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Paths to Victory
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250 Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies
Yemen, 1962–1970
Case Summary
An insurgency was launched in North Yemen after the country’s ruling
imam was overthrown in a coup by Egyptian-trained military officers
in 1962. Seeking to restore the old order, the imam rallied tribal forces,
with support from Saudi Arabia, to launch a guerrilla campaign against
the new republican government, which maintained a weak hold on
the country. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser responded to the
growing insurgent threat to a fellow revolutionary regime by provid-
ing an increasing level of military support to the Yemeni government.
Initially supplying military advisers and special forces teams, Egypt
sent 60,000 troops to Yemen by 1965 to become the primary COIN
force. Yet, despite their overwhelming land and air power, the Egyp-
tian forces could not adequately defend against the imam’s attacks or
achieve popular support due to their brutal COIN tactics and modern
socialist ideology, which was antithetical to traditional Yemeni culture.
Nasser briefly agreed to mediation efforts but subsequently recommit-
ted a large contingent of Egyptian troops to the region as he sought to
fill the strategic vacuum left by Great Britain’s withdrawal from South
Yemen.
It was only after Egypt’s humiliating defeat in the Arab-Israeli
Six-Day War in 1967 that Nasser decided to withdraw from Yemen.
The Yemeni conflict continued at a reduced pace after Egypt’s with-
drawal, finally ending two years later, when moderate leaders emerged
on both sides. In May 1970, the republicans agreed to establish a more
moderate government that provided the imam’s supporters with sig-
nificant political autonomy.
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Detailed Overviews of 41 Insurgency Cases 251
Case Narrative
Phase I: “A Republican Coup Sparks a Counterrevolutionary
Insurgency and Draws Egypt into a War” (1962–1963)
Phase Outcome: COIN Win (Mixed, Favoring COIN)
657 According to some historical analyses, Egypt actually planned and helped execute the
coup against the imam. Saeed M. Badeeb, The Saudi Egyptian Conflict Over North Yemen,
1962–1970, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986, p. 26.
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252 Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies
Within a few weeks of the coup, the imam rallied tribal forces
in Northern Yemen in support of his effort to restore the old order.
He organized an armed resistance movement and launched a series of
hit-and-run guerrilla attacks in October 1962, which inflicted heavy
losses on republican forces and the Egyptian troops that supported
them. As al-Badr’s campaign progressed, his base of support widened
and extended beyond tribal lines. By early 1963, his “royalist” forces
included as many as 20,000 fighters and gained control of the moun-
tainous regions of the country.658
The imam’s forces received significant external support from the
rulers of Saudi Arabia and Jordan, who sought to aid a fellow monarch
against revolutionaries and contain Nasser’s influence in the region.
The Saudis provided the imam with safe haven, allowing him to set up
a government-in-exile within its borders, and supplied the insurgents
with money, weapons, and training. King Hussein of Jordan provided
funding and equipment to the imam’s forces. In addition, the British
offered covert assistance in the form of indirect shipments of arms and
advisory services through mercenaries.659
Yemen’s republican government responded to this growing insur-
gent threat by requesting more support from Egypt. President Nasser,
who maintained an interest in sustaining the Yemeni revolution-
ary movement and extending his influence in the Arab world, was
Yemen’s primary ally and was willing to meet the government’s esca-
lating needs for military assistance. At first, Egyptian military advisers
were dispatched to Yemen. Then, Egypt deployed a commando unit of
100 troops to safeguard the republic and consolidate control over the
country. The commandos were expected to accomplish their mission
in three months.660 However, within a few weeks, it became clear that
they would be unable to defend against the imam’s attacks, and Cairo
deployed 5,000 additional troops and more than 200 aircraft to the
region.
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Detailed Overviews of 41 Insurgency Cases 253
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254 Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies
Therefore, most of the burden for fighting the war continued to fall to
the Egyptians, creating demand for an even greater commitment of
external forces.665
In an attempt to gain support from the local population, the Egyp-
tians adopted a carrot-and-stick approach toward the Yemeni tribes. In
the early stages of the conflict, they sought to buy tribal loyalty with
offers of gold, yet this often led to a bidding war with the royalists,
with many tribes accepting money from both sides. Later, the Egyp-
tians offered weapons to tribes in an attempt to create tribal auxiliaries
that would fight on the government’s behalf.666 It became clear that
these groups were “republican by day and royalist by night.”667 More-
over, such incentives for cooperation were often overshadowed by the
Egyptians’ brutal policy of dealing with tribes who were suspected of
supporting al-Badr. In 1963, Egyptian forces began conducting aerial
attacks against rural villages, which killed hundreds of civilians, in an
effort to intimidate the population to support the government. They
also began a campaign to destroy agricultural lands and wells of tribes
in royalist-controlled areas. Rather than helping to gain support from
the tribes, the brutality of these acts served to drive many to support
the royalists in an effort to rid the country of Egyptians.668
By the end of 1963, the conflict in North Yemen had reached
a stalemate. After the first two years of fighting, it became clear that
the Egyptian forces were sorely unprepared to combat the royalist
insurgency. Despite its overwhelming manpower, airpower, armor,
and artillery, the army could not adequately defend itself against guer-
rilla attacks or penetrate the insurgency’s safe havens in the moun-
tains. Egypt was unable to extend its control beyond a small triangle of
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Detailed Overviews of 41 Insurgency Cases 255
The Egyptian army intensified its COIN efforts in 1964 with a series of
conventional initiatives and a concerted civic action program. In June
1964, the Egyptian army launched a major offensive against al-Badr’s
forces, including a bold attempt to drive two armored columns into the
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256 Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies
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Detailed Overviews of 41 Insurgency Cases 257
675 Craig V. Thorn, “Egypt’s Vietnam: A Case Study of Egypt’s War in Yemen 1962–1967,”
Lyrisense.com, November 26, 2007; Witty, 2001, p. 424.
676 The royalists controlled half of the country, and the Egyptians and republicans were in
no position to retake lost territory.
677 Saudi sources reported that, at Jeddah, Nasser said to King Faisal, “I beg you to save the
prestige of the Egyptian Army.”
678 Nasser announced that Egypt was revising its plans so that it might stay in Yemen for
five years or longer, if necessary, stating that “we shall reduce our forces and expenditures in
Yemen, but shall not leave the posts which are important.” Witty, 2001, p. 154.
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258 Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies
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Detailed Overviews of 41 Insurgency Cases 259
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260 Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies
Conventional Explanations
The outcome of the Yemeni insurgency was considered an embarrass-
ing defeat for the Egyptian military.682 Despite the engagement of tens
of thousands of its best troops and the employment of sophisticated
weapons and extensive resources over the course of five years, Nasser’s
army failed to gain the upper hand against the imam’s tribal militia
force and was unable to train the fledgling republican forces to success-
fully engage the insurgent force on their own.
This lack of success has been attributed to the inherent weakness
of the republican forces, as well as the Egyptians’ failure to adopt an
effective COIN strategy. Lacking a base of local support, the republi-
can contingent was never able build a credible military force of its own.
At the same time, the Egyptian military, which was built to defend
against conventional armies, was unprepared to fight a guerrilla war.
It conducted large-scale assaults against a dispersed enemy, seeking to
win simply by applying overwhelming force. Even when the Egyptians
developed some COIN strategies, they were introduced very late in the
conflict and were not effectively implemented.683 Egypt’s attempt to
681 Imam al-Badr and his family were exiled to Great Britain.
682 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, Civil War Termination, draft, Stanford Univer-
sity, September 12, 2008.
683 Witty, 2001, pp. 434–438.
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Detailed Overviews of 41 Insurgency Cases 261
support civil government and meet the needs of the population back-
fired as the Egyptians tried to modernize Yemen and build a nation
based on socialist principles that were antithetical to Yemen’s tribal cul-
ture. Any reforms based on the Egyptian or revolutionary model served
only to further alienate the public.
Egypt’s foreign political ideology, its reliance on large-scale con-
ventional military operations, and the significant role it assumed in
directing Yemen’s military and civil affairs led it to be viewed as an
occupier, which, in turn, prompted an increase in popular support
for the insurgents. Many of the difficulties that the Egyptians faced
in North Yemen are common among external powers that attempt to
counter local insurgencies—most notably, the Soviets in Afghanistan
and the United States in Vietnam. Indeed, Nasser himself reportedly
referred to the Yemeni conflict as his Vietnam War.684
The outcome of the Yemeni conflict also demonstrated the impact
that external contests for power have over local conflicts. Egypt’s exten-
sive investment in the conflict was driven by its desire to spread the
cause of Nasser’s revolutionary movement and to gain influence in the
region. In turn, Saudi Arabia grew increasingly committed to support-
ing the royalist movement in an effort retain the influence of tradi-
tional Islamic society and its dominant role in the Arabian Peninsula.
Thus, what began as a civil war escalated rapidly into a war by proxy
between Egypt and Saudi Arabia.685 Not only did the regional contest
intensify the conflict, but it also brought about its end, as external
events compelled Egypt and, later, Saudi Arabia to withdraw, leaving
the republicans and the royalists greatly weakened and ultimately will-
ing to compromise.
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262 Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies
Distinctive Characteristics
• North Yemen has long been one of the world’s most conserva-
tive and isolated regions. Prior to 1962, the country was governed
by Imam al-Badr’s father, Imam Ahmed, who ruled ruthlessly
and rejected nearly all forms of modernization. According to Fred
Halliday, Yemen was “one of the most isolated and static coun-
tries in the world, and had not changed in fundamental systemic
ways from the Yemen of two or even seven centuries earlier.”686
While Imam al-Badr was considered more progressive than his
father, he did not offer the promise of significant reform.
• A unique feature of the Yemeni conflict was its sharp contrast to
the communist-inspired “war of national liberation” characteristic
of the revolutionary process in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
In Yemen, the newly emergent forces representing republicanism
and social progress gained control over the government and were
based in the nation’s major cities, whereas the reactionary royal-
ists led the a counterrevolutionary insurgency from the country-
side with the support of the rural population. Thus, the conflict
was in many ways a war of national liberation in reverse.687
• Among the traditional Yemeni population, individuals owed their
primary loyalty to their tribe, yet tribal loyalties often shifted
during the course of the conflict on the basis of both inter- and
intratribal dynamics. Local tribes often changed sides depend-
ing on which faction was being supported by one of their tradi-
tional enemies. This made it difficult for the COIN force to know
who was a royalist and who was a republican or to differentiate
between friend and foe.688
686 Fred Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans, Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1975, p.
19, quoted in Clive Jones, Britain and the Yemen Civil War, 1962–1965: Ministers, Merce-
naries and Mandarins: Foreign Policy and the Limits of Covert Action, Portland, Ore.: Sussex
Academic Press, 2004.
687 Churba, 1969.
688 Corum and Johnson, 2003, p. 383; Witty, 2001, p. 407.
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Detailed Overviews of 41 Insurgency Cases 263
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264 Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies
Figure 24
Map of Yemen
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