Case Summary of Marbury v.
Madison
Brief Fact Summary. William Marbury (Marbury), an end-of-term appointee of
President John Adams (President Adams) to a justice of the peace position in the
District of Columbia, brought suit against President Thomas Jefferson’s (President
Jefferson) Secretary of State, James Madison, seeking delivery of his commission.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court)
has constitutional authority to review executive actions and legislative acts. The
Supreme Court has limited jurisdiction, the bounds of which are set by the United States
Constitution (Constitution), which may not be enlarged by the Congress.
Facts. Before the inauguration of President Jefferson, outgoing President Adams
attempted to secure Federalist control of the judiciary by creating new judgeships and
filling them with Federalist appointees. Included in these efforts was the nomination
by President Adams, under the Organic Act of the District of Columbia (the District), of
42 new justices of the peace for the District, which were confirmed by the Senate the
day before President Jefferson’s inauguration. A few of the commissions, including
Marbury’s, were undelivered when President Jefferson took office. The new president
instructed Secretary of State James Madison to withhold delivery of the commissions.
Marbury sought mandamus in the Supreme Court, requiring James Madison to deliver
his commission.
Issue. Is Marbury entitled to mandamus from the Supreme Court?
Held. No. Case dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
As the President signed Marbury’s commission after his confirmation, the appointment
has been made, and Marbury has a right to the commission
Given that the law imposed a duty on the office of the president to deliver Marbury’s
commission, that the Supreme Court has the power to review executive actions when
the executive acts as an officer of the law and the nature of the writ of mandamus to
direct an officer of the government “to do a particular thing therein specified,”�
mandamus is the appropriate remedy, if available to the Supreme Court.
To issue mandamus to the Secretary of State really is to sustain an original action,
which is (in this case) outside the constitutional limits of jurisdiction imposed on the
Supreme Court.
Discussion. The importance of Marbury v. Madison is both political and legal.
Although the case establishes the traditions of judicial review and a litigable
constitution on which the remainder of constitutional law rests, it also transformed the
Supreme Court from an incongruous institution to an equipotent head of a branch of
the federal government.
Following is the case brief for Marbury v. Madison, United States Supreme
Court, (1803)
 Madison failed to finalize the former president’s appointment of William
Marbury as Justice of the Peace.
 Marbury directly petitioned the Supreme Court for an equitable remedy in
the form of a writ of mandamus.
 The Supreme Court held that although Marbury was entitled to a remedy,
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 expanding the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction was unconstitutional.
 Prior to this case, no law had been rendered unconstitutional. The major
significance of Marbury v. Madison is that it helped define the
original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court.
Marbury v. Madison Case Brief
Statement of the Facts:
Towards the end of his presidency, John Adams appointed William Marbury
as Justice of the Peace for the District of Columbia. After assuming office,
President Thomas Jefferson ordered James Madison not to finalize Marbury’s
appointment. Under Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, Marbury
brought an action against Madison in the United States Supreme Court
requesting the Court to issue a writ of mandamus to force delivery of the
appointment.
Procedural History:
Marbury directly approached the Supreme Court to compel Madison,
Jefferson’s Secretary of State, to deliver the commission to Marbury.
Issues and Holdings:
1. Does Marbury hold a right to his judicial appointment? Yes
2. Is Marbury entitled to a remedy under U.S. law? Yes
3. Is Marbury entitled to a writ of mandamus under Section 13 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789? No
Judgment:
Chief Justice John Marshall denied issuing a writ of mandamus.
Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied:
The United States Supreme Court has the authority to review both the
legislative acts of congress and laws to determine if they comply with
the Constitution.
Reasoning:
 Justice Marshall held that although Marbury was entitled to his
commission, the United States Supreme Court could not hear the case
because it lacked original jurisdiction.
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1. Marbury was lawfully appointed as Justice of the Peace through the
president’s (Adams) signing of Marbury’s commission and Senate
confirmation.
2. Under federal law, Marbury is entitled to a remedy. Whether or not
Marbury may receive a remedy is contingent upon whether the
appointment made Marbury an agent of the president or assigned a duty by
law. If appointed as a political agent of the president, Marbury is not
entitled to a remedy. However, if Marbury was deprived of the ability to
carry out a duty assigned to him by law, Marbury is entitled to a remedy.
Here, Adams gave legal title to the office of Justice of the Peace to
Marbury for the length of the appointment. Madison interfered with
Marbury’s legal title when he refused to finalize Marbury’s appointment.
As a result, Marbury is entitled to a remedy.
3. Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorizing the United States
Supreme Court jurisdiction to provide the remedy of a writ of mandamus is
unconstitutional. The Judiciary Act of 1789 permits the Supreme Court to
exercise original jurisdiction over causes of actions for writs of mandamus.
The problem is the provision directly conflicts with the Constitution,
specifically Article III. Article III serves as a limitation on the types of
cases the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over. Cases not within
the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction may fall under the Court’s
appellate jurisdiction. In short, Section 13 of The Act is unconstitutional
since it attempts to expand the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Concurring/Dissenting Opinions:
Unanimous decision
Significance:
The holding of Marbury v. Madison established the United States Supreme
Court’s power to determine whether a law passed by Congress was
constitutional (Judicial Review). Prior to this case, it was clear that laws
conflicting with the Constitution were invalid, but the branch of government
who determined validity had not been established.
2
FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. NO. 160261. November 10, 2003
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND
MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY
SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE,
REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR.
AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-
intervention.
Facts:
1. On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House
Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.
2. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct
an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
3. On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint
was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the
House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House
Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to
dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in
substance.
4. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of
the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative
inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The
second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
“Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3
of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
5. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were
filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives,
et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the
provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.”
Issues:
3
1. Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment
complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the
Constitution.
2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on
Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional
for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution.
3. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under
Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
3. It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
Rulings:
1. This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond
the scope of the judicial power of the Supreme Court under
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
1. Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a
determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense.
Such a determination is a purely political question which the
Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.
Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.
2. Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is
truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the
controversy.
2. The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is
unconstitutional.
1. Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall
promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out
the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate
its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase “to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Hence, these
rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution
which said rules were intended to effectively carry out.
Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other
specific limitations on its power to make rules.
2. It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution
which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had
absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary
implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of
the Constitution without need of referendum.
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of
filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House
Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of
the Constitution.
2. Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by
former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court,
on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint
filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23,
2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the
initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period.
4
Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued a directive to the
Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of
Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Philippine Army on the Funeral Honors and Service for President Marcos.
Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives
Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the
Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on Prohibition and Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with the Court.
October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI
of the Constitution.
ISSUES

1) Whether respondents Defense Secretary and AFP Rear Admiral committed grave

abuse of discretion when they issued the assailed memorandum and directive in

compliance with the verbal order of President Duterte to implement his election

campaign promise to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB?

Marcos burial case: Ocampo vs. Enriquez case digest 2) Whether the issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and
October 9, 2017
directive violated the Constitution, and domestic and international laws?
Saturnino C. Ocampo, et al. vs. Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez, et al., G.R. Nos.

225973, 225984, 226097, 226116, 226120 & 226294, November 8, 2016

3) Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from the Marcoses

and their cronies, and the pronouncements of the Court on the Marcos regime have
Facts:
nullified his entitlement as a soldier and former President to interment at the LNMB?

During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo
4) Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of the remains of
R. Duterte publicly announced that he would allow the burial former President
former President Marcos at the LNMB after they entered into an agreement with the
Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani ("LNMB"). Duterte won the May 9,
Government of the Republic of the Philippines as to the conditions and procedures by
2016 elections.
which his remains shall be brought back to and interred in the Philippines?

On August 7, 2016, Defense Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to

RULING
AFP Chief of Staff General Ricardo R. Visaya regarding the interment of former

President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani.

The Supreme Court denied the petitions.

5
 in this case is too general and shared by other groups, such that their duty to uphold

Procedural issues the rule of law, without more, is inadequate to clothe them with requisite legal standing.

Political question Petitioners also failed to prove that the case is of transcendental importance. At this

point in time, the interment of Marcos at a cemetery originally established as a national

The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte's decision to have the remains military cemetery and declared a national shrine would have no profound effect on the

of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable political, economic, and other aspects of our national life considering that more than

controversy. In the excercise of his powers under the Constitution and the twenty-seven (27) years since his death and thirty (30) years after his ouster have

Administrative Code of 1987 to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a already passed. Significantly, petitioners failed to demonstrate a clear and imminent

land of the public domain devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine threat to their fundamental constitutional rights.

purposes, President Duterte decided a question of policy based on his wisdom that it

shall promote national healing and forgiveness. There being no taint of grave abuse in As to petitioners Senator De Lima and Congressman Lagman, they failed to show that

the exercise of such discretion, as discussed below, President Duterte's decision on the burial of Marcos encroaches on their prerogatives as legislators.

that political question is outside the ambit of judicial review.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies

Locus standi

Petitioners violated the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Contrary to their claim

Petitioners have no legal standing to file the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and of lack of plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, petitioners

mandamus because they failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and should be faulted for failing to seek reconsideration of the assailed memorandum and

personal injury as a result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB. directive before the Secretary ofNational Defense. The Secretary of National Defense

should be given opportunity to correct himself, if warranted, considering that AFP

Petitioners cannot also file as taxpayers. They merely claim illegal disbursement of Regulations G 161-375 was issued upon his order. Questions on the implementation

public funds, without showing that Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the LNMB by and interpretation thereof demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion,

either express or implied provision of the Constitution, the laws or jurisprudence. requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of his office to determine

technical and intricate matters of fact. If petitioners would still be dissatisfied with the

Petitioners Saguisag, et al., as members of the Bar, failed to disclose the direct or decision of the Secretary, they could elevate the matter before the Office of the

potential injury which they may suffer as a result of the act complained of. Their interest President which has control and supervision over the Department of National Defense

(DND).

6
 workflow charts/public transactions; rules and policies on gifts and benefits; whistle

Hierarchy of Courts blowing and reporting; and client feedback program

While direct resort to the Court through petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, Petitioners' reliance on Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the Constituti

prohibition and mandamus are allowed under exceptional cases, which are lacking in on is also misplaced. Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV refers to the constitutional duty of educational

this case, petitioners cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts that institutions in teaching the values of patriotism and nationalism and respect for human

requires such petitions to be filed first with the proper Regional Trial Court (RTC). The rights, while Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII is a transitory provision on sequestration or freeze

RTC is not just a trier of facts, but can also resolve questions of law in the exercise of orders in relation to the recovery of Marcos' ill-gotten wealth. Clearly, with respect to

its original and concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and these provisions, there is no direct or indirect prohibition to Marcos' interment at the

mandamus, and has the power to issue restraining order and injunction when proven LNMB.

necessary.

The second sentence of Sec. 17 of Art. VII is likewise not violated by public

Substantive issues respondents. Being the Chief Executive, the President represents the government as

a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his

I. The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the or her department. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power

Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. to take "necessary and proper steps" to carry into execution the law. The mandate is

self-executory by virtue of its being inherently executive in nature and is intimately

While the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a people, its entirety related to the other executive functions. It is best construed as an imposed obligation,

should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about anything remotely not a separate grant of power. The provision simply underscores the rule of law and,

related to the Martial Law period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB. corollarily, the cardinal principle that the President is not above the laws but is obliged

to obey and execute them.

Section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution is not a self-executing provision considering

that a law should be passed by the Congress to clearly define and effectuate the There is no violation of RA 289.

principle embodied therein. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted the Code of Conduct

on Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, Petitioners miserably failed to provide legal and historical bases as to their supposition

Plunder Act, and Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007. To complement these statutes, the that the LNMB and the National Pantheon are one and the same. This is not at all

Executive Branch has issued various orders, memoranda, and instructions relative to unexpected because the LNMB is distinct and separate from the burial place envisioned

the norms of behavior/code of conduct/ethical standards of officials and employees; in R.A. No 289. The parcel of land subject matter of President Quirino's Proclamation

7
No. 431, which was later on revoked by President Magsaysay's Proclamation No. 42, victim-oriented perspective, our legislators could have easily inserted a provision

is different from that covered by Marcos' Proclamation No. 208. The National Pantheon specifically proscribing Marcos' interment at the LNMB as a "reparation" for the Human

does not exist at present. To date, the Congress has deemed it wise not to appropriate Rights Violations Victims (HRVVs). The law is silent and should remain to be so. This

any funds for its construction or the creation of the Board on National Pantheon. This Court cannot read into the law what is simply not there. It is irregular, if not

is indicative of the legislative will not to pursue, at the moment, the establishment of a unconstitutional, for Us to presume the legislative will by supplying material details into

singular interment place for the mortal remains of all Presidents of the Philippines, the law. That would be tantamount to judicial legislation.

national heroes, and patriots.

The enforcement of the HRVV s' rights under R.A. No 10368 will surely not be impaired

Furthermore, to apply the standard that the LNMB is reserved only for the "decent and by the interment of Marcos at the LNMB. As opined by the OSG, the assailed act has

the brave" or "hero" would be violative of public policy as it will put into question the no causal connection and legal relation to the law. The subject memorandum and

validity of the burial of each and every mortal remains resting therein, and infringe upon directive of public respondents do not and cannot interfere with the statutory powers

the principle of separation of powers since the allocation of plots at the LNMB is based and functions of the Board and the Commission. More importantly, the HRVVs'

on the grant of authority to the President under existing laws and regulations. Also, the entitlements to the benefits provided for by R.A. No 10368 and other domestic laws are

Court shares the view of the OSG that the proposed interment is not equivalent to the not curtailed. R.A. No. 10368 does not amend or repeal, whether express or implied,

consecration of Marcos' mortal remains. The act in itself does not confer upon him the the provisions of the Administrative Code or AFP Regulations G 161-375.

status of a "hero." Despite its name, which is actually a misnomer, the purpose of the

LNMB, both from legal and historical perspectives, has neither been to confer to the There is no violation of International Human Rights Laws.

people buried there the title of "hero" nor to require that only those interred therein

should be treated as a "hero." Lastly, petitioners' repeated reference to a "hero's burial" The nation's history will not be instantly revised by a single resolve of President Duterte,

and "state honors," without showing proof as to what kind of burial or honors that will acting through the public respondents, to bury Marcos at the LNMB. Whether

be accorded to the remains of Marcos, is speculative until the specifics of the interment petitioners admit it or not, the lessons of Martial Law are already engraved, albeit in

have been finalized by public respondents. varying degrees, in the hearts and minds of the present generation of Filipinos. As to

the unborn, it must be said that the preservation and popularization of our history is not

No violation of RA 10639 . the sole responsibility of the Chief Executive; it is a joint and collective endeavor of

every freedom-loving citizen of this country.

The Court cannot subscribe to petitioners' logic that the beneficial provisions of R.A.

No. 10368 are not exclusive as it includes the prohibition on Marcos' burial at the LNMB. Notably, complementing the statutory powers and functions of the Human Rights

It would be undue to extend the law beyond what it actually contemplates. With its Victims' Claims Board and the HRVV Memorial Commission in the memorialization of

8
HRVV s, the National Historical Commission of the Philippines (NHCP), formerly known of Marcos, therefore, does not constitute a violation of the physical, historical, and

as the National Historical Institute (NHJ), is mandated to act as the primary government cultural integrity of the LNMB as a national military shrine.

agency responsible for history and is authorized to determine all factual matters relating

to official Philippine history. The LNMB is considered as a national shrine for military memorials. The PVAO, which

is empowered to administer, develop, and maintain military shrines, is under the

II. The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is not done whimsically, supervision and control of the DND. The DND, in tum, is under the Office of the

capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias. President.

The LNMB was not expressly included in the national shrines enumerated in PD 105 The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a self-

executing provision of the Constitution and does not require statutory implementation,

P.D. No. 105 does not apply to the LNMB. Despite the fact that P.D. No. 208 predated nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the legislature. This is why

P.D. No. 105, the LNMB was not expressly included in the national shrines enumerated President Duterte is not bound by the alleged 1992 Agreement between former

in the latter. The proposition that the LNMB is implicitly covered in the catchall phrase President Ramos and the Marcos family to have the remains of Marcos interred in

"and others which may be proclaimed in the future as National Shrines" is erroneous Batac, Ilocos Norte. As the incumbent President, he is free to amend, revoke or rescind

because: (1) As stated, Marcos issued P.D. No. 208 prior to P.D. No. 105; (2) Following political agreements entered into by his predecessors, and to determine policies which

the canon of statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, 138 the LNMB is not a he considers, based on informed judgment and presumed wisdom, will be most

site "of the birth, exile, imprisonment, detention or death of great and eminent leaders effective in carrying out his mandate.

of the nation,"; and (3) Since its establishment, the LNMB has been a military shrine

under the jurisdiction of the PVAO. Moreover, under the Administrative Code, the President has the power to reserve for

public use and for specific public purposes any of the lands of the public domain and

Assuming that P.D. No. 105 is applicable, the descriptive words "sacred and hallowed" that the reserved land shall remain subject to the specific public purpose indicated until

refer to the LNMB as a place and not to each and every mortal remains interred therein. otherwise provided by law or proclamation. At present, there is no law or executive

Hence, the burial of Marcos at the LNMB does not diminish said cemetery as a revered issuance specifically excluding the land in which the LNMB is located from the use it

and respected ground. Neither does it negate the presumed individual or collective was originally intended by the past Presidents. The allotment of a cemetery plot at the

"heroism" of the men and women buried or will be buried therein. The "nation's esteem LNMB for Marcos as a former President and Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a

and reverence for her war dead, " as originally contemplated by President Magsaysay Secretary of National Defense, a military personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of Valor

in issuing Proclamation No. 86, still stands unaffected. That being said, the interment awardee, whether recognizing his contributions or simply his status as such, satisfies

the public use requirement. The disbursement of public funds to cover the expenses

9
incidental to the burial is granted to compensate him for valuable public services Similar to AFP Regulations G 161-374, the following are not qualified to be interred in

rendered. the LNMB: (a) Personnel who were dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from

the service; and (b) Authorized personnel who were convicted by final judgment of an

Likewise, President Duterte's determination to have Marcos' remains interred at the offense involving moral turpitude.

LNMB was inspired by his desire for national healing and reconciliation. Presumption

of regularity in the performance of official duty prevails over petitioners' highly disputed In the absence of any executive issuance or law to the contrary, the AFP Regulations

factual allegation that, in the guise of exercising a presidential prerogative, the Chief G 161-375 remains to be the sole authority in determining who are entitled and

Executive is actually motivated by utang na loob (debt of gratitude) and bayad utang disqualified to be interred at the LNMB. Interestingly, even if they were empowered to

(payback) to the Marcoses. As the purpose is not self-evident, petitioners have the do so, former Presidents Corazon C. Aquino and Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, who

burden of proof to establish the factual basis of their claim. They failed. Even so, this were themselves aggrieved at the Martial Law, did not revise the rules by expressly

Court cannot take cognizance of factual issues since We are not a trier of facts. prohibiting the burial of Marcos at the LNMB. The validity of AFP Regulations G 161-

375 must, therefor, be sustained for having been issued by the AFP Chief of Staff acting

AFP Regulations G 161-375 must be sustained. under the direction of the Secretary of National Defense, who is the alter ego of the

President.

Under AFP Regulations G 161-375, the following are eligible for interment at the LNMB:

(a) Medal of Valor Awardees; (b) Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP; ( c) AFP Regulations G 161-375 should not be stricken down in the absence of clear and

Secretaries of National Defense; ( d) Chiefs of Staff, AFP; ( e) General/Flag Officers of unmistakable showing that it has been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting

the AFP; (f) Active and retired military personnel of the AFP to include active draftees to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Neither could it be considered ultra vires for purportedly

and trainees who died in line of duty, active reservists and CAFGU Active Auxiliary providing incomplete, whimsical, and capricious standards for qualification for burial at

(CAA) who died in combat operations or combat related activities; (g) Former members the LNMB.

of the AFP who laterally entered or joined the PCG and the PNP; (h) Veterans of

Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII and recognized guerillas; (i) Government It is not contrary to the "well-established custom," as the dissent described it, to argue

Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists and other deceased persons whose interment that the word "bayani" in the LNMB has become a misnomer since while a symbolism

or reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or the of heroism may attach to the LNMB as a national shrine for military memorial, the same

Secretary of National Defense; and G) Former Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, does not automatically attach to its feature as a military cemetery and to those who

Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists, widows of Former Presidents, Secretaries of were already laid or will be laid therein. As stated, the purpose of the LNMB, both from

National Defense and Chief of Staff. the legal and historical perspectives, has neither been to confer to the people buried

10
there the title of "hero" nor to require that only those interred therein should be treated final judgment of the offense involving moral turpitude nor dishonorably

as a "hero." separated/reverted/discharged from active military service.

In fact, the privilege of internment at the LNMB has been loosen up through the years. The fact remains that Marcos was not convicted by final judgment of any offense

Since 1986, the list of eligible includes not only those who rendered active military involving moral turpitude. No less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a person

service or military-related activities but also non-military personnel who were shall not be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

recognized for their significant contributions to the Philippine society (such as

government dignitaries, statesmen, national artists, and other deceased persons Also, the equal protection clause is not violated. Generally, there is no property right to

whose interment or reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, safeguard because even if one is eligible to be buried at the LNMB, such fact would

Congress or Secretary of National Defense). In 1998, the widows of former Presidents, only give him or her the privilege to be interred therein. Unless there is a favorable

Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of Staff were added to the list. Whether or recommendation from the Commander- in-Chief, the Congress or the Secretary of

not the extension of burial privilege to civilians is unwarranted and should be restricted National Defense, no right can be said to have ripen. Until then, such inchoate right is

in order to be consistent with the original purpose of the LNMB is immaterial and not legally demandable and enforceable.

irrelevant to the issue at bar since it is indubitable that Marcos had rendered significant

active military service and military-related activities. Assuming that there is a property right to protect, the requisites of equal protection

clause are not met. 181 In this case, there is a real and substantial distinction between

Petitioners did not dispute that Marcos was a former President and Commander-in- a military personnel and a former President. The conditions of dishonorable discharge

Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, a military personnel, a veteran, and under the Articles of War attach only to the members of the military. There is also no

a Medal of Valor awardee. For his alleged human rights abuses and corrupt practices, substantial distinction between Marcos and the three Philippine Presidents buried at

we may disregard Marcos as a President and Commander-in-Chief, but we cannot deny the LNMB (Presidents Quirino, Garcia, and Macapagal). All of them were not convicted

him the right to be acknowledged based on the other positions he held or the awards of a crime involving moral turpitude. In addition, the classification between a military

he received. In this sense, We agree with the proposition that Marcos should be viewed personnel and a former President is germane to the purposes of Proclamation No. 208

and judged in his totality as a person. While he was not all good, he was not pure evil and P.D. No. 1076. While the LNMB is a national shrine for military memorials, it is also

either. Certainly, just a human who erred like us. an active military cemetery that recognizes the status or position held by the persons

interred therein.

Aside from being eligible for burial at the LNMB, Marcos possessed none of the

disqualifications stated in AFP Regulations G 161-3 7 5. He was neither convicted by Likewise, Marcos was honorably discharged from military service. PVAO expressly

recognized him as a retired veteran pursuant to R.A. No. 6948, as amended. Petitioners

11
have not shown that he was dishonorably discharged from military service under APP treacherous and perilous path of having to make choices from multifarious inferences

Circular 17, Series of 1987 (Administrative Discharge Prior to Expiration of Term of or theories arising from the various acts of the people. It is not the function of the Court,

Enlistment) for violating Articles 94, 95 and 97 of the Articles of War. The NHCP study is for instance, to divine the exact implications or significance of the number of votes

incomplete with respect to his entire military career as it failed to cite and include the obtained in elections, or the message from the number of participants in public

official records of the AFP. assemblies. If the Court is not to fall into the pitfalls of getting embroiled in political and

oftentimes emotional, if not acrimonious, debates, it must remain steadfast in abiding

The word "service" in AFP Regulations G 161-375 should be construed as that by its recognized guiding stars - clear constitutional and legal rules - not by the

rendered by a military person in the AFP, including civil service, from the time of his/her uncertain, ambiguous and confusing messages from the actions of the people.

commission, enlistment, probation, training or drafting, up to the date of his/her

separation or retirement from the AFP. Civil service after honorable separation and

retirement from the AFP is outside the context of "service" under AFP Regulations G

161-375.

Hence, it cannot be conveniently claimed that Marcos' ouster from the presidency

during the EDSA Revolution is tantamount to his dishonorable separation, reversion or

discharge from the military service. The fact that the President is the Commander-in-

Chief of the AFP under the 1987 Constitution only enshrines the principle of supremacy

of civilian authority over the military. Not being a military person who may be prosecuted

before the court martial, the President can hardly be deemed "dishonorably

separated/reverted/discharged from the service" as contemplated by AFP Regulations

G 161-375. Dishonorable discharge through a successful revolution is an extra-

constitutional and direct sovereign act of the people which is beyond the ambit of

judicial review, let alone a mere administrative regulation.

It is undeniable that former President Marcos was forced out of office by the people

through the so-called EDSA Revolution. Said political act of the people should not be

automatically given a particular legal meaning other than its obvious consequence -

that of ousting him as president. To do otherwise would lead the Court to the

12

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo vs. Pp. G.R. No. 220953, April 18, 2017
Facts
On July 19, 2016, the Court promulgated its decision, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions
for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the resolutions issued in
Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan on April
6, 2015 and September 10, 2015; GRANTS the petitioners’ respective
demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-
0174 as to the petitioners GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO and BENIGNO AGUAS for insufficiency of
evidence; ORDERS the immediate release from detention of said
petitioners; and MAKES no pronouncements on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The State through the Office of the Ombudsman, has moved for the
reconsideration of the Decision on the ground that a certiorari action
assailing an interlocutory order denying a demurrer to evidence
violates Rule 119, Section 23 of the Rules of Court.
Issues
1. Whether or not an order denying a demurrer to evidence is reviewable
by appeal or by certiorari before judgment; and
2. Whether or not right to due process was violated because the
decision imposed additional elements for plunder that neither
Republic Act No. 7080 nor jurisprudence had theretofore required e.,
the identification of the main plunderer, and personal benefit on the
part of the accused committing the predicate crime of raid on the
public treasury;
3. Whether or not the Court did not appreciate the totality of its evidence,
particularly the different irregularities committed in the disbursement
of the PCSO funds, e., the commingling of funds, the non-compliance
with LOI No. 1282, and the unilateral approval of the disbursements;
4. Whether or not the evidence presented by the prosecution was
not fully taken into account, including but not limited to
the irregularities in the confidential/ intelligence fund (cif)
disbursement process, questionable practice of co-mingling of
funds and aguas’ reports to the commission on audit (coa) that
bulk of the php365,997,915.00 withdrawn from the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office’s (pcso) cif were diverted to the
arroyo-headed office of the president;
5. Whether or not Arroyo, Aguas and their Co-accused, if elements
of plunder are not proven, be prosecuted for the crime of
malversation;
6. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing April 6, 2015 and September 10, 2015
Resolutions
Ruling
1. Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is not an insuperable
obstacle to the review by the Court of the denial of the demurrer to
evidence through certiorari. We have had many rulings to that effect in
the past. For instance, in Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan,4 the Court
expressly ruled that the petition for certiorari was the proper remedy to
assail the denial of the demurrer to evidence that was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction, or oppressive
exercise of judicial authority.
2. The State cites the plain meaning rule to highlight that the crime of
plunder did not require personal benefit on the part of the raider of the
public treasury. It insists that the definition of raids on the public
treasury, conformably with the plain meaning rule, is the taking of
public money through fraudulent or unlawful means, and such
definition does not require enjoyment or personal benefit on the part
of plunderer or on the part of any of his co-conspirators for them to be
convicted for plunder.
The submissions of the State are unfounded.
The requirements for the identification of the main plunderer and for
personal benefit in the predicate act of raids on the public
treasury have been written in R.A. No. 7080 itself as well as
embedded in pertinent jurisprudence. This we made clear in the
decision, as follows:
A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution
sought to show was an implied conspiracy to commit plunder among
all of the accused on the basis of their collective actions prior to,
during and after the implied agreement. It is notable that the
Prosecution did not allege that the conspiracy among all of the
accused was by express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a
chain conspiracy.
This was another fatal flaw of the Prosecution.
The law on plunder requires that a particular public officer must
be identified as the one who amassed, acquired or accumulated
ill-gotten wealth because it plainly states that plunder is
committed by any public officer who, by himself or in connivance
with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
13
business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least P50,000,000.00 through
a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in
Section 1(d) hereof. Surely, the law requires in the criminal
charge for plunder against several individuals that there must be
a main plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may be members
of her family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons. In other words, the
allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the
information was appropriate because the main plunderer would
then be identified in either manner. Of course, implied
conspiracy could also identify the main plunderer, but that fact
must be properly alleged and duly proven by the Prosecution.
This interpretation is supported by Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, where
the Court explained the nature of the conspiracy charge and the
necessity for the main plunderer for whose benefit the amassment,
accumulation and acquisition was made, thus:
There is no denying the fact that the “plunder of an entire nation
resulting in material damage to the national economy” is made up of a
complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of plunder,
therefore, different parties may be united by a common purpose. In
the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts
have a commonality – to help the former President amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in
the Amended Information alleged the different participation of each
accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy
charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive
protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a
portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS
and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive
commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself
from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of
them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or
indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-
gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada. [bold
underscoring supplied for emphasis]
Indeed, because plunder is a crime that only a public official can
commit by amassing, accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten wealth in
the aggregate amount or total value of at least P50,000,000.00, the
identification in the information of such public official as the main
plunderer among the several individuals thus charged is logically
necessary under the law itself. In particular reference to Criminal
Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174, the individuals charged therein –
including the petitioners – were 10 public officials; hence, it was only
proper to identify the main plunderer or plunderers among the 10
accused who herself or himself had amassed, accumulated, or
acquired ill-gotten wealth with the total value of at least
P50,000,000.00.
The phrase raids on the public treasury as used in Section 1(d) of R.
A. No. 7080 is itself ambiguous. In order to ascertain the objective
meaning of the phrase, the act of raiding the public treasury cannot be
divided into parts. This is to differentiate the predicate act of raids on
the public treasury from other offenses involving property, like
robbery, theft, or estafa. Considering that R.A. No. 7080 does not
expressly define this predicate act, the Court has necessarily resorted
to statutory construction. In so doing, the Court did not adopt the
State’s submission that personal benefit on the part of the accused
need not be alleged and shown because doing so would have
defeated the clear intent of the law itself,6 which was to punish the
amassing, accumulating, or acquiring of ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least P50,000,000.00 by any
combination or series of acts of misappropriation, conversion, misuse,
or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury.
As the decision has observed, the rules of statutory construction as
well as the deliberations of Congress indicated the intent of Congress
to require personal benefit for the predicate act of raids on the public
treasury, viz.:
The phrase raids on the public treasury is found in Section 1 (d) of
R.A. No. 7080, which provides:
Section 1. Definition of Terms. – x x x
xxx
1. d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or
material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two
(2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies,
nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any
combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of
public funds or raids on the public treasury;
xxx
To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public
treasury, the key is to look at the accompanying
words: misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of
public funds. This process is conformable with the maxim of
14
 statutory construction noscitur a sociis, by which the correct
construction of a particular word or phrase that is ambiguous in
itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings may be made
by considering the company of the words in which the word or
phrase is found or with which it is associated. Verily, a word or
phrase in a statute is always used in association with other
words or phrases, and its meaning may, therefore, be modified or
restricted by the latter.
To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another’s
property as if it were one’s own; to misappropriate means to own,
to take something for one’s own benefit; misuse means “a good,
substance, privilege, or right used improperly, unforeseeably, or
not as intended;” andmalversation occurs when “any public
officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable
for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall
take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment
or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public
funds, or property, wholly or partially.” The common thread that
binds all the four terms together is that the public officer used the
property taken. Considering that raids on the public treasury is in
the company of the four other terms that require the use of the
property taken, the phrase raids on the public treasury similarly
requires such use of the property taken. Accordingly,
the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in contending that the mere
accumulation and gathering constituted the forbidden act of raids
on the public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a sociis,
raids on the public treasury requires the raider to use the property
taken impliedly for his personal benefit.
3. The contention lacks basis.
As can be readily seen from the decision, the Court expressly granted
the petitioners’ respective demurrers to evidence and dismissed the
plunder case against them for insufficiency of evidence because:
x x x the Sandiganbayan as the trial court was guilty of grave abuse of
discretion when it capriciously denied the demurrers to
evidence despite the absence of competent and sufficient
evidence to sustain the indictment for plunder, and despite the
absence of the factual bases to expect a guilty verdict.
Such disposition of the Court fully took into consideration all the
evidence adduced against the petitioners. We need not rehash our
review of the evidence thus adduced, for it is enough simply to stress
that the Prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti of plunder –
that any or all of the accused public officials, particularly petitioner
Arroyo, had amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten wealth in
the aggregate amount or total value of at least P50,000,000.00.
4. No, in accenting certain inadequacies of the allegations of the
information, the Court did not engage in purposeless nitpicking, and
did not digress from the primary task of determining the sufficiency of
the evidence presented by the State against the petitioners. What the
Court thereby intended to achieve was to highlight what would have
been relevant in the properprosecution of plunder and thus enable
itself to discern and determine whether the evidence of guilt was
sufficient or not. In fact, the Court categorically clarified that in
discussing the essential need for the identification of the main
plunderer it was not harping on the sufficiency of the information, but
was only enabling itself to search for and to find the relevant proof that
unequivocally showed petitioner Arroyo as the “mastermind” – which
was how the Sandiganbayan had characterized her participation – in
the context of the implied conspiracy alleged in the information. But
the search came to naught, for the information contained nothing that
averred her commission of the overt act necessary to implicate her in
the supposed conspiracy to commit the crime of plunder. Indeed, the
Court assiduously searched for but did not find the sufficient
incriminatory evidence against the petitioners. Hence, the
Sandiganbayan capriciously and oppressively denied their demurrers
to evidence.
5. This Court has consistently held that the lesser offense of
malversation can be included in plunder when the amount amassed
reaches at least P50,000,000.00. The predicate acts of bribery and
malversation do not need to be charged under separate informations
when a person has already been charged with plurider.
In Atty. Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, the accused assailed the
information for charging more than one offense: bribery, malversation
of public funds or property, and violations of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019 and Section 7(d) of Republic Act No. 6713. This Court
observed that “the acts alleged in the information are not separate or
independent offenses, but are predicate acts of the crime of plunder.”
The Court, quoting the Sandiganbayan, clarified:
It should be stressed that the Anti-Plunder law specifically Section
1(d) thereof does not make any express reference to any specific
provision of laws, other than R.A. No. 7080, as amended, which
coincidentally may penalize as a separate crime any of the overt or
criminal acts enumerated therein. The said acts which form part of the
combination or series of act are described in their generic sense.
15
 Thus, aside from ‘malversation’ of public funds, the law also uses the
generic terms ‘misappropriation,’ ‘conversion’ or ‘misuse’ of said fund.
The fact that the acts involved may likewise be penalized under other
laws is incidental. The said acts are mentioned only as predicate acts
of the crime of plunder and the allegations relative thereto are not to
be taken or to be understood as allegations charging separate
criminal offenses punished under the Revised Penal Code, the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
The observation that the accused in these petitions may be made to
answer for malversation was correctly pointed out by Justice
Ponferrada of the Sandiganbayan in his separate concurring and
dissenting opinion:
There is evidence, however, that certain amounts were released to
accused Rosario Uriarte and Sergio Valencia and these releases
were made possible by certain participatory acts of accused Arroyo
and Aguas, as discussed in the subject Resolution. Hence, there is a
need for said accused to present evidence to exculpate them from
liability which need will warrant the denial of their Demurrer to
Eviderice, as under the variance rule they maybe held liable for the
lesser crimes which are necessarily included in the offense of plunder.
Significantly, the Sandiganbayan’s Resolution to the demurrers to
evidence includes the finding that the PCSO Chairperson Valencia,
should still be made to answer for malversation as included in the
Information in these cases. Since the Information charges conspiracy,
both petitioners in these consolidated cases still need to answer for
those charges. Thus, the demurrer to evidence should also be
properly denied. It would be premature to dismiss and acquit the
petitioners.
6. The Anti-Plunder Law penalizes the most consummate larceny and
economic treachery perpetrated by repositories of public trust. The
majority’s Decision-which effectively makes more stringent the
threshold for conviction by implying elements not supported by
statutory text-cripples the State’s capacity to exact accountability.
In Joseph Ejercito Estrada v. Sandiganbayan:
Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly
sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and economically
catastrophic looting of the national treasury.Such is the Plunder Law,
especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-
scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant
tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of our
nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the
legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society
against the avarice and other venalities in public office.
These are times that try men’s souls. In the checkered history of this
nation, few issues of national importance can equal the amount of
interest and passion generated by petitioner’s ignominious fall from
the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a
virginal statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of
dissension among our people that may linger for a long time. Only by
responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism
and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of
ferment.155 (Emphasis in supplied)
In issuing the Resolutions denying petitioners’ demurrers to evidence,
the Sandiganbayan acted well-within its jurisdiction and competence.
It is not for us to substitute our wisdom for that of the court which
presided over the full conduct of trial, as well as the reception and
scrutiny of evidence.
The rule proscribing appeals to denials of demurrers to evidence is
plain and basic. An accused’s recourse is to present evidence and to
rebut the prosecution’s evidence. The petitioners here failed to
establish an exceptional predicament.
This Court’s overruling of the April 6, 2015 and September 10, 2015
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan on the strength of findings of
inadequacy on the part of the prosecution, but based on standards
introduced only upon the rendition of this Court’s July 19, 2016
Decision, violated the prosecution’s constitutional right to due
process. Both the prosecution and the accused deserve fairness: the
prosecution, that it may sufficiently establish its case in contemplation
of every appropriate legal standard; and the accused, that they may
more competently dispel any case the prosecution may have
established against them.
Trial must, thus, proceed.
16
 A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC
August 8, 2008
RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE COLUMNS OF MR.
AMADO A.P. MACASAET PUBLISHED IN MALAYA DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 19, 20,
AND 21, 2007
Facts of the case:
This resolves a contempt charge against respondent Amado A.P.
Macasaet (Macasaet), a newspaper columnist, for authoring publications
imputing bribery to a member of the Supreme Court namely Justice Consuelo
Ynares-Santiago, amounting to P10 million allegedly received in boxes by
Cecilia Delis (said to be the secretary of Justice Santiago), in relation to a
criminal case which was decided in favor of the accused, Henry T. Go (GR No.
172602). Justice Santiago denied the accusation and Macasaet was ordered
to submit an explanation on why no sanctions should be imposed on him for
indirect contempt of court under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure which states that “After a charge in writing has been filed, and
an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such
period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a
person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt; (d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;”. Macasaet testified that
the information was received from confidential sources while Delis denied
any knowledge of the bribery. An investigating Committee was created to
investigate the alleged bribery committed by Justice Santiago. The
Committee reported that the columns of Macasaet appeared to be just mere
hearsays and concluded that the bribery story was “unbelievable” and further
recommended that Macasaet be held in indirect contempt.
Issue:
Whether or not Macasaet is liable for indirect contempt under Section 3(d),
Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Held/Rationale:
Yes. Freedom of speech and of the press is a public right to scrutinize and
criticize government. However, many types of criticism become harmful and
irresponsible attacks which threaten the judicial independence. A truly
independent judiciary is possible only when public confidence in the
competence and integrity of the judiciary is maintained, and the public
accepts the legitimacy of judicial authority. These kinds of personal attacks
damage and threaten the integrity and indepedence of the judiciary. In
Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, Lagunzad v. Vda Gonzales and Zaldivar
v. Gonzales, it was stated that Freedom of expression is not absolute and not
without limitations.
Upholding the findings stated in the Comprehensive Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Committee which enumerated the
gross inconsistencies and assumptions of the respondent which lacked
veracity and showed the reckless disregard of whether the alleged bribery
was false or not, the Court held Macasaet guilty of indirect contempt of court.
The Court also cited Article 10(2) of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR) which states that “The exercise of these freedoms, since it
carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and necessary in
a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for
preventing disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” Hence, it is the
obligation of the Court to sanction those who wantonly obstruct their
processes.
Separate Opinion
Associate Justice Antonio Carpio had a dissenting opinion. He stated that
there was denial of due process on the part of Macasaet because when the
witnesses the Committee summoned testified, the Committee monopolized
the right to propound questions to the witnesses, denying to Macasaet such
right. As matters stand, Macasaet will be subjected to punitive sanctions
based on evidence he had no opportunity to scrutinize. However, it was
disagreed on the following grounds: (1) the proceedings of the Committee
are presumed to be regular. Thus, the onus probandi to prove otherwise rests
on Macasaet, not on the Committee. (2) assuming arguendo that Macasaet
was not able to cross-examine his witnesses, this does not necessarily mean
that his right to due process of law was violated. Further, Macasaet never
assert his right to cross-examine the witnesses against him. (3) the Court has
17
the power to invoke the right to cross-examine the witnesses against
respondent, for and in his behalf. Otherwise, the Court will be acting as his
counsel, which is absurd.
OCA v Judge Floro
RTJ-99-1460
It was in 1995 that Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first applied for
judgeship. A pre-requisite psychological evaluation on him then by the SC
Clinic revealed "(e)vidence of ego disintegration" and "developing psychotic
process." Judge Floro later voluntarily withdrew his application. In June 1998,
when he applied anew, the required psychological evaluation exposed
problems with self-esteem, mood swings, confusion, social/interpersonal
deficits, paranoid ideations, suspiciousness, and perceptual distortions. Both
1995 and 1998 reports concluded that Atty. Floro was unfit to be a judge. But
because of his impressive academic standing, the JBC allowed Atty. Floro to
seek a second opinion from private practitioners. The second opinion
appeared favorable thus paving the way to atty. Floro's appointment as RTC
judge.
An administrative complaint was filed against him by court
administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo. Then he recommended as well that Judge
Floro be placed under preventive suspension for the duration of the
investigation against him. In a Resolution dated 20 July 1999, the Court en
banc adopted the recommendations of the OCA, docketing the complaint as
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, in view of the commission of the acts or omissions as
reported by the audit team.
One of those reported is for his alleged partiality in criminal cases
where he declares that he is pro-accused which is contrary to Canon 2, Rule
2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct or Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct. The audit team reported that Judge Floro relayed to the members
thereof that in criminal cases, he is always "pro-accused" particularly
concerning detention prisoners and bonded accused who have to continually
pay for the premiums on their bonds during the pendency of their cases.
Judge Floro denies the foregoing charge. He claims that what he did
impart upon Atty. Buenaventura was the need for the OCA to remedy his
predicament of having 40 detention prisoners and other bonded accused
whose cases could not be tried due to the lack of a permanent prosecutor
assigned to his sala. At any rate, Judge Floro submits that there is no single
evidence or proof submitted by any litigant or private complainant that he
sided with the accused. Atty. Dizon, Judge Floro’s Clerk of Court, on the other
hand, categorically stated under oath that Judge Floro, during a staff meeting,
admitted to her and the staff of Branch 73 and in the presence of his PAO
lawyer that he is pro-accused for the reason that he commiserated with them
especially those under detention as he, himself, had been accused by his
brother and sister-in-law of so many unfounded offenses.
Issue: W/n Judge Floro violated Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct
Held: Yes. Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: "A judge
should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary." This means that a judge whose duty is to
apply the law and dispense justice "should not only be impartial, independent
and honest but should be believed and perceived to be impartial,
independent and honest" as well. Judge Floro, by broadcasting to his staff and
the PAO lawyer that he is pro-accused, opened himself up to suspicion
regarding his impartiality. Prudence and judicial restraint dictate that a judge
should reserve personal views and predilections to himself so as not to stir up
suspicions of bias and unfairness. Irresponsible speech or improper conduct
of a judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary.
On a more fundamental level, what is required of judges is objectivity
if an independent judiciary is to be realized. And by professing his bias for the
accused, Judge Floro is guilty of unbecoming conduct as his capacity for
objectivity is put in serious doubt, necessarily eroding the public’s trust in his
ability to render justice.
18
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS
respondent
REASONING:

Supreme Court
September 26, 1996
G.R No. 118882
FACTS:
- The case is a petition for review with an urgent prayer for injunction
and/or restraining order which seeks to: (a)Annul and set aside the
decision of the case People of the Philippines vs Hon Pedro Espina et
al. insofar as it denied the Peoples prayer to inhibit respondent Judge
Pedro Espina of the RTC of Tacloban from hearing the criminal case
entitled People of the Philippines vs Cristela Reyes. And (b) enjoin
the said judge from conducting further proceedings in the aforesaid
criminal case
- The court required the respondents to comment on the sad prayer of
the petitioners within 10 days from notice. The respondents however
failed to do so.
- Until now, the respondents have not yet submitted their comments on
the because the delays of the proceedings may benefit the
respondents and sanctions against them would not be that much since
most of the respondents are detained. The
- The court then proceeded to dispense the comments and proceed
with the disposition of the petition.
- Judge Espina, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
cannot be considered to adequately possess such cold neutrality of an
impartial judge as to fairly assess the both the evidence to be
presented by the prosecution and defense in view of his previous
decision wherein he enjoined the preliminary investigation at the
Regional State Prosecutor’s office level against herein respondent
Jane Go, the principal accused in the killing of her husband
Dominador Go.
- Espina’s decision in favor of respondent Jane Go, serves as sufficient
and reasonable basis for the prosecution to seriously doubt his
impartiality in handing the cases.
- One of the essential requirements of procedural due process in a
judicial proceeding is that there must be an impartial court or tribunal
clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before
it. The court consistently demands the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge.
- The litigants should be sure that when their rights are violated they
can go to a judge who shall give them justice.

ISSUE:

- W/N Judge Espino should be inhibited from presiding on the

Criminal Case, People vs Cristela Reyes.

HELD: YES

19

RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE HEARING
HELD ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2013 AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG,
SANDIGANBAYAN
2014-09-23 | A.M. No. SB-14-21-J
Per Curiam:
FACTS:
In the middle of 2013, the “pork barrel scam” controversy spawned massive protest actions all
over the country. Some government officials and other individuals were mentioned by "whistle-
blowers" who are former employees of the alleged mastermind, Janet Lim-Napoles (Mrs.
Napoles), wife of an ex-military officer. Among the said personalities who allegedly transacted
with Mrs. Napoles was the incumbent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong.
The Kevlar Case:
 Based on the testimonies of Benhur Luy, Marina Sula and Aries Rufo, the
Investigating Justice formulated the charges against the respondent, as follows:
o Respondent acted as contact of Napoles in connection with the Kevlar case
while it was pending in the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division wherein he is
the Chairman;
o Respondent, being Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan, fixed the Kevlar
case resulting in her acquittal;
o Respondent received an undetermined amount of money from Napoles
prior to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case thus, she was
sure ("kampante")of her acquittal;
o Respondent visited Napoles in her office where she handed to him eleven
(11) checks, each amounting to P282,000.00 or a total of P3,102,000.00, as
advanced interest for his P25.5 million BDO check she deposited in her
personal account
o Respondent attended Napoles' parties and was photographed with
Senator Estrada and Napoles
 Respondent thus stands accused of gross misconduct, partiality and corruption or
bribery during the pendency of the Kevlar case, and impropriety on account of his
dealing and socializing with Napoles after her acquittal in the said case. Additionally,
respondent failed to disclose in his September 26, 2013 letter to Chief Justice Sereno
that he had actually visited Napoles at her office in 2012, as he vehemently denied
having partied with or attended any social event hosted by her.
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Justice
 Respondent Justice Gregory S. Ong be found GUILTY of gross misconduct,
dishonesty, and impropriety, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary and be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service
WITH FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, and
WITH PREJUDICE to reemployment to any government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations.
 Benhur and Sula testified in a candid, straightforward, and categorical manner. Their
testimonies were instantaneous, clear, unequivocal, and carried with it the ring of
truth. In fact, their answers to the undersigned's probing questions were consistent
with their testimonies before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. During cross-
examination, they did not waver or falter. It was found that the two whistle blowers
are credible witnesses and their story untainted with bias and contradiction,
reflective of honest and trustworthy witnesses and therefore found unmeritorious
respondent's claim that Benhur and Sula were lying.
 Respondent's transgression pertains to his personal life and no direct relation to his
judicial function. It is not misconduct but plain dishonesty. His act is unquestionably
disgraceful and renders him morally unfit as a member of the Judiciary and unworthy
of the privileges the law confers on him. Furthermore, respondent's conduct
supports Benhur's assertion that he received money from Napoles.
 Dishonesty likewise violates Canon 2 (1 and 2) on Integrity of the same Code
providing in part that judges must ensure that their conduct is above reproach and
must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the Judiciary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Justice Gregory Ong is guilty of gross misconduct, dishonesty and
impropriety, thus violating the New Code of the Judicial Conduct.
COURT’S RULING:
 The Court ADOPTED the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the
Investigating Justice.
 Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper
or wrong behavior; while "gross" has been defined as "out of all measure beyond
allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused.
 The Court agree with Investigating Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez that respondent's
association with Napoles during the pendency and after the promulgation of the
decision in the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal, constitutes GROSS
MISCONDUCT notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of corruption or
bribery in the rendition of the said judgment.
 Bribery is committed when a public officer agrees to perform an act in connection
with the performance of official duties in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or
present received. A judge who extorts money from a party-litigant who has a case
before the court commits a serious misconduct and the Court has condemned such
act in the strongest possible terms. Particularly because it has been committed by
one charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice, it
quickly and surely corrodes respect for law and the courts.
 The evidence in this case is insufficient to sustain the bribery and corruption charges
against the respondent. Both Luy and Sula have not witnessed respondent actually
receiving money from Napoles in exchange for her acquittal in the Kevlar case.
Napoles had confided to Luy her alleged bribe to respondent.
 Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act by the respondent,
the Court found credible evidence of his association with Napoles after the
promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case. The totality of the circumstances of
such association strongly indicates respondent's corrupt inclinations that only
heightened the public's perception of anomaly in the decision-making process. By
20
 his act of going to respondent at her office on two occasions, respondent exposed and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the
himself to the suspicion that he was partial to Napoles. government including government-owned or -controlled corporations.
 Respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two occasions
was GROSSLY IMPROPER and violated Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct, which took effect on June 1, 2004.

Canon 4 (Propriety), Sec.1: Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all the activities of a judge.

 A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial and that
fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance. Public confidence in the
Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. A judge must
avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof. Being the subject of constant
public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
 Judges must, at all times, be beyond reproach and should avoid even the mere
suggestion of partiality and impropriety.24 Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct states that "Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the
performance of all the activities of a judge."
Canon 4 (Propriety), Sec.2: As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves
in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
 In this light, it does not matter that the case is no longer pending when improper
acts were committed by the judge. Because magistrates are under constant public
scrutiny, the termination of a case will not deter public criticisms for acts which may
cast suspicion on its disposition or resolution. As what transpired in this case,
respondent's association with Napoles has unfortunately dragged the Judiciary into
the "Pork Barrel" controversy which initially involved only legislative and executive
officials. Worse, Napoles' much-flaunted "contact" in the judiciary is no less than a
Justice of the Sandiganbayan, our special court tasked with hearing graft cases. The
Court cannot, by any stretch of indulgence and compassion, consider respondent's
transgression as a simple misconduct.
 The Court finds that respondent, in not being truthful on crucial matters even before
the administrative complaint was filed against him motu proprio, is guilty of
DISHONESTY, a violation of Canon 3 (Integrity) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
 Dishonesty is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack
of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray."Dishonesty, being a
grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and with perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in government service. Indeed, dishonesty is a
malevolent act that has no place in the Judiciary.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong
GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and IMPROPRIETY, all in violations of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, for which he is hereby DISMISSED FROM
THE SERVICE, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any,

21
OCAMPO VS. ARCAYA CHUA
When a law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply
apply it; anything less than that would constitute gross ignorance of the
law. This is the rule applied in this case of a Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Lady Judge (Judge AC).
One of the cases assigned to Judge AC involves R.A. 9262 also known
as the “Anti Violence against Women and their Children Act of 2004”
particularly about the issuance of a Temporary Protective Order
(TPO). The case is between husband and wife, Al and Ana and their
daughter Rina who is in the custody of Ana.
On May 7, 2007, upon a complaint filed by Al against Ana, Judge AC
issued a TPO against Ana granting the temporary custody of Rina to
Al after considering the psychological evaluation report of the doctor,
the statements of Rina’s yaya and of Rina herself showing that Ana
was not really the ideal person to whom custody of Rina should be
awarded.
The same TPO issued against Ana also directed her to stay away from
the home and office of Al, to cease and desist from harassing,
intimidating or threatening Al and to refrain from acts or omissions
that create an unreasonable risk to the health, safety or welfare of Al.
Per the Sherriff’s return on May 8, 2007 however, the TPO was not
fully implemented insofar as the turning over of Rina’s custody to Al.
This irked Al resulting in a heated argument between him and the
Clerk of Court. Al insisted that a break open order be issued or that the
Sherriff be permitted to enter the premises of Ana to search for the
child then bring her to the court. On the same day Judge AC issued an
order authorizing the Sherriff granting Al’s demand.
The Office of the Court Administrator found that Judge AC’s speedy
issuance of the orders dated May 7 and May 8, 2007 not only showed
her unusual interest in the case but it also appeared to be tailor fitted to
suit Al’s wishes as expressed in the latter’s heated argument with the
Branch Clerk of Court. And because of reports of rampant selling of
TPOs at that time, the OCA recommended that Judge AC be
administratively charged, among others, for gross ignorance of the law
because under R.A. 9262, the TPO is issued only if the applicant is a
woman and not a man like Al. Was the OCA correct?
Yes. Under R.A. 6292, a TPO cannot be issued in favor of a man
against his wife. It is specifically applicable to “women and their
children” not to men. As a family court judge, Judge AC is expected to
know the correct implementation of said law. She should be the last
person to err in the application of R.A. 9262 by issuing a TPO in favor
of a man purportedly to protect him against his wife. Certainly such a
TPO is absurd and anomalous. Thus while the TPO may be justified
with respect to the protection accorded to their minor daughter, Rina,
the same is not legally feasible with respect to Al.
When the inefficiency in the discharge of a duty springs from a failure
to consider a rule, a law or a principle that is so basic and elementary,
a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position or
title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission can be
considered as deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of
judicial authority.
Hence Judge AC’s error in this regard is gross ignorance of the law for
which she should be punished with suspension from office for six
months without salary and other benefits (OCA vs. Arcaya-Chua,
A.M. RTJ-07-2049, consolidated with Ocampo vs. Arcaya-Chua, A.M.
OCA I.P.I. 07-2630-RTJ, 619 SCRA, 59, 69, 93).
Read more at
https://www.philstar.com/opinion/2011/02/09/655445/incompetent-or-
vicious#Q0C4jXChsqlC0iCc.99
22
Santiago III vs Enriquez, Jr.
A.M. No. CA-09-47-J February 13, 2009
Carpio Morales, J:
COMPLAINANT: Genaro Santiago III
RESPONDENT: Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.
~ Chairperson, 13th Division, Court of Appeals
FACTS:
 Santiago filed before RTC of QC a Petition for Reconstitution
of Lost/Destroyed Original Certificate of Title No. 56,
registered in the name of Pantaleon Santiago and Blas
Fajardo.
 RTC granted the petition. Rep. of the Phils. through OSG
appealed the decision of CA.
 The case was raffled to Justice Gonzales-Sision of the
appellate court’s 13th Division of which respondent was
Chairperson.
 On July 11, 2007, Justice Gonzales-Sison submitted her
Report which was used as basis for the Division’s consultation
and deliberation.
 On July 18, 2007, by letter addressed to Justice Gonzales-
Sison and Justice Veloso, respondent expressed his dissent
from the report.
 Justice Veloso who originally concurred in the report,
requested Justice Gonzales-Sison to take a second look at
the dissenting opinion as the reasons Justice Enriquez gave
are strong enough to be ignored by plain technicality.
 In view of his dissent, respondent requested the Raffle
Committee of the CA to designate 2 associate justices to
complete the composition of Special Division of five (5). Raffle
Committee designated Justice Cruz and Justice Bersamin.
 Justice Veloso and Justice Cruz concurred in the dissenting
opinion of Justice Enriquez and Justice Bersamin concurred
with Justice Gonzales-Sison’s Report.
 Respondent’s Dissenting Opinion thus became the majority
opinion of the Special Division and the Report-opinion of
Justice Gonzales-Sison became the Dissenting Opinion.
 The Decision of the Special Division reversed and set aside
the decision of RTC. Complainant then filed a motion for
reconsideration. And while said motion is pending, Santiago
filed the present complaint which is a Motion for
Disqualification and/or Inhibition pursuant to Par. 2, Sec. 1,
Rule 137. The appellate court denied the motion.
HELD:
 That Cases cited to support a Decision are not applicable, and
the appreciation of evidence and facts is erroneous, do not
necessarily warrant the filing of an administrative complaint
against a judge, unless the decision is tainted with fraud,
malice or dishonesty or with deliberate intent to cause
injustice.
 An administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy
where judicial recourse is still available unless the assailed
order or decision is tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonest.
 The failure to interpret the law or to properly appreciate the
evidence presented does not necessarily render a judge
administratively liable.
 There is no showing that the decision is tainted with fraud,
malice or dishonesty or was rendered with deliberate intent to
cause injustice. The Complaint must be dismissed.
 The Principle of JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
~ insulates judges, and even Justices of superior courts,
from being held to account criminally, civilly or
administratively for an erroneous decision rendered in
23
 good faith. To hold otherwise would render judicial office
untenable.
 This concept of judicial immunity rests upon consideration of
public policy, its purpose being to preserve the integrity and
independence of the judiciary.
 This principle is of universal application and applies to all
grades of judicial officers from the highest judge of the nation
and to the lowest officer who sits as a court.
3-D Industries, Inc vs. Roxas
A.M. No. CA-10-50-J October 5, 2010
Carpio-Morales, J.:
COMPLAINANT: 3-D Industires, Inc. and Smartnet Philippines,
Inc.
RESPONDENT: Justices Vicente Q. Roxas and Juan Q.
Enriquez, Jr.
FACTS:
 Smartnet’s representative Gilbert is the son of Francisco and
Simny Guy. The Spouses organized the Northern Islands Co.,
Inc (NICI) which is engaged in the manufacture, distribution
and sale of various appliances bearing the trademark 3D.
The spouses Guy also organized Lincoln Continental as a
holding company of 50% of the 21, 160 shares of Stock of
NICI in trust for their 3 daughters. (Geraldine, Gladys, Grace)
 Finding that their son Gilbert had been dissipating the assets
of Lincoln Continental, the spouses Guy caused the
registration of 50% of the 20, 160 shares of stock of NICI in
the names of their 3 daughters thus enabling the latter to
assume active role in the management of NICI.
 Lincoln Continental filed a complaint at the RTC of Manila
against NICI and the spouses Guy and 3 daughters for
annulment of the transfer of 50% NICI shares of stock to
Gilbert’s sister. Br. 46 restored the management of NICI to
Gilbert and issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
 NICI and the Guy Family thereafter filed a new petition for
certiorari with application for TRO-preliminary injunction but
CA’s 8th Division enjoined the implementation issued by RTC
of Manila Br. 46.
 On Nov. 2, 2004, NICI and the Guy Family filed with CA-Eight
Division and Urgent Omnibus Motion for the issuance of
Break-Open Order. The motion was granted and the Guy
Family entered the NICI premises.
 Smartnet, one of the occupants of the NICI premises filed a
complaint for forcible entry against NICI and the Guy Family.
 In the meantime, the CA-Eight Division directed the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by NICI and the
Guy Family.
 By resolution of January 24, 2005, the appellate’s court 8 th
Division issued the questioned resolution admitting the
Supplemental Petition for Certiorari alleging the continuing
forum shopping of Gilbert by continuing to use Smartnet as
alter ego and dummy to institute various case in court to gain
control of the properties of NICI.
 By Resolution of April 26, 2005, 8th Division admitted the
Second Supplemental Petition for Certiorari and restrained
the additionally impleaded respondents including Smartnet
from disturbing the writ of preliminary injunction issued but
the 8th Division.
 In the present administrative complaint, complainants allege
that in issuing the assailed Resolutions dated January 24,
24
 2005, respondent caused undue injury to them giving the
NICI and Guy Family in the new petition for Certiorari
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through
manifest impartiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence in the discharge of their judicial functions in
violation of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.
HELD:
 Since the impleading of additional parties, on motion of any
party or motu propio at any stage of the action and/or such
times as are just allowed, the Court finds that respondent’s
participation in the admission of the supplemental petitions
impleading herein complainants as respondents does not
render them administratively liable.
 While respondents may have based the assailed Resolutions
on mere allegations, this disregarding what has been
established in jurisprudence that “mere allegation that a
corporation is the alter ego of the individual stockholders is
insufficient,” this does not render them administratively liable
because not every error or mistake that a judge commits in
the performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is
shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to
do an injustice, which is not the case here.

25

OCA v YU
Office of Court Administrator v. Eliza B. Yu
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813/ A.M. N0.12-1-09-MeTC/ A.M. NO. MTJ-13-1836
(Formerly A.M. No. 11-11-115- MeTC)/ A.M. NO. MTJ-12-1815 (Formerly OCA
IPI No. 11-2401- MTJ) / OCA IPI NO. 11-2398-MTJ / OCA IPI NO. 11-2399-
MTJ/ OCA IPI NO. 11-2378-MTJ/ OCA IPI NO. 12-2456-MTJ/ A.M. NO. MTJ-
13-1821
March 14, 2017
FACTS
Eliza B. Yu's Motion for Reconsideration with Explanation for the Show Cause
Order decision promulgated on November 22, 2016 disposing against her as
follows:
The Court finds and pronounces respondent Judge Elizabeth Yu guilty of gross
insubordination; gross ignorance of the law; gross misconduct; grave abuse of
authority; oppression; and conduct unbecoming of a judicial official; and,
dismisses her from the service effective immediately, with forfeiture of all her
benefits S, except accrued leave credits, and further disqualifies her from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office or employment.
In her motion, the respondent repeatedly denies committing all the
administrative offenses for which she was held guilty, and insists on the
absence of proof to support the findings against her. She pleads that the Court
reconsiders based on the following:
1. Noncompliance with A.O. No. 19-2011 The complaint against her was
premature because of the pendency of her protest against night court duty.
A.O. No. 19-2011 did not carry a penal provision, and was only directory
because of the use of the permissive word may. In addition to A.O. No. 19-
2011 being non-compliant with the requirements of a valid administrative order,
the requirement of night court duty violated Section 5, Rule XVII which limited
the working hours for government officials and employees. There was no law
prohibiting her from writing the protest letters. At any rate, she had the right to
do so under the Freedom of Speech Clause. She did not refuse to obey A.O.
No. 19-2011
2. Refusal to honor the appointments of Ms. Mariejoy P. Lagman and Ms.
Leilani Tejero-Lopez The respondent claims that she did not refuse to honor
the appointment. She merely exercised her statutory right as a judge to
question the appointment of the branch clerk of court assigned to her sala.
Under Canon 2, Section 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary, she was mandated to bring to the proper authorities the
irregularities surrounding the appointments.. She did not also commit any act
of cruelty against Ms. Tejera-Lopez; on the contrary, it was Ms. Tejero-Lopez
who went beyond the norms of decency by her persistent application in my
court harassment. Her opposition against the appointment of Ms. Lagman was
meritorious. There was no proof of the alleged verbal threats, abuse,
misconduct or oppression committed against Ms. Tejero-Lopez. It was not
proper to penalize a judge based on a "letter with few words that other people
find objectionable."6
3. Show-cause order respondent issued against fellow judges
It was premature to rule that she thereby abused and committed misconduct
because she did not issue any ruling on the explanation by the other judges.
She did not violate Section 5, Canon 3 and Section 8, Canon 4 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.
4. Refusal to sign the leave of absence of Mr. Noel Labid The refusal to sign
the application for leave of absence had factual and legal bases. Moreover,
she should be presumed to have acted in good faith if she misconstrued the
rules on approval of application of leave.
26

5. Allowing on-the-job trainees The respondent claims that she did not order
the trainees to perform judicial tasks. She had no personal knowledge that the
trainees were made to serve as assistant court stenographers. Based on what
she heard, the trainees were only in the premises of her court for a few hours.
She reminds that she allowed the trainees to merely observe proceedings.
6. Designation of an officer-in-charge and ordering reception of evidence by a
non-lawyer The respondent denies having violated CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 06-05 when she designated an officer-in-charge. There was no
proof showing that she willfully and deliberately intended to cause public
damage. In fact, the OCA recognized Mr. Ferdinand Santos as the OIC of her
branch in several letters. There was no proof that she violated Section 9, Rule
30 of the Rules of Court. The ex parte reception of evidence by a non-lawyer
clerk of court was allowed under the Rules of Court, as well as by Section 2l(e),
Administrative Circular No. 35-2004, and Administrative Circular No. 37-93.
7. Allowing criminal proceedings to continue despite the absence of counsel
The respondent merely followed the Rules of Criminal Procedure in allowing
criminal proceedings despite absence of counsel.
8. Sending of inappropriate email messages The respondent maintains that
the e-mail messages were hearsay because the certification by the SC-MISO
was not presented to her, depriving her of the opportunity to object. Her
granting access by the MISO to her private e-mails was conditional to prove
tampering. Her Lycos e-mail account was hacked. She did not completely
waive her right to privacy. Considering that she did not authenticate said e-
mail messages, the same were inadmissible for being hearsay. The e-mail
messages with her full name written in capital letters as the sender did not
emanate from her because her Yahoo! and MSN accounts carried her name
with only the first letters being capitalized. The e-mails reproduced in the
decision were not the same messages that she had requested Judge San
Gaspar-Gito to delete. There were words that she did not write on the e-mail
messages pertaining to her demand for reimbursement of $10.00. Her writing
style was different from what appeared in the e-mail messages. She denies
having opened the "Rudela San Gaspar" account. It was wrong to penalize her
based on assumptions and speculations. She did not commit electronic libel.
Her funny and innocent comments were not actionable documents. The
certification by the SC MISO was not an authentication as to the truthfulness
of the contents of the e-mail messages and as to the identification of the sender
or author of the messages. It was wrong and unjust to impute wrongdoing to
her when there was no proof that she had sent the inappropriate messages.
The disclaimer in the e-mails were not printed in the decision; hence, the
messages were inadmissible. The presentation of the messages without her
consent as the sender was covered by the exclusionary rule. Letters and
communications in writing were guaranteed and protected by Sections.
Ruling of the Court
1. The respondent's Motion for Reconsideration is denied for lack of merit. The
submissions tendered in the respondent's Motion for Reconsideration with
Explanation for the Show Cause Order were matters that the Court had already
exhaustively considered and fully resolved in the decision of November 22,
2016.
We still hold and declare that the respondent flagrantly and blatantly violated
the Lawyer's Oath, and several canons and rules of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canon of Judicial Ethics and the New Judicial Code of
Conduct. We propose to expound on some points for greater enlightenment
on the issues and grounds taken into consideration in removing the respondent
from the Judiciary, and for purposes of providing the requisite predicate to the
ruling on the directive for her to show sufficient cause in writing why she should
not also be disbarred from the Roll of Attorneys. The respondent insists that
there was no proof to support the adverse findings of the Court.
The records involved in these cases were voluminous, because they consisted
of the affidavits and other evidence submitted by the several complainants as
well as her own pleadings and motions which constituted proof of her
administrative wrongdoings. As the per curiam decision of November 22, 2016
27
indicated, her explanations vis-a-vis the complaints often backfired against her,
and all the more incriminated her by systematically exposing her personal and
professional ineptitude and stilted logic. She was more than aware that the
quantum of evidence required in administrative proceedings like these was
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
The respondent's argument that she was deprived of the guarantee against
self-incrimination has no basis. As a judge, she was quite aware that the
constitutional guarantee only set the privilege of an individual to refuse to
answer incriminating questions that may directly or indirectly render her
criminally liable.
The respondent's correspondences were outside the scope of the
constitutional proscription against self-incrimination. She had not been
subjected to testimonial compulsion in which she could validly raise her right
against self-incrimination. Worthy to recall is that she had herself voluntarily
waived her right to be present and to confront the complainant and her
witnesses and evidence during the administrative investigation conducted by
CA Associate Justice Hakim Abdulwahid. At any rate, the respondent
alternatively pleads for compassion and mercy, and vows not to repeat the
same transgressions. In this connection, she would have the Court consider in
her favor the following mitigating circumstances pursuant to Section 48, Rule
10 of the Revised Rules
Administrative Cases in Civil Service, which provides thus:
1. Medications on allergies as analogous circumstance to an unsubstantiated
charge;
2. Good faith on each the unsubstantiated charge xxx;
3. First time offense of the unsubstantiated charge;
4. Lack of education or lack of experience on administrative matters as to
analogous circumstance the unsubstantiated charge;
5. Newness or short number in the judicial service as analogous circumstance
to the unsubstantiated charge;
6. Very different work culture from previous employment as unsubstantiated
charge;
7. Lack of prejudice to the public as analogous circumstance to the
unsubstantiated charge;
8. Remorse for not listening to the unsolicited advices of Court Administrator
Jose Midas Marquez and Assistant Court Administrator Thelma Bahia as
analogous circumstance to the unsubstantiated charge;
9. Lack of intent to commit any wrong as analogous circumstance to the
unsubstantiated charge;
I 0. Previously received awards in the performance of his duties to the
unsubstantiated charge;
I 1. Outstanding court performance as to cases disposal for year to the
unsubstantiated charge. The respondent's pleading is unworthy of sympathy.
Firstly, the respondent does not thereby present any compelling argument on
how her having medications for allergies was analogous to physical illness
under Section 48(a) of the Revised Rules of Administrative Cases in Civil
Service. Although the list of circumstances in Section 48 is not exclusive
because the provision expressly recognizes other analogous circumstances,
she cannot simply state any situation without pointing out why it would be
analogous to the listed circumstances. The Court is unable to appreciate how
her consumption of medications for allergies could generate arrogance,
insubordination, gross ignorance of laws, and offensive conduct that
manifested themselves in the periods material to the administrative complaints.
Secondly, the respondent's overall conduct negated her allegation of good
faith. Good faith implies the lack of any intention to commit a wrongdoing.
28
Based on the totality of her acts and actuations, her claims of good faith and
lack of intent to commit a wrong cannot be probable.
Furthermore, we emphatically observed and pointed out in the decision of
November 22, 2016 the following: In all, Judge Yu exhibited an unbecoming
arrogance m committing insubordination and gross misconduct. By her refusal
to adhere to and abide by A.O. No. 19-2011, she deliberately disregarded her
duty to serve as the embodiment of the law at all times. She thus held herself
above the law by refusing to be bound by the issuance of the Court as the duly
constituted authority on court procedures and the supervision of the lower
courts. To tolerate her insubordination and gross misconduct is to abet
lawlessness on her part. She deserved to be removed from the service
because she thereby revealed her unworthiness of being part of the Judiciary.
2. Disbarment is also to be imposed on the respondent.
The respondent's accountability did not end with her removal from the
Judiciary. In the decision of November 22, 2016, we declared that her
misdemeanor as a member of the Bench could also cause her expulsion from
the Legal Profession through disbarment. Consequently, we directed her to
show good and sufficient cause why her actions and actuations should not also
be considered grounds for her disbarment.
By penalizing her with the supreme penalty of dismissal from the service, she
should not anymore be allowed to remain a member of the Law Profession.
However, this rule of fusing the dismissal of a Judge with disbarment does not
in any way dispense with or set aside the respondent's right to due process.
As such, her disbarment as an offshoot of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC without
requiring her to comment on the disbarment would be violative of her right to
due process.
RULING:
Accordingly, gross misconduct, violation of the Lawyer's Oath, and willful
disobedience of any lawful order by the Court constitute grounds to disbar an
attorney. In the respondent's case, she was herein found to have committed
all of these grounds for disbarment, warranting her immediate disbarment as
a consequence. The Court deem it worthwhile to remind that the penalty of
disbarment being hereby imposed does not equate to stripping the respondent
of the source of livelihood her disbannent is intended to protect the
administration of justice by ensuring that those taking part in it as attorneys
should be competent, honorable and reliable to enable the courts and the
clients they serve to rightly repose their confidence in them.

Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and court officials who
are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the
disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer's Oath,
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics,
or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally
recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.

Rule 11.0 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing

language or behavior before the Courts. The Court does not take lightly the
ramifications of Judge Yu's misbehavior and misconduct as a judicial officer.

29
On April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court issued a decision which
dismissed a petition filed by the Malaya Lolas Organization in the
case of Vinuya vs Romulo. Atty. Herminio Harry Roque Jr., counsel
for Vinuya et al, questioned the said decision. He raised, among
others, that the ponente in said case, Justice Mariano del Castillo,
plagiarized three books when the honorable Justice “twisted the true
intents” of these books to support the assailed decision. These
books were:
a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle and Evan
Fox-Descent, Yale Journal of International Law (2009);
b. Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark
Ellis, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2006);
and
c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams,
Cambridge University Press (2005).
As such, Justice del Castillo is guilty of plagiarism, misconduct, and
at least inexcusable negligence.
Interestingly, even the three foreign authors mentioned above,
stated that their works were used inappropriately by Justice Del
Castillo and that the assailed decision is different from what their
works advocated.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is plagiarism in the case at bar.
HELD: No. Even if there is (as emphasized by the Supreme Court
in its ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Vinuya et al in
2011), the rule on plagiarism cannot be applied to judicial bodies.
No Plagiarism
According to Black’s Law Dictionary: Plagiarism is the “deliberate
and knowing presentation of another person’s original ideas or
creative expressions as one’s own.”
This cannot be the case here because as proved by evidence, in the
original drafts of the assailed decision, there was attribution to the
three authors but due to errors made by Justice del Castillo’s
researcher, the attributions were inadvertently deleted. There is
therefore no intent by Justice del Castillo to take these foreign works
as his own.
But in plagiarism, intent is immaterial.
On this note, the Supreme Court stated that in its past decisions, (i.e.
U.P Board of Regents vs CA, 313 SCRA 404), the Supreme Court
never indicated that intent is not material in plagiarism. To adopt a
strict rule in applying plagiarism in all cases leaves no room for
errors. This would be very disadvantageous in cases, like this, where
there are reasonable and logical explanations.
On the foreign authors’ claim that their works were used
inappropriately
According to the Supreme Court, the passages lifted from their
works were merely used as background facts in establishing the
state on international law at various stages of its development. The
Supreme Court went on to state that the foreign authors’ works can
support conflicting theories. The Supreme Court also stated that
since the attributions to said authors were accidentally deleted, it is
impossible to conclude that Justice del Castillo twisted the
advocacies that the works espouse.
No Misconduct
Justice del Castillo is not guilty of misconduct. The error here is in
good faith. There was no malice, fraud or corruption.
No Inexcusable Negligence
The error of Justice del Castillo’s researcher is not reflective of his
gross negligence. The researcher is a highly competent one. The
researcher earned scholarly degrees here and abroad from
reputable educational institutions. The researcher finished third in
her class and 4th in the bar examinations. Her error was merely due
to the fact that the software she used, Microsoft Word, lacked
features to apprise her that certain important portions of her drafts
are being deleted inadvertently. Such error on her part cannot be
said to be constitutive of gross negligence nor can it be said that
Justice del Castillo was grossly negligent when he assigned the
case to her. Further, assigning cases to researchers has been a long
standing practice to assist justices in drafting decisions. It must be
emphasized though that prior to assignment, the justice has already
spelled out his position to the researcher and in every sense, the
justice is in control in the writing of the draft.
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Read full text
Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno dissenting
There is such a thing as judicial plagiarism. And though judicial
plagiarism does not necessarily carry with them the imposition of
sanctions nor does it mean that a case should undergo retrial based
on it, the existence of which should be acknowledged.

31
 ATTY. MELVIN D.C. MANE v. JUDGE
MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119, 30 June 2008
An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of
knowledge of the law.
Examinations which the Court administers, taking of the
Lawyer’s oath, and signing of the Roll of Attorneys, a lawyer is
presumed to be competent to discharge his functions
and duties as, inter alia an officer of the court, irrespective of
where he obtained his law degree. For a judge to determine the
fitness or competence of a lawyer primarily on his almamater is
clearly an engagement in an argumentum ad hominem.

Petitioner Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane filed a letter-complaint to the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) charging respondent
Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen of ―demeaning, humilating, and
berating‖ him during a hearing of Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc. v.
Samue Malabanan, et al. where Mane was counsel for the
plaintiff. During the proceedings, Belen asked Mane about the
latter’s law school. When Mane answered that he came from
Manuel L. Quezon University (MLQU), Belen told him: ―Then
you’re not from UP. Then you cannot equate yourself to me
because there is a saying and I know this, not all law students
are created equal, not all law schools are created equal, not all
lawyers are created equal despite what the Supreme Being that
we all are created equal in His form and substance.‖
A judge must address the merits of the case and not the person of
the counsel. If Judge Belen felt that his integrity and dignity were
being ―assaulted,‖ he acted properly when he directed
complainant to explain why he should not be cited for contempt.
He went out of bounds, however, when he engaged on a
supercilious legal and personal discourse.
The Court reminded members of the bench that even on the face
of boorish behavior from those they deal with, they ought to
conduct themselves in a manner befitting gentlemen and high
officers of the court.

Belen further lambasted Mane and lectured him on the latter’s

person, seemingly disregarding the case at hand. Subsequently,
the OCA, upon evaluation, found that Belen’s insulting remarks
were unwarranted and inexcusable and recommended a
reprimand of Belen.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the statements and actions made by Judge Belen

during the hearing constitute conduct unbecoming of a judge and
a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct

HELD:

The Court held that an alumnus of a particular law school has no

monopoly of knowledge of the law. By hurdling the Bar

32