Joseph Lynch

3/1/10
Medieval Philosophy

Augustine’s Metaphysics

To cover the extent of Augustine of Hippo’s philosophical and theological significance in

any brief manner would prove impossible. This essay seeks merely to address some fundamental

concepts presented in Augustine’s philosophy of the self, while acknowledging their

inseparability from Augustine’s theology; holding that, in not losing sight of the religious beliefs

from which his investigations depart, we may most fully arrive at their completion. It will be

shown that the relationship between Augustine’s epistemology and ontology is clearly identified

in three of his major works which display both his cogito argument and his notion of self

transparency: the cogito argument is presented directly in On Free Will, while his self

transparency is implicit in the two exegeses, On The Trinity and Confessions. Herein, he

discusses the essence of the self, where the analogy is then drawn between its essence and the

Holy Trinity. In so discussing, we can identify how Augustine’s investigations propose a

philosophy that ultimately seeks a greater knowledge of God. In addition, it would be helpful if

not necessary to frame Augustine’s work between the philosophical traditions that appear to have

influenced him, and those long after, which he appears to have influenced. Thus considered, there

is the hope that a sense of the historical breadth of Augustine’s work may be noted as it displays

its own philosophical and religious depth.

Reason Over Sense

As stated, to understand the philosophical approach of Augustine is also to begin to

understand the theological belief of Augustine. In On Free Will, he undertakes an investigation

into the self, seeking to apprehend its substance, his soul. This epistemological foundation is

marked by his use of reason, as well as his firm faith in such reason as the correct means for the

task:
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“What is evident is this: corporeal objects are perceived by bodily sense; no bodily sense can
perceive itself; the interior sense can perceive both corporeal objects perceived by a bodily sense,
and also that bodily sense itself; but reason knows all these things and knows itself, and therefore
has knowledge in the strict sense of the term” (On Free Will 2.4.10).1

Thus, it is through an a priori investigation that Augustine seeks to gain certainty.

Objects, senses, and the interior sense that perceives them must all be distinguished from the

higher authority of reason and the knowledge gained thereby. This hierarchy of knowledge then

parallels that of being, so that such a philosophy is not separate from Augustine’s theological

understanding; he is shaping an ontological hierarchy. As seen in Confessions, this can be

attributed to the fact that Augustine’s reasoning seeks not only to go from external knowledge to

conceptual certainty, but from conceptual certainty to religious truth:

“By which of these ought I seek my God? I had sought Him in the body from earth to heaven, so
far as I could send messengers and beams of my eyes. But the better is the inner, for to it is
presiding and judging, all the bodily messengers reported the answers of heaven and earth, and all
things therein, who said, ‘We are not God, but He made us’”(Confessions, Book X).2

Through his “bodily messengers”, the senses, Augustine explains that one finds only that

which is made by God, and not God Himself. Holding that God is not within the objects of sense,

but above them, so that He cannot be sought through the senses, it follows that the faculty of

reason is superior to the senses, as “the better is the inner”.

Herein, Augustine also expresses the ontological distinction, made on the basis of a

being’s relation to God, the higher truth that Augustine is pursuing. For Augustine – as will be

further discussed – what God has made is distinct from God; noting that hierarchically between

the two is that which God has made in his image – man, as the Bible tells – so that a turn from the

external knowledge to internal certainty seems both a logical and religious progression.

Thus begins the inward turn of Augustine; a turn which may be easily recognized in its

similarities to the Meditations of Rene Descartes. However, long before Descartes stated his

1
(Hyman, Arthur, and James J. Walsh. Philosophy in the Middle Ages: the Christian, Islamic, and Jewish
Traditions. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 1983) p 36.
2
(The Christian Library, ed. The Confessions of St. Augustine. Uhrichsville, OH: Barbour & Company, 1984) p
165.
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fundamental “cogito ergo sum” in his Meditations, Augustine posed the question to himself, “Do

you exist?” To which he affirmed in stating, “If you did not exist it would be impossible for you

to be deceived” (On Free Will, 2.3.7).3 And as Descartes’ so similarly followed, Augustine begins

a purely a priori investigation into the self by isolating the reasonable mind from the senses and

their objects to attain certainty.

Again, we note this turn as not limited to a development of the cogito argument, but also

as an implicit Augustinian belief in the lesser truth of corporeality, wherein neither the self nor

God can be found. So, this turning away from the uncertain and changeable – corporeality, the

senses, and feelings – is to be a simultaneous turning towards what is believed to be more certain

and stable – the soul, mind, and knowledge – where the mind, through its superior faculties, is

directly present to itself. This unmediated relationship being Augustine’s principle of self

transparency.

Mind Over Matter

For Augustine, by removing the identification of the self from corporeal things, he seeks

to find the substance, or soul, and therefore his relation to God. With this inward turn, Augustine

passes from corporeal objects of representational knowledge – where only their image and not the

objects themselves are present to the mind – to what he understands as a non-representational

apprehension: the self transparency of mind. As explained in On The Trinity, a fundamentally

common mistake is the identification of the substance of the self with corporeal objects; thinking

the substance of the self to be of air of fire, Augustine explains, is a misconception that rises from

attachment and association, caused naturally by love. This attachment leads to confusion between

that which is associated with the self, and that which is essentially the self. Explaining the

importance of this separation for the task at hand:

3
(Hyman, Arthur, and James J. Walsh. Philosophy in the Middle Ages: the Christian, Islamic, and Jewish
Traditions. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 1983) p 32.
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“Let it distinguish itself from that which it knows to be another” [so that] “whatsoever remains to it
from itself, that alone is itself”(On The Trinity 10.9.12, 10.10.16).4

Augustine then employs another important supposition that follows from the ability of the

mind to be fully present to itself, without the mediation or uncertainty of corporeality:

“Nothing is at all rightly said to be known while its substance is not known. And therefore the
mind knows itself, it knows its own substance; and when it is certain about itself, it is certain about
its substance” (On The Trinity 10.10.16).5

Simply, a fundamental Augustinian notion is that, in being certain of itself, the mind must

certainly know its own substance. To be sure, the mind cannot be corporeal, but must be separate

from that which is known only through representation. [Here we note a similar distinction

between body and mind in regards to the self, as Descartes later exhibits; although, it is commonly

accepted that their beliefs in the role of the mind differ. Whereas Augustine’s conception is

concerned with separating that which composes the mind from the brain, Descartes distinguishes

the mind as separate from the body. Despite the apparent dispute of the most fundamental

distinction, however, both appear to uphold that the two parts are necessary for life. Again, this is

issue is raised and explained elsewhere, but here its significance should be noted.]

Continuing, in identifying the substance of the mind as that which is not corporeal and

certain of itself, Augustine then proposes what the essence must, in fact, be comprised of. As

thoroughly discussed in On the Trinity, because of their inter-dependent relationship, Augustine

accepts memory, understanding, and will as that which comprises the substance of the mind. For

Augustine, this threefold essence is analogous to the Holy Trinity. In accordance with the Trinity,

Augustine correlates this to the biblical idea that man is made by God in His image. So, the three-

in-one substance of the mind which Augustine has identified – the substance of the self – is none

other than the image of the three-in-one Holy Trinity. Again, Augustine’s various investigations

into the mind continue to culminate in the single effort to seek God.

4
(Ibid) p 70.
5
(Ibid) p 72.
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Additionally, this raises a fundamental question in Augustine’s religious thought, and

therefore brings us to another fundamental matter in his epistemological understanding: If the

mind is certain of itself, and thereby knows itself as an image of the Trinity, how can one know

the substance of that which is represented, and further, how is this image, like others, present to

the mind in the first place, so that its substance can be sought and found? Addressing such a

question to God, Augustine’s Confessions ask, “And how shall I find Thee without my memory,

then do I not retain Thee in my memory. And how shall I find Thee, if I remember Thee not?”

(Confessions, Book 10).6

The Source of Knowledge and Truth

“See, I am mounting up through my mind towards Thee

who abidest above me” (Confessions, Book X).7

In Augustine’s On Free Will, he addresses in his dialogue the issue of how something

such as wisdom, or God in the case of Confessions, can be sought after and found if we do first

have a notion, and therefore a remembrance of such a thing. [In Book X of Confessions, he unites

these two, Truth and God, where ultimately it is agreed that we have a notion of and are seeking

the “happy life” which is comprised of them.] From here he continues; though these things are

desired, and therefore do not appear to be in the possession of our knowledge, it cannot be

doubted that, “Unless by some certain knowledge we knew, we should not with so certain a will

desire” (Confessions, Book X). Do we then, indeed, know their substance, as Augustine would

have it; and if so, how so?

Here we note Augustine’s Platonic roots, specifically regarding Plato’s Doctrine of

Recollection from his dialogue in Meno, where Plato is first seen to express this Augustinian

belief, long before Augustine. Briefly the Doctrine of Recollection asserts the following: that to

seek something, we most know what we are seeking so that we may identify it when it is found;

6
(The Confessions of St. Augustine. Uhrichsville, OH: Barbour & Company, 1984) p 174
7
(Ibid) p 174
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therefore, in arriving at knowledge, we are not learning for the first time, but remembering that

knowledge which we were seeking, and therefore can be certain that we have found it. In the same

vein, Augustine’s Confessions claim: “That is to say, they must as it were be collected together

from their dispersion: whence the word “cogitation” is derived. For cogo [is to] (collect) and

cogito [is to] (recollect).”8 So, Augustine is lead to believe of any truth, “Truly we have it, how, I

know it.”9

Here exhibited is ultimately the source of Augustine’s faith in the mental capacity of

reason, as well as in the source of knowledge itself. This is most clearly expressed in Augustine’s

The Teacher, drawing the conclusion that only belief can be attained through an outward agent

such as words or a teacher, not certainty. Thus, knowledge must come and be made available in

this certain way:

“Considering universals of which we can have knowledge…We listen to Truth which presides
over our minds within us…Our real Teacher is he who is so listened to, who is said to dwell in the
inner man, namely Christ, that is, the unchangeable power and eternal wisdom of
God…Confessedly we must pay heed to the light that it may let us discern visible things so far as
we are able” (The Teacher, X. 38).10

Here, that which “presides over our minds within us” is analogous to Augustine’s earlier

statements on reason; this being the capacity which every man possesses. After then identifying

its divine origins, in relation to the Trinity, Augustine explains this inner faculty of certainty to be

none other than the teacher of the soul, Christ. This faculty, in its direct connection with God, is

thus able to draw forth that unchangeable and eternal Truth; as presented, it is made available to

him who is able remind himself of its truth through reflection.

Thus, Augustine arrives at both a philosophical conclusion regarding the source of truth,

as he has found through a priori reasoning, and thereby justified the a priori approach.

Furthermore, it may be sufficiently demonstrated that Augustine’s overarching epistemology and

8
(The Confessions of St. Augustine. Uhrichsville, OH: Barbour & Company, 1984) p 170.
9
(Ibid) p 176.
10
(Hyman, Arthur, and James J. Walsh. Philosophy in the Middle Ages: the Christian, Islamic, and Jewish
Traditions. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 1983) p 31.
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ontology, through all his arguments, are united by their single pursuit and greater purpose of the

thought of Augustine, himself.

Therefore, we may understand the metaphysical implications of Augustine’s philosophy

as such; he departs from a fundamental belief in God as Truth, thus using this basis as a way to be

sure that he has arrived at completion; surely an argument that arrives at the same conclusions as

the original belief is a means of clarifying which is already known. In so doing, Augustine is able

to propose some groundbreaking approaches to knowledge, as well as uphold a structure which

preceded him, working to better enunciate truths which, by their nature, are and always will be

true. Although we do not believe ourselves to be in possession of a certain truth, it is ultimately up

to the mind to turn inward and find that it is, in fact, inseparable from truth itself, as well as the

knowledge of that truth. To be sure, knowledge implies certainty, and certainty can only, and must

always, be derived internally; Augustine explains that it is from this same source that we

ultimately draw the knowledge as well. It should not be surprising that these conclusions arrive at

Augustine’s most fundamental belief in the existence of God and his relationship to Him; he

remembers the notion of the truth, wills to find the truth, and is therefore able to understand it, as

each stage is dependent on the certainty which his strong faith bestows – a certainty that is a

prerequisite for knowledge, and which is an inherent capacity of the mind. As philosopher Ludwig

Wittgenstein once put it, “If a question can be framed at all, it can be answered.” Perhaps for

Augustine, this is because, when reflecting upon the question, we find that the answer for which

we are searching is drawn from none other than the very thing which wills us to know; the case

being, in fact, that we already know exactly what we are searching for.
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Works Cited

The Christian Library, ed. The Confessions of St. Augustine. Uhrichsville, OH: Barbour &
Company, 1984.

Hyman, Arthur, and James J. Walsh. Philosophy in the Middle Ages: the Christian, Islamic, and
Jewish Traditions. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 1983.