G.R. No.
L-35377-78 July 31, 1975 City and the holding of the trial at Camp Crame appear to be the most convenient
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CAMILO PILOTIN, VINCENT CRISOLOGO, ISIDRO PUGAL and
ERNING ABANO, defendants-appellants.
RESOLUTION
AQUINO, J.:
Vincent Crisologo through counsel filed a verified motion praying for the transfer
to the New Bilibid Prisons or, alternatively, to Camps Crame, Aguinaldo or Olivas,
of the place of trial of Criminal Case No. 3949 of the municipal court of Vigan,
Ilocos Sur, wherein he, as sole defendant, is charged with illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions.
As justificatory ground, he alleged that his life would be in jeopardy if he were to
be confined in the Vigan municipal jail during the trial because there are many
political enemies of the Crisologo family in that vicinity; some of the adherents of
the Crisologos had in fact been murdered in Ilocos Sur, and his father,
Congressman Floro Crisologo, was shot to death while hearing mass at the Vigan
cathedral.
Bluntly, he affirmed that inside that jail he would be a sitting duck for a gunwielder
or grenade-thrower who wants to assassinate him. He could even be lynched or shot
to death on the specious pretext that he was trying to escape.
Asked to comment on the motion, the Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Sur signified his
conformity to the transfer of the venue of the trial to the New Bilibid Prisons.
Section 5(4), Article X of the Constitution expressly empowers this Court to "order
a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice". Here, what is
involved is not merely a miscarriage of justice but the personal safety of movant
Crisologo, the accused. It would be absurd to compel him to undergo trial in a place
where his life would be imperilled.
Present hostile sentiment against the accused at the place of trial is a justification
for transfer of venue (See State vs. Siers, 136 S. E. 503, 103, W. Va. 30; 22 C.J.S.
310).1äwphï1.ñët
We find Crisologo's motion to be meritorious. The change of venue involves not
merely the change of the place of hearing but also the transfer of the expediente of
Criminal Case No. 3949 to another court. According to Crisologo's motion, the
alleged evidence against him is in the custody of the authorities at Camp Crame,
Quezon City. The transfer of Criminal Case No. 3949 to the City Court of Quezon
Philippines can, under the law, be instituted only by the Solicitor General. The
arrangement.
WHEREFORE, the municipal court of Vigan is directed to transfer the record of
Criminal Case No. 3949 to the City Court of Quezon City where it should be re-
docketed and raffled to any Judge thereof. The case may be tried at Camp Crame.
The usual precautions and security measures should be adopted in bringing
defendant Crisologo to Camp Crame on the occasion of the hearing.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-56158-64 March 17, 1981
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
MAYOR PABLO SOLA, SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBER FRANCISCO
(ECOT) GARCIA, RICARDO (CADOY) GARCIA, JOSE BETHOVEN
(ATSONG) CABRAL, CAPTAIN FLORENDO BALISCAO, JOHN, PETER,
OSCAR, OMAR, JACK, RICHARD, JAMES, DONALD, WILLIAM,
ROBERT, HOMER, JESSIE, ANDY, PAUL, all surnamed DOES respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The power of this Tribunal, constitutionally mandated, 1 to order a change of venue
to avoid any miscarriage of justice as well as the procedure ordained in the
implementation of the right to bail 2 are involved in this petition which, even if not
so denominated, partakes of the nature of a certiorari. It must have been the zeal of
private prosecutors Francisco Cruz and Renecio Espiritu, 3 no doubt under the
conviction that there was no time to lose, that must have led them to devote less
than that full measure of attention to certain fundamentals. They ignored the
principle that the responsibility for the conduct of the prosecution is with the public
officials concerned. Nonetheless, the importance of the questions raised, the need
for a change of venue and the cancellation of the bail bonds, necessitated that
further action be taken. Accordingly, in a resolution dated February 12, 1981, one
day after the filing of the petition, the Court required the comment of the Solicitor
General as well as of the private respondents, 4the accused in six pending criminal
cases before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.
On March 4, 1981, the Comment was submitted by Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza. 5 It opened with this preliminary statement: "The present petition was
filed by the private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 1700-1706, People v. Pablo
Sola, et al., pending trial before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.
Rightly, any petition before this Honorable Court on behalf of the People of the
assertion of the petitioner private prosecutors that they are instituting the action
'subject to the control and supervision of the Fiscal' will not, therefore, improve
their legal standing." 6 Nonetheless, it did not press the legal point but instead
adopted "the two-pronged trusts of the petition: 1. the setting aside, by certiorari, of
the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael
Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in the criminal cases mentioned above, and 2.
the petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to
avoid a miscarriage of justice. 7
The facts were therein narrated thus: "On September 15, 1980, acting on the
evidence presented by the Philippine Constabulary commander at Hinigaran,
Negros Occidental, the Court of First Instance of that province issued a search
warrant for the search and seizure of tile deceased bodies of seven persons believed
in the possession of the accused Pablo Sola in his hacienda at Sta. Isabel,
Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. * * * On September 16, 1980 armed with the
above warrant, elements of the of the 332nd PC/INP Company proceeded to the
place of Sola. Diggings made in a canefield yielded two common graves containing
the bodies of Fernando Fernandez, Mateo Olimpos, Alfredo Perez, Custodio
Juanica, Arsolo Juanica, Rollie Callet and Bienvenido Emperado. On September 23
and October 1, 1980, the PC provincial commander of Negros Occidental filed
seven (7) separate complaints for murder against the accused Pablo Sola, Francisco
Garcia, Ricardo Garcia, Jose Bethoven Cabral, Florendo Baliscao and fourteen (14)
other persons of unknown names. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No.
4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139 and 4140 of the Municipal Court of
Kabankalan. After due preliminary examination of the complainant's witnesses and
his other evidence, the municipal court found probable cause against the accused. It
thus issued an order for their a. rest. However, without giving the prosecution the
opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the court
granted them the right to post bail for their temporary release. The accused Pablo
Sola, Francisco Garcia, and Jose Bethoven Cabral availed themselves of this right
and have since been released from detention. In a parallel development. the
witnesses in the murder cases informed the prosecution of their fears that if the trial
is held at the Court of First Instance branch in Himamaylan which is but 10
kilometers from Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least two of the
accused are officials with power and influence in Kabankalan and they have been
released on bail. In addition, most of the accused remained at large. Indeed, there
have been reports made to police authorities of threats made on the families of the
witnesses." 8 The facts alleged argue strongly for the remedies sought, namely a
change of venue and the cancellation of the bail bonds.
On the very next day, March 15, 1981, this Court issued the following resolution:
"The Court Resolved to: (a) [Note] the comment of the Solicitor General on the
urgent petition for change of venue and cancellation of bail bonds, adopting the
plea of the petition, namely, (1) the setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the
Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting
bail to the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139 and
4140, all entitled "People of the Philippines v. Mayor Pablo Sola. et al."; (2) the
petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a
miscarriage of Justice; (b) [Transfer] the venue of the aforesaid criminal cases to
Branch V of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City,
presided by Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio, considering that District Judge
Ostervaldo Emilia of the Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental, Branch VI at
Himamaylan has an approved leave of absence covering the period from January 12
to March 12, 1981 due to a mild attack of cerebral thrombosis and that the said
Branch V is the nearest court station to Himamaylan: and (c) [Await] the comment
of respondents on the petition to cancel bail, without prejudice to the public
officials concerned taking the necessary measures to assure the safety of the
witnesses of the prosecution." 9 Thus, the issue of a change of venue has become
moot and academic. The comments respectively submitted by respondent Florendo
Baliscao on March 5, 1981, respondent Francisco Garcia on March 11, 1981 and
respondent Pablo Sola on March 16, 1981, dealt solely with the question of the
cancellation of the bail bonds. Such comments were considered as answers, with
the case thereafter deemed submitted for decision.
The sole remaining issue of the cancellation of the bail bonds of respondents, there
being a failure to abide by the basic requirement that the prosecution be heard in a
case where the accused is charged with a capital offense, prior to bail being granted,
must be decided in favor of petitioner. The bail bonds must be cancelled and the
case remanded to the sala of Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio for such hearing. So
we rule.
1. It may not be amiss to say a few words on the question of transferring the place
of trial, in this case, from Himamaylan to Bacolod City. The Constitution is quite
explicit. The Supreme Court could order "a change of venue or place of trial to
avoid a miscarriage of justice." 10 The Constitutional Convention of 1971 wisely
incorporated the ruling in the landmark decision of People v. Gutierrez, 11 where
Justice J. B. L. Reyes as ponente vigorously and categorically affirmed: "In the
particular case before Us, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality
where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a
mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which courts
have been established." 12 Why a change of venue is imperative was made clear in
the Comment of the Solicitor General. Thus: "The exercise by this Honorable Court
of its above constitutional power in this case will be appropriate. The witnesses in
the case are fearful for their lives. They are afraid they would be killed on their way
to or from Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Because of qqqts fear, they
may either refuse to testify or testimony falsely to save their lives. 13 Respondent
Florendo Baliscao was not averse to such transfer, but his preference is for a court
anywhere in Metro Manila. 14 Respondent Francisco Garcia confined his comment
to the question of the cancellation of the bail bonds. Respondent Pablo Sola made
clear that he had "no objection to the transfer. 15 It may be added that there may be
cases where the fear, objectively viewed, may, to some individuals, be less than
terrifying, but the question must always be the effect it has on the witnesses who
will testify. The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in
mind. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a change of venue. As a
matter of fact, there need not be a petition of this character filed before this Court.
Such a plea could have been done administratively. In this particular case, however,
there is justification for the procedure followed in view of the fact that along with
the change of venue, the cancellation of the bail bonds was also sought.
2. Equally so the cancellation of the bail bonds is more than justified. Bail was
granted to the accused in the Order of the Municipal Court without hearing the
prosecution That is to disregard the authoritative doctrine enunciated in People v.
San Diego. 16 As pointed out by Justice Capistrano, speaking for the Court: "The
question presented before us is, whether the prosecution was deprived of procedural
due process. The answer is in the affirmative. We are of the considered opinion that
whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be
resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution
must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence
that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail.
If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution
should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due
process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that
ground." 17 These words of Justice Cardozo come to mind: "The law, as we have
seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant charged with crime whatever forms
of procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so
fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial that could be
acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate and inviolable,
however crushing may be the pressure of incriminating proof. But justice, though
due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be
strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true." 18 This
norm which is of the very essence of due process as the embodiment of justice
requires that the prosecution be given the opportunity to prove that there is strong
evidence of guilt. It does not suffice, as asserted herein, that the questions asked by
the municipal judge before bail was granted could be characterized as searching.
That fact did not cure an infirmity of a jurisdictional character. 19
WHEREFORE, the assailed order of Judge Rafael Gasataya granting bail to private
respondents is nullified, set aside, and declared to be without force and effect.
Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, to whose sala the cases had been transferred by virtue of the resolution
of this Court of March 5, 1981, is directed forthwith to hear the petitions for bail of
private respondents, with the prosecution being duly heard on the question of
whether or not the evidence of guilt against the respondents is strong. This decision
is immediately executory. No costs.
G.R. Nos. L-32282-83 November 26, 1970
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIO J. GUTIERREZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Sur, CAMILO PILOTIN, FRANCISCO PIANO, DELFIN PIANO PEDRO
PATAO, VINCENT CRISOLOGO, CAMILO PIANO, CAMILO PATAO,
PEDRING PIANO, ISIDRO PUGAL, ANTONIO TABULDO, LORENZO
PERALTA, VENANCIO PACLEB ANTONIO PIANO, FERMIN PUGAL,
CARLITO PUGAL, FLOR PIANO, ERNING ABANO and EIGHTY-TWO
(82) JOHN DOES, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General
Conrado T. Limcaoco, Solicitor Eduardo C. Abaya and Special Attorney Juan A.
Sison for petitioners.
Adaza, Adaza and Adaza for respondent Erning Abano.
Crisologo Law Office and Pedro Quadra for respondent Camilo Pilotin.
Juan T. David for respondent Vincent Crisologo.
Augusto Kalaw as private prosecutor.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Petition for writs of certiorari and mandamus, with preliminary injunction, filed by
the Solicitor General and State Prosecutors, to annul and set aside the order of
Judge Mario J. Gutierrez of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (respondent
herein), dated 20 July 1970, denying the prosecution's urgent motion to transfer
Criminal Case Nos. 47-V and 48-V of said Court of First Instance, entitled "People
vs. Pilotin, et al.," to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District; to
direct the respondent Judge to effectuate such transfer; and to restrain the trial of
the cases aforesaid in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, sitting in Vigan,
capital of the province.
In the morning of 22 May 1970, a group of armed persons descended on barrio Ora
Centro, municipality of Bantay, Province of Ilocos Sur, and set fire to various
inhabited houses therein. On the afternoon of the same day, in barrio Ora Este of
the same municipality and province, several residential houses were likewise
burned by the group, resulting in the destruction of various houses and in the death
of an old woman named Vicenta Balboa. After investigation by the authorities, the
provincial fiscal, with several state prosecutors assigned by the Department of
Justice to collaborate with him, on 10 June 1970 filed in the Court of First Instance
of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, two informations (Criminal Cases 47-V for arson with
homicide and 48-V for arson) charging that the seventeen private respondents
herein, together with 82 other unidentified persons, "confederating, conspiring,
confabulating and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously burn or cause to be burned several residential houses, knowing the said
houses to be occupied" and belonging to certain persons named in the filed
informations in barrios Ora Este and Ora Centro, Bantay, Ilocos Sur (Petition,
Annexes B and B-1). Accused Camilo Pilotin and Vincent Crisologo furnished bail,
and on 15 June 1970 voluntarily appeared before respondent Judge Gutierrez, were
arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial was then set for 27, 28 and 29 July 1970.
It appears that on the same day, 15 June, the Secretary of Justice issued
Administrative Order No. 221, authorizing Judge Lino Anover, of the Circuit
Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, with official station at San
Fernando, La Union, to hold a special term in Ilocos Sur, from and after 1 July
1970. Three days thereafter, on 18 June 1970, the Secretary further issued
Administrative Order No. 226, authorizing Judge Mario Gutierrez to transfer
Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court, "in the interest
of justice and pursuant to Republic Act No. 5179, as implemented by
Administrative Order Nos. 258 and 274" of the Department of Justice.
On 22 June 1970, the prosecution moved the respondent judge for a transfer of
cases 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court, invoking the Administrative
Orders just mentioned and calling attention to the circumstance that they were
issued at the instance of the witnesses seeking transfer of the hearing from Vigan to
either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City, for reasons of security and personal
safety, as shown in their affidavits. The accused vigorously opposed such transfer,
and on 20 July 1970, the respondent judge declined the transfer sought, on the
ground that Administrative Order No. 258 only provided for transfer of cases to the
Circuit Criminal Court where the interest of justice required it for the more
expeditious disposal of the cases, and in the cases involved the accused had already
pleaded; that if the objective of the proposed transfer was to subsequently obtain a
change of venue from the Supreme Court under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 5179
the same should have been done right at the very inception of these cases.
In view of the lower court's denial of the motion to transfer the cases to the Circuit
Criminal Court, the prosecution resorted to Us for writs of certiorari and
mandamus, charging abuse of discretion and praying this Court to set aside the
order of denial of the transfer and to compel the respondent Court of First Instance
to remand the cases to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, as
well as to authorize the latter to try the cases (47-V and 48-V) at either San
Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City.
Respondents in their answer denied any abuse of discretion in view of the fact that
the Administrative Order No. 226 merely authorized the court below, but did not
require or command it, to transfer the cases in question to the Circuit Criminal
Court, and likewise denied that the circumstances justified any such transfer.
At petitioners' request this Court enjoined the respondent Judge Gutierrez from
proceeding with the trial of the cases until further orders.
We agree with respondents that the present laws do not confer upon the Secretary
of Justice power to determine what court should hear specific cases. Any such
power, even in the guise of administrative regulation of executive affairs, trenches
upon the time-honored separation of the Executive and the Judiciary; and while not
directly depriving the courts of their independence, it would endanger the rights and
immunities of the accused or civil party. It could be much too easily transformed
into a means of predetermining the outcome of individual cases, so as to produce a
result in harmony with the Administration's preferences. The creation by Republic
Act No. 5179 of the Circuit Criminal Courts for the purpose of alleviating the
burden of the regular Courts of First Instance, and to accelerate the disposition of
criminal cases pending or to be filed therein, nowhere indicates an intent to permit
the transfer of preselected individual cases to the circuit courts. Neither do
Administrative Orders Nos. 258 and 274 evidence any such intention; particularly
since Administrative Order No. 258, Series of 1968, in Section 2 of its Part V, as
confirmed by Administrative Order No. 274 of the same year, in Section 3 of Part
III thereof, provides that the transfer to Circuit Criminal Courts of cases pending in
the regular Courts of First Instance should be effected by raffle, chance here
operating to nullify any executive arbitration of what particular cases should be
apportioned to either tribunal. The very terms of Administrative Order No. 226,
issued on 18 June 1970 by Secretary of Justice Makasiar, relied upon by the
petitioners, in merely authorizing, and not directing, Judges Arciaga and Gutierrez
of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 44-V
and 47-V (People vs. Pilotin, et al.) to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second
Judicial District, reveals that the Secretary himself was aware of the impropriety of
imperatively directing transfer of specified cases. Respondent Judge Gutierrez,
therefore in construing Administrative Order No. 226 as permissive and not
mandatory, acted within the limits of his discretion and violated neither the law nor
the Executive Orders heretofore mentioned.
It is unfortunate, however, that in refusing to consider Department Administrative
Order No. 226 of the Secretary of Justice as mandatory respondent Judge Gutierrez
failed to act upon the contention of the prosecuting officers that the cases against
private respondents herein should be transferred to the Circuit Criminal Court of the
Second Judicial District because a miscarriage of justice was impending, in view of
the refusal of the prosecution witnesses to testify in the court sitting in Vigan,
Ilocos Sur, where they felt their lives would be endangered. This claim was
buttressed by the affidavits of the injured parties and prosecution witnesses,
reaffirming their fear to appear in Vigan to testify in cases 47-V and 48-V and
expressing their willingness to testify if the cases are heard outside of Ilocos Sur,
where they can be free from tension and terrorism (Petition, Annex J). The fear thus
expressed can not be considered fanciful and unfounded when account is taken of
the circumstances that the informations filed in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Sur show that of the one hundred armed participants in the burning of the houses at
barrios Ora Este and Ora Centro, Municipality of Bantay, some eighty-two (82) are
still unidentified and at large; that one of the accused, private respondent Vincent
Crisologo, belongs to an influential family in the province, being concededly the
son of the Congressman for the first district of Ilocos Sur and of the lady Governor
that the reluctant witnesses are themselves the complainants in the criminal cases,
and, therefore, have reasons to fear that attempts will be made to silence them; that
it is not shown that the Executive branch is able or willing to give these witnesses
full security during the trial and for a reasonable time thereafter, that even if armed
security escorts were to be provided, the same would be no guarantee against the
possibility of murderous assault against the affiant witnesses, as recent events have
proved; that Constabulary reports (Annex H) show that between 1 January and 31
May 1970 no less than 78 murders have been reported committed in said province,
of which number only 21 were solved; and, finally, that the promotion and
confirmation of respondent Judge Mario Gutierrez from Clerk of Court to Judge of
the Court of First Instance of the Second Judicial District, Branch III, was actively
supported by Congressman and Governor Crisologo, parents of accused Vincent
Crisologo (Annexes H, H-1, and K to N-2 to petitioner's supplemental
memorandum).
This just refusal to testify in Ilocos Sur manifested by the complaining witnesses,
who had on a previous occasion freely given evidence before the investigators in
Manila, renders manifest the imperious necessity of transferring the place of trial to
a site outside of Ilocos Sur, if the cases are to be judicially inquired into
conformably to the interest of truth and justice and the State is to be given a fair
chance to present its side of the case.
The respondents vigorously contend that a transfer of the trial site can not be made,
because it is a long standing rule of criminal procedure in these Islands that one
who commits a crime is amenable therefor only in the jurisdiction where the crime
is committed, for the reason pointed out in U.S. vs. Cunanan, 26 Phil. 376,
and People vs. Mercado, 65 Phil. 665, that the jurisdiction of a Court of First
Instance in the Philippines is limited to certain well-defined territory and they can
not take jurisdiction of persons charged with one offense committed outside of that
limited territory, and they invoke Rule 110, Section 14 (a), of the Revised Rules of
Court providing that "in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and
tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was
committed or any one of the essential ingredient thereof took place."
It is well to note that this Court has explained in Beltran vs. Ramos, 96 Phil. 149,
150, that the purpose of the rule invoked by accused respondents herein was "not to
compel the defendant to move to and appear in a different court from that of the
province where the crime was committed, as it would cause him great
inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place."
Where the convenience of the accused is opposed by that of the prosecution, as in
the case at bar, it is but logical that the court should have power to decide where the
balance of convenience or inconvenience lies, and to determine the most suitable
place of the trial according to the exigencies of truth and impartial justice.
In the particular case before Us, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a
locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to
make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which
courts have been established. Since the rigorous application of the general principle
of Rule 110, Section 14 (a), would result here in preventing a fair and impartial
inquiry into the actual facts of the case, it must be admitted that the exigencies of
justice demand that the general rule relied upon by accused respondents should
yield to occasional exceptions wherever there are weighty reasons therefor.
Otherwise, the rigor of the law would become the highest injustice — "summum
jus, summa in juria."
The respondents accused can not complain that to transfer the trial to a site where
the prosecution's witnesses can feel free to reveal what they know would be
equivalent to railroading them into a conviction. Because regardless of the place
where its evidence is to be heard, the prosecution will be always obligated to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The scales of justice clearly lean
in favor of the prosecution being given full opportunity to lay its case before a
proper arbiter: for a dismissal of the charges for lack of evidence is a verdict that
the prosecution can neither challenge nor appeal.
We must thus reject the idea that our courts, faced by an impasse of the kind now
before Us, are to confess themselves impotent to further the cause of justice. The
Constitution has vested the Judicial Power in the Supreme Court and such inferior
courts as may be established by law (Article VIII, Section 13), and such judicial
power connotes certain incidental and inherent attributes reasonably necessary for
an effective administration of justice. The courts "can by appropriate means do all
things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the
judiciary an effective institution of government" (Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil.
322).
One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of transferring the trial
of cases from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the
imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of
justice, so demands. This authority was early recognized in England as inhering in
the courts of justice even prior to the eighteenth century. The opinion in Crocker vs.
Justices of the Superior Court, 208 Mass. 162, 21 Ann. Cases 1067, has shown how
the eminent Lord Chief Justice Mansfield, in Rex vs. Cowle (Eng.) 2 Burr 834,
decided in 1759, said that, in this respect, "the law is clear and uniform as far back
as it can be traced."
And in Reg. vs. Conway, 7 Jr. C. J. 507, the question was fully discussed, and all
the judges appear to have agreed as to the power of the court, Cramption, Jr., saying
at page 525:
There is another common-law right, equally open to
defendants and prosecutors, ... that where it appears that
either party cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial in the
proper county, then this court ... has jurisdiction to take the
case out of the proper county, as it is called, and to bring it
into an indifferent county ... This jurisdiction to change the
venue ... has been exercised by this court from a very early
period. We have reported cases, where the doctrine is laid
down in emphatic language; we have the practice of the
Court of Queen's Bench in England independently of any
practice of our own court ... The general jurisdiction of the
court, in a proper case, to change the venue from one county
to any other, cannot be the subject of doubt.
This power to transfer trial of criminal cases in furtherance of justice, exercised
through writs of certiorari, has, according to the weight of authority, passed to the
State Supreme Courts of the American Union.1 In Cochecho R. Co. vs. Farrington,
26 N.H. 428, at page 436, it was held that the power to transfer the place of holding
trials —
became thoroughly engrafted upon the common law, long
before the independence of this country; and from that time
forth, not only has the practice prevailed in the courts of
England, but the power is now exercised by the Courts of
very many if not all of our states, either by force of express
statute or the adoption of the common law in the
jurisprudence of the same.
That such inherent powers are likewise possessed by the Philippine courts admits of
no doubt, because they were organized on the American pattern with the enactment
of the first judicial organic law, Act 136, on 11 June 1901, by the Philippine
Commission, then composed by a majority of able American lawyers, fully familiar
with the institutions and traditions of the common law.
In Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson, 21 Phil. 300, 333, this Court stated:
And it is safe to say that in every volume of the Philippine
Reports, numbers of cases might be cited wherein recourse
has been had to the rules, principles and doctrines of the
common law in ascertaining the true meaning and scope of
the legislation enacted in and for the Philippine Islands since
they passed under American sovereignty.
Among the earliest measures of the Philippine Commission,
after the establishment of Civil Government under American
sovereignty, was the enactment on June 11, 1901, of Act No.
136, "An Act providing for the organization of courts in the
Philippine Islands." This Act in express terms abolished the
then existing Audiencia or Supreme Court and Courts of First
Instance, and substituted in their place the courts provided
therein. It sets out in general terms the jurisdiction, duties,
privileges, and powers of the new courts and their judges.
The majority of the members of the body which enacted it
were able American lawyers. The spirit with which it is
informed, and indeed its very language and terminology
would be unintelligible without some knowledge of the
judicial systems of England and the United States. Its
manifest purpose and object was to replace the old judicial
system, with its incidents and traditions drawn from Spanish
sources, with a new system modeled in all its essential
characteristics upon the judicial systems of the United States.
It cannot be doubted, therefore, that any incident of the
former system which conflicts with the essential principles
and settled doctrines on which the new system rests, must be
held to be abrogated by the law organizing the new system.
While not expressly conferred by Act 136, We find it difficult to believe that the
framers' intent was to deny, by silence, to the Philippine Courts, and particularly
upon this Supreme Court, the inherent jurisdiction possessed by the English and
American courts under their common law heritage to transfer the place of trial of
cases in order to secure and promote the ends of justice, by providing fair and
impartial inquiry and adjudication.
Like the exemption of judges of courts of superior or general authority from
liability in a civil action for acts done by them in the exercise of their judicial
functions, upheld in the Alzua case as essentially inherent in the courts established
by Act 136, even if not expressly provided for, the power to transfer the place of
trials when so demanded by the interest of justice is equally essential and possesses
no inferior rank. To it apply, mutatis mutandis, the words of this Court in the Alzua
case just cited:
The grounds of public policy and the reasoning upon which
the doctrine is based are not less forceful and imperative in
these Islands than in the countries from which the new
judicial system was borrowed; and an examination of the
reasons assigned ... leaves no room for doubt that a failure to
recognize it as an incident to the new judicial system would
materially impair its usefulness and tend very strongly to
defeat the ends for which it was established. (21 Phil. 333-
334)
Not only has there been since then no proof of any specific pronouncement, by
Constitution or Congress, against the exercise by our Courts of the power discussed
heretofore: on the contrary, the law establishing the Circuit Criminal Courts,
Republic Act No. 5179, in its Section 4, provides express legislative recognition of
its existence:
SEC. 4. The Circuit Criminal Courts may hold sessions
anywhere within their respective
districts: Provided, however, that cases shall be heard within
the province where the crime subject of the offense was
committed. And provided further, that when the interest of
justice so demands, with prior approval of the Supreme
Court, cases may be heard in a neighboring province within
the district ... (Emphasis supplied)
Since the requirements for proper jurisdiction have been satisfied by the filing of
the criminal case in question with the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, in which
province the offenses charged were committed, according to the informations; since
the holding of the trial in a particular place is more a matter of venue, rather than
jurisdiction; since the interests of truth and justice can not be subserved by
compelling the prosecution to proceed to trial in the respondent court in Ilocos Sur,
because its witnesses, for just and weighty reasons, are unwilling to testify therein,
and the respondent court, ignoring their safety, has abusively denied the motion to
have the case transferred to another court, this Supreme Court, in the exercise of
judicial power possessed by it under the Constitution and the statutes, should decree
that the trial of cases 47-V and 48-V should be heard and decided by the Circuit
Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, either in San Fernando, La Union, or
in Baguio City, at the earlier available date. This arrangement would have the
advantage that the same trial judge could later be authorized to hear the defense
witnesses in Vigan, if circumstances so demanded. Furthermore, the adjudication of
the case by a judge other than respondent Gutierrez, if resulting in acquittal, would
remove any doubt or suspicion that the same was in any way influenced by the trial
Judge's being beholden to the Crisologo family.
The solution thus adopted is in harmony with the ideals set by this Court in Manila
Railroad Co. vs. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523, where We said:
... The most perfect procedure that can be devised is that
which gives opportunity for the most complete and perfect
exercise of the powers of the court within the limitations set
by natural justice. It is that one which, in other words, gives
 the most perfect opportunity for the powers of the court to
transmute themselves into concrete acts of justice between
the parties before it. The purpose of such a procedure is not
to restrict the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter
but to give it effective facility in righteous action.
It may be said in passing that the most salient objection
which can be urged against procedure today is that it so
restricts the exercise of the court's power by technicalities
that part of its authority effective for justice between the
parties is many times in inconsiderable portion of the
whole. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its
proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the
rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to
hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself
which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is
designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In
other words, it is a means to an end. It is the means by which
the powers of the court are made effective in just judgments.
When it loses the character of the one and takes on that of the
other the administration of justice becomes incomplete and
unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave criticism. (Manila
Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General, 20 Phil. 523, 529 [1911].
Emphasis and paragraphing supplied.)
In resume, this Court holds, and so rules:
(1) That Republic Act No. 5179 creating the Circuit Criminal Courts did not, and
does not, authorize the Secretary of Justice to transfer thereto specified and
individual cases;
(2) That this Supreme Court, in the exercise of the Judicial Power vested by the
Constitution upon it and other statutory Courts, possesses inherent power and
jurisdiction to decree that the trial and disposition of a case pending in a Court of
First Instance be transferred to another Court of First Instance within the same
district whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious
and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that originally had
jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a
miscarriage of justice.
(3) That in the present case there are sufficient and adequate reasons for the transfer
of the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V of the Court of First Instance
of Ilocos Sur to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, in the
interest of truth and justice.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the writs
of certiorari and mandamus prayed for are granted; the order
of the respondent Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, dated
20 July 1970, is sustained in so far as it holds that the
Administrative Order No. 221 of the Department of Justice is
not mandatory, but only directory; nevertheless, said order is
declared in grave abuse of discretion and set aside in so far as
it declines to transfer the trial of its cases Nos. 47-V and 48-
V to another court within the district; and said respondent
Court is accordingly directed and ordered to remand the two
criminal cases aforesaid to the Circuit Criminal Court of the
Second Judicial District for hearing of the evidence for the
prosecution either in Baguio or San Fernando, La Union, at
the earliest available date, and such other proceedings as the
Circuit Criminal Court may determine in the interest of
justice.
The accused are required to file bail bonds to answer for their appearance at the trial
and sentence by the Circuit Criminal Court for the Second Judicial District, in the
same amount, and under the same terms and conditions as their present bail bonds,
which will be replaced by those herein ordered, all within fifteen (15) days from
finality of this decision.
No special pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B.
OCON, Petitioners,
vs.
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the 18 December 2002 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 67770 and its 12 June 2003 Resolution denying petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to have
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed Orders, the instant petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition is hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE, and it is hereby
ordered:
1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated
September 21, 2001, Joint Order dated October 16, 2001 and Joint Order
dated November 14, 2001 dismissing the two (2) Informations for
Murder, all issued by public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad in
Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and another entered
UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the Order dated
June 25, 2001 and Joint Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then
acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan;
2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered
REINSTATED in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of
the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela; and
3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to
ISSUE forthwith Warrants of Arrest for the apprehension of private
respondents Jose "Pempe" Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3
Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T. Maderal in said Criminal Cases
Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524. 2
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon,
Isabela, which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and
Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the
witness protection program.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño, SPO1
Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel
Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago
City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila
convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua
except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The
case was appealed to this Court on automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001,
acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he
executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3
Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and
Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer
Tuliao.
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet
dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal.
On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of
arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary
investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the
absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the
ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the
motion cannot be properly heard by the court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed
the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the
case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan.
Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against
petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and
Dalmacio in an Order dated 21 September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and
respondent Tuliao moved for the reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed
for the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration was denied
in a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001 and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a
Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus
and prohibition with this Court, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order,
seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, and seeking
to nullify the Orders and Joint Orders of Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21
September 2001, 16 October 2001, and 22 October 2001.
On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer
for a temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding
with the criminal cases. Shortly after the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued
a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the two Informations for murder
against petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this Court took note of respondent’s
cash bond evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued
the temporary restraining order while referring the petition to the Court of Appeals
for adjudication on the merits.
Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in
Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed
contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14
November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21 November 2001,
we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals in view of the previous referral to it
of respondent’s petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision
granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the
RTC of Santiago City, as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest against
petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this
Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003.
Hence, this petition.
The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this Court the
following assignments of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing and
setting aside the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001,
September 21, 2001, October 16, 2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in criminal
cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-3524; and, erred in upholding, affirming and
reinstating the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by then Acting Presiding Judge
Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused cannot seek any judicial
relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in directing the
reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524 in the docket of Active
Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City,
Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to re-issue the warrants of arrest
against herein petitioners.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the
docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the regional trial court of Santiago
City, Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to issue warrants of arrest
against herein petitioners, the order of dismissal issued therein having become final
and executory.
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction
over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.
The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the Court of
Appeals’ ruling that:
[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the
jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be
acquired either through compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest, or through
his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court. It
is only when the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an
accused may invoke the processes of the court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V.
Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must
first be placed in the custody of the law before the court may validly act on his
petition for judicial reliefs.3
Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners Miranda,
Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they were not yet arrested
or otherwise deprived of their liberty at the time they filed their "Urgent Motion to
complete preliminary investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants
of arrest."4
Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction
over the person of the accused is required only in applications for bail. Furthermore,
petitioners argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over their person is required
before the court can act on their motion to quash the warrant for their arrest, such
jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by the court by their filing of the
above Urgent Motion.
In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the adjudication of
applications for bail, petitioners quote Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar
Herrera:
Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief.
The outright dismissal of the case even before the court acquires jurisdiction over
the person of the accused is authorized under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec.
12a). In Allado vs. Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed on motion of
the accused for lack of probable cause without the accused having been arrested. In
Paul Roberts vs. Court of Appeals (254 SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to hold
the issuance of a warrant of arrest in abeyance pending review by the Secretary of
Justice. And in Lacson vs. Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 1025), the Court ordered
the case transferred from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered
the dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause.6
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already
acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our
pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez7:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction
over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by
filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s
jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail.
On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of
the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has
been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and
jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act
upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs
sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of
the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 8 Custody of the
law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender,9 while jurisdiction over
the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary
appearance. 10 One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of
a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other
hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not
be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial
has commenced. 11 Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person,
who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become
obedient to the will of the law. 12 Custody of the law is literally custody over the
body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13 cited by the Court of Appeals
should not have been separated from the issue in that case, which is the application
for admission to bail of someone not yet in the custody of the law. The entire
paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico reads:
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or
otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that court.
Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained the whereabouts of the
applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the accused before
considering the application for bail. 13
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we
clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. 15 As we held in the aforecited case of
Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal
proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement of the
applicant being in the custody of the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 16 we held that
"[t]he purpose of bail is to secure one’s release and it would be incongruous to
grant bail to one who is free. Thus, ‘bail is the security required and given for the
release of a person who is in the custody of law.’" The rationale behind this special
rule on bail is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious
practice wherein the accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail,
without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein
and compliance with the requirements therefor. 17
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative
relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of one’s
person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer
is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a
special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not
other grounds for dismissal are included; 18 (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and
(3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact
that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very
legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that
is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over
the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any
pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special
jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore,
in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes
of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of
the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies
for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e.,
the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court
upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for
him to be in the custody of the law. The following cases best illustrate this point,
where we granted various reliefs to accused who were not in the custody of the law,
but were deemed to have placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the court.
Note that none of these cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash
an information due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a
warrant of arrest:
1. In Allado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on
the ground of lack of probable cause, we issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge
therein from further proceeding with the case and, instead, to elevate the records to
us.
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 upon the accused’s Motion to Suspend
Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground
that they filed a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice, we directed
respondent judge therein to cease and desist from further proceeding with the
criminal case and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrests against the accused.
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for
certiorari on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we
directed the Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal cases to the Regional Trial
Court even before the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in
applications for bail are not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If we
allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable
that many persons who can afford the bail will remain at large, and could elude
being held to answer for the commission of the offense if ever he is proven guilty.
On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to persons not in the
custody of the law, it would be very rare that a person not genuinely entitled to
liberty would remain scot-free. This is because it is the same judge who issued the
warrant of arrest who will decide whether or not he followed the Constitution in his
determination of probable cause, and he can easily deny the motion to quash if he
really did find probable cause after personally examining the records of the case.
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the
warrant continues in force and effect until it is quashed and therefore can still be
enforced on any day and at any time of the day and night.22Furthermore, the
continued absence of the accused can be taken against him in the determination of
probable cause, since flight is indicative of guilt.
In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise
incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human
rights enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than property
rights,23 demanding that due process in the deprivation of liberty must come before
its taking and not after.
Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review with
the Secretary of Justice and based on doubts engendered by the political climate
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of Judge
Anghad. Judge Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing the criminal cases
against the petitioners. First, he quashed the standing warrant of arrest issued by his
predecessor because of a subsequently filed appeal to the Secretary of Justice, and
because of his doubts on the existence of probable cause due to the political climate
in the city. Second, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutor’s
resolution, he dismissed the criminal cases on the basis of a decision of this Court
in another case with different accused, doing so two days after this Court resolved
to issue a temporary restraining order against further proceeding with the case.
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner
Miranda appealed the assistant prosecutor’s resolution before the Secretary of
Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest
on the basis of said appeal. According to Judge Anghad, "x x x prudence dictates
(that) and because of comity, a deferment of the proceedings is but proper."24
Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge
Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the
warrants of arrest against petitioners just because the petitioners might, in the
future, appeal the assistant prosecutor’s resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But
even if the petition for review was filed before the issuance of the warrants of
arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review of the
prosecutor’s resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest.
In Webb v. de Leon,25 we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as
premature the filing of the information in court against them on the ground that they
still have the right to appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the
Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners
herein should not have been quashed as premature on the same ground.
The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of arrest
is in order if true: violation of the Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad asked and
resolved the question:
In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the above-quoted
constitutional proscription, which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of Rights; to Sec. 6(a),
Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure and to the above-cited decisional cases? To
this query or issue, after a deep perusal of the arguments raised, this Court, through
[its] regular Presiding Judge, finds merit in the contention of herein accused-
movant, Jose "Pempe" Miranda.26
Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution as having
been violated by Judge Tumaliuan:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.27
However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the
supporting evidence to the resolution of the prosecutor in his determination of
probable cause, we find that Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion.
According to petitioners:
In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the
petitioners is apparent from the face of the order itself, which clearly stated that the
determination of probable cause was based on the certification, under oath, of the
fiscal and not on a separate determination personally made by the Judge. No
presumption of regularity could be drawn from the order since it expressly and
clearly showed that it was based only on the fiscal’s certification. 28
Petitioners’ claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuan’s Joint Order contains no such
indication that he relied solely on the prosecutor’s certification. The Joint Order
even indicated the contrary:
Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor, the Court
proceeded to determine the existence of a probable cause by personally evaluating
the records x x x.[29]
The records of the case show that the prosecutor’s certification was accompanied
by supporting documents, following the requirement under Lim, Sr. v. Felix30 and
People v. Inting.31 The supporting documents are the following:
1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes;
2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;
3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;
4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Miranda
and Reynaldo de la Cruz;
5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;
6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 41 in Criminal Case No. 97-160355;
7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal;
8. Information dated 22 June 2001;
9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and
10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente
Buazon.
Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on the part of
Judge Tumaliuan of Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution. Judge Anghad,
however, focused on the substantive part of said section, i.e., the existence of
probable cause. In failing to find probable cause, Judge Anghad ruled that the
confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for the following reasons: (1) it was
given after almost two years in the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation;
(2) it was given by someone who rendered himself untrustworthy for being a
fugitive for five years; (3) it was given in exchange for an obvious reward of
discharge from the information; and (4) it was given during the election period
amidst a "politically charged scenario where "Santiago City voters were pitted
against each other along the lines of the Miranda camp on one side and former City
Mayor Amelita S. Navarro, and allegedly that of DENR Secretary Heherson
Alvarez on the other."32
We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no reason to
disturb the findings of probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan.
It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a witness is not
within the province of the determination of probable cause. As we held in Webb 33:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects.
Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither
on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on
evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United
States, while probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less
than evidence which would justify x x x conviction." A finding of probable cause
merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined
in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial x x x.
Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case
with different accused constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among other things,
that there was a petition for review of the assistant prosecutor’s resolution before
the Secretary of Justice. However, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the
prosecutor’s resolution, Judge Anghad summarily dismissed the two criminal cases
against the petitioners on the basis of the following explanation:
Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. Wilfredo Leano, et al., RTC,
Branch 41, Manila, and based from his sworn statements, he pinpointed to Mr.
Miranda – the mastermind and with him and the other police officers as the direct
perpetrators, the October 9, 2001 Decision of the Supreme Court absolving the five
cops of murder, certainly makes his sworn Statements a "narration of falsehood and
lies" and that because of the decision acquitting said officers "who were likewise
falsely linked by said Rodel Maderal in his April 27, 2001 statements, it is now
beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured
statements and therefore the same is without probable value." This Court agrees
with the defense’s views. Indeed, of what use is Maderal’s statements when the
Supreme Court rejected the prosecution’s evidence presented and adduced in
Criminal Case No. 97-160355. Rodel Maderal is supposed to turn state witness in
these two (2) cases but with the Supreme Court decision adverted to, the probative
value of his statements is practically nil.
xxxx
This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda dated October
18, 2001, praying for the summary dismissal of the two (2) murder charges in view
of the latest decision of the Supreme Court in People of the Philippines vs.
Wilfredo Leaño, et al., G.R. No. 13886, acquitting the accused therein and in effect
disregarding all the evidence presented by the prosecution in that case.
Accordingly, the two (2) informations [for] murder filed against Jose Miranda are
ordered dismissed.34
This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to twist our
decision and interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who was still at large
when the evidence of the prosecution in the Leaño case was presented. A decision,
even of this Court, acquitting the accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of
the dismissal of criminal case against different accused for the same crime. The
blunder of Judge Anghad is even more pronounced by the fact that our decision in
Leaño was based on reasonable doubt. We never ruled in Leaño that the crime did
not happen; we just found that there was reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the
accused therein, since the prosecution in that case relied on circumstantial evidence,
which interestingly is not even the situation in the criminal cases of the petitioners
in the case at bar as there is here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The accused in
Leaño furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliao’s son, whereas
petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao before
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable doubt in
Leaño, "it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and
perjured statements and therefore the same is without probable value."35 On the
contrary, if we are to permit the use of our decision in Leaño, an acquittal on the
ground of reasonable doubt actually points to the probability of the prosecution’s
version of the facts therein. Such probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria of
probable cause.
We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghad’s dismissal of the informations two
days after we resolved to issue, upon the filing of a bond, a temporary restraining
order prohibiting him from further proceeding with the case. The bond was filed the
day after the informations were dismissed. While the dismissal of the case was able
to beat the effectivity date of the temporary restraining order, such abrupt dismissal
of the informations (days after this Court’s resolve to issue a TRO against Judge
Anghad) creates wild suspicions about the motives of Judge Anghad.
Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement of the
orders set aside by the nullified proceeding.
In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals did
not recall or reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan, but instead
directed Judge Anghad to issue apparently new warrants of arrest.36 According to
the petitioners, it was an error for the Court of Appeals to have done so, without a
personal determination of probable cause.
We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new warrants
of arrest or merely ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by
Judge Tumaliuan is merely a matter of scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy
whereof should not be allowed to affect the dispositions on the merits, especially in
this case where the other dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the other
direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25 June 2001 Order of
Judge Tumaliuan,37 which issued the warrants of arrest. Secondly, the Court of
Appeals likewise declared the proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void.
Certainly, the declaration of nullity of proceedings should be deemed to carry with
it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified proceedings. Judge
Anghad’s order quashing the warrants of arrest had been nullified; therefore those
warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.
Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of new warrants
of arrest based on a determination of probable cause, it would have been legally
permissible for them to do so. The records of the preliminary investigation had been
available to the Court of Appeals, and are also available to this Court, allowing both
the Court of Appeals and this Court to personally examine the records of the case
and not merely rely on the certification of the prosecutor. As we have ruled in
Allado v. Diokno and Roberts v. Court of Appeals, the determination of probable
cause does not rest on a subjective criteria. As we had resolved in those cases to
overrule the finding of probable cause of the judges therein on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion, in the same vein, we can also overrule the decision of a judge
reversing a finding of probable cause, also on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion.
There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before
arraignment
In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No.
36-3523 and No. 36-3524, alleging that the order of dismissal issued therein had
become final and executory. According to petitioners:
It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of Judge Anghad
dated November 14, 2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders which were assailed in the
private respondent Tuliao’s Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition filed
by the private respondent before the Court of Appeals. As carefully enumerated in
the first page of the assailed Decision, only the following Orders issued by Judge
Anghad were questioned by private respondent, to wit:
1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;
2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;
3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and
4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.
Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad, which
ultimately dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT included
in the list of the assailed Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the Court of Appeals should
not have passed upon the validity or nullity of the Joint Order of November 14,
2001.38
Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliao’s Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus was filed not with the Court of Appeals, but with this
Court. The Court of Appeals decided the case because we referred the same to them
in our 19 November 2001 Resolution. Such petition was filed on 25 October 2001,
around three weeks before the 14 November 2001 Order. Upon receipt of the 14
November 2001 Order, however, respondent Tuliao lost no time in filing with this
Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad
"deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15
November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for
murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals,
in view of the previous referral of respondent Tuliao’s petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus.
Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public Repondent in
Contempt places the 14 November 2001 Order within the issues of the case decided
by the Court of Appeals. In claiming that Judge Anghad committed contempt of
this Court in issuing the 14 November 2001 Order, respondent Tuliao had ascribed
to Judge Anghad an act much more serious than grave abuse of discretion.
Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November 2001 Order
on 15 November 2001, antedating it so as to avoid the effects of our 12 November
2001 Resolution. In said 12 November 2001 Resolution, we resolved to issue a
temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Anghad from further proceeding with
the criminal cases upon the respondent Tuliao’s filing of a bond in the amount
of P20,000.00. Respondent Tuliao had filed the bond on 15 November 2005.
While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt, seeing as
disobedience to lawful orders of a court and abuse of court processes are cases of
indirect contempt which require the granting of opportunity to be heard on the part
of respondent,39 the prayer to cite public respondent in contempt and for other
reliefs just and equitable under the premises should be construed to include a prayer
for the nullification of said 14 November 2001 Order.
In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does
not constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the
accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case
was dismissed.40
As to respondent Tuliao’s prayer (in both the original petition for certiorari as well
as in his motion to cite for contempt) to disqualify Judge Anghad from further
proceeding with the case, we hold that the number of instances of abuse of
discretion in this case are enough to convince us of an apparent bias on the part of
Judge Anghad. We further resolve to follow the case of People v. SPO1 Leaño,41 by
transferring the venue of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 to the City
of Manila, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4, of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December 2002
and the Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby
AFFIRMED, with the modification that Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-
3524 be transferred to and raffled in the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila.
In this connection,
1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of the
RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to effect the
transfer of the cases within ten (10) days after receipt hereof;
2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, is
likewise directed to report to this Court compliance hereto within ten
(10) days from transfer of these cases;
3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle the
criminal cases within ten (10) days from the transfer;
4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to
report to this Court compliance with the order to raffle within ten (10)
days from said compliance; and
5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed to
act on said cases with reasonable dispatch.
6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith
warrants of arrest for the apprehension of petitioners Jose C. Miranda,
 Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B. Ocon, and accused Rodel T. Maderal,
conformably with the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18
December 2002.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003 is
hereby LIFTED. Costs against Petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164170 April 16, 2009
MACA-ANGCOS ALAWIYA y ABDUL, ISAGANI ABDUL y SIACOR, and
SARAH LANGCO y ANGLI, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG, P/C INSP. MICHAEL ANGELO BERNARDO MARTIN,
P/INSP. ALLANJING ESTRADA MEDINA, PO3 ARNOLD RAMOS ASIS,
PO2 PEDRO SANTOS GUTIERREZ, PO2 IGNACIO DE PAZ, and PO2
ANTONIO SEBASTIAN BERIDA, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 4 February 2004
Decision2 and 25 June 2004 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 76345. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by
petitioners Maca-Angcos Alawiya y Abdul, Isagani Abdul y Siacor, and Sarah
Langco y Angli.
The Facts
On 18 September 2001, petitioners executed sworn statements4 before the General
Assignment Section of the Western Police District in United Nations Avenue,
Manila, charging accused P/C Insp. Michael Angelo Bernardo Martin, P/Insp.
Allanjing Estrada Medina, PO3 Arnold Ramos Asis, PO2 Pedro Santos Gutierrez,
PO2 Ignacio De Paz and PO2 Antonio Sebastian Berida, Jr., who were all
policemen assigned at that time at the Northern Police District, with kidnapping for
ransom.
The sworn-statements of petitioners commonly alleged that at about 10:00 in the
morning of 11 September 2001, while petitioners were cruising on board a vehicle
along United Nations Avenue, a blue Toyota Sedan bumped their vehicle from
behind; that when they went out of their vehicle to assess the damage, several
armed men alighted from the Toyota Sedan, poked guns at, blindfolded, and forced
them to ride in the Toyota Sedan; that they were brought to an office where
₱10,000,000 and two vehicles were demanded from them in exchange for their
freedom; that, after haggling, the amount was reduced to ₱700,000 plus the two
vehicles; that the money and vehicles were delivered in the late evening of 11
September 2001; that they were released in the early morning of 12 September
2001 in Quiapo after they handed the Deed of Sale and registration papers of the
two vehicles.
After the initial investigation by the Western Police District, the case was reported
to the Philippine National Police Intelligence Group in Camp Crame, where a
lateral coordination was made with the Philippine National Police-National Capital
Regional Police Office Regional Intelligence and Investigation Division (PNP-
NCR-RID) for the identification, arrest and filing of appropriate charges against the
accused. After its own investigation, the PNP-NCR-RID recommended that accused
be charged with violation of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,5 as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659.
State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco (State Prosecutor Velasco), who conducted
the preliminary investigation, issued a Resolution6 dated 14 January 2002,
recommending that the accused be indicted for the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
The Resolution was endorsed for approval by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Nilo
C. Mariano and approved by Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño.
On 24 January 2002, State Prosecutor Velasco filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 41,7 an Information for Kidnapping for Ransom against the
accused with no bail recommended. The Information, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 02198832, reads as follows:
That on September 11, 2001 at about 10:00 AM along United Nations Avenue,
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
Accused, who are all police officers, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another and grouping themselves together, did then and there by force
and intimidation, and by the use of high-powered firearms, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, carry away and deprive MACA-ANGCOS ALAWIYA,
ISAGANI ABDUL and ZARAH LANGCO of their liberty against their will for the
purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a demand for ransom was made as a
condition for their release amounting to TEN MILLION PESOS
(PHP10,000,000.00) which amount was later reduced to SEVEN HUNDRED
THOUSAND (PHP700,000.00) plus two vehicles consisting of TOYOTA FX and
MITSUBISHI ADVENTURE to the damage and prejudice of MACA-ANGCOS
ALAWIYA, ISAGANI ABDUL and SARAH LANGCO in said amount and such
other amounts as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
On 28 January 2002, the trial court, upon motion by the prosecution, issued a Hold
Departure Order against the accused.9 On even date, the trial court issued a Warrant
of Arrest against all the accused.10
Meanwhile, on 8 February 2002, the accused filed a petition for review of the
Resolution of State Prosecutor Velasco with the Office of the Secretary of Justice.
On 18 February 2002, the accused moved for the quashal of the Information on the
ground that "the officer who filed the Information has no authority do so."11
In an Order12 dated 27 February 2002, the trial court denied the motion to quash on
the ground that under the ruling in People v. Mapalao,13 an accused who is at large
is not entitled to bail or other relief. The trial court also held that the jurisdiction
and power of the Ombudsman under Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770 (RA
6770),14 as well as Administrative Order No. 8 of the Office of the Ombudsman, are
not exclusive but shared or concurrent with the regular prosecutors. Thus, the
authority of the Department of Justice to investigate, file the information and
prosecute the case could no longer be questioned.
In a Resolution15 promulgated on 24 September 2002, then Secretary of Justice
Hernando B. Perez reversed the ruling of State Prosecutor Velasco and ordered the
latter to cause the withdrawal or dismissal of the Information for kidnapping for
ransom. The Secretary of Justice ruled that there was no prior approval by the
Office of the Ombudsman before the Information for kidnapping was filed with the
trial court. He also found that the incident complained of was a bungled buy-bust
operation, not kidnapping for ransom.
On 11 October 2002, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied by then Secretary of Justice Simeon A. Datumanong in a Resolution
promulgated on 17 February 2003.16
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, seeking the
nullification of the Secretary of Justice’s ruling for having been rendered in grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision of 4 February 2004 dismissing the
petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals denied the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration in a Resolution of 25 June 2004.
Hence, this petition.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals sustained the finding of the Secretary of Justice that the
incident complained of was a bungled buy-bust operation, contrary to the finding of
State Prosecutor Velasco, that it was a kidnapping for ransom.
The Court of Appeals gave credence to the accused’s documentary evidence which
supported their claim that the incident was a botched buy-bust operation. The Court
of Appeals specifically noted the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Cesar Landayan
(Landayan), who was driving a taxi at the time of the incident and was apprehended
together with petitioners. The Sinumpaang Salaysay categorically stated that he and
petitioners were released from accused’s custody at about 12:50 in the afternoon of
the same day, 11 September 2001. Thus, Cesar’s statement refuted the complaint of
petitioners that they were freed only in the morning of 12 September 2001 after a
pay-off of ₱700,000 in casino chips and two vehicles. The Court of Appeals
stressed that Landayan’s Sinumpaang Salaysay was given on 14 September 2001,
prior to petitioners’ complaint for kidnapping for ransom which was filed on 18
September 2001 before the Western Police District. Having been executed prior to
the filing of the complaint for kidnapping for ransom by petitioners,
Cesar’s Sinumpaaang Salaysay could not be discredited as a cover-up evidence.
The Court of Appeals upheld the Secretary of Justice’s ruling that prior approval by
the Office of the Ombudsman for the Military was needed for the filing of the
Information before the RTC, pursuant to OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-
001.17 The Court of Appeals further sustained the finding that there were sufficient
evidence that the offense charged against accused was committed in relation to their
office and that the accused were all acting in the discharge of their functions as
policemen.
The Issues
The issues in this case are:
1. Whether the prior approval by the Office of the Ombudsman for the
Military is required for the investigation and prosecution of the instant
case against the accused;
2. Whether the reversal by the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of
State Prosecutor Velasco amounted to an "executive acquittal;"
3. Whether the accused policemen can seek any relief (via a motion to
quash the information) from the trial court when they had not been
arrested yet; and
4. Whether there was probable cause against the accused for the crime of
kidnapping for ransom.
The Ruling of this Court
On the prior approval by the Ombudsman for the investigation and prosecution of
the case against the accused policemen
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), which is representing the Secretary of
Justice, agrees with petitioners that prior approval by the Ombudsman is not
required for the investigation and prosecution of the criminal case against the
accused policemen. The OSG correctly cites the case of Honasan II v. The Panel of
Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice,18 where the Court held that
the power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or
employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized
agencies of the government such as the provincial, city and state prosecutors. In
view of the foregoing, both the Court of Appeals and the Secretary of Justice
clearly erred in ruling that prior approval by the Ombudsman is required for the
investigation and prosecution of the criminal case against the accused policemen.
On the reversal by the Secretary of Justice
of the resolution of State Prosecutor Velasco
Settled is the rule that the Secretary of Justice retains the power to review
resolutions of his subordinates even after the information has already been filed in
court.19 In Marcelo v. Court of Appeals,20 reiterated in Roberts, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals,21 this Court clarified that nothing in Crespo v. Mogul22 forecloses the
power or authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his
subordinates in criminal cases despite an information already having been filed in
court.23 The nature of the power of control of the Secretary of Justice over
prosecutors was explained in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals24 in this wise:
Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the Secretary of
justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of direct
control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify,
reverse or modify their rulings. (Emphasis supplied)
Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the Secretary of Justice’s reversal of the
Resolution of State Prosecutor Velasco did not amount to "executive acquittal"
because the Secretary of Justice was simply exercising his power to review, which
included the power to reverse the ruling of the State Prosecutor. However, once a
complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case such as its
dismissal or its continuation rests on the sound discretion of the court.25 Trial judges
are not bound by the Secretary of Justice’s reversal of the prosecutor’s resolution
finding probable cause. Trial judges are required to make their own assessment of
the existence of probable cause, separately and independently of the evaluation by
the Secretary of Justice.26
On the motion to quash the information
when the accused had not been arrested yet
People v. Mapalao,27 as correctly argued by the OSG, does not squarely apply to
the present case. In that case, one of the accused, Rex Magumnang, after
arraignment and during the trial, escaped from detention and had not been
apprehended since then. Accordingly, as to him the trial in absentia proceeded and
thereafter the judgment of conviction was promulgated. The Court held that since
the accused remained at large,
he should not be afforded the right to appeal from the judgment of conviction
unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise arrested.
While at large, the accused cannot seek relief from the court as he is deemed to
have waived the same and he has no standing in court.28 In Mapalao, the accused
escaped while the trial of the case was on-going, whereas here, the accused have
not been served the warrant of arrest and have not been arraigned.
Therefore, Mapalao is definitely not on all fours with the present case.lavvphil.net
Furthermore, there is nothing in the Rules governing a motion to quash 29 which
requires that the accused should be under the custody of the law prior to the filing
of a motion to quash on the ground that the officer filing the information had no
authority to do so. Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs
other than an application for bail.30 However, while the accused are not yet under
the custody of the law, any question on the jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an
affirmative relief, except in cases when the accused invokes the special jurisdiction
of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.31
At any rate, the accused’s motion to quash, on the ground of lack of authority of the
filing officer, would have never prospered because as discussed earlier, the
Ombudsman’s power to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees
is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the
government.
On the existence or non-existence of probable cause
Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its
duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or
judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of
jurisdiction.32However, in the following exceptional cases, this Court may
ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable cause by examining
the records of the preliminary investigation.33
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused;
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions;
c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or
regulation;
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
 i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance;

j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a
motion to quash on that ground has been denied; [and]

k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to

prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners.

There is no clear showing that the present case falls under any of the recognized
exceptions. Moreover, as stated earlier, once the information is filed with the trial
court, any disposition of the information rests on the sound discretion of the court.
The trial court is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the existence of
probable cause and it may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the
Secretary of Justice. The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice.34 Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice
amounts to an abdication of the trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine the
existence of probable cause.35

Considering that the Information has already been filed with the trial court, then the
trial court, upon filing of the appropriate motion by the prosecutor, should be given
the opportunity to perform its duty of evaluating, independently of the Resolution
of the Secretary of Justice recommending the withdrawal of the Information against
the accused, the merits of the case and assess whether probable cause exists to hold
the accused for trial for kidnapping for ransom.36

WHEREFORE, we REMAND this case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41,
Manila, to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case to determine
whether probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial.

SO ORDERED.