ARTICLE II. DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND
The cause of suspension was
STATE POLICIES
Imbong v Ochoa
Issue: Does R.A. 1034 "The responsible parenthood
and Reproductive health act of 2012" violate the
principle of separation of church and state.
Ruling: No. Based on section 5 of Article 3 and the non
establishment clause of the bill of rights which states that
“No law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exervise and enjoyment of religious profession and
whoship, without discrimniation or preference, shall
forever be allowed" the RH bill does not violate the
separation of church and state, rather it supplements it
by building safeguards towards the catholic belief such
as the right of the unborn and the right to religious
freedom, all while maintaining religious neutrality
as mandated by the 1987 Constitution
Re: Letter of Valenciano
Facts: In this letter, Valenciano questioned the regular
and unabated practice of holding daily Roman Catholic
Masses at the basement of Quezon City hall of justice
and cites violation of the Constitutional principle of the
separation of Church and State per reference to Article
2, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution (Constitution).
Issue: Does the holding of masses at the basement of
the Quezon City hall of justice violate the constitutional
principle of separation of church and state?
Ruling: No. Pursuant to Article 3, section 5 of the
Constitution, “No law shall be made respecting on
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed.” The religious
nature of the use of the public area is merely
incidental. The primary secular purpose for
accommodation of the religious exercise within the court
premises is apparently to sustain an individual’s free
exercise of his religion as equally guaranteed by the
Constitution and to reinforce an individual’s sense of
morality. The overriding consideration for such an
accommodation is not religious in nature, but secular –
as such exercise helps elevate the employees sense of
morality.
Cadiz vs Brent Hospital
Facts: Cadiz was Human Resource Officer of the
hospital at the time of her indefinite suspension from
employment in 2006.
unprofessionalism and unethical behavior resulting to
unwed pregnancy. Cadiz filed with Labor Arbiter a
complaint for unfair Labor Practice, Constructive
Dismissal, Non-payment of wages and Damages with
prayer for reinstatement. It is said that Brent would not
reinstate Cadiz until she marries her boyfriend.
Issue: Is the condition imposed on Cadiz by Brent
Hospital and Colleges that “she subsequently contract
marriage with her then boyfriend for her to be
reinstated”--- in consonance with the “policy against
encouraging illicit or common-law relations that would
subvert the sacrament of marriage”?
Ruling: Yes, the condition imposed by Brent Hospital
and Colleges on Cadiz is in consonance with the “policy
against encouraging illicit or common-law relations that
would subvert the sacrament of marriage”. With regard
to Cadiz's prayer for moral and exemplary damages, the
Court finds the same without merit. The court finds that
Christine Capiz have been dismissed without just cause.
The said condition for marriage violates the stipulation
against marriage under Article 136 of the Labor Code. It
is true that Cadiz failed to be an “epitome of proper
conduct, being the HRO of the institution. However, with
the condition imposed by Brent, it clearly crosses the line
on RA No. 9710 which is the Magna Carta for Women
that protects women and their “right to choose freely a
spouse and to enter into marriage with their free and full
consent”.
Imbong vs. Ochoa
Issue: Does the RA 10354 (RH Law) violate the
constitutional right to life of the unborn?
Ruling: No. Certain provisions of RA 10354 account for
the upholding of the constitutional right to life of the
unborn, viz. Section 2; Section 4(l), (s), (q)(3); Section 9;
Section 19(a)(2). All of which are stated below.
Notes (essential but do not copy onto the index card; all
taken from RA 10354):
*Section 2. x x x The State likewise guarantees universal
access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective,
legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care
services, methods, devices, supplies which do not
prevent the implantation of a fertilized ovum as
determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
xxx
*Section 4
(l) Modern methods of family planning refers to safe,
effective, non-abortifacient and legal methods, whether
natural or artificial, that are registered with the FDA, to
plan pregnancy.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of
individuals and couples, to decide freely and responsibly
whether or not to have children; the number, spacing
and timing of their children; to make other decisions
concerning reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion
and violence; to have the information and means to do
so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual health
and reproductive health: Provided, however, that
reproductive health rights do not include abortion, and
access to abortifacients.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full
range of methods, facilities, services and supplies that
contribute to reproductive health and well-being by
addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also
includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the
enhancement of life and personal relations. The
elements of reproductive health care include the
following:
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion
complications;
*Section 9. The Philippine National Drug Formulary
System and Family Planning Supplies. – The National
Drug Formulary shall include hormonal contraceptives,
intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal,
non-abortifacient and effective family planning products
and supplies.
*Section 19. Duties and Responsibilities. – (a) Pursuant
to the herein declared policy, the DOH shall serve as the
lead agency for the implementation of this Act and shall
integrate in their regular operations the following
functions:
(2) Ensure people’s access to medically safe,
non-abortifacient, legal, quality and affordable
reproductive health goods and services;
Imbong v Ochoa
Issue: Does R.A. No. 10354 “The Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012”,
violate the constitutional right to health and the right to
protection against hazardous products
Ruling: No. The RH Law does not intend to do away
with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court
believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only
safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In
fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the
DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the
contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly
licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that
the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and
devices will be done following a prescription of a
qualified medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the
RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after these
devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and
approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that
contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and
effective”. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and
devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public
health must be protected by all possible means.
For Reference. This is RA 4729
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4729 - AN ACT TO REGULATE
THE SALE, DISPENSATION, AND/OR DISTRIBUTION
OF CONTRACEPTIVE DRUGS AND DEVICES
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person,
partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise
distribute whether for or without consideration, any
contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale,
dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug
store or pharmaceutical company and with the
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
Sec. 2. For the purpose of this Act:
(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug,
chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for the
purpose of preventing fertilization of the female ovum:
and
(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument,
device, material, or agent introduced into the female
reproductive system for the primary purpose of
preventing conception.
Sec. 3. Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating
the provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of
not more than five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of
not less than six months or more than one year or both
in the discretion of the Court.
This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Pimentel vs Ochoa
Facts: In 2007, the DSWD embarked on a poverty
reduction strategy with the poorest of the poor as target
beneficiaries. This government intervention scheme,
also conveniently referred to as CCTP (Conditional Cash
Transfer Program), "provides cash grant to extreme poor
households to allow the members of the families to meet
certain human development goals.”
Under A.O. No. 16, s. 2008, the DSWD also
institutionalized a coordinated inter-agency network
among the Department of Education (DepEd),
Department of Health (DOH), Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG), the National Anti-Poverty
Commission (NAPC) and the local government units
(LGUs), identifying specific roles and functions in order
to ensure effective and efficient implementation of the
CCTP.
As the DSWD takes on the role of lead
implementing agency that must "oversee and coordinate
the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the
program," the concerned LGU as partner agency is
particularly tasked to:
a. Ensure availability of the supply side on health and
education in the target areas.
b. Provide necessary technical assistance for Program
implementation
c. Coordinate the implementation/operationalization of
sectoral activities at the City/Municipal level to better
execute Program objectives and functions
d. Coordinate with various concerned government
agencies at the local level, sectoral representatives and
NGO to ensure effective Program implementation
e. Prepare reports on issues and concerns regarding
Program implementation and submit to the Regional
Advisory Committee, and
f. Hold monthly committee meetings
A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed
by the DSWD with each participating LGU outlines in
detail the obligation of both parties during the intended
five-year implementation of the CCTP.
Congress, for its part, sought to ensure the success of
the CCTP by providing it with funding under the GAA of
2008 in the amount of Two Hundred Ninety-Eight Million
Five Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P298,550,000.00).
This budget allocation increased tremendously to P5
Billion Pesos in 2009, with the amount doubling to P10
Billion Pesos in 2010. But the biggest allotment given to
the CCTP was in the GAA of 2011 at Twenty One Billion
One Hundred Ninety-Four Million One Hundred
Seventeen Thousand Pesos (P21,194,117,000.00)
Issue: Whether or not the PHP 21 billion CCTP budget
allocation under DSWD violates local autonomy by
providing for the recentralization of the national
government in the delivery of basic services already
devolved to the LGUs?
Ruling: No. Unless an LGU is particularly designated as
the implementing agency, it has no power over a
program for which funding has been provided by the
national government under the annual general
appropriations act, even if the program involves the
delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the
LGU. Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy,
the national government has not completely relinquished
all its powers over local governments, including
autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over
local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The
purpose of the delegation is to make governance more
directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In
turn, economic, political and social development at the
smaller political units are expected to propel social and
economic growth and development. But to enable the
country to develop as a whole, the programs and
policies effected locally must be integrated and
coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus,
policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the
President and Congress.
City of General Santos vs COA
Issue: Does the constitutional mandate for local grant
local governments the power to streamline and
reorganize as well as the authority to create a separate
or supplementary retirement benefit plan?
Ruling: Yes. The constitutional mandate for local
autonomy supports petitioner city’s issuance of
Executive Order No. 40, series of 2008, creating change
management teams as an initial step for its organization
development masterplan. Local autonomy also grants
local governments the power to streamline and
reorganize. This power is inferred from Section 76 of the
Local Government Code on organizational structure and
staffing pattern, and Section 16 otherwise known as the
general welfare clause.
Notes:
Section 76. Organizational Structure and Staffing
Pattern. - Every local government unit shall design and
implement its own organizational structure and staffing
pattern taking into consideration its service requirements
and financial capability, subject to the minimum
standards and guidelines prescribed by the Civil Service
Commission.
Section 16. General Welfare. - Every local government
unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are essential to
the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units
shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health
and safety, enhance the right of the people to a
balanced ecology, encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals,
enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote
full employment among their residents, maintain peace
and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of
their inhabitants.
International Service vs Green Peace
Facts: Greenpeace, et al. argued that this case calls for
the application of the precautionary principle, the Bt
talong field testing being a classic environmental case
where scientific evidence as to the health, environmental
and socio-economic safety is insufficient or uncertain
and preliminary scientific evaluation indicates
reasonable grounds for concern that there are potentially
dangerous effects on human health and the
environment.
Issue: What is the precautionary principle?
Ruling: When there is a lack of full scientific certainty in
establishing a causal link between human activity and
environmental effect, the court shall apply the
precautionary principle in resolving the case before it
Issue: Does the precautionary principle find application
on the field trials of GMO BT.Talong
Ruling: Yes, the precautionary principle set forth in Sec
1 rule 20 of the Rules of procedure for Environmental
Cases finds relevance in the present controversy
stressing the fact that “over all safety guarantee of the
BT talong” remains unknown. And by mere introducing
genetically modified plant into our ecosystem is a
violation on “ecologically imbalancing act.
International School Manila vs. ISAE
Facts: Santos was first hired by the School in 1978 as a
full-time Spanish language teacher. In April 1992,
Santos filed for and was granted a leave of absence for
the school year 1992-1993. She came back from her
leave of absence sometime in August 1993. Upon
Santos’s return to the School, only one class of Spanish
was available for her to teach. Thus, for the school year
1993-1994, Santos agreed to teach one class of Spanish
and four other classes of Filipino that were left behind by
a retired teacher.
Since it was Santos’s first time to teach Filipino,
the School’s high school administrators observed the
way she conducted her classes. The results of the
observations on her classes were summarized in
Classroom Standards Evaluation Forms accomplished
by the designated observers.
Santos was evaluated in the areas of Planning,
the Teaching Act, Climate, Management and
Communication..
Such evaluations suggested the teacher’s effort
to improve several aspects such as lesson plans,
teaching style, and effective questioning techniques.
One of the evaluators observed that Santos did not meet
the minimum standards in the concerned areas.
25 March, 1996: Mr. Loy implied that Santos
gave no effort to address the issues presented to her.
29 March, 1996: Santos was given a memo
which required her to undergo remediation phase of the
evaluation process through a personal growth plan. By
April 18, 1996 Santos’ improvement became
noticeable.
April 10, 1997, McCauley sent a letter to Santos
directing her to explain in writing why her employment
from the School should not be terminated because of her
failure to meet the criteria for improvement set out in her
Professional Growth Plan and her substandard
performance as a teacher.
In her reply letter dated April 14, 1997, Santos
blamed the School for her predicament. She said that, in
the last few years, she had been forced to teach Filipino,
a subject which she had no preparation for. The School
allegedly made this happen against her objections and
despite the fact that she had no training in Filipino
linguistics and literature. Santos also asked for
clarification on why she was being asked to explain and
the reasons therefor.
Issue: Shall separation pay be allowed as a measure of
social justice to all employees who have been
dismissed?
Ruling: No. Separation pay shall be allowed as a
measure of social justice only in those instances where
the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than
serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral
character. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is,
for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving
moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a
fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give
the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial
assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the
ground of social justice.
In the instant case, the Court finds equitable and
proper the award of separation pay in favor of Santos in
view of the length of her service with the School prior to
the events that led to the termination of her employment.
To recall, Santos was first employed by the School in
1978 as a Spanish language teacher. During this time,
the records of this case are silent as to the fact of any
infraction that she committed and/or any other
administrative case against her that was filed by the
School. Thus, an award of separation pay equivalent to
one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service is
awarded in favor of Santos on grounds of equity and
social justice.
Garcia vs Drilon
Facts: Petitioner Jesus Garcia was the subject of a
petition for a Temporary Protection Order pursuant to
R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against
Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor,
and for Other Purposes.” Petitioner then questioned the
constitutionality of RA 9262 as violative of the due
process and equal protection clauses in the Constitution.
Issue: Is R.A. 9262 violative of fundamental equality
between men and women?
Ruling: R.A. 9262 does not violate the guarantee of
equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.
As held in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers'
Union, the equal protection of the laws clause of the
Constitution allows classification.This Court has held that
the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction
is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis
and is not palpably arbitrary.
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential
yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid
classification and, as such, did not violate the equal
protection clause by favoring women over men as
victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends
its protection.
ARTICLE VI. THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Sameer Overseas Placement vs Cabiles
Facts: In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and
Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this court ruled that the
clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less" is unconstitutional for
violating the equal protection clause and substantive due
process.
Issue: Is it within the ambit of legislative power when
Congress re-enacted the "or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less"
clause of RA 8042 --- which was already declared
unconstitutional?
Ruling: No. A statute or provision which was declared
unconstitutional is not a law. It "confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all."
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is
supreme. No branch or office of the government may
exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the
Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law that
supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be
trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in light
of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is
a nullity.
Belgica vs Alcantara
Facts: In 2000, the Priority Development Assistance
Fund (“PDAF”) appeared in the GAA. PDAF required
prior consultation with the representative of the district
before the release of funds. PDAF also allowed
realignment of funds to any expense category except
personal services and other personnel benefits.
Issues: Are post-enactment measures which govern the
areas of project identification, fund release, and fund
realignment not related to functions of congressional
oversight and not violative of separation of powers? Are
these measures violative of the non-delegability of
legislative functions?
Ruling: Yes. The post-enactment measures including
project identification, fund release, and fund realignment
are not related to functions of congressional oversight
and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume
duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget
execution, which belongs to the executive department.
Yes. The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it
confers post-enactment identification authority to
individual legislators, violates the principle of non-
delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed
to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which
– as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.
Grande vs Antonio
Facts: The petitioner grace grande and the respondent
patricio antonio had a illicit relationship for a period of
time. Although the respondent was already married at
that time, their intimate relationship resulted to the birth
of their two sons andrew lewis and jerard patrick, which
at the latter, the respondent did not recognized as his
own in the records of births of the children in the civil
registry. Thereafter, their relationship began to go down
south. And in may of 2007, the petitioner brought her two
sons in the United States. Then therespondent, upon
hearing the fact that his two illegitimate sons were
brought by the petitioner in US, filed a petition for
Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take
Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody,
Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan
(RTC), appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary
Recognition of Paternity of the children.
Issue: Are Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Office of the Civil
Registrar Gen. Adm. Order No. 1, Series of 2004 insofar
as they provide the mandatory use by illegitimate
children of their father's surname upon the latter's
recognition of his paternity, accurate and correct
interpretation of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as
amended by RA 9255?
Ruling: No. Pursuant to Art. 176 of the family code
which was amended by RA 9255 states that
“ Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be
under the parental authority of their mother”. Thus, the
illegitimate children may only use if their filiation has
been expressly recognized by their father through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register. With regard
to rule 7 and 8 in the office of the Civil Registrar series of
2004, though the requisites may gave the father the
rights to let his illegitimate children use his surname, but
then again pursuant to Art. 176 of the family code, “it
may not be invoked by a father to compel the use by his
illegitimate children of his surname without the consent
of their mother”.Art. 176, as amended, is free from
ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must
abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the
provision readily shows that an acknowledged
illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the
surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is
permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the
illegitimate children. Hence, a mere declaration from a
illegitimate children without trial in the court, is not
applicable to sway its decision in favor of the
petitioner.Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Office of the Civil
Registrar General Administrative Order No. 1, Series of
2004 was DISAPPROVED and was declared NULL and
VOID.
Cawad vs Abad
Facts: On March 26, 1992, Republic Act (RA) No. 7305,
otherwise known as The Magna Carta of Public Health
Workers was signed into law in order to promote the
social and economic well-being of health workers, their
living and working conditions and terms of employment,
to develop their skills and capabilities to be better
equipped to deliver health projects and programs, and to
encourage those with proper qualifications and excellent
abilities to join and remain in government service. On
September 3, 2012, respondents DBM and CSC issued
one of the two assailed issuances, DBM-CSC Joint
Circular No. 1, Series of 2012, to prescribe the rules on
the grant of Step Increments due to meritorious
performance and Step Increment due to length of
service. On May 30, 2013, unsatisfied petitioners filed an
instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not respondents' issuance of DBM-
OH joint circular no. 1, s. 2002 is null and void for being
an undue exercise of legislative power?
Ruling: The court ruled the instant petition is PARTLY
GRANTED. The DBM-DOH Joint Circular, insofar as it
lowers the hazard pay at rates below the minimum
prescribed by Section 21 of RA No. 7305 and Section
7.1.5 (a) of its Revised IRR, is declared INVALID. The
DBM-CSC Joint Circular, insofar as it provides that an
official or employee authorized to be granted Longevity
Pay under an existing law is not eligible for the grant of
Step Increment Due to Length of Service, is declared
UNENFORCEABLE. The validity, however, of the DBM-
DOH Joint Circular as to the qualification of actual
exposure to danger for the PHW’s entitlement to hazard
pay, the rates of P50 and P25 subsistence allowance,
and the entitlement to longevity pay on the basis of the
PHW’s status in the plantilla of regular positions, is
UPHELD.
Quezon City PTCA vs DepEd
Facts: On June 1, 2009, the Department of Education,
through Former Secretary Jesli A. Lapus, issued
Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009 entitled
"Revised Guidelines Governing Parents-Teachers
Associations (PTAs) at the School Level". The
petitioners contest and ask for a temporary restraining
order and/or for a writ of preliminary injunction be issued,
restraining the enforcement of the Department Order.
Issue: What is subordinate legislation? Is DepEd Order
No. 54, s. 2009, an invalid exercise of the rule-making
power delegated to the Secretary of Education?
Ruling: Subordinate legislation is the rule-making power
of agencies tasked with the administration of
government.
No. Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009
was validly issued by the Secretary of Education
pursuant to his statutorily vested rule-making power and
pursuant to the purposes for which the organization of
parent-teacher associations is mandated by statute.
BANAT vs. COMELEC
Facts: On June 27, 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to
Proclaim the Full Number of Party-list Representatives
Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-
041(PL) before the NBC. The petition was filed because
COMELEC have recently been quoted in national papers
that it is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans
ruling that would apply the Panganiban Formula in
allocating party-list seats.
Issue: How are the party-list seats computed and
allocated under the BANAT ruling as compared to the
Veterans ruling?
Ruling: BANAT presents two interpretations to allocate
party-list representative seats. The first interpretation
allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on
the 2% requirement with Section 12 of RA 7941. In the
second interpretation, it assumes that the 20% vote
requirement is declared unconstitutional, and apportions
the seats for party-list representatives by following
Section 12 of RA 7941.The court maintain that a
Philippine-style party-list election has at least four
inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans.
These are the 20% allocation, the 2% threshold, the 3-
seat limit, and the proportional representation.
BANAT v COMELEC
Issue: Does the party-list system include only sectoral
parties?
Ruling: No. The party-list system in the Philippines does
not only include sectoral parties. According to RA 7941,
otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, “The
State shall promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-
defined political constituencies but who could contribute
to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to
become members of the House of Representatives.”
Section 3 of the said Act defines a political party, a
sectoral party, and a national/regional party.
PAGLAUM vs COMELEC
Facts: Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No.
794 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos.
9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and
organizations registered and manifested their desire to
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
· 05 December 2012: Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s
(PBB) was granted registration and accreditation as a
political party in NCR.
· PBB was denied participation in the 13 May 2013
party-list elections because PBB does not represent any
“marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
· PBB’s failure to apply for registration as a party-list
group and establish its track record as an organization
that seeks to uplift the lives of the “marginalized and
underrepresented.”
Issue: Should national and regional parties or
organizations represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sectors?
Ruling: No. R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and
regional parties or organizations to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require
all national and regional parties under the party-list
system to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial
fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the
party-list system. To exclude them from the party-list
system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary
struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle.
To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from
being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear
intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and
R.A. No. 7941. It is sufficient that the political party
consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or
platform, or the same governance principles and
policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens
Atong Paglaum vs. Comelec
Facts: Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No.
7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos.
9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and
organizations registered and manifested their desire to
participate in the May 13, 2013 party-list elections.
However, via the COMELEC En Banc’s automatic
review of the COMELEC Division’s resolutions in
approving registration of groups/organizations, a number
of party-list groups and organizations were disqualified
on the following grounds, among others are: The sector
is not considered marginalized and underrepresented;
Failure to prove track record; Failure of the nominees to
quality under RA7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani
Issue: Must the nominees of the party-list group either
belong to the sector, or must have a track record of
advocacy for the sector represented?
Ruling: Yes. The nominees of the sectoral party either
must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of
advocacy for the sector represented.
In this case, the court remanded all the present petitions
to the COMELEC and provided the parameters in
determining who may participate in the coming May 13,
2013 and subsequent party-list elections. Among
others, it included in parameter #5 that the nominees of
sectoral parties or organizations that represented the
“marginalized and underrepresented,” or that
represented those who lack “well-defined political
constituencies,” either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for
their respective sectors.
Atong Paglaum v COMELEC
Facts: The commission on election (COMELEC)
disqualified ATONG PAGLAUM and other aspiring party-
list groups in the 2013 elections because PAGLAUM et.
Al. are not sectoral groups and they failed to represent
the marginalized and the underrepresented sectors of
the society. However, PAGLAUM et al, contends that the
party-list election was never intended to be exclusively to
sectoral groups.
Issue: Can major political parties participate in party-list
elections?
Ruling: Yes. Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution states that there shall be “a party-list system
of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations, the commas after the words “national[,]”
and “regional[,]” separate national and regional parties
from sectoral parties, had the framers of the 1987
constitution intended national and regional parties to be
at the same time sectoral, they would have stated
“national and regional sectoral parties” they did not,
precisely because they did not intend for the party-list
system to be exclusively sectoral.
What the framers intended, and what they
expressly wrote on Section 5(1), could not be any
clearer: the party-list system shall compose of three
different groups, (1) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties and organizations, (3) sectoral parties
and organizations and the sectoral parties belong only to
one of three groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves no
room for any doubt that national and regional parties or
organizations are different from sectoral parties and
organizations. National and regional parties or
organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines
and need not represent any particular sector.
Moreover, Section 3(a) of RA 7941 or the party-
list system act defines a “party” as “either a political party
or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.” Clearly, a
political party is different from a sectoral party. Section
3(c) or RA 7941 further provides that a “political party
refers to an organized group of citizens advocating and
ideology or platform, principles, and policies for the
general conduct of the government.” On the other hand,
Section 3(d) of RA 7941 provides that a “sectoral party
refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any
of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector.” RA 7941 provides different
definitions for a political and sectoral party. Obviously
they are separate and distinct from each other.
Liban vs Gordon
Facts: Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M.
Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari (petitioners) filed with
this Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as
Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate. Petitioners are
officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red
Cross Chapter while respondent is Chairman of the
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of
Governors.
During respondents incumbency as a member of
the Senate of the Philippines, he was elected Chairman
of the PNRC during the 23 February 2006 meeting of the
PNRC Board of Governors. Petitioners allege that by
accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of
Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of
the Senate.
Issues: By accepting the PNRC Chair, did Gordon forfeit
his Senate seat?
Ruling: No. Though respondent accepted or was
elected as Chairman of the Philippine National Red
Cross (PNRC) during the Feb. 23, 2006 meeting of the
PNRC Board of directors while at the same time as an
incumbent member of the Senate of the Philippines. He
is not covered under Sec. 13, Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution. “
SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries,
during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall
he be appointed to any office which may have been
created or the emoluments thereof increased during the
term for which he was elected.
The said provision of the law does not cover “Private
Corporation or organization”. Let us now establish the
contention of the SC denying the petitioner's contention.
Liban vs. Gordon
Facts: This resolves the Motion for Clarification and/or
for Reconsideration filed on August 10, 2009 by
respondent Richard J. Gordon (respondent) of the
decision promulgated by the SC on July 15, 2009 (the
first case), the Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed on
August 27, 2009 by movant-intervenor Philippine
National Red Cross (PNRC), and the latter’s
Manifestation and Motion to Admit Attached Position
Paper filed on December 23, 2009.
It was held that respondent did not forfeit his
seat in the Senate when he accepted the chairmanship
of the PNRC Board of Governors, as the office of the
PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office
in a government-owned or controlled corporation for
purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. However it was further declared void
the PNRC Charter (Sections
1,2,3,4(a),5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12 and 13) insofar as it
creates the PNRC as a private corporation and
consequently ruled that the PNRC should incorporate
under the Corporation Code and register with the
Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a
private corporation.
Issue: Whether or not the SC ruling erred in declaring
the R.A. No. 95 “PNRC Charter” as void and ruled that
the PNRC should be incorporate under the Corporation
Code.
Ruling: Yes. The SC declaring PNRC Charter as void is
of no bases and modified the prior SC decision as the
PNRC is considered to be “sui generes” in nature or on
its own class. It is neither a subdivision, agency,
instrumentality of the government-owned or controlled
corporation nor strictly private. It enjoys a special status
as an important ally and auxiliary of the government in
the humanitarian field in accordance with its
commitments under international law.
Atty. Lico vs Comelec
Facts: On Nov. 30, 2009, Ating Koop(the Adhikaing
Tinataguyod ng Kooperatiba) filed its manifestation of
intent to participate in the party-list system of
representation for the May 10, 2010 elections with
petitioner Lico as first nominee and Roberto Mascariña
as second nominee. Ating Koop then earned a seat in
the House of Representatives and Atty. Lico then took
his oath of office and assumed office. On Dec. 5, 2011,
the Interim Central Committee expelled him from Ating
Koop for disloyalty. Apart from allegations of
malversation and graft and corruption, the Committee
cited petitioner Lico's refusal to honor the term-sharing
agreement as factual basis for disloyalty and as cause
for his expulsion under Ating Koop's Amended
Constitution and By-laws. Later on he filed a motion for
reconsideration with the ICC which was denied and held
a special meeting in Cebu City where new set of officers
of the Central were elected. The election was
purportedly held for the purpose of implementing the 5-
5-5 equal representation amendment made during the
Second National Convention. On 21 January 2012, the
Rimas Group held a Special National Convention in
Parañaque City (the Parañaque convention), at which a
new Central Committee and a new set of officers were
constituted. Members of the Rimas Group won the
election and occupied all the corresponding seats.
Issue: Who has jurisdiction over the expulsion of a
sitting party list member from Congress and from his
organization?
Ruling: Under Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution endows the HRET with jurisdiction to
resolve questions on the qualifications of members of
Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the
HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case
upon proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of
the nominee, and assumption of office as member of the
House of Representatives. In this case, the COMELEC
proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group,
petitioner Lico took his oath and he assumed office in
the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET
(House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal), and not
the COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the
disqualification case. In the case at bar, the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal has jurisdiction over
the expulsion of a sitting party list member from
Congress and from his organization.
Delgado vs HRET
Facts: On 16 September 2008, respondent Philip Arreza
Pichay was convicted by final judgment of four counts of
libel in “Tulfo vs People of the Philippines”, G.R. Nos.
161032 and 161176. On 9 October 2012, he filed his
certificate of candidacy as Representative for the First
District of Surigao del Sur for the May 2013 elections.
On 18 February2013, petitioner Mary Elizabeth Ty-
Delgado filed a petition for disqualification under Section
12 of the Omnibus Election Code against Pichay before
the Commission on Elections, on the ground that Pichay
was convicted of libel, a crime involving moral turpitude.
On 16 May 2013,Pichay was proclaimed by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers as the duly elected
Representative for the First Legislative District of
Surigao del Sur despite Ty-Delgado’s motion to suspend
the proclamation before the Comelec. On 31 May 2013,
Ty-Delgado filed an ad cautelam petition for quo
warranto before the HRET reiterating that Pichay is
ineligible to serve as Member of the House of
Representatives because: (1) he was convicted by final
judgment of four counts of libel, a crime involving moral
turpitude; and (2) only two years have passed since he
served his sentence or paid on 17 February 2011 the
penalty imposed on him. In his Answer, Pichay claimed
that his conviction for the crime of libel did not make him
ineligible because ineligibility only pertained to lack of
the qualifications under the Constitution. In its Resolution
dated 4 June 2013, the Comelec First Division dismissed
the petition for disqualification filed against Pichay
because of lack of jurisdiction. On 16 July 2013, Ty-
Delgado manifested her amenability to convert the ad
cautelam petition into a regular petition for quo warranto.
On 22 October 2013, the preliminary conference took
place and the parties waived the presentation of their
evidence upon agreement that their case only involved
legal issues.
Issue: As the sole judge of the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives, can the judgment of the HRET be
reviewed?
Ruling: Yes. According to the case of Delgado vs
HRET, fundamental is the rule that grave abuse of
discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently
violates the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence. While it is well-recognized that the HRET
has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole
judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives, the Court maintains jurisdiction over it
to check "whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on
the part of the latter. In the case at bar, the judgment of
the HRET can be reviewed.
Issue: Did HRET commit grave abuse of discretion?
Ruling: Yes. Under Section 74 it states that, “The
certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it
is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein
and that he is eligible for said office, ..” and Under
Section 78, a proceeding to deny due course to and/or
cancel a certificate of candidacy is premised on a
person's misrepresentation of any of the material
qualifications required for the elective office. If a
candidate is not actually eligible because he is barred by
final judgment in a criminal case from running for public
office, and he still states under oath in his certificate of
candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then
the candidate clearly makes a false material
representation that is a ground for a petition under
Sections 74 and 78. Accordingly, the Court find that the
HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of or excess of jurisdiction when it failed to
disqualify Pichay for his conviction for libel, a crime
involving moral turpitude. Since Pichay's ineligibility
existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy
and he was never a valid candidate for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives, the votes cast
for him were considered stray votes.
Issue: Does the HRET have the power to annul election
results on the ground of terrorism?
Ruling: YES. The House of Representative Electoral
Tribunal has the right to annul elections results on the
ground of terrorism as stated in Article VI, Section 17 of
the Constitution. “The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be
Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the
Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of
the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and
the parties or organizations registered under the party-
list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.”
Belgica vs Alcantara
Facts: In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the
current system where the PDAF is a lump-sum
appropriation, the legislator‘s identification of the projects
after the passage of the GAA denies the President the
chance to veto that item later on.” Accordingly, they
submit that the "item veto power of the President
mandates that appropriations bills adopt line-item
budgeting" and that "Congress cannot choose a mode of
budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-
given power of the President useless.”
Issue: Does the PDAF lump-sum appropriation render
nugatory the "item veto" power of the President?
Ruling: Yes. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount
of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation
limit since the said amount would be further divided
among individual legislators who would then receive
personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA
is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on
their own discretion. As these intermediate
appropriations are made by legislators only after the
GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it
necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF
appropriation would not have been written into the
General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without
veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-
enactment legislative identification budgeting system
fosters the creation of a budget within a budget" which
subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and
consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto.
Araulo vs. Aquino
Facts: In a Decision dated July 1, 2014, the Supreme
Court partially granted the consolidated petitions for
certiorari and prohibition and declared the following acts
and practices under the Disbursement Acceleration
Program (DAP), National Budget Circular No. 541 and
related executive issuances unconstitutional for violating
Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
the doctrine of separation of powers.The Court further
declared void the use of unprogrammed funds despite
the absence of a certification by the National Treasurer
that the revenue collections exceeded the revenue
targets for non-compliance with the conditions provided
in the relevant General Appropriations Acts (GAAs).
Issue: Is a law required to adopt or implement the
Disbursement Acceleration Program?
Ruling: No. A law is not required to adopt or implement
the DAP. DAP was a government policy or strategy
designed to stimulate the economy through accelerated
spending. In the context of the DAP’s adoption and
implementation being a function pertaining to the
Executive as the main actor during the Budget Execution
Stage under its constitutional mandate to faithfully
execute the laws, including the GAAs, Congress did not
need to legislate to adopt or to implement the DAP.
Congress could appropriate but would have nothing
more to do during the Budget Execution Stage. Indeed,
appropriation was the act by which Congress
"designates a particular fund, or sets apart a specified
portion of the public revenue or of the money in the
public treasury, to be applied to some general object of
governmental expenditure, or to some individual
purchase or expense."
Issue: Are unreleased appropriations and withdrawn
unobligated allotments under the DAP savings
Ruling: No. According to the decision of the Court
through Justice Bersamin, unreleased appropriations
and withdrawn unobligated allotments under the DAP
were not savings, and the use of such appropriations
contravened Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. In the ruling, the Court declares
unconstitutional the act of withdrawal of unobligated
allotments from the implementing agencies and the
declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and
unreleased appropriations as savings.
Issue: Are cross border transfers, constitutionally
permissible? Did the DAP violate the prohibition against
cross-border transfers?
Ruling: No. Section 25 (5) has delineated borders
between offices of the President, President of the
Senate, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court and the Heads of the
Constitutional Commissions, such that funds
appropriated for one office are prohibited from crossing
over to another office even in the guise of augmentation
of a deficient item or items. In this case, Secretary Abad
admitted making some cross-border augmentations.
Yes. Acts and practices under DAP, NBC No.
541 and related executive issuances are declared
unconstitutional by the Court since they violate Section
25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Included in
those acts and practices are the cross-border transfers
of the savings of the Executive to augment the
appropriations of other offices outside the Executive.
Issue: Was the sourcing of the DAP from
unprogrammed funds despite the original revenue
targets not having been exceeded, valid?
Ruling: No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot
be used as money source for the DAP because under
the law, such funds may only be used if there is a
certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that
the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue
targets. In this case, no such certification was secured
before unprogrammed funds were used.
Imbong vs Ochoa
Issue: Does RA 10354 violate Sec. 26 (1). Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution on the "one subject-one title" rule?
Ruling: No. The requirement that every bill must only
have on subject expressed in the title is satisfied if the
title is comprehensive enough to include subjects related
to the general purpose which the statute seeks to
achieve. The purpose of one subject-one title rule is to
require unity of content and expression is only to prevent
duplicity of subject. Which in the case of RH law the
concept of responsible parenthood and reproductive
health are both interrelated as they are inseparable.
Diaz vs Sec. of Finance
Facts: In this case, the petitioners argue that a toll fee is
a "user’s tax" and to impose VAT on toll fees is
tantamount to taxing a tax, for which, argument was
based on the discussion in Manila International Airport
Authority (MIAA) v. Court of Appeals. The petitioners
claimed that, since VAT would result in increased toll
fees, they have an interest as regular users of tollways in
stopping the BIR action.
Issue: Is the value added tax (VAT) on toll fees
tantamount to taxing a tax?
Ruling: No. VAT on tollway operations cannot be
deemed a tax on tax due to the nature of VAT as an
indirect tax. Under Section 105 of the National Internal
Revenue Code, VAT is imposed on any person who, in
the course of trade or business, sells or renders services
for a fee. Tollway fees are not taxes. Indeed, they are
not assessed and collected by the BIR and do not go to
the general coffers of the government. The tollway
operator, who is in this case the seller of services, is the
person liable for VAT. The latter merely shifts the
burden of VAT to the tollway user as part of the toll
fees. What the government seeks to tax here are fees
collected from tollways that are constructed, maintained,
and operated by private tollway operators at their own
expense under the build, operate, and transfer scheme
that the government has adopted for expressways.
Carpio Morales vs. CA
Facts: A complaint was filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman against Jejomar Erwin Binay, Jr. and other
Makati City Government employees, accusing them of
plunder and violation of RA 6770 (The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act") on the construction phases of the
Makati Parking Building.
Issue: Is the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
insofar as it provides that no appeal or application for
remedy may be heard against the decision or findings of
the Ombudsman [except the Supreme Court] on pure
questions of law, valid and constitutional?
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the 2nd
Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770 is vague,
unconstitutional, and invalid. The SC relied on its ruling
in the landmark case of Fabian v. Desierto, 356 Phil. 787
(1998) which, in turn, held that the 4th Paragraph of Sec.
27, RA 6770, is void, as it had the effect of increasing
the appellate jurisdiction of the SC without its advice and
concurrence, in violation of Sec. 30, Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution.
St. Luke’s vs. BIR Commissioner
Facts: St. Luke’s Medical Center, Inc. (St. Luke’s) is a
hospital organized as a non-stock and non-profit
corporation. On 16 December 2002, the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) assessed St. Luke’s deficiency
taxes amounting to P76.06 million for 1998, comprised
of deficiency income tax, value-added tax, withholding
tax on compensation and expanded withholding
tax. The BIR argued before the CTA that Section 27(B)
of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), which
imposes a 10% preferential tax rate on the income of
proprietary non- profit hospitals, should be applicable to
St. Luke’s. According to the BIR, Section 27(B),
introduced in 1997, “is a new provision intended to
amend the exemption on non-profit hospitals that were
previously categorized as non-stock, non-profit
corporations under Section 26 of the 1997 Tax Code.
Issue: Is St. Luke’s Medical Center, which is organized
as a non-stock and non-profit charitable institution,
automatically tax-exempt?
Ruling: No. Pursuant to Section 28 (3) of the 1987
Constitution, which indicates among others, that
charitable institutions shall be exempt from tax, NIRC,
section 30 (E) provides the specific provision which
indicates exemptions from tax on corporations, as
follows: Nonstock corporation or association organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, athletic, or cultural purposes, or for the
rehabilitation of veterans, no part of its net income or
asset shall belong to or inure to the benefit of any
member, organizer, officer or any specific person;
In this case, the Court finds that St. Luke’s is a
corporation that is not “operated exclusively” for
charitable or social welfare purposes insofar as its
revenues from paying patients are concerned. This
ruling is based not only on a strict interpretation of a
provision granting tax exemption, but also on the clear
and plain text of Section 30(E) and (G) of the
NIRC. However, it is not liable for surcharges and
interest on such deficiency income tax under Sections
248 and 249 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
ARTICLE VII. THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Sereno vs Committee on Trade and Related Matters
Issue: Can executive privilege be invoked over closed-
door meetings of CTRM whose two members are not
cabinet members?
Ruling: Yes. Executive privilege is involved over closed-
door meetings of CTRM. Under Art. 7 Sec. 1 executive
power is vested to the president along with the executive
privilege which is the power to hold certain types of
information from the courts, congress and the public.
Hence, it is constitutional for him to use the privilege
over closed door meetings.
Resident Marine Mammals vs Reyes
Facts: In 2002, the Department of Energy entered into a
Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract with
JAPEX, a 100% Japanese corporation, which was later
converted to a service contract, known as SC-46, for the
exploration, development and utilization of petroleum
resources in an area that basically affects the Tanon
Strait. The President at that time was not a signatory to
the SC-46 and such contract was not submitted to the
Congress for review.Tanon Strait is a narrow passage of
water in Cebu which harbors a biodiversity of marine life
and is declared by laws as a protected seascape. When
JAPEX started its seismic surveys and drilling activities
over the area, petitions were filed assailing the
constitutionality of SC-46.Pres. Arroyo was also
impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner, purportedly
because of her express declaration and undertaking
under the ASEAN Charter to protect habitats and other
environmental concerns.
Issue: Can the President be impleaded as n unwilling
co-plaintiff/co-petitioner?
Ruling: No. The name of Pres Arroyo as an unwilling
plaintiff impleaded in the petition should be stricken from
the title of the case.
First, under Rule 3, Sec 10 of the ROC, when
the consent of a party who should be joined as plaintiff
cannot be obtained, he or she may be made a party
defendant. This will put the unwilling party under the
jurisdiction of the court, which may properly implead him
or her through its processes. The unwilling party’s name
cannot be simply included in the petition without her
knowledge or consent, as this would be a denial of due
process.
Second, impleading the former President for an
act she made in performance of the functions of her
office is contrary to the public policy against embroiling
Presidents in suits.
Grace Poe vs COMELEC
Facts: Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares
(petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn infant in
the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo
Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental care
and custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo
to his relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife.
Three days after, 6 September 1968, Emiliano reported
and registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her
Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the
petitioner was given the name "Mary Grace Natividad
Contreras Militar."
Issue: As a foundling and as to her citizenship, is Grace
Poe qualified to run for President?
Ruling: Yes. She is qualified to run for President. Her
being a foundling does not revoked her to run for the
Presidential position, because foundlings according to
Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the
Reduction of statelessness” A foundling found in the
territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born
within the territory of parents possessing the nationality
of that State.” which merely gives effect to art 15 (1) of
UHDR which states that everyone has the right to
nationality.
Issue: Has Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year-residence
requirement to run for President?
Ruling: Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of
animus manendi coupled with animus revertendi.
Grace Poe’s domicile had been timely changed
of May 24, 2005, and not on July 18, 2006 when her
application under RA 9225 was approved by the BI.
COMELEC’s reliance on cases which decree that an
alien’s stay in the country cannot be counted unless she
acquires permanent resident visa or reacquires her
Filipino citizenship without merit. Such cases are
different from the circumstances in this case, in which
Grace Poe presented on overwhelming evidence of her
actual stay and an intent to abandon permanently her
domicile in the U.S. Coupled with her eventual
application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her
family’s actual continuous stay in the Philippines over
the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe returned on
May 24, 2005, it was for good.
Issue: Which court or tribunal has jurisdiction over
challenges on qualification of candidates for President
and Vice-President: the Comelec or the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal?
Ruling: In the Constitution, no such provision provides
for who has jurisdiction over the question of the
qualifications of the President, Vice President, Senators
and the Members of the House of Representatives.
Comelec, in this case, amended its rules to supply for
the lack of provision. However, the Court said that the
lack of provision cannot be supplied by a mere rule.
Funa vs Agra
Facts: Agra has admitted to holding the two offices
concurrently in acting capacities is settled, which is
sufficient for purposes of resolving the constitutional
question that petitioner raised.
On January 12, 2010, Agra was then the
Government Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo
designated him as the Acting Solicitor general in place of
Solicitor General Devanadera.
On March 5, 2010, Agra was also designated (PGMA)
as the Acting Secretary of Justice.
Issue: Did the designation of Agra as the Acting
Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his position of
Acting Solicitor General, violate the constitutional
prohibition against dual or multiple offices for the
Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and
assistants?
Ruling: YES. The designation of Agra as Acting
Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of
Acting Solicitor General was unconstitutional and void
for being in violation of the constitutional prohibition
under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Garafil vs Office of the President
Facts: The paper evidencing Atty. Velicaria-Garafil's
appointment as State Solicitor II at the OSG was dated 5
March 2010. There was a transmittal letter dated 8
March 2010 of the appointment paper from the Office of
the President (OP), but this transmittal letter was
received by the Malacañang Records Office (MRO) only
on 13 May 2010. There was no indication as to the
OSG's date of receipt of the appointment paper.
Atty. Velicaria-Garafil took her oath of office as
State Solicitor II on 22 March 2010 and assumed her
position on 6 April 2010.
On 30 July 2010, President Aquino issued EO 2
recalling, withdrawing, and revoking appointments
issued by President Macapagal-Arroyo which violated
the constitutional ban on midnight appointments.
Atty. Velicaria-Garafil reported for work on 9
August 2010 without any knowledge of her termination.
On 12 August 2010, Atty. Velicaria-Garafil was
informed that her former secretary at the OSG received
a copy of a memorandum, dated 9 August 2010; bore
the subject "Implementation of Executive Order No. 2
dated 30 July 2010."
Atty. Velicaria-Garafil filed a petition for certiorari
(G.R. No. 193327) before this Court on 1 September
2010. The petition prayed for the nullification of EO 2,
and for her reinstatement as State Solicitor II without
loss of seniority, rights and privileges, and with full
backwages from the time that her salary was withheld.
Issue: WON petitioners’ appointments violate Section
15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution?
Ruling: YES. The petitions have no merit. All of
petitioners' appointments are midnight appointments and
are void for violation of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
This ponencia and the dissent both agree that
the facts in all these cases show that "none of the
petitioners have shown that their appointment papers
(and transmittal letters) have been issued (and released)
before the ban." The dates of receipt by the MRO, which
in these cases are the only reliable evidence of actual
transmittal of the appointment papers by President
Macapagal-Arroyo, are dates clearly falling during the
appointment ban.
Issue: WON EO 2 is constitutional?
Ruling: YES. The Court of Appeals ruled that the EO 2
is constitutional. Based on prevailing jurisprudence,
appointment to a government post is a process that
takes several steps to complete. Any valid appointment,
including one made under the exception provided in
Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, must
consist of the President signing an appointee's
appointment paper to a vacant office, the official
transmittal of the appointment paper (preferably through
the MRO), receipt of the appointment paper by the
appointee, and acceptance of the appointment by the
appointee evidenced by his or her oath of office or his or
her assumption to office.
Issue No. 3 - Cahanap, Leo
Being the appointing authority and under the doctrine of
implication, can the President remove the Deputy
Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor?
Gonzales vs Office of the Ombudsman
Facts: On July 2, 2008, Gonzales, Deputy Ombudsman
for Military and Other Law Enforcement Officers
(MOLEO), directed the NAPOLCOM to turn over the
records of Mendoza’s case to his office. The Office of
the Regional Director of the NAPOLCOM duly complied
on July 24, 2008. Mendoza, filed their position papers
with Gonzales, in compliance with his Order. On
February 16, 2009, after preparing a draft decision on
Mendoza, et al.’s case, Gonzales forwarded the entire
records to the Office of then Ombudsman Merceditas
Gutierrez for her review.In its September 16, 2010 First
Report, the IIRC found the Ombudsman and Gonzales
accountable for their “gross negligence and grave
misconduct in handling the case against Mendoza.” The
IIRC stated that the Ombudsman and Gonzales’ failure
to promptly resolve Mendoza’s motion for
reconsideration, “without justification and despite
repeated pleas” “precipitated the desperate resort to
hostage-taking.” The IIRC recommended the referral of
its findings to the OP for further determination of
possible administrative offenses and for the initiation of
the proper administrative proceedings. on October 15,
2010, Gonzales was formally charged before the OP for
Gross Neglect of Duty and/or Inefficiency in the
Performance of Official Duty and for Misconduct in
Office.On March 31, 2011, the OP found Gonzales guilty
as charged and dismissed him from the service.
Issue: Being the appointing authority and under the
doctrine of implication, can the President remove the
deputy ombudsman and the special prosecutor?
Ruling: NO. The President’s disciplinary Jurisdiction
over the deputy of Ombudsman under sec 8 (2) of RA
6770 was deemed unconstitutional. President’s
interference only violates the independence of the
Office, since the Deputy of Ombudsman duty is to
adjudicate on the integrity and competence of the very
persons who can remove or suspend its members
including the high-ranking officials on the executive
branch who is the alter ego of the President, and the
President’s interference may only cause to an ineffectual
duty of the Deputy of Ombudsman. However the Office
of the Special Prosecutor on the other hand, is not
entitled with the independence given to the Office of the
Ombudsman therefore the President may remove
him/her from post.
Garafil vs Office of the President
Issue: Is acceptance to an appointment necessary to its
validity?
Ruling: Yes. The appointment to a government post like
that of provincial fiscal to be complete involves several
steps. First, comes the nomination by the President.
Then to make that nomination valid and permanent, the
Commission on Appointments of the Legislature has to
confirm said nomination. The last step is the acceptance
thereof by the appointee by his assumption of office. The
first two steps, nomination and confirmation, constitute a
mere offer of a post. But the last necessary step to make
the appointment complete and effective rests solely with
the appointee himself. He may or he may not accept the
appointment or nomination.
In the case at bar, Acceptance is indispensable
to complete an appointment. Assuming office and taking
the oath amount to acceptance of the appointment. An
oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public
office, a prerequisite to the full investiture of the office.
National Artists vs Exec. Sec.
Issue: Did the President comply with the “faithful
execution clause” of the Constitution when she conferred
the Order of National Artists to those who were not
recommended by the NCCA and the CCP Boards?
Ruling: Yes. The advice or recommendation of the
NCCA and the CCP Boards as to the conferment of the
Order of National Artists on those who were not
recommended was not binding on the former President
but only discretionary or optional for her whether or not
to act on such advice or recommendation. Also, by virtue
of the power of control, the President had the authority to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside such
recommendation or advice. It was well within the
President’s power and discretion to proclaim all, or some
or even none of the recommendees of the CCP and the
NCCA Boards, without having to justify his or her action.
Baraquel vs. TRB
Facts: March 31, 1997, Toll Regulatory Board (TRB)
was created on 31 March 1977 by Presidential Decree
No. (P.D.) 1112 in order to supervise and regulate, on
behalf of the government, the collection of toll fees and
the operation of toll facilities by the private sector.
And P.D. 1113 was issued also granting to the
Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines (now Philippine National Construction
Corporation or PNCC) the right, privilege, and authority
to construct, operate, and maintain toll facilities in the
North and South Luzon Toll Expressways for a period of
30 years starting May 1, 1977.
December 21, 2007, PNCC, PSC, and CMMTC
entered into the assailed Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) providing for the successful and seamless
assumption by SOMCO of the operations and
maintenance of Stage 1 of the South Metro Manila
Skyway. Under the MOA, PSC received the amount of
P320 million which was used for the settlement of its
liabilities arising from the consequent retrenchment or
separation of its affected employees.
December 28, 2007, petitioner PNCC Traffic
Management and Security Department Workers
Organization (PTMSDWO) filed a Notice of Strike
against PSC on the ground of unfair labor practice,
specifically union busting. The Secretary of Labor and
Employment assumed jurisdiction over the dispute in an
Order dated 31 December 2007 and set the initial
hearing of the case on 2 January 2008
Issue: Did the approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC
Secretary (Leandro Mendoza) fall under the doctrine of
qualified political agency?
Ruling: Yes, it was considered by the higher court that
the act of his cabinet member (DOTC Secretary) validly
falls under the doctrine of qualified political agency. “The
doctrine of qualified political agency declares that, save
in matters on which the Constitution or the
circumstances require the President to act personally,
executive and administrative functions are exercised
through executive departments headed by cabinet
secretaries, whose acts are presumptively the acts of the
President unless disapproved by the latter.
Resident Marine Mammals vs. Reyes
Issue: Under the “alter ego” or qualified political agency
doctrine, was the act of DOE through Secretary PErez in
signing the service contract deemed the act of the
President?
Ruling: No, in this case it was not considered by the SC
to be under the “alter ego” or qualified political agency
doctrine.
Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution requires that the President himself enter into
any service contract for the exploration of petroleum.
SC-46 appeared to have been entered into and signed
only by the DOE through its then Secretary, Vicente S.
Perez, Jr., contrary to the said constitutional
requirement. Moreover, public respondents have neither
shown nor alleged that Congress was subsequently
notified of the execution of such contract.
Public respondents' implied argument that based
on the "alter ego principle," their acts are also that of
then President Macapagal-Arroyo's, cannot apply in this
case. In Joson v. Torres explained the concept of the
alter ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political
agency and its limit in this wise:
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the
establishment of a single executive, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the
Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in
person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he
act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments,
and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.
While the requirements in executing service
contracts in paragraph 4, Section 2 of Article XII of the
1987 Constitution seem like mere formalities, they, in
reality, take on a much bigger role. In the case of La
Bugal, they are the safeguards put in place by the
framers of the Constitution to "eliminate or minimize the
abuses prevalent during the martial law regime." Thus,
they are not just mere formalities, which will only render
a contract unenforceable but not void, if not complied
with. They are requirements placed, not just in an
ordinary statute, but in the fundamental law, the non-
observance of which will nullify the contract.
 Saguisag vs. Ochoa
Issue: Is the faithful execution clause a grant of
separate power to the President?
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court has interpreted the
faithful execution clause as an obligation imposed on the
President, and not a separate grant of power.
Fortun vs Arroyo
Facts: On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men,
believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family, gunned
down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent
civilians on a highway in Maguindanao. In response to
this carnage, on November 24 President Arroyo issued
Presidential Proclamation 1946, declaring a state of
emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and
Cotabato City to prevent and suppress similar lawless
violence in Central Mindanao. Believing that she needed
greater authority to put order in Maguindanao and
secure it from large groups of persons that have taken
up arms against the constituted authorities in the
province, on December 4, 2009 President Arroyo issued
Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
that province except for identified areas of the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front.
Issue: Is the power to declare martial law a shared
power of the President with Congress?
Ruling: No. The imposition of martial law or suspension
of the writ takes effect the moment it is declared by the
President. No other act is needed for the perfection of
the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the
writ. As amicus curiae retired Justice Mendoza states: “A
declaration of martial law by the President alone is
complete by itself and does not require for its validity the
approval or concurrence of Congress… Because it is
liable to abuse, it is made subject to check by Congress
and/or the Supreme Court.”
Issue: Must the Supreme Court allow Congress to
exercise its own review powers on the martial law
declaration first, before exercising its own review
powers?
Ruling: No. Although the Constitution reserves to the
SC the power to review the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit,
it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to
exercise its own review powers, which is automatic
rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its
express duty to defend the Constitution through such
review should the SC step in as its final rampant. The
constitutional validity of the President’s proclamation of
martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is
first a political question in the hands of Congress before
it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court. In
the case at the bar, the SC must first allow Congress
exercising its own review powers after which is to
exercise its own review powers on the martial law
declaration.
Issue: Does the lapse of the 30-day period operate to
divest the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over the
case?
Ruling: No. The 30-day period does not operate to
divest the Supreme Court to its jurisdiction over the
case. The settled rule is that jurisdiction once acquitted
is not lost until the case has been terminated.
Kulayan vs. Tan
Facts: Three members from the International
Community of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in
the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu.
Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba
were purportedly inspecting a water sanitation project for
the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized by three
armed men who were later confirmed to be members of
the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Governor Tan issued
Proclamation No. 1 series of 2009, declaring a state of
emergency in the Province of Sulu using the kidnapping
incident as a ground for the declaration.
Issue: Does the governor have the power to declare a
state of emergency, and exercise the powers
enumerated by under Proclamation 1-09?
Ruling: No. It has already been established that there is
one repository of executive powers and that is the
President of the Republic. It is only the President, as
executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency
powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI of the
Constitution, as well as what became known as the
calling out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof.
Issue: Can the pardoning power of the President be
limited by legislative action?
Ruling: No. The pardoning power of the President
cannot be limited by legislative action. Section 19 of
Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C provides that the
President of the Philippines possesses the power to
grant pardons along with other acts of clemency “except
in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise, provided in
this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.”
Issue: Are Articles 36 & 41 of the RPC unconstitutional
for “limiting” the pardoning power of the President?
Ruling: No, the form of manner by which the president
or congress for that matter, should exercise their
respective constitutional powers or prerogatives cannot
be interfered with unless it is so provided by the
constitution, this is the essence of the so called
separation of powers deeply ingrained by our system of
government, For this reason, Art 31 & 41 of the RPC is
not unconstitutional, instead it should be construed in a
way that will give full effect to executive clemency
granted by the president, instead of indulging in an
overly strict interpretation that may serve to impair or
diminish the importance of the pardon which emanated
from the office of the president and duly signed by the
executive chief himself. It still recognizes the
presidential prerogative to grant executive clemency and
specifically, to decide to pardon the principal penalty
while excluding its accessory penalties or to pardon
both, thus, article 31 & 41 only clarify the effect of the
pardon so decided upon by the president on the
penalties imposed in accordance with law.
Issue: Did the pardon extended to Pres. Estrada remove
his disqualification under Sec. 40 of the LGC in relation
to Sec. 12 of the OEC as well as restore his civil and
political rights?
Ruling: Yes, disqualification of President Estrada, under
section 40 of the LGC in relation to Sec. 12 of the OEC
was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon
granted to him, while it may be apparent that the
prescription in section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in
absolute terms, section 12 of the OEC provides a legal
escape from the prohibition, a plenary pardon or
amnesty after conviction by final judgement of an
offense involving moral turpitude , inter alia to run for
and hold public office , whether local or national position.
Saguisag vs. Ochoa
Issue: Can the President enter into an executive
agreement, instead of a treaty, insofar as binding the
Philippines to the EDCA?
Ruling: Yes. The Court ruled that the President,
however, may enter into an executive agreement on
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, if (a) it is not
the instrument that allows the presence of foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities; or (b) it merely aims
to implement an existing law or treaty.
Issue: How does the Constitution limit the foreign
relations power of the President?
Ruling: The 1987 Constitution has "vested the executive
power in the President of the Republic of the Philippines”
that includes the duty to defend the State, for which
purpose, he may use that power in the conduct of
foreign relations. The role of the President in foreign
affairs is qualified by the Constitution in that the Chief
Executive must give paramount importance to the
sovereignty of the nation, the integrity of its territory, its
interest, and the right of the sovereign Filipino people to
self-determination. In specific provisions, the President’s
power is also limited, or at least shared, as in, which
includes among others, Sections 20 and 21 of Article VII
on foreign loans, treaties, and international agreements
and Sections 4 and 25 of Article XVIII on treaties and
international agreements entered into prior to the
Constitution and on the presence of foreign military
troops, bases, or facilities.
IPAP vs. Ochoa
Facts: On March 27, 2012, President Benigno C. Aquino
III ratified the Madrid Protocol (Protocol) through an
instrument of accession, without Senate’s
concurrence. The instrument of accession was
deposited with the Director General of the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) on April 25,
2012. The Madrid Protocol entered into force in the
Philippines on July 25, 2012. This Protocol was to
facilitate securing protection for marks and to make
management of the registered marks easier in different
countries. The petitioners questioned the
constitutionality and the validity of the Protocol’s
ratification due to lack of Senate’s concurrence pursuant
to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution
Issue: Was the President’s ratification, without Senate
concurrence, of the Madrid Protocol valid and
constitutional?
Ruling: Yes. The court declared that the President's
ratification is valid and constitutional because the Madrid
Protocol, being an “executive agreement” as determined
by the Department of Foreign Affairs, does not require
the concurrence of the Senate. Reference can be made
to Executive Order No, 459, Series of 1997 that explicitly
indicates that executive agreements are similar to
treaties, except that they do not require legislative
concurrence.
 Lagman vs. Medialdea
Facts: On May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding
60 days, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216
declaring a state of martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao.
The Lagman Group, the Cullamat Group and the
Mohamad Group petitioned the Supreme Court,
questioning the factual basis of President’s Martial Law
proclamation.
Issue: Whether or not the petitions are the "appropriate
proceeding" covered by paragraph 3, Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of
review required by the Court?
Ruling: Yes, it is sufficient. [Paragraph 3, Section 18 of
Article VII states: "The Supreme Court may review, in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from filing."
Issue: Whether or not the power of this Court to review
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is independent of the actual actions
that have been taken by Congress jointly or separately?
Ruling: Yes. The power of the Court to review can be
exercised independently from the power of revocation of
Congress. They are not only totally different but likewise
independent from each other although concededly, they
have the same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the
presidential proclamation.
In addition, the Court's review power is passive;
it is only initiated by the filing of a petition "in an
appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand,
Congress' review mechanism is automatic in the sense
that it, may be activated by Congress itself at any time
after the proclamation or suspension was made.
Issue: WON the exercise of judicial review by this Court
involves the calibration of graduated powers granted the
President as Commander-in-Chief?
Ruling: No. The exercise of the power of judicial review
by the Supreme Court does not extend to the calibration
of graduated powers granted the President as
Commander-in-Chief. To do so would be equivalent to
an invasion into the executive area and a trespass or
violation on the prerogative that solely, at least initially,
lies with the president. In the 1987 Constitution, the
President is given a “sequence of graduated powers”.
However, this “graduation of powers” does not dictate or
restrict the manner by which the President decides
which power to choose. It follows that the power to
choose is a judgment call of the President.
Issue: Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No. 216 of
23 May 2017 will:(a) have the effect of recalling
Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or (b) also nullify the acts
of the President in calling out the armed forces to quell
lawless violence in Marawi and other parts of the
Mindanao region?
Ruling: No. Nullification of Proclamation No.216 will not
affect Proclamation No. 55 and neither would it result in
the nullification of the acts of the President done
pursuant thereto. In a similar case (Kulayan v. Tan), the
Court ruled that the President's calling out power is in a
different category from the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to
declare martial law. The Court's review of the President's
declaration of martial law and his calling out the Armed
Forces necessarily entails separate proceedings.
ARTICLE VIII. THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Jardeleza vs. CJ Sereno
Facts: Associate Justice Roberto Abad was about to
retire and the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announce
an opening for application and recommendation for the
said vacancy. Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza),
incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic was
included in the list of candidates. Justice Carpio
disclosed a confidential information which characterized
Jardeleza’s integrity as dubious. Jardeleza answered
that he would defend himself provided that due process
would be observed. His request was denied and he was
not included in the shortlist. Hence, Jardeleza filed for
certiorari and mandamus with prayer for TRO to compel
the JBC to include him in the list on the grounds that the
JBC and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion
in excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient
number of votes to qualify for the position.
Issue: Can the Supreme Court exercise its expanded
certiorari jurisdiction over the JBC which does not
exercise judicial nor quasi-judicial function?
Ruling: Yes. Under the expanded jurisdiction or
expanded power of judicial review vested to the SC by
the 1987 Constitution, a petition for certiorari is a proper
remedy to question the act of any branch or
instrumentality of the government on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
Cudia vs. PMA Superintendent
Facts: Cadet 1 CL Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia was a member of
Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the Philippine Military
Academy (PMA) and was vying for honors and awards
upon graduation. However, a Delinquency Report was
filed against him by one of his professors because he
was late for two (2) minutes in his Eng 412 class. The
petitioner’s written appeal was subjected for
investigation by the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the PMA Cadet Review Appeals Board, and he was held
guilty of "Lying" and the recommendation for his
separation from the Academy was sustained. In this
military decision, even if it involved questions of fact, the
petitioners hold that the Court was empowered to settle
mixed questions of fact and law.
Issue: Can the court exercise the judicial power to
determine whether the AFP and the members of the
court martial acted with grave abuse of discretion in their
military investigation?
Ruling: Yes. According to Section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution, the Court has an expanded scope of
judicial power. It mandates that the duty of the courts of
justice includes not only "to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable" but also "to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government", even if the latter
does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions. Consistent with the republican system of
checks and balances, the Court has been entrusted,
expressly or by necessary implication, with both the duty
and the obligation of determining, in appropriate cases,
the validity of any assailed action of the government. In
this case, the Court is empowered to settle via petition
for certiorari whether there is grave abuse of discretion
on the part of respondents in dismissing Cadet 1 CL
Cudia from the PMA.
Arroyo vs People
Facts: The Court resolves the consolidated petitions for
certiorari separately filed by former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office (PCSO) Budget and Accounts Manager Benigno
B. Aguas.
On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in
the Sandiganbayan former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (GMA) and PCSO Budget and Accounts
Manager Aguas (and some other officials of PCSO and
Commission on Audit whose charges were later
dismissed by the Sandiganbayan after their respective
demurrers to evidence were granted, except for Uriarte
and Valdes who were at large) for conspiracy to commit
plunder, as defined by, and penalized under Section 2
(b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659. Thereafter, accused GMA and Aguas
separately filed their respective petitions for bail which
were denied by the Sandiganbayan on the ground that
the evidence of guilt against them was strong.
After the Prosecution rested its case, accused
GMA and Aguas then separately filed their demurrers to
evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish
a case for plunder against them. The same were denied
by the Sandiganbayan, holding that there was sufficient
evidence to show that they had conspired to commit
plunder. After the respective motions for reconsideration
filed by GMA and Aguas were likewise denied by the
Sandiganbayan, they filed their respective petitions for
certiorari.
Issue: Considering Sec. 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court, can the Supreme Court review on certiorari the
Sandiganbayan Order denying accused’s Demurrer to
Evidence?
Ruling: Yes, the court cannot be deprived of its
jurisdiction to correct grave abuse of discretion.
Considering Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
which provides that “the order denying the motion for
leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the
demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by
certiorari before judgment.” It is not an insuperable
obstacle to this action, however, that the denial of the
demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an
interlocutory order that did not terminate the
proceedings, and the proper recourse of the demurring
accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their
conviction they may then appeal the conviction, and
assign the denial as among the errors to be reviewed.
Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the writ
of certiorari may issue should not be limited, because to
do so would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and
usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the court that
authority does not want to show that certiorari is more
discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus. In the
case at bar, the Supreme court can review on certiorari
the Sandiganbayan order denying accused’s demurrer to
evidence, because the Court has the bounden
constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of
discretion whenever and wherever it is committed.
 Carpio-Morales vs. Binay
Facts: The ombudsman’s argument against the cas lack
of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition and
her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her
interpretation of section 14, RA6770 or the ombudsman
act. The ombudsman maintains that the first paragraph
of section 14 ra6770 textually prohibits courts from
extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any
investigation conducted by her office. Despite the usage
of the general phrase “no writ of injunctions shall be
issued by any court”, the ombudsman herself concedes
that the prohibition does not cover the supreme court.
Issue: Is the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
insofar as it prohibits all courts [except the Supreme
Court], from issuing provisional writs of injunction to
enjoin an Ombudsman investigation, valid and
constitutional?
Ruling: Yes, it is valid and constitutional. The Court
rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so doing, took away from
the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to
enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it
encroached upon this Court’s constitutional rule-making
authority. Through this provision, Congress interfered
with a provisional remedy that was created by this Court
under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which
utility is both integral and inherent to every court’s
exercise of judicial power. Without the Court’s consent to
the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of
the same as part of the rules of procedure through an
administrative circular issued therefor, there thus, stands
to be a violation of the separation of powers principle.
Segovia vs. Climate Change Commission
Facts: To address the clamour of more tangible
response to climate change, former Pres. Arroyo issued
AO171 which created the presidential task force on
climate change (PTFCC) on Feb 20, 2007, This body
was recognised through EO 774 which designated the
President as Chairperson and Cabinet Secretaries as
members of the task force. EO 774 expressed what is
now referred to by the petitioners as the “Road Sharing
Principle.” in 2009, AO 254 was issued , mandating the
DOTC (as lead agency for the Task Group on Fossil
Fuels or TGFF) to formulate a national environmental
sustainable transport strategy (EST) for the Philippines.
Later that same year, congress passed the Climate
Change Act.It created the Climate Change Commission
which absorbed the functions of the PFCC and became
the lead policy making body of the government which
shall be tasked to coordinate, monitor and evaluate the
programs and action plans of the government relating to
climate change. Herein petitioners wrote respondents
regarding their pleas for implementation of the Road
Sharing Principle demanding the reform of the road and
transportation system in the whole country w/in thirty
days from receipt of said letter- foremost, through the
bifurcation of roads and the reduction of official and
government fuel consumption by 50%. Claiming to have
not received a response they filed this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have standing to
file the petition?
Ruling: Yes, the petitioners have standing. Petitioners
counter that they filed the suit as Citizens, Taxpayers
and representatives; that the rules on standing had been
relaxed following the decision in Oposa vs. Factoran,
and that , in any event, legal standing is a procedural
technicality which the court may set aside in its
discretion. The court agrees with the petitioners position.
The RPEC did liberalize the requirements on standing,
allowing the filling of citizens suit for the enforcement of
rights and obligations under environmental laws.
However, it bears noting that there is a difference
between a petition for the issuance of a writ of
Kalikasan, wherein it is sufficient that the person filing
represents the inhabitants prejudiced by the
environmental damage subject of the writ, and a petition
for the issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus, which
is only available to one who is personally aggrieved by
the unlawful act or omission.
Segovia vs. Climate Change Commission
Issue: Whether or not the petition should be dismissed
for failing to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts?
Ruling: No. Under the RPEC, the writ of kalikasan is
designed for a narrow but special purpose: to accord a
stronger protection for environmental rights,aiming,
among others, to provide a speedy and effective
resolution of a case involving the violation of one's
constitutional right to a healthful and balanced ecology
that transcends political and territorial boundaries, and to
address the potentially exponential nature of large-scale
ecological threats. The weight of the problems stated
under the RPEC satisfies at least one of the exceptions
to the rule on hierarchy of courts. Given that the RPEC
allows direct resort to this Court, it is ultimately within the
Court's discretion whether or not to accept petitions
brought directly before it.
Issue: Whether or not a writ of Kalikasan and/or
Continuing Mandamus should be issued?
Ruling: No. The Court finds that the petitioners failed to
establish the requisites for the issuance of the writs. It is
well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the
issuance of a writ of kalikasan has to show that a law,
rule or regulation was violated or would be violated.
In this case, apart from repeated invocation of
the constitutional right to health and to a balanced and
healthful ecology and bare allegations that their right
was violated, the petitioners failed to show that public
respondents are guilty of any unlawful act or omission
that constitutes a violation of the petitioners' right to a
balanced and healthful ecology.
Imbong vs. Ochoa
Issue: Considering that the RH Law has yet to be
implemented, do the petitions present actual controversy
ripe for adjudication?
Ruling: Yes. The Court views that an actual case or
controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination.
Considering that the RH Law and its
implementing rules have already taken effect and that
budgetary measures to carry out the law have already
been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions
present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when
an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a
right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the
dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the
case is so because medical practitioners or medical
providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted
under the RH Law for vague violations thereof,
particularly public health officers who are threatened to
be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of
retirement and other benefits
Saguisag vs. Ochoa
Issue: In view of the abstention of the Senators from the
present proceedings, is there an actual case or
controversy that is already ripe for adjudication?
Ruling: Yes. The Court ruled that they find that the
matter before them involves an actual case or
controversy that is already ripe for adjudication. The
Executive Department has already sent an official
confirmation to the U.S. Embassy that "all internal
requirements of the Philippines x x x have already
been complied with." By this exchange of diplomatic
notes, the Executive Department effectively performed
the last act required under Article XII(l) of EDCA
before the agreement entered into force. Section 25,
Article XVIII of the Constitution, is clear that the
presence of foreign military forces in the country
shall only be allowed by virtue of a treaty
concurred in by the Senate. Hence, the performance
of an official act by the Executive Department that
led to the entry into force of an executive
agreement was sufficient to satisfy the actual case
or controversy requirement.
Issue: Will the present petitions qualify as citizens',
taxpayers', or legislators' suits and, thus, the petitioners
have legal standing?
Ruling: As citizens: No. In assailing the constitutionality
of a governmental act, petitioners suing as citizens may
dodge the requirement of having to establish a direct
and personal interest if they show that the act affects a
public right. In arguing that they have legal standing,
they claim that the case they have filed is a concerned
citizen's suit. But aside from general statements that the
petitions involve the protection of a public right, and that
their constitutional rights as citizens would be violated,
they fail to make any specific assertion of a particular
public right that would be violated by the enforcement of
EDCA. For their failure to do so, the present petitions
cannot be considered by the Court as citizens' suits that
would justify a disregard of the aforementioned
requirements.
As taxpayers: No. A taxpayer's suit concerns a
case in which the official act complained of directly
involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived
from taxation. Here, those challenging the act must
specifically show that they have sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of public money, and
that they will sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the assailed act. Applying that principle
to this case, they must establish that EDCA involves the
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers.
As legislators: No. The SC emphasize that in a
legislators' suit, those Members of Congress who are
challenging the official act have standing only to the
extent that the alleged violation impinges on their right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of the institution
of which they are members. Legislators have the
standing "to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers,
and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office
and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any
official action, which they claim infringes their
prerogatives as legislators." As legislators, they must
clearly show that there was a direct injury to their
persons or the institution to which they belong.
 As correctly argued by respondent, the power to
concur in a treaty or an international agreement is an
institutional prerogative granted by the Constitution to
the Senate, not to the entire Legislature. In Pimentel v.
Office of the Executive Secretary, this Court did not
recognize the standing of one of the petitioners therein
who was a member of the House of Representatives.
The petition in that case sought to compel the
transmission to the Senate for concurrence of the signed
text of the Statute of the International Criminal Court.
Since that petition invoked the power of the Senate to
grant or withhold its concurrence in a treaty entered into
by the Executive Department, only then incumbent
Senator Pimentel was allowed to assert that authority of
the Senate of which he was a member.
Issue: What are matters of transcendental importance?
Does this petition involve matters of transcendental
importance?
Ruling: The matter that the constitutionality of the
nationl agreement has been challenged and that the
exercise of the power of judicial review requires the
concurrence of the following requisites, (1) the existence
of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and
substantial by the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at
the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the
constitutional question be passed upon in order to
decide the case.
No. The present petitions cannot qualify as
citizens', taxpayers', or legislators' suits; the Senate as a
body has the requisite standing, but considering that it
has not formally filed a pleading to join the suit, as it
merely conveyed to the Supreme Court its sense that
EDCA needs the Senate's concurrence to be valid,
petitioners continue to suffer from lack of standing and
the fact that the government had not yet appropriated or
actually disbursed public funds for the purpose of
implementing the agreement.
Philconsa vs. Phil. Gov’t.
Facts: On 15 October 2012, a preliminary peace
agreement called the FAB was signed between the
government and the MILF. The F AB called for the
creation of an autonomous political entity named
Bangsamoro, replacing the ARMM.
On 27 March 2014, the Philippine Government,
represented by GPNP Chairperson Miriam Coronel-
Ferrer, signed the CAB, which was an integration of the
FAB, the Annexes and the other agreements previously
executed by the government and the MILF.
Consolidated petitions challenging the
constitutionality and validity of the Comprehensive
Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) and the
Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB)
entered into between the Government of the Philippines
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) on 27
March 2014 and 12 October 2012, respectively.
Issue: Due to non-enactment of the Bangsamoro Basic
Law, is the challenge on the constitutionality of the CAB
and FAB--- ripe for adjudication?
Ruling: NO. Due to the non-enactment of the
Bangsamoro Basic Law, the challenge on the
constitutionality of the CAB and FAB is not ripe for
adjudication. Pursuant to Section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution, it is clear that the Court's judicial
review power is limited to actual cases or controversies.
The Court generally declines to issue advisory opinions
or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere
academic questions. The limitation of the power of
judicial review to actual cases and controversies assures
that the courts will not intrude into areas specifically
confined to the other branches of government.
Ocampo vs. Rear Admiral Enriquez
Facts: During the campaign period for the 2016
Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo R. Duterte
publicly announced that he would allow the burial of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng
mga Bayani ("LNMB"). Duterte won the May 9, 2016
elections.
On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto
C. Enriquez issued a directive to the Philippine Army on
the Funeral Honors and Service for President Marcos.
Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the petitioners
filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and Petition
for Mandamus and Prohibition with the Court.
Issue: Do petitioners have locus standi?
Ruling: No. Petitioners have no legal standing to file the
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
because they failed to show that they have suffered or
will suffer direct and personal injury as a result of the
interment of Marcos at the LNMB. Petitioners cannot
also file as taxpayers. They merely claim illegal
disbursement of public funds, without showing that
Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the LNMB by
either express or implied provision of the Constitution,
the laws or jurisprudence.
Issue: Does President Duterte's decision to have the
remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involve a
justiciable controversy?
Ruling: No. The requisites for judicial inquiry must
include, among others, the presence of an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power, and
the person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance. An
actual case or controversy is one that involves a conflict
of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, and
susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical dispute. There must be an opposition of
legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the
basis of existing law and jurisprudence. The scope of
the political question doctrine has been limited by
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution when it
vested in the judiciary the power to determine whether or
not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.
In this case, the court ruled that the essential
requisites indicated above were absent. The petitioners
are concerned with questions of policy and issues
dependent upon the wisdom and not on the legality of a
particular measure. With that, the court agreed with the
Office of the Solicitor General that President Duterte's
decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at the
LNMB involves a political question that is not a
justiciable controversy. There being no taint of grave
abuse in the exercise of such discretion, President
Duterte's decision on that political question is outside the
ambit of judicial review.
Jardeleza vs. CJ Sereno
Issue: Does the original invocation of Section 2, Rule 10
of JBC-009 involve a question on Jardeleza’s integrity?
Ruling: Yes, under section 2, rule 10 of JBC-009 it
states that, “the council may order a discreet background
check on the integrity, reputation and character of the
applicant and receive feedback theron from the public,
which shall check or verify to validate the merits thereof.”
In the case at bar, the court ruled that Jardeleza’s
alleged extra-marital affair and acts of insider trading fall
within the contemplation of a question of integrity.
Issue: Does his adoption of a specific legal strategy in
the handling of a case bring forth a relevant and logical
challenge against his moral character?
Ruling: Chief Justice Sereno claims that the invocation
of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 was not borne out of a
mere variance of legal opinion but by an "act of
disloyalty" committed by Jardeleza in the handling of a
case, the fact remains that the basis for her invocation of
the rule was the "disagreement" in legal strategy as
expressed by a group of international lawyers. The
approach taken by Jardeleza in that case was opposed
to that preferred by the legal team. For said reason,
criticism was hurled against his "integrity." The
invocation of the "unanimity rule" on integrity traces its
roots to the exercise of his discretion as a lawyer and
nothing else. No connection was established linking his
choice of a legal strategy to a treacherous intent to
trounce upon the country’s interests or to betray the
Constitution.
Issue: Does the Unanimity Rule apply in case where the
main point of contention is the professional judgement
sans charges or implications of Immoral or corrupt
behaviour?
Ruling: Yes, Sec. 12 Rule 10 of the JBL-009 envisions
only a situation where an applicant's moral fitness is
challenged. It follows then that the “Unanimity Rule” only
comes into operation when the moral character of a
person is put in the issue. In the case at bar, the court
conclude that Jardaleza's alleged extra-marital affair and
acts if insider trading fall within the contemplation of a
question of integrity and would have warranted the
application of the “Unanimity Rule”, he was not afforded
due process in its application.
Villanueva vs. JBC
Facts: On September 27,2013, Presiding Judge
Ferdinand R. Villanueva (petitioner) applied for the
vacant position of Presiding Judge in the following
Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31, Tagum City;
Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad,
Agusan Del Sur. In response, JBC didn’t include his
name in the list of applicants due to the council’s long-
standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to
second-level courts to, among others, incumbent judges
who have served in their current position for at least five
years. Petitioner has been a judge only for more than a
year.
Issue: Is the policy of the JBC “requiring five years of
service as judges of first-level courts before they can
qualify as applicant to second-level
courts” constitutional?
Ruling: Yes. The assailed policy regarding the
promotion to a second-level court, which is a five-year
experience as judge of a first-level court, is a direct
adherence to the qualities prescribed by the
Constitution. It was mentioned that five years is
considered as a sufficient span of time for one to acquire
professional skills for the next level court. JBC’s failure
to publish the five-year requirement, seeking to
implement a constitutional provision requiring proven
competence from members of the judiciary, has not
prejudiced the petitioner’s private interest. The court,
however, directed the JBC to comply with the publication
requirement of the assailed policy and other special
guidelines.
Aguinaldo vs. Aquino
Facts: Republic Act No. 10660, recently enacted on
April 16, 2015, created two more divisions of the
Sandiganbayan with three Justices each, thereby
resulting in six vacant positions. On July 20, 2015, the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) published in the
Philippine Star and Philippine Daily Inquirer and posted
on the JBC website an announcement calling for
applications or recommendations for the six newly
created positions of Associate Justice of the
Sandiganbayan. After screening and selection of
applicants, the JBC submitted to President Aquino six
shortlists contained in six separate letters.
Petitioners were all nominees in the shortlist for
the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. They assert
that they possess the legal standing or locus standi to
file the instant Petition since they suffered a direct injury
from President Aquino's failure to appoint any of them as
the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
Issue: Whether or not President Aquino violated the
Constitution or committed grave abuse of discretion in
disregarding the clustering of nominees into six separate
shortlists for the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice?
Ruling: No. President Aquino validly exercised his
discretionary power to appoint members of the Judiciary
when he disregarded the clustering of nominees into six
separate shortlists for the vacancies for the 16th, 17th,
18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st Sandiganbayan Associate
Justices. President Aquino merely maintained the well-
established practice, consistent with the paramount
Presidential constitutional prerogative, to appoint the six
new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices from the 37
qualified nominees, as if embodied in one JBC list. This
does not violate Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987
Constitution which requires the President to appoint from
a list of at least three nominees submitted by the JBC for
every vacancy.
Issue: Did the clustering of nominees for the six
vacancies in the Sandiganbayan by the JBC impair the
President's power to appoint members of the Judiciary
and to determine the seniority of the newly-appointed
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices?
Ruling: Yes. In its Decision dated November 29, 2016,
the Court ruled that the clustering impinged upon the
President's appointing power in the following ways: The
President's option for every vacancy was limited to the
five to seven nominees in each cluster. Once the
President had appointed a nominee from one cluster,
then he was proscribed from considering the other
nominees in the same cluster for the other vacancies. All
the nominees applied for and were found to be qualified
for appointment to any of the vacant Associate Justice
positions in the Sandiganbayan, but the JBC failed to
explain why one nominee should be considered for
appointment to the position assigned to one specific
cluster only. Correspondingly, the nominees' chance for
appointment was restricted to the consideration of the
one cluster in which they were included, even though
they applied and were found to be qualified for all the
vacancies. Moreover, by designating the numerical order
of the vacancies, the JBC established the seniority or
order of preference of the new Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices, a power which the law (Section 1,
paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1606), rules
(Rule II, Section 1 (b) of the Revised Internal Rules of
the Sandiganbayan), and jurisprudence (Re: Seniority
Among the Four Most Recent Appointments to the
Position of Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals),
vest exclusively upon the President.
OCA vs. Judge Flores
Facts: Acting on these anonymous letters, the Court,
in a Resolution dated June 7, 2011, approved
OCA's request for an audit team (OCA team) to
conduct an investigation and inspection of the
pending and decided cases in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Tubod, Lanao del Norte, Branch 7,
where Judge Flores is the presiding judge, and
RTC of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Branch 21,
where Judge Flores presided in an acting capacity.
The authority included an "on-the-spot"
investigation/examination of any available document
in other government offices which may have direct
connection with the charges.
Issue: Does taking cognizance of cases outside the
court’s jurisdiction tantamount to gross ignorance of the
law?
Ruling: There is gross ignorance of the law when
an error committed by the judge was gross or
patent, deliberate or malicious, or when a judge
ignores, contradicts or fails to apply settled law and
jurisprudence because of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty
or corruption.
The utter disregard shown by Judge Flores
displays not only a lack of familiarity with the law
but a gross ignorance thereof. What's more, Judge
Flores rendered judgments in several cases for
nullity of marriage in record time, which ranged from
six (6) months to one (1) year and seven (7)
months from the date of filing, despite his claim of
being burdened by heavy caseload.
OCA vs. Judge Ruiz
Facts: Respondent Judge Joseph Cedric O. Ruiz ,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61,
Makati City. The Administrative case filed by the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) traces its roots to the
Informations for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No.
3019, “Corrupt practices of public officers” and
malversation of public funds filed by the People of the
Philippines against the respondent judge before the
Sandigan Bayan.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge
administratively liable for acts he is alleged to have
committed while he was still the Mayor of Dapitan City?
Ruling: Yes, he is administratively liable. The Court’s
function in this case is limited to the determination of
whether substantial evidence exists to hold the
respondent administratively liable for acts he allegedly
committed while he was still the Mayor of Dapitan City.
It’s immaterial that the respondent was not yet a
member of the Judiciary when allegedly committed the
acts imputed to him; judges may be disciplined for acts
committed prior to his appointment to the judiciary. The
court’s rule itself recognizes the situation, as it
provides for the immediate forwarding to the SC for
disposition and adjudication of charges against justices
and judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to
their appointment in judiciary. It need not be shown that
the respondent continued to do the act or acts
complained of; it is sufficient that the evidence on record
supports the charges against the respondent through
proof that the respondent committed the imputed acts
violative of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the
applicable provisions of the Rules of Court . As ruled out
by the Court’s decision in Office of the Court
Administrator v. Judge Sardido, “Whether the criminal
case against Judge Hurtado relates to an act committed
before or after he became a judge is of no moment”.
Facts: The respondent, then the City Mayor of Dapitan
City, had conspired with Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Pepe
Nortal to facilitate the latter's withdrawal of P1 million
from the Confidential and Intelligence Fund (CIF) and,
thereafter, used this amount for his (the respondent's)
personal benefit.
Issue: Is the administrative case against premature
since his criminal convictions by the Sandiganbayan are
not yet final?
Ruling: No. Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution grants the Supreme Court administrative
supervision over all courts and their personnel. This
grant empowers the Supreme Court to oversee the
judges' and court personnel's administrative compliance
with all laws, rules, and regulations,9 and to take
administrative actions against them if they violate these
legal norms.The Court likewise possesses the power to
preventively suspend an administratively charged judge
until a final decision is reached, particularly when a
serious charge is involved and a strong likelihood of guilt
exists.
ARTICLE IX. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
Funa vs COA Chair Villar
Facts: On February 15, 2001, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (President Macapagal-Arroyo)
appointed Guillermo N.Carague (Carague) as Chairman
of the Commission on Audit (COA) for a term of seven
(7) years, pursuant to the 1987 Constitution. Carague’s
term of office started on February 2, 2001 to end on
February 2, 2008. On February 7, 2004, President
Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Reynaldo A. Villar (Villar)
as the third member of the COA for a term of seven (7)
years starting February 2, 2004 until February 2,
2011.Following the retirement of Carague on February 2,
2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as COA
Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting
Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14,
2008. On April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and
appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter,
on June 11, 2008, the Commission on Appointments
confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as
Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the
appointment papers, until the expiration of the original
term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February
2, 2011.Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious
bid to lend color of title to his hold on the chairmanship,
insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded
him a fresh term of seven (7) years which is yet to lapse.
He would argue, in fine, that his term of office, as such
chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned
from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that
position.
Issue: what are the rules on appointment/re-
appointment in the CSC Comelec and COA?
Ruling: Art IX-B Sec.1 (2) of the 1987 Constitution
provides that the rules on appointments on the position
of chairman and commissioner shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment.Appointment to any vacancy shall only be
for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.
Second, Art. IX-C Sec.1 (2) provides that the
Commission on Elections are composed of a Chairman
and two other members to be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
who shall hold office for a term of nine years and may
not be reappointed. Of the Members of the Commission
first appointed, one shall hold office for nine years,
another for six years and the third for three years.
Lastly, Article IX-D Sec. 1 (2) provides that the
Chairman and Commissioners on Audit shall be
appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the
Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one
commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner
for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to
any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of
the term of the predecessor
Funa vs Duque
Facts: Petitioner Dennis A.B. Funa, in his capacity as
taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed a petition
challenging the constitutionality of EO 864, designating
CSC Chairman Duque as a member of the Board of
Directors or Trustees in an ex officio capacity of the
following government-owned or government-controlled
corporations: (a) GSIS; PHILHEALTH, (c) ECC, and (d)
the HDMFHIC, ECC, and HDMF for being clear
violations of Section 1 and Section 2, Article IX-A of the
1987 Constitution.
Issue: Does the designation of Duque as member of the
Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity,
impair the independence of the CSC and violate the
constitutional prohibition against the holding of dual or
multiple offices for the Members of the Constitutional
Commission?
Ruling: YES. The CSC Chairman cannot be a member
of a government entity that is under the control of the
President without impairing the independence vested in
the CSC by the 1987 Constitution.
Under Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B, he
can hold any other office or employment in the
Government during his tenure if such holding is allowed
by law or by the primary functions of his position.
The Court notes that Duque’s designation as
member of the governing Boards of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are not anymore derived
from his CSC position and entitles him to receive per
diem, a form of additional compensation that is
disallowed by the concept of an ex officio position by
virtue of its clear contravention of the proscription set by
Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue: Is Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO
292, valid and constitutional?
Ruling: Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO
292 is clear that the CSC Chairman’s membership in a
governing body is dependent on the condition that the
functions of the government entity where he will sit as its
Board member must affect the career development,
employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of
government officials and employees. Based on this, the
Court finds no irregularity in Section 14, Chapter 3, Title
I-A, Book V of EO 292 because matters affecting the
career development, rights and welfare of government
employees are among the primary functions of the CSC
and are consequently exercised through its Chairman.
The CSC Chairman’s membership therein must,
therefore, be considered to be derived from his position
as such. Accordingly, the constitutionality of Section 14,
Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is upheld.The
Court UPHOLDS THE CONSTITUTIONALITY of Section
14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of Executive Order No.
292;
Torres vs De Leon
Facts: When petitioner was the Chapter Administrator of
the PNRC, General Santos City Chapter, the PNRC
Internal Auditing Office conducted an audit of the funds
and accounts of the PNRC. Based on the audit report
submitted to respondent Corazon Alma G. De Leon (De
Leon), petitioner incurred a "technical shortage" in the
amount of P4,306,574.23. Respondent then charged
petitioner with Grave Misconduct for violating the PNRC
Financial Policies on Oversubscription, Remittances and
Disbursement of Funds. Petitioner got penalties of one
month suspension and transfer to the Nat’l
Headquarters. Her motion for reconsideration was
denied. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to
the Board of Governors of the PNRC through
respondent and furnished a copy to the CSC. She
addressed her appeal memorandum to the CSC and
sent copies to the PNRC and the CSC. Respondent, in a
memorandum dated August 13, 2007, denied petitioner's
appeal.The CSC, on April 21, 2008, promulgated a
Resolution dismissing petitioner's appeal and imposing
upon her the penalty of dismissal from service. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration with the CSC, but the
same was denied.
Issue: Does the CSC have appellate jurisdiction over
dismissal orders of PNRC employees by its Board since
PNRC is sui generis?
Ruling: Yes. As ruled by the Court in Liban, et al. v.
Gordon, the PNRC, although not a GOCC, is sui generis
in character, thus, requiring the Court to approach
controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case
basis. The CSC has jurisdiction over the PNRC because
the issue at hand is the enforcement of labor laws and
penal statutes, thus, in this particular matter, the PNRC
can be treated as a GOCC, and as such, it is within the
ambit of Rule I, Section 1 of the Implementing Rules of
Republic Act 6713. Thus, having jurisdiction over the
PNRC, the CSC had authority to modify the penalty and
order the dismissal of petitioner from the service. Under
the Administrative Code of 1987, as well as decisions of
the Court, the CSC has appellate jurisdiction on
administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition
of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty (30) days,
or fine in an amount exceeding thirty (30) days salary.
Estrellado vs CSC Chair David
Facts: On January 15, 2004, the LTO-COS-PB
recommended to the LTO the appointment of Hipolito R.
Garboni and Roberto S. Se to the vacant positions of
TRO II and AO IV within the LTO Law Enforcement
Service. Petitioners Eric N. Estrellado, TRO 1, and
Jossie M. Borja, Records Officer III, who were also
applicants for the aforementioned positions and in their
alleged capacities as next-in-rank employees, filed with
the CSC-NCR a petition to declare the LTO-CO-SPB
selection procedure null and void. They alleged, among
others, that Hipolito R. Garboni and Roberto S. Se did
not meet the requirements for the positions of TRO II
and AO IV.
Issue: Will the claimed next-in-rank status of petitioners
guarantee them of promotion or appointment to the
position aspired for?
Ruling: NO. The next-in-rank status of a government
employee is not a guarantee to one's fitness to the
position aspired for, and the applicant must go through
the rigors of a screening and selection process as
determined and conducted by a department or agency,
subject only to the standards and guidelines set by the
Civil Service Commission (CSC). This is in keeping with
the ideal of promoting through merit rather than
entitlement, and thus ensuring that government service
is rewarded with the best fit.
Posadas vs Sandiganbayan
Facts: Dr. Posadas was Chancellor of the University of
the Philippines (UP) Diliman when on September 19,
1994 he formed a Task Force on Science and
Technology Assessment Management and Policy. On
June 6, 1995, acting on the Task Force's proposal, UP
established the UP Technology Management Center
(UP TMC) the members of which nominated Dr.
Posadas for the post of Center Director. He declined the
nomination, however, resulting in the designation of
Professor Jose B. Tabbada as acting UP TMC Director.
On October 5, 1995 Malacanang granted Dr.
Posadas and fifteen other UP Diliman officials authority
to attend the foundation day of the state university in
Fujian, China, from October 30 to November 6, 1995.
Before he left, Dr. Posadas formally designated Dr.
Dayco, then UP Diliman Vice-Chancellor for
Administration, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) in his
absence. On November 7, 1995, his last day as OIC
Chancellor, Dr Dayco appointed Dr. Posadas as "Project
Director of the TMC Project from September 18, 1995 to
September 17, 1996." In an undated letter, Dr. Dayco
also appointed Dr. Posadas consultant to the project.
The appointments were to retroact to September 18,
1995 when the project began.
About a year later or on August 22, 1996 the
Commission on Audit (COA) Resident Auditor issued a
Notice of Suspension of payments made to UP TMC
personnel, including the second payment to Dr. Posadas
of ₱36,000.00 for his services as TMC Project’s Local
Consultant.
On September 16, 1996, however, the UP
Diliman Legal Office issued a Memorandum to the COA
Resident Auditor, pointing out that the amounts paid the
TMC Project personnel "were legal, being in the nature
of consultancy fees." The legal office also "confirmed the
authority of Dr. Dayco, while he was OIC Chancellor, to
appoint Dr. Posadas as project director and consultant of
the TMC Project." Finding this explanation "acceptable,"
the COA Resident Auditor lifted his previous notices of
suspension.
 Notwithstanding the lifting of the suspension, UP
President Javier constituted an Administrative
Disciplinary Tribunal to hear and decide the
administrative complaint that he himself filed against Dr.
Posadas and Dr. Dayco for grave misconduct and abuse
of authority. On August 18, 1998 the Tribunal
recommended the dismissal of the two from the service.
The UP Board of Regents modified the penalty,
however, to "forced resignation" with right to reapply
after one year provided they publicly apologize. Still, the
UP General-Counsel filed with the Sandiganbayan the
present criminal cases.
Issue: By holding concurrent positions as University
Chancellor and TMC Project Director, did Dr. Posadas
violate the constitutional provision against double
employment and double compensation?
Ruling: Yes, Dr. Posadas violated the constitutional
provision against double employment and double
compensation. The prohibition against government
officials and employees, whether elected or appointed,
from concurrently holding any other office or position in
the government is contained in Section 7, Article IX-B of
the 1987 Constitution. The prohibition on dual
employment and double compensation in the
government service is further specified under Sections 1
and 2, Rule XVIII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of E.O. No. 292, viz:
“Section 1. No appointive official shall hold any
other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters or their subsidiaries, unless otherwise
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position;
Section 2. No elective or appointive public officer
or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law.”
In the case at bar, the appointment of Dr.
Posadas as TMC Project Director falls within the
prohibition against holding of multiple positions since
there is no distinction in Section 7, Article IX-B as to the
employment status, i.e., whether permanent, temporary
or coterminous.
MARINA vs COA
Facts: This case involves the validity of the grant of
allowance and incentives to the officers and employees
of petitioner Maritime Industry Authority. We revisit the
interpretation and application of Section 12 of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
The Resident Auditor issued notices of
disallowance on the allowances and incentives received
by the officers and employees of Maritime Industry
Authority. The Legal and Adjudication Office of the
Commission on Audit upheld the notices of disallowance
issued. The Commission on Audit affirmed the notices of
disallowance. Thus, this petition for certiorari was filed
by Maritime Industry Authority.
Maritime Industry Authority is an attached
agency of the Department of Transportation and
Communication and created under Presidential Decree
No. 474.
Issue: Does the grant of allowances and benefits to the
officers and employees of MARINA constitute double
compensation?
Ruling: Yes. Their receipt of the disallowed benefits and
allowances was tantamount to double compensation.
The grant of allowances and benefits amounts to
double compensation proscribed by Article IX(B),
Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner Maritime Industry Authority argues
that the rule against double compensation does not
apply because National Compensation Circular No. 59 is
ineffectual due to its non-publication.
Respondent Commission on Audit counters that
the disallowed allowances is tantamount to additional
compensation proscribed by Article IX(B), Section 8 of
the 1987 Constitution. This is because these allowances
are not authorized by law.
Republic Act No. 6758 deems all allowances
and benefits received by government officials and
employees as incorporated in the standardized salary,
unless excluded by law or an issuance by the
Department of Budget and Management. The integration
of the benefits and allowances is by legal fiction.
The disallowed benefits and allowances of
petitioner Maritime Industry Authority’s officials and
employees were not excluded by law or an issuance by
the Department of Budget and Management. Thus,
these were deemed already given to the officials and
employees when they received their basic salaries.
PCSO vs COA Chair Pulido
Facts: Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) is
the principal government agency for raising and
providing funds for health programs, medical assistance
and services, and charities of national character. On
March 4, 2008, the PCSO Board of Directors, through
Resolution No. 135, approved the payment of monthly
cost of living allowance (COLA) to its officials and
employees for a period of three (3) years in accordance
with the Collective Negotiation Agreement. In 2010, the
PCSO released the sum of P381,545.43 to all qualified
officials and employees of its Nueva Ecija Provincial
District Office.
However, on post audit, the Team Leader and
Supervising Auditor of the PCSO-Nueva Ecija Provincial
District Office issued Notice of Disallowance (ND) 11-
001-101-(10)7 dated May 16, 2011 invalidating the
payment of P381,545.43 on the grounds that it is
contrary to the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) Circular No. 2001-03 dated November 12, 2001
and it amounts to double compensation that is prohibited
under the 1987 Constitution.
Issue: Under R. A No. 6758, what allowances are
expressly excluded from in the standardized salaries?
Ruling: The first paragraph of Section 12 (Consolidation
of Allowances and Compensation) of R.A. No. 6758
enumerates the following allowances that are expressly
excluded from the standardized salary rates:
(1) representation and transportation allowances
(RATA);
(2) clothing and laundry allowances;
(3) subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on
board government vessels;
(4) subsistence allowance of hospital personnel;
(5) hazard pay; and
(6) allowance of foreign service personnel stationed
abroad;
**The 7th item pertains to “such other additional
compensation not otherwise specified in Section 12 as
may be determined by the DBM”. It is only upon the
amplification of the DBM through the issuance and
taking effect of implementing rules and regulations that
item (7) could be deemed as legally completed. The
DBM is delegated with the authority to identify such
other additional compensation that may be granted to
government employees over and above the
standardized salary rates.
Bagumbayan vs Comelec
Facts: Former Senator Gordon authored Republic Act
No. 9369, the law that amended Republic Act No. 8436,
otherwise known as the Automated Election System
Law.
On December 22, 1997, Republic Act No. 8436
authorized the Commission on Elections to use an
automated election system for electoral exercises.
For the 2016 National and Local Elections, the
Commission on Elections has opted to use the Vote-
Counting Machine. The vote-counting machine is a
"paper-based automated election system," which is
reported to be "seven times faster and more powerful
than the PCOS because of its updated
processor." Likewise, it is reported to have more
memory and security features, and is "capable of
producing the Voter Verification Paper Audit Trail
(VVPAT).” This VVPAT functionality is in the form of a
printed receipt and a touch screen reflecting the votes in
the vote-counting machine.
Issue: WON the fear of vote buying justify the Comelec
to deactivate the “voter verified paper audit trail” function
of the voting counter machine
Ruling: NO. The Commission on Elections cannot opt to
breach the requirements of the law to assuage its fears
regarding the VVPAT. Vote-buying can be averted by
placing proper procedures. The Commission on
Elections has the power to choose the appropriate
procedure in order to enforce the VVPAT requirement
under the law, and balance it with the constitutional
mandate to secure the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot.
The minimum functional capabilities enumerated
under Section 6 of Republic Act 8436, as amended, are
mandatory. These functions constitute the most basic
safeguards to ensure the transparency, credibility,
fairness and accuracy of the upcoming elections.
The law is clear. A "voter verified paper audit
trail" requires the following: (a) individual voters can
verify whether the machines have been able to count
their votes; and (b) that the verification at minimum
should be paper based.
There appears to be no room for further
interpretation of a "voter verified paper audit trail." The
paper audit trail cannot be considered the physical
ballot, because there may be instances where the
machine may translate the ballot differently, or the voter
inadvertently spoils his or her ballot.
Furthermore, We (the court) see no reason why
voters should be denied the opportunity to read the
voter's receipt after casting his or her ballot. There is no
legal prohibition for the Commission on Elections to
require that after the voter reads and verifies the receipt,
he or she is to leave it in a separate box, not take it out
of the precinct. Definitely, the availability of all the voters'
receipts will make random manual audits more accurate.
ER Ejercito vs Comelec
Facts: Three days prior to the May 13, 2013 Elections, a
petition for disqualification was filed by Edgar “Egay”
San Luis before the COMELEC against Emilio Ramon
“E.R.” P. Ejercito, who was a fellow gubernatorial
candidate and, at the time, the incumbent Governor of
the Province of Laguna.Petition alleged Ejercito
distributed orange card to influence voters in his favor;
and Ejercito exceeds the amount of expenditures
necessary. Ejercito proclaimed Governor. The
COMELEC First Division issued a Summons with Notice
of Conference. Ejercito prayed for the dismissal of the
petition which was improperly filed because it is in reality
a complaint for election offenses, thus,the case should
have been filed before the COMELEC Law Department,
and if with probable cause, file with proper court. The
COMELEC First Division resolved to grant the
disqualification of Ejercito. The COMELEC En Banc
agreed with the findings of its First Division that San
Luis’ petition is an action to disqualify Ejercito.Ejercito
filed before the Court GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
against COMELEC and contends It violated the right of
petitioner due process when it ruled for disqualification of
petitioner even it was not prayed fordisqualification .
Worse, there is yet no finding of guilt by competent court
that he committed election offense.
Issue: Did Ejercito correctly invoke Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission in his defense of his
“independent contributors?
Ruling: Having determined that the subject TV
advertisements were done and broadcasted with
Ejercito’s consent, it follows that Citizens United does
not apply. The rulings in Citizens United and Buckley
find bearing only on matters related to "independent
expenditures," an election law concept which has no
application in this jurisdiction. In the US context,
independent expenditures for or against a particular
candidate enjoy constitutional protection. They refer to
those expenses made by an individual, a group or a
legal entity which are not authorized or requested by the
candidate, an authorized committee of the candidate, or
an agent of the candidate; they are expenditures that are
not placed in cooperation with or with the consent of a
candidate, his agents, or an authorized committee of the
candidate.In contrast, there is no similar provision here
in the Philippines. In fact, R.A. No. 9006105 and its
implementing rules and regulation specifically make it
unlawful to print, publish, broadcast or exhibit any print,
broadcast or outdoor advertisements donated to the
candidate without the written acceptance of said
candidate.
Grace Poe vs Comelec
Facts: Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares
(petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn
infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a
certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September
1968. When petitioner was five (5) years old,
celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a.
Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a.
Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City.
On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their
petition and ordered that petitioner's name be
changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras
Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." On 7
July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition Act of 2003. Under the same Act, she
filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn
petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together
with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of
her three minor children on 10 July 2006. On 9
December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to
petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the
United States" effective 21 October 2010. On 2
October 2012, the petitioner filed with the
COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she
answered "6 years and 6 months" to the question
"Period of residence in the Philippines before May
13, 2013." Petitioner obtained the highest number of
votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013.
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for
the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. In her
COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-
born citizen and that her residence in the
Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would
be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted
from 24 May 2005.
A day after petitioner filed her COC for
President, Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a
petition to deny due course or cancel said COC
which was docketed as SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and
raffled to the COMELEC Second Division. She is
convinced that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over
her petition. Essentially, Elamparo's contention is that
petitioner committed material misrepresentation when
she stated in her COC that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten (10) years and eleven
(11) months up to the day before the 9 May 2016
Elections.
Issue: Does the COMELEC have jurisdiction over
challenges on qualification of candidates for President
and Vice-President?
Ruling: No. last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4
which provides that: “The Supreme Court, sitting en
banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its
rules for the purpose.” The tribunals which have
jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of
the President, the Vice-President, Senators and the
Members of the House of Representatives was
made clear by the Constitution. There is no such
provision for candidates for these positions.
Issue: Can the COMELEC, in the same cancellation of
COC case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the
candidate?
Ruling: No. The issue before the COMELEC is
whether or not the COC of petitioner should be
denied due course or cancelled "on the exclusive
ground" that she made in the certificate a false
material representation. The exclusivity of the ground
should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC
and restrain it from going into the issue of the
qualifications of the candidate for the position, if, as
in this case, such issue is yet undecided or
undetermined by the proper authority. The
COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation
case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the
candidate. Provisions in Article IX-C, Section 2:
"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall
exercise the following powers and functions". Not
any one of the enumerated powers approximate the
exactitude of the provisions of Article VI, Section 17
of the same basic law or of the last paragraph of
Article VII, Section 4. It is noteworthy that the
Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the
power to decide cases involving the right to vote,
which essentially involves an inquiry into
qualifications based on age, residence and
citizenship of voters. [Art. IX, C, Section 2(3)].
Javier vs Comelec
Facts: COMELEC Resolution 9385 set the election
period for the May 2013 elections from January 13, 2013
to June 12, 2013. An administrative complaint was filed
against Mayor Roquero. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan
(SP) recommended that Governor Javier preventively
suspend Roquero. Roquero filed with the RTC a petition
for certiorari and prohibition against the SP and Javier.
The RTC granted a preliminary injunction. Javier, Vice
Gov Dimamay, and the SP filed for certiorari with the CA
which issued a TRO. COMELEC issued Resolution
9581, prohibiting the suspension of any elected city
officer, among others, during the election period for the
May 2013 elections.
Issue: For fixing a longer election period for the 2013
election, is COMELEC RES. No. 9851 valid?
Ruling: Yes, it is valid. The Constitution provides that
unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special
cases, the election period shall commence ninety days
before the day of election and shall end thirty days
thereafter. The import of this provision is repeated in the
Omnibus Election Code. The 120-day period is merely
the default period.
Congress has already defined the elements of
elections offenses, some of which may be committed
only during the election period. The power of the
COMELEC to fix the election period, only during which
certain offenses may be committed, does not change
what the offense is or how it is committed.
Baldoz vs COA
Facts: Labrador was the former Chief of the POEA’s
Employment Services Regulation Division (ESRD). On
May 2, 1997, then Labor Secretary Leonardo A.
Quisumbing (Quisumbing) ordered his dismissal from
service as he was found to have bribed a certain
Madoline Villapando, an overseas Filipino worker, in the
amount of ₱6,200.00 in order to expedite the issuance of
her overseas employment certificate. Labrador’s
dismissal was affirmed on appeal by the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) through CSC Resolution No. 03-
0339 dated March 12, 2003,and his subsequent motion
for reconsideration was denied through CSC Resolution
No. 040547 dated May 17, 2004.Aside from the
foregoing administrative proceedings, a criminal case for
direct bribery was instituted against
Labrador in view of the same infraction.
Consequently, on August 31, 1999, the Sandiganbayan
(SB) promulgated a Decision,convicting him of the
aforementioned crime and thereby sentenced him to: (a)
suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years of prision
correccional, as maximum; (b) pay a fine of ₱3,000.00;
(c) suffer the penalty of temporary special
disqualification from public office; and (d) pay costs.
Labrador’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution dated November 17, 1999, prompting him to
elevate the matter to the Court.
Issue: Does the authority of COA to rule on the legality
of the disbursement of government funds include the
authority to disallow its disbursement?
Ruling: Yes. COA has the authority to disallow pursuant
to Section 11 (2), Chapter 4, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of
Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987 “irregular,
unnecessary,excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable
expenditures or uses of government funds and
properties”.it has been pronounced that the COA’s
exercise of its general audit power is among the
constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check
and balance system inherent in our form of government.
Funa vs MECO
Facts: The MECO was organized on 16 December
1997 as a non-stock, non-profit corporation under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 68 or the Corporation Code.
At present, it is the MECO that oversees the
rights and interests of Overseas Filipino Workers
(OFWs) in Taiwan; promotes the Philippines as a tourist
and investment destination for the Taiwanese; and
facilitates the travel of Filipinos and Taiwanese from
Taiwan to the Philippines, and vice versa.
On 23 August 2010, petitioner sent a letter to the
COA requesting for a "copy of the latest financial and
audit report" of the MECO invoking, for that purpose, his
"constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern." .
On 25 August 2010, Assistant Commissioner
Naranjo issued a memorandum referring the petitioner’s
request to COA Assistant Commissioner Emma M.
Espina for "further disposition."
Taking the 25 August 2010 memorandum as an
admission that the COA had never audited and
examined the accounts of the MECO, the petitioner filed
the instant petition for mandamus on 8 September 2010.
Issue: Is MECO a governmental entity? If not, are its
accounts subject to the COA audit?
Ruling: No, the MECO is a non-governmental entity.
However, under existing laws, the accounts of the
MECO pertaining to the "verification fees" it collects on
behalf of the DOLE as well as the fees it was authorized
to collect under Section 2(6) of EO No. 15, s. 2001, are
subject to the audit jurisdiction of the COA. Such fees
pertain to the government and should be audited by the
COA.
Paraiso-Aban vs COA
Facts: During the 11th Congress (1998 to 2001), the
Senate's Committees on Accountability of Public Officers
and Investigations and on National Defense and Security
held various hearings to investigate the alleged
anomalous acquisitions of land by the Armed Forces of
the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits
System (AFP-RSBS) in Calamba, Laguna and Tanauan,
Batangas. The Special Audit Team (SAT) found that in
August 1996 the AFP-RSBS purchased from the
Concord Resources, Inc. four (4) parcels of land located
in Calamba, Laguna, but that the purchase was covered
by two deeds of sale for different amounts; and, that the
sale which was registered with the Register of Deeds of
Calamba indicated a total price of P91,024,800.00 and
bore the signatures of both vendor and vendee, whereas
the deeds of sale found in the records of the AFP-RSBS,
which was executed by Concord alone and which was
entered in the books of accounts of AFP-RSBS, showed
that the AFP-RSBS actually paid P341,343,000.00 for
the lots, or a difference of P250,318,200.00.
Issue: Is AFP-RSBS within the general audit power of
COA?
Ruling: Yes. The exercise by COA of its general audit
power is among the mechanisms of check and balance
instituted under the 1987 Constitution on which our
democratic form of government is founded. Article IX-D,
Section 2(1) of the Constitution provides that the COA
has "the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit,
and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and
receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and
property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the
Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters." Thus,
COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine,
prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of
government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and
conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the
government's, and ultimately the people's, property.
ARTICLE X. LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Pimentel vs Ochoa
Facts: The General Appropriations Act [GAA] of 2011,
which provides a P21 Billion budget allocation for the
Conditional Cash Transfer Program (CCTP) headed by
the Department of Social Welfare & Development
(DSWD) was questioned on the ground that it amounts
to a “recentralization” of government functions that have
already been devolved from the national government to
the local government units
Issue: Whether or not the P21 billion CCTP budget
allocation under the DSWD violates local autonomy by
providing for the recentralization of the national
government in the delivery of basic services already
devoted to the LGUs?
Ruling: No. The P21 billion CCTP budget allocation
formulated by the national government itself but
implemented in partnership with the local government
units to achieve the common national goal development
and social progress can by no means be an
encroachment upon the autonomy of local governments.
Indeed, a complete relinquishment of central
government powers on the matter of providing basic
facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local
Government Code itself weighs against it. The national
government is, thus, not precluded from taking a direct
hand in the formulation and implementation of national
development programs especially where it is
implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs
concerned.
City of General Santos vs. COA
Facts: The mayor of General Santos City, Pedro B.
Acharon, Jr., issued Executive Order No. 40, series of
2008, creating management teams pursuant to its
organization development program. In addition, among
others, Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009 was enacted
on August 13, 2009 by the city of General Santos. It is
entitled An Ordinance Establishing the GenSan Scheme
on Early Retirement for Valued Employees Security
(GenSan SERVES).
Issue: Does the constitutional mandate for local
autonomy grant local governments the power to
streamline and reorganize as well as the authority to
create a separate or supplementary retirement benefit
plan?
Ruling: Yes, it has the power to streamline and
reorganize its local bureaucracy, as inferred from
Section 76 of the Local Government Code on
organizational structure and staffing pattern, and Section
16 otherwise known as the general welfare clause. The
law allows local government units the power to
reorganize in order to be able to deliver more effective
and efficient services. In doing so, they should be given
leeway to entice their employees to avail of severance
benefits that the local government can afford. However,
local government units may not provide such when it
amounts to a supplementary retirement benefit
scheme. With that, it has no power to create a
separate/supplementary retirement benefit plan.
Villafuerte v Robredo
Facts: On December 14, 1995, the DILG issued MC
No. 95-216,enumerating the policies and guidelines on
the utilization of the development fund component of the
IRA. On September 20, 2005, then DILG Secretary
Angelo T. Reyes and Department of Budget and
Management Secretary Romulo L. Neri issued Joint MC
No. 1, series of 2005, pertaining to the guidelines on the
appropriation and utilization of the 20% of the IRA for
development projects, which aims to enhance
accountability of the LGUs in undertaking development
projects. The said memorandum circular underscored
that the 20% of the IRA intended for development
projects should be utilized for social development,
economic development and environmental
management.On August 31, 2010, the respondent, in his
capacity as DILG Secretary, issued the assailed MC No.
2010-83, entitled “Full Disclosure of Local Budget and
Finances, and Bids and Public Offerings,” which aims to
promote good governance through enhanced
transparency and accountability of LGUs.
Issue: Do the assailed DILG Memorandum Circulars
violate LGU’s Local Autonomy?
Ruling: No. The assailed memorandum circulars do not
transgress the local and fiscal autonomy granted to
LGUs.The assailed issuances of the respondent, MC
Nos. 2010-83 and 2011-08, are but implementation of
this avowed policy of the State to make public officials
accountable to the people. They are amalgamations of
existing laws, rules and regulation designed to give teeth
to the constitutional mandate of transparency and
accountability.A scrutiny of the contents of the
mentioned issuances shows that they do not, in any
manner, violate the fiscal autonomy of LGUs. To be
clear, “Fiscal autonomy means that local governments
have the power to create their own sources of revenue in
addition to their equitable share in the national taxes
released by the national government, as well as the
power to allocate their resources in accordance with
their own priorities. It extends to the preparation of their
budgets, and local officials in turn have to work within
the constraints thereof.”
Fernando vs. St. Escolastica College
Facts: Respondents St. Scholastica’s College (SSC)
and St. Scholastica’s Academy-Marikina, Inc. (SSA-
Marikina) are educational institutions organized under
the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, with principal
offices and business addresses at Leon Guinto Street,
Malate, Manila, and at West Drive, Marikina Heights,
Marikina City, respectively.
Respondent SSC is the owner of four (4) parcels
of land measuring a total of 56,306.80 square meters,
located in Marikina Heights and covered by Transfer
Certificate Title (TCT) No. 91537. Located within the
property are SSA-Marikina, the residence of the sisters
of the Benedictine Order, the formation house of the
novices, and the retirement house for the elderly sisters.
The property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter
fence built some thirty (30) years ago. Abutting the fence
along the West Drive are buildings, facilities, and other
improvements.
The petitioners are the officials of the City
Government of Marikina. On September 30, 1994, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Marikina City enacted
Ordinance No. 192, entitled "Regulating the Construction
of Fences and Walls in the Municipality of Marikina."
Issue: Is Marikina City Ordinance No. 192, insofar as
imposing a five-meter setback, a valid exercise of police
power?
Ruling: No. Regarding the beautification purpose of the
setback requirement, it has long been settled that the
State may not, under the guise of police power,
permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their
property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic
appearance of the community. The Court, thus, finds
Section 5 to be unreasonable and oppressive as it will
substantially divest the respondents of the beneficial use
of their property solely for aesthetic purposes.
Accordingly, Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192 is invalid.
SJS vs. Lim
Facts: Ordinance No. 8027, approved by Manila City
Council on November 28, 2001 and effective December
28, 2001, reclassifies portions of Pandacan and Sta. Ana
from industrial to commercial and directs the owners and
operators of businesses to cease and desist from
operating their businesses within 6 months from the
ordinance’s effectivity. Among the businesses in the
area are the so-called Pandacan Terminals of Chevron,
Petron and Shell. Chevron, Petron and Shell questioned
the validity of said ordinance. They argued that they are
fighting for their right to property alleging that they stand
to lose. On June 16, 2006, Mayor Jose Atienza
Jr. approved Ordinance No. 8119 entitled “An
Ordinance Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land
Use Plan and Zoning Regulations of 2006.” This
designates Pandacan oil depot as a Planned Unit
Development/ Overlay Zone. On May 14, 2009, during
the incumbency of Mayor Alfredo Lim, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No. 8187 appended to
the list a Medium and a Heavy Industrial Zone where
petroleum refineries and oil depots are expressly
allowed.
Issue: Is amendatory Manila Ordinance No. 8187, which
would allow the continued stay of oil depots in
Pandacan, valid and constitutional?
Ruling: No. In striking down the contrary provisions of
the assailed Ordinance relative to the continued stay of
the oil depots, the SC followed the same line of
reasoning used in its 7 March 2007 decision, to wit:
“Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted for the purpose of
promoting a sound urban planning, ensuring health,
public safety and general welfare of the residents of
Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures
to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic
devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan
Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian
reclassified the area defined in the ordinance from
industrial to commercial.”
The following facts were found by the
Committee on Housing, Resettlement and Urban
Development of the City of Manila which recommended
the approval of the ordinance: The depot facilities
contained 313.5 million liters of highly flammable and
highly volatile products which include petroleum gas,
liquefied petroleum gas, aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline,
kerosene and fuel oil among others; The depot is open
to attack through land, water and air; It is situated in a
densely populated place and near Malacañang Palace;
and In case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot,
the fire could spread to the neighboring communities.
Aquino vs Municipality of Malay
Facts: Petitioner is the President and CEO of Boracay
Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc. On
January 7, 2010, the company applied for a zoning
compliance with the municipal government of Malay,
Aklan. While the company was already operating a
resort in the area, the application sought the issuance of
a building permit covering the construction of a 3-storey
hotel over a parcel of land measuring 998 sqm. located
in Sitio Diniwid, Barangay Balagab, Boracay Island,
Malay, Aklan. However, the Municipal Zoning
Administrator denied petitioner’s application on the
ground that the proposed construction site was within
the “no build zone”.
 On March 28, 2011, a Cease and Desist Order
was issued by the municipal government, enjoining the
expansion of the resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office
of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO 10,
ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West
Cove’s hotel.
Issue: Do LGUs have the power to establish “no-build-
zones” and to demolish structures which are nuisance
per se and per accidens?
Ruling: Yes, LGUs can establish “no build zones”.
These zones are intended for the protection of the public
because the stability of the ground’s foundation is
adversely affected by the nearby body of water. The
ever present threat of high rising storm surges also
justifies the ban on permanent constructions near the
shoreline.
However, with regard to demolishing structures
which are nuisance per se and per accidens,
generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular
thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is a nuisance
per se. Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance
per accidens, however, the court still finds that the LGU
may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition.
In the exercise of police power and the general welfare
clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of
the government. Otherwise stated, the government may
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty,
property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote
the general welfare.
League of Provinces vs DENR
Facts: On August 8, 2006, respondent DENR Secretary
rendered a Decision in favor of AMTC. The DENR
Secretary agreed with MGB Director Horacio C. Ramos
that the area was open to mining location only on August
11, 2004, fifteen (15) days after the receipt by Golden
Falcon on July 27, 2004 of a copy of the MGB-Central
Office's Order dated July 16, 2004, which Order denied
Golden Falcon's appeal. According to the DENR
Secretary, the filing by Golden Falcon of the letter-
appeal suspended the finality of the Order of denial
issued on April 29, 1998 by the Regional Director until
the resolution of the appeal on July 16, 2004 by the
MGB-Central Office. He stated that the Applications for
Quarry Permit were filed on February 10, 2004 when the
area was still closed to mining location; hence, the
Small-Scale Mining Permits granted by the PMRB and
the Governor were null and void. On the other hand, the
DENR Secretary declared that AMTC filed its Application
for Exploration Permit when the area was already open
to other mining applicants; thus, AMTC’s Application for
Exploration Permit was valid. Moreover, the DENR
Secretary held that the questioned Small-Scale Mining
Permits were issued in violation of Section 4 of R.A. No.
7076 and beyond the authority of the Provincial
Governor pursuant to Section 43 of R.A. No. 7942,
because the area was never proclaimed to be under the
People's Small-Scale Mining Program. Further, the
DENR Secretary stated that iron ore mineral is not
considered among the quarry resources.
Issue: Did the act of respondent [DENR] in cancelling
the small-scale mining permits amount to executive
control, not merely supervision, and usurpation of the
devolved powers of provinces?
Ruling: No, it should be pointed out that the
Administrative Code of 1987 provides that the DENR is,
subject to law and higher authority, in charge of carrying
out the State's constitutional mandate, under Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution, to control and supervise
the exploration, development, utilization and
conservation of the country's natural resources. Hence,
the enforcement of small-scale mining law in the
provinces is made subject to the supervision, control and
review of the DENR under the Local Government Code
of 1991, while the People’s Small-Scale Mining Act of
1991 provides that the People’s Small-Scale Mining
Program is to be implemented by the DENR Secretary in
coordination with other concerned local government
agencies.
NPC vs Cabanatuan City
Facts: The City of Cabanatuan (the City) assessed the
National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) a franchise tax
amounting to P808,606.41, representing 75% of 1% of
its gross receipts for 1992. NAPOCOR refused to pay,
arguing that it is exempt from paying the franchise tax.
Consequently, on November 9, 1993, the City filed a
complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan
City, demanding NAPOCOR to pay the assessed tax
due plus 25% surcharge and interest of 2% per month of
the unpaid tax, and costs of suit.
In the order dated January 25, 1996, the trial
court declared that the City could not impose a franchise
tax on NAPOCOR and accordingly dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit. In the March 12, 2001
decision of the Court of Appeals (Eighth Division) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 53297, the appellate court reversed the trial
court and found NAPOCOR liable to pay franchise tax
Issue: Can local governments impose interest and
surcharges of taxes due?
Ruling: YES. Pursuant to sec.168 of R.A 7160 of the
local government code “The sanggunian may impose a
surcharge not exceeding twenty-five (25%) of the
amount of taxes, fees or charges not paid on time and
an interest at the rate not exceeding two percent (2%)
per month of the unpaid taxes, fees or charges including
surcharges, until such amount is fully paid but in no case
shall the total interest on the unpaid amount or portion
thereof exceed thirty-six (36) months”
Issue: Did the city of cabanatuan impose the correct
surcharge?
Ruling: NO.Respondent's computation of the surcharge
is oppressive and unconscionable. The yearly accrual of
the 25% surcharge is unconscionable. Respondent's
yearly imposition of the 25% surcharge, which was
sustained by the trial court and the Court of Appeals,
resulted in an aggregate penalty that is way higher than
petitioner's basic tax liabilities.
Furthermore, it effectively exceeded the
prescribed 72% ceiling for interest under Section 168 of
the Local Government Code. The law allows the local
government to collect an interest at the rate not
exceeding 2% per month of the unpaid taxes, fees, or
charges including surcharges, until such amount is fully
paid. However, the law provides that the total interest on
the unpaid amount or portion thereof should not exceed
thirty-six (36) months or three (3) years. In other words,
respondent cannot collect a total interest on the unpaid
tax including surcharge that is effectively higher than
72%. Here, respondent applied the 25% cumulative
surcharge for more than three years. Its computation
undoubtedly exceeded the 72% ceiling imposed under
Section 168 of the Local Government Code. Hence,
respondent's computation of the surcharge is oppressive
and unconscionable.
Lim v Colet
Facts: The Manila Revenue Code was enacted on June
22, 1993 by the City Council of Manila and approved on
June 29, 1993 by then Manila Mayor Alfredo S. Lim
(Lim). Shortly thereafter, Ordinance No. 7807 was
enacted by the City Council of Manila on September 27,
1993 and approved by Mayor Lim on September 29,
1993, already amending several provisions of the Manila
Revenue Code. Section 21 of the Manila Revenue Code,
as amended, imposed a lower tax rate on the
businesses that fell under it. The City of Manila, through
its City Treasurer, began imposing and collecting the
business tax under Section 21(B) of the Manila Revenue
Code, as amended, beginning January 1994.
Issue: Is Sec. 21(B) of Manila City Ordinance No. 7794,
aka Manila Revenue Code, as amended, insofar as it
imposes business tax on businesses already assessed
with percentage taxes, valid and constitutional?
Ruling: The Court rules in favor of MAS; Maersk, et al.;
Eastern Shipping; William Lines, et al.; PSTC; OFSI;
Cosco, et al.; Sulpicio Lines; AISL; and Dongnama and
Kyowa. Section 21(B) of the Manila Revenue Code, as
amended, was null and void for being beyond the power
of the City of Manila and its public officials to enact,
approve, and implement under the LGC.
In the case at bar, the sanggunian of the
municipality or city cannot enact an ordinance imposing
business tax on the gross receipts of transportation
contractors, persons engaged in the transportation of
passengers or freight by hire, and common carriers by
air, land, or water, when said sanggunian was already
specifically prohibited from doing so. Any exception to
the express prohibition under Section 133(j) of the LGC
should be just as specific and unambiguous. Second,
the construction adopted by the Court gives effect to
both Sections 133(j) and 143(h) of the LGC. In
construing a law, care should be taken that every part
thereof be given effect and a construction that could
render a provision inoperative should be avoided, and
inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever
possible as parts of a harmonious whole.
FDCP vs. Colon Heritage
Facts: On June 7, 2002, Congress passed RA
9167, creating the Film Development Council of the
Philippines (FDCP) and abolishing the Film
Development Foundation of the Philippines, Inc. and the
Film Rating Board. According to petitioner, from the time
RA 9167 took effect up to the present, all the cities and
municipalities in Metro Manila, as well as urbanized and
independent component cities, with the sole exception of
Cebu City, have complied with the mandate of said law.
Issue: Are Sections 13 and 14 of RA 9167
unconstitutional for violating local fiscal autonomy?
Ruling: YES. The court held that Secs. 13 and 14 of RA
9167 are contrary to the basic policy in local autonomy
that all taxes, fees, and charges imposed by the LGUs
shall accrue exclusively to them, as articulated in Article
X, Sec. 5 of the 1987 Constitution. This edict, according
to the court, is a limitation upon the rule-making power of
Congress when it provides guidelines and limitations on
the local government unit’s (LGU’s) power of taxation.
Therefore, when Congress passed this “limitation,” it
went beyond its legislative authority, rendering the
questioned provisions unconstitutional.
 MCIAA vs CITY OF LAPU-LAPU
Facts: Petitioner Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority (MCIAA) was created by Congress on July 31,
1990 under Republic Act No. 6958 to "undertake the
economical, efficient and effective control, management
and supervision of the Mactan International Airport in the
Province of Cebu and the Lahug Airport in Cebu City x x
x and such other airports as may be established in the
Province of Cebu." Upon its creation, petitioner enjoyed
exemption from realty taxes under the following
provision of Republic Act No. 6958:
Section 14. Tax Exemptions.– The Authority
shall be exempt from realty taxes imposed by the
National Government or any of its political subdivisions,
agencies and instrumentalities: Provided, That no tax
exemption herein granted shall extend to any subsidiary
which may be organized by the Authority.
On September 11, 1996, however, this Court
rendered a decision in Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority v. Marcos (the 1996 MCIAA case) declaring
that upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7160 (The
Local Government Code of 1991), petitioner was no
longer exempt from real estate taxes.
Issue: Whether or not can the City of Lapu-Lapu tax
MCIAA?
Ruling: No. MCIAA is an instrumentality of the
government. Its properties actually is exclusively used
for public purpose, consisting of the airport terminal
building, airfield, runway, taxiway and the lots on which
they are situated, are not subject to real property tax.
Ferrer vs Bautista
Facts: Two Quezon City ordinances—Ordinance No.
SP-2095, S-2011 or the Socialized Housing Tax of
Quezon City and Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013 on
Garbage Collection Fees—were questioned by the
petitioner as unconstitutional. The petitioner filed for a
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)
seeking to declare unconstitutional and illegal Ordinance
Nos. SP-2095, S-2011 and SP-2235, S-2013 on the
Socialized Housing Tax and Garbage Fee, respectively,
which are being imposed by the respondents.
Issue: Are Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011
and Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013 on the Socialized
Housing Tax and Garbage Fee valid and
unconstitutional?
Ruling: Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011 is valid and
constitutional, since it is a tax which is within its power to
impose. It is also consistent with Section 43 of Republic
Act No. 7279. On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-
2235, S-2013 is invalid and unconstitutional, since the
authority of a municipality or city to impose fees is limited
to the collection and transport of non-recyclable and
special wastes and for the disposal of these into the
sanitary landfill.
Alta Vista Golf and Country Club v. Cebu City
Facts: On June 21, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of Cebu City enacted City Tax: Ordinance No. LXIX,
otherwise known as the "Revised Omnibus Tax:
Ordinance of the City of Cebu" (Revised Omnibus Tax:
Ordinance). Section 42 of the said tax ordinance on
amusement tax was amended by City Tax Ordinance
Nos. LXXXII and LXXXIV (which were enacted by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City on December 2,
1996 and April 20, 1998.
Issue: Is Section 42 of the Revised Omnibus Tax
Ordinance, as amended, imposing amusement tax on
golf courses within the authority of Cebu City to enact
under the Local Government Code?
Ruling: No. A local government unit may exercise its
residual power to tax when there is neither a grant nor a
prohibition by statute; or when such taxes, fees, or
charges are not otherwise specifically enumerated in the
Local Government Code, National Internal Revenue
Code, as amended, or other applicable laws. In the
present case, Section 140, in relation to Section 131 (c),
of the Local Government Code already explicitly and
clearly cover amusement tax and respondent Cebu City
must exercise its authority to impose amusement tax
within the limitations and guidelines as set forth in said
statutory provisions. With that, section 42 of the Revised
Omnibus Tax Ordinance, as amended, imposing
amusement tax on golf courses is beyond the authority
of respondent Cebu City to enact under the Local
Government Code. The Court held section 42 to be null
and void.
Abundo vs Comelec
Facts: For four (4) successive regular elections, Abundo
vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he
emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoral
candidate and accordingly served the corresponding
terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however,
the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially
proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in
due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor.
Abundo protested Torres’ election and proclamation.
Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004
mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his
assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of
the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of
a little over one year and one month.
Issue: Is the service of a term less than the full three
years by Mayor Abundo, in view of an election protest,
considered as full service of the term for purposes of the
application of the three consecutive term limit for elective
local officials?
Ruling: NO. The almost two-year period during which
Abundo’s opponent actually served as Mayor is and
ought to be considered an involuntary interruption of
Abundo’s continuity of service. An involuntary interrupted
term, cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule,
be considered as one term for purposes of counting the
three-term threshold.
Abundo vs COMELEC
Issue: Under what instances are the consecutive terms
not involuntary broken or interrupted?
Ruling: (1) Assumption of Office by Operation of Law,
(2) Recall Election, (3) Conversion of a Municipality into
a City, (4) Period of Preventive Suspension, (5) Election
Protest
Umali vs. COMELEC
Facts: On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of Cabanatuan City passed Resolution No. 183-2011,
requesting the President to declare the conversion of
Cabanatuan City from a component city of the province
of Nueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC).
Acceding to the request, the President issued
Presidential Proclamation No. 418, Series of 2012,
proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC subject
to "ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters
therein, as provided for in Section 453 of the Local
Government Code of 1991."
Issue: In the plebiscite for the proposed conversion of
Cabanatuan City to a highly urbanized city, who are
qualified to cast their votes: the registered voters of
Cabanatuan City only or the registered voters of Nueva
Ecija?
Ruling: In view of these changes in the economic and
political rights of the province of Nueva Ecija and its
residents, the entire province certainly stands to be
directly affected by the conversion of Cabanatuan City
into an HUC. Following the doctrines in Tan and Padilla,
all the qualified registered voters of Nueva Ecija should
then be allowed to participate in the plebiscite called for
that purpose. Respondents’ apprehension that requiring
the entire province to participate in the plebiscite will set
a dangerous precedent leading to the failure of cities to
convert is unfounded. Their fear that provinces will
always be expected to oppose the conversion in order to
retain the city’s dependence is speculative at best. In
any event, any vote of disapproval cast by those directly
affected by the conversion is a valid exercise of their
right to suffrage, and our democratic processes are
designed to uphold the decision of the majority,
regardless of the motive behind the vote. It is
unfathomable how the province can be deprived of the
opportunity to exercise the right of suffrage in a matter
that is potentially deleterious to its economic viability and
could diminish the rights of its constituents. To limit the
plebiscite to only the voters of the areas to be partitioned
and seceded from the province is as absurd and illogical
as allowing only the secessionists to vote for the
secession that they demanded against the wishes of the
majority and to nullify the basic principle of majority rule.
ARTICLE XI. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS
Gutierrez vs. House Com of Justice
Facts: On July 22, 2010, private respondents (Baraquel
group) filed an impeachment complaint against petitioner
upon the endorsement of Party-List
Representatives. On August 3, 2010, another
impeachment complaint was filed against petitioner by
private respondents (Reyes group), with a resolution of
endorsement by Party-List Representatives. After
hearing, the public respondent, by Resolution of
September 7, 2010, found the two complaints, which
both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and
betrayal of public trust, were sufficient in substance. The
petitioner was served also on September 7, 2010 a
notice directing her to file an answer to the complaints
within 10 days. On September 13, 2010, petitioner filed
with this Court the present petition with application for
injunctive reliefs. The petitioner basically anchors her
claim on alleged violation, among others, on the one-
year bar provision (Art. XI, Sec 3, par. 5) of the
Constitution and reckons the start of the one-year bar
from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against
her.
Issue: Should the impeachment against Gutierrez be
considered a prohibited second impeachment
proceedings initiated within one-year?
Ruling: No. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the
Constitution states that “No impeachment proceedings
shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year.” Following the
Francisco ruling, the term initiate means to file the
complaint and take initial action on it. The initiation
starts with the filing of the complaint which must be
accompanied with an action to set the complaint
moving. The proceeding is initiated or begins when a
verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee
on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which
triggers the series of steps that follow. In the case at
hand, contrary to petitioner’s emphasis on impeachment
complaint, what the Constitution mentions is
impeachment proceedings. Referring the complaint to
the proper committee ignites the impeachment
proceeding.
With a simultaneous referral of multiple
complaints filed, more than one lighted matchsticks light
the candle at the same time. What is important is that
there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a
year, such that once the candle starts burning,
subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the
candle.
Issue: Should an impeachment complaint only allege
one impeachable offense under the “one offense, one
complaint” rule of the Rules on Criminal Procedure?
Ruling: NO. Without going into the effectiveness of the
suppletory application of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure in carrying out the relevant constitutional
provisions, which prerogative the Constitution vests on
Congress, and without delving into the practicability of
the application of the one offense per complaint rule, the
initial determination of which must be made by the
House which has yet to pass upon the question, the
Court finds that petitioner’s invocation of that particular
rule of Criminal Procedure does not lie. Suffice it to state
that the Constitution allows the indictment for multiple
impeachment offenses, with each charge representing
an article of impeachment, assembled in one set known
as the "Articles of Impeachment." It, therefore, follows
that an impeachment complaint need not allege only one
impeachable offense.
In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents and
the Attendance as Witnesses for the Impeachment
Prosecution Panel
Facts: During the impeachment proceedings against
Chief Justice Corona, the Prosecution Panel manifested
in a COMPLIANCE dated January 27, 2012 that it would
present about 100 witnesses and almost a thousand
documents, to be secured from both private and public
offices. The list of proposed witnesses included Justices
of the Supreme Court, and Court officials and employees
who will testify on matters, many of which are internal to
the Court.
Issue: Can an impeachment court compel by
compulsory process SC Justices, officials and
employees to testify on matters pertaining to their
adjudicatory functions?
Ruling: No. Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec 24 states that
public officials are disqualified from testifying on
information they acquire in confidence in the course of
their duties. The Members of the Court may not be
compelled to testify in the impeachment proceedings
against the Chief Justice or other Members of the Court
about information they acquired in the performance of
their official function of adjudication. In addition,
jurisprudence (in Senate of the Ph vs. Exec. Sec.
Ermita) implies that justices and judges may not be
subject to any compulsory process in relation to the
performance of their adjudicatory functions.
Issue: Can court records and information be
subpoenaed and divulged before an impeachment
proceeding?
Ruling: NO. Court records which are “predecisional” and
“deliberative” in nature are thus protected and cannot be
the subject of a subpoena if judicial privilege is to be
preserved. The privilege in general insulates the
Judiciary from an improper intrusion into the functions of
the judicial branch and shields justices, judges, and
court officials and employees from public scrutiny or the
pressure of public opinion that would impair a judge’s
ability to render impartial decisions. The deliberative
process can be impaired by undue exposure of the
decision-making process to public scrutiny before or
even after the decision is made.
Additionally, two other grounds may be cited for
denying access to court records, as well as preventing
members of the bench, from being subjected to
compulsory process: (1) the disqualification by reason of
privileged communication and (2) the pendency of an
action or matter.
Duncano vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts: Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time
material to the case, the Regional Director of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as
classified under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758. On March
24, 2009, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP),
Office of the Ombudsman, filed a criminal case against
him for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 11 of
R.A. No. 6713, allegedly committed as follows: That on
or about April 15, 2003, or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused DANILO
DUNCANO y ACIDO, a high ranking public officer, being
the Regional Director of Revenue Region No. 7, of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, Quezon City, and as such
is under an obligation to accomplish and submit
declarations under oath of his assets, liabilities and net
worth and financial and business interests, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to disclose in
his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and
Networth (SALN) for the year 2002, his financial and
business interests/connection in Documail Provides
Corporation and Don Plus Trading of which he and his
family are the registered owners thereof, and the 1993
Nissan Patrol motor vehicle registered in the name of his
son VINCENT LOUIS P. DUNCANO which are part of
his assets, to the damage and prejudice of public
interest. Prior to his arraignment, petitioner filed a Motion
to Dismiss With Prayer to Defer the Issuance of Warrant
of Arrest before respondent Sandiganbayan Second
Division. As the OSP alleged, he admitted that he is a
Regional Director with Salary Grade 26. Citing Inding v.
Sandiganbayan and Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,
he asserted that under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1606, as amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249,
the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try and hear
the case because he is an official of the executive
branch occupying the position of a Regional Director but
with a compensation that is classified as below Salary
Grade 27.
Issue: Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over
Duncano who is a BIR Regional Director with Salary
Grade 26?
Ruling: NO. The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, unless committed by public officials
and employees occupying positions of regional director
and higher with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office. In
ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner
admittedly occupied the position of Director II with Salary
Grade "26" under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), the
Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error of jurisdiction,
and acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in suspending petitioner from office,
entitling petitioner to the reliefs prayed for. In the same
way, a certification issued by the OIC – Assistant Chief,
Personnel Division of the BIR shows that, although
petitioner is a Regional Director of the BIR, his position
is classified as Director II with Salary Grade 26.
Arroyo vs. People
Issue: Considering Sec. 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court, can the Supreme Court review on certiorari the
Sandiganbayan Order denying accused’s Demurrer to
Evidence?
Ruling: Yes, since the Sandiganbayan gravely abused
its discretion in denying GMA’s demurrer to evidence.
The exercise of the Court’s power to correct grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to
the contrary or for the sake of the convenience of one
side. This is because the Court has the bounden
constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of
discretion whenever and wherever it is committed.
Gonzales vs. Office of the President
Issue: Does the Ombudsman have the power to
discipline and remove his deputies and the Special
Prosecutor?
Ruling: Yes. The power to discipline or remove an
official of the Office of the Ombudsman should be lodged
only with the Ombudsman and not with the Office of the
President, in light of the independence the Constitution
guarantees the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Office of the Ombudsman is a very powerful
government constitutional agency tasked to enforce the
accountability of public officers. Section 21 of The
Ombudsman Act of 1989 (RA No. 6770) concretizes this
constitutional mandate by providing that:
Section 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary
Authority; Exceptions. - The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including
Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries,
except over officials who may be removed only by
impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary.
The Ombudsman's duty to protect the people
from unjust, illegal and inefficient acts of all public
officials emanates from Section 12, Article XI of the
Constitution. These broad powers include all acts of
malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all
public officials, including Members of the Cabinet and
key Executive officers, during their tenure.
To support these broad powers, the Constitution
saw it fit to insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from
the pressures and influence of officialdom and partisan
politics and from fear of external reprisal by making it an
"independent" office.
Ombudsman vs. Valencerina
Facts: Sometime in October 1997, Ecobel Land, Inc.
(Ecobel) through its Chairman, Josephine Boright
(Boright), applied for a medium-term loan financial
facility with the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) Investment Management Group (or Finance
Group) to finance the construction of its condominium
project in Ermita, Manila (project). In a Memorandum
dated January 27, 1998, respondent Alex M.
Valencerina (Valencerina), then Vice-President for
Marketing and Support Services of the GSIS General
Insurance Group (GIG), submitted Ecobel’s Guarantee
Payment Bond application for evaluation and
endorsement of the GSIS Investment Committee
(INCOM). Consequently, Valencerina, in the letters
dated February 12 and 24, 1999, informed Boright that
the subject bond was "invalid and unenforceable" and
that Ecobel’s check payment was disregarded by the
GSIS. In view of the foregoing events, the GSIS
conducted an investigation on the circumstances
surrounding the processing and issuance of the subject
bond and forwarded its report to the Fact-Finding and
Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB), which then conducted its own fact-
finding investigation.
Issue: As between Sec. 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman
Rule of Procedure and Sec. 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court --- on the effect of appeal from the decision of the
OMB in administrative cases, which shall prevail?
Ruling: Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman supersedes the discretion
given to the CA in Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court when a decision of the Ombudsman in an
administrative case is appealed to the CA. The provision
in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman that a decision is immediately executory is
a special rule that prevails over the provisions of the
Rules of Court. Specialis derogat generali. When two
rules apply to a particular case, that which was specially
designed for the said case must prevail over the other.
Estrada vs Ombudsman
Facts: On 28 March 2014, the Ombudsman issued in
OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397 a Joint
Resolution which found probable cause to indict Sen.
Estrada and his co-respondents with one count of
plunder and 11 counts of violation of Section 3(e) of RA
No. 3019. Sen. Estrada filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (of the Joint Resolution dated 28 March
2014) dated 7 April 2014. Sen. Estrada prayed for the
issuance of a new resolution dismissing the charges
against him. Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration
of the Ombudsman’s 27 March 2014 Order denying his
Request, Sen. Estrada filed the present Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 and sought to annul and set
aside the 27 March 2014 Order.
Issue: IS SEN. ESTRADA ENTITLED TO THE
ESSENTIAL AND FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS
OF DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS, AS LAID DOWN IN ANG TIBAY?
Ruling: NO. Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, should
apply to preliminary investigations will mean that all past
and present preliminary investigations are in gross
violation of constitutional due process. Moreover, a
person under preliminary investigation, as Sen. Estrada
is in the present case when he filed his Request, is not
yet an accused person, and hence cannot demand the
full exercise of the rights of an accused person:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest
on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime
has been committed and was committed by the
suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear
and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States,
while probable cause demands more than "bare
suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would
justify . . . conviction." A finding of probable cause
merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a
pronouncement of guilt.
Carpio-Morales vs. Binay
Facts: On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit was filed
by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI
before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr.
and other public officers and employees of the City
Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), accusing them
of Plunder and violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,
otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of
the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall
Parking Building (Makati Parking Building).

Issue: Are the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 14 of
RA No. 6770, valid and constitutional?
Ruling: The second paragraph of Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 6770 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while the policy against the
issuance of provisional injunctive writs by courts other
than the Supreme Court to enjoin an investigation
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman under the
first paragraph of the said provision is DECLARED
ineffective until the Court adopts the same as part of the
rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly
issued therefor;
Republic vs. Cojuangco
Issue: May the Prosecution of offenses arising from,
relating or incident to, or involving ill-gotten wealth
contemplated in Sec. 15, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution be barred by prescription?
Ruling: As to the main issue, petitioner maintains that,
although the charge against respondents was for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, its
prosecution relates to its efforts to recover the ill-gotten
wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos and of his
family and cronies. Section 15, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution provides that the right of the State to
recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials
or employees is not barred by prescription, laches, or
estoppel.
Ombudsman vs. Capulong
Facts: The case arose from the Complaint-Affidavit for
violation of Section 8 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713,
Perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code,
and serious dishonesty and grave misconduct under the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service filed on July 27, 2009, before the Ombudsman,
docketed as OMB-C-C-09-0560-J (LSC) and OMB-C-A-
09-0570-J (LSC), by Joselito P. Fangon, Acting Director
of the General Investigation Bureau of the Ombudsman,
against respondent Jose T. Capulong (Capulong),
Customs Operation Officer V of the Bureau of Customs
(BOC).
These charges were based on two particular
acts: first, for failure to file the required Statements of
Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) for calendar
years 1987, 1990, 1991, 1993 and 1998; and second, for
failure to disclose in his SALNs for calendar years 1999
to 2004 his wife’s business interest in two corporations,
namely, SYJ Realty Corporation and Radsy Production,
Inc. Accordingly, the Ombudsman issued an Order dated
December 7, 2009 directing Capulong to file a counter-
affidavit.
Issue: Did Capulong’s non-disclosure of his wife’s
business interest in his SALN constitute serious
dishonesty or grave misconduct?
Ruling: No. Capulong’s non-disclosure of his wife’s
business interest does not constitute serious dishonesty
or grave misconduct. Nothing in the records reveals that
Capulong deliberately placed "N/A" in his SALN despite
knowledge about his wife’s business interest. As
explained by Capulong, the SEC already revoked the
registration of the corporations where his wife was an
incorporator; hence, he deemed it not necessary to
indicate it in his SALN.
ARTICLE XII. NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY
Dizon Copper vs. Dr. Dizon
Facts: On 13 November 1935, Celestino M. Dizon
(Celestino) filed with the Office of the Mining Recorder,
Declarations of Location over 57 mining claims in San
Marcelino, Zambales. In 1966, herein petitioner Dizon
Copper-Silver Mines, Inc. was organized. Among its
incorporators were Celestino and his son, respondent
Dr. Luis D. Dizon. On 27 January 1967, Celestino, for
himself and as attorney-in-fact of the other registered
claim-owners, assigned their 57 mining claims to
petitioner. On 6 September 1975, petitioner entered into
an Operating Agreement with Benguet Corporation
(Benguet). In such agreement, petitioner authorized
Benguet to, among others, "explore, equip, develop and
operate" the 57 mining claims. On 4 July 1991, Benguet
filed an MPSA application with the DENR. The
application, designated as MPSA-P-III-16, seeks to
place all existing mining claims and interests then
operated by Benguet under production sharing
agreements in line with Executive Order No. 279 of 25
July 1987.
Issue: What is a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement
(MPSA)? Is it violative of Sec. 2, par. 2, Article XII of the
Constitution?
Ruling: An MPSA is one of the mineral agreements
innovated by the 1987 Constitution by which the State
takes on a broader and more dynamic role in the
exploration, development and utilization of the country’s
mineral resources. By such agreements, the government
does not become a mere licensor, concessor or lessor of
mining resources—but actually assumes "full control and
supervision" in the exploration, development and
utilization of the concerned mining claims in consonance
with Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. Therefore,
it is not violative of Sec. 2, par. 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.
IDEALS vs. PSALM
Facts: Respondent PSALM is a government-owned and
controlled corporation created by virtue of Republic Act
No. 9136,otherwise known as the "Electric Power
Industry Reform Act of 2001" (EPIRA). Sometime in
August 2005, PSALM commenced the privatization of
the 246-megawatt (MW) AHEPP located in San Lorenzo,
Norzagaray, Bulacan. AHEPP’s main units built in 1967
and 1968, and 5 auxiliary units, form part of the Angat
Complex which includes the Angat Dam, Angat
Reservoir and the outlying watershed area. On
December 15, 2009, PSALM’s Board of Directors
approved the Bidding Procedures for the privatization of
the AHEPP.
Issue: Did the sale of AHEPP to a foreign corporation
pursuant to the privatization mandated by EPIRA violate
Sec.2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution?
Ruling: No. The Court rules that while the sale of
AHEPP to a foreign corporation pursuant to the
privatization mandated by the EPIRA did not violate Sec.
2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution which limits the
exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources under the full supervision and control of the
State or the State’s undertaking the same through joint
venture, co-production or production sharing agreements
with Filipino corporations 60% of the capital of which is
owned by Filipino citizens, the stipulation in the Asset
Purchase Agreement and Operations and Maintenance
Agreement whereby NPC consents to the transfer of
water rights to the foreign buyer, K-Water, contravenes
the aforesaid constitutional provision and the Water
Code.
Republic vs. Ivan
Facts: Alleging continuous and adverse possession of
more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos
III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the
registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Paranaque City. On May 21, 1998,
Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land
registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant
because of the latter’s co-ownership of the property. He
alleged that the property had been formed through
accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious,
public, continuous and adverse possession for more
than 30 years.
Issue: Can dry river beds be acquired by acquisitive
prescription?
Ruling: NO. Subject to the exceptions defined in Article
461 of the Civil Code (which declares river beds that are
abandoned through the natural change in the course of
the waters as ipso facto belonging to the owners of the
land occupied by the new course, and which gives to the
owners of the adjoining lots the right to acquire only the
abandoned river beds not ipso facto belonging to the
owners of the land affected by the natural change of
course of the waters only after paying their value), all
river beds remain property of public dominion and
cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless
previously declared by the Government to be alienable
and disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not
shown to be already declared to be alienable and
disposable, respondents could not be deemed to have
acquired the property through prescription.
Fortuna vs. Republic
Facts: In December 1994, the spouses Fortuna filed an
application for registration of a 2,597-square meter land
identified as Lot No. 4457, situated in Bo. Canaoay, San
Fernando, La Union. The spouses Fortuna claimed that
they, through themselves and their predecessors-in-
interest, have been in quiet, peaceful, adverse and
uninterrupted possession of Lot No. 4457 for more than
50 years, and submitted as evidence the lot’s survey
plan, technical description, and certificate of
assessment.
Issue: Is Lot No. 4457 an alienable and disposable land
of public domain?
Ruling: No. The court ruled that the nature of Lot No.
4457 as alienable and disposable public land has not
been sufficiently established. Jurisprudence has
required that an applicant for registration of title acquired
through a public land grant must present incontrovertible
evidence that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable by establishing the existence of
a positive act of the government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, the notation in the survey plan and
the Certification from the DENR Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)
are not proof/evidence of a positive act from the
government (i.e. President or the DENR Secretary)
reclassifying and releasing Lot No. 4457 as alienable
and disposable agricultural land of the public
domain. Mere notations appearing in survey plans are
inadequate proof of the covered properties’ alienable
and disposable character.
Yinlu Bicol Mining vs. Trans Asia
Facts: On August 31, 2007, Yinlu Bicol Mining
Corporation informed the DENR by letter that it had
acquired the mining patents of PIMI from MBC/BDO by
way of a deed of absolute sale, stating that the areas
covered by its mining patents were within the areas of
Trans-Asia’s MPSA. Based on the documents submitted
by Yinlu, four of the six transfer certificates of title (TCTs)
it held covered four mining claims under Patent Nos. 15,
16, 17 and 18 respectively named as Busser, Superior,
Bussamer and Rescue Placer Claims, with an aggregate
area of 192 hectares. The areas covered occupied more
than half of the MPSA area of Trans-Asia.
Issue: Are rights pertaining to mining patents issued
pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and existing prior
to November 15, 1935 vested rights that cannot be
impaired?
Ruling: Yes. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the court
stated that mining rights acquired under the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and prior to the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution were vested rights that could not be
impaired even by the Government. Indeed, the mining
patents of Yinlu were issued pursuant to the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and were subsisting prior to the effectivity of
the 1935 Constitution. Consequently, Yinlu and its
predecessors-in-interest had acquired vested rights in
the disputed mineral lands that could not and should not
be impaired even in light of their past failure to comply
with the requirement of registration and annual work
obligations.
Central Mindanao University vs. Republic
Facts: Petitioner Central Mindanao University (CMU) is
an agricultural educational institution owned and run by
the State established by virtue of Republic Act No. 4498.
It is represented by its President, Dr. Maria Luisa R.
Soliven in accordance with CMU Board of Regents
Resolution No. 02, s. 2011. The subjects of the
controversy are two parcels of land situated at Musuan,
Maramag, Bukidnon identified as "Sheet 1, Lot 1 of Ir-
1031-D" consisting of 20,619,175 square meters, and
"Sheet 2, Lot 2 of Ir-1031-D" consisting of 13,391,795
square meters, more or less. In 1946, CMU took
possession of the subject parcels of land and started
construction for the school site upon the confirmation of
the Secretary of Public Instruction. However, during the
final survey in 1952, CMU discovered that there were
several adverse claimants, holders, possessors and
occupants of the portions of lots identified as school
sites.
Issue: Was CMU able to establish, through
incontrovertible evidence that the land reservations
registered in its name are alienable and disposable
lands of Public Domain?
Ruling: No. CMU failed to establish through
incontrovertible evidence that the land Reservations
registered in its name are alienable and disposable
lands of public domain. Because CMU did not present
any proof of a positive act of the government declaring
the said lands alienable and disposable, for lack of proof
that the said land reservations have been reclassified as
alienable and disposable, the said lands remain part of
inalienable public domain; hence, they are not applicable
under Torrens system.
Republic vs. AFP-RSBS
Facts: Lots X, Y-1 and Y-2 were lands of public domain
located in General Santos. Pursuant to Proclamation No.
168, these disputed lands were reserved for recreation
and health purposes. A subsequent Proclamation
declared that 2 of the 3 lots were open for disposition to
qualified applicants, leaving Lot X as the only remaining
part of the reservation now known as Magsaysay Park.
The respondents claimed that they had acquired vested
interests over Lot X for having occupied the same for
more than 30 years.
Issue: May national parks be increased or diminished?
Ruling: Under the present Constitution, national parks
are declared part of the public domain, and shall be
conserved and may not be increased nor diminished,
except by law.
Beumer vs. Amores
Facts: Petitioner, a Dutch national, and respondent, a
Filipina, married on March 29, 1980. After several years,
the RTC of Negros Oriental declared the nullity of their
marriage on the basis of the former’s psychological
incapacity. Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for
Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership. He insisted that the
money used to purchase the foregoing properties came
from his own capital funds and that they were registered
in the name of his former wife only because of the
constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership.
Thus, he prayed for reimbursement of one-half (1/2) of
the value of what he had paid in the purchase of the said
properties, waiving the other half in favor of his ex-wife.
Issue: Can an alien husband seek reimbursement for
the value of the lands purchased with his funds and titled
in the name of his Filipina spouse?
Ruling: No, the Court cited In Re: Petition For
Separation of Property-Elena Buenaventura Muller v.
Helmut Muller in its decision, the Court had already
denied a claim for reimbursement of the value of
purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by a
foreigner Helmut Muller, against his former Filipina
spouse, Elena Buenaventura Muller. It held that Helmut
Muller cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of
equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly
bought the property despite the prohibition against
foreign ownership of Philippine land enshrined under
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Gamboa vs. Teves
Facts: The issue started when petitioner Gamboa
questioned the indirect sale of shares involving almost
12 million shares of the Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company (PLDT) owned by PTIC to First
Pacific. Thus, First Pacific’s common shareholdings in
PLDT increased from 30.7% to 37%, thereby increasing
the total common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to
about 81.47%. The petitioner contends that it violates
the Constitutional provision on filipinization of public
utility, stated in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution, which limits foreign ownership of
the capital of a public utility to not more than 40%. Then,
in 2011, the Court ruled the case in favor of the
petitioner, hence, this new case, resolving the motion for
reconsideration for the 2011 decision filed by the
respondents.
Issue: Who is a “Philippine national” entitled to own and
operate a reserved public utility pursuant to Sec. 11, Art.
XII of the Constitution?
Ruling: The term "Philippine national" shall mean a
citizen of the Philippines; or a domestic partnership or
association wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines;
or a corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippines of which at least sixty percent (60%) of the
capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is owned
and held by citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation
organized abroad and registered as doing business in
the Philippines under the Corporation Code of which one
hundred percent (100%) of the capital stock outstanding
and entitled to vote is wholly owned by Filipinos or a
trustee of funds for pension or other employee
retirement or separation benefits, where the trustee is a
Philippine national and at least sixty percent (60%) of the
fund will accrue to the benefit of Philippine nationals:
Provided, That where a corporation and its non-Filipino
stockholders own stocks in a Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) registered enterprise, at least sixty
percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and
entitled to vote of each of both corporations must be
owned and held by citizens of the Philippines and at
least sixty percent (60%) of the members of the Board of
Directors of each of both corporations must be citizens
of the Philippines, in order that the corporation shall be
considered a "Philippine national."
Republic vs. City of Parañaque
Facts: On January 8, 2010, the RTC rendered its
decision dismissing PRA’s petition. In ruling that PRA
was not exempt from payment of real property taxes, the
RTC reasoned out that it was a GOCC under Section 3
of P.D. No. 1084. It was organized as a stock
corporation because it had an authorized capital stock
divided into no par value shares. Therefore, as a GOCC,
local tax exemption is withdrawn by virtue of Section 193
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160 Local Government Code
(LGC) which was the prevailing law in 2001 and 2002
with respect to real property taxation.
Issue: Is the Philippine Reclamation Authority a GOCC
under Sec. 16, Art. XII?
Ruling: NO. PRA is not a GOCC for Sec. 16 of Art. XII
of the 1987 provides:
Section 16. The Congress shall not, except by
general law, provide for the formation, organization, or
regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or
controlled corporations may be created or established by
special charters in the interest of the common good and
subject to the test of economic viability.
The fundamental provision above authorizes
Congress to create GOCCs through special charters on
two conditions: 1) the GOCC must be established for the
common good; and 2) the GOCC must meet the test of
economic viability. In this case, PRA may have passed
the first condition of common good but failed the second
one - economic viability. Undoubtedly, the purpose
behind the creation of PRA was not for economic or
commercial activities. Neither was it created to compete
in the market place considering that there were no other
competing reclamation companies being operated by the
private sector. As mentioned earlier, PRA was created
essentially to perform a public service considering that it
was primarily responsible for a coordinated, economical
and efficient reclamation, administration and operation of
lands belonging to the government with the object of
maximizing their utilization and hastening their
development consistent with the public interest.
 Vivas vs. Monetary Board
Facts: The Monetary Board (MB) issued Resolution
No. 27623 placing EuroCredit Community Bank,
Incorporated (ECBI) under receivership in accordance
with the recommendation of the Integrated
Supervision Department (ISD) II on the basis of the
examination findings, in its memorandum, which
findings showed that the Eurocredit Community Bank,
Inc. – a Rural heBank (Eurocredit Bank) (a) is
unable to pay its liabilities as they become due in t
ordinary course of business; (b) has insufficient
realizable assets to meet liabilities; (c) cannot
continue in business without involving probable
losses to its depositors and creditors; and (d) has
willfully violated a cease and desist order of the MB
for acts or transactions which are considered unsafe
and unsound banking practices and other acts or
transactions constituting fraud or dissipation of the
assets of the institution, and considering the failure
of the Board of Directors/management of Eurocredit
Bank to restore the bank’s financial health and
viability despite considerable time given to address
the bank’s financial problems, and that the bank
had been accorded due process, the Board, in
accordance with Section 30 of Republic Act No.
7653 (The New Central Bank Act).
Issue: Is the “Close Now, Hear Later” policy of the
Monetary Board valid and tenable?
Ruling: Yes, if circumstances warrant it, the MB may
forbid a bank from doing business and place it under
receivership without prior notice and hearing in
accordance with Section 30 of R.A. No. 7653. Moreover,
in the case of Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas Monetary
Board v. Hon. Antonio-Valenzuela, the Court reiterated
the doctrine of "close now, hear later," stating that it was
justified as a measure for the protection of the public
interest.
ARTICLE XIII. SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS
Grace Poe vs. Comelec
Issue: Is the declaration of foundlings as natural born
Filipino citizens in keeping with social justice?
Ruling: Yes. As SC rules in this case in verbatim, “We
find no such intent or language permitting discrimination
against foundlings. On the contrary, all three
Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal
protection of the laws. All exhort the State to render
social justice. Of special consideration are several
provisions in the present charter: Article II, Section 11
which provides that the "State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates Congress
to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures
that protect and enhance the right of all the people to
human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3 which
requires the State to defend the "right of children to
assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and
special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to
their development." Certainly, these provisions
contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings on
account of their unfortunate status.
Villanueva vs. JBC
Facts: After about a year from being appointed as a
MCTC judge, Judge Villanueva applied for the vacant
position of presiding judge in some RTC branches
(Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch 13, Davao City; and
Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur). The JBC
however informed him that he was not included in the list
of candidates for such position because the JBC’s long-
standing policy requires 5 years of service as judge of
first-level courts before one can apply as judge for
second-level courts.
Issue: Does the JBC’s five-year requirement violate the
constitutional provision on Social Justice and Human
Rights for Equal Opportunity of Employment?
Ruling: NO. As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution,
the JBC is mandated to recommend appointees to the
judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC in a list
officially transmitted to the President may be appointed
by the latter as justice or judge in the judiciary. Thus, the
JBC is burdened with a great responsibility that is
imbued with public interest as it determines the men and
women who will sit on the judicial bench. While the 1987
Constitution has provided the qualifications of members
of the judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC from
having its own set of rules and procedures and providing
policies to effectively ensure its mandate.
JBC's ultimate goal is to recommend nominees
and not simply to fill up judicial vacancies in order to
promote an effective and efficient administration of
justice. Given this pragmatic situation, the JBC had to
establish a set of uniform criteria in order to ascertain
whether an applicant meets the minimum constitutional
qualifications and possesses the qualities expected of
him and his office. Thus, the adoption of the five-year
requirement policy applied by JBC to the petitioner's
case is necessary and incidental to the function
conferred by the Constitution to the JBC.
Fuji TV vs. Espiritu
Facts: Arlene S. Espiritu (Arlene) was engaged by Fuji
Television Network, Inc. (Fuji) as a news
correspondent/producer. Arlene's employment contract
initially provided for a term of one (1) year but was
successively renewed on a yearly basis with salary
adjustment upon every renewal. Arlene was diagnosed
with lung cancer. After several verbal and written
communications, Arlene and Fuji signed a non-renewal
contract where it was stipulated that her contract would
no longer be renewed after its expiration. The contract
also provided that the parties release each other from
liabilities and responsibilities under the employment
contract. The day after Arlene signed the non-renewal
contract, she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and
attorney's fees with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).
Issue: What is the level of constitutional regulation and
protection afforded to contracts of employment? Are
there factors that may vary the level of protection?
Ruling: Contracts of employment have a high level of
regulation because they are impressed with public
interest. Sec. 3, Art. XIII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution guarantees the protection to labor.
However, the level of protection to labor should vary
from case to case; otherwise, the state might appear to
be too paternalistic in affording protection to labor. The
level of protection to labor must be determined on the
basis of the nature of the work, qualifications of the
employee, and other relevant circumstances.
DCWD vs. Aranquez
Facts: Petitioner Davao City Water District is a
government-owned and controlled corporation in Davao
City. The private respondents are officers and members
of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Davao City Water
District (NAMADACWAD). They were charged with
several administrative cases due to acts committed
during the anniversary celebration of DCWD such as
wearing of t-shirts with inscriptions and posting of bond
papers outside the designated places. The inscriptions
and postings bore employees’ grievances. On 8
November 2007, the officers and members of
NAMADACWAD held an Emergency General Assembly
and they agreed to wear NAMADACWAD t-shirts with
inscriptions stating, "CNA Incentive Ihatag Na, Dir.
Braganza Pahawa Na!" on the day of the anniversary.
Issue: Was the concerted mass action of the DCWD
employees well-within their rights and in keeping with
Sec 3, Art XIII of the 1987 Constitution?
Ruling: Yes. Sec 3, Art XIII states that workers have a
right to strike “in accordance with law”. As defined in
Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 which serves
to regulate the political rights of those in the government
service, the concerted activity or mass action proscribed
must be coupled with the "intent of effecting work
stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their
demands of force concession". It is clear that the
collective activity of joining the fun run in t-shirts with
inscriptions on CNA incentives was not to effect work
stoppage or disrupt the service. As pointed out by the
respondents, they followed the advice of GM Gamboa
"to be there" at the fun run. Respondents joined, and did
not disrupt the fun run. They were in sports attire that
they were allowed, nay required, to wear. Else,
government employees would be deprived of their
constitutional right to freedom of expression. Thus, the
court rules against the findings of both the CSC and
Court of Appeals that the wearing of t-shirts with
grievance inscriptions constitutes as a violation of
Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations.
Security Bank vs. Singson
Facts: In 1985, respondent was initially employed by
petitioner Premiere Development Bank (now Security
Bank Savings Corporation [SBSC]) as messenger until
his promotion as loans processor at its Sangandaan
Branch. Thereafter, he was appointed in June 2007 as
Acting Branch Manager. On March 26, 2008, he was
assigned to its Quezon Avenue Branch under the
supervision of Branch Manager Pinero and held the
position of Customer Service Operations Head (CSOH)
tasked with the safekeeping of its checkbooks and other
bank forms.
On July 22, 2008, respondent received a show-
cause memorandum from Ms. Ruby O. Go, head of
West Regional Operations, charging him of violating the
bank's Code of Conduct when he mishandled various
checkbooks under his custody.
Issue: Is respondent entitled to separation pay as a
measure of social justice?
Ruling: No, the award of separation pay based on social
justice would be improper. The Court holds that
separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social
justice only in those instances where the employee is
validly dismissed for causes other than serious
misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character.
Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, e.g., habitual
intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like
theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the
employer may not be required to give the dismissed
employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or
whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social
justice. As petitioners aptly pointed out, the infractions,
while not clearly indicative of any wrongful intent, are
serious in nature when one considers the employee's
functions, rendering it inequitable to award separation
pay based on social justice.
In the case at bar, respondent's established act
of repeatedly allowing Branch Manager Pinero to bring
the checkbooks and bank forms outside of the bank's
premises in violation of the company's rules and
regulations had already been declared by the Labor
Arbiter to be gross and habitual neglect of duty under
Article 282 of the Labor Code.
Land Bank vs. Eusebio
Facts: Respondent Benecio Eusebio, Jr. was the owner
of a 790.4-hectare parcel of land situated in Corba,
Cataingan, Masbate, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) registered in the name of Ricardo Tañada.
Eusebio purchased this parcel of land from Tañada.
Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) then
revalued the acquirable portion at ₱3,927,188.28,
pursuant to DAR Administrative Order. Eusebio likewise
rejected this valuation. Meanwhile, the LBP opened a
trust account in the amount of ₱3,149,718.20 in favor of
Eusebio and Tañada for the covered portion. The DAR
then took physical possession of the property, had TCT
cancelled in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, and
distributed the property at cost to the recognized farmer-
beneficiaries.
Issue: Is the “just compensation” guaranteed to a
landowner under Section 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution
the same as the “just compensation” embodied in
Section 9, Art. IIIof the Constitution?
Ruling: Yes. The court debunked this very same
argument in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb
Farms Corporation whose factual circumstances closely
mirror and are, in fact, related to those of the present
case. In Honeycomb, they essentially pointed out that
the "just compensation" guaranteed to a landowner
under, Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution is
precisely the same as the "just compensation" embodied
in Section 9, Article III of the Constitution. That is,
whether for land taken pursuant to the State’s agrarian
reform program or for property taken for purposes other
than agrarian reform, the just compensation due to an
owner should be the "fair and full price of the taken
property." In other words, therefore, the clear intent of
the Constitutional guarantee of just compensation,
whether understood within the terms of Article III,
Section 9 or of Article XIII, Section 4, is to secure to any
owner the "full and fair equivalent" of the property taken.
Regardless of whether the taking was pursued in the
"traditional" exercise of eminent domain or in its
"revolutionary" exercise in the context of the State’s
agrarian reform program, just compensation has but one
meaning and the State is obligated to pay the "fair and
full price of the property" even if the property is taken for
social justice purposes.
Delfino vs. Anasao
Facts: Delfino owned parcels of land in Laguna. The
tenanted portion being tilled by respondents was placed
under PD 27. Delfino then filed an Application for
Retention over his land. The DAR Secretary gave him a
maximum of 5 ha. as his right of retention.
Issue: In the agrarian reform, is retention by landowners
a constitutionally guaranteed right? If in the affirmative,
is it absolute?
Ruling: Yes, The right of retention is a constitutionally
guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification by the
legislature making it not an absolute right. It serves to
mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by
balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and
by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not
meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner.
The right to choose the area to be retained,
which shall be compact or contiguous, shall pertain to
the landowner; Provided, however, That in case the area
selected for retention by the landowner is tenanted, the
tenant shall have the option to choose whether to remain
therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another
agricultural land with similar or comparable features. In
case the tenant chooses to remain in the retained area,
he shall be considered a leaseholder and shall lose his
right to be a beneficiary under this Act. In case the
tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in another agricultural
land, he loses his right as a leaseholder to the land
retained by the landowner. The tenant must exercise this
option within a period of one (1) year from the time the
landowner manifests his choice of the area for retention.
SAMMANA vs. Tan
Facts: A Notice of Coverage had been issued over the
129.4227-hectare land in Barangay Ipag, Mariveles,
Bataan and that the 34 hectares sold by the PCGG to
the respondent had been already identified for CARP
coverage and targeted for acquisition in the year 2000.
Samahan ng Magsasaka at Mangingisda ng Sitio
Naswe, Inc.claimed that its members "have resided in
the area for several years doing farming activities" from
which they "derive their income for their daily
sustenance."
Issue: Is social justice in the land reform program
applicable only to farmers and farmworkers?
Ruling: Social justice in the land reform program also
applies to landowners, not merely to farmers and
farmworkers. This is precisely why the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657) and the applicable rules
provide for the procedure for determining the proper
beneficiaries and grantees or awardees of the lands
covered or to be covered under the CARP.
DAR vs. Woodland
Facts: Woodland is the registered owner of a parcel of
agricultural land with an area of 10.0680 hectares
located at Subasta, Calinan, Davao City. On December
11, 2003, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
issued a Notice of Coverage (NOC) placing 5.0680
hectares under the coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)
After the new title was issued in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines based on the NOC,
Certificates of Land Ownership Award were issued in
favor of farmer beneficiaries. Woodland filed a
complaint and contended that the issuance of the NOC
was illegal because R.A. 6657 had already expired on
15 June 1998 and its amendatory, R.A. 8532, did not
extend the DAR's authority to acquire agrarian lands for
distribution.
Issue: Is R.A. No. 8532 which authorized the DAR to
issue Notices of Coverage and Acquisition after June 15,
1998, or beyond the 10-year implementation, valid and
constitutional?
Ruling: Yes. The Court ruled that R.A. 8532 extended
the term of the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under the
CARL. With that, the NOC dated December 11, 2003
and Notice of Acquisition (NOA) dated October 5, 2004
issued over the portion of Woodland’s land are valid.
The phrase "until the year 2008" used in Section
63 of R.A. 8532 unmistakably extends the DAR's
authority to issue NOCs for purposes of acquiring and
distributing private agricultural lands. The Court cannot
subscribe to Woodland’s stance that DAR’s authority to
issue NOCs and acquisition ceased after the 10-year
implementation period mentioned in Section 5 of the
CARL because it was in conflict of the constitutional
mandate firmly lodged in Section 4, Article XIII of the
1987 Constitution which seeks the just distribution of all
agricultural lands to qualified farmers and farm workers
to free them from oppressive tenancy agreements.
Ferrer vs. Bautista
Facts: Effective for five (5) years, the Socialized
Housing Tax ( SHT ) shall be utilized by the Quezon City
Government for the following projects: (a) land
purchase/land banking; (b) improvement of
current/existing socialized housing facilities; (c) land
development; (d) construction of core houses, sanitary
cores, medium-rise buildings and other similar
structures; and (e) financing of public-private partnership
agreement of the Quezon City Government and National
Housing Authority ( NHA ) with the private sector. Under
certain conditions, a tax credit shall be enjoyed by
taxpayers regularly paying the special assessment.
Issue: can the Socialized tax be justified by social
justice?
Ruling: Yes. THE 1987 Constitution explicitly espouses
the view that the use of property bears a social function
and that all economic agents shall contribute to the
common good, and the tax is levied with a regulatory
purpose; in the case at bar, the constitutionality and
legality of the socialized housing tax is sustained for
being consistent with section 43 of RA no. 7279.
Alangdeo vs. City Mayor of Baguio
Facts: Respondent Ernesto Lardizabal (Ernesto) filed ·a
complaint for demolition, before the City Engineer's
Office of Baguio City (City Engineer's Office),
questioning the ongoing construction of a: residential
structure and garage extension by petitioners on a
parcel of land, situated at Barangay Atok Trail, Baguio
City (subject property), allegedly owned by Mariano
Pangloy and Ernesto's father, Juanito Lardizabal. Upon
investigation, the City Engineer's Office found out that
the construction had no building permit. Consequently,
the City Mayor issued, through the Secretary to the
Mayor, Demolition Order No. 05, series of 2005 (DO No.
05) directing the City Demolition Team to summarily
demolish the said structures.
Issue: Is DO No. 05, which ordered the summary
demolition of petitioners’ structures, valid and tenable?
Ruling: No, DO No. 5 is not valid and untenable. DO No.
05, which ordered the summary demolition of petitioners'
structures, has no legal moorings and perforce was
invalidly issued. Accordingly, an injunctive writ to enjoin
its implementation is in order. It is well-settled that for an
injunction to issue, two requisites must concur: first,
there must be a right to be protected; and second, the
acts against which the injunction is to be directed are
violative of said right. Here, the two (2) requisites are
present: there is a right to be protected -- that is,
petitioners' right over their structures which should be
preserved unless their removal is warranted by law; and
the act, i.e., the summary demolition of the structures
under DO No. 05, against which the injunction is
directed, would violate said right.
Imbong vs. Ochoa
Issue: By giving priority to the poor, does the
Reproductive Health Law violate the equal protection
clause of the 1987 Constitution?
Ruling: No. According to the Court, To provide that the
poor are to be given priority in the government's
reproductive health care program is not a violation of the
equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section
11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the
distinct necessity to address the needs of the
underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in
addressing the health development of the people. It
should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes
poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from
fertility issues and desire to have children. There is,
therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law
only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number.
While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it
does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As
Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization
of the population growth rate is incidental to the
advancement of reproductive health."
Manila Memorial Park vs. DSWD Sec.
Facts: Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court filed by petitioners Manila Memorial Park, Inc.
and La Funeraria Paz-Sucat, Inc., domestic corporations
engaged in the business of providing funeral and burial
services, against public respondents Secretaries of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
and the Department of Finance (DOF). Petitioners assail
the constitutionality of Section 4 of Republic Act (RA)
No. 7432, as amended by RA 9257, and the
implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD
and DOF insofar as these allow business establishments
to claim the 20% discount given to senior citizens as a
tax deduction.
Issue/s: Does the tax deduction scheme under R.A.
7432, violate Art. XIII, Sec. 11 of the Constitution
because it shifts the State’s constitutional mandate or
duty of improving the welfare of the elderly to the private
sector? Is it in the nature of an exercise of police power
or eminent domain?
Ruling: No. While Article XIII of the Constitution
provides the precept for the protection of property,
various laws and jurisprudence, particularly on agrarian
reform and the regulation of contracts and public utilities,
continuously serve as x x x reminder[s] that the right to
property can be relinquished upon the command of the
State for the promotion of public good. Undeniably, the
success of the senior citizens program rests largely on
the support imparted by petitioners and the other private
establishments concerned.
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power
which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has
general welfare for its object. Police power as an
attribute to promote the common good would be diluted
considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they
will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned
provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of
evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect
of the provision in question, there is no basis for its
nullification in view of the presumption of validity which
every law has in its favor.
KMU vs. Aquino
Facts: PhilHealth made a partial deferral of the premium
rate increase until the end of CY 2013. From January to
December 2013, the minimum annual premium
contribution rate for IPP and OWP members was
pegged at Php1,800.00, instead of the full Php2,400.00.
Issue: Are PhilHealth Circular Nos. 0027, 0025, and
0024, all series of 2013, which adjusted the premium
contribution rates for the National Health
Insurance Program, issued with grave abuse of
discretion?
Ruling: NO. Even if the procedural issues are
disregarded, the petitions still failed to show that
PhilHealth gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
assailed circulars. On the contrary, PhilHealth acted with
reasonable prudence and sensitivity to the public's
needs. It postponed the rate increase several times to
relieve the public of the burden of simultaneous rate and
price increases. It accommodated the stakeholders and
heard them through consultation. In the end, it even
retained a lower salary bracket ceiling (Php35,000.00
instead of Php50,000.00) and a lower rate (2.5% rather
than the planned 3%).
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts: Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and
several others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the
basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and
misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF). Enrile respectively filed his
Omnibus Motion and Supplemental Opposition, praying,
among others, that he be allowed to post bail should
probable cause be found against him.
Issue: Will the grant of bail to Enrile be in keeping with
the national commitment to uphold the fundamental
human rights?
Ruling: Yes. The national commitment to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the worth
and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of
bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings
but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing
showing: (1 ) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or
a danger to the community; and (2 ) that there exist
special, humanitarian and compelling circumstance
Cudia vs. PMA Superintendent
Issue: In entering the PMA did Cudia surrender his
fundamental human rights?
Ruling: No. While it is true that a PMA cadet, by
enrolling at PMA, must be prepared to subordinate his
private interests for the proper functioning of the
educational institution he attends to, one that is with a
greater degree than a student at a civilian public school.
However, a cadet facing dismissal from the military
academy for misconduct has constitutionally protected
private interests (life, liberty, or property); hence,
disciplinary proceedings conducted within the bounds of
procedural due process is a must.
ARTICLE XIV. EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS
Jenosa vs U.S.A.
Facts: A number of University of San Augustin students
were caught engaging in hazing outside the school
premises. Thereafter, dialogues and consultations were
conducted among the school authorities, the
apprehended students, and their parents. The parties
then agreed that, instead of the possibility of being
charged and found guilty of hazing, the students who
participated in the hazing incident as initiators would just
transfer to another school, while those who participated
as neophytes would be suspended for one month. The
parents of the apprehended students affixed their
signatures to the minutes of the meeting to signify their
conformity. In view of the agreement, the University did
not anymore convene the Committee on Student
Discipline (COSD) to investigate the hazing incident.
Petitioners filed a complaint for injunction and damages,
assailing the Principal's decision to order the immediate
transfer of petitioner students as a violation of their right
to due process because the COSD was not convened.
Issue: Is discipline in education specifically mandated by
the 1987 Constitution? Can school authorities impose
discipline on students?
Ruling: Yes. Discipline in education is specifically
mandated by the 1987 Constitution which provides that
all educational institutions shall teach the rights and
duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual
values, develop moral character and personal discipline.
Schools and school administrators have the authority to
maintain school discipline and the right to impose
appropriate and reasonable disciplinary measures.
Go vs. Collegio de San Juan de Letran
Facts: In October 2001, Mr. George Isleta, the Head of
Letran’s Auxiliary Services Department, received
information that certain fraternities were recruiting new
members among Letran’s high school students. He also
received a list of the students allegedly involved. School
authorities started an investigation, including the conduct
of medical examinations on the students whose names
were on the list. On November 20, 2002, Dr. Emmanuel
Asuncion, the school physician, reported that six (6)
students bore is njuries, probable signs of blunt trauma
of more than two weeks, on the posterior portions of
their thighs. Mr. Rosarda, the Assistant Prefect for
Discipline, conferred with the students and asked for
their explanations in writing.
Ruling: The right to establish disciplinary rules is
consistent with the mandate in the Constitution for
schools to teach discipline; in fact, schools have the duty
to develop discipline in students. Corollarily, the Court
has always recognized the right of schools to impose
disciplinary sanctions on students who violate
disciplinary rules. The penalty for violations includes
dismissal or exclusion from re-enrollment. The Court find
Letran’s rule prohibiting its high school students from
joining fraternities to be a reasonable regulation, not only
because of the reasons stated in DECS Order No. 20, s.
1991, but also because of the adult-oriented activities
often associated with fraternities. Expectedly, most, if not
all, of its high school students are minors. Besides,
Letran’s penalty for violation of the rule is clearly stated
in its enrollment contracts and in the Students Handbook
it distributes at the start of every school year.
People vs Bayabos
Facts: Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. (Balidoy) was admitted
as a probationary midshipman at the Philippine
Merchant Marine Academy. In order to reach an active
status, all new entrants were required to successfully
complete the mandatory "Indoctrination and Orientation
Period,” which was set from May 2 to June 1, 2001. On
May 3, 2001, during the mandatory period, Balidoy
died. The respondents were charged as accomplices to
the crime of hazing due to their alleged consent and
actual knowledge of the hazing perpetrated by the
principals and failed to take any action to prevent the
occurrence of the hazing and the infliction of
psychological and physical injuries, causing the death of
Balidoy.
Issue: What is the extent of liability of schools and
school authorities under R.A. No. 8049, aka the “Anti-
Hazing Law”?
Ruling: In the enactment of the Anti-Hazing Law (R.A.
No. 8049), Section 4 provides that the failure by school
authorities, including faculty members, to take any action
to prevent the offenses as provided by the law exposes
them to criminal liability as accomplices in the criminal
acts. Thus, the institution and its officers cannot stand
idly by in the face of patently criminal acts committed
within their sphere of responsibility. They bear the
commensurate duty to ensure that the crimes covered
by the Anti-Hazing Law are not committed.
Calawag vs. UP
Facts: The petitioners enrolled in the Master of Science
in Fisheries Biology at UP Visayas under a scholarship
from the Department of Science and Technology-
Philippine Council for Aquatic and Marine Research and
Development. They finished their first year of study with
good grades, and thus were eligible to start their thesis
in the first semester of their second year. The petitioners
then enrolled in the thesis program, drafted their
tentative thesis titles, and obtained the consent of Dr.
Rex Baleña to be their thesis adviser, as well as the
other faculty members’ consent to constitute their
respective thesis committees. Dean Baylon wrote a
series of memos addressed to Professor Sanares,
questioning the propriety of the thesis topics with the
college’s graduate degree program. He subsequently
disapproved the composition of the petitioners’ thesis
committees and their tentative thesis topics.
Issue: Is the right to education absolute? Does
academic freedom give the dean the power to
disapprove the composition of a thesis committee?
Ruling: No. The right to education is not absolute.
Section 5(e), Article XIV of the Constitution provides that
"every citizen has a right to select a profession or course
of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
admission and academic requirements." The thesis
requirement and the compliance with the procedures
leading to it, are part of the reasonable academic
requirements a person desiring to complete a course of
study would have to comply with.
Yes. Under the UP System’s faculty manual, the
dean has complete discretion in approving or
disapproving the composition of a thesis committee. The
academic freedom accorded to institutions of higher
learning gives them the right to decide for themselves
their aims and objectives and how best to attain them.
Imbong vs. Ochoa
Issue: In mandating the teaching Age-and Development-
Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat
of fine and/or imprisonment, does the Reproductive
Health Law violate academic freedom?
Ruling: No. It is also the inherent right of the State to act
as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral
development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution
makes mention of the importance of developing the
youth and their important role in nation building.
Considering that Section 14 provides not only for the
age-appropriate reproductive health education, but also
for values formation; the development of knowledge and
skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual
abuse and violence against women and children and
other forms of gender based violence and teen
pregnancy; physical, social and emotional changes in
adolescents; women's rights and children's rights;
responsible teenage behavior; gender and development;
and responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section
11 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself
provides for the teaching of responsible teenage
behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and emotional
changes among adolescents - the Court finds that the
legal mandate provided under the assailed provision
supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and duties
of the parents in the moral development of their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the
mandatory reproductive health education program shall
be developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-
community associations, school officials and other
interest groups, it could very well be said that it will be in
line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By
imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the
petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates Article
XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit.
Cudia vs. PMA Superintendent
Issue: Does the Philippine Military Academy enjoy
academic freedom?
Ruling: Yes. As the premiere military educational
institution of the AFP in accordance with Section 30,
Article III of C.A. No. 1 and Sections 58 and 59, Chapter
9, Subtitle II, Title VIII, Book IV of E.O. No. 292
(“Administrative Code of 1987′′), the PMA is an
institution that enjoys academic freedom guaranteed by
Section 5(2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue: If in the affirmative, is it within academic freedom
for PMA to impose disciplinary measures and to enforce
its internal rules and regulations on its students?
Ruling: Yes. The school’s power to instill discipline in
their students is subsumed in their academic freedom
and that “the establishment of rules governing university-
student relations, particularly those pertaining to student
discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the
smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its
very survival.” In this regard, the Court has always
recognized the right of schools to impose disciplinary
sanctions, which includes the power to dismiss or expel,
on students who violate disciplinary rules.
International School vs. ISAE
Issue: Can a teacher be dismissed on account of
academic freedom in view the high standards set up by
the school?
Ruling: YES. The Court enunciated in Peña v. National
Labor Relations Commission that "it is the prerogative of
the school to set high standards of efficiency for its
teachers since quality education is a mandate of the
Constitution. As long as the standards fixed are
reasonable and not arbitrary, courts are not at liberty to
set them aside." Moreover, the prerogative of a school to
provide standards for its teachers and to determine
whether these standards have been met is in
accordance with academic freedom, which gives the
educational institution the right to choose who should
teach.
The CBA between ISAE and the School for the
years 1992-1995 also recognized the exclusive right of
the School to "hire and appoint qualified faculty subject
to such reasonable rules and regulations as it may
prescribe," as well as the right of the School to discipline
its faculty and determine reasonable levels of
performance. Section 8 of Appendix A of the CBA also
states that "[a]ll faculty members must meet the high
standard of performance expected by the SCHOOL and
abide by all its policies, procedures and contractual
terms."
National Artists vs. Exec. Sec.
Issue: Did the President validly confer the Order of
National Artists to Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Manosa
and Moreno as National Artists?
Ruling: No. The conferment of the Order of National
Artists on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
Mañosa and Moreno was an entirely different matter.
There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1)
done contrary to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously
or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias. In the
case at bar, there was a violation of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution when the former President
gave preferential treatment to respondents Guidote-
Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno. The former
President’s constitutional duty to faithfully execute the
laws and observe the rules, guidelines and policies of
the NCCA and the CCP as to the selection of the
nominees for conferment of the Order of National Artists
proscribed her from having a free and uninhibited hand
in the conferment of the said award. The manifest
disregard of the rules, guidelines and processes of the
NCCA and the CCP was an arbitrary act that unduly
favored respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa
and Moreno. The conferment of the Order of National
Artists on said respondents was therefore made with
grave abuse of discretion and should be set aside.
ARTICLE XV. THE FAMILY
Imbong vs. Ochoa
Issue: Is Section 7 of the RH Law which debars parental
consent where the minor, who will be undergoing a
procedure, is already a parent or had a miscarriage,
valid and constitutional?
Ruling: No. Section 7 of the R.A. No. 10354 was ruled
as invalid and unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a
minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has
had a miscarriage is anti-family and violates Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: “The natural
and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of
the youth for civic efficiency and the development of
moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.”
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
Facts: Petitioner failed to prove that his wife
(respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He
presented the testimonies of two supposed expert
witnesses who concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of
these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or
behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently
proven. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s
allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions,
visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends,
adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s
experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when
performed constantly to the detriment of quality and
quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and
wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of
NPD.
Issue: What is psychological incapacity as a ground for
the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the family
code?
Ruling: Psychological incapacity as a ground for the
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even prior to the celebration of the marriage that is
permanent as to deprive the party of the awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
he or she was about to assume
Issue: Should the marriage of the petitioner and
respondent be voided?
Ruling: Yes. In this case, the marriage never existed
from the beginning because the respondent was afflicted
with psychological incapacity at and prior to the time of
the marriage. Hence, the Court should not hesitate to
declare the nullity of the marriage between the parties.
Republic vs. Romero
Facts: Married couple Reghis and Olivia Romero
experienced a turbulent and tumultuous marriage, often
having violent fights and jealous fits. Reghis could not
forgive Olivia for dragging him into marriage and
resented her condescending attitude towards him. They
became even more estranged when Reghis secured a
job as a medical representative and became engrossed
in his career and focused on supporting his parents and
siblings. As a result, he spent little time with his family,
causing Olivia to complain that Reghis failed to be a real
husband to her. In 1986, the couple parted ways. Reghis
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, citing
his psychological incapacity to comply with his essential
marital obligations
Issue: What is the constitutional policy on the family?
Ruling: The policy of the Constitution is to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family.
As such, the Constitution decrees marriage as legally
inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of
the parties.
Republic vs. Romero
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the
RTC’s declaration of nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity?
Ruling: Yes. After a thorough review of the records of
this case, the Court finds that the foregoing requirements
do not concur. As aptly pointed out by the petitioners,
Reghis’ testimony shows that he was able to comply with
his marital obligations which, therefore, negates the
existence of a grave and serious psychological
incapacity on his part. Thus, absent sufficient evidence
to prove psychological incapacity within the context of
Article 36 of the Family Code, the Court is compelled to
uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.
Manila Memorial Park vs. DSWD Sec.
Facts: On April 23, 1992, R.A. 7432 was passed into
law, granting qualified senior citizens 20% discount from
all establishments specified in the aforementioned
law. The petitioners assail the constitutionality of
Section 4 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7432, as amended
by RA 9257, and the implementing rules and regulations
issued by the DSWD and DOF insofar as these allow
business establishments to claim the 20% discount
given to senior citizens as a tax deduction.
Issue: Does the tax deduction scheme under R.A. 7432,
violate Article XV, Section 4 of the Constitution because
it shifts the State’s constitutional mandate or duty of
improving the welfare of the elderly to the private sector?
Ruling: No. Pursuant to Article XV, Section 4 of the
Constitution, it is the duty of the family to take care of its
elderly members while the State may design programs
of social security for them. The validity of the 20%
senior citizen discount and tax deduction scheme under
R.A. 7432 (amended by RA 9257), as an exercise of
police power of the State for the common good, has
already been settled in the court’s ruling on Carlos
Superdrug Corporation.
Imbong vs. Ochoa
Issue: In mandating the teaching of Age-and
Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health
Education, does the RH Law violate Sec 3(1), Art XIV,
1987 Constitution?
Ruling: Any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the
RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the
teaching of Age-and Development-Appropriate
Reproductive Health Education, is premature because
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet
to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate
reproductive health education. One can only speculate
on the content, manner and medium of instruction that
will be used to educate the adolescents and whether
they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners
and validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the
premature nature of this particular issue, the Court
declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
Issue: Is Section 23(a) (2) 9(i) Reproductive Health Law
unconstitutional for intruding into marital privacy and
autonomy?
Ruling: Yes. Decision-making involving a reproductive
health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the
couple, not just one of them. Any decision they would
reach would affect their future as a family because the
size of the family or the number of their children
significantly matters. The decision whether or not to
undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and
shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they
chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed
private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has
not shown any compelling interest, the State should see
to it that they chart their destiny together as one family.
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section
19(c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "Magna
Carta of Women," provides that women shall have equal
rights in all matters relating to marriage and family
relations, including the joint decision on the number and
spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible
parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is a
shared responsibility between parents. Section
23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray
the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the
family by giving to only one spouse the absolute
authority to decide whether to undergo reproductive
health procedure. The right to chart their own destiny
together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy
and such state intervention would encroach into the
zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution.
Valino vs. Adriano
Facts: Atty. Adriano, a partner in the Pelaez Adriano
and Gregorio Law Office, married respondent Rosario.
The marriage, however, turned sour and they were
eventually separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano
courted Valino, one of his clients, until they decided to
live together as husband and wife. Despite such
arrangement, he continued to provide financial support
to Rosario and their children (respondents). In 1992,
Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. At that time,
Rosario was in the United States spending Christmas
with her children. As none of the family members was
around, Valino took it upon herself to shoulder the
funeral and burial expenses for Atty. Adriano. When
Rosario learned about the death of her husband, she
immediately called Valino and requested that she delay
the interment for a few days but her request was not
heeded. The remains of Atty. Adriano were then interred
at the mausoleum of the family of Valino at the Manila
Memorial Park. Respondents were not able to attend the
interment. Claiming that they were deprived of the
chance to view the remains of Atty. Adriano before he
was buried and that his burial at the Manila Memorial
Park was contrary to his wishes. Respondents
commenced suit against Valino praying that they be
indemnified for actual, moral and exemplary damages
and attorney’s fees and that the remains of Atty. Adriano
be exhumed and transferred to the family plot at the Holy
Cross Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City.
Issue: As between the legal wife and the common-law
wife, who has the legal right over the remains of
deceased patriarch?
Ruling: It is clear that the law gives the right and duty to
make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the
surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she
was living separately from her husband and was in the
United States when he died has no controlling
significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived
or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty
to make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased
husband is baseless. The right and duty to make funeral
arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered
as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear
and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and
voluntary intent to that end.
ARTICLE XVI. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Lockheed vs. UP
Facts: Petitioner Lockheed Detective and Watchman
Agency, Inc. (Lockheed) entered into a contract for
security services with respondent University of the
Philippines (UP).
Several security guards assigned to UP filed
separate complaints against Lockheed and UP for
payment of underpaid wages, 25% overtime pay,
premium pay for rest days and special holidays, holiday
pay, service incentive leave pay, night shift differentials,
13th month pay, refund of cash bond, refund of
deductions for the Mutual Benefits Aids System (MBAS),
unpaid wages from December 16-31, 1998, and
attorneys fees.
A Notice of Garnishment was issued to
Philippine National Bank (PNB) UP Diliman Branch for
the satisfaction of the award.
The CA held that although the subject funds do
not constitute public funds, in light of the ruling in the
case of National Electrification Administration v. Morales
mandates that all money claims against the government
must first be filed with the Commission on Audit (COA).
Hence, petitioner filed this petition before the SC.
Issue: Having a charter with which it can sue and be
sued, can UP funds be garnished?
Ruling: Yes. UP is a juridical personality separate and
distinct from the government and has the capacity to sue
and be sued. Thus, also like NEA, it cannot evade
execution, and its funds may be subject to garnishment
or levy.
DOH vs. Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc.
Facts: Based on the “Report on Violative Products”
issued by the BFAD, it found out that some products,
including those of Phil Pharma Wealth, Inc. (PPI) which
were being sold to the public, were unfit for human
consumption. With this, PPI and the other drug
companies were directed to submit within 10 days their
respective explanations on the adverse findings covering
their respective products. However, PPI’s belated reply
was found “untenable” by Undersecretary Galon and
informed the former that, effective immediately, its
accreditation has been suspended for two years
pursuant to AO 10 and Memorandum No. 171-C. PPI
then filed a complaint, for which the herein petitioners
considered as a suit against the State.
Issue: Does the mantle of non-suability extend to
complaints filed against public officials?
Ruling: Yes. The mantle of non-suability extends to
complaints filed against public officials for acts done in
the performance of their official functions. The State
may not be sued without its consent. Likewise, public
officials may not be sued for acts done in the
performance of their official functions or within the scope
of their authority. With that, the suability of a
government official depends on whether the official
concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional
capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance
of official functions will result in a charge or financial
liability against the government.
Hermano Oil vs. TRB
Facts: Hermano Oil Manufacturing & Sugar Corporation
owned a parcel of land at NLEX. The petitioner
requested that respondent Toll Regulatory Board (TRB)
grant an easement of right of way, for it had been
deprived of its enjoyment and possession by the fence
that barred its entry. TRB denied based on the Limited
Access Highway Act. Hence, petitioner sued TRB and
Engr. Dumlao demanding specific performance, the
grant of the easement of right of way and damages
being deprived of its property without due process, just
compensation and equal protection of the law. As to the
matter of non-suability, the Court notes that while
respondent PNCC is a government owned and
controlled corporation, the other respondents are either
agencies of the State (DPWH and TRB) or an employee
of a government agency. Petitioner argued that the
principle of non-suability of the state does not apply
when the government acted in a non-governmental
capacity. The Court, however, notes that petitioner
merely cites cases to this effect but did not put forward
any argument why the maintenance of NLEX should be
considered as a non-governmental function. It cannot be
denied that the maintenance of the highways is part of
the necessary functions of the government of
maintaining public infrastructures.
Issue: What is the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity?
Ruling: A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of
any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the
logical and practical ground that there can be no legal
right against the authority that makes the law on which
the right depends. An unincorporated government
agency without any separate juridical personality of its
own enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested
with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a
claim for damages against the agency cannot prosper;
otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated.
In the case at bar, TRB and DPWH correctly invoke the
doctrine of sovereign immunity because its function is
governmental or incidental to such function.
Issue: Did TRB, DPWH, and PNCC correctly invoke the
doctrine of sovereign immunity?
Ruling: I Qualify. The TRB and the DPWH correctly
invoked the doctrine of sovereign immunity in their favor.
The TRB and the DPWH performed purely or essentially
government or public functions. As such, they were
invested with the inherent power of sovereignty. Being
unincorporated agencies or entities of the National
Government, they could not be sued as such. On the
other hand, PNCC being a private business entity, was
not immune from suit. The PNCC was incorporated in
1966 under its original name of Construction
Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) for
a term of fifty years pursuant to the Corporation Code. In
1983, the CDCP changed its corporate name to the
PNCC to reflect the extent of the Government's equity
investment in the company, a situation that came about
after the government financial institutions converted their
loans into equity following the CDCP's inability to pay the
loans. Although the majority or controlling shares of the
PNCC belonged to the Government, the PNCC was
essentially a private corporation due to its having been
created in accordance with the Corporation Code, the
general corporation statute. More specifically, the PNCC
was an acquired asset corporation under Administrative
Order No. 59, and was subject to the regulation and
jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Consequently, the doctrine of sovereign immunity had
no application to the PNCC.
Arigo vs. Commander Swift
Facts: The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine
countermeasures ship of the US Navy. The US Embassy
in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the
said vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the
Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the
purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance,
and crew liberty.” Sometime in January 2013, while
transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the
northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs,
about 80 mi. east-southeast of Palawan. No one was
injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of
leaking fuel or oil. Petitioners claim that the grounding,
salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS
Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental
damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of
Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros
Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte,
Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-tawi, which events violate their
constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.
Issue: Did the United States waive state immunity under
the Visiting Forces Agreement?
Ruling: The waiver of state immunity under the VFA
pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special
civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of
a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from
Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court that a criminal
case against a person charged with a violation of an
environmental law is to be filed separately.
Art. XVII. AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Lambino vs. Comelec
Facts: On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition
with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify
their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution
under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic
Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act. The
Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987
Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI
(Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII
(Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII
entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These proposed
changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential
system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of
government. On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group
filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) of their initiative. The COMELEC denied the
petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735
inadequate to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution.
Issue: Whether the Lambino Group’s Initiative petition
complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s
initiative?
Ruling: No. The Lambino Group miserably failed to
comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution
for conducting a people's initiative. The Lambino Group
did not attach to their present petition with this Court a
copy of the paper that the people signed as their
initiative petition. They just submitted to this Court a
copy of a signature sheet after the oral arguments of 26
September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on
11 October 2006. Thus, there is even no need to revisit
Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal
based alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to
comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution.
For following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave
abuse of discretion is attributable to the Commision on
Elections.
Art. XVIII. TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
Cojuangco vs. Republic
Facts: In 1971, R.A. No. 6260 was enacted creating the
Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer the
Coconut Investment Fund (CIF), which, under Section 8
thereof, was to be sourced from a PhP 0.55 levy on the
sale of every 100 kg of copra. Of the PhP 0.55 levy of
which the copra seller was–––or ought to be–––issued
COCOFUND receipts, PhP 0.02 was placed at the
disposition of COCOFED, the national association of
coconut producers declared by the Philippine Coconut
Administration (PHILCOA, now PCA) as having the
largest membership.
The declaration of martial law in September
1972 saw the issuance of several presidential decrees
purportedly designed to improve the coconut industry
through the collection and use of the coconut levy fund.
While coming generally from impositions on the first sale
of copra, the coconut levy fund came under various
names. Charged with the duty of collecting and
administering the Fund was PCA. Like COCOFED with
which it had a legal linkage, the PCA, by statutory
provisions scattered in different coco levy decrees, had
its share of the coco levy.
Issue: Is the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement involving coco-
levy funds constitutional?
Ruling: No. As the coconut levy funds partake of the
nature of taxes and can only be used for public purpose,
and importantly, for the purpose for which it was
exacted, i.e., the development, rehabilitation and
stabilization of the coconut industry, they cannot be used
to benefit–––whether directly or indirectly–––private
individuals, be it by way of a commission, or as the
subject Agreement interestingly words it: compensation.
Consequently, Cojuangco cannot stand to benefit by
receiving, in his private capacity, 7.22% of the FUB
shares without violating the constitutional caveat that
public funds can only be used for public purpose.
Accordingly, the 7.22% FUB (UCPB) shares that were
given to Cojuangco shall be returned to the Government,
to be used "only for the benefit of all coconut farmers
and for the development of the coconut industry."
Republic vs. Bakunawa
Facts: The Republic appeals the adverse decision
rendered on April 10, 2002, and the resolution issued on
November 8, 2007, whereby the Sandiganbayan
respectively dismissed the complaint for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution and damages filed
against respondents in Civil Case No. 0023, and denied
the Republic’s motion for reconsideration.
Civil Case No. 0023 is an action for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
damages brought by the Republic against respondents
for having allegedly acquired and accumulated ill-gotten
wealth consisting of funds and other property “in
unlawful concert with one another” and “in flagrant
breach of trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public
officers, with grave abuse of right and power and in
brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of the
Republic of the Philippines, thus resulting in their unjust
enrichment.”
Issue: What quantum of evidence is required in the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth? Was the Republic able to
establish the ill-gotten nature of the Bakunawa’s wealth?
Ruling: Only a preponderance of evidence is needed to
prove the demand for reconveyance or recovery of ill-
gotten wealth. This is clear from Section 1 of EO No. 14-
A. preponderance of evidence refers to the comparative
weight of the evidence presented by the opposing
parties. As such, it has been defined as “the weight,
credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either
side,” and is usually considered to be synonymous with
the term greater weight of the evidence or greater weight
of the credible evidence. It is proof that is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto. Although the
evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the
defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on the
plaintiff’s side if its evidence alone is insufficient to
establish its cause of action. The evidence of the
Republic did not preponderantly establish the ill-gotten
nature of the Bakunawas’ wealth.
POTC and PHILCOMSAT vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts: After the successful People Power Revolution on
February 1986, the new President Corazon Cojuangco
Aquino, issued Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2, creating
the PCGG to recover properties amassed by the
unseated President Ferdinand Edralin Marcos, Sr., his
immediate family, relatives, and cronies, "by taking
undue advantage of their public office and/or using their
powers, authority, influence, connections or
relationship,"and to sequester and take over such
properties.
Pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2, on 14
March 1986, then PCGG Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz
issued a letter directing Officer-In-Charge Carlos M.
Ferrales to:
1. Sequester and immediately take over POTC
and PHILCOMSAT among others, and
2. To freeze all withdrawals, transfers and/or
remittances under any type of deposit accounts, trust
accounts or placements.
POTC is a private corporation, which is a main
stockholder of PHILCOMSAT, a government-owned and
controlled corporation, which was established in 1966
and was granted a legislative telecommunications
franchise by virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7949, to establish and
operate international satellite communication in the
Philippines.
Issue: What is the effect of the failure to properly
implead POTC and PHILCOMSAT in the light of Sec. 26,
Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution?

Ruling: Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution

mandates that if no judicial action has been filed within
six (6) months after the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, the writ of sequestration shall automatically
be lifted. In the case at bar, there was no judicial action
filed against POTC and PHILCOMSAT. There has never
been any appropriate judicial action for reconveyance or
recovery ever instituted by the Republic against POTC
and PHILCOMSAT.