Datuman vs First Cosmopolitan Manpower and Promotion the respondent only to the first contract since the signing
act since the signing of substitute
Services Inc
Doctrine:
1. Private Employment agencies are held jointly and severally
liable with the foreign-based employer for any violation of
recruitment agreement and contract employment.
2. Employment contracts: The signing of a substitute contract
with the foreign employer before the expiration of the
approved contract by the POEA and against the will of the
employee are continuing breaches of the original POEA
approved contract.
3. The right to claim unpaid salaries accrue as they fall due.
(ex. The petitioner’s cause of action to claim salary
differential for October 1989 only accrued after she had
rendered services for that month)
Facts:
Sometime in 1989 respondent recruited petitioner to work
abroad as a Saleslady for one year having a monthly salary of
US370.00, when petitioner was deployed, her foreign employer took
her passport and was forced to work as a domestic helper with a
salary of US100.00 in contrary to what was indicated in her contract of
employment signed by the POEA. Later her employer compelled her to
sign another contract, transferring her to another employer for the
duration of two years. She was compelled to work against her will and
worst without any compensation. By the help of Bahrain Passport and
Immigration Department she was able to finally return to the
Philippines. She then filed a complaint before POEA against respondent
for underpayment and non-payment of salary and other money claims.
While the case was pending, she filed the same complaint before the
NLRC, the respondent countered petitioner stating that the latter
agreed to work as a housemaid and only because such job is not yet
allowed by the POEA that they used the position saleslady and further
alleged that it was the petitioner who violated the contract for entering
into another contract without the respondents consent, and lastly they
raised the defense of prescription of action since the claim was filed
beyond the three year period from the time the right accrued. The
NLRC rendered decision in favour of the petitioner, but subsequently
reversed by the CA, stating that the local agency is privy only to the
first contract and the POEA rules were not made to make the local
agency a perpetual insurer against all untoward acts that may be done
by the foreign principal or the direct employer board, it is only as
regards the principal contract to which it is privy shall its liability
extends. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in not holding respondent liable for
petitioner’s money claims pursuant to their contract of employment.
Held:
The supreme court ruled in favour of the petitioner. Sec. 1
of rule 2 of the POEA rules and regulations clearly state that private
employer agency shall assume joint and solidary liability with the
employer. Time and again, this court ruled that private employment
agencies are held jointly and severally liable with the foreign based
employer for any violations of the recruitment agreement or contract
of employment, and further the CA is wrong in limiting the liability of
contracts with the foreign employer before the expiration of the POEA
approved contract and any continuation of petitioner’s employment
beyond the original one year term against the will of petitioner are
continuing breaches of the original POEA approved contract. In the
issue of money claims, this court agree with the NLRC that precepts of
justice and fairness dictate that petitioner must be compensated for all
months worked regardless of the supposed termination of the original
contract, since the respondent cannot disclaim liability for he is in bad
faith. Local employers should see to it that the contract of employment
be complied in good faith.
(UNG COMPUTATION NG PRESCRIPTION SA UNPAID SALARY
DI KO GANO GETS, KAYA DI KO MUNA NILAGAY SA RULING.)
SORRY!!!!!!
People vs Gallo
Doctrine:
Making misrepresentations concerning the agency’s
purported power and authority to recruit for overseas
employment, and in the process, collected money in the
guise of placement fees, is illegal recruitment.
Facts:
On May 22, 2001, dela caza was introduced by Panuncio to
the accused-appellant Gallo, Pacardo, Manta, Mardeolyn, Lulu, Yeo Sin
Ung and another Korean national at the office of MPM International
Recruitment and Promotion Agency located in Malate, Manila. Dela
Caza was told of the position of each person in the company. Gallo
introduced himself as a relative of Mardeolyn who is said to be the
President of MPM agency, together with Manta and Pacardo they told
dela caza of a 150,000 placement fee with a down payment of 45,000
and the balance to be paid through salary deduction. Dela Caza and
together with other applicants were briefed of their work in Korea as a
factory worker and was shown of visas procured for the deployed
workers, Dela caza was convinced he then agreed to parted with his
money as a down payment. After 2 weeks Dela caza went back to the
agency but it changed its office to Makati, san isidro, because of this
he withdraw his application and demanded the return of the money
but was talked out by pacardo and manta, however gallo denied
having any knowledge of the money. After 2 months of waiting in vain
to be deployed the applicants decided to take action and had gallo,
pacarda and manta arrested. The trial court and ca order the
conviction of the accused, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not accused in engaged in illegal recruitment.
Held:
Yes. The accused averring that he cannot be held criminally liable for
illegal recruitment because he was neither an officer nor an employee
of the agency and stated the even if he is an employee, such cannot
warrant his outright conviction sans evidence that he acted in
conspiracy with the officers of the agency is disagreed by this court.
To commit syndicated illegal recruitment, three elements must be
established: 1. The offender undertakes either any activity with the
meaning of placement and recruitment or any prohibited practices
provided by existing laws. 2. He has no valid license or authority
1
required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and
placement of workers and 3. The illegal recruitment is committed by a
group of three or more persons conspiring or confederating with one
another. The prosecution was able to establish the elements of the
offense sufficiently. The MPM agency was revealed to be unlicensed to
recruit workers and even assuming that they are licensed, they still
constituted acts of illegal recruitment. (1. Charging any amount
greater than that specified in the schedule of allowable fees or any
amount greater than that actually received by him as a loan or
advance, 2. Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as
determined by the DOLE, 3. Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by
the worker in connection with his documentation and processing for
purposes of deployment and processing for purposes of
deployment….). Accused cannot argue that the trial court erred in
finding that he was indeed and employee of the agency, since his
active participation is unmistakable. Additionally, the accused is guilty
of the crime of estafa as provided in RPC. Indubitably, accused-
appellant’s denial of the crimes charged crumbles in the face of the
positive identification made by dela caza. Therefore, the court did not
err in convicting accused Gallo.
REPUBLIC, represented by the ADMINISTRATOR OF THE POEA
vs. PRINCIPALIA
G.R. No. 167639 April 19, 2006
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
This case stemmed from two separate complaints filed before the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) against
Principalia Management and Personnel Consultants, Incorporated
(Principalia) for violation of the 2002 POEA Rules and Regulations.
In the first complaint, Concha alleged that in August 2002, she applied
with Principalia for placement and employment as caregiver or physical
therapist in the USA or Canada. Despite paying P20,000.00 out of the
P150,000.00 fee required by Principalia which was not properly
receipted, Principalia failed to deploy Concha for employment abroad.3
Baldoza initiated the second complaint on October 14, 20035 alleging
that Principalia assured him of employment in Doha, Qatar as a
machine operator with a monthly salary of $450.00. After paying
P20,000.00 as placement fee, he departed for Doha, Qatar on May 31,
2003 but when he arrived at the jobsite, he was made to work as
welder, a job which he had no skills. He insisted that he was hired as
machine operator but the alternative position offered to him was that
of helper, which he refused. Thus, he was repatriated on July 5, 2003.
On November 12, 2003, Baldoza and Principalia entered into a
compromise agreement with quitclaim and release whereby the latter
agreed to redeploy Baldoza for employment abroad. Principalia,
however, failed to deploy Baldoza as agreed hence, in an Order dated
April 29, 2004,6 the POEA suspended Principalia’s documentary
processing.
Principalia moved for reconsideration which the POEA granted on June
25, 2004.7 The latter lifted its order suspending the documentary
processing by Principalia after noting that it exerted efforts to obtain
overseas employment for Baldoza within the period stipulated in the
settlement agreement but due to Baldoza’s lack of qualification, his
application was declined by its foreign principal.
Meanwhile, on June 14, 2004, or before the promulgation of POEA’s
order lifting the suspension, Principalia filed a Complaint (Complaint)
against Rosalinda D. Baldoz in her capacity as Administrator of POEA
and Atty. Jovencio R. Abara in his capacity as POEA Conciliator, before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City for "Annulment of
Order for Suspension of Documentation Processing with Damages and
Application for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction, and a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction." Principalia claimed that the suspension of its documentary
processing would ruin its reputation and goodwill and would cause the
loss of its applicants, employers and principals. Thus, a writ of
preliminary injunction and a writ of mandatory injunction must be
issued to prevent serious and irreparable damage to it.
On June 14, 2004,9 Judge Paulita B. Acosta-Villarante of the RTC of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 211, granted a 72-hour restraining order
enjoining Administrator Baldoz and Atty. Abara to refrain from
imposing the suspension orders before the matter can be heard in full.
POEA appealed to the Court of Appeals which was dismissed15
outright for failure of POEA to attach copies of its Memorandum dated
June 30, 2004, as well as the transcripts of the hearings conducted on
June 22, 2004 and June 29, 2004 as required under Section 3 of Rule
46 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Petition for
Certiorari based on purely technical grounds
(2) Whether the trial court erred in issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction
HELD:
(1) NO. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari due
to POEA’s failure to comply with Section 3, Rule 46 and Section 1, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. The allowance of the petition on the ground
of substantial compliance with the Rules is not a novel occurrence in
our jurisdiction.20 Indeed, if we apply the Rules strictly, we cannot
fault the Court of Appeals for dismissing the petition21 because the
2
POEA did not demonstrate willingness to comply with the requirements
set by the rules and to submit the necessary documents which the
Court of Appeals need to have a proper perspective of the case.
(2) NO.If the injunctive writ was not granted, Principalia would have
been labeled as an untrustworthy recruitment agency before there
could be any final adjudication of its case by the DOLE. It would have
lost both its employer-clients and its prospective Filipino-applicants.
Loss of the former due to a tarnished reputation is not quantifiable.
Moreover, POEA would have no authority to exercise its regulatory
functions over Principalia because the matter had already been
brought to the jurisdiction of the DOLE. Principalia has been granted
the license to recruit and process documents for Filipinos interested to
work abroad. Thus, POEA’s action of suspending Principalia’s license
before final adjudication by the DOLE would be premature and would
amount to a violation of the latter’s right to recruit and deploy workers.
Petition is denied for lack of merit.
Stolt-Nielsen Transporation Group, Inc., et al. Vs. Sulpecio
Modequillo
January 18, 2012 | G.R. No. 177498
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS
On 6 November 1991(First Contract), Madequillo was hired by Stolt-
Nielsen Marine Services, Inc on behalf of its principal Chung-Gai Ship
Management of Panama as Third Assistant Engineer on board the
vessel “Stolt Aspiration” for a period of nine (9) months. He would be
paid with a monthly basic salary of $808.00 and a fixed overtime pay
of $404.00 or a total of $1,212.00 per month during the employment
period commencing on 6 November 1991.
On 8 November 1991, he joined the vessel MV “Stolt Aspiration”. On
February 1992 or for nearly three (3) months of rendering service and
while the vessel was at Batangas, he was ordered by the ship’s master
to disembark the vessel and repatriated back to Manila for no reason
or explanation. Upon his return to Manila, he immediately proceeded
to the petitioner’s office where he was transferred employment with
another vessel named MV “Stolt Pride” under the same terms and
conditions of the First Contract.
On 23 April 1992, the Second Contract was noted and approved by the
POEA. The POEA, without knowledge that he was not deployed with
the vessel, certified the Second Employment Contract on 18
September 1992. Despite the commencement of the Second Contract
on 21 April 1992, petitioners failed to deploy him with the vessel MV
“Stolt Pride”. He made a follow-up with the petitioner but the same
refused to comply with the Second Employment Contract.
On 22 December 1994, he demanded for his passport, seaman’s book
and other employment documents. However, he was only allowed to
claim the said documents in exchange of his signing a document. He
was constrained to sign the document involuntarily because without
these documents, he could not seek employment from other agencies.
On 21 July 2000, Labor Arbiter Layawen rendered a judgment finding
that the respondent was constructively dismissed by the petitioners.
The Labor Arbiter found the first contract entered into by and between
the complainant and the respondents to have been novated by the
execution of the second contract. In other words, respondents cannot
be held liable for the first contract but are clearly and definitely liable
for the breach of the second contract. However, he ruled that there
was no substantial evidence to grant the prayer for moral and
exemplary damages. On 28 February 2003, the NLRC affirmed with
modification the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. Before the NLRC, the
petitioners assailed that they were not properly notified of the hearings
that were conducted before the Labor Arbiter. They further alleged
that after the suspension of proceedings before the POEA, the only
notice they received was a copy of the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
The NLRC upheld the finding of unjustified termination of contract for
failure on the part of the petitioners to present evidence that would
justify their non-deployment of the respondent. Thereafter the
petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of NLRC, but the latter
affirmed the decision of the NLRC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the second contract novated the first contract
2. Whether there was constructive dismissal under the second contract
HELD:
Regarding the first issue, the SC concurred with the finding that there
was a novation of the first employment contract. It emphasized the
principle that findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-
judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not
only respect, but finality when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Such
findings deserve full respect and, without justifiable reason, ought not
to be altered, modified or reversed. With the finding that respondent
“was still employed under the first contract when he negotiated with
petitioners on the second contract”, novation became an unavoidable
conclusion.
3

On the second issue, the petitioners argue that under the POEA
Contract, actual deployment of the seafarer is a suspensive condition
for the commencement of the employment. The SC agrees with
petitioners on such point. However, even without actual deployment,
the perfected contract gives rise to obligations on the part of
petitioners. Thus, even if by the standard contract employment
commences only “upon actual departure of the seafarer”, this does not
mean that the seafarer has no remedy in case of non-deployment
without any valid reason.
Distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment
contract and the commencement of the employer-employee
relationship. The perfection of the contract, which in this case
coincided with the date of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner
and respondent agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the
rest of the terms and conditions therein. The commencement of the
employer-employee relationship, as earlier discussed, would have
taken place had petitioner been actually deployed from the point of
hire. Thus, even before the start of any employer-employee
relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment
contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of
which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party. Thus,
if the reverse had happened, that is the seafarer failed or refused to
be deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The 31 January 2007 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 91632 is hereby AFFIRMED.
TRANS ACTION OVERSEAS CORPORATION vs. THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR
G.R. No. 109583 September 5, 1997
ROMERO, J.:
FACTS:
From July 24 to September 9, 1987, petitioner Trans Action Overseas
Corporation, a private fee-charging employment agency, scoured Iloilo
City for possible recruits for alleged job vacancies in Hongkong. Private
respondents sought employment as domestic helpers through
petitioner's employees, Luzviminda Aragon, Ben Hur Domincil and his
wife Cecille. The applicants paid placement fees ranging from
P1,000.00 to P14,000.00, but petitioner failed to deploy them. Their
demands for refund proved unavailing; thus, they were constrained to
institute complaints against petitioner for violation of Articles 32 and
34(a) 1 of the Labor Code, as amended.
Petitioner denied having received the amounts allegedly collected from
respondents, and averred that Aragon, whose only duty was to pre-
screen and interview applicants, and the spouses Domincil were not
authorized to collect fees from the applicants. Accordingly, it cannot be
held liable for the money claimed by respondents. Petitioner maintains
that it even warned respondents not to give any money to
unauthorized individuals.
POEA Regional Extension Unit Coordinator Edgar Somes testified that
although he was aware that petitioner collected fees from
respondents, the latter insisted that they be allowed to make the
payments on the assumption that it could hasten their deployment
abroad. He added that Mrs. Honorata Manliclic, a representative of
petitioner tasked to oversee the conduct of the interviews, told him
that she was leaving behind presigned receipts to Aragon as she
cannot stay in Iloilo City for the screening of the applicants. Manliclic,
however, denied this version and argued that it was Somes who
instructed her to leave the receipts behind as it was perfectly alright to
collect fees.
On April 5, 1991, then Labor Undersecretary Nieves R. Confesor
rendered the assailed order. Respondent agency is liable for twenty
eight (28) counts of violation of Article 32 and five (5) counts of Article
34 (a) with a corresponding suspension in the aggregate period of
sixty six (66) months.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Labor and Employment has
jurisdiction to cancel or revoke the license of a private fee-charging
employment agency
HELD:
YES. The power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit
employees for overseas employment is vested upon the Secretary of
Labor and Employment. Article 35 of the Labor Code, as amended. In
addition, in the case of Eastern Assurance and Surety Corp. v.
Secretary of Labor, we held that:
The penalties of suspension and cancellation of license or
authority are prescribed for violations of the above quoted
provisions, among others. And the Secretary of Labor has
the power under Section 35 of the law to apply these
sanctions, as well as the authority, conferred by Section 36,
not only to "restrict and regulate the recruitment and
placement activities of all agencies," but also to "promulgate
rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and
implement the provisions" governing said activities. Pursuant
to this rule-making power thus granted, the Secretary of
Labor gave the POEA, "on its own initiative or upon filing of
a complaint or report or upon request for investigation by
any aggrieved person, . . (authority to) conduct the
necessary proceedings for the suspension or cancellation of
the license or authority of any agency or entity" for certain
enumerated offenses including —
4
 1) the imposition or acceptance, directly or
indirectly, of any amount of money, goods or
services, or any fee or bond in excess of what is
prescribed by the Administration, and
2) any other violation of pertinent provisions of
the Labor Code and other relevant laws, rules and
regulations.
The Administrator was also given the power to "order the
dismissal of the case of the suspension of the license or
authority of the respondent agency or contractor or
recommend to the Minister the cancellation thereof."
This power conferred upon the Secretary of Labor and Employment
was echoed in People v. Diaz, viz.:
A non-licensee or non-holder of authority means any person,
corporation or entity which has not been issued a valid
license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement
by the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or authority has
been suspended, revoked or cancelled by the POEA or the
Secretary. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the Court's disposition on the matter, we rule that the
power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit
employees for overseas employment is concurrently vested with the
POEA and the Secretary of Labor.
Santiago vs CF Sharp
Facts: Petitioner had been working as a seafarer for Smith Bell
Management, Inc. (respondent) for about five (5) years. On 3
February 1998, he signed a new contract of employment with
respondent, with the duration of nine (9) months. He was assured of a
monthly salary of US$515.00, overtime pay and other benefits. The
following day. The contract was approved by POEA. Petitioner was to
be deployed on board the "MSV Seaspread" which was scheduled to
leave the port of Manila for Canada on 13 February 1998. However, he
was not able to leave for Canada because of phone calls received by
his employer allegedly from his wife and other unnamed sources. The
callers gave feedbacks that Santiago might jump ship like his brother.
Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, damages, and
attorney's fees against respondent and its foreign principal, Cable and
Wireless (Marine) Ltd. The case was raffled to Labor Arbiter Teresita
Castillon-Lora, who ruled that the employment contract remained valid
but had not commenced since petitioner was not deployed. According
to her, respondent violated the rules and regulations governing
overseas employment when it did not deploy petitioner, causing
petitioner to suffer actual damages representing lost salary income for
nine months and fixed overtime fee, all amounting to US$7, 209.00.
On appeal by respondent, the National Labor Relations Commission
ruled that there is no employer-employee relationship between
petitioner and respondent because under the Standard Terms and
Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board
Ocean Going Vessels (POEA Standard Contract), the employment
contract shall commence upon actual departure of the seafarer from
the airport or seaport at the point of hire and with a POEA-approved
contract. In the absence of an employer-employee relationship
between the parties, the claims for illegal dismissal, actual damages,
and attorney’s fees should be dismissed. The NLRC found respondent’s
decision not to deploy petitioner to be a valid exercise of its
management prerogative.
Issue: WON petitioner may claim damages against respondent despite
not having been aboard the ship and the contract not commencing.
WON there is an employer-employee relationship between
the two.
Held: Yes, petitioner may claim damages despite not having been
aboard the ship and the employer-employee relationship not
commencing between the two. The SC provided a distinction in this
case between the perfection of a contract and the start of an employer
employee relationship. Although the latter may not have existed yet
between the two since petitioner was not able to provide services for
respondent, there is a breach of contract on the part of respondent.
The perfection of a contract which in this case coincided with the date
of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner and respondent agreed
on the object and the cause, as well as the rest of the terms and
conditions therein. The commencement of the employer-employee
relationship, as earlier discussed, would have taken place had
petitioner been actually deployed from the point of hire. Respondent’s
act of preventing petitioner from departing the port of Manila and
boarding "MSV Seaspread" constitutes a breach of contract, giving rise
to petitioner’s cause of action. Respondent unilaterally and
unreasonably reneged on its obligation to deploy petitioner and must
therefore answer for the actual damages he suffered.
People vs Chua
5
Facts: Melissa Chua is charged and found guilty of large scale illegal
recruitment and three counts of estafa. Her victims, Marilyn, Tan, and
King all separately charged accused and gave testimonies and positive
identification that she had convinced them to part with their money
and give it to her as placement fees for deployment to Taiwan. When
they later inquired as to when their actual deployment would be,
accused was unable to give concrete answers. Refunds were also
unfruitful, and upon learning that Golden Gate Inc was not licensed,
they filed complaints against her. As her defense, accused alleges that
she is merely a as a temporary cashier from January to October, 2002
at the office of Golden Gate, owned by one Marilyn Calueng, she
maintained that Golden Gate was a licensed recruitment agency and
that Josie, who is her godmother, was an agent. Admitting having
received P80,000 each from Marilyn and Tan, receipt of which she
Estate of Nelson
issued but denying receiving any amount from King, she claimed that
she turned over the money to the documentation officer, one Arlene
Vega, who in turn remitted the money to Marilyn Calueng whose
present whereabouts she did not know. Facts: Nelson was employed by [herein respondent] General
Charterers Inc. (GCI), a subsidiary of co-petitioner [herein co-
respondent] Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime Inc. since 1986. He initially
worked as an ordinary seaman and later as bosun on a contractual
Issue: WON accused’s appeal and defense may prosper.
basis. From September 3, 1999 up to July 19, 2000, Nelson was
detailed in petitioners’ vessel, the MV Kickapoo Belle. On August 13,
2000, after the completion of his employment contract, Nelson died
Held: No. Regardless of being a temporary cashier, accused is still due to acute renal failure secondary to septicemia. At the time of his
liable for Illegal Recruitment and violation of the Labor Code, death, Nelson was a bona fide member of the Associated Marine
specifically Art 38, using the definition under Art 13(b). For illegal Officers and Seaman’s Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP), GCI’s
recruitment in large scale to prosper, the prosecution has to prove collective bargaining agent. Nelson’s widow, Merridy Jane, thereafter
three essential elements, to wit: (1) the accused undertook claimed for death benefits through the grievance procedure of the
a recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice Collective Bargaining Agreement between AMOSUP and GCI. However,
under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) the accused did not have the on January 29, 2001, the grievance procedure was “declared
license or the authority to lawfully engage in therecruitment and deadlocked” as petitioners refused to grant the benefits sought by the
placement of workers; and (3) the accused committed such illegal widow. On March 5, 2001, Merridy Jane filed a complaint with the
activity against three or more persons individually or as a group. NLRC Sub-Regional Arbitration Board in General Santos City against
GCI for death and medical benefits and damages. On March 8, 2001,
Golden Gate, of which appellant admitted being a cashier
Joven Mar, Nelson’s brother, received P20,000.00 from [respondents]
from January to October 2002, was initially authorized to recruit
pursuant to article 20(A)2 of the CBA and signed a “Certification”
workers for deployment abroad. Per the certification from the
acknowledging receipt of the amount and releasing AMOSUP from
POEA, Golden Gate’s license only expired on February 23, 2002 and it
further liability. Merridy Jane contended that she is entitled to the
was delisted from the roster of licensed agencies on April 2, 2002.
aggregate sum of Ninety Thousand Dollars ($90,000.00) pursuant to
Even if appellant were a mere temporary cashier of Golden Gate, that
[A]rticle 20 (A)1 of the CBA. Merridy Jane averred that the P20,000.00
did not make her any less an employee to be held liable for illegal
already received by Joven Mar should be considered advance payment
recruitment as principal by direct participation, together with the
of the total claim of US$90,000. Respondent argues that NLRC has no
employer, as it was shown that she actively and consciously
jurisdiction over the case because of the lack of an employee-employer
participated in the recruitment process. Even if she was not aware that
relationship between GCI and Nelson at the time of his death. They
her actions constitutes that of Illegal Recruitment, she can still be held
are liable for death benefits only during the time of the contract and
accountable since Large Scale Illegal Recruitment is malum prohibitum
said contract has already expired and the cause of the death is not
since it is a special law (RA 8042).
work-related. Herein respondents then filed a special civil action
for certiorari with the CA contending that the NLRC committed grave

6
abuse of discretion in affirming the jurisdiction of the NLRC over the
case; in ruling that a different provision of the CBA covers the death
claim; in reversing the findings of the Labor Arbiter that the cause of
death is not work-related; and, in setting aside the release and
quitclaim executed by the attorney-in-fact and not considering the
P20,000.00 already received by Merridy Jane through her attorney-in-
fact. CA ruled that LA has no jurisdiction over the case; that while the
suit filed by Merridy Jane is a money claim, the same basically involves
the interpretation and application of the provisions in the subject CBA.
As such, jurisdiction belongs to the voluntary arbitrator and not the
labor arbiter
Issue: WON CA committed an error in its decision.
Held: No. a careful reading of RA 89042 shows that there is no specific
provision which provides for jurisdiction over disputes or unresolved
grievances regarding the interpretation or implementation of a CBA.
Section 10 of R.A. 8042, which is cited by petitioner, simply speaks, in
general, of “claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or
by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other
forms of damages.” On the other hand, Articles 217(c) and 261 of the
Labor Code are very specific in stating that voluntary arbitrators have
jurisdiction over cases arising from the interpretation or
implementation of collective bargaining agreements. Moreover, it is in
the CBA between deceased and respondent that in case of dispute,
there should be negotiations through the voluntary arbiter, not the LA.
Said provision in the CBA is in consonance with Rule VII, Section 7 of
the present Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended by Republic
Act No. 10022. SC found no error in the ruling of the CA that the
voluntary arbitrator has jurisdiction over the instant case.
*basta tungkol sa CBA between employer and employee and how it
should be resolved (via voluntary arbiter, not labor arbiter). Gulo lang
ng pagkakasulat ng case ehh, nalito ako, haha.
PAUL V. SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. CF SHARP CREW
MANAGEMENT, INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 162419
July 10, 2007
TINGA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner had been working as a seafarer for Smith Bell Management,
Inc. (respondent) for about five (5) years. He signed a new contract of
employment with the duration of 9 months on Feb 3 1998 and he was
to be deployed 10 days after. This contract was approved by POEA. A
week before the date of departure, the respondent received a phone
call from petitioner’s wife and some unknown callers asking not to
send the latter off because if allowed, he will jump ship in Canada.
Because of the said information, petitioner was told that he would not
be leaving for Canada anymore. This prompted him to file a complaint
for illegal dismissal against the respondent. The LA held the latter
responsible. On appeal, the NLRC ruled that there is no employer-
employee relationship between petitioner and respondent, hence, the
claims should be dismissed. The CA agreed with the NLRC’s finding
that since petitioner had not departed from the Port of Manila, no
employer-employee relationship between the parties arose and any
claim for damages against the so-called employer could have no leg to
stand on.
ISSUE: When does the employer-employee relationship involving
seafarers commence?
RULING:
A distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment
contract and the commencement of the employer-employee
relationship. The perfection of the contract, which in this case
coincided with the date of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner
and respondent agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the
rest of the terms and conditions therein. The commencement of the
employer-employee relationship, as earlier discussed, would have
taken place had petitioner been actually deployed from the point of
hire. Thus, even before the start of any employer-employee
relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment
contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of
which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party. Thus,
if the reverse had happened, that is the seafarer failed or refused to
be deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.
7
Respondent’s act of preventing petitioner from departing the port of
Manila and boarding "MSV Seaspread" constitutes a breach of contract,
giving rise to petitioner’s cause of action. Respondent unilaterally and
unreasonably reneged on its obligation to deploy petitioner and must
therefore answer for the actual damages he suffered.
People v Panis
142 SCRA 664 (1986)
Facts:
Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the Court of First
Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that Serapio Abug,
private respondent herein, "without first securing a license from the
Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging
employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally operate a private fee-charging employment agency by
charging fees and expenses (from) and promising employment in
Saudi Arabia" to four separate individuals named therein, in violation
of Article 16 in relation to Article 39 of the Labor Code.
Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did
not charge an offense because he was accused of illegally recruiting
only one person in each of the four informations. Under the proviso in
Article 13(b), he claimed, there would be illegal recruitment only
"whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or
offered any employment for a fee."
The posture of the petitioner is that the private respondent is being
prosecuted under Article 39 in relation to Article 16 of the Labor Code;
hence, Article 13(b) is not applicable. However, as the first two cited
articles penalize acts of recruitment and placement without proper
authority, which is the charge embodied in the informations,
application of the definition of recruitment and placement in Article
13(b) is unavoidable.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violating Article 13(b) of P. D.
442, otherwise known as the Labor Code.
Held:
Article 13(b) of P. D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code, states
that, "(b) 'Recruitment and placement' refers to any act of canvassing,
'enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring workers, and
includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided,
That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for
a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement."
As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition
on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto but merely to
create a presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity
is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing
with two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer
or promise of employment is made in the course of the "canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of)
workers."
At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to
the campaign against illegal recruitment and placement, which has
victimized many Filipino workers seeking a better life in a foreign land,
and investing hard-earned savings or even borrowed funds in pursuit
of their dream, only to be awakened to the reality of a cynical
deception at the hands of their own countrymen.
SERRANO v. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES INC. & MARLOWE
NAVIGATION CO., INC.
G.R. No. 167614. March 24, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow
Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a POEA-approved Contract of
Employment. On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was
constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of
Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and
representation of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of
April. However, respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner
Chief Officer. Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was
repatriated to the Philippines on May.
Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12 months or
from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the time of his repatriation on
May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his
contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23)
days.
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against
respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims. LA
rendered the dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits.
Respondents appealed to the NLRC to question the finding of the LA. Likewise,
8
petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not
applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to
their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts.
Petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA
erred in not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Commission that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are
entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts. Petitioner filed
a Motion for Partial Reconsideration; he questioned the constitutionality of the
subject clause. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the
constitutional challenge against the subject clause. CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on
the reduction of the applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the
constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
The last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8042, to wit:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of
termination of overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the
workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his
placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per
annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the
lump-sum salary of petitioner at the monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the
period of three months out of the unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days
of his employment contract or a total of US$4,200.00.
Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner
contends that, in addition to the US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC and the CA,
he is entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a total of US$25,382.23, equivalent to his
salaries for the entire nine months and 23 days left of his employment contract,
computed at the monthly rate of US$2,590.00
Issue:
1.) Is petitioner entitled to his monetary claim which is the lump-
sum salary for the entire unexpired portion of his 12-month
employment contract, and not just for a period of three months?
2.) Should petitioner’s overtime and leave pay form part of the
salary basis in the computation of his monetary award, because
these are fixed benefits that have been stipulated into his
contract?
Held:
1.) Yes. Petitioner is awarded his salaries for the entire unexpired
portion of his employment contract consisting of nine months and 23 days
computed at the rate of US$1,400.00 per month. The subject clause “or for three
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in the
5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared
unconstitutional.
In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-
term employment who were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the
computation of their money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries
for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of
R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed
OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment
contract have since been differently treated in that their money claims are subject
to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers with
fixed-term employment.
The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a
suspect classification in that, in the computation of the monetary
benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it
imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired
portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims
of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The
subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it
with a peculiar disadvantage.
The Court further holds that the subject clause violates petitioner's
right to substantive due process, for it deprives him of property, consisting of
monetary benefits, without any existing valid governmental purpose. The subject
clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire
unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract,
pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.
2.) No. The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include
overtime and leave pay. For seafarers like petitioner, DOLE Department Order
No. 33, series 1996, provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in
which salary is understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay
and other bonuses; whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work
“performed” in excess of the regular eight hours, and holiday pay is compensation
for any work “performed” on designated rest days and holidays.
By the foregoing definition alone, there is no basis for the
automatic inclusion of overtime and holiday pay in the computation of petitioner's
monetary award; unless there is evidence that he performed work during those
periods.
CLAUDIO S. YAP, Petitioner, vs.THENAMARIS SHIP'S
MANAGEMENT and INTERMARE MARITIME AGENCIES, INC.,
Respondents. G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011
Facts: Claudio S. Yap was employed as electrician of the vessel, M/T
SEASCOUT on 14 August 2001 by Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc. in
behalf of its principal, Vulture Shipping Limited. for a duration of 12
9
months. On 23 August 2001, Yap boarded M/T SEASCOUT and
commenced his job as electrician. However, on or about 08 November
2001, the vessel was sold. Yap, along with the other crewmembers,
was informed by the Master of their vessel that the same was sold and
will be scrapped.
Yap received his seniority bonus, vacation bonus, extra bonus along
with the scrapping bonus. However, with respect to the payment of his
wage, he refused to accept the payment of one-month basic wage. He
insisted that he was entitled to the payment of the unexpired portion
of his contract since he was illegally dismissed from employment. He
alleged that he opted for immediate transfer but none was made.
The Labor Arbiter
Thus, Claudio S. Yap (petitioner) filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal
with Damages and Attorney’s Fees before the Labor Arbiter (LA). On
July 26, 2004, the LA rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, finding
the latter to have been constructively and illegally dismissed by
respondents. LA opined that since the unexpired portion of
petitioner’s contract was less than one year, petitioner was
entitled to his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
contract for a period of nine months.
The NLRC
Aggrieved, respondents sought recourse from the NLRC. The NLRC
affirmed the LA’s findings that petitioner was indeed
constructively and illegally dismissed. However, the NLRC held
that instead of an award of salaries corresponding to nine months,
petitioner was only entitled to salaries for three months as
provided under Section 108 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042,9
as enunciated in our ruling in Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc.
v. National Labor Relations Commission.
Respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. Finding merit in
petitioner’s arguments, the NLRC reversed its earlier Decision,
holding that "there can be no choice to grant only three (3) months
salary for every year of the unexpired term because there is no full
year of unexpired term which this can be applied."
The Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the findings and ruling of the LA and the NLRC that
petitioner was constructively and illegally dismissed. However, the CA
ruled that the NLRC erred in sustaining the LA’s interpretation
of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. In this regard, the CA relied on
the clause "or for three months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less" provided in the 5th
paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042.
Issue: Whether or not Section 10 of R.A. [No.] 8042, to the extent
that it affords an illegally dismissed migrant worker the lesser benefit
of – "salaries for [the] unexpired portion of his employment contract or
for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever
is less" – is constitutional. –YES
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in granting
petitioner only three (3) months backwages when his unexpired term
of 9 months is far short of the "every year of the unexpired term"
threshold. -YES
The Supreme Court
In the meantime, while this case was pending before this Court, we
declared as unconstitutional the clause "or for three months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less"
provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 in the
case of Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. on March 24, 2009.
This case should not be different from Serrano.
The said provision of law has long been a source of abuse by callous
employers against migrant workers; and that said provision violates
the equal protection clause under the Constitution because,
while illegally dismissed local workers are guaranteed under the Labor
Code of reinstatement with full backwages computed from the time
compensation was withheld from them up to their actual
reinstatement. It imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an
unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on
the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term
employment.
Respondents, aware of our ruling in Serrano, aver that our
pronouncement of unconstitutionality should not apply in this case
because Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is a substantive law that deals
with the rights and obligations of the parties in case of Illegal Dismissal
of a migrant worker and is not merely procedural in character. Thus,
pursuant to the Civil Code, there should be no retroactive application
of the law in this case.
As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no
rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. The doctrine
of operative fact serves as an exception to the aforementioned
general rule.
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule,
only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects
of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a
statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative
fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The
doctrine is applicable when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who
have relied on the invalid law.
Following Serrano, we hold that this case should not be included
in the aforementioned exception. To rule otherwise would be
iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs, and would, in effect, send a
wrong signal that principals/employers and recruitment/manning
agencies may violate an OFW’s security of tenure which an
employment contract embodies and actually profit from such violation
based on an unconstitutional provision of law.
Invoking Serrano, respondents claim that the tanker allowance should
be excluded from the definition of the term "salary."
Fair play, justice, and due process dictate that this Court cannot now,
for the first time on appeal, pass upon this question. Matters not taken
up below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. A close perusal
of the contract reveals that the tanker allowance of US$130.00 was
not categorized as a bonus but was rather encapsulated in the basic
salary clause, hence, forming part of the basic salary of petitioner.
10
A final note.
We ought to be reminded of the plight and sacrifices of our OFWs. In
Olarte v. Nayona, this Court held that:
Figueroa. Ramos, whose duties include the surveillance of suspected
illegal recruiters, immediately contacted a friend, a certain Mayeth
Bellotindos, so they could both go the place where the recruitment was
reportedly being undertaken. Upon arriving at the reported area at

Our overseas workers belong to a disadvantaged class. Most of them
come from the poorest sector of our society. Their profile shows they
live in suffocating slums, trapped in an environment of crimes. Hardly
literate and in ill health, their only hope lies in jobs they find with
difficulty in our country. Their unfortunate circumstance makes them
easy prey to avaricious employers. They will climb mountains, cross
the seas, endure slave treatment in foreign lands just to survive. Out
of despondence, they will work under sub-human conditions and
accept salaries below the minimum. The least we can do is to protect
them with our laws.
around 4:00 p.m., Bellotindos entered the house and pretended to be
an applicant. Ramos remained outside and stood on the pavement,
from where he was able to see around six (6) persons in the sala.
Ramos even heard a woman, identified as Carol Figueroa, talk about
the possible employment she has to provide in Singapore and the
documents that the applicants have to comply with. Fifteen (15)
minutes later, Bellotindos came out with a bio-data form in hand.
Thereafter, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt. Mendoza

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) to organize the arrest of the
alleged illegal recruiter. A surveillance team was then organized to
confirm the report. After which, a raid was executed.

Consequently, Carol was charged and convicted by the trial

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee court of illegal recruitment.

vs. CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA, accused-appellant Upon appeal, accused questions her conviction for illegal
recruitment in large scale and assails, as well, the constitutionality of
G.R. No. 121777 (350 SCRA 163) January 24, 2001
the law defining and penalizing said crime. First, accused submits that

KAPUNAN, J. Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining “recruitment and placement”
is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause.

The provision in question reads:

FACTS: On the afternoon of January 30, 1994, Maria Lourdes Modesto
and Nancy Araneta together with her friends Jennelyn Baez, and ART. 13. Definitions.—(a) x x x.

Sandra Aquino went to the house of Jasmine Alejandro, after having

(b) “Recruitment and placement”
learned that a woman is there to recruit job applicants for Singapore.
refers to any act of canvassing,
Carol dela Piedra was already briefing some people when they arrived.
enlisting, contracting,
Jasmine, on the other hand, welcomed and asked them to sit down.
transporting, utilizing, hiring or

They listened to the “recruiter” who was then talking about procuring workers, and

the breakdown of the fees involved: P30,000 for the visa and the includes referrals, contract

round trip ticket, and P5,000 as placement fee and for the processing services, promising or

of the papers. The initial payment was P2,000, while P30,000 will be advertising for employment,

by salary deduction. The recruiter said that she was “recruiting” locally or abroad, whether for

nurses for Singapore. profit or not: Provided, That

any person or entity which,
Araneta, her friends and Lourdes then filled up bio-data in any manner, offers or
forms and were required to submit pictures and a transcript of records. promises for a fee
After the interview, Lourdes gave the initial payment of P2,000 to employment to two or
Jasmine, who assured her that she was authorized to receive the more persons shall be
money. deemed engaged in
recruitment and
Meanwhile, in the morning of the said date, Erlie Ramos,
placement.
Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA),
received a telephone call from an unidentified woman inquiring about
the legitimacy of the recruitment conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol

11
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not sec. 13 (b) of P.D. 442, as amended, employer) does not render the law overbroad. Evidently,
otherwise known as the illegal recruitment law is unconstitutional as it Dela Piedra misapprehends concept of overbreadth.
violates the due process clause. (2) Whether or not accused was
A statute may be said to be overbroad where it
denied equal protection and therefore should be exculpated
operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms
affirmatively guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the
freedom of speech or religion. A generally worded statute,
HELD:
when construed to punish conduct which cannot be
constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague to the
(1) For the First issue, dela Piedra submits that Article
extent that it fails to give adequate warning of the boundary
13 (b) of the Labor Code defining “recruitment and
between the constitutionally permissible and the
placement” is void for vagueness and, thus, violates
constitutionally impermissible applications of the statute.
the due process clause.
Due process requires that the terms of a penal
statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are
subject to it what conduct on their part will render them (2) Anent the second issue, Dela Piedra invokes the
liable to its penalties. equal protection clause in her defense. She points
out that although the evidence purportedly shows that
In support of her submission, dela Piedra invokes
Jasmine Alejandro handed out application forms and even
People vs. Panis, where the Supreme Court “criticized” the
received Lourdes Modesto’s payment, appellant was the
definition of “recruitment and placement.”
only one criminally charged. Alejandro, on the other
hand, remained scot-free. From this, she concludes that
The Court ruled, however, that her reliance on
the prosecution discriminated against her on grounds of
the said case was misplaced.
regional origins. Appellant is a Cebuana while Alejandro
The issue in Panis was whether, under the proviso of is a Zamboangueña, and the alleged crime took place in
Article 13 (b), the crime of illegal recruitment could be Zamboanga City.
committed only “whenever two or more persons are in any The Supreme Court held that the argument has
manner promised or offered any employment for a fee.” In no merit.
this case, the Court merely bemoaned the lack of records
The prosecution of one guilty person while
that would help shed light on the meaning of the proviso.
others equally guilty are not prosecuted, is not, by itself, a
The absence of such records notwithstanding, the Court was
denial of the equal protection of the laws. The unlawful
able to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the proviso by
administration by officers of a statute fair on its face,
applying principles in criminal law and drawing from the
resulting in its unequal application to those who are
language and intent of the law itself. Section 13 (b),
entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal
therefore, is not a “perfectly vague act” whose obscurity is
protection unless there is shown to be present in it an
evident on its face. If at all, the proviso therein is merely
element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. But a
couched in imprecise language that was salvaged by proper
discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a
construction. It is not void for vagueness.
showing of “clear and intentional discrimination.”

In the case at bar, Dela Piedra has failed to show

Dela Piedra further argues that the acts that that, in charging her, there was a “clear and intentional
constitute “recruitment and placement” suffer from discrimination” on the part of the prosecuting officials.
overbreadth since by merely “referring” a person for
Furthermore, the presumption is that the
employment, a person may be convicted of illegal
prosecuting officers regularly performed their duties, and
recruitment.
this presumption can be overcome only by proof to the
That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant contrary, not by mere speculation. As said earlier,
apparently considers as customary and harmless acts such accused has not presented any evidence to overcome this
as “labor or employment referral” (“referring” an applicant, presumption. The mere allegation that dela Piedra, a
according to appellant, for employment to a prospective Cebuana, was charged with the commission of a crime,
12
while a Zamboangueña, the guilty party in appellant’s eyes, prosecution officers denied appellant equal protection of
was not, is insufficient to support a conclusion that the the laws.

13