Marc Uribe and Yvon Uribe

1 PO Box 86488
2 San Diego, CA 92138
619-861-4155
3 In Pro Per

4
5
6
7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 MARC URIBE and
Case Number:
12 YVON URIBE
13 Plaintiff
Motion for Restraining Order and
14 v Relief to Wrongful Eviction / Wrongful
Foreclosure [Document No.1]
15 SAN DIEGO HOME FUNDING, LLC
UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE
16 Defendant
OVER $25,000.00
17
18
19
20 Here comes Marc Uribe and Yvon Uribe, husband and wife, Pro Se Plaintiffs respectfully
21 requesting injunctive relief in the form of Restraining Order to Wrongful Eviction / Wrongful
22 Foreclosure from real property, primary residence and homestead, remedies and relief for
23 damages actual and punitive based on Defendant’s fraud, wrongful eviction, fraudulent
24 conveyance, employment of deceptive trade practices, and failure to comply with statutory
25 requirements.
26 1. Background
27 Prior to November 09, 2005, Plaintiffs were “pre-approved” by Cabrillo Mortgage &
28 Realty Services, Camino Del Rio South, Suite 314, San Diego, CA, 92108 for the amount

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1 $273,000.00, the cost of the real property, a modest one bedroom condominium located at 1605
2 Hotel Circle South, #B304, San Diego, CA 92108 to be used as primary residence and
3 homestead. On or about November 09, 2005, Plaintiffs accepted the terms of 100% financing
4 and entered into two Mortgage Notes with American Mortgage Express Corp., 136 Gaither
5 Drive, Mount Laurel, NJ 08054: First Mortgage Note , a Fixed Adustable Rate Loan, for 30
6 years, referred to as 1/5 ARM at 6%, Libor Index Base in the amount of $218,400.00, attached
7 and hereby incorporated by reference as Exhibit: 1/5 ARM and the Second Mortgage in the
8 amount of $54,600.00 , 180 monthly payments of $494.59 at an interest rate of 7.125% , attached
9 and hereby incorporated by reference as Exhibit: 15 Year Balloon, and the Deed of Trust,
10 attached and hereby incorporated by reference as Exhibit: Deed of Trust.
11 On or about October, 2010 Plaintiffs received “NOTICE OF DEFAULT AND
12 ELECTION TO SELL UNDER DEED OF TRUST”, dated 09/27/2010, attached herewith
13 incorporated by reference as Exhibit: ETS NOD , wherein ETS Services LLC requesting
14 $16,827.03 to cure the foreclosure process, and stating $220,425.28 the Principal Balance of the
15 $218,400.00 “ Note”.
16 On or about November, 2010, prior to 30 days after receipt of afore referenced NOTICE
17 OF DEFAULT AND ELECTION TO SELL UNDER DEED OF TRUST, Plaintiffs in good
18 faith advised; GMAC Mortgage, GMAC LLC, and ETS Services LLC, a GMAC Company of
19 their wrongful foreclosure process, deceptive trade practices, improper accounting practices and
20 requested GMAC comply with statutory requirements and provide proof of “beneficial
21 interest”.
22 On or about January 04, 2011, Plaintiffs received NOTICE OF TRUSTEE SALE,
23 attached as Exhibit: NOTS with Foreclosure sale date of January 26, 2011. The “Notice”
24 identifies ETS Services LLC a GMAC Company acting as Trustee(s) for GMAC LLC. Said
25 Notice of Trustee Sale further states the “total amount secured by said instrument is as of the
26 time of publication of this notice is $226,239.00”.
27

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1 On or about January 22, 2011, Plaintiff received correspondence from GMAC Mortgage
2 dated January 18, 2011, attached and hereby incorporated by reference as Exhibit: GMAC
3 Mortgage LLC, stating that the Plaintiff was approved for a trial modification.
4 Plaintiffs assert GMAC LLC, ETS Services LLC a GMAC Company, GMAC Mortgage
5 and GMAC Mortgage LLC do not (emphasis added); legally or contractually hold claim to the
6 Deed of Trust, nor are they assigned as Beneficiary, Trustee, or Assignee in the Deed of Trust as
7 filed with the San Diego County Clerk and attached as Exhibit: Deed of Trust.
8 On or about March 02, 2010, Plaintiff received correspondence from GMAC Mortgage,
9 attached as Exhibit: GMAC Mortgage, stating GMAC Mortgage is currently attempting to
10 work out a loan modification with Plaintiff.
11 On or about March 28, 2011, Plaintiffs received 3-DAY NOTICE OF QUIT, attached as
12 Exhibit: 3 DAY alleging “SAN DIEGO HOME FUNDING, LLC who/which is authorized to
13 receive same.”, and requesting Plaintiffs surrender the real property.
14 On March 28, 2011, Plaintiff found posted on door, a note from John Keville, and 3-
15 DAY NOTICE TO QUIT, both attached and hereby incorporated by reference as Exhibit: 3
16 DAY. The 3 Day Notice to Quit required the Plaintiff to “quit and deliver up possession of the
17 real property” to “San Diego Home Funding, LLC”, ….. “subject property has been duly
18 sold”…. “under a deed of sale contained in the deed of trust”… “and the title under the sale has
19 been duly perfected.” The referenced 3 Day Notice to Quit further stated Plaintiff: “will be
20 responsible for all Court Cost, and may be liable for additional statutory damages of up to SIX
21 HUNDRED DOLLARS($600.00)”.
22 Plaintiffs assert: American Mortgage Express Corp currently holds the Deed of
23 Trust, as well as the First and Second Mortgages. Plaintiffs assert Homecomings Financial
24 LLC, “a GMAC Company” , GMAC Mortgage, GMAC Mortgage LLC, GMAC LLC,
25 and ETS Services LLC a GMAC Company, are not assigned as Trustee(s), Beneficiaries or
26 Nominee(s) and therefore do have the ability to legally hold any claim to the Deed of Trust
27 or the Mortgages and therefore cannot execute or duly perform a Sale under Deed of
28 Trust, Trustee Sale, or Foreclosure Sale.

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1 Plaintiff since March 28, 2011 experienced great emotional pain and suffering and
2 further experienced monetary damages for moving and storage cost to partially vacate the Real
3 Property.
4 On or about April 07, 2011, Plaintiff received correspondence from GMAC Mortgage
5 LLC dated April 05, 2011, stating the Plaintiff loan modification was under review, and GMAC
6 Mortgage would advise on the status within 30 days.
7 On or about April 08, 2011 Defendants filed through Attorney of Record Christine Relph,
8 Bar No. 213984, with the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, North County
9 Division: “COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER, 3 DAY NOTICE TO QUIT,
10 LIMITED CASE, UNDER $10,000.00, Case No. 37-2011-00034566-CL-UD-CTL”, attached
11 and hereby incorporated by reference as Exhibit: Unlawful Detainer.
12 On or about April 13, 2011, Plaintiff found posted on door afore-referenced Exhibit:
13 Unlawful Detainer, and PREJUDGMENT CLAIM OF RIGHT OF POSSESSION.
14 On or about April 14, 2011, Plaintiff received correspondence from GMAC Mortgage
15 LLC dated April 08, 2011, stating the Plaintiff’s loan modification was under review, and
16 GMAC Mortgage would advise on the status within 30 days.
17 Plaintiffs assert Defendant, SAN DIEGO HOME FUNDING, LLC, John Keville,
18 and Michael Contreras are acting as “Foreclosure Consultants”. Plaintiffs assert cause of
19 action for damages actual and punitive as part of San Diego Home Funding, LLC, John
20 Keville, and Michael Contreras conspiracy to fraudulently strip Plaintiffs of their home.
21 Plaintiffs further assert Defendants’ intentional and or negligent disregard for statutory
22 requirements as related to requirements of due diligence and good faith required prior to
23 foreclosure by State and Federal Acts, Codes, and other requirements.
24 As of the date of this filing, Defendants have failed to provide any documentation of
25 ownership of the Real Property, have failed to provide proof of a “duly perfected” title as
26 Defendants assert in referenced Exhibit: 3 DAY, and Exhibit: Unlawful Detainer.
27 Plaintiffs herewith respectfully request the Honorable Court order injunctive relief
28 in the form of Restraining Order from Wrongful Eviction / Wrongful Foreclosure on real

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1 property, primary residence and homestead, Plaintiff further request remedies and relief
2 for damages actual and punitive based on the Defendant’s Fraud, Wrongful Eviction /
3 Wrongful Foreclosure, failure to comply with statutory requirements, fraudulent
4 conveyance, promissory estoppels, and breach of contract, while employing deceptive
5 trade practices while acting as Agent and “Foreclosure Consultant.
6
7 2. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
8 Original Deed of Trust filed in San Diego County, City of San Diego on or about
9 November 15, 2005 and remains in San Diego County. The Plaintiffs cite Kaveh, Khast,
10 Plaintiffs, vs. Washington Mutual Bank; JP Morgan Bank; California Reconveyance Company,
11 Defendants. Case No: 10-CV-2168-IEG (JMA)¸ United States District Court Southern District
12 of California:
13 I. LEGAL STANDARD
14 A party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate: (1) that he is likely to succeed on the
15 merits; (2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the
16 balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v Nat.
17 Res. Def. Council, Inc., — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 365, 374 (2008). Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary
18 remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”
19 Id. at 375-76.
20 II. ANALYSIS
21 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits , 1. Violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law
22 (“UCL”), CAL. US.&PROF. CODE § 17200:
23 California’s unfair competition statute prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business
24 act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 (2009).1 Because Section 17200 is written in the
25 disjunctive, it prohibits three separate types of unfair competition: (1) unlawful acts or practices, 1
26 Plaintiff is a California resident, Defendant JPM Chase is incorporated in Delaware, and the
27 amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Thus, it appears that this case is properly before the court
28 based on diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (2) unfair acts or practices, and (3) fraudulent acts

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1 or practices. Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 548, 561
2 (Cal. 1999). By proscribing “unlawful” acts or practices, “Section 17200 ‘borrows’ violations of
3 other laws and treats them as unlawful practices independently actionable.” Id. at 539-40. When an
4 action is brought by a consumer against the creditor, as is the case here, a broader definition of the
5 word “unfair” applies than when an action is between direct competitors. In this context, an
6 “unfair” business practice occurs “when it offends an established public policy or when the practice
7 is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.” See People
8 v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, Inc., 159 Cal. App. 4th 509, 530 (1984), abrogated on other
9 grounds in Cel-Tech, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 565 & n.12; accord McDonald v. Coldwell Banker, 543
10 F.3d 498, 506 (9th Cir. 2008). The term “fraudulent” as used in Section 17200 “does not refer to the
11 common law tort of fraud” but only requires a showing members of the public “are likely to be
12 deceived.” Puentes v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 903, 909 (Ct. App. 2008)
13 (quoting Saunders v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438, 441 (Ct. App. 1994). “Unless the
14 challenged conduct ‘targets a particular disadvantaged or vulnerable group, it is judged by the effect
15 it would have on a reasonable consumer.’” Puentes, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 909 (quoting Aron v. U-Haul
16 Co. of Cal., 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 555, 562 (Ct. App. 2006)). Claims grounded in fraud, including those
17 alleged under Section 17200, must be pled with particularity under Rule 9(b). See Kearns v. Ford
18 Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009) (“We have specifically ruled that Rule 9(b)’s
19 heightened pleading standards apply to claims for violations of the . . . UCL”). “In cases of
20 corporate fraud, however, the pleading standard is relaxed since the circumstances may make it
21 difficult to attribute particular fraudulent conduct to each defendant as an individual. Rule 9(b)
22 serves to give defendants notice of the specific fraudulent conduct against which they must defend.”
23 625 3rd St. Assoc., L.P. v. Alliant Credit Union, 633 F.Supp.2d 1040, 1049-50 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
24 (citing Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir.2001).Plaintiff claims that, around
25 May 12, 2008, a representative of Defendant WAMU instructed him to cease making the scheduled
26 payments and to default on his loan, and that if Plaintiff complied, WAMU would restructure his
27 loan. Plaintiff’s defaulting on the loan enabled Defendants to begin nonjudicial foreclosure
28 proceedings, culminating with the scheduled sale of the Property on October 27, 2010. See CAL.

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1 CIV. CODE § 2924 (California law only permits foreclosure proceedings after the debtor enters
2 default); Castillo v. Skoba, No. 10-CV-1838-BTM, 2010 WL 3986953, *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2010)
3 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924) (“The power of sale in a nonjudicial foreclosure may only be
4 exercised when a notice of default has first been recorded.”); In Re Henry, 266 B.R. 457, 472 n.14
5 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924) (“Under California law, a secured creditor has
6 no right to commence foreclosure proceedings unless the debtor is in default.”). Taking these
7 allegations as true, the conduct by WAMU appears to be “immoral, unethical, oppressive,
8 unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers,” and thus satisfies the UCL’s “unfair” prong.
9 See Casa Blanca, 159 Cal. App. 4th at 530; McDonald, 543 F.3d at 506. Moreover, a reasonable
10 consumer is likely to rely on representations by a bank’s agent; thus, such conduct also violates the
11 UCL’s “fraudulent” practices prong. See Puentes, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 909. Plaintiff has stated that
12 he possesses documents which support his contention that Defendant WAMU instructed Plaintiff to
13 purposefully enter into default and assured Plaintiff that, if he did so, WAMU would restructure his
14 loan. Accordingly, Plaintiff has demonstrated that at this time he is likely to succeed on the merits of
15 his claim under the UCL.
16 2. Promissory Estoppel
17 Plaintiff alleges that on or about May 12, 2008, a representative of Defendant WAMU told Plaintiff
18 that it would modify his mortgage, but only if Plaintiff was in default. The same WAMU
19 representative, Plaintiff alleges, then “instructed Plaintiff to purposely stop making his mortgage
20 payments in order to qualify.” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 22.) Relying on that statement, Plaintiff ceased
21 making the scheduled payments and defaulted on his loan. Defendants, however, did not restructure
22 Plaintiff’s loan. After Plaintiff defaulted on his loan, California law allowed Defendants to foreclose
23 on Plaintiff’s property unless Plaintiff has defaulted on the loan. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924. “The
24 doctrine of promissory estoppel ‘make[s] a promise binding under certain circumstances, without
25 consideration in the usual sense of something bargained for and given in exchange.’” Garcia v.
26 World Sav., FSB, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 683, 692 (Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Youngman v. Nev. Irrigation
27 Dist., 70 Cal. 2d 240, 249 (1969)); accord Raedeke v. Gibralter Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 10 Cal. 3d 665,
28 672 (1974). “Under this doctrine a promisor is bound when he should reasonably expect a

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1 substantial change of position, either by act or forbearance, in reliance on his promise, if injustice
2 can be avoided only by its enforcement.” Youngman, 10 Cal. 3d at 249. “The vital principle is that he
3 who by his language or conduct leads another to do what he would not otherwise have done shall not
4 subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing the expectations upon which he acted.” Garcia,
5 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 692 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Where a party acts to its
6 detriment in reliance on a promise, promissory estoppel affords that party a remedy, even where the
7 promiso received no consideration for its promise. See Garcia, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 692 (citing Wade
8 v. Markwell & Co., 118 Cal. App. 2d 410, 420 (1953)). In this case, Plaintiff has alleged (a) that
9 Defendant WAMU promised to modify Plaintiff’s loan if Plaintiff stopped making payments and
10 defaulted, (b) that Plaintiff relied on Defendant’s promise and therefore stopped making payments
11 and entered default, and (c) that Defendant failed to modify Plaintiff’s loan as promised. Plaintiff has
12 stated that he possess documents to support this claim, and he has thus shown that he is likely to
13 succeed on the merits of his promissory estoppel claim. See Youngman, 10 Cal. 2d at 249-51; Garcia,
14 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 695-97.
15 B. Likelihood of Irreparable Harm
16 A plaintiff seeking a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction must demonstrate that
17 “irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.” Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 375 (emphasis in
18 original). This requires a plaintiff to demonstrate more than the “possibility” of irreparable harm. Id.
19 If the foreclosure sale of Plaintiff’s Property proceeds on October 27, 2010, as scheduled, Plaintiff
20 will lose his home. Losing one’s home through foreclosure is an irreparable injury. See Alcaraz v.
21 Wachovia Mortgage FSB, 592 F.Supp.2d 1296, 1301 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“Clearly, loss of a home is a
22 serious injury.”). Plaintiff has thus demonstrated the likelihood of irreparable injury absent judicial
23 intervention.
24 C. Public Interest
25 A plaintiff seeking a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction must demonstrate that an
26 injunction is in the public interest. Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 374. Plaintiffs bear the initial burden.
27 Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1139 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 378).
28 There is a strong interest in accurately resolving ownership of real property. See DaSilva v. Wells

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1 Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 3:10-cv-00381, 2010 WL 3910139, at *7 (D. Nev. Oct. 1, 2010) (“[The] public
2 interest in the prevention of improper nonjudicial foreclosures is great.”); Perry v. Nat’l Default
3 Servicing Corp., No. 10-CV-03167, 2010 WL 3325623. at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2010) (nothing that
4 preventing a party from proceeding with a foreclosure sale to which it is entitled does not serve the
5 public interest). Because Plaintiff has demonstrated likelihood of success on the merits, Plaintiff has
6 shown that the public interest favors granting his request for a temporary restraining order.
7 D. Balance of Hardships
8 In order to obtain injunctive relief, a plaintiff must establish that “the balance of equities tips in his
9 favor.” Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 374. The district court “must balance the competing claims of injury and
10 must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.” Id. at
11 376 (quoting Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987). “In
12 exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the public
13 consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 376-77
14 (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982)). The balance of hardships weighs
15 in Plaintiff’s favor. If the sale of Plaintiff’s Property proceeds as scheduled, Plaintiff will lose his
16 home. Even if Defendants were ultimately to prevail, a temporary restraining order will only force
17 them to delay the sale of the Property by a matter of days. The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for
18 a temporary restraining order, and HEREBY ORDERS the following: (1) Defendants are ordered to
19 refrain from foreclosing upon and selling Plaintiff’s home until the Court can hold a hearing on
20 whether a preliminary injunction should issue.
21
22 Plaintiffs respectfully requesting injunction relief in the form of Temporary Restraining
23 Order from Wrongful Foreclosure on real property and primary residence, remedies and relief for
24 damages actual and punitive based on the Defendants’ / Respondents’ wrongful foreclosure by
25 failing to comply with statutory requirements, fraudulent conveyance, promissory estopple, and
26 breach of contract, while employing deceptive trade and improper accounting practices.
27
28 3. PARTIES

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1 Plaintiffs;
2 Marc Uribe and Yvon Uribe, married couple:
3 PO Box 86488, San Diego, CA 92138
4 Defendants;
5 San Diego Home Funding, LLC, John Keville and Michael Allen Contreras,
6 1767 Glidden Court, San Diego, CA 92111
7
8 4. LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
9 Plaintiffs entered into and executed on November 9th, 2005, the Deed of Title / Deed of
10 Trust, the Legal and Binding Agreement for the real property 1605 Hotel Circle South, Suite
11 #B304, San Diego, California 92108, as filed with the County Clerk of San Diego County,
12 California; Plaintiffs reside, in the County of San Diego, California, homestead the real property.
13 Plaintiff asserts Mortgages and Deeds of Trust are legal obligations between the “Borrowers”,
14 the Plaintiffs, and the “Lender” American Mortgage Express Corp. Plaintiff further asserts
15 Fraud, Wrongful Eviction and/or Wrongful Foreclosure as San Diego Home Funding,
16 LLC, acting as a “Foreclosure Consultant”, has fraudulently claimed to Plaintiff: “That
17 on or about 03/28/2011 SAN DIEGO HOME FUNDING , LLC became the owner of the
18 subject premises by purchasing said property in a trustee’s sale following foreclosure
19 proceedings. Said foreclosure sale and all notices preseding said foreclosure were done in
20 compliance with the California Civil Code 2924 et seq. and title under said sale has been
21 duly perfected.”
22 Plaintiffs assert there can be but one form of action for the recovery of any debt, or the
23 enforcement of any right secured by mortgage upon real property." (Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. §
24 726 —and if the loan secured by the deed of trust or mortgage with American Mortgage Express
25 Corp., as currently filed with the County Clerk of San Diego, California was used to pay all or
26 part of the purchase price of the property being foreclosed. (Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. Code §
27 580b.) The purposes behind the One Action Rule statutes are to prevent multiple actions, (See
28 In re: Prestige Ltd. Partnership-Concord v. East Bay Car Wash Partners, 234 F.3d 1108, 1115

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1 (9th Cir. 2000).) Taken together, sections 726, 580a, 580b, and 580d of the California Code of
2 Civil Procedure constitute a comprehensive statutory scheme that specifically protects defaulting
3 borrowers from being taken advantage of by overly aggressive lenders who may care more about
4 making loans than protecting borrowers. (See Clayton Dev. Co. v. Falvey, 206 Cal. App. 3d 438,
5 445 (1988).) The provisions aim to protect against overvaluation by lenders, apply automatically
6 only to standard purchase-money transactions. (See Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal. 2d 35,
7 41 (1963) and Sprangler v. Memel, 7 Cal. 3d 603, 610, and 612 (1972 ) when the borrower has
8 never refinanced and the real property is still encumbered by the original purchase-money trust
9 deed, the borrower retains the protection of the statutes. (See Foothill Village Homeowners Ass'n
10 v. Bishop, 68 Cal. App. 4th 1364, 1367 n.1 (1999).)
11 2009 California Civil Code - Section 3439-3439.12 :: Chapter 1. Uniform Fraudulent
12 Transfer Act, and /or Breach of Contract CIVIL CODE SECTION 3300-3322. Illegal,
13 fraudulent or willfully oppressive sale of property under a power of sale contained in a mortgage
14 or deed of trust." Munger v. Moore (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d. 1. Cal. Financial Code §4970 et seq.
15 and §4973 et seq.
16 Plaintiff assert fraud with the NOTICE OF DEFAULT AND ELECTION TO SELL
17 UNDER DEED OF TRUST including assignment of ETS Services, LLC, a GMAC
18 Company as Trustee, and/or Beneficiary, and/or agent and/or substitute thereof, dated
19 09/27/2010 is null and void in accordance with explicit terms of Exhibit: Deed of Trust.
20 Plaintiff further asserts the NOTICE OF TRUSTEE SALE, Exhibit: NOTS is also thereby
21 Null and Void. {[Civ. No. 34408. Court of Appeals of California, First Appellate District,
22 Division One. April 10, 1975.] GEORGINA REDINGLER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. IMPERIAL
23 SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF THE NORTH, Defendant and Respondent (Opinion
24 by The Court.) [47 Cal.App.3d 49] …..intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent
25 infliction of emotional distress, violation of Business and Professions Code Section 17200
26 (Unfair Business Practices), quiet title, wrongful foreclosure (violation of Civil Code Section
27 2924), accounting and/or promissory estoppel.}
28

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1 Plaintiffs assert the Honorable Court has the authority to order injunctive relief in the
2 form of Restraining Order from Wrongful Eviction and/or Wronful Foreclosure based on the
3 Defendants’ fraudulent conveyance of Title to Property: [No. E041858. Fourth Dist., Div. Two.
4 Nov. 20, 2007.] ROBERT A. GARRETSON, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DEBORAH POST,
5 Defendant and Appellant. (Superior Court of San Bernardino County, No. VCVVS 041043, Kurt
6 J. Lewin, Judge. fn. * )(Opinion by Gaut, J., with Hollenhorst, Acting P. J., and Richli, J.,
7 concurring.) Civ. No. 2787. Fourth Dist. Sept. 15, 1941.]PAUL BOLTON, Appellant, v. R. S.
8 LOGAN, Respondent [1] The protective provisions of section 2945 et seq. pertain to transactions
9 where the homeowner's property is in foreclosure…….. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
10 …….[152 Cal.App.3d 559] Section 2945 et seq. … These provisions of the Civil Code were
11 passed by the Legislature in 1979, in recognition of the fact that "homeowners whose residences
12 are in foreclosure are subject to fraud, deception, harassment and unfair dealing by foreclosure
13 consultants" and hence are in need of legislative protection. These sections provide the
14 homeowner with various procedural safeguards consistent with the expressed legislative intent.
15 Section 2945, subdivision (c), states, "[t]he intent and purposes of this article are the following:
16 (1) To require that foreclosure consultant service agreements be expressed in writing; to
17 safeguard the public against deceit and financial hardship; to permit rescission of foreclosure
18 consultation contracts; to prohibit representations that tend to mislead; and to encourage fair
19 dealing in the rendition of foreclosure services." (See also §§ 2945.2 and 2945.3.)…… The
20 legislative findings and declarations state that homeowners are subject to "fraud, deception,
21 harassment, and unfair dealing by foreclosure consultants from the time a Notice of Default is
22 recorded pursuant to Section 2924 until the time of the foreclosure sale." (§ 2945, subd. (a).)
23 …….. [2] Plaintiff in rebuttal sought to attack the foreclosure decree by introducing evidence
24 over the objection of the defendant attacking the validity of the mortgage and the alleged
25 collusion involved in its foreclosure. The court admitted this evidence but did not make a finding
26 thereon. Judgment upon the second trial went for defendant and plaintiff appeals. The court
27 properly admitted the evidence attacking the validity of the mortgage and the collusion
28 involved in its foreclosure, but erred in not making a finding on this material issue. (Bird v.

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1 Murphy, 72 Cal.App. 39 [236 P. 154]; Krug v. John E. Yoakum Co., 27 Cal.App.2d 91 [80
2 PaCal.2d 492], citing Title Insurance & Trust Co. v. California Development Co., 171 Cal. 173
3 [152 P. 542].) [46 Cal.App.2d 741] ………..… For this reason the judgment is reversed and
4 the cause remanded with instructions to the trial court to make findings as to the validity of
5 the mortgage and the foreclosure and enter judgment accordingly. Barnard, P. J., and Griffin,
6 J., concurred.
7 Plaintiffs again assert GMAC LLC, or ETS Services, LLC are not assigned as Trustee(s),
8 Beneficiaries or Nominee(s) and therefore did not have the ability to legally hold any claim to
9 the Deed of Trust, and therefore did have the ability to legally execute a “Trustee Sale /
10 Foreclosure” through MERS. (Kaveh, Khast, Plaintiffs, vs. Washington Mutual Bank; JP
11 Morgan Bank; California Reconveyance Company, Defendants Case No: 10-CV-2168-IEG
12 (JMA). (“UCL”), CAL. US.&PROF. CODE § 17200: California’s unfair competition statute
13 prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
14 § 17200 (2009).1 Because Section 17200 is written in the disjunctive, it prohibits three separate
15 types of unfair competition: (1) unlawful acts or practices,….. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (2) unfair acts
16 or practices, and (3) fraudulent acts or practices. Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles
17 Cellular Tel. Co., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 548, 561 (Cal. 1999)).
18 Plaintiffs assert GMAC LLC did not legally or contractually hold claim to the Deed
19 of Trust, nor were they assigned as Beneficiary, Trustee, or Assignee in the Deed of Trust as
20 Filed with the San Diego County Clerk and attached as Exhibit: Deed of Trust. . Plaintiffs
21 again assert American Mortgage Express Corp currently holds the Deed of Trust, as well as the
22 First and Second Mortgages. Plaintiff asserts GMAC LLC and ETS Services, LLC, were not
23 assigned as Trustee(s), Beneficiaries or Nominee(s) and therefore Defendants did not have the
24 ability to legally buy the Real Property through Deed of Trust Sale / “Trustee Sale /
25 Foreclosure”. Munger v. Moore (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d. 1. Additionally, the borrower may also
26 obtain damages for emotional distress in a wrongful foreclosure action. Young v. Bank of
27 America (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 108; Anderson v. Heart Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1989)
28 208 Cal.App.3d. 202.

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1 Plaintiffs assert SAN DIEGO HOME FUNDING, LLC the “Foreclosure Consultant”
2 have fraudulently acquired the alleged Title to the real property, (Puentes v. Wells Fargo Home
3 Mortg.) 2009 California Civil Code - Section 3439-3439.12 :: Chapter 1. Uniform Fraudulent
4 Transfer Act, and /or Breach of Contract CIVIL CODE SECTION 3300-3322. Illegal,
5 fraudulent or willfully oppressive sale of property under a power of sale contained in a mortgage
6 or deed of trust." Munger v. Moore (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d. 1. Cal. Financial Code §4970 et seq.
7 and §4973 et seq.
8 Plaintiffs assert the Honorable Court has Jurisdiction in this matter. Plaintiff respectfully
9 request the Honorable Court use discretion and Order immediate injunctive relief in the form of
10 Restraining Order from Wrongful Eviction and/or Wrongful Foreclosure of real property and
11 primary residence, remedies and relief for damages actual and punitive based on the
12 Defendant’s wrongful eviction and/or wrongful foreclosure by failing to comply with statutory
13 requirements, fraud, and employing deceptive trade practices.
14
15 5. ADDITIONAL COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS
16 Plaintiffs assert SAN DIEGO HOME FUNDING, LLC acting in collusion with GMAC,
17 LLC, negligently and/or intentionally employed deceptive trade practices including but not
18 limited to fraudulent conveyance of the Deed of Title, (Puentes v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg.),
19 (Young v. Bank of America) as related to requirements of due diligence and good faith required
20 prior to foreclosure by State and Federal Acts, Codes, all while using a shell game of name
21 changes to confuse the Plaintiff to strip the equity of real property and fraudulently acquire the
22 real property while the Plaintiff relies on the good faith of the “Mortgage Servicers”.
23 Plaintiffs assert that GMAC LLC after fraudulently claiming to be “Mortgage Servicer”
24 (See Clayton Dev. Co. v. Falvey, 206 Cal. App. 3d 438, 445 (1988)).; changed the terms of the
25 Deed of Trust and Mortgage Agreement, and in collusion employed SAN DIEGO HOME
26 FUNDING, LLC as “Foreclosure Consultant” to utilize deceptive trade practices; wrongfully
27 dishonored personal checks; required payment by money order; utilized improper accounting
28 techniques and fraudulently assumed the rights of Trustee, Beneficiary, and Assignee of the

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1 Deed of Trust, and proceeded with wrongful foreclosure. No. D001064. Court of Appeals of
2 California, Fourth Appellate District, Division One. October 18, 1985.] A-C COMPANY, INC., et
3 al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. SECURITY PACIFIC NATIONAL BANK, Defendant and Appellant.
4 (Opinion by Lewis, J., with Kremer, P. J., and Lovett, J., concurring.) On February 22, 1979,
5 Conley and the Company filed a complaint against the Bank for a temporary restraining order,
6 preliminary injunction, declaratory relief and damages, on a cause of action for breach of contract
7 based on an alleged "accord and satisfaction" at the January 31, 1979, meeting. [173 Cal.App.3d
8 469] ….. Promissory estoppel has been characterized as a "peculiarly equitable doctrine designed to
9 deal with situations which, in total impact, necessarily call into play discretionary powers."
10 (Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine (1969) 78 Yale L.J. 343, 379-
11 380.)……Since the causes of action for wrongful dishonor of checks and intentional infliction of

12 emotional distress were entirely dependent upon the Bank's duties arising from an enforceable
13 promise in equity, all other issues raised in the appeal and cross-appeal are moot because of the
14 necessity to reverse on the equitable claim.

15 American Mortgage Express Corp currently holds the Deed of Trust, as well as the First
16 and Second Mortgages. Platiffs assert GMAC, LLC and ETS Services, LLC were never legally
17 assigned as Trustee(s), Beneficiaries or Nominee(s) and therefore Defendants did not have the
18 ability to legally acquire the Deed of Title, (See Clayton Dev. Co. v. Falvey, 206 Cal. App. 3d
19 438, 445 (1988).) through the alleged“Trustee Sale / Foreclosure” through MERS. {[Civ. No.
20 34408. Court of Appals of California, First Appellate District, Division One. April 10, 1975.]
21 GEORGINA REDINGLER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. IMPERIAL SAVINGS AND LOAN
22 ASSOCIATION OF THE NORTH, Defendant and Respondent (Opinion by The Court.) [47
23 Cal.App.3d 49] …...intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional
24 distress, violation of Business and Professions Code Section 17200 (Unfair Business Practices),
25 quiet title, wrongful foreclosure (violation of Civil Code Section 2924), accounting and/or
26 promissory estoppel.} [No. E041858. Fourth Dist., Div. Two. Nov. 20, 2007.] ROBERT A.
27 GARRETSON, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DEBORAH POST, Defendant and Appellant.
28 (Superior Court of San Bernardino County, No. VCVVS 041043, Kurt J. Lewin, Judge. fn. *

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1 )(Opinion by Gaut, J., with Hollenhorst, Acting P. J., and Richli, J., concurring.) Civ. No. 2787.
2 Fourth Dist. Sept. 15, 1941.]PAUL BOLTON, Appellant, v. R. S. LOGAN, Respondent [1] The
3 protective provisions of section 2945 et seq. pertain to transactions where the homeowner's
4 property is in foreclosure…….. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. [152 Cal.App.3d 559]
5 Section 2945 et seq. ….These provisions of the Civil Code were passed by the Legislature in
6 1979, in recognition of the fact that "homeowners whose residences are in foreclosure are
7 subject to fraud, deception, harassment and unfair dealing by foreclosure consultants" and
8 hence are in need of legislative protection. These sections provide the homeowner with various
9 procedural safeguards consistent with the expressed legislative intent. Section 2945, subdivision
10 (c), states, "[t]he intent and purposes of this article are the following: (1) To require that
11 foreclosure consultant service agreements be expressed in writing; to safeguard the public
12 against deceit and financial hardship; to permit rescission of foreclosure consultation contracts;
13 to prohibit representations that tend to mislead; and to encourage fair dealing in the rendition of
14 foreclosure services." (See also §§ 2945.2 and 2945.3.) …... The legislative findings and
15 declarations state that homeowners are subject to "fraud, deception, harassment, and unfair
16 dealing by foreclosure consultants from the time a Notice of Default is recorded pursuant to
17 Section 2924 until the time of the foreclosure sale." (§ 2945, subd. (a).) ……. [2] Plaintiff in
18 rebuttal sought to attack the foreclosure decree by introducing evidence over the objection of the
19 defendant attacking the validity of the mortgage and the alleged collusion involved in its
20 foreclosure. The court admitted this evidence but did not make a finding thereon. Judgment upon
21 the second trial went for defendant and plaintiff appeals. The court properly admitted the
22 evidence attacking the validity of the mortgage and the collusion involved in its foreclosure,
23 but erred in not making a finding on this material issue. (Bird v. Murphy, 72 Cal.App. 39 [236
24 P. 154]; Krug v. John E. Yoakum Co., 27 Cal.App.2d 91 [80 PaCal.2d 492], citing Title
25 Insurance & Trust Co. v. California Development Co., 171 Cal. 173 [152 P. 542].) [46
26 Cal.App.2d 741] ………..… For this reason the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded
27 with instructions to the trial court to make findings as to the validity of the mortgage and the
28 foreclosure and enter judgment accordingly. Barnard, P. J., and Griffin, J., concurred.

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1 Plaintiffs further assert Defendants and GMAC, LLC disregard for statutory requirements
2 as related to requirements of due diligence and good faith required prior to foreclosure by State
3 and Federal Acts, Codes, and other requirements; employment of deceptive trade practices by
4 utilizing name changes of “Mortgage Servicer” as a shell game to confuse the plaintiffs as well
5 as employment of improper accounting practices, and fraudulent conveyance of Mortgages,
6 wherein the Plaintiffs rely on the good faith of the Mortgage Servicers.
7 California Foreclosure Prevention Act :On February 20, 2009, Governor Schwarzenegger
8 signed ABX2 7 and SBX2 7, which establish the California Foreclosure Prevention Act. The
9 California Foreclosure Prevention Act modifies the foreclosure process to provide additional
10 time for borrowers to work out loan modifications while providing an exemption for mortgage
11 loan servicers that have implemented a comprehensive loan modification program. Civil Code
12 Section 2923.52 requires an additional 90 day period beyond the period already provided before
13 a Notice of Sale can be given in order to allow all parties to pursue a loan modification to
14 prevent foreclosure of loans meeting certain criteria identified in that section.
15 Plaintiffs assert statutory requirements for mortgage servicers who have implemented a
16 comprehensive loan modification program may file an application for exemption from the
17 provisions of Civil Code Section 2923.52. Approval of this application provides the mortgage
18 loan servicer an exemption from the additional 90-day period before filing the Notice of Sale
19 when foreclosing on real property as designated by this Section.
20 Plaintiffs call attention to section 1403 of the housing bill (HERA) that was signed into
21 law on July 30, 2008 (HR 3221, the Housing and the Economic Recovery Act of 2008, P.L. 110-
22 289): SEC. 1403. FIDUCIARY DUTY OF SERVICERS OF POOLED RESIDENTIAL
23 MORTGAGE LOANS. The Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) is amended by inserting
24 after section 129 the following new section: “SEC. 129A. FIDUCIARY DUTY OF SERVICERS
25 OF POOLED RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGES. “(a) IN GENERAL.---except as may be established
26 in any investment contract between a servicer of pooled residential mortgages and an investor, a
27 servicer of pooled residential mortgages--- “(1) owes any duty to maximize the net present value of
28 the pooled mortgages in an investment to all investors and parties having a direct or indirect interest

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1 in such investment, not to any individual party or group of parties; and “(2) shall be deemed to act
2 in the best interests of all such investors and parties if the servicer agrees to or implements a
3 modification or workout plan, including any modification or refinancing undertaken pursuant to the
4 HOPE for Homeowners Act of 2008, for a residential mortgage or a class of residential mortgages
5 that constitute a part or all of the pooled mortgages in such investment, provided that any mortgage
6 so modified meets the following criteria:“(A) Default on the payment of such mortgage has occurred
7 or is reasonably foreseeable.“(B) the property securing such mortgage is occupied by the mortgagor
8 of such mortgage. “(C) The anticipated recovery on the principal outstanding obligation of the
9 mortgage under the modification H.R. 3221---157or workout plan exceeds, on a net present value
10 basis, the anticipated recovery on the principal outstanding obligation of the mortgage through
11 foreclosure.“(b) EFINITION.--- As used in this section, the term ‘servicer’ means the person

12 responsible for servicing of a loan (including the person who makes or holds a loan if such person
13 also services the loan).”. [Civ. No. 2179. Fourth Appellate District. November 10, 1938.] MINNIE
14 AMANDA EVANS, as Executrix, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. THE CITIZENS NATIONAL TRUST

15 AND SAVINGS BANK OF RIVERSIDE (a National Banking Association) et al., Defendants and
16 Respondents; JAMES M. LEAVER, Jr., Defendant and Appellant. (Kaveh, Khast, Plaintiffs, vs.
17 Washington Mutual Bank; JP Morgan Bank; California Reconveyance Company, Defendants
18 Case No: 10-CV-2168-IEG (JMA). (“UCL”), CAL. US.&PROF. CODE § 17200: California’s
19 unfair competition statute prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or
20 practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 (2009).1 Because Section 17200 is written in the
21 disjunctive, it prohibits three separate types of unfair competition: (1) unlawful acts or
22 practices,….. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (2) unfair acts or practices, and (3) fraudulent acts or practices.
23 Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 548, 561 (Cal.
24 1999)). Munger v. Moore (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d. 1. Additionally, the borrower may also obtain
25 damages for emotional distress in a wrongful foreclosure action. Young v. Bank of America
26 (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 108; Anderson v. Heart Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1989) 208
27 Cal.App.3d. 202.

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1 Plaintiffs assert cause of action for damages actual and punitive as part of promissory
2 estoppels, and breach of contracts by Mortgage Servicers designed to wrongfully foreclose on
3 the real property. No. D001064. Court of Appeals of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division
4 One. October 18, 1985.] A-C COMPANY, INC., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. SECURITY
5 PACIFIC NATIONAL BANK, Defendant and Appellant. (Opinion by Lewis, J., with Kremer, P. J.,
6 and Lovett, J., concurring.) On February 22, 1979, Conley and the Company filed a complaint
7 against the Bank for a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, declaratory relief and
8 damages, on a cause of action for breach of contract based on an alleged "accord and satisfaction"
9 at the January 31, 1979, meeting. [173 Cal.App.3d 469] ….. Promissory estoppel has been
10 characterized as a "peculiarly equitable doctrine designed to deal with situations which, in total
11 impact, necessarily call into play discretionary powers." (Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and

12 Traditional Contract Doctrine (1969) 78 Yale L.J. 343, 379-380.)……Since the causes of action for
13 wrongful dishonor of checks and intentional infliction of emotional distress were entirely dependent
14 upon the Bank's duties arising from an enforceable promise in equity, all other issues raised in the

15 appeal and cross-appeal are moot because of the necessity to reverse on the equitable claim.
16 Plaintiffs assert damages actual and as a result of emotional distress due to GMAC LLC
17 et al; disregard for statutory requirements as related to requirements of due diligence and good
18 faith required prior to foreclosure by State and Federal Acts, Codes, and other requirements;
19 employment of deceptive trade practices by utilizing name changes of “Mortgage Servicer” as a
20 shell game to confuse the plaintiffs as well as employment of improper accounting practices, and
21 fraudulent conveyance of Mortgages, wherein the Plaintiffs rely on the good faith of the
22 Mortgage Servicers. Plaintiffs assert; they are victims of predatory lending practices GMAC
23 LLC et al, are not assigned as Trustee(s), Beneficiaries or Nominee(s) and therefore do not
24 (emphasis added) have the ability to legally hold any claim to the Deed of Trust. Platiffs assert
25 GMAC LLC et al are not assigned as Trustee(s), Beneficiaries or Nominee(s) in the Deed and
26 therefore do not (emphasis added) have the ability to legally execute a Trustee Sale / Foreclosure
27 Sale.

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1 Plaintiffs assert the Honorable Court has Jurisdiction in this matter. Plaintiff respectfully
2 request the Honorable Court use discretion and order remedies and relief for damages actual and
3 punitive based on the Defendants’ intentionally or negligently employment of fraud.
4
5 6. DAMAGES, ACTUAL and PUNATIVE
6 Plaintiffs herewith respectfully request the Honorable Court consider damages as a result
7 of Wrongful Eviction and/or Wrongful Foreclosure on real property, primary residence and
8 homestead; Plaintiffs request remedies and relief for damages actual and punitive based on the
9 Defendant’s wrongful foreclosure; multiple counts of fraudulent conveyance of rights to the
10 Mortgage Deed of Trust, promissory estoppels, improper accounting practices, wrongful
11 dishonor of checks, predatory lending practices; disregard for statutory requirements as related
12 to requirements of; fiduciary duty, due diligence and good faith required prior to foreclosure by
13 State and Federal Acts, Codes, all while GMAC LLC et al using a shell game of name changes
14 to confuse the homebuyer and strip the equity of real property to fraudulently acquire the real
15 property, wherein the Plaintiffs rely on the good faith of the Mortgage Servicers. {[Civ. No.
16 34408. Court of Appeals of California, First Appellate District, Division One. April 10, 1975.]
17 GEORGINA REDINGLER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. IMPERIAL SAVINGS AND LOAN
18 ASSOCIATION OF THE NORTH, Defendant and Respondent (Opinion by The Court.) [47
19 Cal.App.3d 49] ….party injured by breach should receive as nearly as possible the equivalent of
20 the benefits of performance. (See C.C. 3300; U.C.C. 1106(1)) "For the breach of an obligation
21 arising from contract, the measure of damages, except where otherwise expressly provided by
22 this code, is the amount which will compensate the party aggrieved for all the detriment
23 proximately caused thereby, or which, in the ordinary course of things, would be likely to result
24 therefrom." (C.C. 3300.)…..intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of
25 emotional distress, violation of Business and Professions Code Section 17200 (Unfair Business
26 Practices), quiet title, wrongful foreclosure (violation of Civil Code Section 2924), accounting
27 and/or promissory estoppel.}

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1 Plaintiff asserts actual damages in the amount of $273,000.00 the amount of the
2 Mortgage Deed of Trust, the amount required to replace the homestead wrongfully foreclosed.
3 {[Civ. No. 34408. Court of Appeals of California, First Appellate District, Division One. April
4 10, 1975.] GEORGINA REDINGLER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. IMPERIAL SAVINGS AND
5 LOAN ASSOCIATION OF THE NORTH, Defendant and Respondent (Opinion by The Court.)
6 [47 Cal.App.3d 49] ….party injured by breach should receive as nearly as possible the
7 equivalent of the benefits of performance. (See C.C. 3300; U.C.C. 1106(1)) "For the breach of
8 an obligation arising from contract, the measure of damages, except where otherwise expressly
9 provided by this code, is the amount which will compensate the party aggrieved for all the
10 detriment proximately caused thereby, or which, in the ordinary course of things, would be likely
11 to result therefrom." (C.C. 3300.)…..intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent
12 infliction of emotional distress, violation of Business and Professions Code Section 17200
13 (Unfair Business Practices), quiet title, wrongful foreclosure (violation of Civil Code Section
14 2924), accounting and/or promissory estoppel.}
15
16 Plaintiffs assert emotional distress due to Fraud and Deceptive Practices of SAN
17 DIEGO HOME FUNDING, LLC (Defendant) while acting as a Foreclosure Consultant
18 utilizing fraud in conveyance of the Deeds of Title, Civil Code Section 3333. Damages are the
19 value of the property at the time of the sale in excess of the mortgage and lien against the
20 property. Munger v. Moore (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d. 1. Additionally, the borrower may also obtain
21 damages for emotional distress in a wrongful foreclosure action. Young v. Bank of America
22 (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 108; Anderson v. Heart Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1989) 208
23 Cal.App.3d. 202. Plaintiffs further assert cause of action for damages actual and punitive as part
24 of SAN DIEGO HOME FUNDING, LLC fraud while acting as a Foreclosure Consultant to strip
25 Plaintiffs of their home. No. D001064. Court of Appeals of California, Fourth Appellate District,
26 Division One. October 18, 1985.] A-C COMPANY, INC., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v.
27 SECURITY PACIFIC NATIONAL BANK,

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1 Plaintiffs generally assert emotional distress as a result of Defendants; disregard for
2 statutory requirements as related to requirements of due diligence and good faith required prior
3 to foreclosure by State and Federal Acts, Codes, and deceptive trade practices including fraud
4 while acting as the Foreclosure Consultant.
5
6 7. REQUEST FOR LEGAL FEES and COURT COST
7 The Respondent respectfully request the Honorable Court consider Plaintiffs request
8 Defendants pay Fair and Reasonable Legal Fees and Court Cost in the amount of Ten Thousand
9 Dollars, ($10,000.00.)
10
11 8. PRAYER
12 The Plaintiffs pray the Honorable Court grant injunctive relief and issue Restraining Order
13 prohibiting SAN DIEGO HOME FUNDING, LLC from wrongful foreclosure, and Plaintiffs
14 further pray the Honorable Court use its discretion and provide relief for actual damages in the
15 amount of $273,000.00 the actual cost of the Deed of Trust, and punitive relief for emotional
16 pain and suffering for the wrongful foreclosure based on Defendants general bad faith, in the
17 amount of $273,000.00, the cost of the “like kind” replacement of the Primary Residence and
18 Homestead wrongfully foreclosed. Plaintiff prays for general relief in all respects.
19
20 Respectfully submitted,
21 ______________________________
22 Marc Uribe and Yvon Uribe
23 Pro se Plaintiffs
24 P.O. Box 86488
25 San Diego, CA. 92138
26 Telephone: (619) 861-4155

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