conviction is in accord with the
law, jurisprudence and the evidence on record. To
bolster its claim, the OSG cited the ruling of this
Court in Republic v. Nolasco.19
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which
defines and penalizes bigamy, reads:
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision
mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The provision was taken from Article 486 of the
Spanish Penal Code, to wit:
El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio
sin hallarse legítimamente disuelto el anterior,
será castigado con la pena de prision mayor. xxx
The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is
to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of
marriage established by law.20 The phrase "or
before the absent spouse had been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings" was
incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because
the drafters of the law were of the impression that
"in consonance with the civil law which provides
for the presumption of death after an absence of a
number of years, the judicial declaration of
presumed death like annulment of
marriage should be a justification for bigamy."21
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the
prosecution is burdened to prove the felony: (a)
he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she
contracts a subsequent marriage without the
former marriage having been lawfully dissolved.
The felony is consummated on the celebration of
the second marriage or subsequent marriage.22 It
is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the
alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requirements, would be valid were it not for the
subsistence of the first marriage.23 Viada avers
that a third element of the crime is that the second
marriage must be entered into with fraudulent
intent (intencion fraudulente) which is an
essential element of a felony by dolo.24 On the
other hand, Cuello Calon is of the view that there
are only two elements of bigamy: (1) the
existence of a marriage that has not been lawfully
dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second
marriage. It does not matter whether the first
marriage is void or voidable because such
marriages have juridical effects until lawfully
dissolved by a court of competent
jurisdiction.25 As the Court ruled in Domingo v.
Court of Appeals26 and Mercado v. Tan,27 under
the Family Code of the Philippines, the judicial
declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is a
defense.
In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code,
Albert is of the same view as Viada and declared
that there are three (3) elements of bigamy: (1) an
undissolved marriage; (2) a new marriage; and
(3) fraudulent intention constituting the felony of
the act.28 He explained that:
… This last element is not stated in Article 349,
because it is undoubtedly incorporated in the
principle antedating all codes, and, constituting
one of the landmarks of our Penal Code, that,
where there is no willfulness there is no crime.
There is no willfulness if the subject
believes that the former marriage has been
dissolved; and this must be supported by very
strong evidence, and if this be produced, the act
shall be deemed not to constitute a crime. Thus, a
person who contracts a second marriage in the
reasonable and well-founded belief that his first
wife is dead, because of the many years that have
elapsed since he has had any news of her
whereabouts, in spite of his endeavors to find her,
cannot be deemed guilty of the crime of bigamy,
because there is no fraudulent intent which is one
of the essential elements of the crime.29
As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the
petitioner is charged with bigamy, a felony
by dolo (deceit). Article 3, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that there is deceit
when the act is performed with deliberate intent.
Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent.
Since a felony by dolo is classified as an
intentional felony, it is deemed
voluntary.30 Although the words "with malice" do
not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal
Code, such phrase is included in the word
"voluntary."31
Malice is a mental state or condition prompting
the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or
justification from which another suffers
injury.32 When the act or omission defined by law
as a felony is proved to have been done or
committed by the accused, the law presumes it to
have been intentional.33 Indeed, it is a legal
presumption of law that every man intends the
natural or probable consequence of his voluntary
act in the absence of proof to the contrary, and
such presumption must prevail unless a
reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of
the whole evidence.34
For one to be criminally liable for a felony
by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an
evil act and an evil intent. Actus non facit reum,
nisi mens sit rea.35
In the present case, the prosecution proved that
the petitioner was married to Gaña in 1975, and
such marriage was not judicially declared a
nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to
subsist.36 The prosecution also proved that the
petitioner married the private complainant in
1996, long after the effectivity of the Family
Code.
The petitioner is presumed to have acted with
malice or evil intent when he married the private
complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or
good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a
prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense
negates malice or criminal intent. However,
ignorance of the law is not an excuse because
everyone is presumed to know the
law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his
defense that when he married the private
complainant in 1996, he was of the well-
grounded belief
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not
heard from her for more than 20 years since
1975. He should have adduced in evidence a
decision of a competent court declaring the
presumptive death of his first wife as required by
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation
to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial
declaration also constitutes proof that the
petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate
criminal intent on his part when he married the
private complainant and, as a consequence, he
could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case.
The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his
burden.
The phrase "or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered on the proceedings" in Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an
aggroupment of empty or useless words. The
requirement for a judgment of the presumptive
death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the
spouse present, as protection from the pains and
the consequences of a second marriage, precisely
because he/she could be charged and convicted of
bigamy if the defense of good faith based on
mere testimony is found incredible.
The requirement of judicial declaration is also for
the benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section
12 of the Constitution, the "State shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution." Marriage is a social institution
of the highest importance. Public policy, good
morals and the interest of society require that the
marital relation should be surrounded with every
safeguard and its severance only in the manner
prescribed and the causes specified by law.37 The
laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to
serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or
general welfare of the community and the parties
can waive nothing essential to the validity of the
proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered
society by encouraging stable relationships over
transient ones; it enhances the welfare of the
community.
In a real sense, there are three parties to every
civil marriage; two willing spouses and an
approving State. On marriage, the parties assume
new relations to each other and the State touching
nearly on every aspect of life and death. The
consequences of an invalid marriage to the
parties, to innocent parties and to society, are so
serious that the law may well take means
calculated to ensure the procurement of the most
positive evidence of death of the first spouse or of
the presumptive death of the absent spouse38 after
the lapse of the period provided for under the
law. One such means is the requirement of the
declaration by a competent court of the
presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof
that the present spouse contracts a subsequent
marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death
of the first spouse. Indeed, "men readily believe
what they wish to be true," is a maxim of the old
jurists. To sustain a second marriage and to
vacate a first because one of the parties believed
the other to be dead would make the existence of
the marital relation determinable, not by certain
extrinsic facts, easily capable of forensic
ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective
condition of individuals.39 Only with such proof
can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to
permit second marriages.40 Thus, Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution
of marriage dependent not only upon the personal
belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts
easily capable of accurate judicial
cognizance,41 namely, a judgment of the
presumptive death of the absent spouse.
The petitioner’s sole reliance on Article 390 of
the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for
bigamy is misplaced.
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide –
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it
being unknown whether or not, the absentee still
lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes,
except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the
purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the
age of seventy-five years, an absence of five
years shall be sufficient in order that his
succession may be opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead
for all purposes, including the division of the
estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea
voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who
has not been heard of for four years since the loss
of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken
part in war, and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death
under other circumstances and his existence has
not been known for four years.
The presumption of death of the spouse who had
been absent for seven years, it being unknown
whether or not the absentee still lives, is created
by law and arises without any necessity of
judicial declaration.42 However, Article 41 of the
Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules
on presumptive death, reads:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person
during the subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present had a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In
case of disappearance where there is danger of
death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent
marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Court for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of
the absent spouse.43
With the effectivity of the Family Code,44 the
period of seven years under the first paragraph of
Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four
consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse
present may contract a subsequent marriage, he
or she must institute summary proceedings for
the declaration of the presumptive death of the
absentee spouse,45 without prejudice to the effect
of the reappearance of the absentee spouse. As
explained by this Court in Armas v. Calisterio:46
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order
that a subsequent bigamous marriage may
exceptionally be considered valid, the following
conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse
of the contracting party must have been absent
for four consecutive years, or two years where
there is danger of death under the circumstances
stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time
of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse is
already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule,
a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee for which purpose the spouse present
can institute a summary proceeding in court to
ask for that declaration. The last condition is
consistent and in consonance with the
requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent
marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation
to Article 40, of the Family Code.
The Court rejects petitioner’s contention that the
requirement of instituting a petition for
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41
of the Family Code is designed merely to enable
the spouse present to contract a valid second
marriage and not for the acquittal of one charged
with bigamy. Such provision was designed to
harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion
spawned by the rulings of this Court and
comments of eminent authorities on Criminal
Law.
As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled
in Jones v. Hortiguela47 that, for purposes of the
marriage law, it is not necessary to have the
former spouse judicially declared an absentee
before the spouse present may contract a
subsequent marriage. It held that the declaration
of absence made in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole
purpose the taking of the necessary precautions
for the administration of the estate of the
absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage,
however, the law only requires that the former
spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage, that the
spouse present does not know his or her former
spouse to be living, that such former spouse is
generally reputed to be dead and the spouse
present so believes at the time of the celebration
of the marriage.48 In In Re Szatraw,49 the Court
declared that a judicial declaration that a person
is presumptively dead, because he or she had
been unheard from in seven years, being a
presumption juris tantum only, subject to
contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality
or become final; and that proof of actual death of
the person presumed dead being unheard from in
seven years, would have to be made in another
proceeding to have such particular fact finally
determined. The Court ruled that if a judicial
decree declaring a person presumptively dead
because he or she had not been heard from in
seven years cannot become final and executory
even after the lapse of the reglementary period
within which an appeal may be taken, for such
presumption is still disputable and remains
subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such
a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous
and of no benefit to the petitioner. The Court
stated that it should not waste its valuable time
and be made to perform a superfluous and
meaningless act.50 The Court also took note that a
petition for a declaration of the presumptive death
of an absent spouse may even be made in
collusion with the other spouse.
In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,51 the
Court declared that the words "proper
proceedings" in Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code can only refer to those authorized by law
such as Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code
which refer to the administration or settlement of
the estate of a deceased person. In Gue v.
Republic of the Philippines,52 the Court rejected
the contention of the petitioner therein that, under
Article 390 of the Civil Code, the courts are
authorized to declare the presumptive death of a
person after an absence of seven years. The Court
reiterated its rulings in Szatraw,
Lukban and Jones.
Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of
the view that "the provision of Article 349 or
"before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment
reached in the proper proceedings" is erroneous
and should be considered as not written. He
opined that such provision presupposes that, if
the prior marriage has not been legally dissolved
and the absent first spouse has not been declared
presumptively dead in a proper court
proceedings, the subsequent marriage is
bigamous. He maintains that the supposition is
not true.53 A second marriage is bigamous only
when the circumstances in paragraphs 1 and 2 of
Article 83 of the Civil Code are not
present.54 Former Senator Ambrosio Padilla was,
likewise, of the view that Article 349 seems to
require judicial decree of dissolution or judicial
declaration of absence but even with such decree,
a second marriage in good faith will not
constitute bigamy. He posits that a second
marriage, if not illegal, even if it be annullable,
should not give rise to bigamy.55 Former Justice
Luis B. Reyes, on the other hand, was of the view
that in the case of an absent spouse who could not
yet be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code, the spouse present cannot be charged and
convicted of bigamy in case he/she contracts a
second marriage.56
The Committee tasked to prepare the Family
Code proposed the amendments of Articles 390
and 391 of the Civil Code to conform to Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code, in that, in a case
where a spouse is absent for the requisite period,
the present spouse may contract a subsequent
marriage only after securing a judgment declaring
the presumptive death of the absent spouse to
avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the
present spouse will have to adduce evidence that
he had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead.57 Such judgment is
proof of the good faith of the present spouse who
contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if
the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if
the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be
convicted of the crime. As explained by former
Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy:
… Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349
of the Revised Penal Code providing that the
present spouse must first ask for a declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse in order
not to be guilty of bigamy in case he or she
marries again.
The above Article of the Family Code now
clearly provides that for the purpose of the
present spouse contracting a second marriage, he
or she must file a summary proceeding as
provided in the Code for the declaration of the
presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the latter’s reappearance. This
provision is intended to protect the present
spouse from a criminal prosecution for bigamy
under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code
because with the judicial declaration that the
missing spouses presumptively dead, the good
faith of the present spouse in contracting a second
marriage is already established.58
Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L.
Pineda (now Undersecretary of Justice) who
wrote that things are now clarified. He says
judicial declaration of presumptive death is now
authorized for purposes of
remarriage. The present spouse must institute a
summary proceeding for declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, where the
ordinary rules of procedure in trial will not be
followed. Affidavits will suffice, with possible
clarificatory examinations of affiants if the Judge
finds it necessary for a full grasp of the facts. The
judgment declaring an absentee as presumptively
dead is without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the said absentee.
Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight
of authority is that the clause "before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead x x
x" should be disregarded because of Article 83,
paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. With the new law,
there is a need to institute a summary proceeding
for the declaration of the presumptive death of
the absentee, otherwise, there is bigamy.59
According to Retired Supreme Court Justice
Florenz D. Regalado, an eminent authority on
Criminal Law, in some cases where an absentee
spouse is believed to be dead, there must be a
judicial declaration of presumptive death, which
could then be made only in the proceedings for
the settlement of his estate.60 Before such
declaration, it was held that the remarriage of the
other spouse is bigamous even if done in good
faith.61 Justice Regalado opined that there were
contrary views because of the ruling in Jones and
the provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil Code,
which, however, appears to have been set to rest
by Article 41 of the Family Code, "which
requires a summary hearing for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse before the
other spouse can remarry."
Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition
for a declaration of the presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family
Code may be filed under Articles 239 to 247 of
the same Code.62
On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise,
faults the trial court and the CA for awarding
moral damages in favor of the private
complainant. The petitioner maintains that moral
damages may be awarded only in any of the cases
provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, and
bigamy is not one of them. The petitioner asserts
that the appellate court failed to apply its ruling
in People v. Bondoc,63 where an award of moral
damages for bigamy was disallowed. In any case,
the petitioner maintains, the private complainant
failed to adduce evidence to prove moral
damages.
The appellate court awarded moral damages to
the private complainant on its finding that she
adduced evidence to prove the same. The
appellate court ruled that while bigamy is not
included in those cases enumerated in Article
2219 of the Civil Code, it is not proscribed from
awarding moral damages against the petitioner.
The appellate court ruled that it is not bound by
the following ruling in People v. Bondoc:
... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron
daños, ello se debió indedublamente porque el
articulo 2219 del Código Civil de Filipinas
autoriza la adjudicación de daños morales en los
delitos de estupro, rapto, violación, adulterio o
concubinato, y otros actos lascivos, sin incluir en
esta enumeración el delito de bigamia. No existe,
por consiguiente, base legal para adjudicar aquí
los daños de ₱5,000.00 arriba mencionados.64
The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of
the CA are based on the evidence and the law.
The OSG, likewise, avers that the CA was not
bound by its ruling in People v. Rodeo.
The Court rules against the petitioner.
Moral damages include physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation,
moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act
or omission.65 An award for moral damages
requires the confluence of the following
conditions: first, there must be an injury, whether
physical, mental or psychological, clearly
sustained by the claimant; second, there must be
culpable act or omission factually
established; third, the wrongful act or omission of
the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury
sustained by the claimant; and fourth, the award
of damages is predicated on any of the cases
stated in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil
Code.66
Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the
offended party only in criminal cases enumerated
in Article 2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the
Civil Code and analogous cases, viz.:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in
the following and analogous cases.
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical
injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious
acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of
defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21,
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted,
raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this
article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and
brothers and sisters may bring the action
mentioned in No. 9 of this article in the order
named.
Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages
should be awarded in all cases where the
aggrieved party has suffered mental anguish,
fright, moral anxieties, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation and similar injury arising out of an
act or omission of another, otherwise, there
would not have been any reason for the inclusion
of specific acts in Article 221967 and analogous
cases (which refer to those cases bearing analogy
or resemblance, corresponds to some others or
resembling, in other respects, as in form,
proportion, relation, etc.)68
Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically
mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in
which the offender may be ordered to pay moral
damages to the private complainant/offended
party. Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to the
private complainant for moral damages under
Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21
of the Civil Code.
According to Article 19, "every person must, in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith." This provision
contains what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, and sets certain
standards which must be observed not only in the
exercise of one’s rights but also in the
performance of one’s duties. The standards are
the following: act with justice; give everyone his
due; and observe honesty and good faith. The
elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a
legal right or duty; (b) exercised in bad faith; and
(c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.69
Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all
other provisions of law which do not especially
provide for its own sanction. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform to
the standards set forth in the said provision and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must
be responsible.70 If the provision does not provide
a remedy for its violation, an action for damages
under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil
Code would be proper. Article 20 provides that
"every person who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another shall
indemnify the latter for the same." On the other
hand, Article 21 provides that "any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for
damages." The latter provision
is adopted to remedy "the countless gaps in the
statutes which leave so many victims of moral
wrongs helpless, even though they have actually
suffered material and moral injury should
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold
number of moral wrongs which it is impossible
for human foresight to prove for specifically in
the statutes." Whether or not the principle of
abuse of rights has been violated resulting in
damages under Article 20 or Article 21 of the
Civil Code or other applicable provisions of law
depends upon the circumstances of each case.71
In the present case, the petitioner courted the
private complainant and proposed to marry her.
He assured her that he was single. He even
brought his parents to the house of the private
complainant where he and his parents made the
same assurance – that he was single. Thus, the
private complainant agreed to marry the
petitioner, who even stated in the certificate of
marriage that he was single. She lived with the
petitioner and dutifully performed her duties as
his wife, believing all the while that he was her
lawful husband. For two years or so until the
petitioner heartlessly abandoned her, the private
complainant had no inkling that he was already
married to another before they were married.
Thus, the private complainant was an innocent
victim of the petitioner’s chicanery and heartless
deception, the fraud consisting not of a single act
alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by
day, he maintained the appearance of being a
lawful husband to the private complainant, who
changed her status from a single woman to a
married woman, lost the consortium, attributes
and support of a single man she could have
married lawfully and endured mental pain and
humiliation, being bound to a man who it turned
out was not her lawful husband.72
The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective
acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after
his marriage with the private complainant were
willful, deliberate and with malice and caused
injury to the latter. That she did not sustain any
physical injuries is not a bar to an award for
moral damages. Indeed, in Morris v.
Macnab,73 the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled:
xxx The defendant cites authorities which
indicate that, absent physical injuries, damages
for shame, humiliation, and mental anguish are
not recoverable where the actor is simply
negligent. See Prosser, supra, at p. 180; 2 Harper
& James, Torts, 1031 (1956). But the authorities
all recognize that where the wrong is willful
rather than negligent, recovery may be had for the
ordinary, natural, and proximate consequences
though they consist of shame, humiliation, and
mental anguish. See Spiegel v. Evergreen
Cemetery Co., 117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup.
Ct. 1936); Kuzma v. Millinery Workers, etc.,
Local 24, 27 N.J. Super, 579, 591, 99 A.2d 833
(App. Div. 1953); Prosser, supra, at p. 38. Here
the defendant’s conduct was not merely
negligent, but was willfully and maliciously
wrongful. It was bound to result in shame,
humiliation, and mental anguish for the plaintiff,
and when such result did ensue the plaintiff
became entitled not only to compensatory but
also to punitive damages. See Spiegel v.
Evergreen Cemetery Co., supra; Kuzma v
Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF.
Note, "Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts,"
70 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1957). The plaintiff
testified that because of the defendant’s bigamous
marriage to her and the attendant publicity she
not only was embarrassed and "ashamed to go
out" but "couldn’t sleep" but "couldn’t eat," had
terrific headaches" and "lost quite a lot of
weight." No just basis appears for judicial
interference with the jury’s reasonable allowance
of $1,000 punitive damages on the first count.
See Cabakov v. Thatcher, 37 N.J. Super 249, 117
A.2d 298 (App. Div.74 1955).
The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts
are against public policy as they undermine and
subvert the family as a social institution, good
morals and the interest and general welfare of
society.
Because the private complainant was an innocent
victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she is not
barred from claiming moral damages. Besides,
even considerations of public policy would not
prevent her from recovery. As held in Jekshewitz
v. Groswald:75
Where a person is induced by the fraudulent
representation of another to do an act which, in
consequence of such misrepresentation, he
believes to be neither illegal nor immoral, but
which is in fact a criminal offense, he has a right
of action against the person so inducing him for
damages sustained by him in consequence of his
having done such act. Burrows v. Rhodes, [1899]
1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370,
17 N.E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the court said
that a false representation by the defendant that
he was divorced from his former wife, whereby
the plaintiff was induced to marry him, gave her a
remedy in tort for deceit. It seems to have been
assumed that the fact that she had unintentionally
violated the law or innocently committed a crime
by cohabiting with him would be no bar to the
action, but rather that it might be a ground for
enhancing her damages. The injury to the
plaintiff was said to be in her being led by the
promise to give the fellowship and assistance of a
wife to one who was not her husband and to
assume and act in a relation and condition that
proved to be false and ignominious. Damages for
such an injury were held to be recoverable in
Sherman v. Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v.
Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am. Rep. 336.
Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does
not base her cause of action upon any
transgression of the law by herself but upon the
defendant’s misrepresentation. The criminal
relations which followed, innocently on her part,
were but one of the incidental results of the
defendant’s fraud for which damages may be
assessed.
[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a
woman to enter into the marriage relation have
been maintained in other jurisdictions. Sears v.
Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224, 17 L.R.
A. (N.S.) 819; Larson v. McMillan, 99 Wash.
626, 170 P. 324; Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y.
434, 97 Am. Dec. 747; Morril v. Palmer, 68 Vt.
1, 33 A. 829, 33 L.R.A. 411. Considerations of WE CONCUR:
public policy would not prevent recovery where
the circumstances are such that the plaintiff was REYNATO S. PUNO
conscious of no moral turpitude, that her illegal
action was induced solely by the defendant’s Associate Justice
misrepresentation, and that she does not base her
cause of action upon any transgression of the law Chairman
by herself. Such considerations
distinguish this case from cases in which the MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
court has refused to lend its aid to the DANTE O. TINGA
enforcement of a contract illegal on its face or to
Associate Justice Associate Justice
one who has consciously and voluntarily become
a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of On leave
action is founded. Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257
Mass. 518, 520, 154 N.E. 251, 49 A. L. R. 958.76 MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Considering the attendant circumstances of the Associate Justice
case, the Court finds the award of ₱200,000.00
for moral damages to be just and reasonable. ATTESTATION
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the were reached in consultation before the case was
Court of Appeals isAFFIRMED. Costs against assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
the petitioner. Court’s Division.
SO ORDERED. REYNATO S. PUNO
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice
Chairman, Second Division
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
Sources:
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/nov200
5/gr_165842_2005.html
 People v. Delim, GR 142773, Jan 28, 2003
G.R. No. 142773 January 28, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
MARLON DELIM, LEON DELIM,
MANUEL DELIM alias "BONG" (At Large),
ROBERT DELIM (At Large), and RONALD
DELIM alias "BONG", accused-appellants.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court on automatic review is the
Decision,1 dated January 14, 2000, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, Urdaneta City,
finding accused appellants Marlon Delim, Leon
Delim and Ronald Delim guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of
death. The court also ordered accused-appellants
to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the
victim the sums of P75,000.00 as moral damages
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Accused-appellants Marlon, Ronald and Leon,
together with Manuel alias "Bong" and Robert,
all surnamed Delim, were indicted for murder
under an Information dated May 4, 1999 which
reads:
"That on or about January 23, 1999, in the
evening at Brgy. Bila, Sison, Pangasinan, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, armed with short
firearms barged-in and entered the house of
Modesto Delim and once inside with intent to
kill, treachery, evident premedidation (sic),
conspiring with one another, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab, hold,
hogtie, gag with a piece of cloth, brought out and
abduct Modesto Delim, accused Leon Delim and
Manuel Delim stayed in the house guarded and
prevented the wife and son of Modesto Delim
from helping the latter, thereafter with abuse of
superior strength stabbed and killed said Modesto
Delim, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659."2
Only accused-appellants Marlon (Bongbong),
Leon and Ronald, all surnamed Delim, were
apprehended. Accused Robert and Manuel
remain at-large.
At their arraignment, Marlon, Ronald and Leon,
with the assistance of their counsel, pleaded not
guilty to the charge.
At the trial, the prosecution established the
following relevant facts3 —
Marlon, Manuel and Robert Delim are brothers.
They are the uncles of Leon Delim and Ronald
Delim. Modesto Manalo Bantas, the victim, was
an Igorot and a carpenter. He took the surname
Delim after he was "adopted" by the father of
Marlon, Manuel and Robert. However, Modesto's
wife, Rita, an illiterate, and their 16-year old son,
Randy, continued using Manalo Bantas as their
surname. Modesto, Rita and Randy considered
Marlon, Robert, Ronald, Manuel and Leon as
their relatives. Manuel and Leon were the
neighbors of Modesto. Marlon, Robert and
Ronald used to visit Modesto and his family.
Modesto and his family and the Delim kins
resided in Barangay Bila, Sison, Pangasinan.
On January 23, 1999, at around 6:30 in the
evening, Modesto, Rita and Randy were
preparing to have their supper in their home.
Joining them were Modesto and Rita's two young
grandchildren, aged 5 and 7 years old. They were
about to eat their dinner when Marlon, Robert
and Ronald suddenly barged into the house and
closed the door. Each of the three intruders was
armed with a short handgun. Marlon poked his
gun at Modesto while Robert and Ronald
simultaneously grabbed and hog-tied the victim.
A piece of cloth was placed in the mouth of
Modesto.4Marlon, Robert and Ronald herded
Modesto out of the house on their way towards
the direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. Rita
and Randy were warned by the intruders not to
leave the house. Leon and Manuel, who were also
armed with short handguns, stayed put by the
door to the house of Modesto and ordered Rita
and Randy to stay where they were. Leon and
Manuel left the house of Modesto only at around
7:00 a.m. the following day, January 24, 1999.
As soon as Leon and Manuel had left, Randy
rushed to the house of his uncle, Darwin Niño, at
Sitio Labayog, informed the latter of the incident
the night before and sought his help for the
retrieval of Modesto. Randy was advised to
report the matter to the police authorities.
However, Randy opted to first look for his father.
He and his other relatives scoured the vicinity to
locate Modesto to no avail. They proceeded to
Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan, around 200 meters
away from Modesto's house, to locate Modesto
but failed to find him there. On January 25, 1999,
Randy and his relatives returned to the housing
project in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan to locate
Modesto but again failed to find him there. On
January 26, 1999, Randy reported the incident to
the police authorities.
At around 3:00 in the afternoon of January 27,
1999, Randy, in the company of his relatives,
Nida Pucal, Pepito Pucal, Bernard Osias and
Daniel Delim, returned to the housing project in
Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan and this time they
found Modesto under thick bushes in a grassy
area. He was already dead. The cadaver was
bloated and in the state of decomposition. It
exuded a bad odor. Tiny white worms swarmed
over and feasted on the cadaver. Randy and his
relatives immediately rushed to the police station
to report the incident and to seek assistance.
When informed of the discovery of Modesto's
cadaver, the local chief of police and SPO2
Jovencio Fajarito and other policemen rushed to
the scene and saw the cadaver under the thick
bushes. Pictures were taken of the cadaver.5 Rita
and Randy divulged to the police investigators
the names and addresses of Marlon, Ronald,
Robert, Leon and Manuel, whom they claimed
were responsible for the death of Modesto. Rita
and Randy were at a loss why the five
malefactors seized Modesto and killed him. Rita
and Randy gave their respective sworn statements
to the police investigators.6 Police authorities
proceeded to arrest Marlon, Ronald, Robert,
Manuel and Leon but failed to find them in their
respective houses. The police officers scoured the
mountainous parts of Barangays Immalog and
Labayog to no avail.
The cadaver was autopsied by Dr. Maria Fe L. De
Guzman who prepared her autopsy report, which
reads:
"SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
Body both upper extremities are
both lower extremities are
(+) body decomposition
(+) worms coming out fro
injuries
 10 x 10 ml. GSW, pre-auricular area, right police investigators were able to confirm that
20 x 20 ml. GSW, mandibular areas, right Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Leon and Manuel had
no licenses for their firearms.8
10 x 10 ml. GSW, maxillary area, right
10 x 10 ml. GSW, below middle nose, directed Records
upward of the PNP Criminal Investigation and
(POE) Detection Group in Baguio City show that
30 x 40 ml. GSW, mid parieto — occipital areaMarlon
(POEx)had pending cases for robbery in the
2 x 1 cms. lacerated wound, right cheek Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in Criminal
1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, axillary area, left Case No. 16193-R, and for robbery in band in
Criminal Cases Nos. 9801 and 9802 pending with
1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, lateral aspect M/3rd left arm
the Regional Trial Court in Urdaneta,
1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, lateral aspect D/3rd, left arm
Pangasinan. 9

1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect M/3rd, left

arm To exculpate themselves, Marlon, Ronald and
Leon
1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound medial aspect D/3rd, left interposed denial and alibi.10
arm
#3; 1 x 1 cm. in line with each other, stabbed would,
Ronald claimed that on January 23, 1999, he, his
medial aspect, M/3rd, left forearm
wife and children, his mother, his brothers and
1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect, D/3rd,sisters
left were in their house at Asan Norte, Sison,
forearm Pangasinan about two kilometers away from
10 x 6 cms. Inflamed scrotum Modesto's house.
penis inflamed
SIGNIFICANT INTERNAL FINDINGS: He denied having been in the house of Modesto
on January 23, 1999 and of abducting and killing
no significant internal findings him. He theorized that Rita and Randy falsely
CAUSE OF DEATH: implicated him upon the coaching of Melchor
7
GUN SHOT WOUND, HEAD." Javier who allegedly had a quarrel with him
concerning politics.
The stab wounds sustained by Modesto on his left
arm and forearm were defensive wounds. The
Leon for his part averred that on January 23,
1999, he was in the house of his sister, Hermelita
Estabillo at No. 55-B, Salet, Laoag City, Ilocos
Norte where he had been living since 1997 after
leaving Asan Norte, Sison, Pangasinan. Since
then, he had been working for Sally Asuncion at
a hollow-block factory in that city where he was a
stay-in worker.
Sally Asuncion corroborated Leon's alibi. She
testified that Leon Delim never went home to his
hometown in Pangasinan during his employment.
His sister, Hermelita Estabillo, likewise averred
that on January 23, 1999, his brother was at her
house to give her his laundry. She claimed that
the distance between Laoag City and Bila, Sison,
Pangasinan can be traversed in six hours by bus.
Leon presented a Barangay Certificate to prove
that he was a resident of Laoag City from January
1998 up to February 1999.11
Marlon asserted that he was on vacation in
Dumaguete City from December 26, 1998 up to
January 29, 1999. During his stay there, he lived
with his sister, Francisca Delim. Upon his return
to Manila on January 29, 1999, he immediately
proceeded to Baguio to visit his cousin. Marlon
denied setting foot in Bila, Sison, Pangasinan
after his sojourn in Dumaguete City.
The trial court rendered judgment finding
accused-appellants guilty of murder. The
dispositive portion of the trial court's decision
reads:
"WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT OF
CONVICTION beyond reasonable doubt is
hereby rendered against Ronald Delim, Marlon
Delim and Leon Delim (for) the commission of
Aggravated Murder, an offense defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. 7659 and the Court
sentences Marlon Delim, Ronald Delim and Leon
Delim to suffer the penalty of DEATH, to be
implemented in the manner as provided for by
law; the Court likewise orders the accused,
jointly and solidarily, to indemnify the heirs of
Modesto Delim the sum of P75,000.00 as moral
damages, plus the amount of P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to
transmit the entire records of this case to the
Honorable Supreme Court, and to prepare the
mittimus fifteen (15) days from date of
promulgation.
The Jail Warden, Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology, Urdaneta District Jail, Urdaneta City is
hereby ordered to transmit the persons of Marlon,
Ronald and Leon, all surnamed Delim to the New
Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City, fifteen days
from receipt of this decision.
SO ORDERED."12
The trial court appreciated treachery as a
qualifying circumstance and of taking advantage
of superior strength, nighttime and use of
unlicensed firearms as separate of aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the crime.
Marlon, Ronald and Leon, in their appeal brief,
assail the decision alleging that:
"I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN
THE CASE AT BAR.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS' DEFENSE OF
ALIBI."13
Before resolving the merits of the case at bar, we
first resolve the matter of whether the crime
charged in the Information is murder or
kidnapping. During the deliberation, some
distinguished members of the Court opined that
under the Information, Marlon, Ronald and Leon
are charged with kidnapping under Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code and not with murder in
its aggravated form in light of the allegation
therein that the accused "willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously grab(bed), h(e)ld, hog-tie(d),
gag(ged), with a piece of cloth, brought out and
abduct(ed) Modesto Delim (while) Leon Delim
and Manuel Delim stayed in the house (and)
guarded and prevented the wife and son of
Modesto Delim from helping the latter." They
submit that the foregoing allegation constitutes
the act of deprivation of liberty of the victim, the
gravamen in the crime of kidnapping. They
contend that the fact that the Information went
further to charge accused with the killing of the
victim should be of no moment, the real nature of
the criminal charge being determined not from
the caption or the preamble of the Information
nor from the specification of the law alleged to
have been violated — these being conclusions of
law — but by the actual recital of facts in the
complaint or information. They further submit
that since the prosecution failed to prove motive
on the part of Marlon, Ronald and Leon to kill
Modesto, they are not criminally liable for the
death of the victim but only for kidnapping the
victim.
It bears stressing that in determining what crime
is charged in an information, the material
inculpatory facts recited therein describing the
crime charged in relation to the penal law
violated are controlling. Where the specific intent
of the malefactor is determinative of the crime
charged such specific intent must be alleged in
the information and proved by the prosecution. A
decade ago, this Court held in People v. Isabelo
Puno, et al.,14 that for kidnapping to exist, there
must be indubitable proof that the actual specific
intent of the malefactor is to deprive the offended
party of his liberty and not where such restraint of
his freedom of action is merely an incident in the
commission of another offense primarily
intended by the malefactor. This Court further
held:
"x x x Hence, as early as United States vs.
Ancheta, and consistently reiterated thereafter, it
has been held that the detention and/or forcible
taking away of the victims by the accused, even
for an appreciable period of time but for the
primary and ultimate purpose of killing them,
holds the offenders liable for taking their lives or
such other offenses they committed in relation
thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the
victims' liberty does not constitute kidnapping or
serious illegal detention."15
If the primary and ultimate purpose of the
accused is to kill the victim, the incidental
deprivation of the victim's liberty does not
constitute the felony of kidnapping but is merely
a preparatory act to the killing, and hence, is
merged into, or absorbed by, the killing of the
victim.16 The crime committed would either be
homicide or murder.
What is primordial then is the specific intent of
the malefactors as disclosed in the information or
criminal complaint that is determinative of what
crime the accused is charged with — that of
murder or kidnapping.
Philippine and American penal laws have a
common thread on the concept of specific intent
as an essential element of specific intent crimes.
Specific intent is used to describe a state of mind
which exists where circumstances indicate that an
offender actively desired certain criminal
consequences or objectively desired a specific
result to follow his act or failure to act.17 Specific
intent involves a state of the mind. It is the
particular purpose or specific intention in doing
the prohibited act. Specific intent must be alleged
in the Information and proved by the state in a
prosecution for a crime requiring specific
intent.18 Kidnapping and murder are specific
intent crimes.
Specific intent may be proved by direct evidence
or by circumstantial evidence. It may be inferred
from the circumstances of the actions of the
accused as established by the evidence on
record.19
Specific intent is not synonymous with motive.
Motive generally is referred to as the reason
which prompts the accused to engage in a
particular criminal activity. Motive is not an
essential element of a crime and hence the
prosecution need not prove the same. As a
general rule, proof of motive for the commission
of the offense charged does not show guilt and
absence of proof of such motive does not
establish the innocence of accused for the crime
charged such as murder.20 The history of crimes
shows that murders are generally committed from
motives comparatively trivial.21 Crime is rarely
rational. In murder, the specific intent is to kill
the victim. In kidnapping, the specific intent is to
deprive the victim of his/her liberty. If there is no
motive for the crime, the accused cannot be
convicted for kidnapping.22 In kidnapping for
ransom, the motive is ransom. Where accused
kills the victim to avenge the death of a loved
one, the motive is revenge.
In this case, it is evident on the face of the
Information that the specific intent of the
malefactors in barging into the house of Modesto
was to kill him and that he was seized precisely
to kill him with the attendant modifying
circumstances. The act of the malefactors of
abducting Modesto was merely incidental to their
primary purpose of killing him. Moreover, there
is no specific allegation in the information that
the primary intent of the malefactors was to
deprive Modesto of his freedom or liberty and
that killing him was merely incidental to
kidnapping.23 Irrefragably then, the crime
charged in the Information is Murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and not
Kidnapping under Article 268 thereof.
The threshold issue that now comes to fore is
whether or not the prosecution mustered the
requisite quantum of evidence to prove that
Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty of murder.
In criminal prosecutions, the prosecution is
burdened to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
cavil of doubt. The prosecution must rely on the
strength of its own evidence and not on the
weakness of the evidence of the accused. The
proof against the accused must survive the test of
reason; the strongest suspicion must not be
permitted to sway judgment.24
In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened
to prove the corpus delicti which consists of two
things: first, the criminal act and second,
defendant's agency in the commission of the
act.25 Wharton says that corpus delictiincludes
two things: first, the objective; second, the
subjective element of crimes.26 In homicide (by
dolo) and in murder cases, the prosecution is
burdened to prove: (a) the death of the party
alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was
produced by the criminal act of some other than
the deceased and was not the result of accident,
natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant
committed the criminal act or was in some way
criminally responsible for the act which produced
the death.27 To prove the felony of homicide or
murder, there must be incontrovertible evidence,
direct or circumstantial, that the victim was
deliberately killed (with malice); in other words,
that there was intent to kill. Such evidence may
consist inter alia in the use of weapons by the
malefactors, the nature, location and number of
wounds sustained by the victim and the words
uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or
immediately after the killing of the victim. If the
victim dies because of a deliberate act of the
malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively
presumed.
The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus
delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by direct
evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive
evidence.28
In the case at bar, the prosecution adduced the
requisite quantum of proof of corpus delicti.
Modesto sustained five (5) gunshot wounds. He
also sustained seven (7) stab wounds,29 defensive
in nature. The use by the malefactors of deadly
weapons, more specifically handguns and knives,
in the killing of the victim as well as the nature,
number and location of the wounds sustained by
said victim are evidence of the intent by the
malefactors to kill the victim with all the
consequences flowing therefrom.30 As the State
Supreme Court of Wisconsin held in Cupps v.
State:31
"This rule, that every person is presumed to
contemplate the ordinary and natural
consequences of his own acts, is applied even in
capital cases. Because men generally act
deliberately and by the determination of their
own will, and not from the impulse of blind
passion, the law presumes that every man always
thus acts, until the contrary appears. Therefore,
when one man is found to have killed another, if
the circumstances of the homicide do not of
themselves show that it was not intended, but was
accidental, it is presumed that the death of the
deceased was designed by the slayer; and the
burden of proof is on him to show that it was
otherwise."
The prosecution did not present direct evidence to
prove the authors of the killing of Modesto. It
relied on circumstantial evidence to discharge its
burden of proving the guilt of accused-appellants
of murder. Circumstantial evidence consists of
proof of collateral facts and circumstances from
which the existence of the main fact may be
inferred according to reason and common
experience.32 What was once a rule of account
respectability is now entombed in Section 4, Rule
133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which
states that circumstantial evidence, sometimes
referred to as indirect or presumptive evidence, is
sufficient as anchor for a judgment of conviction
if the following requisites concur:
"x x x if (a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived have been established; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to
warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt."33
The prosecution is burdened to prove the
essential events which constitute a compact mass
of circumstantial evidence, and the proof of each
being confirmed by the proof of the other, and all
without exception leading by mutual support to
but one conclusion: the guilt of accused for the
offense charged.34 For circumstantial evidence to
be sufficient to support a conviction, all the
circumstances must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that accused is
guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every
other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.35 If
the prosecution adduced the requisite
circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of
accused beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of
evidence shifts to the accused to controvert the
evidence of the prosecution.
In the present case, the prosecution mustered the
requisite quantum of circumstantial evidence to
prove that accused-appellants, in confabulation
with their co-accused, conspired to kill and did
kill Modesto:
1. Randy Bantas testified that Marlon and Ronald
barged into the house of Modesto, each armed
with a handgun. Marlon poked his gun on
Modesto while Ronald hog-tied Modesto. They
then seized Modesto and herded him out of his
house:
"FISCAL TOMBOC: What were you doing then
at that time in your house?
A We were eating, sir.
Q You said we, who were your companions
eating then at that time?
A My father, my mother and the two
children and myself, sir.
Q While taking your supper that time, do
you recall if there was anything unusual that
happened at that time?
A When we were about to start to eat three
armed men entered our house.
Q Do you know these three armed men who
entered your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who are they, name them one by one?
A Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Ronald
Delim.
Q Are these three persons inside the
courtroom now?
A Two of them, sir.
Q Who are these two who are inside the
courtroom?
A Marlon and Ronald, sir.
Q Will you please stand up and point to
them?
A (Witness is pointing to a person seated on
the bench inside the courtroom, who, when his
name was asked answered Marlon Delim.
Likewise, witness is pointing unto a person
seated on the bench inside the courtroom, who,
when his name was asked he answered Ronald
Delim).
Q You said that these two armed persons
entered your house, what kind of arm were they
carrying at that time?
A Short handgun, sir.
Q When these three armed persons whom
you have mentioned, armed with short firearms,
what did they do then when they entered your
house?
A They took my father, sir.
Q Who took your father?
A Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Ronald
Delim, sir.
Q When these three persons took your
father, what did you do then?
A None, sir.
COURT: How did they get your father?
A They poked a gun and brought him
outside the house, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: Who poked a gun?
A Marlon Delim, sir.
Q Again, Mr. Witness, will you point to the
person who poked a gun?
A (Witness is pointing to Malon (sic) Delim,
one of the accused).
Q After bringing your father out from your
house, what transpired next?
A Manuel Delim and Leon Delim said, 'Stay
in your house,' and guarded us.
COURT: You said your father was taken out,
who?
A Marlon, Robert and Ronald, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: Where did these three
persons bring your father?
A I do not know where they brought my
father, sir.
COURT: Was your father taken inside your
house or outside?
A Inside our house, sir.
Q You said that Marlon poked a gun at your
father, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did Ronald and Robert do while
Marlon was poking his gun to your father?
A Ronald and Robert were the ones who
pulled my father out, sir."36
Randy's account of the incident was corroborated
by his mother, Rita, who testified:
"PROSECUTION TOMBOC: You said during
the last hearing that on January 23, 1999 at
around 6:30 in the evening while preparing for
your supper three (3) armed men entered inside
your house, who were these three (3) men who
entered your house?
A I know, Marlon, Bongbong and Robert,
sir.
ATTY. FLORENDO: We just make of record
that the witness is taking her time to answer,
Your Honor.
PROSECUTOR TOMBOC: You said that
Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Bongbong
entered your house, are these three (3) persons
who entered your house in Court now?
A They are here except the other one, sir.
Q Will you please step down and point to
the persons who entered your house?
A Witness is pointing to Marlon Delim,
Robert Delim is not in Court and Bongbong is
Ronald Delim.
Q After these three (3) armed men entered
your house, what happened then?
A My husband was brought out, sir.
Q What is the name of your husband?
A Modesto Delim, sir."37
2. Randy said that when Marlon and Ronald
barged into their house, Leon, armed with a
handgun, acted as a lookout when he stood guard
by the door of the house of Modesto and
remained thereat until 7:00 a.m. of the next day:
"FISCAL TOMBOC: When your father was
pulled out from your house by these three
persons, what did you and your mother do while
these three persons were taking out of your
house?
A We did not do anything because Manuel
and Leon Delim guarded us.
COURT: Where, in your house?
A Yes, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: From that very time that
your father was pulled out by these three persons
Marlon, Robert and Ronal (sic), where were Leon
and Manuel then?
A They were at the door, sir.
COURT: Why do you know that they were
guarding you?
A Because they were at the door, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: What was their appearance
that time when these two persons were guarding
you, these Leon and Manuel?
A They were armed, sir.
Q What do you mean by armed?
A They have gun, sir.
Q What kind of firearm?
A Short firearm, sir.
Q By the way, where are these Leon and
Manuel now, if you know?
A Leon is here, sir.
Q About Manuel?
A None, sir.
Q Will you please stand up and point at
Leon, Mr. Witness?
A (Witness pointed to a person seated on the
bench inside the courtroom, who when his name
was asked, answered, Leon Delim)."38
3. Rita and Randy were ordered by Leon not to
leave the house as Ronald and Marlon left the
house with Modesto in tow. Rita and Randy were
detained in their house up to 7:00 a.m. of January
24, 1999 to prevent them from seeking help from
their relatives and police authorities.
4. Randy likewise testified that on January 27,
1999, at about 3:00 p.m., the cadaver of Modesto
was found under the thick bushes in a grassy area
in the housing project located about 200 meters
away from the house of Modesto. The cadaver
exuded bad odor and was already in the state of
decomposition:
"Q So what did you do then on January 27, COURT: When you found your father, what was
where did you look for your father? his condition?

A The same place and at 3:00 o'clock P.M., A He was dead, sir.
we were able to find my father.
COURT: Go ahead.
COURT: Where?
FISCAL TOMBOC: You said that he was
A At the housing project at Paldit, Sison, already dead, what was his appearance then when
Pangasinan, sir. you saw him dead?

FISCAL TOMBOC: Do you have companions at A He has bad odor, sir, in the state of
that time when you were able to look for your decompsition (sic)."39
father on January 27, 1999 at 3:00 o'clock P.M.?
The testimony of Randy was corroborated by Dr.
A Yes, sir. de Guzman who testified that the cadaver of
Modesto was in a state of decomposition, with
Q Who? tiny white worms crawling from his wounds, and
that his penis and scrotum were inflamed. The
A My Aunt, sir. victim sustained five gunshot wounds and
defensive wounds on the left arm and forearm:
Q What is the name of your Aunt?
"PROS. TOMBOC:
A Nida Pucal, sir.
Q Will you please tell the Honorable Court
Q Who else? your findings, Doctora?
A Pepito Pucal, Bernard Osias and Daniel WITNESS:
Delim, sir.
A First finding: Upon seeing the cadaver,
this is the position of the body, both upper
extremities are flexed and both lower extremities
are flexed (Nakakukot).
Q How many days had already elapsed when
you autopsied the cadaver of the victim, Doctora?
A Four (4) days upon the recovery of the
body, sir.
Q And what was your findings Doctora?
A The body was already under the state of
decomposition, sir, with foul odor and there were
so many worms coming out from the injuries,
there were tiny white worms, sir.
Q What else did you observe Doctora?
A Upon seeing the cadaver I asked the
relative to refer it to the NBI sir. Actually the
victim was an igorot (sic) and they have tradition
that they will bury immediately. Whether they
like it or not I should do it, sir.
Q What else Doctora?
A And the penis was inflammed (sic), the
scrotum was also inflammed (sic), sir.
And for the head injuries there was 10 x 10 ml.
GSW pre-auricular area, right; there was also 20
ml x 20 ml. GSW, mandibular area, right; I
cannot also determine the exit.
Q So there were two (2) gunshot wounds
(GSW) Doctora?
A Yes sir.
And there was also 10 x 10 ml. GSW, maxillary
area, right; there was also 10 x 10 ml. GSW,
below middle nose, directed upward (POE); and
there was also 30 x 40 ml. GSW, mid parieto-
occipital area (POEx).
Q How many all in all are the gunshot
wound?
A Five (5) sir.
And also there was 2 x 1 cms. Lacerated wound,
right cheek; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, axillary
area, left; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, lateral aspect
M/3rd, left arm; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound lateral
aspect D/3rd, left arm; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound,
medial aspect M/3rd, left arm; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed
wound, medial aspect D/3rd, left arm; and #3; 1 x
1 cm. in line with each other, stabbed wound,
medial aspect, M/3rd, left forearm.
Q How many stabbed wound are there
Doctora?
A There were seven (7) stabbed wounds, sir.
Q Those stabbed wounds were defensive
wounds, Doctora?
A Yes sir."40
The state of decomposition of the cadaver, with
tiny white worms swarming and feasting on it
and the distention of his scrotum and penis are
evidence that the cadaver was in the stage of
putrefaction and that the victim had been dead for
a period ranging from three to six
days.41 Admittedly, there are variant factors
determinative of the exact death of the victim. An
equally persuasive authority states:
"Chronological Sequence of Putrefactive Changes Occurring
in Tropical Region:
Time Condition of the Body
Since
Death
48 hours Ova of flies seen. Trunk bloated. Face
discolored and swollen. Blisters present.A
Moving maggots seen
72 hours Whole body grossly swollen and disfigur
Hair and nails loose. Tissues soft and
discolored."42
The lapse of two or three to four days from the
seizure of the victim in the evening of January
23, 1999 to the discovery of his cadaver which
was already in the state of putrefaction in the
afternoon of January 27, 1999, about 200 meters
away from his house, is consistent with and
confirmatory of the contention of the prosecution
that the victim was killed precisely by the very
malefactors who seized him on January 23, 1999.
5. When police authorities went to the residences
of all the malefactors, the latter had flown the
coop and were nowhere to be found:
"COURT: In connection with this case, you
investigated the wife and son of Modesto Delim?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the course of the investigation did you
come to know who were the suspects?
Yes, sir, she elaborated that the suspects
were their neighbors, Marlon Delim and his
brothers, sir.
Q What are the names of the brothers?
A Manuel Delim, Leon Delim I cannot
remember the others, sir.
Q By reason of that information were you
able to apprehend any of them for investigation?
A No, sir.
Q Why?
A Because when we were dispatched by the
Chief of Police no Delim brothers could be
found, they all left the place, sir.
Q In what place did you look for the
brothers Delim?
A Within the vicinity, sir.
Q In what place?
A Brgy. Bila and the place where the crime
was committed in Brgy. Bila and the place where
the cadaver was found in Paldit, sir.
Q Where did you look for the Delim
brothers?
A Nearby barangays, Immalog, sir.
Q Wherelse (sic)?
A Labayog, Sison, sir.
Q Wherelse?
A In mountainous part of Immalog, part of
Tuba Benguet, sir.
Q What was the result?
A Negative result, sir."43
6. Leon was the neighbor of Modesto and Rita
while Marlon and Ronald used to go to the house
of Modesto and Rita:
"COURT: These Leon and Manuel Delim are
they known to you prior to that day, January 23,
1999?
A Yes, sir, I know them.
Q Why do you know Manuel and Leon prior
to January 23, 1999?
A They are my neighbors, sir.
Q How about Marlon, Robert and Bongbong
do you know them before January 23, 1999?
A I know them, sir.
Q Why do you know them?
A They used to go to our house, sir.
Q I noticed that Marlon, Bongbong, Robert,
Manuel and Leon are all Delims and your
husband's name is Modesto Delim are they
related with each other?
A Yes, sir."44
The sudden disappearance of Marlon, Ronald and
Leon from their houses in Barangay Bila, Sison is
strong circumstantial evidence of their guilt for
the death of Modesto. Although flight after the
commission of an offense does not create a legal
presumption of guilt, nevertheless, the same is
admissible in evidence against them and if not
satisfactorily explained in a manner consistent
with their innocence, will tend to show that they,
in fact, killed Modesto.45
It is true that the prosecution failed to prove
motive on the part of the malefactors to abduct
and kill Modesto. Indeed, Randy and Rita
testified that they were not aware of any
misunderstanding or grudge between Modesto on
the one hand and Marlon, Ronald and Leon and
their co-accused on the other before the incident,
or any motivation on the part of the three
malefactors to cause harm to Modesto.
Nonetheless, it cannot thereby be concluded that
a person or persons other than Marlon, Ronald
and Leon were criminally responsible for the
death of the victim. It is a matter of judicial
notice that nowadays persons have killed or
committed serious crimes for no reason at all.46 In
this case, the inscrutable facts are that Marlon and
Ronald, each of whom was armed with a
handgun, forcibly took Modesto from his house
at the gunpoint, hog-tied, put a piece of cloth in
his mouth and after Ronald and Marlon had left
the house with Modesto in tow, Rita heard three
gunshots or so and the cadaver of Modesto was
found concealed under the bushes and already in
a state of putrefaction in the afternoon of January
27, 1999. Modesto sustained several gunshot
wounds and died because of a gunshot wound on
the head. The criminal acts and the connection of
Marlon, Ronald and Leon with said acts having
been proved by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt, the act itself furnishes the
evidence, that to its perpetration there was some
causes or influences moving the mind.47 The
remarkable tapestry intricately woven by the
prosecution should not be trashed simply because
the malefactors had no motive to kill Modesto.
Ranged against the evidence of the prosecution,
the burden of evidence shifted on Marlon, Ronald
and Leon to rebut the same and explain what
happened to the victim after taking him from his
house in the evening of January 23, 1999. They
may have freed the victim shortly after taking
him, or the victim may have been able to escape
and that thereafter a person or some other persons
may have killed him. However, Marlon, Ronald
and Leon failed to give any explanation. Instead,
they merely denied having seized and killed the
victim and interposed alibi as their defense.
Leon is equally guilty for the death of Modesto
because the evidence on record shows that he
conspired with accused-appellants Marlon and
Ronald and accused Robert and Manuel in killing
the victim.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons
agree to commit a felony and decide to commit
it.48 Conspiracy must be proven with the same
quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more
specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Conspiracy is not presumed. It may be proved by
direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence.
Conspiracy is deducible from the acts of the
malefactors before, during and after the
commission of the crime which are indicative of
a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence
of sentiment.49 To establish conspiracy, it is not
essential that there be proof as to the existence of
a previous agreement to commit a crime.50 It is
sufficient if, at the time of the commission of the
crime, the accused had the same purpose and
were united in its execution. If conspiracy is
established, the act of one is deemed the act of
all. It matters not who among the accused
actually shot and killed the victim.51 This is based
on the theory of a joint or mutual agency ad
hoc for the prosecution of the common plan:
"x x x The acts and declarations of an agent,
within the scope of his authority, are considered
and treated as the acts and declarations of his
principal. 'What is so done by an agent, is done
by the principal, through him, as his mere
instrument.' Franklin Bank of Baltimore v.
Pennsylvania D. & M. Steam Navigation Co., 11
G. & J. 28, 33 (1839). 'If the conspiracy be
proved to have existed, or rather if evidence be
given to the jury of its existence, the acts of one
in furtherance of the common design are the acts
of all; and whatever one does in furtherance of
the common design, he does as the agent of the
co-conspirators.' R. v. O'Connell, 5 St.Tr. (N.S.)
1, 710."52
In the eyes of the law, conspirators are one man,
they breathe one breath, they speak one voice,
they wield one arm and the law says that the acts,
words and declaration of each, while in the
pursuit of the common design, are the acts, words
and declarations of all.53
In the case at bar, Marlon, Ronald and Leon
arrived together in the house of Modesto, each
armed with a handgun. Marlon and Ronald
barged into said house while Leon stood guard by
the door thereof. After Marlon and Ronald had
left with Modesto in tow, Leon stood by the door
and warned Randy and Rita not to leave the
house. Leon stood guard by the door of the house
until 7:00 a.m. of January 24, 1999 when he left
the house. The overt acts of all the malefactors
were so synchronized and executed with
precision evincing a preconceived plan or design
of all the malefactors to achieve a common
purpose, namely the killing of Modesto.
Irrefragably, the tasks assigned to Leon in the
commission of the crime were — (a) to act as a
lookout; (b) to ensure that Rita and Randy remain
in their house to prevent them from seeking
assistance from police authorities and their
relatives before their mission to kill Modesto
shall have been a fait accompli as well as the
escape of Marlon and Ronald.54 Patently, Leon, a
lookout for the group, is guilty of the killing of
Modesto.55 Leon may not have been at the situs
criminis when Modesto was killed by Marlon and
Ronald nevertheless he is a principal by direct
participation.56 If part of a crime has been
committed in one place and part in another, each
person concerned in the commission of either part
is liable as principal. No matter how wide may be
the separation of the conspirators, if they are all
engaged in a common plan for the execution of a
felony and all take their part in furtherance of the
common design, all are liable as principals.
Actual presence is not necessary if there is a
direct connection between the actor and the
crime.57
Ronald, Marlon and Leon, however, assail the
testimonies of Randy and Rita alleging that the
same were marred by inconsistencies.
1. Randy initially stated that he did not know
where the assailants brought his father. Later
however, Randy claimed that the malefactors
proceeded to the direction of Paldit, Sison,
Pangasinan;
2. Rita on the other hand identified Leon, Marlon
and Ronald as those who barged into their house.
She later changed her testimony and declared that
it was Robert, together with Marlon and Ronald
who barged into the house;
3. Rita likewise testified that two men stood
outside the house guarding them. Later, she
testified that after the three men brought out the
victim, the two other accused entered the house
and guarded them there;
4. Rita claimed that she went out to look for her
husband the next day, or on January 25, 1999,
and she was accompanied by her son Randy.
However, Randy testified that he was alone when
he looked for his father from January 24 to 26,
1999.58
We do not agree with Marlon, Ronald and Leon.
Case law has it that the findings of facts of the
trial court, its calibration of the collective
testimonies of witnesses and its assessment of the
probative weight thereof and its conclusions
culled from its findings are accorded by the
appellate court great respect, if not conclusive
effect, because of its unique advantage of
observing at close range the demeanor,
deportment and conduct of the witnesses as they
give their testimonies before the court.
In the present case, the trial court gave credence
and full probative weight to the testimonies of the
witnesses of the prosecution. Moreover, there is
no evidence on record that Randy and Rita were
moved by any improper or ill motive in testifying
against the malefactors and the other accused;
hence, their testimonies must be given full credit
and probative weight.59 The inconsistencies in the
testimonies of Rita and Randy do not render them
incredible or their testimonies barren of probative
weight. It must be borne in mind that human
memory is not as unerring as a photograph and a
person's sense of observation is impaired by
many factors including the shocking effect of a
crime. A truth-telling witness is not always
expected to give an error-free testimony
considering the lapse of time and the treachery of
human memory. What is primordial is that the
mass of testimony jibes on material points, the
slight clashing of statements dilute neither the
witnesses' credibility nor the veracity of his
testimony.60 Variations on the testimony of
witnesses on the same side with respect to minor,
collateral or incidental matters do not impair the
weight of their united testimony to the prominent
facts.61 Inconsistencies on minor and trivial
matters only serve to strengthen rather than
weaken the credibility of witnesses for they erase
the suspicion of rehearsed testimony. 62
Moreover, the testimony of a witness should be
construed in its entirety and not in truncated
terms and the true meaning of answers to isolated
questions propounded to a witness is to be
ascertained by due consideration of all the
questions propounded to the witness and his
answers thereto.63
Randy's testimony that he did know where the
malefactors brought his father is not inconsistent
with his testimony that Ronald and Marlon
brought his father towards the direction of Paldit,
Sison, Pangasinan. Randy may not have known
the destination of accused-appellants but he saw
the direction to which they went. While it may be
true that when asked to identify the three who
barged into their house, Rita pointed to Leon as
one of them, however, Rita had been consistent
throughout her testimony that those who barged
into their house were Ronald and Marlon. Leon's
counsel never cross-examined Rita and
impeached her testimony on her identification of
Leon as one of those who barged into their house
to give her an opportunity to explain her
perceived inconsistency conformably with Rule
132, Section 13, of the Revised Rules of
Evidence which reads:
"Before a witness can be impeached by evidence
that he has made at other times statements
inconsistent with his present testimony, the
statements must be related to him, with the
circumstances of the times and places and the
persons present, and he must be asked whether he
made such statements, and if so, allowed to
explain them. If the statements be in writing they
must be shown to the witness before any question
is put to him concerning them."64
Hence, the presentation of the inconsistent
statements made by Rita is insufficient for the
desired impeachment of her.65 As to whether Rita
and Randy were together in looking for Modesto
or Leon merely stood guard by the door of the
house or entered the house are inconsequential.
The fact is that Leon stood guard throughout the
night to prevent Rita and Randy from seeking
assistance for the seizure and killing of Modesto.
This Court is convinced, as the trial court was,
that the respective testimonies of Randy and Rita
bear the earmarks of truth and sincerity. Despite
intense and grueling cross-examination, they
responded with consistency upon material details
that could only come from a firsthand knowledge
of the shocking events which unfolded before
their eyes. The Court thus finds no cogent reason
to disregard the findings of the trial court
regarding their credibility.
Marlon, Ronald and Leon contend that the trial
court committed a reversible error in not giving
credence and probative weight to their evidence
to prove their defense of alibi. They aver that
their collective evidence to prove their defense is
strong.
We do not agree. Case law has it that the defense
of alibi is one of the weakest of defenses in
criminal prosecution because the same is easy to
concoct between relatives, friends and even those
not related to the offender.66 It is hard for the
prosecution to disprove. For alibi to merit
approbation by the trial court and this Court,
Marlon, Ronald and Leon are burdened to prove
with clear and convincing evidence that they
were in a place other than the situs criminis at the
time of the commission of the crime; that it was
physically impossible for them to have
committed the said crime.67 They failed to
discharge their burden. Moreover, Rita and
Randy positively and spontaneously identified
Marlon, Ronald and Leon as the culprits. The
house of Ronald, where he claimed he was when
the crime was committed, was only two
kilometers away from the house of Modesto and
can be negotiated by a tricycle. Leon failed to
adduce any documentary evidence to prove his
employment by Sally Asuncion. The barefaced
fact that he was a resident of Laoag City does not
constitute proof that he was in Laoag City on the
day of the commission of the crime. With respect
to Marlon, he failed to adduce evidence aside
from his self-serving testimony that he resided in,
left Dumaguete City and arrived in Manila on
January 29, 1999.
The trial court convicted Marlon, Ronald and
Leon of murder with the qualifying circumstance
of treachery in the killing of Modesto. The trial
court likewise appreciated nighttime and abuse of
superior strength and the use of unlicensed
firearms as separate aggravating circumstances.
The Office of the Solicitor General contends that
indeed treachery was attendant in the killing of
Modesto. Hence, Marlon, Ronald and Leon are
guilty of murder defined in and penalized by
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Court however finds that Marlon, Ronald
and Leon are guilty only of homicide defined in
and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Qualifying circumstances such as treachery and
abuse of superior strength must be alleged and
proved clearly and conclusively as the crime
itself. Mere conjectures, suppositions or
presumptions are utterly insufficient and cannot
produce the effect of qualifying the crime.68 As
this Court held: "No matter how truthful these
suppositions or presumptions may seem, they
must not and cannot produce the effect of
aggravating the condition of defendant."69Article
14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that there is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and
especially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. For treachery to be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, the
prosecution is burdened to prove the following
elements: (a) the employment of means of
execution which gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; (b) the
means of execution is deliberately or consciously
adopted.70 Although the victim may have been
defenseless at the time he was seized but there is
no evidence as to the particulars of how he was
assaulted and killed, treachery cannot be
appreciated against the accused.71 In this case, the
victim was defenseless when seized by Marlon
and Ronald. However, the prosecution failed to
present any witness or conclusive evidence that
Modesto was defenseless immediately before and
when he was attacked and killed. It cannot be
presumed that although he was defenseless when
he was seized the victim was in the same
situation when he was attacked, shot and stabbed
by the malefactors. To take advantage of superior
strength means to purposely use force that is out
of proportion to the means of defense available to
the person attacked.72 What is primordial, this
Court held in People v. Rogelio
Francisco73 is that the assailants deliberately
took advantage of their combined strength in
order to consummate the crime. It is necessary to
show that the malefactors cooperated in such a
way as to secure advantage from their superiority
in strength.74 In this case, the prosecution failed
to adduce evidence that Marlon and Ronald
deliberately took advantage of their numerical
superiority when Modesto was killed. The
barefaced facts that the malefactors outnumbered
Modesto and were armed while Modesto was not
does not constitute proof that the three took
advantage of their numerical superiority and their
handguns when Modesto was shot and stabbed.75
In sum then, we believe that Marlon, Ronald and
Leon are guilty only of Homicide defined in and
penalized by Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code with reclusion temporal in its full period.
Although the special aggravating circumstance of
the use of unlicensed firearms was proven during
the trial, there is no allegation in the Information
that Marlon, Ronald and Leon had no license to
possess the firearm. Lack of license to possess a
firearm is an essential element of the crime of
violation of PD 1866 as amended by Republic
Act No. 8294, or as a special aggravating
circumstance in the felony of homicide or
murder.76 Neither can dwelling, although proven,
aggravate the crime because said circumstance
was not alleged in the Information as required by
Rule 110, Section 8, of the Revised Rules of
Court.77 Although this rule took effect on
December 1, 2000, after the commission of the
offense in this case, nonetheless it had been given
retroactive effect considering that the rule is
favorable to the accused.78
There being no modifying circumstances in the
commission of homicide, Marlon, Ronald and
Leon should be meted an indeterminate penalty,
the minimum of which shall be taken from the
entirety of prision mayor, ranging from 6 years
and one day to 12 years and the maximum period
of which shall be taken from the medium period
of reclusion temporal, ranging from 14 years, 8
months and one day to 17 years and 4 months.
Consequently, the award for damages in favor of
the heirs of the victim should be modified. The
sum of P75,000.00 awarded as moral damages
should be reduced to P50,000.00 in accordance
with prevailing jurisprudence.79 The amount of
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is in
order.80 In addition, civil indemnity in the amount
of P50,000.00 should be awarded without need of
proof, likewise in consonance with prevailing
jurisprudence.81
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants Marlon
Delim, Ronald Delim and Leon Delim are hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
felony of Homicide defined in and penalized by
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. There
being no modifying circumstances in the
commission of the crime, each of accused-
appellants is hereby meted an indeterminate
penalty of from ten (10) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor in its maximum period as
minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its
medium period as maximum. Accused-appellants
are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally,
to the heirs of the victim the amount of
P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity, the
amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages
and the amount of P25,000.00 by way of
exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales and Azcuna,
JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Ynares-Santiago, J., joins the dissenting opinion
of J. Vitug.
Gutierrez, J., joins Justice Vitug in his dissenting
opinion.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J.:
Circumstantial evidence has been defined as that
which relates to a series of facts other than the
fact in issue which, by experience, are found to
be so associated with such fact that, in relation of
cause and effect, they lead to a veritable
conclusion. There should, for circumstantial
evidence to warrant a criminal conviction, be a)
more than one circumstance; b) proof of the facts
from which the inference is derived; and c) a
clear showing that the combination of all the
circumstances can aptly support a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.1 The use of
circumstantial evidence in criminal cases,
prompted by sheer necessity, has long been an
accepted, practice but with one important caveat
— it must be used with utmost care and, when its
exacting standards are not met, it is correctly
ignored.
On 04 May 1999, the following Information was
filed against Marlon, Leon, Manuel, Robert and
Ronald, all surnamed Delim; viz:
"That on or about January 23, 1999 in the
evening at Brgy. Bila, Sison, Pangasinan, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused armed with short
firearms barged in and entered the house of
Modesto Delim and once inside with intent to
kill, treachery, evident premeditation, conspiring
with one another, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously grab, hold, hog-tie,
gag with a piece of cloth, brought out and abduct
Modesto Delim, (while) accused Leon and
Manuel Delim stayed in the house (and) guarded
and prevented the wife and son of Modesto
Delim from helping the latter, thereafter with
abuse of superior strength stabbed and killed said
Modesto Delim, to the damage and prejudice of
his heirs.
"Contrary to Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659."2
The evidence would show that Modesto Delim
was forcibly abducted from his residence by
appellants, all armed, on the night of 23 January
1999. But to say that the same group was also
responsible for his death, days later, or that his
violent end was the consequence of the
abduction, and nothing more, would be to unduly
put to risk our standard of moral certainty
required for all convictions.
It was approximately six-thirty on the evening of
23 January 1999. Three armed men suddenly
barged into the house of Modesto Delim in Brgy.
Bila, Sison, Pangasinan. Modesto, who was then
about to take his supper with his wife Rita
Manalo Bantas, his teen-age son Randy Manalo
Bantas, and his two grandchildren, was suddenly
seized by the intruders. Randy identified the
malefactors to be their neighbors — Marlon,
Robert, and Ronald, all surnamed Delim. Without
any word, the trio went straight for Modesto.
Randy saw Marlon poke a gun at his father while
Ronald and Robert held back his arms and
brought him outside the house. Two more armed
cohorts, namely, Manuel and Leon, both also
surnamed Delim, stood guard by the door. No
words were uttered to interrupt the heavy silence
except when one of the two men told the stunned
family members to stay where they were. All
through the night, both Manuel and Leon Delim
kept watch outside the door and only left at
around seven o'clock in the morning of the next
day.
Soon after Manuel Delim and Leon Delim had
left, Randy immediately sought the help of his
Uncle Darwin Niño who forthwith told him to
bring the matter to the authorities. But it was only
two days later that, in the company of his Uncle
Melchor, Randy finally reported the incident to
the police. In the meantime, the distressed son
scoured the vicinity of Paldit, Pangasinan, to look
for his father. He was nowhere to be found. Days
passed. Then, one day, he stumbled upon the
decomposing body of his father at a thick grassy
portion of a housing project in Paldit, Sison,
Pangasinan, some 200 meters from their house.
Dr. Ma. Fe Lagmay de Guzman, who conducted
the autopsy, found the corpse riddled with five
fatal gunshot wounds, seven stab wounds and
several "defensive" wounds.
The victim's surviving spouse Rita Manalo
Bantas and son Randy Manalo Bantas could not
understand why anyone would want Modesto
killed. The family was completely unaware of
any possible motive for the nabbing and killing of
Modesto Delim or of any bad blood between
Modesto and the five indictees.
On 14 January 2000, the Regional Trial Court of by Randy Manalo Bantas and Rita Manalo
Urdaneta City, Branch 46, rejecting the defense Bantas at the witness stand, identifying each of
of alibi, convicted Ronald, Marlon, and Leon for the appellants and detailing their individual
murder; it held: participation in the incident, could not have been
more spontaneous and straightforward; thus —
"WHEREFORE, judgment of conviction beyond
reasonable doubt is hereby rendered against Testimony of Randy Manalo Bantas
Ronald Delim, Marlon Delim and Leon Delim
(for) the commission of Aggravated Murder, an "Q While taking your supper that time, do
offense defined and penalized under Article 248 you recall if there was anything unusual that
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. happened at that time?
7659 and the Court sentences Marlon Delim,
Ronald Delim and Leon Delim to suffer the "A When we were about to start to eat, three
penalty of death, to be implemented in the armed men entered our house.
manner as provided for by law; the Court
likewise ordered the accused, jointly and "Q Do you know these three armed men
solidarily, to indemnify the heirs of Modesto who entered your house?
Delim the sum of P75,000.00 as moral damages,
plus the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary "A Yes, sir.
damages."3
"Q Who were they, name them one by one.
In assailing the finding of guilt beyond
"A Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Ronald
reasonable doubt by the court a quo, appellants
Delim.
stress on what they claim to be inconsistencies in
the testimony of Randy Manalo Bantas and that "Q Are these three persons inside the
of Rita Manalo Bantas. I agree with my courtroom now?
colleagues that the trial court has not erred in
regarding the so-called inconsistencies as being "A Two of them, sir.
minor and trivial that hardly can affect the
credibility of the witnesses. The narration given
"Q Who are these two who are inside the How did they get your father?
courtroom?
"A They poked a gun and brought him
"A Marlon and Ronald, sir. outside the house, sir.

xxx xxx xxx "FISCAL TOMBOC:

"Q You said that these two armed persons Who poked a gun?
entered your house; what kind of arms were they
carrying at that time? "A Marlon Delim, sir.

"A Short handguns, sir. "xxx xxx xxx

"Q When these three armed persons whom
you have mentioned, armed with short firearms,
what did they do when they entered your house?
"A They took my father, sir.
"Q After bringing your father out from your
house, what transpired next?
"A Manuel Delim and Leon Delim said,
'Stay in your house,' and guarded us.

"Q Who took your father? "COURT:

"A Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Ronald You said your father was taken out, who?
Delim, sir.
"A Marlon, Robert and Ronald, sir.
"Q When these three persons took your
father, what did you do then? "FISCAL TOMBOC:

"A None, sir. Where did these three persons bring your father?

"COURT: "A I do not know where they brought my

father, sir.
"COURT: What was their appearance that time when these
two persons were guarding you, these Leon and
Was your father taken inside your house or Manuel?
outside?
"A They were armed, sir.
"A Inside our house, sir.
"Q What do you mean by armed?
"Q You said that Marlon poked a gun at
your father, is that correct? "A They have [a] gun, sir.

"A Yes, sir. "Q What kind of firearm?

"Q What did Ronald and Robert do while "A Short firearm, sir.
Marlon was poking his gun at your father?
"xxx xxx xxx
"A Ronald and Robert were the ones who
pulled my father out, sir. "FISCAL TOMBOC:

"FISCAL TOMBOC: You said that you were guarded by Leon and
Manuel, how long did these two persons guard
When your father was pulled out from your house you in your house?
by these three persons, what did you and your
mother do while these three persons were taking "A Up to the morning, sir.
your father out of your house?
"Q You know what time?
"A We did not do anything because Manuel
and Leon Delim guarded us. "A Yes, sir, [seven o'clock].

"xxx xxx xxx "xxx xxx xxx

"FISCAL TOMBOC:
"Q When [seven o'clock] arrived, you said "A They are here except the other one, sir.
that they guarded you up to [seven o'clock], what
did these two, Leon and Manuel, do then? "Q Will you please step down and point to
the persons who entered your house?
"A They left, sir.
"A Witness is pointing to Marlon Delim,
"Q Do you know where they went? Robert Delim is not in Court and Bongbong is
Ronald Delim.
"A No, sir."4
"Q After these three (3) armed men entered
Testimony of Rita Manalo Bantas your house, what happened then?

"PROSECUTOR TOMBOC "A My husband was brought out, sir.

You said during the last hearing that on January "xxx xxx xxx
23, 1999 at around 6:30 in the evening while
preparing for your supper three (3) armed men "PROSECUTOR TOMBOC
entered inside your house, who were these three
(3) men who entered your house? Who brought your husband out of your house on
January 23, 1999 at 6:30 in the evening?
"A I know, Marlon, Bongbong and Robert,
sir. "A Marion Delim, Bongbong and Robert
Delim, sir.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Q Then after Marlon Delim, Bongbong and
"PROSECUTOR TOMBOC Robert Delim brought your husband out what
transpired next?
You said that Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and
Bongbong entered your house, are these three (3) "A The two (2) stayed at the door of our
persons who entered your house in Court now? house to guard us, sir.
"Q Who were these two (2) persons who "Q What did you do then when these two (2)
guarded you? armed persons guarded you in your house?

"A Leon and Manuel, sir. "A We did not do anything because we were
afraid, sir.
"xxx xxx xxx
"COURT
"COURT
These Leon and Manuel Delim are they known to
You said the two (2) Leon and Manuel stayed at you prior to that day, January 23, 1999?
the door guarding you, is that correct?`
"A Yes, sir, I know them.
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Why do you know Manuel and Leon
"Q What made you say that you are guarded prior to January 23, 1999?
by them?
"A They are my neighbors, sir.
"A Because they have guns with them, sir.
"Q How about Marlon, Robert and
"PROSECUTOR TOMBOC Bongbong do you know them before January 23,
1999?
Do you know what kind of firearm were they
holding? "A I know them, sir.

"A I don't know, sir. "Q Why do you know them?

"Q But you can describe whether long or "A They used to go to our house, sir.
short firearm?
"xxx xxx xxx
"A Short firearms, sir.
"Q You said that Leon and Manuel Delim "PROSECUTOR TOMBOC
guarded the door of your house, how long did
they stay there? You said they held the hand of your husband, will
you please demonstrate how he was brought
"A The whole night up to [seven] o'clock the outside?
following morning when they left the house, sir.
"A They held the 2 hands placed at the back
"Q You said they left, do you know where and they brought outside my husband, sir.
they proceeded?
"Q Who among the 3 men held the hands of
"A I don't know where they [went], sir. your husband?

"Q How about you, what did you do then "A Marlon, Bongbong and Robert, Sir.
when the two persons left your house?
"COURT
"A I stayed at home because I [was] afraid,
sir. Did your husband resist when they held the hand?

"COURT "A He did not resist, Sir."5

When the 3 persons brought your husband out did Between the positive identification made by the
Modesto Delim go with them voluntarily? eyewitnesses and the bare denial of appellants,
there is scarcely any serious doubt but that
"A No, sir. decisive weight must be given to the positive
testimony of Randy Manalo Bantas and Rita
"Q Why do you say [that] he did not go Manalo Bantas.6 The defense of alibi, being one
voluntarily? that can easily be fabricated, is inherently weak
and cannot be expected to withstand the positive
"A Because they held his hand and brought identification made by credible witnesses.
him outside, sir.
Randy Manalo Bantas, who was in the house
when the five intruders entered their abode and
took his father away, could not have been
mistaken in identifying the malefactors who not
only were neighbors but also had family ties with
them as well. According to Randy and Rita
Manalo Bantas, it was appellant Leon Delim,
together with Manuel Delim (at large), who stood
guard at their house after the others, appellant
Marlon Delim, Robert Delim (at large) and
appellant Ronald Delim, took Modesto away on
the early evening of 23 January 1999. Leon and
Manuel stayed well into the night and left only at
seven o'clock in the morning of the next day. The
certificate of residency issued by the barangay
captain of Salet, Laoag City, only confirmed that
Leon Delim was a co-resident of the barangay but
it did not establish with any degree of certainty
that Leon Delim had not left Laoag City on the
day of the incident. Appellant Ronald Delim, in
his case, said that he was home at Asan Norte
with his family when the abduction and the brutal
slaying of Modesto Delim occurred. Ronald
himself confirmed, however, that Asan Norte was
a mere ten-minute bicycle ride from the victim's
house at Paldit, Pangasinan. Alibi, to be believed,
must invariably place the accused at such location
as to render it physically impossible for him to be
at the place of the crime and, let alone, to commit
the same. The claim, upon the other hand, of
appellant Marlon Delim that he was at
Dumaguete City during the fateful day of 23 to
24 January 1999 remained to be just a bare
assertion; it was not corroborated even by his
sister in Dumaguete whom, he said, he worked
for.
The evidence would indeed point out that
Marlon, Ronald and Robert seized Modesto
Delim from his house while Leon and Manuel
stood guard and stayed at the door of the victim's
house. Randy Manalo Bantas and Rita Manalo
Bantas, however, could only testify on the
participation of each of the malefactors in the
abduction of Modesto Delim but not on what
might have happened to him thereafter. In
arriving at its verdict convicting appellants for
"aggravated murder," the trial court considered
the act of the accused of forcibly taking Modesto
Delim from his house as being likewise enough to
substantiate the killing by them of the victim. The
conclusion could rightly be assailed. The
accounts of Randy and his mother Rita would
indicate that the forcible taking of Modesto was
carried out in absolute silence, with not one of
the five intruders uttering any word which could
give a clue on the reason for the abduction and,
more particularly, whether the same was carried
out for the purpose of killing Modesto. The two
witnesses were unaware of any existing grudge
between the malefactors and the victim that could
have prompted them to violently snuff out the life
of the latter. While the motive of an accused in a
criminal case might generally be immaterial, not
being an element of the crime, motive could be
important and consequential when the evidence
on the commission of the crime would be short of
moral certainty.7
In sustaining the conclusion of the trial court that
the five accused also snuffed out the life of
Modesto Delim, the ponencia relied on
circumstantial evidence testified to by Randy
Bantas. He recounted that, on the early evening
of 23 January 1999, Marlon and Ronald barged
into the house of Modesto, each armed with a
handgun. Marlon poked his gun on Modesto
while Ronald hog-tied Modesto. They then seized
Modesto and herded him out of the house. Leon,
armed with a handgun, acted as a lookout by
standing guard by the door of the house of
Modesto until seven o'clock in the morning of the
next day. Rita and Randy were ordered by Leon
not to leave the house as Ronald and Marlon left
the house with Modesto in tow. On the afternoon
of 27 January 1999, the cadaver of Modesto was
found under the thick bushes in a grassy area in
the housing project located about 200 meters
away from the house of Modesto, exuding bad
odor and in a state of decomposition.
The above recitals all point to only one
established fact, i.e., that the accused forcibly
took Modesto Delim from his residence to an
unknown destination on the night of 23 January
1999, would be scanty to support a conclusion
that the five, aside from abducting the victim,
likewise killed him. There was an unexplained
gap in what ought to have been a continuous
chain of events. The body bore several defensive
wounds, which could give rise to the not too
unlikely scenario that Modesto might have
ultimately been released by his abductors
sometime before he was killed.
Recognizing that circumstantial evidence is as
strong as the weakest link, this Court is bound not
to ignore all other possibilities.8 It would seem to
me that what has instead . been shown and
established beyond reasonable doubt is the guilt
of appellants for the crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention, the whereabouts of the
victim — the immediate consequence of the
abduction — for "more than three days" from the
time of his abduction not having been accounted
for. The allegation in the Information that the
accused "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
grab(bed), h(e)ld, hog-tie(d), gag(ged), with a
piece of cloth, brought out and abduct(ed)
Modesto Delim (while) Leon Delim and Manuel
Delim stayed in the house (and) guarded and
prevented the wife and son of Modesto Delim
from helping the latter," constitutes the act of
deprivation of liberty and the gravamen in the
crime of kidnapping. Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, provides:
"Article 267 Kidnapping and serious illegal
detention. Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any manner
deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death:
"1 If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted
more than three days.
"2 If it shall have been committed simulating
public authority.
"3 If any serious physical injuries shall have been
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained;
or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
"4 If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a
minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, a female or a public officer.
"The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping
or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other
person, even if none of the circumstances
abovementioned were present in the commission
of the offense.
"When the victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the detention or is raped, or is
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed."
The fact that the Information went further to
charge the accused with the killing of the victim
should be of no moment, the real nature of the
criminal charge being determined not from the
caption or the preamble of the Information nor
from the specification of the law alleged to have
been violated — these being conclusions of law
— but by the actual recital of facts in the
complaint or information. 9
In meting upon appellants the supreme penalty of
death, the trial court has appreciated five
aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of
superior strength, nighttime, dwelling, and use of
unlicensed firearms. The Information specifies
treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident
premeditation as being the aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the crime.
Treachery and superior strength, however, only
pertain to crimes against persons. The crime of
kidnapping, falling as it does within the
classification of crimes against liberty, is
aggravated neither by treachery nor superior
strength. The aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation can be appreciated when it
is shown that the culprits have previously
reflected on the crime, or that they have prepared
appropriate means to execute it, coolly taking
into account its consequences. The evidence is
deficient in this respect. The aggravating
circumstances of nighttime, dwelling and use of
unlicensed firearms, not having been alleged in
the Information, cannot be considered. The
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, rendered
effective on 01 December 2000,10 requires
aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or
qualifying, to be specified in the complaint or
information.
The crime of kidnapping is punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death. There being
neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance
that can be appreciated, the punishment that
should be imposed is the lesser penalty
of reclusion perpetua than the penalty of death.11
Now, on the civil aspect of the case. The law
places abundant protective shields in order to
ensure that no man shall be made to account for a
crime he might not have committed or be
adjudged guilty and meted a punishment without
him having first been afforded a full opportunity
to defend his cause. Thus, a conviction is
pronounced only upon proof beyond reasonable
doubt, preceded by an arraignment where he
pleads on the basis of a complaint or information
that specifies the gravamen of the offense and the
circumstances that are said to aggravate it and
then the trial where evidence is adduced by the
parties. For purposes of the civil liability, as well
as its extent, civil law principles, however, are
applied, and damages might be accorded to the
aggrieved party upon a mere preponderance of
evidence. There is, I believe, enough justification,
albeit inadequate for purposes of a criminal
conviction, to hold appellants responsible and
civilly liable for the death of Modesto Delim
whose body was found riddled with bullets a few
days after being forcibly abducted by appellants.
Consonantly, appellants should be held liable,
jointly and severally, for civil indemnity of
P50,000.00 for the death of the victim, moral
damages in an equal amount for the mental
anguish suffered by his heirs and P25,000.00
exemplary damages because of the attendance of
aggravating circumstances that were established
albeit not allowed to be considered in meting out
the sentence for the crime. Thus, in People vs.
Catubig,12 the Court has said:
"The term 'aggravating circumstances' used by
the Civil Code, the law not having specified
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or
generic sense. The commission of an offense has
a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it
breaches the social order and the other upon the
private victim as it causes personal sufferings,
each of which is addressed by, respectively, the
prescription of heavier punishment for the
accused and by an award of additional damages
to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a
shift to a graver felony underscores the
exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of
aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or
qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal
liability which is basically a State concern, the
award of damages, however, is likewise, if not
primarily, intended for the offended party who
suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an
award of exemplary damages to be due the
private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when
it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying
nature of an aggravating circumstance is a
distinction that should only be of consequence to
the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of
the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of
the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether
ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the
offended party to an award of exemplary
damages within the unbridled meaning of Article
2230 of the Civil Code.
"Relevantly, the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, made effective on 01 December 2000,
requires aggravating circumstances, whether
ordinary or qualifying, to be stated in the
complaint or information.
"xxx xxx xxx
"A court would thus be precluded from
considering in its judgment the attendance of
'qualifying or aggravating circumstances' if the
complaint or information is bereft of any
allegation on the presence of such circumstances.
"The retroactive application of procedural rules,
nevertheless, cannot adversely affect the rights of
the private offended party that have become
vested prior to the effectivity of said rules. Thus,
in the case at bar, although relationship has not
been alleged in the information, the offense
having been committed, however, prior to the
effectivity of the new rules, the civil liability
already incurred by appellant remains unaffected
thereby."
WHEREFORE, I vote for the modification of the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46,
of Urdaneta City by instead holding appellants
Ronald Delim, Marlon Delim and Leon Delim
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention,
defined and penalized by Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, and imposing on each of
them the penalty of reclusion perpetua, as well as
by ordering said appellants to pay, jointly and
severally, the heirs of Modesto Delim the
amounts of P50,000.00 civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 moral damages and P25,000.00
exemplary damages, with costs de officio.
Sources:
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/jan200
3/gr_142773_2003.html
 Ivler v. San Pedro, GR. No. 172716, Nov 17,
2010
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN
PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and
EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming
sub-silencio a lower court’s ruling finding
inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a
second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property.
This, despite the accused’s previous conviction
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries arising from the same incident
grounding the second prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004,
petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses:
(1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for
injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L.
Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage
to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the
death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C.
Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s
vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary
release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty
to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and
was meted out the penalty of public censure.
Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to
quash the Information in Criminal Case No.
82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless
imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of
offenses in the two cases.3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration,
petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a
petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803).
Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the
suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366, including the arraignment on 17 May
2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial
question. Without acting on petitioner’s motion,
the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and,
because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail
and ordered his arrest.4 Seven days later, the
MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s
motion to suspend proceedings and postponing
his arraignment until after his arrest.5 Petitioner
sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this
petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner,
respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the
dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner’s loss
of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner
contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC
dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding
its ruling on petitioner’s forfeiture of standing to
maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the
MeTC’s order to arrest petitioner for his non-
appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case
No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of
S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed
the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but
this proved unavailing.6
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his
petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to
forego participation in the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner
distinguishes his case from the line of
jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals
for absconding appellants because his appeal
before the RTC was a special civil action seeking
a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a
judgment of conviction.7
Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the
merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking
jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his
constitutional right not to be placed twice in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars
his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366,
having been previously convicted in Criminal
Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless
imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences
of such crime are material only to determine his
penalty.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court
to disturb the RTC’s decision forfeiting
petitioner’s standing to maintain his petition in
S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce
calls the Court’s attention to jurisprudence
holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical
injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave
felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution
was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal
Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries
from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide
and damage to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the
Office of the Solicitor General’s motion not to
file a comment to the petition as the public
respondent judge is merely a nominal party and
private respondent is represented by counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1)
whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek
relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his
arrest following his non-appearance at the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2)
if in the negative, whether petitioner’s
constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy
Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at
the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did
not divest him of personality to maintain the
petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection
afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner
from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of
second punishment for the same offense bars
further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment
in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of
Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the
appellant’s escape from custody or violation of
the terms of his bail bond are governed by the
second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,8 in
relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this
Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon
motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss
the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or
confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country during the pendency of the appeal." The
"appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is
a suit to review judgments of convictions.
The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil
action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment
ancillary question on the applicability of the Due
Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural
rules and jurisprudence. The RTC’s reliance
on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of
its ruling because Esparas stands for a
proposition contrary to the RTC’s ruling. There,
the Court granted review to an appeal by an
accused who was sentenced to death for
importing prohibited drugs even though she
jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried and
convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas
treated the mandatory review of death sentences
under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to
Section 8 of Rule 124.10
The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of
petitioner’s non-appearance at his arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of
standing becomes more evident when one
considers the Rules of Court’s treatment of a
defendant who absents himself from post-
arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule
11411 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely
renders his bondsman potentially liable on its
bond (subject to cancellation should the
bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30
days); the defendant retains his standing and,
should he fail to surrender, will be tried in
absentia and could be convicted or acquitted.
Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the
bondsman to produce the accused underscores the
fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto
convert the accused’s status to that of a fugitive
without standing.
Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner
provided "no explanation why he failed to attend
the scheduled proceeding"12 at the MeTC is
belied by the records. Days before the
arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of
the MeTC’s proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in
S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTC’s refusal
to defer arraignment (the order for which was
released days after the MeTC ordered petitioner’s
arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His
motion remained unresolved as of the filing of
this petition.
Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No.
82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accused’s negative constitutional right not to
be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense"13protects him from, among others,
post-conviction prosecution for the same offense,
with the prior verdict rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid
information.14 It is not disputed that petitioner’s
conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the
question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and
Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same
offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view,
submitting that the two cases concern the same
offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled
otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely
separate offense from Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
"as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact
which the other does not."15
We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from
the same facts, were prosecuted under the same
provision of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the
provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who,
by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act
which, had it been intentional, would constitute a
grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period; if it would
have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty
of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods shall be imposed; if it would have
constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto
menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or
negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a
less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor
in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this
article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal
to the value of said damages to three times such
value, but which shall in no case be less than
twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and
censure shall be imposed upon any person who,
by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause
some wrong which, if done maliciously, would
have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court
shall exercise their sound discretion, without
regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-
four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not
be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is
equal to or lower than those provided in the first
two paragraphs of this article, in which case the
court shall impose the penalty next lower in
degree than that which should be imposed in the
period which they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with
violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a
person shall be caused, in which case the
defendant shall be punished by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum
periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but
without malice, doing or failing to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
person performing or failing to perform such act,
taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of
precaution displayed in those cases in which the
damage impending to be caused is not immediate
nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those
provided for in this article shall be imposed upon
the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the
injured parties such help as may be in this hand to
give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible
into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the
penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of
"imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2);
(2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both
quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a
generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties
(paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless
imprudence" and "simple imprudence"
(paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses
penalize "the mental attitude or condition behind
the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care
or foresight, the imprudencia punible,"16 unlike
willful offenses which punish the intentional
criminal act. These structural and conceptual
features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the
mass of intentional crimes under the first 13
Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether
reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime,
separately defined and penalized under the
framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As
early as the middle of the last century, we already
sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in
Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the
proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a
crime in itself but simply a way of committing it
x x x"17 on three points of analysis: (1) the object
of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to
intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to
treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed
to subsuming them under the mitigating
circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the
different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and
intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the
Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence"
is not a crime in itself but simply a way of
committing it and merely determines a lower
degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve
unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their
structure cannot be committed through
imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious
mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our
Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi
offense, and dealt with separately from willful
offenses. It is not a mere question of
classification or terminology. In intentional
crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or
imprudence, what is principally penalized is the
mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight,
the imprudencia punible. x x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the
commission of felonies, operating only to reduce
the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in
the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially
the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as
the one actually committed. Furthermore, the
theory would require that the corresponding
penalty should be fixed in proportion to the
penalty prescribed for each crime when
committed willfully. For each penalty for the
willful offense, there would then be a
corresponding penalty for the negligent variety.
But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365)
fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at
arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional
[medium], if the willful act would constitute a
grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for
the latter could range all the way from prision
mayor to death, according to the case. It can be
seen that the actual penalty for criminal
negligence bears no relation to the individual
willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole
class, or series, of crimes.18 (Emphasis supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to
allege quasi-crimes is to state that their
commission results in damage, either to person or
property.19
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in
Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for
"Damage to Property through Reckless
Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to
trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an
intentional crime conceptually incompatible with
the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-
crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative
ancestry of our present day penal code) and since
repeatedly reiterated,21 stands on solid conceptual
foundation. The contrary doctrinal
pronouncement in People v. Faller22 that
"[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x
x [but] simply a way of committing it x x
x,"23 has long been abandoned when the Court en
banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two
decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939.
Quizon rejected Faller’s conceptualization of
quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under
Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not
merely methods of committing crimes. Faller
found expression in post-Quizon
jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal
confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion
of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes
and the complexing of intentional crimes under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which, as
will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous
conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the
Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes
undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence
applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-
offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-
offense alleging one resulting act after a prior
conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging
another resulting act but arising from the same
reckless act or omission upon which the second
prosecution was based.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under
Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and
not merely a means to commit other crimes such
that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense
bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-
offense, regardless of its various resulting acts,
undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of
jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to
Article 365 starting with People v.
Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor,
ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to
property thru reckless imprudence" because a
prior case against the same accused for "reckless
driving," arising from the same act upon which
the first prosecution was based, had been
dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same
legal question was brought before the Court, that
is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of
reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution
for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the
consequences alleged for both charges, the Court
unfailingly and consistently answered in the
affirmative in People v. Belga26 (promulgated in
1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v.
Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per
Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas28 (promulgated
in 1960 by the Court en banc, per Bengzon J.),
People v. Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by the
Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v.
Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court
en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v.
Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en
banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v.
Court of Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by the
Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City
Court of Manila33 (promulgated in 1983 by the
First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases
uniformly barred the second prosecutions as
constitutionally impermissible under the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending
the constitutional protection under the Double
Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best
articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan,
where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for
"serious physical injuries and damage to property
thru reckless imprudence" because of the
accused’s prior acquittal of "slight physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both
charges grounded on the same act, the Court
explained:34
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once
convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted
again for that same act. For the essence of the
quasi offense of criminal negligence under article
365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the
execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or
careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of
the consequence is only taken into account to
determine the penalty, it does not qualify the
substance of the offense. And, as the careless act
is single, whether the injurious result should
affect one person or several persons, the offense
(criminal negligence) remains one and the same,
and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.35 x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on
double jeopardy merely extended to its logical
conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling
going against this unbroken line of authority.
Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo
de Filipinas v. Estipona,36 decided by the pre-war
colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the
subsequent prosecution of an accused for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property
despite his previous conviction for multiple
physical injuries arising from the same reckless
operation of a motor vehicle upon which the
second prosecution was based. Estipona’s
inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of
jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At
any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest
in 1982 in Buerano.37 There, we reviewed the
Court of Appeals’ conviction of an accused for
"damage to property for reckless imprudence"
despite his prior conviction for "slight and less
serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence," arising from the same act upon
which the second charge was based. The Court of
Appeals had relied on Estipona. We reversed on
the strength of Buan:38
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired
by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of
People vs. Estipona decided on November 14,
1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan,
22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court,
speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that –
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once
convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted
again for that same act. For the essence of the
quasi offense of criminal negligence under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the
execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or
careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of
the consequence is only taken into account to
determine the penalty, it does not qualify the
substance of the offense. And, as the careless act
is single, whether the injurious result should
affect one person or several persons, the offense
(criminal negligence) remains one and the same,
and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.
xxxx
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan,
by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal)
Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of
slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for
serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the
province, where both charges are derived from
the consequences of one and the same vehicular
accident, because the second accusation places
the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had
effectively overruled Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in
Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in
Silva, joined causes with the accused, a fact
which did not escape the Court’s attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V.
Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated
December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) admits
that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining
petitioner’s plea of double jeopardy and submits
that "its affirmatory decision dated January 28,
1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding
petitioner guilty of damage to property through
reckless imprudence should be set aside, without
costs." He stressed that "if double jeopardy exists
where the reckless act resulted into homicide and
physical injuries. then the same consequence
must perforce follow where the same reckless act
caused merely damage to property-not death-and
physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human
life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot
be equated with any amount of damages caused
to a motors vehicle arising from the same
mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission
that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in
his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the
Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting
jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioner’s
case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny.
There, the accused, who was also involved in a
vehicular collision, was charged in two separate
Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru
Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with
Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless
Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the
former, the accused sought the quashal of the
latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The
trial court initially denied relief, but, on
reconsideration, found merit in the accused’s
claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming
the trial court, we quoted with approval its
analysis of the issue following Diaz and its
progeny People v. Belga:42
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered
its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case,
holding: —
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely
within the doctrine of double jeopardy enunciated
in People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco
Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice
of the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the
crime of physical injuries through reckless
imprudence arising from a collision between the
two automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No.
88). Without the aforesaid complaint having been
dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other
criminal complaints were filed in the same justice
of the peace court, in connection with the same
collision one for damage to property through
reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed
by the owner of one of the vehicles involved in
the collision, and another for multiple physical
injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case
No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the
accident. Both of these two complaints were filed
against Jose Belga only. After trial, both
defendants were acquitted of the charge against
them in Crim. Case No. 88. Following his
acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the
complaint for multiple physical injuries through
reckless imprudence filed against him by the
injured passengers, contending that the case was
just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of
Police wherein he had just been acquitted. The
motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose
Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to
the Court of First Instance of Albay. In the
meantime, the case for damage to property
through reckless imprudence filed by one of the
owners of the vehicles involved in the collision
had been remanded to the Court of First Instance
of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second
stage of the preliminary investigation. After such
remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of
First Instance two informations against Jose
Belga, one for physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, and another for damage to property
through reckless imprudence. Both cases were
dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon
motion of the defendant Jose Belga who alleged
double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal
by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was
affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following
language: .
The question for determination is whether the
acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the
chief of police constitutes a bar to his subsequent
prosecution for multiple physical injuries and
damage to property through reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-
6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was
charged in the municipal court of Pasay City with
reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an
automobile in a ῾fast and reckless manner ...
thereby causing an accident.’ After the accused
had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in
that court ῾for failure of the Government to
prosecute’. But some time thereafter the city
attorney filed an information in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused with
damage to property thru reckless imprudence.
The amount of the damage was alleged to be
₱249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused
filed a motion, and on appeal by the Government
we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we
there said through Mr. Justice Montemayor —
The next question to determine is the relation
between the first offense of violation of the
Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay
City Municipal Court and the offense of damage
to property thru reckless imprudence charged in
the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests
of double jeopardy is whether or not the second
offense charged necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the
former complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec.
9). Another test is whether the evidence which
proves one would prove the other that is to say
whether the facts alleged in the first charge if
proven, would have been sufficient to support the
second charge and vice versa; or whether one
crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x
xxxx
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court
also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting
attorney that the charge for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence could not
have been joined with the charge for homicide
with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions
of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. The prosecution’s contention might be
true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to
first prosecute the accused for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence before
pressing the more serious charge of homicide
with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Having first prosecuted the
defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of
the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which
acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney
is not now in a position to press in this case the
more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence
which arose out of the same alleged reckless
imprudence of which the defendant have been
previously cleared by the inferior court.43
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us
in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz)
"for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its
application."44 We declined the invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court
erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of
double jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal
of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical
Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same
breath said State, thru the Solicitor General,
admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall
squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x,
upon which the order of dismissal of the lower
court was anchored. The Solicitor General,
however, urges a re-examination of said ruling,
upon certain considerations for the purpose of
delimiting or clarifying its application. We find,
nevertheless, that further elucidation or
disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the
facts of which are analogous or similar to those in
the present case, will yield no practical advantage
to the government. On one hand, there is nothing
which would warrant a delimitation or
clarification of the applicability of the Belga case.
It was clear. On the other, this Court has
reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case,
in the identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc.,
L-12669, April 30, 1959.45 (Emphasis supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in
this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed,
stems from persistent but awkward attempts to
harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive
and procedural rules in criminal law, namely,
Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-
offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes,
both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is
a procedural device allowing single prosecution
of multiple felonies falling under either of two
categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two
or more grave or less grave felonies (thus
excluding from its operation light felonies46); and
(2) when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other. The legislature crafted this
procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu
of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the
maximum of the penalty for the most serious
crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule
penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the
mental attitude x x x behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight
x x x,"47 a single mental attitude regardless of the
resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was
crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or
more consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate
smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a
single prosecution multiple intentional crimes
falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs
the prosecution of imprudent acts and their
consequences. However, the complexities of
human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-
offense not falling under either models – that of a
single criminal negligence resulting in multiple
non-crime damages to persons and property with
varying penalties corresponding to light, less
grave or grave offenses. The ensuing
prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should
such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article
48’s framework apply to "complex" the single
quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal)
consequences (excluding those amounting to
light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or
should the prosecution proceed under a single
charge, collectively alleging all the consequences
of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized
separately following the scheme of penalties
under Article 365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one
line of rulings (none of which involved the issue
of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by
"complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple
consequences48 unless one consequence amounts
to a light felony, in which case charges were split
by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts
amounting to grave or less grave felonies and
filing the charge with the second level courts and,
on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to
light felonies and filing the charge with the first
level courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach the
MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent
Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act
No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original
jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty
under Article 365 which is prision correccional in
its medium period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy
will not arise if the "complexing" of acts
penalized under Article 365 involves only
resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave
felonies because there will be a single
prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of
double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts
is penalized as a light offense and the other acts
are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in
which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and
the act penalized as a light offense is tried
separately from the resulting acts penalized as
grave or less grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48
and sanctions a single prosecution of all the
effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in
one charge, regardless of their number or
severity,51 penalizing each consequence
separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,52 we
interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in
relation to a charge alleging "reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property and less serious
physical injuries," as follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads
as follows:
When the execution of the act covered by this
article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal
to the value of said damage to three times such
value, but which shall in no case be less than 25
pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if
there is only damage to property the amount fixed
therein shall be imposed, but if there are also
physical injuries there should be an additional
penalty for the latter. The information cannot be
split into two; one for the physical injuries, and
another for the damage to property, x x
x.53 (Emphasis supplied)
By "additional penalty," the Court meant,
logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are
irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands
choosing one framework over the other. Either
(1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-
crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate
offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-
conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present
framing under Article 365, discard its conception
under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and
treat the multiple consequences of a quasi-crime
as separate intentional felonies defined under
Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2)
we forbid the application of Article 48 in the
prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes,
require single prosecution of all the resulting acts
regardless of their number and severity,
separately penalize each as provided in Article
365, and thus maintain the distinct concept of
quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365,
articulated in Quizon and applied to double
jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of
cases.1avvphi1
A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our
scheme of government denying it the power to
make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the
conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and
intentional felonies under our penal code. Article
48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes
under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible
for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a
single act constituting two or more grave or less
grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a
necessary means for committing another. This is
why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the
Solicitor General’s argument that double
jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for
slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence allegedly because the charge for that
offense could not be joined with the other charge
for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code:
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the
charge for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence could not be joined with the
accusation for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing
of grave or less grave felonies. This same
argument was considered and rejected by this
Court in the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:
[T]he prosecution’s contention might be true. But
neither was the prosecution obliged to first
prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence before pressing the
more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
Having first prosecuted the defendant for the
lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the
defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in
a position to press in this case the more serious
charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence which arose out of
the same alleged reckless imprudence of which
the defendant has been previously cleared by the
inferior court.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of
this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x x
x of the charge of slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, prevents his being
prosecuted for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance
of the province, where both charges are derived
from the consequences of one and the same
vehicular accident, because the second accusation
places the appellant in second jeopardy for the
same offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled
choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges
under Article 365, irrespective of the number and
severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions
of constitutionally impermissible second
prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that
scarce state resources are conserved and diverted
to proper use.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article
365 should proceed from a single charge
regardless of the number or severity of the
consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge
will do no more than apply the penalties under
Article 365 for each consequence alleged and
proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of
charges under Article 365, and only one
information shall be filed in the same first level
court.55
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.
protection of their constitutional right under the
Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby Let a copy of this ruling be served on the
denied the beneficent effect of the favorable President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
sentencing formula under Article 48, but any House of Representatives.
disadvantage thus caused is more than
compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution SO ORDERED.
for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light
offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious ANTONIO T. CARPIO
consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so Associate Justice
minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by
extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula WE CONCUR:
of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all
Associate Justice
resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less
grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact
the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. DIOSDADO M. ROBERTO A.
Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties PERALTA ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a
lower rung of culpability, should cushion the
effect of this ruling. JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.
We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February ATTESTATION
2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the
had been reached in consultation before the case
Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the
Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming
sub-silencio a lower court’s ruling finding
inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a
second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property.
This, despite the accused’s previous conviction
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries arising from the same incident
grounding the second prosecution.
The Facts

RENATO C. CORONA Following a vehicular collision in August 2004,

Chief Justice petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010 Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses:
(1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner, Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for
vs. injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless
PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage
Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the
EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents. death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C.
Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s
DECISION vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary
release in both cases.
CARPIO, J.:
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty
The Case
to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and
was meted out the penalty of public censure.
Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to
quash the Information in Criminal Case No.
82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless
imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of
offenses in the two cases.3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration,
petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a
petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803).
Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the
suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366, including the arraignment on 17 May
2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial
question. Without acting on petitioner’s motion,
the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and,
because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail
and ordered his arrest.4 Seven days later, the
MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s
motion to suspend proceedings and postponing
his arraignment until after his arrest.5 Petitioner
sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this
petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner,
respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the
dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner’s loss
of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner
contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC
dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding
its ruling on petitioner’s forfeiture of standing to
maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the
MeTC’s order to arrest petitioner for his non-
appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case
No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of
S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed
the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but
this proved unavailing.6
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his
petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to
forego participation in the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner
distinguishes his case from the line of
jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals
for absconding appellants because his appeal
before the RTC was a special civil action seeking
a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a
judgment of conviction.7
Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the
merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking
jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his
constitutional right not to be placed twice in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars
his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366,
having been previously convicted in Criminal
Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless
imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences
of such crime are material only to determine his
penalty.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court
to disturb the RTC’s decision forfeiting
petitioner’s standing to maintain his petition in
S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce
calls the Court’s attention to jurisprudence
holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical
injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave
felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution
was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal
Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries
from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide
and damage to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the
Office of the Solicitor General’s motion not to
file a comment to the petition as the public
respondent judge is merely a nominal party and
private respondent is represented by counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1)
whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek
relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his
arrest following his non-appearance at the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2)
if in the negative, whether petitioner’s
constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy
Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at
the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did
not divest him of personality to maintain the
petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection
afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner
from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of
second punishment for the same offense bars
further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment
in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of
Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the
appellant’s escape from custody or violation of
the terms of his bail bond are governed by the
second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,8 in
relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this
Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon
motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss
the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or
confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country during the pendency of the appeal." The
"appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is
a suit to review judgments of convictions.
The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil
action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment
ancillary question on the applicability of the Due
Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural
rules and jurisprudence. The RTC’s reliance
on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of
its ruling because Esparas stands for a
proposition contrary to the RTC’s ruling. There,
the Court granted review to an appeal by an
accused who was sentenced to death for
importing prohibited drugs even though she
jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried and
convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas
treated the mandatory review of death sentences
under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to
Section 8 of Rule 124.10
The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of
petitioner’s non-appearance at his arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of
standing becomes more evident when one
considers the Rules of Court’s treatment of a
defendant who absents himself from post-
arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule
11411 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely
renders his bondsman potentially liable on its
bond (subject to cancellation should the
bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30
days); the defendant retains his standing and,
should he fail to surrender, will be tried in
absentia and could be convicted or acquitted.
Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the
bondsman to produce the accused underscores the
fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto
convert the accused’s status to that of a fugitive
without standing.
Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner
provided "no explanation why he failed to attend
the scheduled proceeding"12 at the MeTC is
belied by the records. Days before the
arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of
the MeTC’s proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in
S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTC’s refusal
to defer arraignment (the order for which was
released days after the MeTC ordered petitioner’s
arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His
motion remained unresolved as of the filing of
this petition.
Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No.
82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accused’s negative constitutional right not to
be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense"13protects him from, among others,
post-conviction prosecution for the same offense,
with the prior verdict rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid
information.14 It is not disputed that petitioner’s
conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the
question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and
Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same
offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view,
submitting that the two cases concern the same
offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled
otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely
separate offense from Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
"as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact
which the other does not."15
We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from
the same facts, were prosecuted under the same
provision of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the
provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who,
by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act
which, had it been intentional, would constitute a
grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period; if it would
have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty
of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods shall be imposed; if it would have
constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto
menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or
negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a
less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor
in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this
article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal
to the value of said damages to three times such
value, but which shall in no case be less than
twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and
censure shall be imposed upon any person who,
by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause
some wrong which, if done maliciously, would
have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court
shall exercise their sound discretion, without
regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-
four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not
be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is
equal to or lower than those provided in the first
two paragraphs of this article, in which case the
court shall impose the penalty next lower in
degree than that which should be imposed in the
period which they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with
violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a
person shall be caused, in which case the
defendant shall be punished by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum
periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but
without malice, doing or failing to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
person performing or failing to perform such act,
taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of
precaution displayed in those cases in which the
damage impending to be caused is not immediate
nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those
provided for in this article shall be imposed upon
the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the
injured parties such help as may be in this hand to
give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible
into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the
penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of
"imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2);
(2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both
quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a
generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties
(paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless
imprudence" and "simple imprudence"
(paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses
penalize "the mental attitude or condition behind
the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care
or foresight, the imprudencia punible,"16 unlike
willful offenses which punish the intentional
criminal act. These structural and conceptual
features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the
mass of intentional crimes under the first 13
Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether
reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime,
separately defined and penalized under the
framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As
early as the middle of the last century, we already
sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in
Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the
proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a
crime in itself but simply a way of committing it
x x x"17 on three points of analysis: (1) the object
of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to
intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to
treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed
to subsuming them under the mitigating
circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the
different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and
intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the
Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence"
is not a crime in itself but simply a way of
committing it and merely determines a lower
degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve
unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their
structure cannot be committed through
imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious
mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our
Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi
offense, and dealt with separately from willful
offenses. It is not a mere question of
classification or terminology. In intentional
crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or
imprudence, what is principally penalized is the
mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight,
the imprudencia punible. x x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the
commission of felonies, operating only to reduce
the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in
the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially
the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as
the one actually committed. Furthermore, the
theory would require that the corresponding
penalty should be fixed in proportion to the
penalty prescribed for each crime when
committed willfully. For each penalty for the
willful offense, there would then be a
corresponding penalty for the negligent variety.
But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365)
fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at
arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional
[medium], if the willful act would constitute a
grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for
the latter could range all the way from prision
mayor to death, according to the case. It can be
seen that the actual penalty for criminal
negligence bears no relation to the individual
willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole
class, or series, of crimes.18 (Emphasis supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to
allege quasi-crimes is to state that their
commission results in damage, either to person or
property.19
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in
Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for
"Damage to Property through Reckless
Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to
trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an
intentional crime conceptually incompatible with
the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-
crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative
ancestry of our present day penal code) and since
repeatedly reiterated,21 stands on solid conceptual
foundation. The contrary doctrinal
pronouncement in People v. Faller22 that
"[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x
x [but] simply a way of committing it x x
x,"23 has long been abandoned when the Court en
banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two
decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939.
Quizon rejected Faller’s conceptualization of
quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under
Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not
merely methods of committing crimes. Faller
found expression in post-Quizon
jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal
confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion
of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes
and the complexing of intentional crimes under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which, as
will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous
conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the
Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes
undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence
applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-
offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-
offense alleging one resulting act after a prior
conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging
another resulting act but arising from the same
reckless act or omission upon which the second
prosecution was based.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under
Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and
not merely a means to commit other crimes such
that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense
bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-
offense, regardless of its various resulting acts,
undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of
jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to
Article 365 starting with People v.
Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor,
ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to
property thru reckless imprudence" because a
prior case against the same accused for "reckless
driving," arising from the same act upon which
the first prosecution was based, had been
dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same
legal question was brought before the Court, that
is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of
reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution
for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the
consequences alleged for both charges, the Court
unfailingly and consistently answered in the
affirmative in People v. Belga26 (promulgated in
1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v.
Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per
Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas28 (promulgated
in 1960 by the Court en banc, per Bengzon J.),
People v. Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by the
Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v.
Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court
en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v.
Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en
banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v.
Court of Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by the
Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City
Court of Manila33 (promulgated in 1983 by the
First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases
uniformly barred the second prosecutions as
constitutionally impermissible under the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending
the constitutional protection under the Double
Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best
articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan,
where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for
"serious physical injuries and damage to property
thru reckless imprudence" because of the
accused’s prior acquittal of "slight physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both
charges grounded on the same act, the Court
explained:34
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once
convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted
again for that same act. For the essence of the
quasi offense of criminal negligence under article
365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the
execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or
careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of
the consequence is only taken into account to
determine the penalty, it does not qualify the
substance of the offense. And, as the careless act
is single, whether the injurious result should
affect one person or several persons, the offense
(criminal negligence) remains one and the same,
and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.35 x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on
double jeopardy merely extended to its logical
conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling
going against this unbroken line of authority.
Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo
de Filipinas v. Estipona,36 decided by the pre-war
colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the
subsequent prosecution of an accused for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property
despite his previous conviction for multiple
physical injuries arising from the same reckless
operation of a motor vehicle upon which the
second prosecution was based. Estipona’s
inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of
jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At
any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest
in 1982 in Buerano.37 There, we reviewed the
Court of Appeals’ conviction of an accused for
"damage to property for reckless imprudence"
despite his prior conviction for "slight and less
serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence," arising from the same act upon
which the second charge was based. The Court of
Appeals had relied on Estipona. We reversed on
the strength of Buan:38
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired
by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of
People vs. Estipona decided on November 14,
1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan,
22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court,
speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that –
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once
convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted
again for that same act. For the essence of the
quasi offense of criminal negligence under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the
execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or
careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of
the consequence is only taken into account to
determine the penalty, it does not qualify the
substance of the offense. And, as the careless act
is single, whether the injurious result should
affect one person or several persons, the offense
(criminal negligence) remains one and the same,
and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.
xxxx
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan,
by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal)
Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of
slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for
serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the
province, where both charges are derived from
the consequences of one and the same vehicular
accident, because the second accusation places
the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had
effectively overruled Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in
Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in
Silva, joined causes with the accused, a fact
which did not escape the Court’s attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V.
Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated
December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) admits
that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining
petitioner’s plea of double jeopardy and submits
that "its affirmatory decision dated January 28,
1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding
petitioner guilty of damage to property through
reckless imprudence should be set aside, without
costs." He stressed that "if double jeopardy exists
where the reckless act resulted into homicide and
physical injuries. then the same consequence
must perforce follow where the same reckless act
caused merely damage to property-not death-and
physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human
life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot
be equated with any amount of damages caused
to a motors vehicle arising from the same
mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission
that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in
his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the
Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting
jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioner’s
case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny.
There, the accused, who was also involved in a
vehicular collision, was charged in two separate
Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru
Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with
Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless
Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the
former, the accused sought the quashal of the
latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The
trial court initially denied relief, but, on
reconsideration, found merit in the accused’s
claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming
the trial court, we quoted with approval its
analysis of the issue following Diaz and its
progeny People v. Belga:42
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered
its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case,
holding: —
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely
within the doctrine of double jeopardy enunciated
in People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco
Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice
of the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the
crime of physical injuries through reckless
imprudence arising from a collision between the
two automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No.
88). Without the aforesaid complaint having been
dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other
criminal complaints were filed in the same justice
of the peace court, in connection with the same
collision one for damage to property through
reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed
by the owner of one of the vehicles involved in
the collision, and another for multiple physical
injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case
No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the
accident. Both of these two complaints were filed
against Jose Belga only. After trial, both
defendants were acquitted of the charge against
them in Crim. Case No. 88. Following his
acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the
complaint for multiple physical injuries through
reckless imprudence filed against him by the
injured passengers, contending that the case was
just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of
Police wherein he had just been acquitted. The
motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose
Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to
the Court of First Instance of Albay. In the
meantime, the case for damage to property
through reckless imprudence filed by one of the
owners of the vehicles involved in the collision
had been remanded to the Court of First Instance
of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second
stage of the preliminary investigation. After such
remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of
First Instance two informations against Jose
Belga, one for physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, and another for damage to property
through reckless imprudence. Both cases were
dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon
motion of the defendant Jose Belga who alleged
double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal
by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was
affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following
language: .
The question for determination is whether the
acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the
chief of police constitutes a bar to his subsequent
prosecution for multiple physical injuries and
damage to property through reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-
6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was
charged in the municipal court of Pasay City with
reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an
automobile in a ῾fast and reckless manner ...
thereby causing an accident.’ After the accused
had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in
that court ῾for failure of the Government to
prosecute’. But some time thereafter the city
attorney filed an information in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused with
damage to property thru reckless imprudence.
The amount of the damage was alleged to be
₱249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused
filed a motion, and on appeal by the Government
we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we
there said through Mr. Justice Montemayor —
The next question to determine is the relation
between the first offense of violation of the
Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay
City Municipal Court and the offense of damage
to property thru reckless imprudence charged in
the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests
of double jeopardy is whether or not the second
offense charged necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the
former complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec.
9). Another test is whether the evidence which
proves one would prove the other that is to say
whether the facts alleged in the first charge if
proven, would have been sufficient to support the
second charge and vice versa; or whether one
crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x
xxxx
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court
also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting
attorney that the charge for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence could not
have been joined with the charge for homicide
with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions
of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. The prosecution’s contention might be
true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to
first prosecute the accused for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence before
pressing the more serious charge of homicide
with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Having first prosecuted the
defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of
the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which
acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney
is not now in a position to press in this case the
more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence
which arose out of the same alleged reckless
imprudence of which the defendant have been
previously cleared by the inferior court.43
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us
in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz)
"for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its
application."44 We declined the invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court
erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of
double jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal
of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical
Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same
breath said State, thru the Solicitor General,
admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall
squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x,
upon which the order of dismissal of the lower
court was anchored. The Solicitor General,
however, urges a re-examination of said ruling,
upon certain considerations for the purpose of
delimiting or clarifying its application. We find,
nevertheless, that further elucidation or
disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the
facts of which are analogous or similar to those in
the present case, will yield no practical advantage
to the government. On one hand, there is nothing
which would warrant a delimitation or
clarification of the applicability of the Belga case.
It was clear. On the other, this Court has
reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case,
in the identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc.,
L-12669, April 30, 1959.45 (Emphasis supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in
this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed,
stems from persistent but awkward attempts to
harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive
and procedural rules in criminal law, namely,
Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-
offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes,
both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is
a procedural device allowing single prosecution
of multiple felonies falling under either of two
categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two
or more grave or less grave felonies (thus
excluding from its operation light felonies46); and
(2) when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other. The legislature crafted this
procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu
of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the
maximum of the penalty for the most serious
crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule
penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the
mental attitude x x x behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight
x x x,"47 a single mental attitude regardless of the
resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was
crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or
more consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate
smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a
single prosecution multiple intentional crimes
falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs
the prosecution of imprudent acts and their
consequences. However, the complexities of
human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-
offense not falling under either models – that of a
single criminal negligence resulting in multiple
non-crime damages to persons and property with
varying penalties corresponding to light, less
grave or grave offenses. The ensuing
prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should
such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article
48’s framework apply to "complex" the single
quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal)
consequences (excluding those amounting to
light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or
should the prosecution proceed under a single
charge, collectively alleging all the consequences
of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized
separately following the scheme of penalties
under Article 365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one
line of rulings (none of which involved the issue
of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by
"complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple
consequences48 unless one consequence amounts
to a light felony, in which case charges were split
by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts
amounting to grave or less grave felonies and
filing the charge with the second level courts and,
on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to
light felonies and filing the charge with the first
level courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach the
MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent
Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act
No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original
jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty
under Article 365 which is prision correccional in
its medium period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy
will not arise if the "complexing" of acts
penalized under Article 365 involves only
resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave
felonies because there will be a single
prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of
double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts
is penalized as a light offense and the other acts
are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in
which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and
the act penalized as a light offense is tried
separately from the resulting acts penalized as
grave or less grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48
and sanctions a single prosecution of all the
effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in
one charge, regardless of their number or
severity,51 penalizing each consequence
separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,52 we
interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in
relation to a charge alleging "reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property and less serious
physical injuries," as follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads
as follows:
When the execution of the act covered by this
article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal
to the value of said damage to three times such
value, but which shall in no case be less than 25
pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if
there is only damage to property the amount fixed
therein shall be imposed, but if there are also
physical injuries there should be an additional
penalty for the latter. The information cannot be
split into two; one for the physical injuries, and
another for the damage to property, x x
x.53 (Emphasis supplied)
By "additional penalty," the Court meant,
logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are
irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands
choosing one framework over the other. Either
(1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-
crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate
offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-
conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present
framing under Article 365, discard its conception
under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and
treat the multiple consequences of a quasi-crime
as separate intentional felonies defined under
Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2)
we forbid the application of Article 48 in the
prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes,
require single prosecution of all the resulting acts
regardless of their number and severity,
separately penalize each as provided in Article
365, and thus maintain the distinct concept of
quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365,
articulated in Quizon and applied to double
jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of
cases.1avvphi1
A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our
scheme of government denying it the power to
make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the
conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and
intentional felonies under our penal code. Article
48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes
under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible
for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a
single act constituting two or more grave or less
grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a
necessary means for committing another. This is
why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the
Solicitor General’s argument that double
jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for
slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence allegedly because the charge for that
offense could not be joined with the other charge
for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code:
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the
charge for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence could not be joined with the
accusation for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing
of grave or less grave felonies. This same
argument was considered and rejected by this
Court in the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:
[T]he prosecution’s contention might be true. But
neither was the prosecution obliged to first
prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence before pressing the
more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
Having first prosecuted the defendant for the
lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the
defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in
a position to press in this case the more serious
charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence which arose out of
the same alleged reckless imprudence of which
the defendant has been previously cleared by the
inferior court.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of
this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x x
x of the charge of slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, prevents his being
prosecuted for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance
of the province, where both charges are derived
from the consequences of one and the same
vehicular accident, because the second accusation
places the appellant in second jeopardy for the
same offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled
choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges
under Article 365, irrespective of the number and
severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions
of constitutionally impermissible second
prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that
scarce state resources are conserved and diverted
to proper use.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article
365 should proceed from a single charge
regardless of the number or severity of the
consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge
will do no more than apply the penalties under
Article 365 for each consequence alleged and
proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of
charges under Article 365, and only one
information shall be filed in the same first level
court.55
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing
an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler
protection of their constitutional right under the
Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby
denied the beneficent effect of the favorable
sentencing formula under Article 48, but any SO ORDERED.
disadvantage thus caused is more than
compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution ANTONIO T. CARPIO
for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light Associate Justice
offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious
consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so WE CONCUR:
minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by
extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty Associate Justice
shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all
resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less DIOSDADO M. ROBERTO A.
grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact PERALTA ABAD
the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Associate Justice Associate Justice
Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties
under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a JOSE C. MENDOZA
lower rung of culpability, should cushion the Associate Justice
effect of this ruling.
ATTESTATION
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.
We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court had been reached in consultation before the case
of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against Court’s Division.
petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch ANTONIO T. CARPIO
71 on the ground of double jeopardy. Associate Justice
Chairperson
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the CERTIFICATION
House of Representatives.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitioner
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the Rollie Calimutan prays for the reversal of the
above Decision had been reached in consultation Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
before the case was assigned to the writer of the No. 23306, dated 29 August 2001,1affirming the
opinion of the Court’s Division. Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 46, of Masbate, Masbate, in Criminal
RENATO C. CORONA Case No. 8184, dated 19 November
Chief Justice 1998,2 finding petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under
Sources: Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/nov201 The Information3 filed with the RTC charged
0/gr_172716_2010.html petitioner Calimutan with the crime of homicide,
allegedly committed as follows –
 Calimutan v. People, GR No. 152133, Feb 9,
2006 That on or about February 4, 1996, in the
morning thereof, at sitio Capsay, Barangay
Panique, Municipality of Aroroy, Province of
Masbate, Philippines within the jurisdiction of
G.R. No. 152133 February 9, 2006 this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
with intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
ROLLIE CALIMUTAN, Petitioner,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
vs.
throw a stone at PHILIP CANTRE, hitting him at
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET
the back left portion of his body, resulting in
AL., Respondents.
laceration of spleen due to impact which caused
DECISION his death a day after.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: CONTRARY TO LAW.

Masbate, Masbate, September 11, 1996.
Accordingly, the RTC issued, on 02 December
1996, a warrant4 for the arrest of petitioner
Calimutan. On 09 January 1997, however, he was
provisionally released5 after posting sufficient
bailbond.6 During the arraignment on 21 May
1997, petitioner Calimutan pleaded not guilty to
the crime of homicide charged against him.7
In the course of the trial, the prosecution
presented three witnesses, namely: (1) Dr.
Ronaldo B. Mendez, a Senior Medico-Legal
Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI); (2) Belen B. Cantre, mother of the victim,
Philip Cantre; and (3) Rene L. Sañano,
companion of the victim Cantre when the alleged
crime took place. Their testimonies are
collectively summarized below.
On 04 February 1996, at around 10:00 a.m., the
victim Cantre and witness Sañano, together with
two other companions, had a drinking spree at a
videoke bar in Crossing Capsay, Panique,
Aroroy, Masbate. From the videoke bar, the
victim Cantre and witness Sañano proceeded to
go home to their respective houses, but along the
way, they crossed paths with petitioner
Calimutan and a certain Michael Bulalacao.
Victim Cantre was harboring a grudge against
Bulalacao, suspecting the latter as the culprit
responsible for throwing stones at the Cantre’s
house on a previous night. Thus, upon seeing
Bulalacao, victim Cantre suddenly punched him.
While Bulalacao ran away, petitioner Calimutan
dashed towards the backs of victim Cantre and
witness Sañano. Petitioner Calimutan then picked
up a stone, as big as a man’s fist, which he threw
at victim Cantre, hitting him at the left side of his
back. When hit by the stone, victim Cantre
stopped for a moment and held his back. Witness
Sañano put himself between the victim Cantre
and petitioner Calimutan, and attempted to pacify
the two, even convincing petitioner Calimutan to
put down another stone he was already holding.
He also urged victim Cantre and petitioner
Calimutan to just go home. Witness Sañano
accompanied victim Cantre to the latter’s house,
and on the way, victim Cantre complained of the
pain in the left side of his back hit by the stone.
They arrived at the Cantre’s house at around
12:00 noon, and witness Sañano left victim
Cantre to the care of the latter’s mother, Belen.8
Victim Cantre immediately told his mother,
Belen, of the stoning incident involving petitioner
Calimutan. He again complained of backache and
also of stomachache, and was unable to eat. By
nighttime, victim Cantre was alternately feeling
cold and then warm. He was sweating profusely
and his entire body felt numb. His family would
have wanted to bring him to a doctor but they had
no vehicle. At around 3:00 a.m. of the following
day, 05 February 1996, Belen was wiping his son
with a piece of cloth, when victim Cantre asked
for some food. He was able to eat a little, but he
also later vomited whatever he ate. For the last
time, he complained of backache and
stomachache, and shortly thereafter, he died.9
Right after his death, victim Cantre was
examined by Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday, the
Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate.
The Post-Mortem Examination Report10 and
Certification of Death,11 issued and signed by Dr.
Ulanday, stated that the cause of death of victim
Cantre was cardio-respiratory arrest due to
suspected food poisoning. The body of victim
Cantre was subsequently embalmed and buried
on 13 February 1996.
Unsatisfied with the findings of Dr. Ulanday, the
Cantre family, with the help of the Lingkod
Bayan-Circulo de Abogadas of the ABS-CBN
Foundation, requested for an exhumation and
autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre by the
NBI. The exhumation and autopsy of the body of
the victim Cantre was conducted by Dr. Ronaldo
B. Mendez on 15 April 1996,12 after which, he
reported the following findings –
Body; fairly well-preserved with sign of partial
autopsy; clad in white Barong Tagalog and blue
pants placed inside a wooden golden-brown
coffin and buried in a concrete niche.
Contused-abrasion, 2.3 x 1.0 cms., posterior chest
wall, left side.
Hematoma, 16.0 x 8.0 cms., abdomen, along
mid-line.
Hemoperitoneum, massive, clotte [sic].
Laceration, spleen.
Other visceral organ, pale and embalmed.
Stomach contains small amount of whitish fluid
and other partially digested food particles.
xxxx
CAUSE OF DEATH: TRAUMATIC INJURY
OF THE ABDOMEN.
In his testimony before the RTC, Dr. Mendez
affirmed the contents of his exhumation and
autopsy report. He explained that the victim
Cantre suffered from an internal hemorrhage and
there was massive accumulation of blood in his
abdominal cavity due to his lacerated spleen. The
laceration of the spleen can be caused by any
blunt instrument, such as a stone. Hence, Dr.
Mendez confirmed the possibility that the victim
Cantre was stoned to death by petitioner
Calimutan.13
To counter the evidence of the prosecution, the
defense presented the sole testimony of the
accused, herein petitioner, Calimutan.
According to petitioner Calimutan, at about 1:00
p.m. on 04 February 1996, he was walking with
his house helper, Michael Bulalacao, on their way
to Crossing Capsay, Panique, Aroroy, Masbate,
when they met with the victim Cantre and
witness Sañano. The victim Cantre took hold of
Bulalacao and punched him several times.
Petitioner Calimutan attempted to pacify the
victim Cantre but the latter refused to calm down,
pulling out from his waist an eight-inch Batangas
knife and uttering that he was looking for trouble,
either "to kill or be killed." At this point,
petitioner Calimutan was about ten meters away
from the victim Cantre and was too frightened to
move any closer for fear that the enraged man
would turn on him; he still had a family to take
care of. When he saw that the victim Cantre was
about to stab Bulalacao, petitioner Calimutan
picked up a stone, which he described as
approximately one-inch in diameter, and threw it
at the victim Cantre. He was able to hit the victim
Cantre on his right buttock. Petitioner Calimutan
and Bulalacao then started to run away, and
victim Cantre chased after them, but witness
Sañano was able to pacify the victim Cantre.
Petitioner Calimutan allegedly reported the
incident to a kagawad of Barangay Panique and
to the police authorities and sought their help in
settling the dispute between Bulalacao and the
victim Cantre. Bulalacao, meanwhile, refused to
seek medical help despite the advice of petitioner
Calimutan and, instead, chose to go back to his
hometown.14
Petitioner Calimutan was totally unaware of what
had happened to the victim Cantre after the
stoning incident on 04 February 1996. Some of
his friends told him that they still saw the victim
Cantre drinking at a videoke bar on the night of
04 February 1996. As far as he knew, the victim
Cantre died the following day, on 05 February
1996, because of food poisoning. Petitioner
Calimutan maintained that he had no personal
grudge against the victim Cantre previous to the
stoning incident.15
On 19 November 1998, the RTC rendered its
Decision,16 essentially adopting the prosecution’s
account of the incident on 04 February 1996, and
pronouncing that –
It cannot be legally contended that the throwing
of the stone by the accused was in defense of his
companion, a stranger, because after the boxing
Michael was able to run. While it appears that the
victim was the unlawful aggressor at the
beginning, but the aggression already ceased after
Michael was able to run and there was no more
need for throwing a stone. The throwing of the
stone to the victim which was a retaliatory act can
be considered unlawful, hence the accused can be
held criminally liable under paragraph 1 of Art. 4
of the Revised Penal Code.
The act of throwing a stone from behind which
hit the victim at his back on the left side was a
treacherous one and the accused committed a
felony causing physical injuries to the victim.
The physical injury of hematoma as a result of
the impact of the stone resulted in the laceration
of the spleen causing the death of the victim. The
accused is criminally liable for all the direct and
natural consequences of this unlawful act even if
the ultimate result had not been intended. (Art. 4,
Par. 1, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Narciso,
CA-G.R. No. 03532-CR, Jan. 13, 1964)
One is not relieved from criminal liability for the
natural consequences of one’s illegal acts merely
because one does not intend to produce such
consequences (U.S. vs. Brobst, 14 Phil. 310).
The crime committed is Homicide as defined and
penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal
Code.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds that
accused ROLLIE CALIMUTAN is GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide defined and penalized under Art. 249
of the Revised Penal Code with no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law hereby imposes the
penalty of imprisonment from EIGHT (8)
YEARS of Prision Mayor as minimum, to
TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
Reclusion Temporal as maximum, and to
indemnify the heirs of Philip Cantre the sum of
Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos as
compensatory damages and the sum of Fifty
Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
Petitioner Calimutan appealed the Decision of the
RTC to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals, in its Decision, dated 29 August
2001,17 sustained the conviction of homicide
rendered by the RTC against petitioner
Calimutan, ratiocinating thus –
The prosecution has sufficiently established that
the serious internal injury sustained by the victim
was caused by the stone thrown at the victim by
the accused which, the accused-appellant does
not deny. It was likewise shown that the internal
injury sustained by the victim was the result of
the impact of the stone that hit the victim. It
resulted to a traumatic injury of the abdomen
causing the laceration of the victim’s spleen.
This is clearly shown by the autopsy report
prepared by Dr. Ronaldo Mendez, a Senior
Medico Legal Officer of the NBI after the
exhumation of the victim’s cadaver…
The Court cannot give credence to the post
mortem report prepared by Municipal Health
Officer Dr. Conchita Ulanday stating that the
cause of the victim’s death was food poisoning.
Dr. Ulanday was not even presented to testify in
court hence she was not even able to identify
and/or affirm the contents of her report. She was
not made available for cross-examination on the
accuracy and correctness of her findings.
Dr. Conchita Ulanday’s post mortem report
cannot prevail over the autopsy report (Exh. "C")
of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI who
testified and was cross-examined by the defense.
Besides, if accused-appellant was convinced that
the victim indeed died of food poisoning, as
reported by Dr. Conchita Ulanday, why did they
not present her as their witness to belie the report
of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI.
The trial court’s evaluation of the testimony of
Dr. Mendez is accorded the highest respect
because it had the opportunity to observe the
conduct and demeanor of said witness.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate,
Branch 46, finding accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide is hereby AFFIRMED.
The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution, dated 15
January 2002,18 denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioner Calimutan for
lack of merit since the issues raised therein had
already been passed and ruled upon in its
Decision, dated 29 August 2001.
Comes now petitioner Calimutan, by way of the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking
(1) the reversal of the Decisions of the RTC,
dated 19 November 1998, and of the Court of
Appeals, dated 29 August 2001, convicting him
of the crime of homicide; and, (2) consequently,
his acquittal of the said crime based on
reasonable doubt.
Petitioner Calimutan contended that the existence
of the two autopsy reports, with dissimilar
findings on the cause of death of the victim
Cantre, constituted reasonable doubt as to the
liability of petitioner Calimutan for the said
death, arguing that –
x x x [I]t was Dra. Conchita Ulanday, Municipal
Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate was the first
physician of the government who conducted an
examination on the cadaver of the victim Philip
Cantre whose findings was that the cause of his
death was due to food poisoning while the second
government physician NBI Medico Legal Officer
Dr. Ronaldo Mendez whose findings was that the
cause of the death was due to a traumatic injury
of the abdomen caused by a lacerated spleen and
with these findings of two (2) government
physicians whose findings are at variance with
each other materially, it is humbly contended that
the same issue raised a reasonable doubt on the
culpability of the petitioner.
As there are improbabilities and uncertainties of
the evidence for the prosecution in the case at
bar, it suffices to reaise [sic] reasonable doubt as
to the petitioner’s guilt and therefore, he is
entitled to acquittal (People vs. Delmendo, G.R.
No. 32146, November 23, 1981).19
In this jurisdiction, an accused in a criminal case
may only be convicted if his or her guilt is
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires only a
moral certainty or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind; it
does not demand absolute certainty and the
exclusion of all possibility of error.20
In the Petition at bar, this Court finds that there is
proof beyond reasonable doubt to hold petitioner
Calimutan liable for the death of the victim
Cantre.
Undoubtedly, the exhumation and autopsy report
and the personal testimony before the RTC of
prosecution witness, NBI Senior Medico-Legal
Officer Dr. Mendez, are vital pieces of evidence
against petitioner Calimutan. Dr. Mendez
determined that the victim Cantre died of internal
hemorrhage or bleeding due to the laceration of
his spleen. In his testimony, Dr. Mendez clearly
and consistently explained that the spleen could
be lacerated or ruptured when the abdominal area
was hit with a blunt object, such as the stone
thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the victim
Cantre.
It bears to emphasize that Dr. Mendez was
presented by the prosecution as an expert witness,
whose "competency and academic qualification
and background" was admitted by the defense
itself.21 As a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the
NBI, Dr. Mendez is presumed to possess
sufficient knowledge of pathology, surgery,
gynecology, toxicology, and such other branches
of medicine germane to the issues involved in a
case.22
Dr. Mendez’s testimony as an expert witness is
evidence,23 and although it does not necessarily
bind the courts, both the RTC and the Court of
Appeals had properly accorded it great weight
and probative value. Having testified as to
matters undeniably within his area of expertise,
and having performed a thorough autopsy on the
body of the victim Cantre, his findings as to the
cause of death of the victim Cantre are more than
just the mere speculations of an ordinary person.
They may sufficiently establish the causal
relationship between the stone thrown by the
petitioner Calimutan and the lacerated spleen of
the victim Cantre which, subsequently, resulted
in the latter’s death. With no apparent mistake or
irregularity, whether in the manner by which Dr.
Mendez performed the autopsy on the body of the
victim Cantre or in his findings, then his report
and testimony must be seriously considered by
this Court.
Moreover, reference to other resource materials
on abdominal injuries would also support the
conclusion of Dr. Mendez that the stone thrown
by petitioner Calimutan caused the death of the
victim Cantre.
One source explains the nature of abdominal
injuries24 in the following manner –
The skin may remain unmarked inspite of
extensive internal injuries with bleeding and
disruption of the internal organs. The areas most
vulnerable are the point of attachment of internal
organs, especially at the source of its blood
supply and at the point where blood vessels
change direction.
The area in the middle superior half of the
abdomen, forming a triangle bounded by the ribs
on the two sides and a line drawn horizontally
through the umbilicus forming its base
is vulnerable to trauma applied from any
direction. In this triangle are found several blood
vessels changing direction, particularly the celiac
trunk, its branches (the hepatic, splenic and
gastric arteries) as well as the accompanying
veins. The loop of the duodenum, the ligament of
Treitz and the pancreas are in the retroperitoneal
space, and the stomach and transverse colon are
in the triangle, located in the peritoneal cavity.
Compression or blow on the area may cause
detachment, laceration, stretch-stress, contusion
of the organs (Legal Medicine 1980, Cyril H.
Wecht et., p. 41).
As to injuries to the spleen, in particular,25 the
same source expounds that –
The spleen usually suffers traumatic rupture
resulting from the impact of a fall or blow from
the crushing and grinding effects of wheels of
motor vehicles. Although the organ is protected
at its upper portion by the ribs and also by the air-
containing visceral organs, yet on account of
its superficiality and fragility, it is usually
affected by trauma. x x x.
Certainly, there are some terms in the above-
quoted paragraphs difficult to comprehend for
people without medical backgrounds.
Nevertheless, there are some points that can be
plainly derived therefrom: (1) Contrary to
common perception, the abdominal area is more
than just the waist area. The entire abdominal
area is divided into different triangles, and the
spleen is located in the upper triangle, bounded
by the rib cage; (2) The spleen and all internal
organs in the same triangle are vulnerable to
trauma from all directions. Therefore, the stone
need not hit the victim Cantre from the front.
Even impact from a stone hitting the back of the
victim Cantre, in the area of the afore-mentioned
triangle, could rupture the spleen; and (3)
Although the spleen had already been ruptured or
lacerated, there may not always be a perceptible
external injury to the victim. Injury to the spleen
cannot, at all times, be attributed to an obvious,
external injury such as a cut or bruise. The
laceration of the victim Cantre’s spleen can be
caused by a stone thrown hard enough, which
qualifies as a nonpenetrating trauma26 –
Nonpenetrating Trauma. The spleen, alone or
in combination with other viscera, is the most
frequently injured organ following blunt
trauma to the abdomen or the lower thoracic
cage. Automobile accidents provide the
predominating cause, while falls, sledding and
bicycle injuries, and blows incurred during
contact sports are frequently implicated in
children. x x x
The sheer impact of the stone thrown by
petitioner Calimutan at the back of the victim
Cantre could rupture or lacerate the spleen – an
organ described as vulnerable, superficial, and
fragile – even without causing any other external
physical injury. Accordingly, the findings of Dr.
Mendez that the victim Cantre died of internal
hemorrhage from his lacerated spleen, and the
cause of the laceration of the spleen was the stone
thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the back of the
victim Cantre, does not necessarily contradict his
testimony before the RTC that none of the
external injuries of the victim Cantre were fatal.
Based on the foregoing discussion, the
prosecution was able to establish that the
proximate cause of the death of the victim Cantre
was the stone thrown at him by petitioner
Calimutan. Proximate cause has been defined as
"that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred."27
The two other witnesses presented by the
prosecution, namely Sañano and Belen Cantre,
had adequately recounted the events that
transpired on 04 February 1996 to 05 February
1996. Between the two of them, the said
witnesses accounted for the whereabouts, actions,
and physical condition of the victim Cantre
during the said period. Before the encounter with
petitioner Calimutan and Bulalacao, the victim
Cantre seemed to be physically fine. However,
after being hit at the back by the stone thrown at
him by petitioner Calimutan, the victim Cantre
had continuously complained of backache.
Subsequently, his physical condition rapidly
deteriorated, until finally, he died. Other than
being stoned by petitioner Calimutan, there was
no other instance when the victim Cantre may
have been hit by another blunt instrument which
could have caused the laceration of his spleen.
Hence, this Court is morally persuaded that the
victim Cantre died from a lacerated spleen, an
injury sustained after being hit by a stone thrown
at him by petitioner Calimutan. Not even the
post-mortem report of Dr. Ulanday, the
Municipal Health Officer who first examined the
body of the victim Cantre, can raise reasonable
doubt as to the cause of death of the victim
Cantre. Invoking Dr. Ulanday’s post-mortem
report, the defense insisted on the possibility that
the victim Cantre died of food poisoning. The
post-mortem report, though, cannot be given
much weight and probative value for the
following reasons –
First, a closer scrutiny of the words used by Dr.
Ulanday in her post-mortem report, as well as in
the death certificate of the victim Cantre, reveals
that although she suspected food poisoning as the
cause of death, she held back from making a
categorical statement that it was so. In the post-
mortem report, 28 she found that "x x x the
provable (sic) cause of death was due to cardio-
respiratory arrest. Food poisoning must be
confirm (sic) by laboratory e(x)am." In the death
certificate of the victim Cantre, 29 she wrote that
the immediate cause of death was "Cardio-
Respiratory Arrest" and the antecedent cause was
"Food Poisoning Suspect." There was no showing
that further laboratory tests were indeed
conducted to confirm Dr. Ulanday’s suspicion
that the victim Cantre suffered from food
poisoning, and without such confirmation, her
suspicion as to the cause of death remains just
that – a suspicion.
Second, Dr. Ulanday executed before the NBI a
sworn statement30 in which she had explained her
findings in the post-mortem report, to wit –
05. Q: Did you conduct an autopsy on his
cadaver?
A: I did sir, but not as exhaustive as that done by
the NBI Medico-legal.
06. Q: Now, what do you want to state regarding
your certification on the death of PHILIP B.
CANTRE?
A: I stated in the certification and even in the
Death Certificate about "Food Poisoning". What I
stated in the Death Certificate was that CANTRE
was a SUSPECTED victim of food poisoning. I
didn’t state that he was a case of food poisoning.
And in the Certification, I even recommended
that an examination be done to confirm that
suspicion.
07. Q: What gave you that suspicion of
poisoning?
A: As there were no external signs of fatal
injuries except that of the contusion or abrasion,
measuring as that size of a 25 centavo coin, I
based my suspicion from the history of the victim
and from the police investigation.
08. Q: You also mentioned in your Certification
that there was no internal hemorrhage in the
cadaver. Did you open the body of the cadaver?
A: As I have already stated sir, I did not conduct
an exhaustive autopsy. I made an incision on the
abdomen and I explored the internal organs of the
cadaver with my hand in search for any clotting
inside. But I found none. I did not open the body
of the cadaver.
09. Q: You mentioned about a contusion you
have observed on the cadaver. Where was it
located?
A: On the left portion of his back, sir.
10. Q: Now, is it possible that if somebody be hit
by a hard object on that part of his body, his
SPLEEN could be injured?
A: Yes, sir. But that would depend on how strong
or forceful the impact was.
In contrast, Dr. Mendez described in his
testimony before the RTC31 how he conducted
the autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre, as
follows –
Q What specific procedure did you do in
connection with the exhumation of the body of
the victim in this case?
A We opened the head, chest and the abdomen.
Q That was part of the autopsy you have
conducted?
A Yes, sir.
Q Aside from opening the head as well as the
body of the victim Philip Cantre, what other
matters did you do in connection therewith?
A We examined the internal organs.
Q What in particular internal organs you have
examined?
A The brain, the heart, the lungs, the liver, the
kidneys, the pancreas plus the intestines.
xxxx
Q The cause of death as you have listed here in
your findings is listed as traumatic injury of the
abdomen, will you kindly tell us Doctor what is
the significance of this medical term traumatic
injury of the abdomen?
A We, medico-legal officers of the NBI don’t do
what other doctors do as they make causes of
death as internal hemorrhage we particularly
point to the injury of the body like this particular
case the injury was at the abdomen of the victim.
Q Will you tell as Doctor what particular portion
of the abdomen of the victim this traumatic injury
is located?
A Along the midline but the damaged organ was
at the left.
Q What particular organ are you referring to?
A The spleen, sir.
The difference in the extent of the examinations
conducted by the two doctors of the body of the
victim Cantre provides an adequate explanation
for their apparent inconsistent findings as to the
cause of death. Comparing the limited autopsy
conducted by Dr. Ulanday and her unconfirmed
suspicion of food poisoning of the victim Cantre,
as opposed to the exhaustive autopsy performed
by Dr. Mendez and his definitive finding of a
ruptured spleen as the cause of death of the
victim Cantre, then the latter, without doubt,
deserves to be given credence by the courts.
Third, that the prosecution no longer presented
Dr. Ulanday before the RTC despite being
included in its list of witnesses did not amount to
a willful suppression of evidence that would give
rise to the presumption that her testimony would
be adverse to the prosecution if produced.32 As
this Court already expounded in the case
of People v. Jumamoy33 –
The prosecution's failure to present the other
witnesses listed in the information did not
constitute, contrary to the contention of the
accused, suppression of evidence. The prosecutor
has the exclusive prerogative to determine the
witnesses to be presented for the prosecution. If
the prosecution has several eyewitnesses, as in
the instant case, the prosecutor need not present
all of them but only as many as may be needed to
meet the quantum of proof necessary to establish
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The testimonies of the other witnesses may,
therefore, be dispensed with for being merely
corroborative in nature. This Court has ruled that
the non-presentation of corroborative witnesses
would not constitute suppression of evidence and
would not be fatal to the prosecution's case.
Besides, there is no showing that the
eyewitnesses who were not presented in court as
witnesses were not available to the accused. We
reiterate the rule that the adverse presumption
from a suppression of evidence is not applicable
when (1) the suppression is not willful; (2) the
evidence suppressed or withheld is merely
corroborative or cumulative; (3) the evidence is at
the disposal of both parties; and (4) the
suppression is an exercise of a privilege.
Moreover, if the accused believed that the failure
to present the other witnesses was because their
testimonies would be unfavorable to the
prosecution, he should have compelled their
appearance, by compulsory process, to testify as
his own witnesses or even as hostile witnesses.
It was a judgment call for the prosecution to no
longer present Dr. Ulanday before the RTC,
perhaps believing that it had already presented
sufficient evidence to merit the conviction of
petitioner Calimutan even without her testimony.
There was nothing, however, preventing the
defense from calling on, or even compelling, with
the appropriate court processes, Dr. Ulanday to
testify in court as its witness if it truly believed
that her testimony would be adverse to the case
presented by the prosecution.
While this Court is in accord with the factual
findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals
and affirms that there is ample evidence proving
that the death of the victim Cantre was caused by
his lacerated spleen, an injury which resulted
from being hit by the stone thrown at him by
petitioner Calimutan, this Court, nonetheless, is
at variance with the RTC and the Court of
Appeals as to the determination of the appropriate
crime or offense for which the petitioner should
have been convicted for.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies
felonies according to the means by which they
are committed, in particular: (1) intentional
felonies, and (2) culpable felonies. These two
types of felonies are distinguished from each
other by the existence or absence of malicious
intent of the offender –
In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the
offender is malicious. In the language of Art. 3,
the act is performed with deliberate intent (with
malice). The offender, in performing the act or in
incurring the omission, has the intention to cause
an injury to another. In culpable felonies, the act
or omission of the offender is not malicious. The
injury caused by the offender to another person is
"unintentional, it being simply the incident of
another act performed without malice." (People
vs. Sara, 55 Phil. 939). As stated in Art. 3, the
wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.34
In the Petition at bar, this Court cannot, in good
conscience, attribute to petitioner Calimutan any
malicious intent to injure, much less to kill, the
victim Cantre; and in the absence of such intent,
this Court cannot sustain the conviction of
petitioner Calimutan for the intentional crime of
homicide, as rendered by the RTC and affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. Instead, this Court finds
petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the culpable felony of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide under Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code expressly
provides for the definition of reckless imprudence
– spree in Crossing Capsay, while petitioner
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but
without malice, doing or failing to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
person performing or failing to perform such act,
taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
There are several circumstances, discussed in the
succeeding paragraphs, that demonstrate
petitioner Calimutan’s lack of intent to kill the
victim Cantre, and conversely, that substantiate
the view of this Court that the death of victim
Cantre was a result of petitioner Calimutan’s
reckless imprudence. The RTC and the Court of
Appeals may have failed to appreciate, or had
completely overlooked, the significance of such
circumstances.
It should be remembered that the meeting of the
victim Cantre and witness Sañano, on the one
hand, and petitioner Calimutan and his helper
Bulalacao, on the other, was a chance encounter
as the two parties were on their way to different
destinations. The victim Cantre and witness
Sañano were on their way home from a drinking
Calimutan and his helper Bulalacao were walking
from the market to Crossing Capsay. While the
evidence on record suggests that a running
grudge existed between the victim Cantre and
Bulalacao, it did not establish that there was
likewise an existing animosity between the victim
Cantre and petitioner Calimutan.1avvphil.net
In both versions of the events of 04 February
1996 submitted by the prosecution and the
defense, it was the victim Cantre who was the
initial aggressor. He suddenly punched
Bulalacao, the helper and companion of petitioner
Calimutan, when they met on the road. The attack
of the victim Cantre was swift and unprovoked,
which spurred petitioner Calimutan into
responsive action. Given that this Court dismisses
the claim of petitioner Calimutan that the victim
Cantre was holding a knife, it does take into
account that the victim Cantre was considerably
older and bigger, at 26 years of age and with a
height of five feet and nine inches, compared to
Bulalacao, the boy he attacked, who was only 15
years old and stood at about five feet. Even with
his bare hands, the victim Cantre could have hurt
Bulalacao. Petitioner Calimutan sought only to
protect Bulalacao and to stop the assault of the
victim Cantre against the latter when he picked
up a stone and threw it at the victim Cantre. The
stone was readily available as a weapon to
petitioner Calimutan since the incident took place
on a road. That he threw the stone at the back of
the victim Cantre does not automatically imply
treachery on the part of petitioner Calimutan as it
is highly probable that in the midst of the fray, he
threw the stone rashly and impulsively, with no
regard as to the position of the victim Cantre.
When the victim Cantre stopped his aggression
after being hit by the stone thrown by petitioner
Calimutan, the latter also desisted from any other
act of violence against the victim Cantre.
The above-described incident could not have
taken more than just a few minutes. It was a very
brief scuffle, in which the parties involved would
hardly have the time to ponder upon the most
appropriate course of action to take. With this in
mind, this Court cannot concur in the declaration
made by the Court of Appeals that petitioner
Calimutan threw the stone at the victim Cantre as
a retaliatory act. It was evidently a swift and
spontaneous reaction to an unexpected and
unprovoked attack by the victim Cantre on
Bulalacao. That Bulalacao was already able to
run away from the victim Cantre may have
escaped the notice of the petitioner Calimutan
who, under the pressure of the circumstances,
was forced to act as quickly as possible.
The prosecution did not establish that petitioner
Calimutan threw the stone at the victim Cantre
with the specific intent of killing, or at the very
least, of harming the victim Cantre. What is
obvious to this Court was petitioner Calimutan’s
intention to drive away the attacker who was, at
that point, the victim Cantre, and to protect his
helper Bulalacao who was, as earlier described,
much younger and smaller in built than the victim
Cantre.35
Granting that petitioner Calimutan was impelled
by a lawful objective when he threw the stone at
the victim Cantre, his act was committed with
inexcusable lack of precaution. He failed to
consider that a stone the size of a man’s fist could
inflict substantial injury on someone. He also
miscalculated his own strength, perhaps unaware,
or even completely disbelieving, that he could
throw a stone with such force as to seriously
injure, or worse, kill someone, at a quite lengthy
distance of ten meters.
Since it is irrefragable that the stone thrown by
petitioner Calimutan at the victim Cantre was the
proximate cause of the latter’s death, despite MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
being done with reckless imprudence rather than Associate Justice
with malicious intent, petitioner Calimutan
remains civilly liable for such death. This Court, WE CONCUR:
therefore, retains the reward made by the RTC
and the Court of Appeals to the heirs of the ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
victim Cantre of the amount of ₱50,000.00 as Chief Justice
civil indemnity for his death and another Chairperson
₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
MA. ALICIA
CONSUELO
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the AUSTRIA-
YNARES-
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23306, MARTINEZ
SANTIAGO
dated 29 August 2001, affirming the Decision of Asscociate
Associate Justice
the RTC in Criminal Case No. 8184, dated 19 Justice
November 1998, is hereby MODIFIED.
Petitioner Calimutan is found GUILTY beyond ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence Associate Justice
resulting in homicide, under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, and is accordingly CERTIFICATION
sentenced to imprisonment for a minimum period
of 4 months of arresto mayor to a maximum Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the
period of two years and one day of prision Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
correccional. Petitioner Calimutan is further conclusions in the above Decision were reached
ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim Cantre in consultation before the case was assigned to
the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
the latter’s death and ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages. ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
SO ORDERED.
Sources:
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/feb200
6/gr_152133_2006.html
 Diego v. Castillo, AM RTJ-02-1673, Aug 11,
2004
A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673 August 11, 2004
EDUARDO P. DIEGO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE SILVERIO Q. CASTILLO,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, DAGUPAN
CITY, BRANCH 43, respondent.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is an administrative complaint against
Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo
for allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment in a criminal case and/or rendering
judgment in gross ignorance of the law.
The facts and circumstances of the criminal case
are summarized, as follows:
a) On January 9, 1965, accused Lucena Escoto
contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio, Jr.,
solemnized before then Mayor Liberato Reyna of
Dagupan City. The couple were both Filipinos. In
the marriage contract, the accused used and
adopted the name Crescencia Escoto, with a civil
status of single;
b) In a document dated February 15, 1978,
denominated as a "Decree of Divorce" and
purportedly issued to Jorge de Perio as petitioner
by the Family District Court of Harris County,
Texas (247th Judicial District), it was "ordered,
adjudged and decreed, that the bonds of
matrimony heretofore existing between Jorge de
Perio and Crescencia de Perio are hereby
Dissolved, Cancelled and Annulled and the
Petitioner is hereby granted a Divorce."
c) Subsequently, on June 4, 1987, the same
Crescencia Escoto contracted marriage with
herein complainant’s brother, Manuel P. Diego,
solemnized before the Rev. Fr. Clemente T.
Godoy, parish priest of Dagupan City. The
marriage contract shows that this time, the
accused used and adopted the name Lucena
Escoto, again, with a civil status of single.1
After trial of the criminal case for bigamy,
respondent Judge promulgated a decision, on
February 24, 1999, the dispositive part of which
stated:
WHEREFORE, for failure of the STATE to
prove accused’s guilt beyond whisper of doubt,
the COURT hereby orders her ACQUITTAL
with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.2
The decision states that the main basis for the
acquittal was good faith on the part of the
accused. Respondent Judge gave credence to the
defense of the accused that she acted without any
malicious intent. The combined testimonial and
documentary evidence of the defense was aimed
at convincing the court that accused Lucena
Escoto had sufficient grounds to believe that her
previous marriage to Jorge de Perio had been
validly dissolved by the divorce decree and that
she was legally free to contract the second
marriage with Manuel P. Diego.
In rendering the decision, respondent Judge
reasoned, thus:
While it is true that in our jurisdiction the
matrimonial bond between Jorge de Perio and the
accused are not yet annulled, it remains
undisputed that cessation of the same was
decreed in the Family District Court of Harris
County, Texas, 247th Judicial District, effective
February 15, 1978.
xxx
The CHARGE filed against the accused is
categorized as Mala en se (sic) which requires the
indispensable presence of criminal intent/dolo.
The felony on BIGAMY as defined and penalized
by the Revised Penal Code explicitly mandates
that it must be committed with criminal intent. In
other words, there must be an unquestionable
demonstration on the part of the perpetrator that
he/she criminally, willfully and unlawfully
contracted a second marriage despite knowledge
that his/her first marriage is still existing.
As borne out by the evidence adduced, the
accused contracted the second marriage after she
was informed and furnished of the Divorce
Decree which was granted by the Family District
Court of Harris County Texas in her favor.
As an ordinary laywoman accused being a
recipient of a divorce decree, she entertains the
impression that she can contract a subsequent
marriage which she did when she married the late
Manuel Diego.
To the honest evaluation of the Court the act
complained of against the accused is not patently
illegal for the reason that she acted in good faith
believing that her marriage was already annulled
by a foreign judgment.3
Complainant herein alleges that the decision
rendered by the respondent Judge is manifestly
against the law and contrary to the evidence. He
questions the evidentiary weight and
admissibility of the divorce decree as a basis for
the finding of good faith. In addition,
complainant stresses that the evidence on record
negates respondent Judge’s finding of good faith
on the part of the accused. Thus, complainant
urges this Court to impose sanctions upon
respondent Judge as, according to complainant,
these acts amount to knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment and/or gross ignorance of the
law.
In his comment, respondent Judge explains that
what was in issue was the criminal culpability of
the accused under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code. Respondent Judge does not dispute
that the second marriage was bigamous because
at the time it was contracted, the first marriage
was still subsisting since divorce is not
recognized in our country and because the
accused’s first husband was still alive.
Respondent Judge, however, maintains that what
was controlling was whether by virtue of the
divorce decree the accused honestly believed,
albeit mistakenly, that her first marriage had been
severed and she could marry again. According to
respondent Judge, the same is a state of mind
personal to the accused. He further stressed that
knowledge of the law should not be exacted
strictly from the accused since she is a lay person,
and that ineptitude should not be confused with
criminal intent.
By separate manifestations, both parties agreed to
submit the case for resolution based on the
pleadings.
The Disputed Decision
A careful study of the disputed decision reveals
that respondent Judge had been less than
circumspect in his study of the law and
jurisprudence applicable to the bigamy case.
In his comment, respondent Judge stated: "That
the accused married Manuel P. Diego in the
honest belief that she was free to do so by virtue
of the decree of divorce is a mistake of fact."
This Court, in People v. Bitdu,4 carefully
distinguished between a mistake of fact, which
could be a basis for the defense of good faith in a
bigamy case, from a mistake of law, which does
not excuse a person, even a lay person, from
liability. Bitdu held that even if the accused, who
had obtained a divorce under the Mohammedan
custom, honestly believed that in contracting her
second marriage she was not committing any
violation of the law, and that she had no criminal
intent, the same does not justify her act. This
Court further stated therein that with respect to
the contention that the accused acted in good
faith in contracting the second marriage,
believing that she had been validly divorced from
her first husband, it is sufficient to say that
everyone is presumed to know the law, and the
fact that one does not know that his act
constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt
him from the consequences thereof.5
Moreover, squarely applicable to the criminal
case for bigamy, is People v.
Schneckenburger, 6 where it was held that the
accused who secured a foreign divorce, and later
remarried in the Philippines, in the belief that the
foreign divorce was valid, is liable for bigamy.
These findings notwithstanding, the issue before
us is whether or not respondent Judge should be
held administratively liable for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment and/or gross
ignorance of the law.
Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment
Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is a
criminal offense defined and penalized under
Article 2047 of the Revised Penal Code. For
conviction to lie, it must be proved that the
judgment is unjust and that the judge knows that
it is unjust. Knowingly means consciously,
intelligently, willfully or intentionally. It is firmly
established in this jurisdiction that for a judge to
be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment, it must be shown that the judgment is
unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported
by the evidence, and that the same was made with
conscious and deliberate intent to do an
injustice.8
The law requires that (a) the offender is a judge;
(b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to
him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; (d)
he knew that said judgment is unjust.9 This Court
reiterates that in order to hold a judge liable, it
must be shown that the judgment is unjust and
that it was made with conscious and deliberate
intent to do an injustice. That good faith is a
defense to the charge of knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment remains the law.10
As held in Alforte v. Santos,11 even assuming that
a judge erred in acquitting an accused, she still
cannot be administratively charged lacking the
element of bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose.
Malice or bad faith on the part of the judge in
rendering an unjust decision must still be proved
and failure on the part of the complainant to
prove the same warrants the dismissal of the
administrative complaint.12
There is, therefore, no basis for the charge of
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.
Gross Ignorance of the Law
Anent the charge of gross ignorance of the
law, Mañozca v. Domagas,13 is instructive.
Therein respondent judge was charged with gross
ignorance of the law resulting in a manifestly
unjust judgment for granting a demurrer to the
evidence in a bigamy case. The grant of the
demurrer to the evidence was based on the
judge’s finding of good faith on the part of the
accused, anchored upon a document denominated
as a "Separation of Property with Renunciation of
Rights." This Court stated that said act of the
judge exhibited ignorance of the law, and
accordingly he was fined in the amount
of P5,000.
Also, in Guillermo v. Reyes, Jr.,14 where therein
respondent judge was given a reprimand with a
stern warning of a more severe penalty should the
same or similar act be committed in the future,
this Court explained:
We have heretofore ruled that a judge may not be
held administratively accountable for every
erroneous order or decision he renders. To
unjustifiably hold otherwise, assuming that he
has erred, would be nothing short of harassment
and would make his position doubly unbearable,
for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret
the law in the process of administering justice can
be infallible in his judgment. The error must be
gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in evident
bad faith. It is only in this latter instance, when
the judge acts fraudulently or with gross
ignorance, that administrative sanctions are called
for as an imperative duty of this Court.
As a matter of public policy then, the acts of a
judge in his official capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action, even though such acts are
erroneous. Good faith and absence of malice,
corrupt motives or improper considerations are
sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with
ignorance of the law can find refuge. It does not
mean, however, that a judge, given the leeway he
is accorded in such cases, should not evince due
care in the performance of his adjudicatory
prerogatives.
15
Furthermore, in Wingarts v. Mejia, where
therein respondent judge, although absolved of
any guilt for the charge of knowingly rendering
an unjust judgment, was still imposed sanctions
by this Court, thus:
In any event, respondent judge deserves to be
appropriately penalized for his regrettably
erroneous action in connection with Criminal
Case No. 2664 of his court. We have repeatedly
stressed that a municipal trial judge occupies the
forefront of the judicial arm that is closest in
reach to the public he serves, and he must
accordingly act at all times with great constancy
and utmost probity. Any kind of failure in the
discharge of this grave responsibility cannot be
countenanced, in order to maintain the faith of the
public in the judiciary, especially on the level of
courts to which most of them resort for redress.16
Applying these precedents to the present case, the
error committed by respondent Judge being gross
and patent, the same constitutes ignorance of the
law of a nature sufficient to warrant disciplinary
action.
Penalty
After evaluation of the merits of the case, the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
recommended that respondent Judge be
reprimanded with a stern warning of a more
severe penalty in the future.
The act of respondent Judge in rendering the
decision in question took place on February 24,
1999 or before the effectivity, on October 1,
2001, of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC which classified
gross ignorance of the law as a serious charge and
penalized the offense with a fine of not less
than P20,000 but not more than P40,000.
Applying the rule as then prevailing,17 and in line
with applicable jurisprudence,18 the sanction on
respondent Judge should be a fine in the amount
of P10,000.
WHEREFORE, Regional Trial Court Judge
Silverio Q. Castillo is hereby FINED in the
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
 SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Sources:
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/aug200
4/am_rtj_02_1673_2004.html
B. Mala in se v. Mala Prohibita
 People v. Bayona, 61 Phil. 181
G.R. No. L-42288 February 16, 1935
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CORNELIO BAYONA, defendant-appellant.
Gervasio Diaz for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for
appellee.
VICKERS, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of Judge
Braulio Bejasa in the Court of First Instance of
Capiz, finding the defendant guilty of a violation
of section 416 of the Election Law and
sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for thirty
days and to pay a fine of P50, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs.
The facts as found by the trial judge are as
follows:
A eso de las once de la mañana del dia 5 de junio
de 1934, mientras se celebrahan las elecciones
generales en el precinto electoral numero 4,
situado en el Barrio de Aranguel del Municipio
de Pilar, Provincia de Capiz, el aqui acusado fue
sorprendido por Jose E. Desiderio, que era
entonces el representante del Departamento del
Interior para inspecionar las elecciones generales
en la Provincia de Capiz, y por el comandante de
la Constabularia F.B. Agdamag que iba en
aquella ocasion con el citado Jose E. Desiderio,
portando en su cinto el revolver Colt de calibre
32, No. 195382, Exhibit A, dentro del cerco que
rodeaba el edificio destinado para el citado
colegio electoral numero 4 y a una distancia de
22 metros del referido colegio electoral.
Inmediatament Jose E. Desiderio se incauto del
revolver en cuestion.
La defensa, por medio del testimonio de Jose D.
Benliro y de Dioscoro Buenvenida, trato de
establecer que el aqui acusado paro en la calle
que daba frente al colegio electoral numero 4 a
invitacion de dicho Jose D. Benliro y con el
objeto de suplicarle al mencionado acusado para
llevar a su casa a los electores del citado Jose D.
Benliro que ya habian terminado de votar, y que
cuando llegaron Jose E. Desidierio y el
comadante F.B. Agdamag, el aqui acusado estaba
en la calle. Desde el colegio electoral hasta el
sitio en que, segun dichos testigos, estaba el
acusado cuando se le quito el revolver Exhibit a,
hay una distancia de 27 metros.
Appellant's attorney makes the following
assignments of error:
1. El Juzgado a quo erro al declarar que el
apelante fue sorprendido con su revolver dentro
del cerco de la casa escuela del Barrio de
Aranguel, Municipio de Pilar, que fue habilitado
como colegio electoral.
2. El Juzgado a quo erro al declarar al apelante
culpable de la infraccion de la Ley Electoral
querrellada y, por consiguiente, al condenarle a
prision y multa.
As to the question of fact raised by the first
assignment of error, it is sufficient to say that the
record shows that both Jose E. Desiderio, a
representative of the Department of the Interior,
and Major Agdamag of the Philippine
Constabulary, who had been designated to
supervise the elections in the Province of Capiz,
testified positively that the defendant was within
the fence surrounding the polling place when
Desiderio took possession of the revolver the
defendant was carrying. This also disposes of that
part of the argument under the second assignment
of error based on the theory that the defendant
was in a public road, where he had a right to be,
when he was arrested. The latter part of the
argument under the second assignment of error is
that if it be conceded that the defendant went
inside of the fence, he is nevertheless not guilty
of a violation of the Election Law, because he
was called by a friend and merely approached
him to find out what he wanted and had no
interest in the election; that there were many
people in the public road in front of the polling
place, and the defendant could not leave his
revolver in his automobile, which he himself was
driving, without running the risk of losing it and
thereby incurring in a violation of the law.
As to the contention that the defendant could not
leave his revolver in his automobile without the
risk of losing it because he was alone, it is
sufficient to say that under the circumstances it
was not necessary for the defendant to leave his
automobile merely because somebody standing
near the polling place had called him, nor does
the record show that it was necessary for the
defendant to carry arms on that occasion.
The Solicitor-General argues that since the
Government does not especially construct
buildings for electoral precincts but merely
utilizes whatever building there may be available,
and all election precincts are within fifty meters
from some road, a literal application of the law
would be absurd, because members of the police
force or Constabulary in pursuit of a criminal
would be included in that prohibition and could
not use the road in question if they were carrying
firearms; that people living in the vicinity of
electoral precincts would be prohibited from
cleaning or handling their firearms within their
own residences on registration and election days;
That the object of the Legislature was merely to
prohibit the display of firearms with intention to
influence in any way the free and voluntary
exercise of suffrage;
That if the real object of the Legislature was to
insure the free exercise of suffrage, the
prohibition in question should only be applied
when the facts reveal that the carrying of the
firearms was intended for the purpose of using
them directly or indirectly to influence the free
choice of the electors (citing the decision of this
court in the case of People vs. Urdeleon [G.R.
No. 31536, promulgated November 20, 1929, not
reported], where a policeman, who had been sent
to a polling place to preserve order on the request
of the chairman of the board of election
inspectors, was acquitted); that in the case at bar
there is no evidence that the defendant went to
the election precinct either to vote or to work for
the candidacy of anyone, but on the other hand
the evidence shows that the defendant had no
intention to go to the electoral precinct; that he
was merely passing along the road in front of the
building where the election was being held when
a friend of his called him; that while in the strict,
narrow interpretation of the law the defendant is
guilty, it would be inhuman and unreasonable to
convict him.
We cannot accept the reasons advanced by the
Solicitor-General for the acquittal of the
defendant. The law which the defendant violated
is a statutory provision, and the intent with which
he violated it is immaterial. It may be conceded
that the defendant did not intend to intimidate any
elector or to violate the law in any other way, but
when he got out of his automobile and carried his
revolver inside of the fence surrounding the
polling place, he committed the act complained
of, and he committed it willfully. The act
prohibited by the Election Law was complete.
The intention to intimidate the voters or to
interfere otherwise with the election is not made
an essential element of the offense. Unless such
an offender actually makes use of his revolver, it
would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
prove that he intended to intimidate the voters.
The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a
criminal intent, but in those mala prohibita it is
sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally
done. "Care must be exercised in distinguishing
the difference between the intent to commit the
crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. ..."
(U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil., 128.)
While it is true that, as a rule and on principles of
abstract justice, men are not and should not be
held criminally responsible for acts committed by
them without guilty knowledge and criminal or at
least evil intent (Bishop's New Crim. Law, vol. I,
sec. 286), the courts have always recognized the
power of the legislature, on grounds of public
policy and compelled by necessity, "the great
master of things", to forbid in a limited class of
cases the doing of certain acts, and to make their
commission criminal without regard to the intent
of the doer. (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil., 128;
U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488.) In such cases
no judicial authority has the power to require, in
the enforcement of the law, such knowledge or
motive to be shown. (U.S. vs. Siy Cong Bieng
and Co Kong, 30 Phil., 577.)
The cases suggested by the Solicitor-General do
not seem to us to present any difficulty in the
enforcement of the law. If a man with a revolver
merely passes along a public road on election
day, within fifty meters of a polling place, he
does not violate the provision of law in question,
because he had no intent to perpetrate the act
prohibited, and the same thing would be true of a
peace officer in pursuing a criminal; nor would
the prohibition extend to persons living within
fifty meters of a polling place, who merely clean
or handle their firearms within their own
residences on election day, as they would not be
carrying firearms within the contemplation of the
law; and as to the decision in the case of People
vs. Urdeleon, supra, we have recently held in the
case of People vs. Ayre, and Degracia (p.
169, ante), that a policeman who goes to a
polling place on the request of the board of
election inspectors for the purpose of maintaining
order is authorized by law to carry his arms.
If we were to adopt the specious reasoning that
the appellant should be acquitted because it was
not proved that he tried to influence or intended
to influence the mind of any voter, anybody
could sell intoxicating liquor or hold a cockfight
or a horse race on election day with impunity.
As to the severity of the minimum penalty
provided by law for a violation of the provision
in question, that is a matter for the Chief
Executive or the Legislature.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed
from is affirmed, with the costs against the
appellant.
Avanceña, C.J., Street, Abad Santos, and Hull,
JJ., concur.
Sources:
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1935/feb193
5/gr_l-42288_1935.html
 US v. Chico, 14 Phil. 128
G.R. No. 4963 September 15, 1909
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GO CHICO, defendant-appellant.
Gibbs and Gale for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for
appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
The defendant is charged with the violation of
section 1 of Act No. 1696 of the Philippine
Commission, which reads as follows:
Any person who shall expose, or cause or permit
to be exposed, to public view on his own
premises, or who shall expose, or cause to be
exposed, to public view, either on his own
premises or elsewhere, any flag, banner, emblem,
or device used during the late insurrection in the
Philippine Islands to designate or identify those
in armed rebellion against the United States, or
any flag, banner, emblem, or device used or
adopted at any time by the public enemies of the
United States in the Philippine Island for the
purpose of public disorder or of rebellion or
insurrection against the authority of the United
States in the Philippine Islands, or any flag,
banner, emblem, or device of the Katipunan
Society, or which is commonly known as such,
shall be punished by a fine of not less that five
hundred pesos for more than five thousand pesos,
or by imprisonment for not less than three months
nor more than five years, or by both such fine and
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
The defendant was tried in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila on the 8th day of
September, 1908. After hearing the evidence
adduced the court adjudged the defendant guilty
of the crime charged and sentenced him under
that judgment to pay a fine of P500, Philippine
currency, and to pay the costs of the action, and
to suffer subsidiary imprisonment during the time
and in the form and in the place prescribed by
law until said fine should be paid. From that
judgment and sentence the defendant appealed to
this court.
A careful examination of the record brought to
this court discloses the following facts:
That on or about the 4th day of August, 1908, in
the city of Manila, the appellant Go Chico
displayed in one of the windows and one of the
show cases of his store, No. 89 Calle Rosario, a
number of medallions, in the form of a small
button, upon the faces of which were imprinted in
miniature the picture of Emilio Aguinaldo, and
the flag or banner or device used during the late
insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate
and identify those in armed insurrection against
the United States. On the day previous to the one
above set forth the appellant had purchased the
stock of goods in said store, of which the
medallions formed a part, at a public sale made
under authority of the sheriff of the city of
Manila. On the day in question, the 4th of August
aforesaid, the appellant was arranging his stock
of goods for the purpose of displaying them to
the public and in so doing placed in his showcase
and in one of the windows of his store the
medallions described. The appellant was ignorant
of the existence of a law against the display of the
medallions in question and had consequently no
corrupt intention. The facts above stated are
admitted.
The appellant rests his right to acquittal upon two
propositions:
First. That before a conviction under the law cited
can be had, a criminal intent upon the part of the
accused must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Second. That the prohibition of the law is
directed against the use of the identical banners,
devices, or emblems actually used during the
Philippine insurrection by those in armed
rebellion against the United States.
In the opinion of this court it is not necessary that
the appellant should have acted with the criminal
intent. In many crimes, made such by statutory
enactment, the intention of the person who
commits the crime is entirely immaterial. This is
necessarily so. If it were not, the statute as a
deterrent influence would be substantially
worthless. It would be impossible of execution.
In many cases the act complained of is itself that
which produces the pernicious effect which the
statute seeks to avoid. In those cases the
pernicious effect is produced with precisely the
same force and result whether the intention of the
person performing the act is good or bad. The
case at bar is a perfect illustration of this. The
display of a flag or emblem used particularly
within a recent period, by the enemies of the
Government tends to incite resistance to
governmental functions and insurrection against
governmental authority just as effectively if made
in the best of good faith as if made with the most
corrupt intent. The display itself, without the
intervention of any other factor, is the evil. It is
quite different from that large class of crimes,
made such by the common law or by statute, in
which the injurious effect upon the public
depends upon the corrupt intention of the person
perpetrating the act. If A discharges a loaded gun
and kills B, the interest which society has in the
act depends, not upon B's death, upon the
intention with which A consummated the act. If
the gun were discharged intentionally, with the
purpose of accomplishing the death of B, then
society has been injured and its security violated;
but if the gun was discharged accidentally on the
part of A, then society, strictly speaking, has no
concern in the matter, even though the death of B
results. The reason for this is that A does not
become a danger to society and institutions until
he becomes a person with a corrupt mind. The
mere discharge of the gun and the death of B do
not of themselves make him so. With those two
facts must go the corrupt intent to kill. In the case
at bar, however, the evil to society and the
Governmental does not depend upon the state of
mind of the one who displays the banner, but
upon the effect which that display has upon the
public mind. In the one case the public is affected
by the intention of the actor; in the other by the
act itself.
It is stated in volume 12 of Cyc., page 148, that
—
The legislature, however, may forbid the doing of
an act and make its commission a crime without
regard to the intent of the doer, and if such an
intention appears the courts must give it effect
although the intention may have been innocent.
Whether or not in a given case the statute is to be
so construed is to be determined by the court by
considering the subject-matter of the prohibition
as well as the language of the statute, and thus
ascertaining the intention of the legislature.
In the case of The People vs. Kibler (106 N. Y.,
321) the defendant was charged with the sale of
adulterated milk under a statute reading as
follows:
No person or persons shall sell or exchange or
expose for sale or exchange any impure,
unhealthy, adulterated, of unwholesome milk.
It was proved in that case that one Vandeburg
purchased at the defendant's store 1 pint of milk
which was shown to contain a very small
percentage of water more than that permitted by
the statute. There was no dispute about the facts,
but the objection made by the defendant was that
he was not allowed, upon the trial, to show an
absence of criminal intent, or to go the jury upon
the question whether it existed, but was
condemned under a charge from the court which
made his intent totally immaterial and his guilt
consist in having sold the adulterated article
whether he knew it or not and however carefully
he may have sought to keep on hand and sell the
genuine article.
The opinion of the court in that case says:
As the law stands, knowledge or intention forms
no elements of the offense. The act alone,
irrespective of its motive, constitutes the crime.
xxx xxx xxx
It is notorious that the adulteration of food
products has grown to proportions so enormous
as to menace the health and safety of the people.
Ingenuity keeps pace with greed, and the careless
and heedless consumers are exposed to increasing
perils. To redress such evils is a plain duty but a
difficult task. Experience has taught the lesson
that repressive measures which depend for their
efficiency upon proof of the dealer's knowledge
or of his intent to deceive and defraud are of title
use and rarely accomplish their purpose. Such an
emergency may justify legislation which throws
upon the seller the entire responsibility of the
purity and soundness of what he sells and
compels him to know and certain.
In the case of Gardner vs. The People (62 N. Y.,
299) the question arose under a statute which
provided that an inspector of elections of the city
of New York should not be removed from office
except "after notice in writing to the officer
sought to be removed, which notice shall set forth
clearly and distinctly the reasons for his
removal," and further provided that any person
who removed such an officer without such notice
should be guilty of a misdemeanor. An officer
named Sheridan was removed by Gardener, the
defendant, without notice. Gardener was arrested
and convicted of a misdemeanor under the
statute. He appealed from the judgment of
conviction and the opinion from which the
following quotation is made was written upon the
decision of that appeal. Chief Justice Church,
writing the opinion of the court, says in relation
to criminal intent:
In short, the defense was an honest
misconstruction of the law under legal device.
The court ruled out the evidence offered, and held
that intentionally doing the act prohibited
constituted the offense. It is quite clear that the
facts offered to be shown, if true, would relieve
the defendant from the imputation of a corrupt
intent, and, indeed, from any intent to violate the
statute. The defendants made a mistake of law.
Such mistakes do not excuse the commission of
prohibited acts. "The rule on the subject appears
to be, that in acts mala in se, intent governs but in
those mala prohibit a, the only inquiry is, has the
law been violated?
xxx xxx xxx
The authorities seem to establish that sustain and
indictment for doing a prohibited act, it is
sufficient to prove that the act was knowingly and
intentionally done.
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, if the defendants could have shown
that they believed that in fact notice had been
given to the inspector, although it had not, they
would not have been guilty of the offense,
because the intention to do the act would have
been wanting. Their plea is: True, we intended to
remove the inspector without notice, but we
thought the law permitted it. This was a mistake
of law, and is not strictly a defense.
xxx xxx xxx
If the offense is merely technical, the punishment
can be made correspondingly nominal; while a
rule requiring proof of a criminal intent to violate
the statute, independent of an intent to do the act
which the statute declares shall constitute the
offense, would, in many cases, prevent the
restraining influence which the statute was
designed to secure.
In the case of Fiedler vs. Darrin (50 N.Y., 437)
the court says:
But when an act is illegal, the intent of the
offender is immaterial.
In the case of The Commonwealth vs. Murphy
(165 Mass., 66) the court says:
In general, it may be said that there must
be malus animus, or a criminal intent. But there is
a large class of cases in which, on grounds of
public policy, certain acts are made punishable
without proof that the defendant understands the
facts that give character to his act.
In such cases it is deemed best to require
everybody at his peril to ascertain whether his act
comes within the legislative prohibition.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering the nature of the offense, the purpose
to be accomplished, the practical methods
available for the enforcement of the law, and such
other matters as throw light upon the meaning of
the language, the question in interpreting a
criminal statute is whether the intention of the
legislature was to make knowledge of the facts an
essential element of the offense, or to put upon
everyone the burden of finding out whether his
contemplated act is prohibited, and of refraining
from it if it is.
In the case of Halsted vs. The State (41 N. J. L.,
552; 32 Am. Rep., 247), the question of a
criminal intent arose under a statute, under which
the defendant was convicted of a crime,
providing that if any township committee or other
body shall disburse or vote for the disbursement
of public moneys in excess of appropriations
made for the purpose, the persons constituting
such board shall be guilty of a crime. The
defendant was one who violated this law by
voting to incur obligations in excess of the
appropriation. He was convicted and appealed
and the opinion from which the quotation is taken
was written upon a decision of that appeal. That
court says:
When the State had closed, the defense offered to
show that the defendant, in aiding in the passage
and effectuation of the resolution which I have
pronounced to be illegal, did so under the advice
of counsel and in good faith, and from pure and
honest motives, and that he therein exercise due
care and caution.
xxx xxx xxx
As there is an undoubted competency in the
lawmaker to declare an act criminal, irrespective
of the knowledge or motive of the doer of such
act, there can be of necessity, no judicial
authority having the power to require, in the
enforcement of the law, such knowledge or
motive to be shown. In such instances the entire
function of the court is to find out the intention of
the legislature, and to enforce the law in absolute
conformity to such intention. And in looking over
the decided cases on the subject it will be found
that in the considered adjudications this inquiry
has been the judicial guide.
In the case of Rex vs. Ogden (6 C. & P., 631; 25
E. C. L., 611), the prisoner was indicted for
unlawfully transposing from one piece of
wrought plate to another the lion-
poisson contrary to the statutes. It was conceded
that the act was done without any fraudulent
intention. The court said:
There are no words in the act of Parliament
referring to any fraudulent intention. The words
of it are, 'Shall transpose or remove, or cause of
procure to be transposed or removed, from one
piece of wrought plate to another.
In the case of The State vs. McBrayer (98 N. C.,
623) the court stated:
It is a mistaken notion that positive, willful intent
to violate the criminal law is an essential
ingredient in every criminal offense, and that
where is an absence of such intent there is no
offense; this is especially true as to statutory
offenses. When the statute plainly forbids an act
to be done, and it is done by some person, the law
implies conclusively the guilty intent, although
the offender was honestly mistaken as to the
meaning of the law he violates. When the
language is plain and positive, and the offense is
not made to depend upon the positive, willful
intent and purpose, nothing is left to
interpretation.
In the case of the Commonwealth vs. Weiss (139
Pa. St., 247), the question arose on an appeal by
the defendant from a judgment requiring him to
pay a penalty for a violation of the statute of the
State which provided that any person would be
liable to pay a penalty "who shall manufacture,
sell, or offer or expose for sale, or have in his
possession with intent to sell," oleomargarine,
etc. At the trial the defendant requested the court
to instruct the injury that if they believed, from
the evidence, that the defendant did not
knowingly furnish or authorize to be furnished, or
knew of there furnished, to any of his customers
any oleomargarine, but, as far as he knew,
furnished genuine butter, then the verdict must be
for the defendant. The court refused to make the
charge as requested and that is the only point
upon which the defendant appealed.
The court says:
The prohibition is absolute and general; it could
not be expressed in terms more explicit and
comprehensive. The statutory definition of the
offense embraces no word implying that the
forbidden act shall be done knowingly or
willfully, and if it did, the designed purpose of
the act would be practically defeated. The
intention of the legislature is plain, that persons
engaged in the traffic so engage in it at their peril
and that they can not set up their ignorance of the
nature and qualities of the commodities they sell,
as a defense.
The following authorities are to the same effect:
State vs. Gould (40 Ia., 374);
Commonwealth vs. Farren (9 Allen, 489);
Commonwealth vs. Nichols (10 Allen, 199);
Commonwealth vs. Boyton (2 Allen, 160);
Wharton's Criminal Law, section 2442;
Commonwealth vs. Sellers (130 Pa., 32); 3
Greenleaf on Evidence, section 21;
Farrell vs. The State (32 Ohio State, 456);
Beekman vs. Anthony (56 Miss., 446); The
People vs. Roby (52 Mich., 577).
It is clear from the authorities cited that in the act
under consideration the legislature did not intend
that a criminal intent should be a necessary
element of the crime. The statutory definition of
the offense embraces no word implying that the
prohibited act shall be done knowingly or
willfully. The wording is plain. The Act means
what it says. Nothing is left to the interpretation.
Care must be exercised in distiguishing the
differences between the intent to commit the
crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. The
accused did not consciously intend to commit a
crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and the
act is, by the very nature of things, the crime
itself — intent and all. The wording of the law is
such that the intent and the act are inseparable.
The act is the crime. The accused intended to put
the device in his window. Nothing more is
required to commit the crime.
We do not believe that the second proposition of
the accused, namely, that the law is applicable
only to the identical banners, etc., actually used in
the late insurrection, and not to duplicates of
those banners, can be sustained.
It is impossible that the Commission should have
intended to prohibit the display of the flag or
flags actually used in the insurrection, and, at the
same time, permit exact duplicates thereof
(saving, perhaps, size) to be displayed without
hindrance. In the case before us, to say that the
display of a certain banner is a crime and that the
display of its exact duplicate is not is to say
nonsense. The rules governing the interpretation
of statutes are rules of construction not
destruction. To give the interpretation contended
for by the appellant would, as to this particular
provision, nullify the statute altogether.
The words "used during the late insurrection in
the Philippine Islands to designate or identity
those in armed rebellion against the United
States" mean not only the identical flags actually
used in the insurrection, but any flag which is of
that type. This description refers not to a
particular flag, but to a type of flag. That phrase
was used because there was and is no other way
of describing that type of flag. While different
words might be employed, according to the taste
of the draftsman, the method of description
would have to be the same. There is no concrete
word known by which that flag could be aptly or
properly described. There was no opportunity,
within the scope of a legislative enactment, to
describe the physical details. It had no
characteristics whatever, apart from its use in the
insurrection, by which it could, in such
enactment, be identified. The great and the only
characteristic which it had upon the which the
Commission could seize as a means of
description and identification was the fact that it
was used in the insurrection. There was,
therefore, absolutely no way in which the
Commission could, in the Act, describe the flag
except by reciting where and how it was used. It
must not be forgotten that the Commission, by
the words and phrases used, was not attempting
to describe a particular flag, but a type of flag.
They were not describing a flag used upon a
particular field or in a certain battle, but a type of
flag used by an army — a flag under which many
persons rallied and which stirred their sentiments
and feelings wherever seen or in whatever form it
appeared. It is a mere incident of description that
the flag was used upon a particular field or in a
particular battle. They were describing the flag
not a flag. It has a quality and significance and an
entity apart from any place where or form in
which it was used.
Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to
be incapable of being used in more than one
sense, and the literal interpretation of a statute
may lead to an absurdity or evidently fail to give
the real intent of the legislature. When this is the
case, resort is had to the principle that the spirit of
a law controls the letter, so that a thing which is
within the intention of a statute is as much within
the statute as if it were within the letter, and a
thing which is within the letter of the statute is
not within the statute unless it be within the
intention of the makers, and the statute should be
construed as to advance the remedy and suppress
the mischief contemplated by the framers. (U.
S. vs. Kirby, 7 Wall., 487; State Bolden, 107 La.,
116, 118; U.S. vs.Buchanan, 9 Fed. Rep., 689;
Green vs. Kemp, 13 Mass., 515; Lake Shore R.
R. Co. vs. Roach, 80 N. Y., 339;
Delafield vs. Brady, 108 N. Y., 524
Doyle vs. Doyle, 50 Ohio State, 330.)
The intention of the legislature and the object
aimed at, being the fundamental inquiry in
judicial construction, are to control the literal
interpretation of particular language in a statute,
and language capable of more than one meaning
is to be taken in that sense which will harmonize
with such intention and object, and effect the
purpose of the enactment. (26 Am. & Eng. Ency.
of Law., 602.)
Literally hundreds of cases might be cited to
sustain this proposition.
The preamble is no part of the statute, but as
setting out the object and intention of the
legislature, it is considered in the construction of
an act. Therefore, whenever there is ambiguity, or
wherever the words of the act have more than one
meaning, and there is no doubt as to the subject-
matter to which they are to be applied, the
preamble may be used." (U. S. vs. Union Pacific
R. R. Co., 91 U. S., 72; Platt vs. Union Pacific R.
R. Co., 99 U. S., 48; Myer vs. Western Car Co.,
102 U. S., 1; Holy Trinity Church vs. U. S., 143
U. S., 457; Coosaw Mining Co. vs. South
Carolina, 144 U. S., 550; Cohn vs. Barrett, 5 Cal.,
195; Barnes vs. Jones, 51 Cal., 303;
Field vs. Gooding, 106 Mass., 310;
People vs. Molineaux, 40 N. Y., 113;
Smith vs. The People, 47 N. Y., 330; The
People vs. Davenport, 91 N.Y., 547; The
People vs. O'Brien, 111 N.Y., 1)
The statute, then, being penal, must be construed
with such strictness as to carefully safeguard the
rights of the defendant and at the same time
preserve the obvious intention of the legislature.
If the language be plain, it will be construed as it
reads, and the words of the statute given their full
meaning; if ambiguous, the court will lean more
strongly in favor of the defendant than it would if
the statute were remedial. In both cases it will
endeavor to effect substantial justice."
(Bolles vs. Outing Co., 175 U. S., 262, 265; U.
S. vs. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat., 76, 95; U.
S. vs. Reese, 92 U. S., 214)
It is said that notwithstanding this rule (the penal
statutes must be construde strictly) the intention
of the lawmakers must govern in the construction
of penal as well as other statutes. This is true, but
this is not a new, independent rule which subverts
the old. It is a modification of the known maxim
and amounts to this -- that though penal statutes
are to be construed strictly, they are not be
construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious
purpose of the legislature. (U. S. vs. Wiltberger, 5
Wheat., 76; Taylor vs. Goodwin, L. R. 4, Q. B.
Civ., 228.)
In the latter case it was held that under a statute
which imposed a penalty for "furiously driving
any sort of carriage" a person could be convicted
for immoderately driving a bicycle.
It is presumed that the legislature intends to
impart to its enactments such a meaning as will
render then operative and effective, and to
prevent persons from eluding or defeating them.
Accordingly, in case of any doubt or obscurity,
the construction will be such as to carry out these
objects. (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 106.)
In The People vs. Supervisors (43 N. Y., 130) the
court said:
The occasion of the enactment of a law always be
referred to in interpreting and giving effect to it.
The court should place itself in the situation of
the legislature and ascertain the necessity and
probable object of the statute, and then give such
construction to the language used as to carry the
intention of the legislature into effect so far as it
can be ascertained from the terms of the statute
itself. (U. S. vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 91 U. S.,
72, 79.)
We do not believe that in construing the statute in
question there is necessity requiring that clauses
should be taken from the position given them and
placed in other portions of the statute in order to
give the whole Act a reasonable meaning.
Leaving all of the clauses located as they now are
in the statute, a reasonable interpretation, based
upon the plain and ordinary meaning of the words
used, requires that the Act should be held
applicable to the case at bar.
The judgment of the court below and the sentence
imposed thereunder are hereby affirmed. So
ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, and Carson, JJ., concur.
Sources:
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1909/sep190
9/gr_4963_1909.html
 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 148560,
Nov. 19, 2011
G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty,
unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the
rights of the individual from the vast powers of
the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But
even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating
the limits on individuality beyond which the State
cannot tread - asserting that "individual
spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with
very little regard to social interference - he
veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights
and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation,
which society is justified in enforcing at all cost,
against those who would endeavor to withhold
fulfillment. Thus he says -
The sole end for which mankind is warranted,
individually or collectively, in interfering with the
liberty of action of any of their number, is self-
protection. The only purpose for which power
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and
illimitable right of the State to self-preservation.
With the end of maintaining the integrity and
cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the
State to formulate a system of laws that would
compel obeisance to its collective wisdom and
inflict punishment for non-observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism
to unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in
the social order, carrying with it a new
formulation of fundamental rights and duties
more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary
socio-political ideologies. In the process, the web
of rights and State impositions became tangled
and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple
shades and colors, the skein irregular and broken.
Antagonism, often outright collision, between the
law as the expression of the will of the State, and
the zealous attempts by its members to preserve
their individuality and dignity, inevitably
followed. It is when individual rights are pitted
against State authority that judicial conscience is
put to its severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-
ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080
(An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder),1 as amended by RA 7659,2 wishes to
impress upon us that the assailed law is so
defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but
distinct line which divides the valid from the
constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a
stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder
Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly
because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the
vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the
"reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element
of mens rea in crimes already punishable
under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are
purportedly clear violations of the fundamental
rights of the accused to due process and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law
claimed by petitioner to have transgressed
constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2
and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means
any asset, property, business, enterprise or
material possession of any person within the
purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by
him directly or indirectly through dummies,
nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business
associates by any combination or series of the
following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion,
misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids
on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any
commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or
any other form of pecuniary benefit from any
person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of
the office or position of the public office
concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or
disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies
or instrumentalities, or government owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly
or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any
other form of interest or participation including
the promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or
commercial monopolies or other combinations
and/or implementation of decrees and orders
intended to benefit particular persons or special
interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position,
authority, relationship, connection or influence to
unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder,
Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or
in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons,
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of overt
or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d)
hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of
at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall
be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any
person who participated with the said public
officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall
likewise be punished for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the degree of
participation and the attendance of mitigating
and extenuating circumstances as provided by the
Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the
court. The court shall declare any and all ill-
gotten wealth and their interests and other
incomes and assets including the properties and
shares of stocks derived from the deposit or
investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State
(underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of
establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act
done by the accused in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring
supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman
filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate
Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No.
26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by
RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562,
inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par.
(a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively;
(c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7,
par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for
Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code);
and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of
An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus
Motion for the remand of the case to the
Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with
respect to specification "d" of the charges in the
Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for
reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses
under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the
accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits
and other documents necessary to prove lack of
probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised
were only lack of preliminary investigation,
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and
opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The
purported ambiguity of the charges and the
vagueness of the law under which they are
charged were never raised in that Omnibus
Motion thus indicating the explicitness and
comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third
Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No.
26558 finding that "a probable cause for the
offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the
issuance of warrants for the arrest of the
accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion
for reconsideration was denied by the
Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the
Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the
ground that the facts alleged therein did not
constitute an indictable offense since the law on
which it was based was unconstitutional for
vagueness, and that the Amended Information for
Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On
21 June 2001 the Government filed
its Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and five
(5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner
submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July
2001 the Sandiganbayan denied
petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the
oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the issues
for resolution in the instant petition for certiorari
are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for
being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less
evidence for proving the predicate crimes of
plunder and therefore violates the rights of the
accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder
as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum,
and if so, whether it is within the power of
Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts
pertaining to the validity of legislation is
predicated on the basic principle that a legislative
measure is presumed to be in harmony with the
Constitution.3 Courts invariably train their sights
on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative
act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the
postulate of constitutional adjudication. This
strong predilection for constitutionality takes its
bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one
branch of the government to encroach upon the
duties and powers of another. Thus it has been
said that the presumption is based on the
deference the judicial branch accords to its
coordinate branch - the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the
legislation may firmly rest, the courts must
assume that the legislature is ever conscious of
the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and
has passed the law with full knowledge of the
facts and for the purpose of promoting what is
right and advancing the welfare of the majority.
Hence in determining whether the acts of the
legislature are in tune with the fundamental law,
courts should proceed with judicial restraint and
act with caution and forbearance. Every
intendment of the law must be adjudged by the
courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity
being a measure of last resort. In construing
therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must
first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly
possible to sidestep the question of
constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v.
Yaranon4 we held that as long as there is some
basis for the decision of the court, the
constitutionality of the challenged law will not be
touched and the case will be decided on other
available grounds. Yet the force of the
presumption is not sufficient to catapult a
fundamentally deficient law into the safe
environs of constitutionality. Of course, where
the law clearly and palpably transgresses the
hallowed domain of the organic law, it must be
struck down on sight lest the positive commands
of the fundamental law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the
presumption weighs heavily on the party
challenging the validity of the statute. He must
demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there
is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for
absent such a showing, there can be no finding of
unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-
founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by
Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."5 And
petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case
to discharge his burden and overcome the
presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder
Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains
ascertainable standards and well-defined
parameters which would enable the accused to
determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is
sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts,
conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and
prescribes the elements of the crime with
reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus -
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts
by himself or in connivance with members of his
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other
persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-
gotten wealth through a combination or series of
the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through
misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or
malversation of public funds or raids on the
public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or
indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickback or any other form of
pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity
in connection with any government contract or
project or by reason of the office or position of
the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent
conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to
the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of
Government owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or
accepting directly or indirectly any shares of
stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future
employment in any business enterprise or
undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural,
industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees
and orders intended to benefit particular persons
or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of
official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself
or themselves at the expense and to the damage
and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the
ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or
acquired is at least ₱50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible
guide or rule that would inform those who are
subject to it what conduct would render them
liable to its penalties, its validity will be
sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in
its application; the counsel, in defending one
charged with its violation; and more importantly,
the accused, in identifying the realm of the
proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood
with little difficulty that what the assailed statute
punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing
or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least
₱50,000,000.00 through a series or combination
of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the
Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely
tracks the language of the law, indicating with
reasonable certainty the various elements of the
offense which petitioner is alleged to have
committed:
"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and
OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman,
hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA'
and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose
'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward
Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro,
JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio
Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia
Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime
of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No.
7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659,
committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to
January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPI
RACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE
MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES
BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY,
BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES
AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING
UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL
POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP,
CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF,
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten
wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL
VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY
THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (₱4,097,804,173.17), more or
less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING
HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE
EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE
FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR
A combination OR Aseries of overt OR criminal
acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS,
described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or
indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES,
MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT
OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE
MILLION PESOS (₱545,000,000.00), MORE
OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN
THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE,
PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY
FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with co-
accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose
'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward
Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION
OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL
GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING,
misappropriating,
converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR
PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in
the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY
MILLION PESOS (₱130,000,000.00), more or
less, representing a portion of the TWO
HUNDRED MILLION PESOS
(₱200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share
allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under
R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in connivance
with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma
Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a.Eleuterio Ramos Tan
or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND
OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic
supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR
HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the
Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES
OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social
Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES
OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE
BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT
OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE
HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE
HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY
CENTAVOS (₱1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE
OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR
MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE
THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY
PESOS (₱744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY,
OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE
BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY
SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY
SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
(₱1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING
OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR
PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID
PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN
THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(₱189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM
THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH
BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE
ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM
COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES,
PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY
FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR
LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED
THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED
FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (₱3,233,104,173.17) AND
DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS
ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT
THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague
or ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that
will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although
subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly
show that the elements of the crime are easily
understood and provide adequate contrast
between the innocent and the prohibited acts.
Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is
completely informed of the accusations against
him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent
defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law
to provide for the statutory definition of the terms
"combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts"
found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word
"pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to
petitioner, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague
and overbroad and deny him the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, hence, violative of his
fundamental right to due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure
sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and
void merely because general terms are used
therein, or because of the employment of terms
without defining them;6 much less do we have to
define every word we use. Besides, there is no
positive constitutional or statutory command
requiring the legislature to define each and every
word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted
in the form of expression of its will, and its
inability to so define the words employed in a
statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness
or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative
will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the
whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the
Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal
hermeneutics that words of a statute will be
interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification,7 unless it is evident
that the legislature intended a technical or special
legal meaning to those words.8 The intention of
the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained
philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory
phraseology in such a manner is always
presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate
Dictionary contains the following commonly
accepted definition of the words "combination"
and "series:"
Combination - the result or product of
combining; the act or process of combining.
To combine is to bring into such close
relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series - a number of things or events of the same
class coming one after another in spatial and
temporal succession.
That Congress intended the words "combination"
and "series" to be understood in their popular
meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative
deliberations on the bill which eventually became
RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:
DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL
COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our
definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A
COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR
CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN
SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say
combination, we actually mean to say, if there
are two or more means, we mean to say that
number one and two or number one and
something else are included, how about a series
of the same act? For example, through
misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these
be included also?
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.
REP. ISIDRO: Series.
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a
combination.
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it
seems that -
REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean
that two of the enumerated means not twice of
one enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice -
but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, that’s it. When
we say combination, we mean, two different acts.
It cannot be a repetition of the same act.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is
repeated, so there are two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.
REP. ISIDRO: That’s not series. Its a
combination. Because when we say combination
or series, we seem to say that two or more, di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really
from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is
a very good suggestion because if it is only one
act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have
here a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts. So x x x x
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh
di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term
"series?"
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano,
two misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations
will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two
different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning,
repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6
June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our
interpellations that sometimes "one" or maybe
even "two" acts may already result in such a big
amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider
deleting the words "a series of overt or," to read,
therefore: "or conspiracy COMMITTED by
criminal acts such as." Remove the idea of
necessitating "a series." Anyway, the criminal
acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a
combination of two or more of the acts mentioned
in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would
be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because "a series"
implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x
xx
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he
has to be prosecuted under the particular crime.
But when we say "acts of plunder" there should
be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is
already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of
"combination," it is referring to at least two (2)
acts falling under different categories of
enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g.,
raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d),
subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets
belonging to the National Government under Sec.
1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there
must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts
falling under the same category of enumeration
found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation,
malversation and raids on the public treasury, all
of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1).
Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or
distinctive meaning for "combination" and
"series," it would have taken greater pains in
specifically providing for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations
of the Sandiganbayan9 that this term is
sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec.
1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -
x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern'
consists of at least a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections
(1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec.
2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts
is directed towards a common purpose or goal
which is to enable the public officer to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And
thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful
scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common
goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall
unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of
action or method' which the principal accused
and public officer and others conniving with him
follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In
the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme
or where the schemes or methods used by
multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts
must form part of a conspiracy to attain a
common goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the
law does not give a fair warning and sufficient
notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the
circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-
for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced.
The doctrine has been formulated in various
ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect
that a statute establishing a criminal offense must
define the offense with sufficient definiteness that
persons of ordinary intelligence can understand
what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can
only be invoked against that specie of legislation
that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which
cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by
construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ in its application. In such
instance, the statute is repugnant to the
Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially
the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what
conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.10 But the doctrine does not
apply as against legislations that are merely
couched in imprecise language but which
nonetheless specify a standard though defectively
phrased; or to those that are apparently
ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types
of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper
construction, while no challenge may be mounted
as against the second whenever directed against
such activities.11 With more reason, the doctrine
cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is
clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute
is void for uncertainty is whether the language
conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice.12It must be stressed,
however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely
requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the
statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to
suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous
specificity, is permissible as long as the metes
and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated.
An act will not be held invalid merely because it
might have been more explicit in its wordings or
detailed in its provisions, especially where,
because of the nature of the act, it would be
impossible to provide all the details in advance as
in all other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the
observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
during the deliberations of the Court that the
allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and
overbroad do not justify a facial review of its
validity -
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a
statute which either forbids or requires the doing
of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law."13 The
overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees
that "a governmental purpose may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms."14
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a
vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible "chilling effect" upon
protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen
statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no
readily apparent construction suggests itself as a
vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society
of constitutionally protected expression is
deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly
broad statutes with no requirement that the
person making the attack demonstrate that his
own conduct could not be regulated by a statute
drawn with narrow specificity."15 The possible
harm to society in permitting some unprotected
speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of others
may be deterred and perceived grievances left to
fester because of possible inhibitory effects of
overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes.
Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect
resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the
State may well be prevented from enacting laws
against socially harmful conduct. In the area of
criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in
the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then
have special application only to free speech
cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of
penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it,
in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we
have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine
outside the limited context of the First
Amendment."16 In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,17 the
Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth
have been entertained in cases involving statutes
which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth
claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed
when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that
are sought to be applied to protected conduct."
For this reason, it has been held that "a facial
challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would
be valid."18 As for the vagueness doctrine, it is
said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its
face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some
conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied
to the conduct of others."19
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny,
overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in
free speech cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment cases. They
cannot be made to do service when what is
involved is a criminal statute. With respect to
such statute, the established rule is that "one to
whom application of a statute is constitutional
will not be heard to attack the statute on the
ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to other persons or other situations in
which its application might be
unconstitutional."20 As has been pointed out,
"vagueness challenges in the First Amendment
context, like overbreadth challenges typically
produce facial invalidation, while statutes found
vague as a matter of due process typically are
invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular
defendant."21 Consequently, there is no basis for
petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-
Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes
results in striking them down entirely on the
ground that they might be applied to parties not
before the Court whose activities are
constitutionally protected.22 It constitutes a
departure from the case and controversy
requirement of the Constitution and permits
decisions to be made without concrete factual
settings and in sterile abstract contexts.23 But, as
the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v.
Harris24
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute,
pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring
correction of these deficiencies before the statute
is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate
task for the judiciary. The combination of the
relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact
on the legislative process of the relief sought, and
above all the speculative and amorphous nature
of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed
statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case
that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding
constitutional questions, whichever way they
might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of
statutes has been described as "manifestly strong
medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as
a last resort,"25 and is generally disfavored.26 In
determining the constitutionality of a statute,
therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have
been violated in a case must be examined in the
light of the conduct with which the defendant is
charged.27
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident
that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law,
so tenaciously claimed and argued at length by
petitioner, is more imagined than real.
Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created
by dissecting parts and words in the statute to
furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of
scientific precision in the law. Every provision of
the law should be construed in relation and with
reference to every other part. To be sure, it will
take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-
entrenched presumption of constitutionality and
validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner
cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law
is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted
for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the
law was extensively deliberated upon by the
Senate and its appropriate committees by reason
of which he even registered his affirmative vote
with full knowledge of its legal implications and
sound constitutional anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v.
Sandiganbayan28 must be mentioned if only to
illustrate and emphasize the point that courts are
loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty
unless the law itself is so imperfect and deficient
in its details, and is susceptible of no reasonable
construction that will support and give it effect.
In that case,
petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the
constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Actfor being vague.
Petitioners posited, among others, that the term
"unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic
with no common law meaning or settled
definition by prior judicial or administrative
precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par.
(e), violates due process in that it does not give
fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks
to penalize. Petitioners further argued that the
Information charged them with three (3) distinct
offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted"
benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving of
"unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith;
and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through
gross inexcusable negligence while in the
discharge of their official function and that their
right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against them was violated because
they were left to guess which of the three (3)
offenses, if not all, they were being charged and
prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that
Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act does not suffer from the
constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases
"manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and
"gross and inexcusable negligence" merely
describe the different modes by which the offense
penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be
committed, and the use of all these phrases in the
same Information does not mean that the
indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses.
The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems
lacking adequate or official support; unjustified;
unauthorized (Webster, Third International
Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification or
adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.
v. US Dept. of Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8,
12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent
Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual
Pocket Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt practice
and make unlawful the act of the public officer
in:
x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge
of his official, administrative or judicial functions
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3
[e], Rep. Act 3019, as amended).
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what
the aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the
act of a public officer, in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions, in
giving any private party benefits, advantage or
preference which is unjustified, unauthorized or
without justification or adequate reason, through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.
In other words, this Court found that there was
nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the
term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was
understood in its primary and general acceptation.
Consequently, in that case, petitioners' objection
thereto was held inadequate to declare the section
unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the
highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder
Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder
when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt
or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or
conspiracy -
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of
establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act
done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme
or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire
ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish
beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious
even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal
prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the
accused always has in his favor the presumption
of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights, and unless the State succeeds in
demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt
that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal.29 The use of the "reasonable doubt"
standard is indispensable to command the respect
and confidence of the community in the
application of criminal law. It is critical that the
moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a
standard of proof that leaves people in doubt
whether innocent men are being condemned. It is
also important in our free society that every
individual going about his ordinary affairs has
confidence that his government cannot adjudge
him guilty of a criminal offense without
convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with
utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt"
standard has acquired such exalted stature in the
realm of constitutional law as it gives life to
the Due Process Clause which protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary
to constitute the crime with which he is
charged.30 The following exchanges between
Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on
this score during the deliberations in the floor of
the House of Representatives are elucidating -
DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October
1990
MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also
elementary in our criminal law that what is
alleged in the information must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act
and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated
in the information, does that not work against the
right of the accused especially so if the amount
committed, say, by falsification is less than ₱100
million, but the totality of the crime committed is
₱100 million since there is malversation, bribery,
falsification of public document, coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything
alleged in the information needs to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element
of the crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker,
there is an enumeration of the things taken by the
robber in the information – three pairs of pants,
pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved
beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not
prevent the conviction of a crime for which he
was charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs
of diamond earrings the prosecution proved two.
Now, what is required to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt is the element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker,
but considering that in the crime of plunder the
totality of the amount is very important, I feel that
such a series of overt criminal acts has to be
taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery,
he was able to accumulate only ₱50,000 and in
the crime of extortion, he was only able to
accumulate ₱1 million. Now, when we add the
totality of the other acts as required under this
bill through the interpretation on the rule of
evidence, it is just one single act, so how can we
now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for
purposes of proving an essential element of the
crime, there is a need to prove that element
beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one
essential element of the crime is that the amount
involved is ₱100 million. Now, in a series of
defalcations and other acts of corruption in the
enumeration the total amount would be ₱110 or
₱120 million, but there are certain acts that
could not be proved, so, we will sum up the
amounts involved in those transactions which
were proved. Now, if the amount involved in
these transactions, proved beyond reasonable
doubt, is ₱100 million, then there is a crime of
plunder (underscoring supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the
legislature did not in any manner refashion the
standard quantum of proof in the crime of
plunder. The burden still remains with the
prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt
every fact or element necessary to constitute the
crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of
each and every component of the crime suffers
from a dismal misconception of the import of that
provision. What the prosecution needs to prove
beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts
sufficient to form a combination or series which
would constitute a pattern and involving an
amount of at least ₱50,000,000.00. There is no
need to prove each and every other act alleged in
the Information to have been committed by the
accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing
that the accused is charged in an Information for
plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on
the public treasury. The prosecution need not
prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient
to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids
beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they
amounted to at least ₱50,000,000.00.31
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4,
brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the
very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing
hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern
arises where the prosecution is able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as
defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-
product of the proof of the predicate acts. This
conclusion is consistent with reason and common
sense. There would be no other explanation for a
combination or series of
overt or criminal acts to stash ₱50,000,000.00 or
more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth." The
prosecution is therefore not required to make a
deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as
it necessarily follows with the establishment of a
series or combination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the
purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that
"pattern" is "a very important element of the
crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two
pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a
substantive element of the crime," such that
without it the accused cannot be convicted of
plunder -
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot
an accused be convicted under the Plunder Law
without applying Section 4 on the Rule of
Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable
doubt of the commission of the acts complained
of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted
of individual crimes enumerated in the Revised
Penal Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all
the elements of the crime are proved beyond
reasonable doubt without applying Section 4, can
you not have a conviction under the Plunder
Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder,
your Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard
the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused
charged for violation of the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first
place Section 4 lays down a substantive element
of the law x x x x
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we
have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof
beyond reasonable doubt on the acts charged
constituting plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because
Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of
evidence and it contains a substantive element of
the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by
which we can avoid Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof
beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate
crimes charged are concerned that you do not
have to go that far by applying Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that
Section 4 contains a very important element of
the crime of plunder and that cannot be avoided
by the prosecution.32
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand.
Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder
can be culled and understood from its definition
in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and
"pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the
epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and
unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of
establishing the crime of plunder x x x x
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of
procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case
for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure,
Sec. 4 does not define or establish any
substantive right in favor of the accused but only
operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a
means to an end, an aid to substantive law.
Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a
conviction for plunder may be had, for what is
crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient
evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted
by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even
granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is
flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by
petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest
of the provisions without necessarily resulting in
the demise of the law; after all, the existing rules
on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than
enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for
a separability clause -
Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any
provisions of this Act or the application thereof to
any person or circumstance is held invalid, the
remaining provisions of this Act and the
application of such provisions to other persons or
circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid
the whole act from being declared invalid as a
result of the nullity of some of its provisions,
assuming that to be the case although it is not
really so, all the provisions thereof should
accordingly be treated independently of each
other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of
the statute can best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with
Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in
se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus,
he says, in his Concurring Opinion -
x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes
are mala in se the element of mens rea must be
proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is
noteworthy that the amended information alleges
that the crime of plunder was committed
"willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus
alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute
eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is
the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner
cites the following remarks of Senator Tañada
made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
SENATOR TAÑADA . . . And the evidence that
will be required to convict him would not be
evidence for each and every individual criminal
act but only evidence sufficient to establish the
conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of
plunder.33
However, Senator Tañada was discussing §4 as
shown by the succeeding portion of the transcript
quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the
Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4,
Rule of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's
view, would provide for a speedier and faster
process of attending to this kind of cases?
SENATOR TAÑADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .34
Senator Tañada was only saying that where the
charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the
prosecution need not prove each and every
criminal act done to further the scheme or
conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or ciminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the
pattern are concerned, however, the elements of
the crime must be proved and the requisite mens
rea must be shown.
Indeed, §2 provides that -
Any person who participated with the said public
officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall
likewise be punished for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the degree of
participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the
Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the
court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating
circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to
prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law
indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element
of plunder since the degree of responsibility of
the offender is determined by his criminal intent.
It is true that §2 refers to "any person who
participates with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the
crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe,
however, that it does not apply as well to the
public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice
Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities
about not supplying criminal laws with what they
omit, but there is no canon against using common
sense in construing laws as saying what they
obviously mean."35
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of
plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have
been resolved in the affirmative by the decision
of Congress in 1993 to include it among the
heinous crimes punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are
punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A.
No. 7659. Referring to these groups of heinous
crimes, this Court held in People v. Echegaray:36
The evil of a crime may take various forms.
There are crimes that are, by their very nature,
despicable, either because life was callously
taken or the victim is treated like an animal and
utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the
normal course of his or her growth as a human
being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention for
ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the
victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to
dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in
death; and drug offenses involving minors or
resulting in the death of the victim in the case of
other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide,
infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal
detention, where the victim is detained for more
than three days or serious physical injuries were
inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were
made or the victim is a minor, robbery with
homicide, rape or intentional mutilation,
destructive arson, and carnapping where the
owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped
vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by
reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous
by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the
abomination lies in the significance and
implications of the subject criminal acts in the
scheme of the larger socio-political and economic
context in which the state finds itself to be
struggling to develop and provide for its poor and
underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of
corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the
government and impoverished the population, the
Philippine Government must muster the political
will to dismantle the culture of corruption,
dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that
so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of
society and the psyche of the populace. [With the
government] terribly lacking the money to
provide even the most basic services to its
people, any form of misappropriation or
misapplication of government funds translates to
an actual threat to the very existence of
government, and in turn, the very survival of the
people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no
less heinous are the effects and repercussions of
crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson
resulting in death, and drug offenses involving
government officials, employees or officers, that
their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause
further destruction and damage to society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that
plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is
a malum in se. For when the acts punished are
inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they
are mala in se37 and it does not matter that such
acts are punished in a special law, especially
since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes
are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd
to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they
are mere prosecutions for violations of the
Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an
ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to
the inherent wrongness of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity
of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on
constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however
that it is now too late in the day for him to
resurrect this long dead issue, the same having
been eternally consigned by People v.
Echegaray38 to the archives of jurisprudential
history. The declaration of this Court therein that
RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a
declaration of the State, and becomes, by
necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution
now as an integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of
corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in
high places which have shaken its very
foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption
has become more elaborate in the corridors of
time as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive
more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers
of the government. Drastic and radical measures
are imperative to fight the increasingly
sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and
economically catastrophic looting of the national
treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially
designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of
grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked,
will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately
consume the moral and institutional fiber of our
nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living
testament to the will of the legislature to
ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure
society against the avarice and other venalities in
public office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the
checkered history of this nation, few issues of
national importance can equal the amount of
interest and passion generated by petitioner's
ignominious fall from the highest office, and his
eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal
statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge
of dissension among our people that may linger
for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion
call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and
prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the
midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds
that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder
Law, as amended by RA 7659, is
CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition
to declare the law unconstitutional is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr. C.J., Melo, Quisumbing, JJ., join
concurring opinion of J. Mendoza.
Puno, Vitug, JJ., concurred and joins J.
Mendoza's concurring opinion.
Kapunan, Pardo, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Ynares-
Santiago, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Mendoza, J., please see concurring opinion.
Panganiban J., please see separate concurring
opinion.
Carpio, J., no part. Was one of the complainants
before Ombudsman.
Sources:
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/nov200
1/gr_148560_2001.html
Article 4. Criminal Liability
 People vs. Iligan, 191 SCRA 643
G.R. No. 144595 August 6, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
DANTE ILAGAN, appellant.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For automatic review is the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 1246-M-99,
convicting appellant Dante Ilagan of Qualified
Rape and sentencing him to suffer the extreme
penalty of death and to pay the offended party,
Mylene Ilagan, the sums of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P100,000.00 as moral damages.1
The information for Rape against appellant reads:
That on or about the 19th day of May, 1998, in the
municipality of Norzagaray, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with lewd designs, by means of force
and intimidation, have carnal knowledge of his
daughter Mylene Ilagan, 16 years old, against her
will and consent.
Contrary to law.2
During the arraignment, appellant pleaded not
guilty to the charge.3 Thereafter, the trial of the
case ensued.
The facts of the case as established by the
prosecution are as follows:
The offended party, Mylene Ilagan, lived with her
father, appellant Dante Ilagan, and her siblings at
Barangay Bulalo, Norzagaray, Bulacan. Her
mother, Marietta, had gone off to live with
another man.4
On May 18, 1998, Mylene's elder sister went with
her paternal grandmother, Nenita Ilagan, to
Meycauayan to attend the birthday celebration of
their eldest sister. Later that evening, while
Mylene was asleep beside her other siblings,
accused woke her up and told her that they would
sleep in her grandmother Nenita's house, located
some fifteen meters away,5 leaving behind her
other siblings in their own house.
At 3:00 in the morning of the following day,
while Mylene was asleep, she was awakened by
someone taking off her shorts and panties. She
saw appellant, naked from the waist down, lying
on top of her. Appellant inserted his penis into
her vagina, causing her pain. She was unable to
cry for fear that appellant might kill her since he
had threatened to kill her before. Appellant
stopped the sexual intrusion when a substance,
which looked like phlegm, came out of his penis.
He then got up and went to the kitchen to boil
some water. He told Mylene to watch the pot and
left the house.6
On December 10, 1998, while appellant was in
Quezon Province, Mylene mustered the courage
to tell her friend, Jocelyn, about the sexual assault
by her father. They went to the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD),
which brought Mylene to the Norzagaray Police
where she gave her sworn statement. Thereafter,
she was brought to the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Provincial Crime Laboratory in Malolos,
Bulacan for physical examination.7
Dr. Manuel Aves, the PNP Medico-Legal Officer
who examined Mylene, found multiple healed
deep lacerations on her hymen. He concluded that
Mylene was a non-virgin at the time of the
examination on December 15, 1998.8
On the same date, Mylene filed a complaint for
Rape against appellant before the Norzagaray
Municipal Trial Court.9
In his defense, appellant denied the charges and
claimed that he was in Alabang, Muntinlupa City
on the date that the alleged rape was committed,
working at a project for Nipponville Home
Gallery. Moreover, as a furniture worker, he
stayed in Manila for several days and went home
to Bulacan only on weekends.10 He alleged that
Mylene had several boyfriends, and presented in
court purported love letters sent by Mylene to
Larry and Rudy, as well as letters she received
from her male suitors, namely, Boy Bicol,
Dondon Hernandez, Rab and Orly.11 Her
grandmother, Nenita Ilagan, and sister, Judith,
corroborated appellant's testimony. They alleged
that appellant frequently scolded Mylene for
coming home late, and surmised that this may be
the reason why she filed charges against her
father.12
On June 9, 2000, the trial court rendered the
appealed judgment, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, ALL PREMISES
CONSIDERED, this Court resolves that the
prosecution has successfully undertaken his
burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Accordingly, accused Dante
Ilagan is hereby found GUILTY of the crime of
RAPE from having violated the provisions of
Article 266-B in relation to Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. Considering
the presence of aggravating circumstances that
the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and
the offender is a parent of the victim in this case,
he is hereby sentenced to suffer the Supreme
Penalty of DEATH by lethal injection.
One final word. The Court treats the imposition
of the capital punishment upon the hereby
accused as an unpleasant, if not an unenviable
task. Nonetheless, the burden becomes lighter as
we ponder on what the Supreme Court stated
with regard to a case of Rape of this nature. Thus:
"incestuous relations are abhorrent to the nature
of man, not only to civilized men, but also to
semi-civilized and barbarous people x x x and
when a man perpetrates his lascivious desires on
his own direct relative, he descends to a level
lower than that of a beast. (People vs. Mandap,
244 SCRA 457)
Lastly, the accused is also ordered to indemnify
Mylene Ilagan the sum of P75,000.00 and further
amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.13
In his brief, appellant assigns the following
errors:
I Consequently, the issues in a rape case boil down
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME CHARGED AND SENTENCING HIM
TO SUFFER THE DEATH PENALTY.
II
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE
TO THE TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT MYLENE ILAGAN.14
Well-entrenched is the rule that a conviction for
rape may be made even on the testimony of the
victim herself, as long as such testimony is
credible.15 It is likewise settled that when a
woman says that she had been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that she had
been raped, and if her testimony meets the test of
credibility, the accused may be convicted on the
basis of the victim's testimony. A rape victim
would not publicly disclose that she had been
raped and undergo the troubles and humiliation
of a public trial if her motive was not to bring to
justice the person who abused her.16
to the credibility of the victim. In assessing her
credibility, courts are guided by the following
principles:
(1) As accusation for rape can be made with
facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult
for the person accused, though innocent, to
disprove;
(2) In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of
rape where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant is
scrutinized with extreme caution, and;
(3) The evidence of the prosecution stands or
falls on its own merits and can not be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the defense.17
In the case at bar, complainant recounted her
harrowing experience in the hands of appellant in
this wise:
Q: My question is, where
were you on May 1998 at around
3 o'clock early in the morning?
A: I was in the house of my
grandmother, sir. My father
asked me to undress and remove
my panty.
Q: You said that you were
then at the house of your
grandmother, what is the name
of your grandmother?
A: Her name is Aida Ilagan,
sir.
Q: Where is this house
located?
A: Near our house in
Norzagaray, Bulacan, sir.
Q: What is the exact place
in Norzagay where your lola's
house is located?
A: Bulalo, Norzagaray, sir.
Q: Who were with you in
the house of your lola at that
time?
A: My father, sir.
Q: What about your lola?
A: She was in Meycauayan,
Bulacan, sir together with my
ate.
Q: How about your other
siblings? Where were they at
that time?
A: They were in our house,
sir.
Q: Why did you decide to
sleep at the house of your lola?
A: I was sleeping there in
our house, but my father asked
me to go with him and sleep at
the house of my lola because
nobody was there, sir.
Q: After your panty was
removed by your father, what
happened next?
A: I was
molested (ginalaw), sir.
Q: Tell me exactly what do
you mean by "ginalaw"?
A: He placed his body on
top of me and inserted his
private organ on my private
organ, sir.
Q: You said your clothes
and panty were removed by your
father. Are you saying that you
were totally naked when your
father placed on top of you?
Court:
By the way, did the witness say
that it was not only her panty but
also her clothes were removed?
Q: Just to clarify this, your
honor. What was removed by
your father from your body?
A: My shorts and panty, sir.
Court:
Was it your father or yourself
who removed your shorts and
panty?
A: My father, your honor.
Court: Proceed.
Q: What were you wearing
on your upper apparel?
A: T-shirt, sir.
Q: What did you feel when
your father inserted his private
organ into yours?
A: It was painful, sir.
The aforequoted testimony of the
victim is marked by spontaneity,
honesty, and sincerity. When the
testimony of the victim is simple
and straightforward, the same
must be given full faith and
credit.19 A young girl's
revelation that she had been
raped, coupled with her
voluntary submission to medical
examination and her willingness
to undergo public trial where she
could be compelled to give out
Q: How long did your
father placed himself on top of
you?
A: Half an hour, sir.
Q: While your father was
on top of you, what was he
doing?
A: He forcibly inserted his
penis into my private organ, sir.
Q: Did you feel anything
from the private organ of your
father?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that, that you
felt came out from the private
organ if your father?
A: As if phlegm (sipon),
sir.18
the details of an assault on her
dignity, cannot be easily
dismissed as mere concoction. It
is highly inconceivable for a
daughter to publicly accuse her
father of rape if it were not true.
Indeed, it is highly against
human nature to fabricate a story
that would expose herself as well
as her family to a lifetime of
dishonor, especially when her
charge could mean the death of
her own father.20
Appellant claims that the
victim's failure to resist the
assault and the delay in reporting
the case to the authorities are
sufficient to impair her
credibility. We disagree.
Physical resistance need not be
established in rape when
intimidation is exercised upon
the victim herself. As held
in People v. Las Pinas, Jr.,21 the
test is whether the intimidation
produces a reasonable fear in the
mind of the victim that if she
resists or does not yield to the
desires of the accused, the threat
would be carried out. When
resistance would be futile,
offering none at all does not
amount to consent to sexual
assault. The law does not impose
upon a rape victim the burden of
proving resistance.
Anent the delay in reporting the
case to the authorities, suffice it
to state that delay and the initial
reluctance of a rape victim to
make public the assault on her
virtue is neither unknown or
uncommon.22 Rape is a
traumatic experience, and the
shock concomitant with it may
linger for a while. Oftentimes,
the victim would rather bear the
ignominy and the pain in private,
rather than reveal her shame to
the world or risk the rapist's
carrying out his threat to harm
her.23
We find no sufficient basis for
disregarding, let alone
overturning, the factual
assessment made by the court a
quo. Once again, we must
reiterate the familiar rule that the
task of taking on the issue of
credibility is a function properly
lodged with the trial court,
whose findings are entitled to
great weight and accorded the
highest respect by the reviewing
courts, unless certain facts of
substance and value were
overlooked or misappreciated
such as would alter the
conviction of the
appellant.24 There is no such fact
of substance and value in this
case.
Premised on the complainant's
testimony, there is sufficient
foundation to conclude that
appellant succeeded by force in
having carnal knowledge of her
own daughter on May 19, 1998.
Against this backdrop of
evidence and in stark contrast to
complainant's convincing recital
of facts is appellant's defense of
denial and alibi. An intrinsically
weak defense, denial must be
buttressed by strong evidence of
non-culpability in order to merit
credibility. It is a negative self-
serving assertion that has no
weight in law if unsubstantiated
by clear and convincing
evidence.25Since denial and alibi
are so easy to concoct and
fabricate, the same cannot
prevail over the positive and
credible testimony of the
prosecution witness that the
accused committed the crime.26
The rule is settled that for the
defense of alibi to prosper, the
requirement of time and place
must be strictly met.27 It is,
therefore, incumbent upon
appellant to prove with clear and
convincing evidence that at the
time of the commission of the
offense charged, he was in a
place other than the situs
criminis or immediate vicinity
thereof, such that it was
physically impossible for him to
have committed the crime
charged.28
Thus, appellant's alibi and denial
must necessarily fail. The
defense of denial and alibi per
se, if not substantiated by
sufficient evidence, can not in
any way diminish the credibility
of the complainant or the weight
of her testimony.
The pertinent provisions of
Articles 266-A and 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 8353,
otherwise known as The Anti-
Rape Law of 1997, state:
ART. 266-A. Rape; When and
How Committed. – Rape is
committed:
1) By a man who shall have
carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or
intimidation;
b) When the offended party is
deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent
machination or grave abuse of
authority; and
d) When the offended party is
under twelve (12) years of age or
is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned
above be present.
xxx xxx xxx.
ART. 266-B. Penalties. –
xxx xxx xxx.
The death penalty shall also be
imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances:
1) When the victim is under
eighteen (18) years of age and
the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the
victim;
xxx xxx xxx.
The qualifying circumstances of
minority and relationship must
concur. More importantly, they
must be both alleged and proved,
in order to qualify the crime of
Rape and warrant the imposition
of the death penalty.29
Hence, in addition to the
requirement that the qualifying
and aggravating circumstance
must be specifically alleged in
the information, it must be
established with certainty that
the victim was below eighteen
(18) years of age or that she was
a minor at the time of the
commission of the crime. It must
be stressed that the severity of
the death penalty, especially its
irreversible and final nature once
carried out, makes the decision-
making process in capital
offense aptly subject to the most
exacting rules of procedure and
evidence.30
In the case at bar, the
prosecution failed to present the
birth certificate or similar
authentic document, such as the
school records or baptismal
certificate of the victim to prove
her age. Thus, the age of the
victim cannot be determined
with utmost certainty. In People
v. Pruna,31 it was held:
In order to remove any
confusion that may be
engendered by the foregoing
cases, we hereby set the
following guidelines in
appreciating age, either as an
element of the crime or as a
qualifying circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the
age of the offended party is an
original or certified true copy of
the certificate of live birth of
such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate
of live birth, similar authentic
documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records
which show the date of birth of
the victim would suffice to prove
age.
3. If the certificate of live birth
or authentic document is shown
to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the
testimony, if clear and credible,
of the victim's mother or a
member of the family either by
affinity or consanguinity who is
qualified to testify on matters
respecting pedigree such as the
exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to
Section 40, Rule 130 of the
Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following
circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be
below 3 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is
less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be
below 7 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is
less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be
below 12 years of age and what
is sought to be proved is that she
is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate
of live birth, authentic document,
or the testimony of the victim's
mother or relatives concerning
the victim's age, the
complainant's testimony will
suffice provided that it is
expressly and clearly admitted
by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has
the burden of proving the age of
the offended party. The failure of
the accused to object to the
testimonial evidence regarding
age shall not be taken against
him.
The trial court should always
make a categorical finding as to
the age of the victim.
Hence, for failure of the
prosecution to prove the age of
the victim by any of the means
set forth above, appellant can
only be found guilty of Simple
Rape and the death penalty
imposed on him by the trial court
shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua.
Consequently, the amount of
civil indemnity awarded by the
trial court should accordingly be
reduced to P50,000.00. The
amount of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity is mandatory only in
cases involving qualified rape
where the death penalty is
imposed. In cases of simple rape,
the amount of civil indemnity
shall be P50,000.00.32 As
regards the award of moral
damages, the same should
likewise be reduced to
P50,000.00, consistently with
controlling jurisprudence. Moral
damages are awarded in rape
cases without need of pleading
or proof.33
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 21, in Criminal
Case No. 1246-M-99, finding
appellant Dante Ilagan guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Rape, is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONS.
Appellant is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and is ordered to pay the private
offended party, Mylene Ilagan,
the amounts of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P50,000.00
as moral damages.
Costs de oficio.
 SO ORDERED.
 People v Mananqui, 132 SCRA
198
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-35574 September
28, 1984
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
VALENTINA MANANQUIL
Y LAREDO, defendant-
appellant.
The Solicitor General for
plaintiff-appellee.
Herminio Sugay for defendant-
appellant.
CUEVAS, J.:
In an amended
Information 1 filed before the
then Court of First Instance of
Rizal, VALENTINA
MANANQUIL y LAREDO was
accused of PARRICIDE
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of
March, 1965, in Pasay City,
Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Hon. Court,
the abovenamed accused, did
then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with
evident premeditation, that is,
having conceived and
deliberated to kill her husband,
Elias Day y Pablo, with whom
she was united in lawful
wedlock, enter (sic) the
NAWASA building situated at
Pasay City, where said Elias Day
y Pablo was working as a
security guard; and the said
accused, having in her
possession a bottle containing
gasoline suddenly and without
warning, poured the contents on
the person of her husband, Elias
Day y Pablo, ignited the
gasoline, as a result of which,
said Elias Day y Pablo suffered
burns and injuries which
subsequently caused his death.
Contrary to law 2
Tried after pleading "NOT
GUILTY" upon arraignment,
accused was convicted and
thereafter sentenced to reclusion
perpetua to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased in the amount of
P12,000.00; and to pay costs.
From the aforesaid judgment,
she ventilated an appeal to the
then Court of Appeals (which
referred the appeal to us
considering that the penalty
imposed was reclusion
perpetua, assailing her aforesaid
conviction and contending that
the trial court erred: 1) in
convicting her solely on the
basis of the alleged extrajudicial
confession; 2) in finding that
Pneumonia was a complication
of the burns sustained by the
victim; 3) in not finding her not
to have cause the death of the
deceased; and 4) in not
acquitting her at least on ground
of reasonable doubt.
The prosecution's version of the
incident as summarized in the
People's Brief is as follows:
On March 6, 1965, at about
11:00 o'clock in the evening,
appellant went to the NAWASA
Building at Pasay City where her
husband was then working as a
security guard. She had just
purchased ten (10) centavo
worth of gasoline from the Esso
Gasoline Station at Taft Avenue
which she placed in a coffee
bottle (t.s.n., p. 13, January 13,
1969). She was angry of her
husband, Elias Day y Pablo,
because the latter had burned her
clothing, was maintaining a
mistress and had been taking all
the food from their house. Upon
reaching the NAWASA
Building, she knocked at the
door. Immediately, after the door
was opened, Elias Day shouted
at the appellant and castigated
her saying, "PUTA BUGUIAN
LAKAW GALIGAON" (t.s.n.,
p. 14, Id). The appellant tired of
hearing the victim, then got the
bottle of gasoline and poured the
contents thereof on the face of
the victim (t.s.n., p. 14, Id).
Then, she got a matchbox and
set the polo shirt of the victim a
flame. (Exhs. "A" and "A-1", p.
197, Rec.)
The appellant was investigated
by elements of the Pasay City
Police to whom she gave a
written statement (Exh. "A", p.
197, Rec.) where she admitted
having burned the victim.
Upon the other hand, the victim
was taken first to the Philippine
General Hospital and then to the
Trinity General Hospital at Sta.
Ana, Manila, when he died on
March 10, 1965. (Exh. "C", p.
208, rec.) due to pneumonia,
lobar bilateral Burns 2
secondary. 3
Appellant's story on the other
hand runs, thus:
It was before 10:00 o'clock p.m.
when appellant returned from
Olongapo City. She fed her
grandson and put him to bed.
After filing the tank with water,
she remembered that the next
day was a Sunday and she had to
go to church. Her shoes were
dirty but there was no gasoline
with which to clean them.
Taking with her an empty bottle
of Hemo, she left for a nearby
gasoline station and bought ten
centavos worth of gasoline. Then
she remembered that her
husband needed gasoline for his
lighter so she dropped by his
place of work. (p. 13, Ibid.)
Appellant saw her husband
inside a bonding of the
NAWASA standing by the
window. As the iron grille was
open, she entered and knocked at
the wooden door. Elias opened
the door, but when he saw his
wife he shouted at her. Appellant
said that she had brought the
gasoline which he needed for his
lighter, but Elias, who was under
the influence of liquor, cursed
her thus: "PUTA BUGUIAN
LAKAW GALIGAON". Elias
continued shouting and cursing
even as appellant told him that
she had come just to bring the
gasoline that he wanted.
Appellant trembled and became
dizzy. She was beside herself
and did not know that she was
sprinkling the gasoline on her
husband's face. She was tired
and dizzy and had to sit down
for a while. Then she
remembered her grandson who
was alone in the house so she
went home leaving her husband
who was walking to and fro and
not paying attention to her. (pp.
13-14, Ibid., p. 2, March 20,
1969)
She went to bed but could not
sleep. She went back to the
NAWASA compound to
apologize to her husband. Upon
reaching the NAWASA,
however, she found that police
officers were present. Her
husband was walking all around
still fuming mad, and when he
saw her he chased her. A
policeman pulled appellant aside
and asked if she was the wife of
Elias. When she replied in the
affirmative, the police officer
accused her of burning her
husband. She denied the
accusation. But the police took
her to the headquarters, and
prepared a written statement,
Exhibits A, A-1. Appellant was
made to sign said statement upon
a promise that she would be
released if she signed it.
Although she did not know the
contents, she signed it because of
the promise. (pp. 14-16. Id.; p. 5,
March 20,1969) 4
Appellant's assigned errors boil
down to two (2) main issues: (1)
whether or not appellant's
extrajudicial confession was
voluntarily given; and (2)
whether or not the burns
sustained by the victim
contributed to cause pneumonia
which was the cause of the
victim's death.
Right after the burning incident,
appellant was picked up by the
police operatives of Pasay City.
She was thereafter investigated
by Sgt. Leopoldo Garcia of the
Pasay City Police who took her
statement in Tagalog and in
Question and Answer form
which was reduced into
writing. 5 After Sgt. Garcia was
through taking her statement, she
was brought to Fiscal Paredes
who asked her questions
regarding the said statement and
its execution and before whom
said statement was subscribed
and sworn to by her. In that
investigation, appellant
categorically admitted having
thrown gasoline at her husband
and thereafter set him aflame as
evidenced by this pertinent
portion of her statement-
T Ano ang nangyari at iyong
binuksan ng gasolina ang iyong
asawa na si Elias Day?
S Dahil may sala siya, at sinunog
niya ang aking mga damit, at
may babae pa, at saka lahat ng
aming pagkain sa bahay ay
hinahakot.
T Ng dahil dito sa mga binanggit
mong ito ay ano ang ginawa mo
sa iyong asawa?
S Ako po ay nagdilim ang aking
isipan at ang ginawa ko ay naisip
kong buhusan ng gasolina, kaya
ang aking ginawa ay bumili ako
ng halagang 10 sentimos sa Esso
Gasoline Station sa Tall Avenue
at inilagay ko sa isang boti.
T Pagkatapos na ikaw ay
makabili ng gasolina sa station
ng Esso sa Taft Avenue dito sa
Pasay City, ay ano ang ginawa
mo?
S Ako po ay nagpunta sa kanya
na pinaggoguardiahan sa
Nawasa at pagdating ko nuon ay
kumatok ako sa pintuan ng
Nawasa, at nang marinig niya
ang aking katok sa pinto ay
binuksan niya ang pintuan, at
pagkabukas ng pintuan ay nakita
niya ako, at nagalit siya at ako ay
minura ng puta putan Ina mo,
lalakad ka ng gabi, at namumuta
raw ako, at pagkatapos na ako ay
mamura ay hinahabol pa ako ng
suntok, kayat ang ginawa ko po
kinuha ko ang aking dalang bote
na may gasolina at aking
ibinuhos sa kanyang katawan at
aking kinuha ang posporo at
aking sinindihang at hangang
magliyab ang suot niyang polo
shirt, na may guhit na itim at
puti.
T Alam mo ba na kung ano ang
iyong ginawa sa iyong asawa
kanginang humigit kumulang na
mag-iika alas 11:00 ng gabi
Marzo 6, 1965?
S Opo, aking sinunog ang aking
asawa. (Exhs. A & A-1
Emphasis supplied)
She would now like her
aforesaid extrajudicial
confession discredited by
asserting that she did not
understand its contents because
she is not a Tagala aside from
having reached only the primary
grades; and furthermore, that
said statement was signed by her
merely upon the promise of the
policemen that she will later be
released.
We find appellant's aforesaid
assertions a mere pretense too
flimsy to be accepted as true. For
the truth is that appellant knew
and understood Tagalog despite
Q But you can understand
Tagalog because of the length of
time that you litem been living
here in Manila?
A Yes.
Q And as a matter of fact, when
you buy something from the
store, you speak Tagalog?
A Yes.
Q And when you ride in a jeep
or bus, you speak Tagalog?
A Yes.
Q And you were well understood
by these Tagalog people?
A Yes.
Q And as a matter of fact, you
can understand Tagalog?
A Yes,
her not being a Tagala, having
stayed in Manila since 1951,
continuously up to the time of
the burning incident in question
for which she was investigated.
During this period of almost
fourteen years, she was in daily
association with Tagalogs
communicating with them in
Pilipino. This is clear from her
admission on cross-examination
which runs thus-
Q And you can also read
Tagalog?
A Yes.
Q You can read?
A Yes, but I do not litem interest
to read. TSN, March 29, 1969,
pp.11-12).
All through shout the entire investigation and even at
the time appellant A as before Fiscal Paredes, before
whom she subscribed and swore to the truth of an what
appeared in her statement, 6 no denunciation of any sort
was made nor levelled by her against the police
investigators. Neither was there any complaint aired by
her to the effect that she merely affixed her signatures
thereto because of the promise by the police that she
will be released later. We therefore find her aforesaid
claim highly incredible and a mere concoction. For why
will the police still resort to such trickery when the very
sworn statement given by her proved by its contents that
appellant was indeed very cooperative. In fact, almost
all the recitals and narrations appearing in the said
statement were practically repeated by her on the
witness stand thus authenticating the truth and veracity
of her declarations contained therein. Moreover, We
find said statement replete with details which could not
litem been possibly supplied by the police investigators
who litem no previous knowledge of, nor acquaintance
with her and the victim, especially with respect to the
circumstances and incidents which preceded the fatal
incident that brought about the death of the latter. We
therefore find no error in the trial court's pronouncement
that appellant's sworn statement was voluntarily given
by her; that she fully understood its contents; and that
she willingly affixed her signatures thereto.
Well settled is the rule that extrajudicial confession may
be regarded as conclusive proof of guilt when taken
without maltreatment or intimidation 7 and may serve as
a basis of the declarant's conviction. 8 It is presumed to
be voluntary until the contrary is proven. The burden of
proof is upon the person who gave the
confession. 9 That presumption has not been overcome
in the instant case.
Indeed the trial court could not be faulted for relying
heavily on accused-appellant's sworn statement in
assessing her guhit since it was given shortly after the
incident took place. By then, she had yet no time to
concoct any fabrication favorable to her. Shock by the
aftermath consequences of her criminal design she must
litem been motivated by no other purpose except to
admit the undeniable. On the other hand, when she took
the witness stand, disclaiming any responsibility for the
burning of her husband, it was already January 13, 1969
. . . more than five years after the incident and decidedly
after she had the benefit of too many consultations.
That appellant has murder in her heart and meant to do
harm to her husband when she went to the latter's place
of work on that fatal night and intended an the
consequences of her nefarious act finds clearer
manifestation and added support in her total indifference
and seemingly unperturbed concern over the fate that
had befallen the victim . . . her husband . . . especially at
times when he needed her most. Being the wife, she
must be the closest to him and the hardest hit by the
mishap if she has not authored the same nor voluntarily
participated therein. She was then reasonably expected
to come to his succor and alleviate him from his
sufferings. And yet, the records do not show her having
seen her husband even once while the latter lay
seriously ill at the hospital hovering between life and
375
death. Neither did she attend his funeral nor was she
ever present during the wake while the victim's remains
lay in state. That she was under detention does not
excuse nor justify those glaring and significant
omissions. For she could litem asked the court's
permission for any of the enumerated undertakings
which we believe would not litem been denied. But she
did not even attempt.
Indeed, the more we scrutinize appellant's alibi and
explanation, we become more convinced of the falsity
and incredibility of her assertions. For instance, her
claim that her purpose in buying gasoline at so an
unholy hour of the night, past ten o clock in the evening,
solely for the purpose of cleaning her shoes which she
would wear in going to church the following Sunday,
hardly recommend acceptance. That she dropped at her
husband's place of work also at the middle of the night
for no other purpose except to deliver to him gasoline
for his cigarette lighter, is likewise too taxing upon one's
credulity . . . more so if we litem to consider the
previous spat she had with the deceased in the morning
of that fatal day.
In her vain attempt to exculpate herself, appellant would
like Us to believe that her husband died of pneumonia
because the latter drank liquor as shown by the
toxicology report indicating presence of alcohol in the
victim's body. Hence, assuming she set her husband on
fire, she is not criminally liable for her husband's death.
We are not persuaded by appellant's aforesaid
ratiocination
The claim that the victim drank liquor while confined in
the hospital would not suffice to exculpate the appellant.
For as testified by Dr. Reyes, pneumonia could not be
caused by taking alcohol. In fact, alcohol, according to
him, unless taken in excessive dosage so as to produce
an almost comatose condition would not cause
suffocation nor effect a diminution of the oxygen
content of the body. 10 In fine, as correctly pointed out
by the Hon. Solicitor General, the victim's taking of
liquor was not an efficient supervening cause of his
death which took place on March 10, 1965, just four
days after the burning.
The cause of death as shown by the necropsy report is
pneumonia, lobar bilateral. Burns 2' secondary. There is
no question that the burns sustained by the victim as
shown by The post-mortem findings immunity about
62% of the victim's entire body. The evidence shows
that pneumonia was a mere complication of the burns
sustained. While accepting pneumonia as the immediate
cause of death, the court a quo held on to state that this
could not litem resulted had not the victim suffered from
second degree burns. It concluded, and rightly so, that
with pneumonia having developed, the burns became as
to the cause of death, merely contributory. We agree.
Appellant's case falls squarely under Art, 4, Par. 1 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides:
Art. 4. Criminal Liability. — Criminal liability shall be
incurred.
376
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.
the essential requisites of which are: (a) that an
intentional felony has been committed; and (b) that the
wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural
and logical consequence of the felony committed by the
offender. 11
The reason for the rule as spelled out in the earlier cases
of PP vs. Moldes, 61 Phil. 1, 3 & 4; and PP vs.
Quianzon, 62 Phil. 162, citing 13 RCL 748, 751 is as
follows —
One who inflicts injury on another is deemed guilty of
homicide if the injury contributes immediately or
immediately to the death of such other. The fact that
other causes contribute to the death does not relieve the
actor of responsibility. He would still be liable "even if
the deceased might litem recovered if he had taken
proper care of himself, or submitted to surgical
operation, or that unskilled or improper treatment
aggravated the wound and contributed to the death, or
that death was men." caused by a surgical operation
rendered necessary by the condition of the wound. The
principle on which this rule is founded is one of
universal application. It lies at the foundation of
criminal jurisprudence. It is that every person is held to
contemplate and be responsible for the natural
consequences of his own acts. If a person inflicts a
wound with a deadly weapon in a manner as to put life
in jeopardy, and death follows as a consequence of this
felonious and wicked act, it does not alter its nature or
diminish its criminality to prove that other causes
cooperated in producing the fatal result. Neglect of the
wound or its unskilled and improper treatment which
are themselves consequences of the criminal act, must in
law be deemed to litem been among those which are in
contemplation of the guilty party and for which he must
be responsible The rule has its foundation on a wise and
practical policy. A different doctrine would tend to give
immunity to crime and to take away from human life a
salutary and essential safeguard. Amidst the conflicting
theories of medical men and the uncertainties attendant
upon the treatment of bodily ailments and injuries it
would be easy in many cases of homicide to raise a
doubt as to the immediate cause of death, and thereby
open a wide door by which persons guilty of the highest
crime might escape conviction and punishment.
In convicting the accused, the trial court imposed upon
her the obligation to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
only in the amount of P12,000.00. That should now be
increased to P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, except as thus modified, the judgment
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with costs against
appellant.
It appearing however that appellant Valentina
Mananquil is now 71 years of age, this Court
recommends her for executive clemency. For the
purpose, let His Excellency, President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, be furnished with a copy of this decision thru
the Hon. Minister of Justice.
377
 SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Chairman), Aquino, Abad Santos and
Escolin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr. and Guerrero, JJ., are on leave.
 People v. Andres, et.al. GR 155791 March 16,2005, 458
SCRA 511
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 155791. March 16, 2005
MELBA QUINTO, Petitioners,
vs.
DANTE ANDRES and RANDYVER
PACHECO, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
At around 7:30 a.m. on November 13, 1995, eleven-
year-old Edison Garcia, a Grade 4 elementary school
pupil, and his playmate, Wilson Quinto, who was also
about eleven years old, were at Barangay San Rafael,
Tarlac, Tarlac. They saw respondents Dante Andres and
Randyver Pacheco by the mouth of a drainage culvert.
Andres and Pacheco invited Wilson to go fishing with
them inside the drainage culvert.1 Wilson assented.
When Garcia saw that it was dark inside, he opted to
remain seated in a grassy area about two meters from
the entrance of the drainage system.2
Respondent Pacheco had a flashlight. He, along with
respondent Andres and Wilson, entered the drainage
system which was covered by concrete culvert about a
meter high and a meter wide, with water about a foot
deep.3 After a while, respondent Pacheco, who was
holding a fish, came out of the drainage system and
left4 without saying a word. Respondent Andres also
came out, went back inside, and emerged again, this
time, carrying Wilson who was already dead.
Respondent Andres laid the boy’s lifeless body down in
the grassy area.5 Shocked at the sudden turn of events,
Garcia fled from the scene.6 For his part, respondent
Andres went to the house of petitioner Melba Quinto,
Wilson’s mother, and informed her that her son had
died. Melba Quinto rushed to the drainage culvert while
respondent Andres followed her.7
The cadaver of Wilson was buried without any autopsy
thereon having been conducted. The police authorities
of Tarlac, Tarlac, did not file any criminal complaint
against the respondents for Wilson’s death.
Two weeks thereafter, or on November 28, 1995,
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigators
took the sworn statements of respondent Pacheco,
Garcia and petitioner Quinto.8 Respondent Pacheco
alleged that he had never been to the drainage system
catching fish with respondent Andres and Wilson. He
also declared that he saw Wilson already dead when he
378
passed by the drainage system while riding on his
carabao.
On February 29, 1996, the cadaver of Wilson was
exhumed. Dr. Dominic Aguda of the NBI performed an
autopsy thereon at the cemetery and submitted his
autopsy report containing the
following postmortem findings:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Body in previously embalmed, early stage of
decomposition, attired with white long sleeves and dark
pants and placed inside a wooden coffin in a niche-
apartment style.
Hematoma, 14.0 x 7.0 cms., scalp, occipital region.
Abrasion, 4.0 x 3.0 cms., right face, 5.0 x 3.0 cms., left
forearm.
Laryngo – tracheal lumina – congested and edematous
containing muddy particles with bloody path.
Lungs – hyperinflated, heavy and readily pits on
pressure; section contains bloody froth.
Brain – autolyzed and liquefied.
Stomach – partly autolyzed.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Asphyxia by drowning; traumatic
head injuries, contributory.9
The NBI filed a criminal complaint for homicide against
respondents Andres and Pacheco in the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, which found probable cause for
homicide by dolo against the two.
An Information was later filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Tarlac, Tarlac, charging the respondents
with homicide. The accusatory portion reads:
That at around 8 o’clock in the morning of November
13, 1995, in the Municipality of Tarlac, Province of
Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused Dante Andres and
Randyver Pacheco y Suliven @ Randy, conspiring,
confederating, and helping one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack,
assault, and maul Wilson Quinto inside a culvert where
the three were fishing, causing Wilson Quinto to drown
and die.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
After presenting Garcia, the prosecution presented Dr.
Dominic Aguda, who testified on direct examination
that the hematoma at the back of the victim’s head and
the abrasion on the latter’s left forearm could have been
caused by a strong force coming from a blunt instrument
or object. The injuries in the larynx and trachea also
indicated that the victim died of drowning, as some
muddy particles were also found on the lumina of the
larynx and trachea ("Nakahigop ng putik"). Dr. Aguda
stated that such injury could be caused when a person is
put under water by pressure or by force.11 On cross-
379
examination, Dr. Aguda declared that the hematoma on
the scalp was caused by a strong pressure or a strong
force applied to the scalp coming from a blunt
instrument. He also stated that the victim could have
fallen, and that the occipital portion of his head could
have hit a blunt object.
Dr. Aguda also declared that the 14x7-centimeter
hematoma at the back of Wilson’s head could have
rendered the latter unconscious, and, if he was thrown in
a body of water, the boy could have died by drowning.
In answer to clarificatory questions made by the court,
the doctor declared that the 4x3-centimeter abrasion on
the right side of Wilson’s face could have also been
caused by rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement,
or by contact with a rough surface. He also stated that
the trachea region was full of mud, but that there was no
sign of strangulation.12
After the prosecution had presented its witnesses and
the respondents had admitted the pictures showing the
drainage system including the inside portions
thereof,13 the prosecution rested its case.
The respondents filed a demurer to evidence which the
trial court granted on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence, per its Order dated January 28, 1998. It also
held that it could not hold the respondents liable for
damages because of the absence of preponderant
evidence to prove their liability for Wilson’s death.
The petitioner appealed the order to the Court of
Appeals (CA) insofar as the civil aspect of the case was
concerned. In her brief, she averred that –
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
CASE AND IN RULING THAT NO
PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD
ACCUSED-APPELLEES CIVILLY LIABLE FOR
THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM WILSON QUINTO.14
The CA rendered judgment affirming the assailed order
of the RTC on December 21, 2001. It ruled as follows:
The acquittal in this case is not merely based on
reasonable doubt but rather on a finding that the
accused-appellees did not commit the criminal acts
complained of. Thus, pursuant to the above rule and
settled jurisprudence, any civil action ex delicto cannot
prosper. Acquittal in a criminal action bars the civil
action arising therefrom where the judgment of acquittal
holds that the accused did not commit the criminal acts
imputed to them. (Tan v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., 91
Phil. 672)15
The petitioner filed the instant petition for review and
raised the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE EXTINCTION OF
RESPONDENTS’ CRIMINAL LIABILITY,
LIKEWISE, CARRIES WITH IT THE EXTINCTION
OF THEIR CIVIL LIABILITY.
380
II
WHETHER OR NOT PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE
EXISTS TO HOLD RESPONDENTS CIVILLY
LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF WILSON QUINTO.16
The petitioner avers that the trial court indulged in mere
possibilities, surmises and speculations when it held that
Wilson died because (a) he could have fallen, his head
hitting the stones in the drainage system since the
culvert was slippery; or (b) he might have been bitten by
a snake which he thought was the prick of a fish fin,
causing his head to hit hard on the top of the culvert; or
(c) he could have lost consciousness due to some
ailment, such as epilepsy. The petitioner also alleges
that the trial court erred in ruling that the prosecution
failed to prove any ill motive on the part of the
respondents to kill the victim, and in considering that
respondent Andres even informed her of Wilson’s
death.
The petitioner posits that the trial court ignored the
testimony of the Medico-Legal Expert, Dr. Aguda; the
nature, location and number of the injuries sustained by
the victim which caused his death; as well as the locus
criminis. The petitioner insists that the behavior of the
respondents after the commission of the crime betrayed
their guilt, considering that respondent Pacheco left the
scene, leaving respondent Andres to bring out Wilson’s
cadaver, while respondent Andres returned inside the
drainage system only when he saw Garcia seated in the
grassy area waiting for his friend Wilson to come out.
The petitioner contends that there is preponderant
evidence on record to show that either or both the
respondents caused the death of her son and, as such,
are jointly and severally liable therefor.
In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver
that since the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence
to prove that they committed the crime of homicide and
caused the death of Wilson, they are not criminally and
civilly liable for the latter’s death.
The petition has no merit.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.17 The civil liability of such person established in
Articles 100, 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code
includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused,
and indemnification for consequential damages.18 When
a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.19 With the
implied institution of the civil action in the criminal
action, the two actions are merged into one composite
proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the
civil.20
The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish
the offender in order to deter him and others from
committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him
from society, to reform and rehabilitate him or, in
381
general, to maintain social order.21 The sole purpose of
the civil action is the restitution, reparation or
indemnification of the private offended party for the
damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual
or felonious act of the accused.22While the prosecution
must prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime charged, it is required to prove the
cause of action of the private complainant against the
accused for damages and/or restitution.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
the extinction of the civil action. However, the civil
action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if
there is a finding in a final judgment in the civil action
that the act or omission from where the civil liability
may arise does not exist.23
Moreover, a person committing a felony is criminally
liable for all the natural and logical consequences
resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.24 "Natural" refers
to an occurrence in the ordinary course of human life or
events, while "logical" means that there is a rational
connection between the act of the accused and the
resulting injury or damage. The felony committed must
be the proximate cause of the resulting injury.
Proximate cause is that cause which in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred. The
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing
the injury, either immediately, or by setting other events
in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous
chain of events, each having a close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor.25
There must be a relation of "cause and effect," the cause
being the felonious act of the offender, the effect being
the resultant injuries and/or death of the victim. The
"cause and effect" relationship is not altered or changed
because of the pre-existing conditions, such as the
pathological condition of the victim (las condiciones
patologica del lesionado); the predisposition of the
offended party (la predisposicion del ofendido); the
physical condition of the offended party (la constitucion
fisica del herido); or the concomitant or concurrent
conditions, such as the negligence or fault of the doctors
(la falta de medicos para sister al herido); or the
conditions supervening the felonious act such as tetanus,
pulmonary infection or gangrene.26
The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the
resulting injury when:
(a) there is an active force that intervened between the
felony committed and the resulting injury, and the active
force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the
felonious act of the accused; or
(b) the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the
victim.27
If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in
such a manner as to put life in jeopardy and death
follows as a consequence of their felonious act, it does
not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove
382
that other causes cooperated in producing the factual
result. The offender is criminally liable for the death of
the victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated or
contributed to the death of the victim.28 A different
doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to
take away from human life a salutary and essential
safeguard.29 This Court has emphasized that:
… Amid the conflicting theories of medical men, and
the uncertainties attendant upon the treatment of bodily
ailments and injuries, it would be easy in many cases of
homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of
death, and thereby to open a wide door by which
persons guilty of the highest crime might escape
conviction and punishment. …30
In People v. Quianzon,31 the Supreme Court held:
… The Supreme Court of Spain, in a Decision of April
3, 1879, said in a case similar to the present, the
following: Inasmuch as a man is responsible for the
consequences of his act – and in this case, the physical
condition and temperament of the offended party nowise
lessen the evil, the seriousness whereof is to be judged,
not by the violence of the means employed, but by the
result actually produced; and as the wound which the
appellant inflicted upon the deceased was the cause
which determined his death, without his being able to
counteract its effects, it is evident that the act in
question should be qualified as homicide, etc.32
In the present case, the respondents were charged with
homicide by dolo. In People v. Delim,33 the Court
delineated the burden of the prosecution to prove the
guilt of the accused for homicide or murder:
In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to
prove the corpus delicti which consists of two things:
first, the criminal act and second, defendant’s agency in
the commission of the act. Wharton says that corpus
delicti includes two things: first, the objective; second,
the subjective element of crimes. In homicide (by dolo)
and in murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to
prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b)
that the death was produced by the criminal act of some
other than the deceased and was not the result of
accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant
committed the criminal act or was in some way
criminally responsible for the act which produced the
death. To prove the felony of homicide or murder, there
must be incontrovertible evidence, direct or
circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately killed
(with malice); in other words, that there was intent to
kill. Such evidence may consist inter alia in the use of
weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and
number of wounds sustained by the victim and the
words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or
immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim
dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent
to kill is conclusively presumed.34
Insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, the
prosecution or the private complainant is burdened to
adduce preponderance of evidence or superior weight of
evidence. Although the evidence adduced by the
plaintiff is stronger than that presented by the defendant,
383
he is not entitled to a judgment if his evidence is not
sufficient to sustain his cause of action. The plaintiff
must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not
upon the weakness of that of the defendants’.35
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence
provides how preponderance of evidence is determined:
Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined.
– In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof
must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.
In determining where the preponderance or superior
weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court
may consider all the facts and circumstance of the case,
the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence,
their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to
which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to
which they testify, the probability of their testimony,
their interest or want of interest, and also their personal
credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear
upon the trial. The court may also consider the number
of witnesses, though the preponderance is not
necessarily with the greater number.36
In the present case, we rule that, as held by the trial
court and the CA, the prosecution failed to adduce
preponderant evidence to prove the facts on which the
civil liability of the respondents rest, i.e., that the
petitioner has a cause of action against the respondents
for damages.
It bears stressing that the prosecution relied solely on
the collective testimonies of Garcia, who was not an
eyewitness, and Dr. Aguda.
We agree with the petitioner that, as evidenced by the
Necropsy Report of Dr. Dominic Aguda, the deceased
sustained a 14x7-centimeter hematoma on the scalp. But
as to how the deceased sustained the injury, Dr. Aguda
was equivocal. He presented two possibilities: (a) that
the deceased could have been hit by a blunt object or
instrument applied with full force; or (b) the deceased
could have slipped, fell hard and his head hit a hard
object:
COURT:
The Court would ask questions.
Q So it is possible that the injury, that is – the
hematoma, caused on the back of the head might be due
to the victim’s falling on his back and his head hitting a
pavement?
A Well, the 14x7-centimeter hematoma is quite
extensive, so if the fall is strong enough and would fall
from a high place and hit a concrete pavement, then it is
possible.
Q Is it possible that if the victim slipped on a concrete
pavement and the head hit the pavement, the injury
might be caused by that slipping?
A It is also possible.
384
Q So when the victim was submerged under water while
unconscious, it is possible that he might have taken in
some mud or what?
A Yes, Sir.
Q So it is your finding that the victim was submerged
while still breathing?
A Yes, Your Honor, considering that the finding on the
lung also would indicate that the victim was still alive
when he was placed under water.37
The doctor also admitted that the abrasion on the right
side of the victim’s face could have been caused by
rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement:
Q The abrasion 4x3 centimeters on the right [side of
the] face, would it be caused by the face rubbing against
a concrete wall or pavement?
A Yes, Sir. Abrasion is usually caused by a contact of a
skin to a rough surface.
Q Rough surface?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q When you say that the trachea region was full of mud,
were there no signs that the victim was strangled?
A There was no sign of strangulation, Your Honor.38
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Dr.
Aguda that the deceased might have slipped, causing the
latter to fall hard and hit his head on the pavement, thus:
Q -Could it be possible, Doctor, that this injury might
have been caused when the victim fell down and that
portion of the body or occipital portion hit a blunt object
and might have been inflicted as a result of falling
down?
A - If the fall … if the victim fell and he hit a hard
object, well, it is also possible.39
The trial court took into account the following facts:
Again, it could be seen from the pictures presented by
the prosecution that there were stones inside the culvert.
(See Exhibit "D" to "D-3"). The stones could have
caused the victim to slip and hit his head on the
pavement. Since there was water on the culvert, the
portion soaked with water must be very slippery, aside
from the fact that the culvert is round. If the victim hit
his head and lost consciousness, he will naturally take in
some amount of water and drown.40
The CA affirmed on appeal the findings of the trial
court, as well as its conclusion based on the said
findings.
We agree with the trial and appellate courts. The general
rule is that the findings of facts of the trial court, its
assessment of probative weight of the evidence of the
parties, and its conclusion anchored on such findings,
385
affirmed no less by the CA, are given conclusive effect
by this Court, unless the trial court ignored, misapplied
or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances which,
if considered, would change the outcome of the case.
The petitioner failed to show any justification to warrant
a reversal of the findings or conclusions of the trial and
appellate courts.
That the deceased fell or slipped cannot be totally
foreclosed because even Garcia testified that the
drainage culvert was dark, and that he himself was so
afraid that he refused to join respondents Andres and
Pacheco inside.41Respondent Andres had no flashlight;
only respondent Pacheco had one.
Moreover, Dr. Aguda failed to testify and explain what
might have caused the abrasion on the left forearm of
the deceased. He, likewise, failed to testify whether the
abrasions on the face and left forearm of the victim were
made ante mortem or post mortem.
The petitioner even failed to adduce preponderance of
evidence that either or both the respondents hit the
deceased with a blunt object or instrument, and,
consequently, any blunt object or instrument that might
have been used by any or both of the respondents in
hitting the deceased.
It is of judicial notice that nowadays persons have killed
or committed serious crimes for no reason at
all.42However, the absence of any ill-motive to kill the
deceased is relevant and admissible in evidence to prove
that no violence was perpetrated on the person of the
deceased. In this case, the petitioner failed to adduce
proof of any ill-motive on the part of either respondent
to kill the deceased before or after the latter was invited
to join them in fishing. Indeed, the petitioner testified
that respondent Andres used to go to their house and
play with her son before the latter’s death:
Q Do you know this Dante Andres personally?
A Not much but he used to go to our house and play
with my son after going from her mother who is
gambling, Sir.
Q But you are acquainted with him, you know his face?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Will you please look around this courtroom and see if
he is around?
A (Witness is pointing to Dante Andres, who is inside
the courtroom.)43
When the petitioner’s son died inside the drainage
culvert, it was respondent Andres who brought out the
deceased. He then informed the petitioner of her son’s
death. Even after informing the petitioner of the death of
her son, respondent Andres followed the petitioner on
her way to the grassy area where the deceased was:
Q Did not Dante Andres follow you?
A He went with me, Sir.
386
 Q So when you went to the place where your son was
lying, Dante Andres was with you?
A No, Sir. When I was informed by Dante Andres that
my son was there at the culvert, I ran immediately. He
[was] just left behind and he just followed, Sir.
Q So when you reached the place where your son was
lying down, Dante Andres also came or arrived?
A It was only when we boarded the jeep that he arrived,
Sir.44
In sum, the petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of
evidence to prove a cause of action for damages based
on the deliberate acts alleged in the Information.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition
is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-
Nazario, JJ., concur.
 People v. Quianzon, 62 Phil. 162
G.R. No. 42607 September 28, 1935
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN QUIANZON, defendant-appellant.
Pedro B. Pobre for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
RECTO, J.:
Charged with and convicted of the crime of homicide in
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six years
and one day of prision mayor, as minimum to fourteen
years, seven months and one day of reclusion temporal,
as maximum, Juan Quianzon appeal to this court for the
review of the case.
On February 1, 1934, a novena for the suffrage of the
soul of the deceased person was being held in the house
of Victoria Cacpal in a barrio, near the poblacion, of the
municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte, with the usual
attendance of the relatives and friends. The incident that
led to the filling of these charges took place between 3
to 4 o'clock in the afternoon. Andres Aribuabo, one of
the persons present, went to ask for food of Juan
Quianzon, then in the kitchen, who, to all appearances,
had the victuals in his care. It was the second or third
time that Aribuabo approached Quianzon with the same
purpose whereupon the latter, greatly peeved, took hold
of a firebrand and applied ran to the place where the
people were gathered exclaiming that he is wounded
and was dying. Raising his shirt, he showed to those
present a wound in his abdomen below the navel.
Aribuabo died as a result of this wound on the tenth day
after the incident.
387
There is no conflict between the prosecution and the
defense as regards the foregoing facts. The question to
be determined is who wounded Aribuabo. The
prosecution claims that it was Juan Quianzon and, to
prove it, called Simeon Cacpal, Roman Bagabay,
Gregorio Dumlao and Julian Llaguno to the witness
stand.
The first witness, Simeon Cacpal, claims to have
witnessed the wounding of Andres Aribuabo in the
abdomen by Juan Quianzon. However, we find the
testimony of this witness so improbable, incongruent
and contradictory that we consider meritorious the claim
of the defense that it was an error of the lower court to
have taken it into consideration in formulating the
findings of its judgment. Not so with respect to the
testimony of the other witnesses. Roman Bagabay, one
of the persons present at said gathering, testified that he
saw Juan Quianzon apply a firebrand to the neck of
Andres Aribuabo who shortly afterwards went toward
the place where the witness and the other guests were
gathered, telling that he was wounded and was going to
die and naming Juan Quianzon as the person who
wounded him. He also testified that Juan Quianzon,
upon being asked immediately by him about the
incident, admitted to him attacked Aribuabo with a
bamboo spit. Gregorio Dumalao, a barrio lieutenant,
who, upon being informed of the incident, forthwith
conducted an investigation, questioned Aribuabo and
the latter told him that it was the accused who had
wounded him. He likewise questioned the accused and
the latter, in turn, stated that he had wounded the
deceased with a bamboo spit. Upon being brought
before Juan Llaguno, chief of police of Paoay, for
questioning, Quianzon confessed to Llaguno that he had
applied a firebrand to Aribuabo's neck and had later
wounded him with a bamboo spit. Before the chief of
police could put this confession of Quianzon in writing,
the later retracted, denying that he had wounded
Aribuabo, for which reason in the affidavit Exhibit B
the fact of having applied a firebrand to Aribuabo's neck
appears admitted by Quianzon but not of having
wounded the deceased with a bamboo spit.
The disinterestedness of these three witnesses for the
prosecution, Bagabay, Dumalo and Llaguno, is not
questioned by the defense. Neither the accused, in his
testimony, nor his counsel, in the brief filed by him in
this court, was able to assign any unlawful, corrupt or
wicked motive that might have actuated them to testify
falsely in this case and knowingly bring about the
imprisonment of an innocent person. Bagabay is not
even a relative of the deceased. Dumlao, the barrio
lieutenant, is a nephew of the accused. Llaguno, chief of
police of Paoay, is an officer of the law whose
intervention of this case was purely in compliance with
his official duties. All the appellant has been able to
state in his brief to question the credibility of these
witnesses is that they were contradicted by Simeon
Cacpal, the other witness for the prosecution, who
testified that he had not seen them speak neither to
Aribuabo nor to Quianzon in the afternoon of the crime.
But the position of the defense in invoking Simeon
Cacpal's testimony for the purpose of discrediting the
388
other witnesses for the prosecution is untenable, after
having vigorously impeached said testimony, branding
it as improbable, incongruent and contradictory. If
Cacpal is a false witness — and the court believes this
claim of the defense as true — , none of his statements
may be taken into account or should exert any influence
in the consideration of the other evidence in the case.
After discharging testimony of Simeon Cacpal, the
evidence presented by the prosecution relative to the
appellant's criminal liability for the death of Andres
Aribuabo, briefly consists, first, in the victim's statement
immediately after receiving the wound, naming the
accused as the author of the aggression, and the
admission forthwith made by the accused that he had
applied a firebrand to Aribuabo's neck and had wounded
him, besides, with a bamboo spit. Both statements are
competent evidence in the law, admissible as a part of
the res gestae (section 279 and 298, No. 7, of the Code
of Civil Procedure; U.S. vs. Macuti, 26 Phil., 170;
People vs. Portento and Portento, 48 Phil., 971). Second,
in the extrajudicial confession of the accused to the
barrio lieutenant, Dumlao, and later to the chief of
police Llaguno, in the same afternoon of the crime, that
he was the author of Aribuabo's wound and that he had
inflicted it by means of a bamboo spit. Inasmuch as this
confession, although extrajudicial, is strongly
corroborated and appears to have been made by the
accused freely and voluntarily, it constitutes evidence
against him relative to his liability as author of the crime
charged (U.S. vs. so Fo, 23 Phil., 379;
People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil., 64, 82; U.S. vs. Jamino, 3
P.R.A., 52; Francisco's Quizzer on Evidence).
The defense of the accused consisted simply in denying
that he had wounded the deceased and that he had
confessed his guilt to the witnesses Bagabay, Dumlao
and Llaguno. But such denial cannot prevail against the
adverse testimony of these three veracious and
disinterested witnesses, all the more because neither the
accused nor any other witness for the defense has stated
or insinuated that another person, not the accused, might
be the author of the wound which resulted in Aribuabo's
death, and because it is admitted by the defense that it
was the accused, whom Aribuabo had been pestering
with request for food, who attacked the latter, burning
his neck with a firebrand, afetr which Aribuaboappeared
wounded in the abdomen, without the accused and the
witnesses for the defense explaining how and by whom
the aggression had been made.
It is contended by the defense that even granting that it
was the accused who inflicted the wound which resulted
in Aribuabo's death, he should not be convicted of
homicide but only of serious physical injuries because
said wound was not necessarily fatal and the deceased
would have survived it had he not twice removed the
drainage which Dr. Mendoza had placed to control or
isolate the infection. This contention is without merit.
According to the physician who examined whether he
could survive or not." It was a wound in the abdomen
which occasionally results in traumatic peritonitis. The
infection was cause by the fecal matter from the large
intestine which has been perforated. The possibility,
389
admitted by said physician that the patient might have
survived said wound had he not removed the drainage,
does not mean that the act of the patient was the real
cause of his death. Even without said act the fatal
consequence could have followed, and the fact that the
patient had so acted in a paroxysm of pain does not alter
the juridical consequences of the punishable act of the
accused.
One who inflicts an injury on another is deemed by the
law to be guilty of homicide if the injury contributes
mediately or immediately to the death of such other.
The fact that the other causes contribute to the death
does not relieve the actor of responsibility. . . . (13 R.
C.L., 748.)
Furthermore, it does not appear that the patient, in
removing the drainage, had acted voluntarily and with
the knowledge that he was performing an act prejudicial
to his health, inasmuch as self-preservation is the
strongest instinct in living beings. It much be assumed,
therefore, that he unconsciously did so due to his
pathological condition and to his state of nervousness
and restlessness on account of the horrible physical pain
caused by the wound, aggravated by the contract of the
drainage tube with the inflammed peritoneum. "When
the peritonitis is due to traumatism, or to a perforation
of the stomach, intestine or gall-bladder, etc., it is
indicated by violent shivering and pain first localized at
a point in the abdomen, extending later to the entire
abdominal wall; acute intolerable pain, which is
aggravated by the slightest movement, becoming
unbearable upon contact with the hand, a rag, or the
bedclothes. The pain is continuous but it gives frequent
paroxysms. The abdomen is swollen, tense. Vomittings
of the greenish matter, which are very annoying and
terribly painful, take from the beginning and continue
while the disease lasts." (XVI Spanish-America
Encyclopaedic Dictionary, 176; see also XXI
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1911 ed., 171.) If to this is
added the fact that the victim in this case was mentally
deranged, according to the defense itself, it becomes
more evident that the accused is wrong in imputing the
natural consequences of his criminal act to an act of his
victim.
The question herein raised by the appellant has already
been finally settled by jurisprudence. The Supreme
Court of Spain, in a decision of April 3, 1879, said in
the case similar to the present, the following: "Inasmuch
as a man is responsible for the consequences of his
act — and in this case the physical condition and
temperament of the offended party nowise lessen the
evil, the seriousness whereof is to be judged, not by the
violence of the means employed, but by the result
actually produced; and as the wound which the
appellant inflicted upon the deceased was the cause
which determined his death, without his being able to
counteract its effects, it is evident that the act in
question should be qualified as homicide, etc."
In the case of People vs. Almonte (56 Phil., 54), the
abdominal wound was less serious than that received by
Aribuabo in this case, as it was not penetrating, merely
involving the muscular tissue. In said case the death of
the victim was due to a secondary hemorrhage produced
390
twenty-four hours after the wound had been inflicted,
because of the "bodily movements of the patient, who
was in a state of nervousness, sitting up in bed, getting
up and pacing about the room, as as a consequence of
which he internal vessels, already congested because of
the wound, bled, and the hemorrhage thus produced
caused his death." The court in deciding the question
stated that "when a person dies in consequence of an
internal hemorrhage brought on by moving about
against the doctor's orders, not because of carelessness
or a desire to increase the criminal liability of his
assailant, but because of his nervous condition due to
the wound inflicted by said assailant, the crime is
homicide and not merely slight physical injuries, simply
because the doctor was of the opinion that the wound
might have healed in seven days."
The grounds for this rule of jurisprudence are correctly
set forth in 13 R.C.L., 751, as follows:
While the courts may have vacilated from time to time it
may be taken to be settled rule of the common law that
on who inflicts an injury on another will be held
responsible for his death, although it may appear that
the deceased might have recovered if he had taken
proper care of himself, or submitted to a surgical
operation, or that unskilled or improper treatment
aggravated the wound and contributed to the death, or
that death was immediately caused by a surgical
operation rendered necessary by the condition of the
wound. The principle on which this rule is founded is
one of universal application, and lies at the foundation
of the criminal jurisprudence. It is, that every person is
to be held to contemplate and to be responsible for the
natural consequences of his own acts. If a person inflicts
a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to
put life in jeopardy, and death follows as a consequence
of this felonious and wicked act, it does not alter its
nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other
causes co-operated in producing the fatal result. Indeed,
it may be said that neglect of the wound or its unskillful
and improper treatment, which are of themselves
consequences of the criminal act, which might naturally
follow in any case, must in law be deemed to have been
among those which were in contemplation of the guilty
party, and for which he is to be held responsible. But,
however, this may be, the rule surely seems to have its
foundation in a wise and practical policy. A different
doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to
take away from human life a salutary and essential
safeguard. Amid the conflicting theories of the medical
men, and the uncertainties attendant upon the treatment
of bodily ailments and injuries, it would be easy in
many cases of homicide to raise a doubt as to the
immediate cause of death, and thereby to open a wide
door by which persons guilty of the highest crime might
escape conviction and punishment.
Assuming that we should disregard Simeon Cacpal's
testimony, there is no evidence of record that the crime
charged was committed by means of the knife, Exhibit
A, and we only have the extrajudicial admission of the
accused that he had committed it by means of a bamboo
spit with which the wound of the deceased might have
been caused because, according to the physician who
391
 testified in this case, it was produced by a "sharp and
penetrating" instrument.
Inasmuch as the mitigating circumstances of lack of
instruction and of intention to commit so grave a wrong
as the committed should be taken into consideration in
favor of the appellant, without any aggravating
circumstances adverse to him, we modify the appealed
judgment by sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty
with a minimum of four years of prision
correccional and a maximum of a eight years of prision
mayor, affirming it in all other respect, with cost to said
appellant.
Avanceña, C.J., Abad Santos, Hull, and Vickers,
JJ., concur.
 Urbano vs. IAC, GR 72964, January 7, 1988
G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988
FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the
decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan
City finding petitioner Filomeno Urban guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
The records disclose the following facts of the case.
At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23,
1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield
at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan located
at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of
Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he stored his
palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation
canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano went to the
elevated portion of the canal to see what happened and
there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting
grass. He asked them who was responsible for the
opening of the irrigation canal and Javier admitted that
he was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded
that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between
them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet
long, including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and
hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand,
which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who
was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was
overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting
Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo,
causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to
hack and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced
and prevented him from hacking Javier.
392
Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and
Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his house about 50 meters
away from where the incident happened. Emilio then
went to the house of Barangay Captain Menardo
Soliven but not finding him there, Emilio looked for
barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice
of Solis, the Erfes together with Javier went to the
police station of San Fabian to report the incident. As
suggested by Corporal Torio, Javier was brought to a
physician. The group went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla,
rural health physician of San Fabian, who did not attend
to Javier but instead suggested that they go to Dr. Mario
Meneses because Padilla had no available medicine.
After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his
companions returned to Dr. Guillermo Padilla who
conducted a medico-legal examination. Dr. Padilla
issued a medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "C" dated
September 28, 1981) which reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that I have examined the wound of
Marcelo Javier, 20 years of age, married, residing at
Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan on October
23, 1980 and found the following:
1 -Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion
of the lesser palmar prominence, right.
As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9)
days period. This wound was presented to me only for
medico-legal examination, as it was already treated by
the other doctor. (p. 88, Original Records)
Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and
Javier agreed to settle their differences. Urbano
promised to pay P700.00 for the medical expenses of
Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two
accompanied by Solis appeared before the San Fabian
Police to formalize their amicable settlement. Patrolman
Torio recorded the event in the police blotter (Exhibit
A), to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ Re entry Nr 592 on
page 257 both parties appeared before this Station
accompanied by brgy. councilman Felipe Solis and
settled their case amicably, for they are neighbors and
close relatives to each other. Marcelo Javier accepted
and granted forgiveness to Filomeno Urbano who
shoulder (sic) all the expenses in his medical treatment,
and promising to him and to this Office that this will
never be repeated anymore and not to harbour any
grudge against each other. (p. 87, Original Records.)
Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station.
On November 3, 1980, the additional P300.00 was
given to Javier at Urbano's house in the presence of
barangay captain Soliven.
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was
rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very
serious condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier
393
had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo
Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that
the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus
toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in
Javier's palm which could have been infected by
tetanus.
On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died
in the hospital. The medical findings of Dr. Exconde are
as follows:
Date Diagnosis
11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismusadm. at DX
TETANUS
1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With
diffi-
#35, 421 culty opening his mouth. Restless at times.
Febrile
11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden
cessation of respiration and HR after muscular spasm.
02 inhalation administered. Ambo bag resuscitation and
cardiac massage done but to no avail.
Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao at 4:18 P.M.
PMC done and cadaver brought home by relatives. (p.
100, Original Records)
In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno
Urbano was charged with the crime of homicide before
the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City, Third
Judicial District.
Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After
trial, the trial court found Urbano guilty as charged. He
was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of
from TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor, as
minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, together with the accessories of the law, to
indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marcelo Javier, in the
amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He was
ordered confined at the New Bilibid Prison, in
Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of the decision, in view
of the nature of his penalty.
The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the
conviction of Urbano on appeal but raised the award of
indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to P30,000.00
with costs against the appellant.
The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or
new trial. The motion for new trial was based on an
affidavit of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven (Annex
"A") which states:
That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio
Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan, and up to the present
having been re-elected to such position in the last
barangay elections on May 17, 1982;
394
That sometime in the first week of November, 1980,
there was a typhoon that swept Pangasinan and other
places of Central Luzon including San Fabian, a town of
said province;
That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of
the Bued irrigation dam which irrigates the ricefields of
San Fabian were closed and/or controlled so much so
that water and its flow to the canals and ditches were
regulated and reduced;
That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of
the dam leading to the canals and ditches which will
bring water to the ricefields, the water in said canals and
ditches became shallow which was suitable for catching
mudfishes;
That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in
the area affected, with my secretary Perfecto Jaravata;
That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting
survey, I saw the late Marcelo Javier catching fish in the
shallow irrigation canals with some companions;
That few days there after,or on November l5, l980, I
came to know that said Marcelo Javier died of tetanus.
(p. 33, Rollo)
The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.
In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course
to the petition.
The case involves the application of Article 4 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that "Criminal
liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing
a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended ..." Pursuant to
this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for
acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the
natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom."
(People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631).
The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by
the petitioner who used a bolo as a result of which
Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right
palm; that on November 14, 1981 which was the 22nd
day after the incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital
in a very serious condition and that on the following
day, November 15, 1981, he died from tetanus.
Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that
Javier's death was the natural and logical consequence
of Urbano's unlawful act. Hence, he was declared
responsible for Javier's death. Thus, the appellate court
said:
The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause
which supervened from the time the deceased was
wounded to the time of his death, which covers a period
of 23 days does not deserve serious consideration. True,
that the deceased did not die right away from his wound,
but the cause of his death was due to said wound which
was inflicted by the appellant. Said wound which was in
the process of healing got infected with tetanus which
ultimately caused his death.
395
Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital
testified that the victim suffered lockjaw because of the
infection of the wound with tetanus. And there is no
other way by which he could be infected with tetanus
except through the wound in his palm (tsn., p. 78, Oct.
5, 1981). Consequently, the proximate cause of the
victim's death was the wound which got infected with
tetanus. And the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that an
accused is liable for all the consequences of his
unlawful act. (Article 4, par. 1, R.P.C. People v. Red,
CA 43 O.G. 5072; People v. Cornel 78 Phil. 418).
Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the
victim's death was due to his own negligence in going
back to work without his wound being properly healed,
and lately, that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation
canals in the first week of November, 1980, is an
afterthought, and a desperate attempt by appellant to
wiggle out of the predicament he found himself in. If the
wound had not yet healed, it is impossible to conceive
that the deceased would be reckless enough to work
with a disabled hand. (pp. 20-21, Rollo)
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate
cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own
negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in
the injury, and that Javier got infected with tetanus
when after two weeks he returned to his farm and
tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing
the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.
The evidence on record does not clearly show that the
wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at
the time of the infliction of the wound. The evidence
merely confirms that the wound, which was already
healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the
fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus
However, as to when the wound was infected is not
clear from the record.
In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181),
we adopted the following definition of proximate cause:
xxx xxx xxx
... A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found
in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American
Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their
brief. It is as follows:
... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing
the injury, either immediately or by setting other events
in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous
chain of events, each having a close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at
the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
396
person might probably result therefrom." (at pp. 185-
186)
The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was
an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was
wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano
from any liability for Javier's death.
We look into the nature of tetanus-
The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between
injury and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms,
ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of
patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short
incubation period indicates severe disease, and when
symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the
mortality rate approaches 100 percent.
Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as
restlessness, irritability, and headache are encountered
occasionally, but the commonest presenting complaints
are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and
difficulty swallowing. As the progresses, stiffness gives
way to rigidity, and patients often complain of difficulty
opening their mouths. In fact, trismus in the commonest
manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the
familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles
are involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and
sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. The
intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite
variable. In a small proportion of patients, only local
signs and symptoms develop in the region of the injury.
In the vast majority, however, most muscles are
involved to some degree, and the signs and symptoms
encountered depend upon the major muscle groups
affected.
Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the
first symptom, an interval referred to as the onset time.
As in the case of the incubation period, a short onset
time is associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms are
caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli
arising in the periphery, which increases rigidity and
causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of
muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be both
painful and dangerous. As the disease progresses,
minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense and
longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency.
Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic
contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent
adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to
irreversible central nervous system damage and death.
Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of
at least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6
days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is absent
and generalized spasms are brief and mild. Moderately
severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period
and onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia and
generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation remains
adequate even during spasms. The criteria for severe
tetanus include a short incubation time, and an onset
time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and
rigidity and frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive
spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983
Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)
397
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus
found inside a man's body depends on the incubation
period of the disease.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised
wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which
Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place
on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November
14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like
lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day,
November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the
appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the
time, it is more medically probable that Javier should
have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus
because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd
day after the hacking incident or more than 14
days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore,
the onset time should have been more than six days.
Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset
time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time
Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe
form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present.
Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected
with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the
circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound
could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but
not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be
the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v.
Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a
criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused
the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond
reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead
us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the
wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause
later or between the time Javier was wounded to the
time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct
and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil.
1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound
was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection,
for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus
may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death
with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled
in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil.
118).
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an
action if such remote cause did nothing more than
furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by
which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the
injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no
danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the
proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into operation the instances
which result in injury because of the prior defective
398
condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)
It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to
go scot free of criminal liability. At the very least, the
records show he is guilty of inflicting slight physical
injuries. However, the petitioner's criminal liability in
this respect was wiped out by the victim's own act. After
the hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the
facilities of barangay mediators to effect a compromise
agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano
defrayed the medical expenses of Javier. This settlement
of minor offenses is allowed under the express
provisions of Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508,
Section 2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA
16).
We must stress, however, that our discussion of
proximate cause and remote cause is limited to the
criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. It does not
necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free of civil
liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while
not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. Thus, in
the recent case of People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al.
(G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we said:
xxx xxx xxx
... While the guilt of the accused in a criminal
prosecution must be established beyond reasonable
doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a
civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The
judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of
the accused only when it includes a declaration that the
facts from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil
Code, which provides that the acquittal of the accused
on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from
civil liability for the same act or omission, has been
explained by the Code Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a
criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one
of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system.
It has given use to numberless instances of miscarriage
of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the
accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the
civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense,
when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be
demanded.
This is one of those causes where confused thinking
leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such
reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation
between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to
determine the logical result of the distinction. The two
liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One
is for the punishment or correction of the offender while
the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the
aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different
from each other that article 1813 of the present
399
(Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a
compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime;
but the public action for the imposition of the legal
penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and
proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or
fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of
indemnity the complaining party, why should the
offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not
the invasion or violation of every private right to be
proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the
right of the aggrieved person any less private because
the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?
"For these reasons, the Commission recommends the
adoption of the reform under discussion. It will correct a
serious defect in our law. It will close up an
inexhaustible source of injustice-a cause for
disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons
injured or wronged."
The respondent court increased the P12,000.00
indemnification imposed by the trial court to
P30,000.00. However, since the indemnification was
based solely on the finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt in the homicide case, the civil liability of the
petitioner was not thoroughly examined. This aspect of
the case calls for fuller development if the heirs of the
victim are so minded.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. The questioned decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is
ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and,Cortes, JJ.,
concur.
Impossible Crimes
 Intod v. CA, 215 SCRA 52
.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992
SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review
of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming in
toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
XIV, Oroquieta City, finding him guilty of the crime of
attempted murder.
From the records, we gathered the following facts.
400
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod,
Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig
went to Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez
Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with
them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan.
Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and
Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He
told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed
because of a land dispute between them and that
Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men,
otherwise, he would also be killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day,
Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all
armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house in
Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the
instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the
location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter,
Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said
room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in
another City and her home was then occupied by her
son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room
when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the
gun fire.
Petitioner and his companions were positively identified
by witnesses. One witness testified that before the five
men left the premises, they shouted: "We will kill you
(the witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan
and we will come back if (sic) you were not injured". 2
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of
attempted murder. The court (RTC), as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, holding that Petitioner was guilty of
attempted murder. Petitioner seeks from this Court a
modification of the judgment by holding him liable only
for an impossible crime, citing Article 4(2) of the
Revised Penal Code which provides:
Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal
Responsibility shall be incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an
offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual
means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from
her room on the night he and his companions riddled it
with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.
On the other hand, Respondent People of the
Philippines argues that the crime was not impossible.
Instead, the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt
and to convict Intod for attempted murder. Respondent
alleged that there was intent. Further, in its Comment to
the Petition, respondent pointed out that:
. . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not
because of the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment (Art. 4(2), Revised Penal Code), but
due to a cause or accident other than petitioner's and his
accused's own spontaneous desistance (Art. 3., Ibid.)
401
Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that time.
Had it not been for this fact, the crime is possible, not
impossible. 3
Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the Revised
Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the void in the Old
Penal Code where:
. . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has
been commenced, that the person conceiving the idea
should have set about doing the deed, employing
appropriate means in order that his intent might become
a reality, and finally, that the result or end contemplated
shall have been physically possible. So long as these
conditions were not present, the law and the courts did
not hold him criminally liable. 5
This legal doctrine left social interests entirely
unprotected. 6 The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the
Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his
formidability, 7 and now penalizes an act which were it
not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out
with means which prove inadequate, would constitute a
felony against person or against property. 8 The
rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal
tendencies. 9
Under this article, the act performed by the offender
cannot produce an offense against person or property
because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment: or (2) the means
employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. 10
That the offense cannot be produced because the
commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be
impossible under this clause, the act intended by the
offender must be by its nature one impossible of
accomplishment. 11 There must be either impossibility
of accomplishing the intended act 12 in order to qualify
the act an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even
if completed, would not amount to a crime. 13 Thus:
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances
where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to
perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is
intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a
performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the
consequence resulting from the intended act does not
amount to a crime. 14
The impossibility of killing a person already
dead 15 falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when
extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or
beyond his control prevent the consummation of the
intended crime. 16 One example is the man who puts
his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention
to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty. 17
The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner
shoots the place where he thought his victim would be,
although in reality, the victim was not present in said
402
place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his
end.
One American case had facts almost exactly the same as
this one. In People vs. Lee Kong, 18 the accused, with
intent to kill, aimed and fired at the spot where he
thought the police officer would be. It turned out,
however, that the latter was in a different place. The
accused failed to hit him and to achieve his intent. The
Court convicted the accused of an attempt to kill. It held
that:
The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the
attacking party imagined where he was, and where the
bullet pierced the roof, renders it no less an attempt to
kill. It is well settled principle of criminal law in this
country that where the criminal result of an attempt is
not accomplished simply because of an obstruction in
the way of the thing to be operated upon, and these facts
are unknown to the aggressor at the time, the criminal
attempt is committed.
In the case of Strokes vs. State, 19 where the accused
failed to accomplish his intent to kill the victim because
the latter did not pass by the place where he was lying-
in wait, the court held him liable for attempted murder.
The court explained that:
It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not
committed. . . . It only became impossible by reason of
the extraneous circumstance that Lane did not go that
way; and further, that he was arrested and prevented
from committing the murder. This rule of the law has
application only where it is inherently impossible to
commit the crime. It has no application to a case where
it becomes impossible for the crime to be committed,
either by outside interference or because of
miscalculation as to a supposed opportunity to commit
the crime which fails to materialize; in short it has no
application to the case when the impossibility grows out
of extraneous acts not within the control of the party.
In the case of Clark vs. State, 20 the court held
defendant liable for attempted robbery even if there was
nothing to rob. In disposing of the case, the court quoted
Mr. Justice Bishop, to wit:
It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves
punishment by reason of his criminal intent, no one can
seriously doubt that the protection of the public requires
the punishment to be administered, equally whether in
the unseen depths of the pocket, etc., what was
supposed to exist was really present or not. The
community suffers from the mere alarm of crime.
Again: Where the thing intended (attempted) as a crime
and what is done is a sort to create alarm, in other
words, excite apprehension that the evil; intention will
be carried out, the incipient act which the law of attempt
takes cognizance of is in reason committed.
In State vs. Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to kill,
fired at the window of victim's room thinking that the
latter was inside. However, at that moment, the victim
was in another part of the house. The court convicted
the accused of attempted murder.
403
The aforecited cases are the same cases which have
been relied upon by Respondent to make this Court
sustain the judgment of attempted murder against
Petitioner. However, we cannot rely upon these
decisions to resolve the issue at hand. There is a
difference between the Philippine and the American
laws regarding the concept and appreciation of
impossible crimes.
In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article
4(2), expressly provided for impossible crimes and
made the punishable. Whereas, in the United States, the
Code of Crimes and Criminal Procedure is silent
regarding this matter. What it provided for were
attempts of the crimes enumerated in the said Code.
Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the impossibility of
committing the offense is merely a defense to an attempt
charge. In this regard, commentators and the cases
generally divide the impossibility defense into two
categories: legal versus factual impossibility. 22 In U.S.
vs. Wilson 23 the Court held that:
. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime
is not a defense. If the crime could have been committed
had the circumstances been as the defendant believed
them to be, it is no defense that in reality the crime was
impossible of commission.
Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense
which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an
attempt. In U.S. vs. Berrigan, 24 the accused was
indicated for attempting to smuggle letters into and out
of prison. The law governing the matter made the act
criminal if done without knowledge and consent of the
warden. In this case, the offender intended to send a
letter without the latter's knowledge and consent and the
act was performed. However, unknown to him, the
transmittal was achieved with the warden's knowledge
and consent. The lower court held the accused liable for
attempt but the appellate court reversed. It held
unacceptable the contention of the state that
"elimination of impossibility as a defense to a charge of
criminal attempt, as suggested by the Model Penal Code
and the proposed federal legislation, is consistent with
the overwhelming modern view". In disposing of this
contention, the Court held that the federal statutes did
not contain such provision, and thus, following the
principle of legality, no person could be criminally
liable for an act which was not made criminal by law.
Further, it said:
Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that
intent plus act plus conduct constitutes the offense of
attempt irrespective of legal impossibility until such
time as such legislative changes in the law take place,
this court will not fashion a new non-statutory law of
criminal attempt.
To restate, in the United States, where the offense
sought to be committed is factually impossible or
accomplishment, the offender cannot escape criminal
liability. He can be convicted of an attempt to commit
the substantive crime where the elements of attempt are
satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the act is penalized,
not as an impossible crime, but as an attempt to commit
a crime. On the other hand, where the offense is legally
404
impossible of accomplishment, the actor cannot be held
liable for any crime — neither for an attempt not for an
impossible crime. The only reason for this is that in
American law, there is no such thing as an impossible
crime. Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a
defense to a crime charge — that is, attempt.
This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction,
impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of
accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a
defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the
phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article
4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction
between factual or physical impossibility and legal
impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos.
The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical
impossibility which rendered the intended crime
impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is
sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.
 People v. Domasian, 219 SCRA 245
To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense
was Attempted Murder because the absence of
Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of
the actor's will, will render useless the provision in
Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an
act "which would be an offense against persons or
property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances
which prevented the consummation of the offense will
be treated as an accident independent of the actor's will
which is an element of attempted and frustrated felonies.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the
petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of
Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. We hereby
hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined
and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the
Revised Penal Code, respectively. Having in mind the
social danger and degree of criminality shown by
Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty
of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the
accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.
G.R. No. 95322 March 1, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PABLITO DOMASIAN AND DR. SAMSON
TAN, accused-appellant.
405
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Silvestre L. Tagarao for appellant Pablito Domasian.
Lino M. Patajo for appellant Dr. Samson Tan.
CRUZ, J.:
The boy was detained for only about three hours and
was released even before his parents received the
ransom note. But it spawned a protracted trial spanning
all of 8 years and led to the conviction of the two
accused.1
The victim was Enrico Paulo Agra, who was 8 years old
at the time of the incident in question. The accused were
Pablito Domasian and Samson Tan, the latter then a
resident physician in the hospital owned by Enrico's
parents. They were represented by separate lawyers at
the trial and filed separate briefs in this appeal.
The evidence of the prosecution showed that in the
morning of March 11, 1982, while Enrico was walking
with a classmate along Roque street in the poblacion of
Lopez, Quezon, he was approached by a man who
requested his assistance in getting his father's signature
on a medical certificate. Enrico agreed to help and rode
with the man in a tricycle to Calantipayan, where he
waited outside while the man went into a building to get
the certificate. Enrico became apprehensive and started
to cry when, instead of taking him to the hospital, the
man flagged a minibus and forced him inside, holding
him firmly all the while. The man told him to stop
crying or he would not be returned to his father. When
they alighted at Gumaca, they took another tricycle, this
time bound for the municipal building from where they
walked to the market. Here the man talked to a jeepney
driver and handed him an envelope addressed to Dr.
Enrique Agra, the boy's father. The two then boarded a
tricycle headed for San Vicente, with the man still
firmly holding Enrico, who continued crying. This
aroused the suspicion of the driver, Alexander Grate,
who asked the man about his relationship with the boy.
The man said he and the boy were brothers, making
Grate doubly suspicious because of the physical
differences between the two and the wide gap between
their ages. Grate immediately reported the matter to two
barangay tanods when his passengers alighted from the
tricycle. Grate and the tanods went after the two and
saw the man dragging the boy. Noticing that they were
being pursued, the man told Enrico to run fast as their
pursuers might behead them. Somehow, the man
managed to escape, leaving Enrico behind. Enrico was
on his way home in a passenger jeep when he met his
parents, who were riding in the hospital ambulance and
already looking for him.2
At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after
Enrico's return, Agra received an envelope containing a
ransom note. The note demanded P1 million for the
release of Enrico and warned that otherwise the boy
would be killed. Agra thought the handwriting in the
note was familiar. After comparing it with some records
in the hospital, he gave the note to the police, which
referred it to the NBI for examination.3
406
The test showed that it bad been written by Dr. Samson
Tan.4 On the other hand, Enrico was shown a folder of
pictures in the police station so be could identify the
man who had detained him, and he pointed to the
picture of Pablito Domasian.5 Domasian and Tan were
subsequently charged with the crime of kidnapping with
serious illegal detention in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon.6
The defense of both accused was denial and alibi.
Domasian claimed that at the time of the incident he
was watching a mahjong game in a friend's house and
later went to an optical clinic with his wife for the
refraction of his eyeglasses.7 Dr. Tan for his part said he
was in Manila.8
After trial Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas found both
accused guilty as charged and sentenced them to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and all accessory
penalties. They were also required to pay P200,000.00
to Dr. and Mrs. Enrique Agra as actual and moral
damages and attorney's fees.
In the present appeal, the accused-appellants reiterate
their denial of any participation in the incident in
question. They belittle the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses and submit that their own witnesses are more
believable. Tan specifically challenges the findings of
the NBI and offers anew the opposite findings of the
PC/INP showing that he was not the writer of the
ransom note. He maintains that in any case, the crime
alleged is not kidnapping with serious illegal detention
as no detention in an enclosure was involved. If at all, it
should be denominated and punished only as grave
coercion. Finally, both Domasian and Tan insist that
there is no basis for the finding of a conspiracy between
them to make them criminally liable in equal degree.
First, on the credibility of the witnesses. This is assessed
in the first instance by the trial judge, whose finding in
this regard is received with much respect by the
appellate court because of his opportunity to directly
observe the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand.
In the case at bar, Judge Lanzanas relied heavily on the
testimony of the victim himself, who positively
identified Domasian as the person who detained him for
three hours. The trial court observed that the boy was
"straight-forward, natural and consistent" in the
narration of his detention. The boy's naivete made him
even more believable. Tirso Ferreras, Enrico's classmate
and also his age, pointed to Domasian with equal
certainty, as the man who approached Enrico when they
were walking together that morning of March 11, 1982.
Grate, the tricycle driver who suspected Enrico's
companion and later chased him, was also positive in
identifying Domasian. All these three witnesses did not
know Domasian until that same morning and could have
no ill motive in testifying against him. By contrast,
Eugenia Agtay, who testified for the defense, can hardly
be considered a disinterested witness because she
admitted she had known Domasian for 3 years.
The defense asks why Domasian openly took Enrico to
several public places if the intention was to kidnap and
detain him. That is for Domasian himself to answer. We
407
do no have to probe the reasons for the irrational
conduct of an accused. The more important question, as
we see it, is why Domasian detained Enrico in the first
place after pretending he needed the boy's help. That is
also for Domasian to explain. As for Enrico's alleged
willingness to go with Domasian, this was manifested
only at the beginning, when he believed the man
sincerely needed his assistance. But he was soon
disabused. His initial confidence gave way to fear when
Domasian, after taking him so far away from the
hospital where he was going, restrained and threatened
him if he did not stop crying.
Domasian's alibi cannot stand against his positive
identification by Enrico, Grate and Ferreras, let alone
the contradictions made by his corroborating witness,
Dr. Irene Argosino, regarding the time he was in the
optical clinic and the manner of his payment for the
refraction.9 Tan's alibi is not convincing either. The
circumstance that he may have been in Manila at the
time of the incident does not prove that he could not
have written the ransom note except at that time.
Concerning the note, Rule 132, Section 22, of the Rules
of Court provides as follows:
The handwriting of a person may be proved by any
witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such
person and has seen the person write, or has seen
writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has
acted or been charged and has thus acquired knowledge
of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting
the handwriting may also be given by a comparison,
made by the witness or the court with writings admitted
or treated as genuine by the party against whom the
evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge.
Two expert witnesses were presented in the case at bar,
one from the NBI, 10 who opined that the ransom note
and the standard documents were written by one and the
same person, and another from the PC/INP 11 who
expressed a contrary conclusion. The trial court chose to
believe the NBI expert because his examination and
analysis "was more comprehensive than the one
conducted by the PC/INP handwriting expert, who
virtually limited his reliance on the perceived
similarities and dissimilarities in the pattern and style of
the writing, thereby disregarding the basic principle in
handwriting identification that it is not the form alone
nor anyone feature but rather a combination of all the
qualities that identify."
We have held that the value of the opinion of a
handwriting expert depends not upon his mere
statements of whether a writing is genuine or false, but
upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out
distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies
in and between genuine and false specimens of writing
which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from
an unpracticed observer. 12 The test of genuineness
ought to be the resemblance, not the formation of letters
in some other specimens but to the general character of
writing, which is impressed on it as the involuntary and
unconscious result
408
of constitution, habit or other permanent course, and is,
therefore itself permanent. 13
Presented with the conflicting opinions of the witnesses
in the case at bar, the Court feels that the scales should
tilt in favor of the prosecution. Significantly, the NBI
opinion was bolstered by the testimony of Agra, who
believed that the ransom note was written by Tan, with
whose handwriting he was familiar because they had
been working in the hospital for four years and he had
seen that handwriting every day in Tan's prescriptions
and daily reports. 14
Cesar v. Sandiganbayan 15 is not applicable because
that case involved a forgery or the
deliberate imitation of another person's signature. In the
case before us, there was in fact an effort to disguise the
ransom note writer's penmanship to prevent his
discovery.
As for the nature of the crime committed, Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. —
Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain
another, or in any manner deprive him of his liberty,
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more
than five days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public
authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; of if
threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor,
female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or
detention was committed for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the victim or any other person; even if
none of the circumstances above-mentioned were
present in the commission of the offense.
Contrary to Tan's submission, this crime may consist
not only in placing a person in an enclosure but also in
detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his
liberty. 16 In the case at bar, it is noted that although the
victim was not confined in an enclosure, he was
deprived of his liberty when Domasian restrained him
from going home and dragged him first into the minibus
that took them to the municipal building in Gumaca,
thence to the market and then into the tricycle bound for
San Vicente. The detention was committed by
Domasian, who was a private individual, and Enrico
was a minor at that time. The crime clearly comes under
Par. 4 of the above-quoted article.
Tan claims that the lower court erred in not finding that
the sending of the ransom note was an impossible crime
which he says is not punishable. His reason is that the
second paragraph of Article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that criminal liability shall be incurred
"by any person performing an act which would be an
409
offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual
means." As the crime alleged is not against persons or
property but against liberty, he argues that it is not
covered by the said provision.
Tan conveniently forgets the first paragraphs of the
same article, which clearly applies to him, thus:
Art. 4. Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be
incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.
xxx xxx xxx
Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of
kidnapping with serious illegal detention had already
been committed. The act cannot be considered an
impossible crime because there was no inherent
improbability of its accomplishment or the employment
of inadequate or ineffective means. The delivery of the
ransom note after the rescue of the victim did not
extinguish the offense, which had already been
consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico of his
liberty. The sending of the ransom note would have had
the effect only of increasing the penalty to death under
the last paragraph of Article 267 although this too
would not have been possible under the new
Constitution.
On the issue of conspiracy, we note first that it exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it, whether they act through physical volition of
one or all, proceeding severally or collectively. 17
It is settled that conspiracy can be inferred from and
proven by the acts of the accused themselves when said
acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action and community of interests. 18 In the instant case,
the trial court correctly held that conspiracy was proved
by the act of Domasian in detaining Enrico; the writing
of the ransom note by Tan; and its delivery by
Domasian to Agra. These acts were complementary to
each other and geared toward the attainment of the
common ultimate objective, viz., to extort the ransom of
P1 million in exchange for Enrico's life.
The motive for the offense is not difficult to discover.
According to Agra, Tan approached him six days before
the incident happened and requested a loan of at least
P15,000.00. Agra said he had no funds at that moment
and Tan did not believe him, angrily saying that Agra
could even raise a million pesos if he really wanted to
help. 19 The refusal obviously triggered the plan to
kidnap Enrico and demand P1 million for his release.
The constitutional issues raised by Domasian do not
affect the decision in this case. His claim that he was
arrested without warrant and then tortured and
held incommunicado to extort a confession from him
does not vitiate his conviction. He never gave any
confession. As for the allegation that the seizure of the
410
documents used for comparison with the ransom note
was made without a search warrant, it suffices to say
that such documents were taken by Agra himself and
not by the NBI agents or other police authorities. We
held in the case of People vs. Andre Marti, 20 that the
Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against acts of private
individuals, being directed only against the government
and its law-enforcement agencies and limitation on
official action.

We are satisfied that Tan and Domasian, in conspiracy

with each other, committed the crime of kidnapping as
defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code and so deserve the penalty imposed upon
them by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED,

with costs against the accused-appellants.

Let a copy of this decision be sent to the Commission

on Human Rights for investigation of the alleged
violation of the constitutional rights of Pablito
Domasian.

SO ORDERED.

Griño-Aquino, Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

411