Jesus Falcis v. Civil Registrar (Philippine Same-Sex Marriage Case, Combined Petition and Petition in Intervention)

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18 f,i 3: 38
SUPREME COURT
MANILA
JESUS NICARDO M. FALCIS ill,
Petitioner, G.R.No. ___
- versus -
CIVIL REGISTRAR-GENERAL,
R espondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------x
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION
PE'TTflONER, through undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable

Supreme Court, most respectfully states that
PREFATORY STATEMENTS
"The Family Code provides that the consequences, and inCJdents /of
marriage} are governed by law and not subject to stipulation," but this does
not gv as far as reaching into d1e choices of intimacy inherent in human
relations. These choices form part of autonomy, protected by dJe liberty and
human dignity clauses. Human dignitv includes our choices of association,
and we are as free to associatf} and identifv as we are free not to associate or
1denti/Y. " '
- Justice Marvic Leonen
I 1' I 11 •1•
"We do not doubt that a number ofour citizens may believe that homosexual
conduct is dist.asteful, olknsive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and
express that VIew. On the other hanJ, LGBTs and their supporters, in all
hke!JJ10od, believe with equal fervor that relationships between indiVIduals of
the same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too,
are entJded to hold and expres!J t/1at VJe w. However, as far as this Cowt is
concemed, our democracv precludes using the religious or moral VJews ofone
part of the community to exclude from consideration the values of other
members ofthe /
- Justice Mariano del Castillo
I.
NATURE OF PETIDON
1. This is a Petition for CERTIORARI and PROHIBITION

under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to:
1.1 NULLIFY the portions of Articles 1 and 2, which

defines and limits marriage as between man and woman, of
Executive Order 209, othen vise known as "The Family Code of
the Philippines" (hereafter referred to as the "Family Code") for
violating Section 1 Article III and Section 3(1) Article XV of the
1987 Philippine Constitution; and
1.2 NULLIFY portions of Articles 46(4) and 55 (6),

which mentions lesbianism or homosexuality as grounds for
annulment and legal separation, of the Family Code as a
consequence of the unconstitutionality of Articles 1 and 2; and
1.3 PROHIBIT the Civil Registrar-General (hereafter

referred to as "Respondent") from enforcing the aforementioned
portions of Articles l and 2 of the Family Code in processing
applications for and in . issuing marriage licenses against
homosexual couples.
' Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.190582, April 8, 2010.
II.
. THE PARTIES
2. PETITIONER is a taxpayer, a resident of Quezon City, and a

citizen of the Republic of the Philippines. He, as an open and
homosexual, is interested in the unconstitutionality of the provisions of the
Family Code disallowing same-sex marriage. He may be served with summons
and other processes of the Honorable Supreme Court through undersigned
counsel.
3. The Respondent CIVIL REGISTRAR-GENERAL is a public

officer tasked to carry out and administer the provisions of Commonwealth
Act No. 3753, otherwise known as the "Civil Registry Law", and authorized to
give orders and instructions to the local civil registrars with reference to the
performance of their duties in processing applications for and in issuing
marriage licenses. The CIVIL REGISTRAR-GENERAL may be served with
summons at 3'd Floor, NSO-CVEA Building, East Avenue, Diliman, Quezon
City.
ill.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
4. On June 18, 1949, then President approved Republic Act No.

386, othenvise known as the "Civil Code of the Philippines" (the "Civil
Code").
5. Articles 52,3 53,' and 54:1 of the Civil Code did not define and
limit marriage as between man and woman.
' Article 52 of the New Civil Code stales: "Marriage is not a mere contract but ;m inviolable
social institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are governed by law and not
subject Lo slipulalion, except t11a! die marriage sc!Ucments may to a certain extent fix the
properly rclatiom during t11e marriage"
1
Arlicle 53 of the New Civil Code 1o marriage shall be solemnized unless all these
requisites are complied with:

(!) Legal capacity or the conlracting p;utics;
(2) T heir consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing t11c marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character"
" Article 54 of ilie New Civil Code stales: "Any male of the age of sixteen years or upwards,
and any female of the age of years or upwards, not under any of the impediments
mentioned in articles 80 lo 84'., may contract 1muTiage"
6. On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued,
under her legislative powers, Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as
the Family Code. The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
7. Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code repealed Articles 52, 53, and
54 of the Civil Code, thus ch;mging and limiting the definition of marriage as
between man and woman.
IV.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. Jurisdiction
8. Petitioner submits that Article 1 and 2 of the Family Code violate

the petitioner's constitutionally protected right to due process and equal
protection, right to decisional 1)rivacy, and right to found a family in
accordance with religious convictions.
9. Petitioner submits that th is petition is cognizable by the Supreme

Court under its power of b·aditional and expanded power of judicial review as
conferred by Section 1 Article VIII of the Constitution and under its original
jurisdiction as conferred by Section 5 (1) Article VIII of the Constitution.
B. Propriety of Rule 65
l 0. Petitioner submiL-; that using the procedural device or Rule 65 to

assail the constitutionality of a statute is proper and appropriate given the
absence of a specific remedial vehicle. This is supported by this Court's
pronouncement in the case or Magallona vs. Executive Secretary where it said:
''lf1ien this Court r:xercises its constitutional power of

judicial renew, however, we have, bv tradition. newed the wnts
of certioran· and prohibition as proper remedial veh.Jdes to test
the constitutionalitv ofsta.tutes. ,, Ii
11. This Honorable Court reiterated such rule recently in Araullo vs.
Executive Secretary stating:
• Prof. Magallona vs. Executive Sccrct;:u·y Ermita, C.R. o.1 87 167, August 16, 2011.
"With respect to the Courl, however, the remedies of certiorari
and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the
writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
j urisdiction commilted not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or
officer exercising 1i1dicial, quasi:fudicial or ministerial functions but also
to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lad or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Governm ent, even if the latter does not exercise
judicial, quasi:fudicial or ministerial functions. This application is
expressly authorized by d1e text of the second paragraph of Section 1,
supra.
Thus, petitions for certioran· and prohibition are appropnate

remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or
nullifjrthe act.s oflegislative and executive oflicials. 111
12. Justice Brion, in his Separate Opinion, further said:
"That Rule 65 of the Rules of Court has been expressly

cited, to my mind, i\· not a hii1drance to our present review as the
allegations of the pelitions and d1e rem edies sought, not tl1eir
titles, determine in the exercise of the p ower of
judicial review. 118
Petitioner respenlully submit<; that until this H onorable Court

crafts a specific remedial' vehicle under iL-; constitutional rule-making powers,
availing of Rule 65 to assail the constitutionality of statutes is proper and
appropriate.
C. Requisites of Judicial Review
14. .Petitioner submits that the requisites for this Court's exercise of
the power of judicial review exist, whether under the traditional or expanded
concept.
15. In Justice Brion's Separate Opinion in the case of Araullo vs.

Executive Secretary, he offe red a "fresh" approach to this Court's judicial
power. H e said:
"This H onor;J/J/c Court under the 1987 ConstJLudon

possesses three p o,we1:;·:
' Araullo vs. Aquino, C .R. No. 209287, J uly 1, 20 14.

' Ibid., Separale Opinion orJusticc Brion.
(J) the traditionaf.iusticiable cases involving actual disputes
and controvenies based purely on demandable and
enforceable right'i;
(2) the trad//Jonal justiciri.ble cases as understood 1i1 (1),

but additionally 1i1vo!VJi1gjuri5dictional and consatu/Jonal
1ssues;
(3) pure cons/Jtuaonal disputes attended by grave abuse of

di'>cretion in d1e process 1iJVo!ved or in their result/ s." ''
16. Petitioner submils that the instant petition falls under the third
(3'.i) classification pointed out by.Justice Brion.
17. Assuming ;ffguendo that the instant petition does not fall under
the expanded power of judicial review, Petitioner submit-; that the requisites
for judicial re'view still exists even under the traditional power of judicial
reV1ew.
i. Expanded power ofJudicial Review
18. 1 he third (3"') classification of the "fresh" approach requires two

essential requisites:
"/F/irst, they must demonstrate a prima Jacie show1i1g of

grave abuse ofdiscretion on die part ofthe govemmentiJJ body's
actions; and seconcl, they must prove that they relate to matters
oltranscendenW 1in1H>nance to dJe nation. "' 0
1. Prima facie case of Grave Abuse of Discretion
19. Prima facie evidence is defined as:
"EVJdence gpod. and su!Hcient on its /ace. Such e vidence

as, 1n the judgment of' die Jaw, is sulficient to establish a ;_p'ven
fact, or the group or ch;ui1 ol lricts constitutJng the claJm
or defense, and which 1/'not rebutted or contradicted, will remain
sufficient. Evidence wh/ch, _Ii' unexpiaJned or uncontradicted, is
sulficient to sustain a judgment 1n Javor of the issue it supports,
but which may be contradicted by odier eVJdence. " 11
' Ibid.
0
' Ibid.
" 'Na-Aeon vs. People of the Phili ppines, C.R. o . 164.575, December 6, 20()().
20. Petitioner submiL'> that a µrima facie case of grave abuse of
discretion exists in the passage of Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code.
Limiting the definition of marriage as between man and woman is, on its face,
a grave abuse of discretion because of the following facts:
20.1 The 1987 Philippine Constitution does not define

marriage solely as belween man and woman. 12
20.2 The Family Code does not require married

individuals to procreate or have t11e ability to procreate. 13 The law
allows impotency, which refers to the inability to copulate or have
sexual intercourse, as a ground for annulment" of marriage but
not sterility, which refers to the inability to procreate. Old men
and women who are sterile are allowed to marry and are not
allowed to annul their marriage on the ground of sterility.
20.3 Homosexuals ordinarily are not impotent. \Vhile

same-sex couples cannot biologically procreate together, they are
ordinarily not sterile. Even if assuming homosexuals can be
classified as a group as sterile, they are not prohibited by
Philippine law 911 ·domestic adoption15 and inter-country
adoption 16 from individually adopting children.
20.4 Heterosexuals are no better parents than

homosexuals. Stated otherlvise, homosexuals aren't necessarily
worse parents than . heterosexuals. Homosexuals can raise
children well in the same manner that heterosexuals can. \tVhile
there is no assurance that gays will not be bad or incompetent
parents, there is also no assurance t11at heterosexuals will not be
bad or incompetent parents. This Honorable Court itself has
stated that:
"Sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove

parental neglect or incompetence. " 11
20.5 Homosexu;tl men and women are ordinarily attracted

to the same-sex in the same way that heterosexual men and
women are ordinarily attracted to the opposite-sex. Gay
12
Section 2 Article XV.
" Articles 2 and 3 of the Family Code.
"Article 1t.5(5) of Lhe Family Code.
" Republic Act No. 8552 or the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.
,. Republic Act No. 8043 or the Inter Adoption Act of 1995.
11
Gualberlo vs. GualberLo Y, C.R. o. J511D94, June 28, 2005.
individuals are human beings who can love another person just
like straight individuals.
20.6 Heterosexuals who enter marriage after committing

to or to commit to a long-term monoga1nous relationship arc no
different from homosexuals, who can enter into long-term
monogamous relationships as well. Both straight and gay couples
have the same chances of' breaking up or falling out of love.
2. Transcendental Importance
21. Petitioner submits that the instant petition raises issues of

transcendental importance.
22. Lesbian ai1d gay Filipinos, who are citizens just as much as
straight Filipinos, are releg<1ted to 2""-class citizens. The United Nations
Development and the l Tnited States Agency for International
D evelopment identified the -elfocts of the unequal treatment of lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender (hereafrer referred to as "LGBT") Filipinos in our
marital laws and said:
''Without die right to many, LGBT Filipinos are treated

unequally in a whole host of way.5 in comparison to heterosexual
married couples. There remain no clear nghts for either spouse
in same-sex and transgender-heterosexual partnerships reg;u-ding
hospital and prison· 11:r;itations, making medical and burial
transfer of' .101i1t properties, custody of clnldren,
insurance benefits, and other privileges accorded to married and
unmarried opposite-sex couples. Sim1Jarly, government-mcu1aged
social security and health insur;mce are not awarded to the
sUiviving spouse ofa deceased swne-sex partner. " 18
23. Petitioner forthcr submits that homosexuals are deprived of their

right to due process and equal protection, the right to decisional and mai·ital
privacy, and the right to found a family in accordance with their religious or
irreligious convictions.
24.. 'fhe right of indivi<luals, homosexual or heterosexual, to choose

the person he or she wants to have a relationship with and consequently have
that relationship legally recognized wit·h all concomitant the rights and
obligations is a private decision for individuals to make, not the State. This
H onorable Court itself recog1lized the right to marital privacy when it said:
" UNDP, USAID (201 4). Being LGBT in Asia: The Philippin·es Country Report
Bangkok.
''Motives for entering Ji1to ;1 marriage are varied and
complex. The SCJ.te does not and cannot dictate on the Jund of
life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their
lifestyle would go into Uie realm of their right to privr2cy and
would raise serious constitutional questions. The right to m adtal
pdvacv allows married ccuples to structure their marn"ages in
almost any way they sec fit, to live together or live apart, to have
children or no ch1ldren, Lo love one another or not, and so on. 1119
25. Lastly, Petitioner suhmilc; t1·1at the instant petition raises an issue
of transcendental importance to the nation because of the millions of LGBT
Filipinos all over the country who are deprived from marrying the one they
want or the one they love. They are discouraged and stigmatized from
pursuing same-sex relationships to begin with. Those who pursue same-sex
relationships despite the stigma are deprived of the bundle of rights that flow
from a legal recognition of a couple's relationship - visitation and custody
rights, property and successional righl'i, and other privileges accorded to
opposite-sex relationships.
ii. Traditional power of Judicial Review
26. Assuming arguendo that tl1e instant petition does not invoke tl1is
Honorable Court's expanded power of'juclicial review, Petitioner submits that
the requisites for the exercise oJ' the traditional power of judicial review exist.
27. The requisites fo r the exercise of the traditional power of judicial

review are:
"J) there must he ;111 actual case or controversy calhi1;/ for

d1e exercise ofjudici;:d powe_r;
(2) the person challeng1i1g the act must have the st;wd1ng
to question the validity of d1e sul?/ect act or issuance; od1erwise
stated, he must ha.ve a personal and subst.a.ntial interest in the
case such that he has susra1i1ed, or will sustain, direct iJ?fury as a
result ofits enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionali ty must be raised at the

earliest opportunity; aI1d
09
Republic of the Philippines vs. Albios, C.R. No. 198780, October 16, 20Ia.
(4) the issue o{constitutionality must be the very ii> mota
olthe case. " 20
28. Petitioner submit'i that there is an actual case calling for the
exercise of judicial power. Citing the case of Pimentel vs. Aguirre, this
H onorable Court reiterated that:
"Vliflen an act of' the Jegi5lative department is senr;us/y

alleged to have infhnged the Constitution, settling the
controversy becomes d1e duty of' this Court. By the mere
enactment of the questJoned Jaw or the approval ol the
challenged actJon, the dispute 1:5 saJd to have ripened 1i1to a
judicial controve1:>y ei 'en 1vithout ;UJy other overt act mi
29. Petitioner submits that he has standing to question Lhe Family

Code. This Honorable Court explained that:
"The question 011 leg-;.J/ st;mrhng is whether sud1 parties

have 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure d1at concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the cowt so
largely depends for 1J/um1naaon of difficult constitu/Jonal
questJons. nm
30. Petitioner has a personal stake in the ·outcome or this case.

Petitioner is an open and homosexual. Petitioner has sustained
direct injury as a result of the prohibition against same-sex marriages.
Petitioner has grown up in a society where same-sex relationships are frowned
upon because of the law's normative impact. Petitioner's ability to find and
enter into long-term monogamous same-sex relationships is impaired because
of the absence of a leg-al incentive for gay individuals to seek such relationship.
31. Petitioner has currently no plans to settle down in any other

country except the Philippines, where he exercises his profession. The
prohibition against t11e right to marry tl1e same-sex injures Petitioner's plans to
settle down and have a companion for lite in his beloved country. A favorable
or unfavorable outcome of this case will heavily influence Petitioner's decision
Lo stay or migrate to a more LGBT friendly country.
'° 13iraogo vs. Philippine Trut11 C .R. Nos. 192935, December 7, 2010.
" La Bugal-B'Ja;m Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos, C.R. No. 127882, December l,
2004.
"'Araullo vs. Aquino, C.R. No. 209287, July l , 20 14.
32. Petitioner suhmiLs that the question of constitutionaliLy has been
raised at the earliest opportu11ity. 'This Honorable Court explained that raising
a constitutional issue at the earliest opportunity:
"fEfnt.a.Jls the 1i1Lerposit/on of the issue in the pleadings

before a competent court, such d1at, 1f the issue is not rais·ed 1i1
the plead1i1gs before d1at competent court, it cannot be
cons1dered at the and, 1fnot cons1dered in the trial, it cannot
be cons1dered on " 2"
33. Petitioner submiL'i that he has raised the issue of constitutionality

in this pleading before a competent court. Direct recourse to this Honorable
Court is justified by the transcendental importance of the issues raised and the
absence of necessity for trial to obtain facts required to decide the issues
raised.
34. Petitioner submits that the issue of constitutionality is the very !is
m ota of the instant petition. This H onorable Court explained that lis mota
means:
''that the Coult will not pass upon a question of

unconstitutionality, although properly presented, 1f the case can
be disposed olon some od1er ground, such as the applicatJ.on of
the st:a.tute or the general law. The petJtioner must be able to
show that d1e case · c,w not be legall y resol ved unless the
constitutJ'onaJ question raJsed is deLenmned. "u
35. Petitioner submits that the instant petition cannot be disposed of

on some other ground. T'here Is no other way to determine whether the
Petitioner should be prohibited from having the legal opportunity to pursue
same-sex marriage except by resolving the constitutional anchor of' Articles 1
and 2 of the Family Code.
D. ,A..pplicability of the rule on Facial Challenge
36. Petitioner suhmiL'i that the Family Code is facially invalid and
may be facially challenged. Honorable Court has said that:
"The rule 1n our jurisdictJ'on is, only statutes

on free speech, religious keedom, and other fundamental rights
may be facially dial./enged. " 2·1
" Scmmo vs. Gallant Maritime Sci Inc., C.R. o. 167614, March 24, 2009.
"CongTessman Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, C .R. No. 157584, Apri12, 20W.
" Romualdez vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 167011, December 11 , 2008.
37. In the case of Imbong vs. Ochoa, this Honorable Court
reiterated the rule in Romualclez saying:
"In this juris·d/ction, dJe application of doctrines

originating from the l!.S. has been generally maint.a.ined, albeit
with some modifications. vVhile this Gou.rt ha.s withheld the
application of facial r·hallenges to stricdy penal statues, 1t· has
expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free
5peech, but also d10se involving rdigious freedom, and other
li.mdamental nghts. ""';
38. Petitioner submits that Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code

regulates h.mdamental rights such as the right to due process and equal
protection, right to decisional ·and marital privacy, and the right to found a
family in accordance with religious convictions. Thus, Petitioner submits that
a facial challenge is proper.
:39. Petitioner s1,1bm;Ls that the violation of the right to privacy has
been recognized by this H onorable Court as a right that triggers a facial
challenge. In Ople vs. Torres, thi.- Honorable Court said:
0. No. 308 /. ../ a.nnot pass constitutional muster as an

administrative legislation because fa.ciallr it violates the nght to
pn'vacv. "v
"" Imbongvs. Executive Secreta1y Ochoa, C.R . .'o. 2048 19, April 8, 2014..
"' Opie vs. Torres, C.R. No. 12768.'i, July 23, 1998.
v.
LEGAL ARGUMENTS
A.
'T'HE FAMILY CODE, 'I r DEFINING AND LIMITING

MARRIAGE AS BET\IVEE MAN AND WOMAN, IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT DEPRIVES
PETITIONER AND OTHER HOMOSEXUALS T HE
RIGI--I'I' T'O LIBERrl 'Y \IVITHOUT SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS OF lAW;
B.
THE FAMILY CODE, IN DEFINING AND LIMIT ! TG

MARRIAGE AS BETWEEN MAN AND WOMAN , IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT DENIES
PETITIONER A. ID OTHER HOMOSEXUALS THE
EQUALPROTECTIO OFTHElAWS;
c.
THE FAMILY CODE, IN DEFINING AND LIMIT ING

MARRIAGE AS ' BETWEE r MAN AND WOMAN, IS
UNCONSTITUTIO! AL BECAUSE IT VIOLATES SEC.
3(1) ART. XV OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION.
VI.
DISCUSSION
A. THE FAMILY CODE, IN

DEFINING AND LIMITING
MARRIAGE AS BETWEE1 A MA.
A D A WOMAN, IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECA USE
IT DEPRIVES PET!TIONAJ? AND
OTI-fER HOMOSA"Xf!ALS THE
RIGHT TO UBERTY WITHOUT
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS OF
!A vr;:
40. Petitioner that applying the strict scrutiny test, Articles 1

and 2 of the Family Code is unconstitutional because there is no rational
nexus between the means of limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples and the
compelling state interest of protecting marriage as the foundation of the
family.
41. Petitioner submits the strict scrutiny test is appropriate. 'T'his

Honorable Court explained in Lhe case orvVhite Light Corporation vs. City of
Manila:
"Jn tenns ofjudicia/ review o/'statutes qr strict

scrutJny refers to the sLaJJdard for detenmning the quality ;wd the
amount ofgovernmental 1i1terest brought to justifj the regu!atJon
of funda:nenta! freedoms. Stn"ct scrutinv is used todav to test the
vahditv oflaws dealing with the regulation ofspeech, or
race as well as othe'r fundaIIJentaJ rights as expansion from its
earlier applicatJons to equal protectJon. " 28
42. Articles l and 2 of the Family Code regulate the right to

decisional privacy, the right to marital privacy, and the right to found a family
in accordance with religious convictions. Petitioner avers that such rights are
fundamental rights.
43. Preliminarily, Petitioner avers that the presumption of

constitutionality is reversed in cases where the strict scrutiny is applied. This
Honorable Court has stated that:
"' While Lighl Corporation vs. CiLy o r I:mila, G.R No. 122846,January 20, 2009.
"The apphca/Jon of the stn'ct scrotinv analvsis to
petitJoners' daims lbr provi51on;J/ relief warrants the inevit;1ble
conclus1on that the tn"rd court cannot deny provisional relie f to
the party alleging a prima lane case alleging government
infringement on the to Hee expression without hearing Ii-om
the infiinger the cause why its actions should be sust;11ned
provisionally. Such acts of infringement are presump/J.velv
uncons/Jtutional, thus Lhe trial court cannot deny provisional
relief outright since to do so would lead to the sustena'on of a
presumpa'vely unconstJtutional act. It would be necesswyfor the
infringer to appear in court and somehow rebut against the
presumption ofunconstJtu/Jonalitv for the trial court to deny the
1i1junctive relief sought for 1n cases where there is a pnina
lac1e case esta.blish1i1g Lhe infringement of the right to kee
H 'l'J
44. Proceeding to the application, for a statute to pass the strict

scrutiny test under substantive clue process, this Honorable Court explained
in the case of City of Manila vs. Laguio, .Jr. that:
''/l/f it is ;w art>;1 whe1e strict scrutiny is used, such as for

protectJi1g fundamen tal nghts, d1en the gvvemment wi.U meet
substmtive due process only if 1t can prove that the law is
,1ecesswy to achieve a compeUinggovemment purpose. ,, 30
45. Petitioner submit" that the compelling state interest is the

protection of marriage as the fo undation of the family as provided by Section
2, Article XV of the ComtiLuLio n."' The presence of a state interest is
complied with if it is laid down by the Constitution itself. This Honorable
Court, speaking through .T ustice Cruz, in the case of Association of Small
Landowner!' vs. Secretary of' Agrarian Reform explained:
''.As the suqject and purpose ofagrarian reform have /Jeen

laid down by d1e ConstJi:uuon itself,' we may say that die /jrst
requirement has been satisfied. vVhat remains to be examii1ed is
the validity ofthe m edwd employed to achieve the constitutional
goal. ,m
"Newsounds Broadcasling N elwork Inc. vs. Dy, C.R. No. 170270 & 179411, April 2,
"' City of' M<mila vs. Laguio,Jr., C.R. No. 1181 27, April 12, 2005.
" Seel.ion 2, Article XV slates: "Marriage, as <Ul inviolable social inslitulion, is the
l'oundalion 01' 1.he fmnily and shall be prolcclecl b y Lhc State."
" Association of' Small Landowners vs. Secrelary of Agrarian Reform, C.R. No. 78742, July
14, 1989.
46. Even though a compelling state interest exists, Petitioner submits
that the provisions of t:he Family Code limiting marriage as between a man
and a woman is not necessary to achieve such interest. To emphasize, the
state interest is the protection of marriage as the foundation of the family and
no t the protection of heterosexual relationships per se.
47. What is a family? According to Black's Law Dictionary, a family

is a collective body of persons who live in one house and under one head or
management. 33 Merriam \tVehster defines family as a group of people who are
related to each other. :u
48. Petitioner emphalically avers that homosexuals are people or

persons like heterosexuals who can be a part of a family and contribute to that
family. Homosexuals are born out of a family and grow up in a family.
Homosexuals can leave their family and found their own family. Same-sex
couples who live in one house constitute a family. Same-sex couples can
formally adopt children as individuals under Philippine law or informally
adopt children jointly, either or which is a family according to the definition of
Black's Law Dictionary.
49. Aside from tl1e ability to fo und and constitute a fan1ily, Petitioner
submits that homosexuals jusl like heterosexuals can fulfill the essential
marital obligations laid 'do\\;n by the Family Code, as identified by this
H onorable Court in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals85 , namely:
49.1 The obligation t.o live together, observe mutual love,

respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. 86
49.2 The obligation to fix the family domicile. 37
49.3 The obligation to support the family and pay the

expenses for such supp<)1t and other conjugal obligations.38
49.4 The obligations in regard to parents and their

children as stated in Articles 220, 221, and 225 of the Family
Code. ·
·" Black's Law Dictionary 2"' l·:dition Online, http:// thelawdjctionan1.ord family/, last
accessed on May 18, 2015.
" Merriam-\Vebsler Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionarvlfamily, last
accessed on May 18, 20 15.
"' Republic vs. Courl of Appeals and C.R. o. 108763, February 13, l
"" ArLicle 68 of the Family Code.
" ArLicle 69 of the Family Code.
" Article 70 of the Family Code.
50. Petiti.oner subm its that homosexuals can fulfill the essential
marital obligations regardless whether it is as between the spouses or as
between the pa.rents and their children.
51. To reiterate, as aforementioned, the Family Corle does not

require married individuals to p1 ocreate or have the ability to procreate.
There is no legal requirement in any Philippine law for married couples to
have children before ent,ering marriage or during its subsistence.
52. Petitioner is aware that this Honorable Court has stated that
procreation is one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code
in the case of Chi Ming T soi vs. Court of' Appeals, where it stated:
"Endendy, one of the essential mantal obligations under

the Fam1ly Code '/t/o procreate children based on the
universal principle d1at p rocreation of children through sexual
cooperation is d1e basic end ofmaniage. "139
53. Petitioner respect.fully submits that such declaration of this

Honorable Court is without legal basis and is obiter dictum. No such
obligation can be found in the Family Code or in any Philippine law.
54. Assuming a.rguendo that married couples are required, Petitioner

respectfully points out, as aforementioned, that homosexuals are not
prohibiLed by Philippine law on domestic adoption'° and inter-country
adoption4 1 from adopting children.
55. Also, again, heterosexuals are no better parents than

homosexuals. Stated otherwise, homosexuals aren't necessarily worse parents
than heterosexuals. Homosexuals can rnise children well in the same manner
that heterosexuals can. While there is no assurance that gays will not be bad
or incompetent parents, there is also no assurance that heterosexuals will not
be bad or incompetent p;u·enLs. his H o norable Court itself has stated that:
''Sexual preference or m oral laxity 'alone does n ot prove

parental neglect or 1i1competence. " n
"' Chi Ming T soi vs. Courl of Appeals, G.R. o. 11 9190, January 16, 1997.
"' Republic Acl No . 8552 or t11c Domcslic Adoption Act of 1998.
" Republic Act No. 8043 or the Inter Adoption Acl of 1995.
"Gualbcrlo vs. Gualberlo V, G.R lo. 154994,June 28, 2005.
56. Thus, Petitioner submits that homosexuals and same-sex couples
DO NOT and CANNOT HARM the institution of marriage. In fact,
homosexuals and sam\ -sex. couples can serve to f01ward the State's
compelling interest in protecting and strengthening the family as a basic
autonomo us social institution. "' Consequently, there is NO NECESSITY to
limit marriage as between a man and a woman to protect and strengthen the
family. There is actually a necessity to allow same-sex marriage.
57. There being no. necessity lo limit marriage to o pposite-sex

couples, there is no rational nexus or relation of the means of limiting
marriage as between a man and a woman to the compelling stale interest of
protecting marriage as the foundation o r the family. Thus, Articles 1 and 2 of
the Family Code are UNCONSTITUTIONAL for depriving Petitioner of his
right to liberty without substantive due process of law.
B. T'HE FAMILY CODE, IN

DEFI ING AND UMITI TC
MARIUAGE AS B).\T\VEGN M A
Al D WOMAN, IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BJ;,CA l f.)E
I T DENIES PE17TfO,\'ER AND
OTI-fER HOMOS.t,"'X[iAl.S, THE
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE
LAW);
58. Petitioner submits that applying the strict scrutiny test, Articles 1
and 2 of the Family Code are unconstitutional because the classification of
same-sex and opposite-sex couples is not necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest of protecting marriage as the foundation of the family.
59. Alternatively, assuming that the rational basis test is applicable,

Petitioner submits that Articles I and 2 of the Family Code a.re still
unconstitutional because the re is no substantial distinction between same-sex
and o pposite-sex couples and the classification is not applied eq ually to all
members of the same class.
i. Strict scrutiny test
GO. Petitioner submits the sb·ict scrutiny test is appropriate. T his

H onorable Court explained in Lhe case of Light Corporation vs. City of
Manila:
" Section 12, Article II st.ales: ,''The Stale recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
prol.ecl ;md strengthen I.he family as ;1 basic aulonomous social institution."
"Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a
valid classification. and its policies should be accorded
recognition and respect by the courts ofjustice except when diey
run afoul of die Constitution. The deference stops where the
classification violates a fundamental right, or preiudices persons
accorded special protection bv the Constitution. Vfiflen these
violations arise, thi'i Court must discharge its primary role as the
vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and
more exacting adhercnf'e to constitulional limitatJons. Rational
basis should not suflice. " 11
61. Classifying legally capacilated and consenting adults into same-

sex and opposite-sex couples violate decisional and marital privacy. The
decision who to marry is a fundamental right, thus strict scrutiny test is
appropriate.
62. Furthermore. sb·ict scrutiny is appropriate when the classification

is considered suspect. This H onorable Court explained in the case of Serrano
vs. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.:
"171e Court has 1i1 a way f(;und the strict scrudny stand;ud,
an American constJtutional construct, useful in determimil/J" the
constitutionality of diat tend to target a class of thing:'i or
persons. According· to du:> st;mdard, a legislative classification
that impermissibly 1i1lederes w1d1 the exercise of' fundam ental
right or operates to die peculiar class disadvant;Jge of a suspect
class is presumed unconsbtutional. The burden is on die
government to prove tJ1at d1e class1/jcalion is necessaiy to aclueve
a compelling sta.Le 1i1tcrest and that 1t is the least restrictive means
to protect such 1ntere.st. "1.1
63. Petitioner submits that classifying . individuals by sexual

orientation and gender, so to rlistinguish between same-sex and opposite-
sex couples, is a suspect classilication.
64. Former Chier .T ustice Reyinto Puno imported into Philippine

jurisprudence the factors that the United States Supreme Court takes into
account in assessing whether or not a classification is suspect. In the case of
Ang Ladlad vs. COMELEC, former Chief Justice Puno explained in his
Separate Concurring Opinion:
" Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs. Bcu1gko Sentral ng Pilipin<ts, G.R. No.
148208, December 15, 2004. ·
"Scrrrmo vs. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., C.R. No. 1676 14, March 24., 2009.
''Instead ofadopai1g a rigid !Ormula to determine whether
cert.ain legislative clas.Hfications warrant more demanding
constitutional the United St.ates Supreme Court has
looked to four thw:
(I) The histor;' of'irmdious discrimination against the class

burdened by the legic;lation;
(2) Whed1er U1e characteristics that distinguish die class

indic<.:te a typical class member's ab1lity to contribute to
society;
(3)Whether d1e dic;angui5h1i1g characteristic is 'immutable'

or beyond d1e class memben' control,· and
(4)The political power ofthe sul{ject. class." 46
65. Former Chief Justice Puno, looking into the four factors, found
that state action singling out homosexuals or homosexuality warrant a
heightened judicial scrutir.y. Looking into the first factor, he finds:
"The first consideration is whether homosexuals have

sufkred a history of purposeful unequal treatment because of
their sexual orienration. One cannot, 1n good faith, dispute that
ffelY and lesbian penons hist.oncally have been, and conaiwe to
be, the t.arget of J.> ur1msefu l and pernicious discrim1nation due
solely lo the1i· sexual onentatJon. Paragraphs 6 and 7 ol Ang
Ladlad's Peation for Regislra.aon for party-list accreditaaon Ji1
fact state: ·
6. There have heen documented cases of discnininatJon

and VJolence perpetuated a;punst the LGBT Community,
;unong which are:
(a) J;,/fennnate or gay youths being beaten up by

their parent'i and/or guardians to make them
confonn Lo standard gender norms of
(b) FatheH and/or guardians who allow their

daughten; 1vho are butch lesbians to be raped/, so
as/ to "cure "dJem 1nlo becoming straight women;
"' Ang Ladlad LGBT Parly vs. Colllmission on Separate Concurring O pinion of
Chier.Justice Puno, C.R. Ajiril 8, 20 10.
(c) Eflenni1ate and butch lesbians a.re kicked
out of school, and choirs because at U1eir
identity;
(d) Ailenni1r1te youths and m asculine young women

a.re refused admission from (sic) certain are
suspended or are rwtomatically put on probation;
(e) D em;d prom otions, IIainings and other

work lx:ne/jtc; once one's sexual orienta.t1(>n and
gemJer is (51() revealed;
(!} Consensual partneHhips or relatiomhips hy gays

and les/Jians 1,vho a1e already of age, are broken up
by dJeir parents or guardians using the /A/nD._
ludnapping IL/aw; ·
(g) Pray-overs, exorcism s, a.nd other religious cures

are p edr>1med on gay.'i and lesbians to ''reH>rm"
them;
(h) Youn// g-r1y.c,· and lesbians are forCJbly sul{/ected

to psychiatric counseling and therapy to cure
them/,/ de:,pite d1e de-lisDng (sic) of h om osexuality
an d lesh1;mi'im as a mental disorder hy the
American P.c,ychiaDfr: Association;
(J) T1-rmsgenders, or individuals who were horn

mall buL 1vho se/ as wom en and d1ess as
such, a1e denied entry or ·serVJces in certain
restwrant..- and est1b/ir;hments; and
(J) Sevend murders from the years 2003-3006 were

committed ag21nst gay m en, but we1e not
adwo1vler./,t;ed by police as hate crimes or violent
acts o/higouy.
7. Jn U1e recc11/ \lfay 2009 US asylum case of' Plnlip

B elarmino, he dwL as a young gay person 1i1 the
Ph1Jip p1nes, he IVrts sul{/ected to a variety of sexual abuse
and vi'olence, including repe<1ted rapes/,/ which he could
not report to /d1e/ police /or speak ofl to his own parents
According/v. this historr of discrimination suggests that
anvlegislative burden pl:iced on lesbian and ga.vpeople as a class
is "more li.kelv than. others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather
than legislative rationality m pursuit of some legitimate
obiective. "" 11
66. Moving into the second facto r, former Chief Justice Puno finds
that homosexuality is not related or relevant to a person's ability to contribute
Lo society.
''.it second relevant cons1deration is whether the character-

in-issue is related to the person -S abihi:v to contnbute to society.
Heightened scrutiny is· applied when the classification beaH no
relationsh1jJ to d1is ahihiy,· dJe e,n:•;tence of this factor Ii1dicates
the c/r15sJ/ication i5 likely based on irrelevant stereotypes and
prejudice. Insofar as sexual orientition is concerned, it 1:'i gainful
Lo repair to Kerrigan v. Commim'oner ofPublic Healdi, viz.:
The dek11dants also concede that sexual orientation

bears no relation to a persons ability to participate 1n or
contnbute to society, a fact that many courts· have
·as well. x xx Ifhomosexuals were aflheted
with some sort of imped1inent to their ability to pedorm
and lo contnbute lo society, die entire phenomenon of'
'sraying in die /c/loset' and of 'coming out' would not exist;
their imped1inent ;,wJUld betray their status. x x x Jn this
critical re.spec{, ;.;ay pe1:sDns stand 1ii swk contrast to od1er
groups d1at kll'e been demed suspect or
class recogmtion, &·spite a history of discnimi1a/Jon,
because die characteristics of those gmups
adversely ;dfcct the1i· a/JJ/1Ly or capacity to perform certaJi1
functions or to dis·charge ceJte:un responsibilities In soCJety.
Unlike the charactenstics unique to those groups,

however, "homosexuality bears no relation at all to [an/
individual's ability to contn'bute fuDr to societv. * Indeed,
because an homosexual orienldtion 'fo1plies
no Iinpmiment 1i1 judgment, sldbility, reliab1Jity or general
social or vocatJ'onal the observa/Jon of' the
United St;Ltes Supreme Court that race, aliena.ge and
national onjpi1 -all suspect classes entJded to the highest
level ol cons/Jtut1'onal protectJon- "are so seldom relevm1t
to du:: ac/11evement ofany legi'llinate state interest d1at laws
grounded 1n such cons1dera/Jons are deemed to reflect
" Ibid.
pre;judice and ;mtljJathy" 1s no less applicable to ga.y
persons. (italics supplied)
Clearly, homosexual orientaa'on is no more relevant

to a. person's :1h!lity to perform and contribute to society
than is heLerosexual onentatlon. JJ<lll
67. Going further into the third factor, former Chief J ustice P uno
finds that ho mosexuality is s<'> central to the identity of gays and lesbians that
to penalize persons for it would be ahhorrent.
''.A third factor that courts have considered in detennining

whether the members of a class are entided to heightened
protection for equal protection purposes is whether the attribute
or chara.ctenstic that distingwshes them is immutable or
otheIWJse bevond theiJ: control Of' course, the characteristic that
di>tin;;uishes /:PLY permns !Tom others and qualifies them for
recognition as a disl1i1cl and diffrete group 1s the characteristic
that historically has resulted 1i1 d1eir social and legal ostl-aci5m,
namely, d1eir attiacti()JJ to persons ofthe same sex.
ImmutabJ!ity is· a factor 1'n determining the appropriate

level of scrutiny because d7e 1i1abJ/ity of a person to change a
characteristic d1at is· used tojustifj1 different treatment makes the
discnininatlon v1olati·1 ·e of d1e rad1er "'basic concept or our
system that legal burdens should bear some relat1onsl11jJ to
1i1dividuaf respomibI!1!y. '" H oweve1; d1e constitutional relevance
of d1e immutability hLclor is not reserved to those instances In
which the trait dehiiing the burdened class is absolutely
1inpossible to change. That is, the 1inmutab1lity prong or the
suspectness 1i1quiry surely 1:s· sati:s'fied when the identifying ti-;ut is
"so central to a peHon '.s· 1den/Jly d1at it would be abhorrent for
government to penali?.e a pe1:5011 for refusing to change fit/. "
PresC1i1d1i1g liVJn d1ese premises, it is not appropnate to

require a person to repudiate or change his or her sexual
on'entation in order to avo:d dl'scnininatorytreatrnent, because a
person's sexual on'entadon is so integral an aspect of one's
identity. Consequently, because sexual orientation "may be
altered fif' at all/ only al the expense ofsignificant damage to the
1i1diVIdual's sense of sdf," dass1fica/Jons based thereon "a.re no
less entitled to consideraaon as a suspect or class
dJan any other group d7at ha.s been deemed to exhibit an
1inmutable "Stated d1flere11dy, sexual orientation is
'" Ibid.
not the type of' human /Jwt diat allows courts to relax their
standard of review hecause die barrier is tempora1y or
susceptJb1e
l to se11-
f ''j 1e; p' . '" ·"
68. Finally, looking into the fo urth factor, former Chief.I ustice Puno
lincls that lesbians and gays are a and insular minority.
"The final factor that bears consideration is whether the

m.J2 is 'a minoritv or politicaUv powerless.• the
p olitical powerlessness filctor of d1e level-of-scrutiny inqwiy does
not require a sho WJiig- of'a bsolute political powerlessness. Rather,
d1e touchstone of'd1e analysis should be "whether the group Jacks
sufficient political stJ-ength to hnng a prompt end to the pre;/udice
;111d discnimnatJ'on d1rough traditJ'onal political means. "
Apply1ng this· st;wdard, 1L would not be dlflicult to

conclude that gay persons are entitled to heightened
constJtutJonal procecLion despite som e recent political progress.
The discnimnatJ'on thaL they have suffered has been so p en 'l1sive
and severe - even d10ugh d1e1i· sexual orient.a/Jon has n o bearing
at all on their ability to contribute to or peJfonn in society - that
1( is hi!fhly unlikely d1at enactments alone WJ/l suffice to
ehininate that discTJimnation. Furthermore, insofar as the LGBT
community plavs a role in the political process. it is apparent that
their numbers reflect their status as a smaU and insular minontv. "
.I()
69. Former Puno concludes that state action classif)1ing

ho1nosexuals or individuals on the basis of sexual orientation is a quasi-
suspect classification that requi res intermediate review.
"Gwded by d1is· !i-a1;1ework, and cons1denng- furth er that

classilicafJons based on sex or gender - albeit on a male/ Iemale,
man/woman basis - have been pre viously held to Digger
heighten ed scrutJny, 1 respectfully submit that classificatJ'on on
the basis of sexual onent.afJ'on u:e.. homosexualitv and/or
bisexualitvJ is a quasi-suspect classification that prompts
intennediate review. "·"
70. Petitioner respectfully disagrees with the former Chief Justice's

conclusion. Petitioner respec'Lf'ully submits to this Honorable Court that based
on th e four factors in assessing classifications, the appropriate conclusion is
"' Iii id.

'° Ibid.
" Ibid.
that classifications on the basis of .'>exual orientation is a suspect classification
that requires strict scrutiny.
71. Classifications on the basis of sexual orientation ;u-e suspect

because it is almost always arbitrary and unreawnable. There is nothing in
one's sexual orientation Lhat would be relevant to a person's ability to
contribute to society. Sexu;1l orientation by itself is not debilitating to a
person's ability to function.
72. Sexual orientation is an immutable trait. The Separate

Concurring Opinion of former Chief .T ustice Puno implies that sexuality can
be changed or altered, only tfott it is abhorrent to penalize persons for refusing
to change it because it is cen.tral to a person's identity. Petitioner emphatically
avers that sexuality is wholly, totally, and absolutely immutable. Homosexual
individuals cannot change or choose who they are sexually attracted to.
Lesbians and gays cannot choose to be straight in the same way that
heterosexuals or straight individuals cannot choose to be gay.
73. Sexuality as a choice or preference is an illusion. While any

individual can choose to have sex with cu1y individual of the same or opposite
sex, they cannot choose who they have feelings of sexual attraction with, such
as bulterflies in the stomach or erotic arousal. If a gay person is sexually
attTacted to a woman and ends up having sex with a woman, he is better called
a bisexual rather than as having "chosen to change sexuality".
74. T'hus, classifications on the basis of sexual orientation are suspect

because such classifications cu·e often meaningless and ultimately unfair.
75. In summary, Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code trigger a strict

judicial scrutiny because it violates the fundamental rights to decisional and
marital privacy and because it created a suspect classification.
76. Applying the strict scrutiny test, Petitioner submits that Articles 1
;me! 2 of the Family Code are. unconstitutional because the classiticalion is not
necesscu)' to achieve a compelliug state interest.
77. As aforementioned in the l" legal argument regarding the Due

Process Clause, and same-sex couples DO NOT and
CANNOT HARM the institution of marriage and the Stat.e's compelling
interest in protecting marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, Articles
1 and 2 of the Family Code fail to pass the strict scrutiny test
ii. Rational basis test
78. Assuming argu endo that strict scrutiny test is not applicable,
Petitioner submits that Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code are still
unconstitutional because there is no substantial distinction between same-sex
and opposite-sex couples and the classification is not applied equally to all
members of the same class or individuals who cannot procreate.
79. Under: the rational basis test, a classification to be valid and

constitutional must pass four .standards. Citing the case of People vs. Cayat,
a
this Honorable Court has consistently required that classification:
"(J) must rest 011 substantial distinctions;

(2) must be germane to the purposes ofthe law;
(3) must not be limited to exi5ting conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all m embers ofthe same class. 'm
80. Petitioner submiLc; that Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code fail
the l " and 4.'i. requisites.
81. The classification of same-sex couples as a group that is denied

marriage and of opposite-sex couples as a group that is allowed marriage does
not rest on substantial distinctions. Gay couples can do everything that
opposite-sex couples ca1 1do ·as required by the Family Code. Gay couples can
live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual
help and support. 53 Gay couples can fix tl1e family domicile. 54 Gay couples can
support the family and pay the expenses for such support and other conjugal
obligations.55
82. Assuming arguendo that same-sex couples are denied marriage

because of their inability to procreate, the classification is not applied equally
to all members of the same class. While all same-sex couples might not be
able to naturally procreate, a portion of opposite-sex couples who are in tl1eir
old age are sterile and cannot procreate as well. However, the law allows
sterile opposite-sex couples to marry.
83. There being no rational basis in classifying same-sex couples as a

group to protect marriage as the foundati on of the family, Articles 1 and 2 of
the Family Code are UNCONSTITUTIONAL for denying Petitioner of the
equal protection of the laws.
·" Biraogo vs. Philippine T ruth Commission , C.R. No. 192935, December 7, 20 10.
"' Article 68 of the Family Code.
·" Arlicle (i9 of the Family Code.
" Arlicle 70 of the Family Code.
C. THE FAMILY CODE, IN
DEFINING AND LIMITING
MARRIAGE AS BETWEEN MAN
AND WO.MAN, IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE
IT VIOi.ATES SEC 30 ) A RT. XV OF
THE 1.987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION
84. Petitioner subm ils that Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code a.re
contrary to Section 3(1) Article XV of the Constitution because it prohibits
same-sex couples from founding a family through the vehicle of marriage in
accordance with their religious convictions.
85. This H onorable Court has recognized Sec. 3(1) Art XV of the
Constitution as a source of rights specifically the right to marital privacy and
autonomy. In the case of Im bong vs. Ochoa, this Court said:
"Petitioner CFC assails the RH La.w because Section 23(a)

(2) (j) thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution bv
inauding into manta.J pn'vacv and autonomr. It argues that it
cultivates disunity and fostc'H ;iminosity in the family rather than
promote its solidarity and to_t.;u development.
The Comt cannot but agree.
The 1987 Consdtution i5 replete with prov1s1011s

st.rengd1ening the fam1IJ·;is 1/: i5 d1e IN1sic social institution. In fact,
one article, Article X V, i•; devoted entirely to the
86. Petitioner avers that individuals belonging to religious

denominations that believe in same-sex marriage exist and are denied of the
right to fo und a family in accordance with their religious convictions. Gay
Christian Filipinos belonging to LGBTS Christian Church Inc.57 or
Metropolitan Community Churchs" believe in same-sex marriage .
.. Irnbong vs. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014.
·" LCBTS CHRISTIAN CHURCH INC, accessed on May 18, 2015,
'"' f,GBT Holy Union / - Jllfc1ropohi;1n Commumiy Church, accessed on May

18, 20 15, hup://mccmb.webs.corn/ lghlholyunionweddings.htm
87. Same-sex weddings have been held by members· belonging to
such Christian denominatiom from Baguio City59 to Quezon City. 60 Such
religious weddings have been denied recognition under civil law unlike the
religious convictions of Catholics61 and Muslims.62
88. Thus, Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code are

UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violating Section 3(1) Article XV of the
Constitution.
"' " I 0 couples exchange vows in Baguio's lirsl smne-sex wedding," The P/11/ipp1i1c St;u-,
accessed May 18, 2015, htt])://mvw.philslar.com/headlines/699582/10-couplcs-exch;mge-
vo1vs-baguios-first-same-sex-wedcli11g.
'° "Protest.;mt church performs same-sex weddings in PHL," GMA News Onlii1c, accessed
on Ma}1, 18 2015, http://www.gm;melwork.com/news/stoiy/224555/news/nalion/proleslantc
church-nerfonns-same-sex-weddings-in-phl
., Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code of t11c Philippines.
"'Chapter Two Marriage (NIK.AH), Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
RELIEF
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, Petitioner respectfully
request<; that the H onorable Ccfurt grant the Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition and decl<tre Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code as
unconstitutional and, as a consequence, nullify Articles 46(4) and 55(6) of the
Family Code.
Other just or equitahle relief·s under the premises arc likewise

requested for.
Q uezon City for the City of Manila, May 18, 2015.
Counsel for Petition

Roll of Attorneys No. 6479:1
MCLE Exemption No. - NI A
IBP Lifetime Member No. 0 13716
PTR No. 1324088
47-E Scout Rallos St., Brgy. Laging

Hand a, Quezon City 1103
Metro Manila
Pho ne: (+632) 738-2137
Email: jesusfalcis@yahoo.com
COPY FURNISHED:
CIVIL REGISTRAR-GENERAL
Public Respondent
3'.i Floor, NSO-CVEA Building
East Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City
VERIFICATION
AND
CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING
1, JES US NICARDO M. FALCIS Ill, of legal age, Filipino, after

having been duly sworn in accordance with law, hereby depose and state that:
l. I am the petitioner in the instant case entitled Nicardo M

Fa/cis III vs. Gnl Regist.rar-Ct:neral" that was filed before this Honorable
Court.
2. I caused the preparalion of the foregoing Petition for Cert.iordI'i and

Prohibition.
3. I have read the said pk:<lding and hereby aver that the allegations
therein are true and correct of my personal knowledge or based on authentic
records.
4. I have not commenced any other action or filed any claim involving
the same issues in any court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best
of my knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein.
5. If I should hereafter learn that the same or a similar action or claim

has been filed or is pending before t11e Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or
any other tribunal or agency, I shall report such fact within live (5) days
therefrom to this Honorable Court.
IN WITNESS W,HEREOF, I have hereunto set our hand Lhis J8.'!1iay

of May 2015 in QUEZON CITY, Philippines.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this J{!'day of May

2015 at QUEZON CITY, afliant exhibiting his/ her competent evidence of
identity, to wit:
Name Identification Card Valid until

Jes us .Jicardo M. Falcis III /'BP ,eJ.i# 11r,
Doc. No.
Page No.I:
2.,t/-
Serles of 20,JL
tt:;Jz
Noldry Pubhc for ezon City. Until Dec. 31. 2015
Adm Molter NP· (2014·2015) / RoUNo. 31559
O.R No. 055Msn "r
VERIFIE'D DECLARATION
I, JESUS NICARDO M. FALCIS III, of legal age, Filipino, after

having been duly sworn in accordance with l"-w, hereby declare that the
docurnent/s (and annexes thereof) hereto submitted electronically in
acconlance with the Efficienl Use of Paper Rule is/are complelc and true
copy/ ies of the document/s (and annexes) filed with the Supreme Court.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this of May

2015 at QUEZON CITY, alfianl exhibiting his/her competent evidence of
identit:y, to wit:

.Tes us Nicardo M. Falcis III /BF'
Doc. No. 25'

ATIY. OMEO . RUZ
PageNo. i Notary PubHc for zon City. nril Dec 3t. 7.0t5
Book No. Adm. Matter NP- (2014·2015) I RoU No 31559
Serles of 20 l'TR 0 R No 0558856. t·5·2015. O.C
IBP 0 R. No S75559. 11-19-14. O.C
122 Alum111. Ctr. UP Oil.. Tel No. 3523587
MCLE Compliance No. V-OOOt 16. Issued on 11-20-13
:";.'•.t'•··
.
•\
,, . ' .
i'.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SUPREME COURT
MANILA
JESUS NICARDO M. FALCIS III,
Petitioner,
- versus - G.R. No. 217910

For: Certiorari and Prohibition
CML REGISTRAR-GENERAL,
Re.spondent,
LGBTS CHRISTIAN CHURCH INC.,

REVEREND CRESCENCIO "CEEJAY"
AGBAYANI JR., MARLON FELIPE,
and MARIA ARLYN "SUGAR" IBANEz
Petitioners-In-Inte111entio11. w
onsJEIY rr='""'·-,-s. .
. ..
x-------------------------------------------------------x .. ,·. l. . .,
- . .-ll .. 1r.oo"J:. . . . "..JE
PETITION-IN-INTERVENTION
INTERVENORS, through undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable

Supreme Court, most respectfully state that:
PREFATORY STATEMENT
" ... {Jjfgvve111111ent based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tac1dy approve
· or endorse d1at beliefand thereby also tac1dy disapprove contrdJY religious or non-
re/jgious wews d1at would not suppo1t the po.bey. As a result, gvven11nent w1!/ not
provide mil religious keedo1n for all its citizens, or even make 1f- appear dmt d1ose
whose be.befs are d1:s-app1vved are second-class citizens. " 1
ChiefJustice Puno
'Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August4, 2003.
Petition-In-Intervention Page 1 of 21
I.
NATURE OF PETITION
1. This is a Petition-for-Certiorari-in-Intervention under Rule ()!) in

relation to Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to:
1.1 DECLARE the portions of Articles 1 and 2, which

defines and limit-; marriage as between man and woman, of
Executive Order 209, othe1wise known as "The Family Code of
the Philippines" (hereinafter referred to as the "Family Code")
for violating Section 1 Article III, Section 5 Article III, and
Section 3(1) Article XV of the 1987 Philippine Constitution as
UNCONSTIT'U'T'IONAL; and
1.2 NULLIFY portions of Articles 46(4) and 55(6),

which mentions lesbianism or homosexuality as grounds for
annulment and legal separation, of the Family Code as a
consequence of the unconstitutionality of Articles l and 2; and
II.
THE PARTIES
2. Petitioner LGB'T'S CHRIS'T'IAN CHURCH INC. (hereaJter

referred to as "LGBTS Church") is a juridical person with a Certificate of
Incorporation2 , dated December 7, 2012, from the Securities and Exchange
Commission. The LGBTS Church, through Reverend Ceejay, performs the
Rite of Holy Union between lesbian and gay couples since 2012. The LGB'fS
Church may be served with summons and other processes of the Honorable
Supreme Court through undersigned counsel.
3. Petitioners REVEREND CRESCENCIO "CEl·:JA Y"

AGBAYANI and MARLON FELIPE are taxpayers, citizens of the Republic
of the Philippines, and Christians. 'They are a gay couple who have been in a
romantic and sexual relationship for more than a decade or ten ( 10) years. I
'T'hey have been married under a religious ceremony in 2009 and have since
then been deporting themselves as spouses to their families and friends. They
are open and self-identified homosexuals who wish to be married legally and
have applied for a marriage license but were denied. They may be served
,J
summons and other processes of the Honorable Supreme Court through
undersigned counsel.
' See attached "Annex A".
Petition-In-Intervention Page 2 of 2 1
II
I
,, ") /
l 'l.) ,
4,, Petitioner MARIA ARLYN "SUGAR" IBANEZ is a taxpayer,

citizen of the Republic of the Philippines, and Christian. She is in a romantic
and sexual relationship with JOANNE REENA "JR" GREGORIO, her
lesbian partner, for more than two (2) years. She and her partner have been
married under a religious ceremony3 conducted by Reverend Ceejay in 2015
and have since then been deporting themselves as spouses to their families
and friends. She is an open and self-identified homosexual who wishes to be
married legally with her partner JR and she has applied for a marriage license
but was denied. She may be served with summons and other processes of the
Honorable Supreme Court through undersigned counsel.
"'
III.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
5. On June 18, 1949, then President approved Republic Act No.

386, otherwise known as the "Civil Code of the Philippines" (the "Civil
Code").
6. Articles 52, 53, and 54 of the Civil Code did not define and limit
marriage as between man and woman.
7. On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued,

under her legislative powers, Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as
the Family Code. The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
8. Articles l and 2 of the Family Code repealed Articles 52, and

54 of the Civil Code, thus changing and limiting the definition of marriage as
between man and woman.
9. Petitioners CEEJA Y and SUGAR went to the Civil Registry

Department of Quezon City on August 3, 2015 to submit the requiremenl'i
for the application of marriage licenses. Petitioners brought and prepared all
requirements such as the copies of their birth certificates and duly filled out
application forms. Petitioners went to Counter 11 to submit the requirements.
Petitioners were told by the attending staff that the requiremenl<> could not be
accepted, much less entertained, because on the face of the duly filled out
application forms the sex of the applicants were of the same sex. ·15
3
See attached "Annex B".
·• "S;une-sex couples denied marriage in QC, vows battle not over", accessed April
7, 2015, htt.p://www.rapplcr.com/ movc-ph/issues/gender-issues/ l 0 l
license-qc.
5
"Same-sex couples to challenge m<u-riage bcu1 at SC", Inquirer, accessed April 7, 201.'J ,
l1ttp://newsinfo.inq uirer .nel/7 10349/ s<une-sex-cou pies-to-cl iallenge-marriage-ban-at-sc.
.• '' l ,-,
J... u d
IV.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. Jurisdiction
10. Petitioners aver that Article 1 and 2 of the Family Code violate
the constitutionally protected rights to equal protection of the laws and right or
spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions.
11. Petitioners aver that this petition is cognizable by the Supreme ..

Court under its power of traditional and expanded power of judicial review as
conferred by Section 1 Article VIII of the Constitution and under it-; original
jurisdiction as conferred by Section 5(1) Article VIII of the Constitution.
B. Propriety of Rule 65
12. Petitioners submit that using the procedural device of Rule 65 to

assail the constitutionality of a statute is proper and appropriate given the
absence of a specific remedial vehicle. 'fhis is supported by this Court's
pronouncement in the case of Magallona vs. Executive Secretary where it said:
"lfJJen this Comt exercises its constitutional power of

judicial reVIew, however, we have, by tradition, VIewed the writs
of certioran· and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test
the constitutionality ofstatutes. " 6
13. 'T'his Honorable Court reiterated such rule recently in Araullo vs.
Executive Secretary stating:
"Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate

remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit or nullify the acts of legisbtive and executive otlicials." 1
C. Requisites ofJudicial Review
14. Petitioners submit that the requisites for the exercise of the
power of judicial review exist.
15. 'T'he requisites for the exercise of the traditional power of judicial
reVIew are:
"J) diere 1nust be ;m actual case or controversy calling for

die exercise ofjudicial power;
6
Mag<tllona vs. Executive Secretary Ermita, C.R. No.1 .8 7167,July 16, 2011
1
Araullo vs. Executive Secretary Ochoa, C.R. No. 209287,July l, 201/f.
., ") C•
..i. 0 <e_1
(2) the person clwllenging die act must have die standing
to question die validity oldie suqject act or issuance; othenn:s·e
stated, he must have a personal and substantial ii1terest in the
case such diat he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injwy as a
result ofits enforcement;
(3) die question of constitutionality must be raised at the

earliest opportunity; and
(4) die issue of constitutionality must be the ve1y fi5 mota

ofthe case. " 8
Actual Case or Controversy
16. Petitioners submit that an actual case or controversy exists. The

instant case involves the rights of petitioner which are legally demandable and
enforceable. Petitioners have a right to equal protection of the laws and the
right to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions as
protected by the Constitution. These rights are demandable from the
government, which is prohibited from passing or implementing laws that
contravene constitutionally protected rights. The flat out denial of the
application for a marriage license by the Petitioners on August 3, 2015 was the
moment that gave rise to an actual case - with the Petitioners demanding their
rights under the Constitution and the government implementing the Family
Code, parts of which contravene constitutionally protected rights.
Locus St:andi
17. Petitioners submit that the LGBTS Church, as a corporation

conducting religious marriage ceremonies to same-sex couples, has the
requisite standing to plead for the protection of its members' rights to equal
protection of the laws and right to found a family in accordance with religious
convictions of its members.
18. Petitioners submit that it can bring this suit before this
Honorable Court by invoking the principle. of third-party standing as an
exception to the general rules on standing.
19. In White Light Corporation v. City of Manila9 , this Honorable

Court recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third
parties, provided three important criteria are satisfied:
19. l. T'he litigant must have sutlered an 'injury-in-fact,'

thus giving him or her "sufficiently concrete interest" in the
outcome of the issue in dispute;
s Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission, C.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010.
0
White Light Corporation vs. City of Manila, C.R. No. 122846,January 20, 2009.
140
19.2. 'T'he litigant must have a close relation to the third
party; and,
19.3. There must exist some hindrance to the third

party's ability to protect his or her own interest'i.
20. Petitioners submit that it satisfies the first criterion as it sutlers an

'injury-in-fact' since the same-sex marriage ceremonies that it conduct'i are not
being given legal reco.!,rnition by the State in contrast to opposite-sex marriage
ceremonies which other religious organizations conduct. Religious
organizations that conduct opposite-sex marriage ceremonies can register the
same at the local civil registrar while the LGBTS Church cannot. No religious
test should be required for the exercise of this civil right. 'fhe LG BTS
Church's ability to recruit members, evangelize, and proselytize is impaired by
the lack of recognition the State grants t6 the religious same-sex marriage
ceremonies it conducts.
21. Petitioners submit that it satisfies the second criterion as the third
parties on whose behalf it brings this suit are its members who have been
married under its Church. Such third parties continue to be members of the
LGBTS Church even after they have been religiously married.
22. Petitioners submit that it satisfies the third criterion as the relative
silence in constitutional litigation of such speci.al interest groups in our nation
such as the American Civil Liberties Union in the United States may also be
construed as a hindrance for same-sex married couples to bring suit' 0 • It is
unlikely that same-sex couples married by the LGBTS Church will pursue the
process needed to vindicate their own fundamental rights given the stigma
against coming out and the public nature of any suit such as the instant case.
23. Having satisfied these three criteri!!, Petitioners submit that it

must be allowed to advocate or invoke the fundamental equal protection
claims and the constitutional right to found a family of its same-sex married
couple members.
24. At any event, the LGBTS Church is joined in the instant case by
lesbian and gay couples who have actually attempted to apply for marriage
licenses with their local civil registrars and were actually denied. Petitioners
CEEJAY and SUGAR have thus sustained a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of Articles l and 2 of the Family Code.
Earliest Opportunity
25. Petitioners submit that the question of constitutionality has been

raised at the earliest opportunity. 'T'his Honorable Court explained that raising
a constitutional issue at the earliest opportunity:
IO Ibid.
"fE/nt;uJs d1e interposition of d1e issue in the pleadings
before a coinpetent court, such that, 1f the issue is not raised Ji1
the pleadings before that competent court, it cannot be
considered at d1e tnaJ and, 1fnot considered in the trial, it cannot
be considered on appeal. " 11
26. Petitioners submit that it has raised the issue of constitutionality

in this pleading before a competent court. Direct recourse to this Honorable
Court is justified by the transcendental importance of the issues raised and the
absence of necessity for trial to obtain facts required to decide the case.
Lis Mota
27. Petitioners submit that the issue of constitutionality is the very !is
mota of the instant petition. 'T'his Honorable Court explained that lis mota
n1eans:
"d1at die Cowt l'VJll not pass upon a question of

unconstitutionality, aldwugh properly presented, 1f die case can
be disposed ofon some od1erground, such as die applicadon of
d1e statute or dJe general law. The petitioner must be able to
show d1at d1e case cannot be legally resolved unless the
constitutional question raised is determined." 12
28. Petitioners submit that the instant petition cannot be disposed of

on some other ground. 'T'here is no other way to determine whether the
marriages that it conducts to iti; members who are same-sex couples should be
registered by the local civil registrar and there is also no other way whether
said same-sex couples· should be denied marriage licenses except by resolving
the issue of constitutionality of Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code.
D. Propriety of a Direct Recourse to the Supreme Court
29. Petitioners submit that a direct recourse to this Honorable Court

is proper and legally justified. In the case of The Diocese of Bacolod vs.
COMELEC, this Honorable Court listed the exceptions to the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts:
"IT/he Supreme role to inte1pret d1e Constitution

and act in order to protect constitutional rights when these
become exigent should not be emasculated by d1e doctrine in
respect of dJe hierarchy of courts. That has never been the
purpose olsuch doctni1e.
Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-

clad J1lie. This court has ''full discretionary power to take
11
Serrano vs. Gallcmt Maritime Services, Inc., C.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009.
12
Congressman Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, C.R. No. 157 584, April 2, 2009.
cognizance and assume juri'idiction loved special civil actions !Or
certioran: .. Hied direcdy with it for exceptionally compelling
reasons or 1f wa1ranted by die nature of the issues clearly and
specifically raised in die petition. "As co1Tecdy pointed out by
petitioners, we have provided exceptions to this doctrine:
First, a direct resort to this cow:t is allowed when there are

genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the
most immediate time. A direct resort to this court includes
availing of die remedies of certiorari and prohibition to assail the
constitutionality of actions of bodi legislative and executive
branches of die government.
A second exception is when the issues involved are of

transcendental importance. In these cases, die imminence and
clarity of the direat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh
die necessity for prudence. The doctrine relating to
constitutional is-sues of transcendental importance prevents
courts fro1n dJe paralysi5 of procedural niceties when clearly
faced with die need for substantial protection.
Third, cases of first impression waiTant a direct resOJt to

this court. In cases offi1:5t impression, no jurisprudence yet exi'it'i
diat will gwde dJe lower cowts on this 1natter.
Fourth, the constitutional issues raised are better decided

brthis court.
Fifth, die time element presented in diis case cannot be

ignored.
Sixdi, die filed petition reviews dJe act of a constitutional

organ.
Sevendi, petitioners righdy clai1n dJat diey had 110 other

plain, speedy, and adequate remedy 1n dJe ordinary course of/aw
that could Hee dJem from dJe injwious eflecl'i of respondent'>'
acts 1n vi'olation ofdieir nght to freedom ofexpression.
1,}'ghdi, the petition includes questions that are "dictated by

public welfare and dJe advance1nent of public pofily, or
demanded by die broader interest of justice, or the mders
complained of were found to be patent nullities, or die appeal
was considered as clearly an inappropnate remedy. "
It is not, however, necessarv that all of these exceptions

must occur at the same time to i'ustify a direct resort to this court.
While generally, die hierarchy of courts is respected, the present
'1 3
l.. ·:::··
case falls under die recognized exceptions and, as such, may he

resolved by diis court direcdy.
30. Petitioners submit that the first, second, third, and fourth
exception exists in the instant case.
31. Petitioners submit that there are genuine issues of

constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time. Every
minute that passes by is another minute that a group of Filipinos are treated as
2"d class citizens. Every minute that passes by is another minute that LGBT
couples are in a state of insecurity and without the legal protections afforded
by marriage. Every minute that passes by is another minute that LGBT "'
couples are not considered as family and cannot serve as the foundation of the
nation.
32. Petitioners submit that issues involved are of transcendental

importance. The rights involved in this case are of a fundamental character.
'T'he rights pertain to not just the Petitioners but to other LGBT couples, who
number hundreds of thousands across the Philippines.
33. Petitioners submit that this case is one of first impression. The
issues involved have never been considered, much less resolved, by this
Honorable Court. No case exisL" in the annals of jurisprudence that will guide
the lower courts on this matter.
34. Petitioners submit that the issues raised are better decided by this
Honorable Court since no jurisprudence exists that would guide lower courL".
35. Thus, with three exceptions to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts

being extant in the present case, a direct recourse to this Honorable Court is
proper and legally justified.
'"The Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728,J<urnary 21, 2015.
v.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
THE FAMILY CODE, IN LIMITING THE DEFINITION

OF MARRIAGE TO OPPOSITE-SEX COUPLES ONLY, IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT VIOIATES SEC.
3(1) ART. XV IN RELATION WITH SEC. 1 ART. ill (THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CIAUSE) AS AN
INTERLOCKING RIGHT
VI.
DISCUSSION
A. PETI170Ni,l?S HA VE A
RELIGIOUS CONVIC170N TO
FOUND A FAMILY AS A SAME-SEX
COUPLE
36. Article XV Section 3(1) of the Constitution states that the State
shall defend:
"The right ofspouses to found a. familvin accordance with

their religious convictions and dJe demands of re.spons1h/e
parendwod."
37. Petitioners are of the religious conviction that Christianity does

not treat homosexuality as a sin and that Christianity does not prohibit same
sex marnage and hence gay and lesbian Christians can also enter into
marriage.
i. Homosexuality is not a sin
38. Petitioners are part of and fall under LG BT affirming Christian

denominations, which includes but is not limited to the United Church of
Christ and the Metropolitan Community Church in the Philippines and in
other countries. LGBT affirming Christian denominations do not consider
homosexuality or transgenderism as sins.
39. Petitioners believe that the original text of the Bible does not and
could not use the word homosexual, especially in the Biblical account" in
Genesis 19:1-9 which recounts the story of Sodom. The term "homosexual" is
of modern origin arising around about a hundred ( 100) of years agu. The
Bible on the other hand is of ancient origin dating back from a range of one
thousand five hundred (1,500) to three thousand 3,000 (3,000) years ago.
'1' ·'' --
...L _. . '
40. The CALIP Foundation, a non profit organization dedicated to

reconciling the message of God's love and the LGBT community, explains
through Reverend Justin Cannon a linguistic and theological analysis of the
history of rise of homosexual as a term in the Bible. Explaining the term
homosexual in relation with sodomy, the Reverend says:
"Homosexual: The £nglish word homosexual is· a

compound word made fi-om dJe Greek word homo, 1nea11ing
"d1e same': and dJe Latin term sexualis, meaning sex. 171e te1m
''homosexual" i'i of modern origin, a.rid it wasn't untJJ about a
hundred years ago dJat it was Hrst used. There is no word in
biblical Greek or Hebrew that i'i equivalent to dJe Englis'/1 word
homosexual. The 1946 Revi'ied Standard Version (RSV) of the
B1ble was dJe first tJwslau·on to use die word homosexual.
Sodomite: 171ere 1:5 no i-v01d in biblical Greek or Hebrew

for ''sodomy.,, A Sod01nite was silnply an inhabitant of Sodom,
just as a Moabite was an inhabitant of Moab. Any translation of
dJe New Testament 1naking use of dJe word'i ''sodomy" or
''sodomite" ;uc: c/e;u· inteqHc:tatJ()J]s and not faithful translations."
1,1
41. Furthermore, the major Biblical passages (Genesis 1-2, Genesis

19: 1-9, Leviticus 18:22 and 20: 13, Romans 1:24-27, 1 Corinthians G:9, I
Timothy 1:10) used by Catholicism and non-LGBT affirming denominations
to refer to homosexuality as allegedly a sin are all either inaccurate translations
of the Bible's original Hebrew text to Greek and then to English or taken out
of context.1.1
42. Thus, Petitioners are of the religious conviction that Christianity

does not treat homosexuality as a sin.
ii. Sarne-sex marriage is not prohibited
43. Petitioners believe, as other Christians all over the world believe,
that aside from the Bible not condemning homosexuality as a sin, the Bible
also does not prohibit same-sex marriage and in fact fit11 perfectly under the
·framework of marriage in the Bible.
44. Petitioners, for brevity, will cite just the first ten ( l 0) out of the
fifteen (15) theological arguments of Changing Attitude England, a network of"
LGBT and heterosexual members of the Church of England, in favor of
same-sex marriage as Biblically 1:,>rounded:
" "The Bible, Christianily, and HomosexualiLy", Rev. Justin Cmnon, accessed April 7,
2015, 11tlp://wvvw.gaycl1urch.org/l1omosexuality-an<l-ll1e-bible/ ll1e-biblc-cl1risliani1y-and-
homoscxualily/ .
15
Ibi<l.
"1. The fundamental pmpose ofmarriage is companionship:
Then YI-fvVH s;ud, "it not good /(;r t11e 1·)1rth C'reature to be
alone. I w1Jl inake a Jilting comp;.wion for it. " Genesis· 2: J8
The reason God creates Eve i5 solely to alleni1te Adam\

isolation. ove111ding concern is· for rr 'e //
being: God wants hi111/us to tl11ive ;uid floun:5h and reah:ses that
thi<; w1Jl not happen unless hi5/our loneliness i" relieved hy a
sou/mate. IF God did tJ11:s· For Adan1 it is- not cred1ble that God
would cTeate homosexual people and tlien subject tl1em to tl1e
pain of hfelong loneliness For gay people tile fitting com1;;w1011,
tlie sou/Jnate, i<; necessar:Iiy somebody oldie sa1ne sex.
2. A lifelong companion has to be someone compatible. Gender

is not important
171e f,';uth Creature gave 11an1es to all the cattle, all tl1e /JJ1ds· of
tiJe ;md all tiJe r1'lid ;u11inals. But none of'the1n p1v1'ed to be a
/jtt1iig c0111panio11. Genesi5 2:20
At Hrst God Dies to find a companion for Ada111 by creatJ11g the

hut then realises that he need5 s0111eo11e /JK.e /11]11self,·
another hwn;w bc1i1g: So tl1e essenu';Li p01i1t a/mu/ 1:s· 1101
that she is· female hut that she is· human. She a human penon
hke Ada111.
3. The essence of marriage 1s mutual commitment and

faithfi.Jlness
Adam excl;uined, "tJ11:'i Dine, dii5 i5 die one! Bone of my hone

and flesh of" my flesh! Now, she w1Jl be Hlon1an, and I rv1J/ be
111;111, because we are of one flesh. Genesis· 2:23
VV?iat 1natteJ:5 here i5 diat the human pali" should c01mnit tot;z//y
to each otl1er Ill a relations/11j1 of mutual dedication and 1;11/h!iJI
supp01t. Jtvidorvers and bereal'ed partners often S<L)'
tiJey feel only 'half a peHon ' afi:er die death of' the1i· .spouse.
'One flesh' docs nol crassly iinply the sexual ;i_ct but rather the
ent11c: human union which the two people together C1C:att:d. 'j),vo
n1en or /H'O women can equally make such profound mutual
co111111it111e11t.
4. Procreation is not essential
There is no reference to procreauon in the stmy of Ada1n and

Eve untJJ chapter tl1ree of Genesi<;, and even then it comes only
;1s a so1t ofincidental afie1thought. Its· only mendon as a mfrwr
1 4'?
detaJJ in die st01y of puni5l11nent of Eve /hr eating the

apple proffered by die snake.
To die wwn;w God said, I will gready nJult1jJly your pains in

you w1Jl bec:1r c111Jdren iii paii1. You rv1Jl des1i-e
union 'vVJLb your man, but he w1Jl be bent on sulJ/ugaL1i1g
you. Genes15· 3: 16
Cl11Jdbe;u:ii1g is· therefhre not an essential pa.It And

Ji1deed the Chn511'cw churches hm·e long been happy to many
couples who c;.umot have c111ldren by reason of liife111Jity or
age. And of'cow:s·e protestant ;wd ref(;nned churches all approve
of' contraception which clea.1Jy de1no11strates their view that
1naITiage 15· not about hani1g children. 171ere can therefore he no
objection to san1e-sex maniage on the grounds- of' li1a/JJ/J"ty to
procreate.
5. Tb.ere is no B1bhcal injunction on individuals to reproduce
There are two accounts of Ci-eation 1i1 111 the liHt

account dierc i'i no mention o/Ad;u11 ;u1d Eve. Cod creates the
heaven and die eard1 and d1en e11erytl11i1g else li1clu(/Ji1g
;wd then the text says:
God saw t11at this· was gvod and blessed then1. "Bear fi-uit,
Jfl{Tease your and fill die waters of the seas! B1ids
abound on the eaith!" Genesi5 1:22
17115· iryunction 15· addressed to whole .species of creatures, and

by in1plication to the whole of hwnani(y, not to lndividua/<;. So
diere i5 no necess;uy 1i11pli'cation he1-e that ei·-eIJ' s1iwle penon
supposed to be heterosexual or produce' c111klre11. Indeed in the
present cli'cwnstance of global ove1populatio11 where the e;uth
has been 11101-e tl1a11 reple1115·hed, this· commandment has been
fi11filled ;wd not h;iniig cluldren be considered the more
godly act.
6. Ifmarriage is a 'remedy for sin' for opposite-sex couples then

it is equally so for same-sex couples
St Paul's view was dwt the sexu<li chive 15· so powerful d1at 1nost
people (he of cow:5e 111eant 1nen) have difficulty restraii11ng it,
ai1d so it i'i better !hr diem to many Iii order to avoid the s1i1 of'
k>rnication.
But 1fyou cannot control yow:5elves, then you should many, !hr
IL i'i beLter to be m;uned d1a11 lo bu111 w1Lh pass/on. 1
Coninth/ans 7: 9
Honwsexual people are as much in need of tl1i5 1i1stitutionali'icd
channel for sexual e,\]Jression as heterosexu;;Js, and it is therefore
as good a tl1eological just1fication for the 1n;11nages oflesbian and
gay people as it i5 for tlwse ofstra1,[fht people.
7. Ma.niage is a. partnership ofequals
St Paul i'i usual/;1 read as ;1 defender ol and !l.·malc

suq/ugation, but on the question of 1na1Tiage he ad1 ·ocates
equality, with each partner owmi1g the body oftl1e other.
The husbnnrf \ body helo11g5 noL lo /11in alone, but afwJ to the
wife, and the w1fe's body belongs not to her alone, but aim lo the
husband. J Coni1thia11s 7:4
He even 1roes furthcT to su/rgest d1at d1ere should be cquahty Ji1

die sexual pleasure enjoyed by botJ1 p;1rtners, placing a duly on
botl1 to ensure diat tl1ey dunk oftl1e ofeach othe1:·
Do not depn've each other (of scA), except by 1nutual consent

and r,vifl11i1 a tJine fhune, so tl1at you can devote younelves to
praye1: But come togetl1er agaJi1 lest you JiJVite S1tan to tempt
you tl1rough J ow· weakness. 1 Coni1tl1ians 7: S
1
S1nce tl1ere is· 110 gender rhflerentJ'cidon Iii tl1ese liuunctions the.1·
apply equally well to a faithfully conunitted saJne-sex couple.
Some C'hn:slians, pardcuf;uJy e1'ang-elicals, believe that 111

Genesis·, and Ii1 some of'the wn'tlngs ofSt Paul, God estahlisi1es
what they call 'co111ple111entanty' between the sexes.
k>r which 111 practice there i'i ve1y little actual BdJ/ical
support, leads the1n to the rhflerences between
1nales ;wd fe1nales and ignore manJfest hist01ical and cultural
vanation, to believe that Cod ordmi1ed 1ne11 to rule over women,
;wd of course to argue that mo11og-a111ous heterosexuahiy the
only diVJi1ely sanctioned erotic. 171ey 01'erlook both PauFs·
1inpo1ta11t staten1ent tl1at 'Ji1 Chri5t tl1ere i5 no 111ale or female'
and Chris't'.'i own worri'i d1at lhere w1JJ be no many1i1g Ji1 the
J(Ji1gdom or Heaven. diw.n :dited Idea an llJ{t'l]Jretii c
Iinposition on the Biblical text and JS' not a sound basis· for
oppos1i1ggender equality and same-sex marnage.
8. The diversity ofhuman sexuality is a. gift of God
Paul believed that die second cm111i1g of and the end of'
the wodd were Jinminent Ill 111:5 own tJines. He thcrclhrc Lhou;.;ht
it best d1at people should re1nai11 cehbate in order to "vod !hr
I
I
t11e con11ng of Kingdom, altlwugh he acknowledges that \
t11i5 does not sw{ eve1ybody.
Let 1ne n1ake a suggestion - it not a decree. I would hope that

eve1yone could be like n1e. But we all have our own particular
g1fis Ji-om Cod. One has the g1/l l(Jr one thing and anlhLhcr has
the gilt for another thing: 1 Coni1thians 7:6
There see1ns to be an JinpliCJl n·cog11itio11 here Lhat not

eve1ybody i•> t11e same. Some theolo;p';ms hm c: seen Ji 1 tin:,. text
an Jinph(:.i t acknowledgement ofbwnan sexual (/J.1-ersity as a 151/t
of God. JVot eve1ybody i'>· heterosexual and d1ese (]J/Jerences
should be re..,pecled because they are pa1t of' crcadon.
The logk· of t11e argument that Jf 1narn';1ge the solution !Or
heterosexuals t11en it is also t11e solution for those vvith other 'gifts
of' lest they too fall 1i1to s1i1.
9. Marriage is the union of two people who find each other

sexually attra.ctive, love each other and wish to commit to each
other. It is not necessarily the union of one man and one
woman.
A pe1:w11 does not 111any somebody because they are the

opposile sex. A man does not choose to many a 1mman
because she female. He m;un'es her because he i.,· sexually
attracted to her ;md loves her. 1l1an1';1ge the union of' two
people who are sexually attracted to each ot11er and 1ri10 /01't'
e,1ch othe1: 171i5 works 1i1 exactly t11e s;11ne way /(Jr two
ho1nosexual persons as it does /(;r tvvo heterosexual penons.
171ere no dJfle1-ence. If God blesses tlu: union of a man and
won1aJ1 who Jove ead1 other ;wd 111any he will also bless the
union of two men or two women who get n1a1Tied because £hey
love each othe1: 'Ibere 1:5 110 ingredient' Ji1 homosexual
unions 'vvhich present in heterosexual unions. Also, because
1naniage i:.,. the union oftwo hwmw pe1:5011s there is· no 'shiJpe1y
slope' into (/J:m1de1: /V/;11n';,1ge 1:.,· an I-Thou relationslni; in
Martin sense. 1J11:s- rules out all the usual c/;uins about
tl1e reCCJ.[Jnition ofsaJne-se.'\· maJ11'<1,r.;e leading to the /eg-;d1:.,·ation of'
pederasty, bcst1';,1/JLy, polygamy etc.
10. 'Traditional' marriage is constmtly evolving
Hi.;;torically 1na11iage was seen in a socio-pohlical aJ1d economic

context. Jn BJ/J/ical uines daughten were eflectfrely mnu::d by
t11e1i· fi1t11ers, ;wd then 'gfren' in m;un';1ge to a husband who took
over owne1:'il11jJ. The 111ain concern 1,-vas control of'property and
obedience to aud10nly. A thous;wd yeaJ:5 most man1ages
were not celebrated in church. Right into the twendeth century
1 50
n1;wy states in An1erica prol11bited inte1Tacial 111aniagc. 13ein/.{

divorced used to be a banier lo remaniag-e. /Vow ahnost ha/J'of'
all n1aniages end 1/1 (h'vorce, and serial monog;11ny has /Jecome
nonnal, so 1/1 practice 1narriage is no longer a lifelong union or
two people to the exclusion of'1:7ll otheH. It i'i sin1p/y not the case
that there i'i a 'traditional' concepl of 1na111';1ge which same-sex
1narriag-e threatens to deslroy. On the contrary, die devotion and
co1n1111Dnent of scvne-sex n1aniages will help to strengthen the
institution. " 16
45. Thus, Petitioners are of the religious conviction that Christianity

does not prohibit same-sex marriage but in fact allows it.
46. Given the religious convictions that homosexuality is not a sin

and that same-sex marriage is not prohibited under Christianity and the Bible,
Petitioners have founded a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and thus lived lives as gay or lesbian spouses. Petitioners ha,·e
availed of the Rites of Holy Union from LGBTS Christian Church and since
having been married, Petitioners have been deporting themselves as spouses
to their families and friends. T'he families and friends of Petitioners ha,·e
accepted and treated Petitioners as spouses indeed.
B. PE11TIONERS' RIGHT TO
FOUND A FAMILY IN
ACCORDANCE WITH 1HEIR
RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS HAS
BA"EN DENIED EQUAL
PROTECTION
47. Petitioners submit that there exists no substantial distinction

between petitioners' religious convictions and the religious convictions of
Filipino Catholics and Filipino Muslims in relation to founding a family and
the right to marry.
48. At the outset, it must be noted that the Family Code and it-;
definition of marriage as between a man and a woman is quite in line with the
religious convictions of Filipino Catholics and some other Christian
denominations. So when Filipino Catholics marry under a religious ceremony
conducted by a religious solemnizing otlicer, they can have it legally
recognized at the same time under the Family Code.
49. It must also be noted that the Code of Muslim Personal Laws
allows the religious practice of polygamy by Filipino Muslims to be legally
recognized.
16
"Fifteen theological <U"gumenlS for gay marriage", Changing Alu'tude, accessed April 7,
2015, http://changing-attitude.org. uk/ rcsourccs/ pu blications/fiftccn-ll 1cological-arg11111e111 s-
for-gay-marriage.
50. 'T'hus, under the current Philippine legal landscape, the laws ha,·e
made a classification of the religious convictions of Filipino Catholics and
Filipino Muslims in one category and the religious convictions of the
Petitioners, or Filipinos who are part of LGBT affirming Christian
denominations. T'he former category is classified as legally recognized and
permissible while the latter category is classified as legally prohibited and
impermissible.
51. Given the existence of a classification, such classification must he

tested under the equal protection clause for it<; validity. Equal protection, as
explained in the case of le hong vs. Hernandez, means "all penons shall be "'
treated alike, under !Jke circwnst;mces ;md conditions bod1 as to JHivileges
conferred and JiabJJities enforced." 11 Otherwise stated, similar things should be
treated similarly while difforent things should be treated diflerently.
52. Petitioners submit that such classification is invalid and

unconstitutional for lacking the existence of a substantial distinction between
the two classifications or categories of religious convictions (one legally
recognized and permitted and the other one not).
53. There are two reasons why there exists no substantial distinction.
First, the religious convictions of Petitioners and of other Filipinos are both
similarly sincerely held. Second, the religious convictions of Petitioners and of
other Filipinos are both similarly theologically grounded.
54. First, petitioners sincerely hold their religious beliefs that

Christianity permits homosexuality and same-sex marriage equally as the
religious beliefs of Catholics and Muslims that' homosexuality is a sin and that
marriage is between a man and a woman. Petitioners have been practicing and
preaching such sincerely held beliefs in their daily lives for years.
55. Petitioner LGB'T'S Christian Church has been marrying, through

Reverend same-sex couples since 2012. Petitioners Ceejay and
Marlon have been together as a couple for more than a decade. Petitioner
Sugar has been with her partner for more than 2 years.
56. Second, the religious convictions of Petitioners of other

·Filipinos are similarly theologically grounded. As discussed above in this
Petition, the religious convictions that homosexuality is not a sin and that
same-sex marriage is not prohibited can be rooted and explained in the Bible
itself.
57. 'fhus, the classification of Petitioners' religious convictions versus

the religious convictions of other Filipinos is invalid and unconstitutional.
11
Ichongvs. Hermmdcz, G.R. No. L-7995, May 1957.
i::-rJ
..t. u ,·:...
REIJEF
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, Petitioners respectfully
request that the Honorable Court grant the Petition-In-Intervention and
declare Articles I and 2 of the Family Code as unconstitutional and, as a
consequence, nullify Articles 46(4) and 55(6) of the Family Code.
Other just or equitable reliefs under the premises are likevvise

requested for.
Quezon City for the City of Manila, April 7, 2015.
of Attorneys
CLE Compliance No. - pending
IBP Lifetime Member No. 013716
PTR No. 1324088 I Quezon City
COPY FURNISHED:
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

Public Respondent
OSG Building, 134 Amorsolo St.
Legaspi Village, Makati City
ATTY. FERNANDO P. PERITO

Inte1venor
Rm. 14, Bldg. 2, Plaza Pacita
Brgy. Nueva, Pacita Complex
San Pedro City, Laguna
VERIFICATION
AND
CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING
We, CRESCENCIO AGBAYANI JR., MARLON FELIPE, and

MARIA ARLYN IBANEZ, of legal age and Filipino, after having been duly
sworn in accordance vvith law, hereby depose and state that:
1. We are the intervenors in the Petit.ion-in-Intervendon in the ongoing

case of ''Falcis l :5. Civil Registrar-Ceneral" that was filed before this "'
1
Honorable Court.
2. We caused the preparation of the foregoing Petition-in-Intervention.
3. We have read the said pleading and hereby aver that the allegations
therein are true and correct of our personal knowledge or based on authentic
records.
4. We have not commenced any other action or filed any claim
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal, or quasi-:iudicial agency and,
to the best of my knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein.
5. If we should hereafter learn that the same or a similar action or claim
has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or
any other tribunal or agency, we shall report such fact vvithin live (.'>) days
there from to this Honorable Court.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hand this r day

of April 2016 in QUEZ I'TY, Philippines.
Alliant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 7 day of April 20 I() 11

'
at Quezon City, atliants exhibiting their competent evidence of identity, to wit:

Crescencio Agbayani.Jr . Afe· cl/qJ.. 211<1 /11(//g. 111 ; t>/1
Marlon Felipe
Maria Arlyn Ibanez
1An:71 (] &Ii)}- tJIJ(..p- tJt 93 1f-:Jlf3
0V7U-l1)( fw·lM1/.4 /{Jlf /J){--- /&,, tJO f1J j r
v tuA a l!V? hI 9-df f _. uf- tJ t--
Doc. No .
Page No. _{g.U...;
Book No. _\{lLJ; ATTv..
Notary Public for ezon City, U ii Dec. 31, 2017
Series of 2016. Adm. Matter 004 2016-2017 Roll No. 31559
PTR 0 .R. No. 2147871 , 1·4-2016, 0.C.
· IBP O.R. NCI. 1010855, 11 · 10·2015, 0 .C.
Stall 007 Centennial Dorm 2, E. Jacinto St.,
U.P. Oil., Q,C., iel. No. I (02) ll818e80
! 91!1Jf32 I
VERIFIED DECLARATION
I, JESUS NICARDO M. FALCIS III, of legal age, Filipino, atter

having been duly sworn in accordance with law, hereby declare that the
clocument/s (and annexes thereof) hereto submitted electronically in
accordance with the Ef-licient Use of Paper Rule is/are complete and true
copy/ies of the document/s (and annexes) filed with the Supreme Court.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this r day of April 201 G

at Quezon City, afliant exhibiting his competent evidence of identity, to 'Nit:

Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III JJ} P {JJ !/7v /u>I/ o/Ju (J);tlJm ttp j} /J. fq 3
Doc. No. J_tCf..;
Page No. k"f_;
ATTY. OM UZ
Book No. Notary Public for a ezon City, nt Dec. 31 . 2017
Adm. Matter CO• 2016·2017) oll No. 31559
Series of 2016. PTR O.R . No. 2U7871, 1_.·2016, Q.C.
IBP O.R. No. 101085e, 11-10·2015, a .c .
Stoll 007 ContennlDI Corm 2, E. Jacinto St.,
U.P Oii., O.C., TflL No. S4U7&4 I (02) 9816660
MCLIO Cornrill1r1cu Ne. V·000111l, luued on 11·20·13
EXPLANATION
'The foregoing PE'TTT'ION-IN-IN'TERVEN'T'ION is being filed with this

Court and served on the respondentli by registered mail due to the lack of
time and logistical difficulty by counsel, who is a full-time teacher, to effect
personal service.
. FALCIS III
Petition-In-Intervention Page 20of21

Republic of the Philippines)
Quezon City )
AFFIDAVIT OF ·
Post 0 _ice ·_ - i-'. · ·,, _; nC':l - ii 1
!,JESUS NICARDO M. FALCIS ill, ul1( ri :.·· l..;·. -' •1 ._ . ;': LU

.. F ;'
Letter/rr1ac . > · ......, , .• . .. :i 1
!.). . . • t .! . ·. '
.
Posted:im., ·-:.:,
t{ · .. ,f 7ip.l-' .,..
· A
•,,J 'V
i o
-.
'.
1. I am the Counsel of the Interv1 Preserv r'et:elp't for refi!'rence in· case of inquiry
Scout Rallos Street, Brgy. L1ging Handa, (
"""""--:-.- -
Po- s-,
tm
;-'a'-
. s-te-r/-Te- 11-er- -
. .
2. I served copies of the Petition-in-fotervention in the extant case "'- ----
No. 217910 filed before the Supreme Court, on the following parties at their
respective addresses and on the dates indicated below:
Name Address · Date of Service ·Mode of Service

OSG Building,
Oflice of the
134 Arnorsolo St.,
Solicitor 7 April 2016 i Registered Mail
Legaspi Village,
General
Makati City
Rm. 14 Bldg. 2,
, Atty. Fernando i Plaza Pacita, Brgy. Nueva,
7 April 2016 · Registered Mail
P. Perito Pacita Complex,
: San Pedro City, Liguna
by depositing a copy in the post office, in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed

to the addressee at his residence or office, with postage fully prepaid, as
evidenced by Registry Receipt Nos attached, and
with the return the mail to the sender after te1 i
(10) days 1f undelivered. <;"')_I g--lf(o ytJ.-.S Z2-
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 7"' day of April
. 2016 in Quezon City, Metro Manila. ,-
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN o before me is 7"' day of April 1(}

at Quezon City, affiant exhibiting his competent evidence of identity, to wit:

Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III ())l/;v )vii 1Jf atzovn;t MA· r;yjq3
Doc. No.
Page No. AT:TY.
Notary Public ror ezon
Adm. Matter 004 (2016-2017)
ar;.
nt' Dec. 31 , 2017
oll No. 31559
Book No. PTR O.R. No. 2147671, 1-4-2016, Q.C.
Series of 2016. IBP O.R. No. 1010855, 11-10-2015, Q.C.
Stall 007 Centennial Dorm 2. E. Jacinto st ..
U.P. Oil., 0.C ., Tel. No. 5463754 I (02) 9818680
MCLE Compliance No. V-000116 , issued on 11·20-13

Jesus Falcis v. Civil Registrar (Philippine Same-Sex Marriage Case, Combined Petition and Petition in Intervention)

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Jesus Falcis v. Civil Registrar (Philippine Same-Sex Marriage Case, Combined Petition and Petition in Intervention)

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JESUS NICARDO M. FALCIS ill,

Petitioner, G.R.No. ___

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION

PE'TTflONER, through undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable

- Justice Marvic Leonen

- Justice Mariano del Castillo

1. This is a Petition for CERTIORARI and PROHIBITION

1.1 NULLIFY the portions of Articles 1 and 2, which

1.2 NULLIFY portions of Articles 46(4) and 55 (6),

1.3 PROHIBIT the Civil Registrar-General (hereafter

2. PETITIONER is a taxpayer, a resident of Quezon City, and a

3. The Respondent CIVIL REGISTRAR-GENERAL is a public

4. On June 18, 1949, then President approved Republic Act No.

requisites are complied with:

8. Petitioner submits that Article 1 and 2 of the Family Code violate

9. Petitioner submits that th is petition is cognizable by the Supreme

l 0. Petitioner submiL-; that using the procedural device or Rule 65 to

''lf1ien this Court r:xercises its constitutional power of

Thus, petitions for certioran· and prohibition are appropnate

12. Justice Brion, in his Separate Opinion, further said:

"That Rule 65 of the Rules of Court has been expressly

Petitioner respenlully submit<; that until this H onorable Court

C. Requisites of Judicial Review

15. In Justice Brion's Separate Opinion in the case of Araullo vs.

"This H onor;J/J/c Court under the 1987 ConstJLudon

' Araullo vs. Aquino, C .R. No. 209287, J uly 1, 20 14.

(2) the trad//Jonal justiciri.ble cases as understood 1i1 (1),

(3) pure cons/Jtuaonal disputes attended by grave abuse of

i. Expanded power ofJudicial Review

18. 1 he third (3"') classification of the "fresh" approach requires two

"/F/irst, they must demonstrate a prima Jacie show1i1g of

1. Prima facie case of Grave Abuse of Discretion

19. Prima facie evidence is defined as:

"EVJdence gpod. and su!Hcient on its /ace. Such e vidence

20.1 The 1987 Philippine Constitution does not define

20.2 The Family Code does not require married

20.3 Homosexuals ordinarily are not impotent. \Vhile

20.4 Heterosexuals are no better parents than

"Sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove

20.5 Homosexu;tl men and women are ordinarily attracted

20.6 Heterosexuals who enter marriage after committing

21. Petitioner submits that the instant petition raises issues of

''Without die right to many, LGBT Filipinos are treated

23. Petitioner forthcr submits that homosexuals are deprived of their

24.. 'fhe right of indivi<luals, homosexual or heterosexual, to choose

ii. Traditional power of Judicial Review

27. The requisites fo r the exercise of the traditional power of judicial

"J) there must he ;111 actual case or controversy calhi1;/ for

(3) the question of constitutionali ty must be raised at the

"Vliflen an act of' the Jegi5lative department is senr;us/y

29. Petitioner submits that he has standing to question Lhe Family

"The question 011 leg-;.J/ st;mrhng is whether sud1 parties

30. Petitioner has a personal stake in the ·outcome or this case.

31. Petitioner has currently no plans to settle down in any other

"fEfnt.a.Jls the 1i1Lerposit/on of the issue in the pleadings

33. Petitioner submiL'i that he has raised the issue of constitutionality

''that the Coult will not pass upon a question of

35. Petitioner submits that the instant petition cannot be disposed of

D. ,A..pplicability of the rule on Facial Challenge

"The rule 1n our jurisdictJ'on is, only statutes

"In this juris·d/ction, dJe application of doctrines

38. Petitioner submits that Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code