A.

Legislative Intent
 Art. 10, Civil Code

ARTICLE 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. (n)

AISPORNA v. CA

G.R. No. L-39419 April 12, 1982

DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:

Mapalad Aisporna, petitioner, appealed on certiorari to reverse CA’s decision in

affirming the City of Court of Cabanatuan’s judgement in declaring Aisporna guilty of Sec. 189 of the
Insurance Act (Act NO. 2427, as amended) and sentenced her to pay a fine of P 500.00 with
imprisonment in case of insolvency and pay costs.

Rodolfo S. Aisporna, petitioner’s husband, was the duly licensed insurance agent to
Perla Compania de Seguros, with license to expire on 30 June 1970. The petitioner was charged with
with violation of Sec. 189 of Insurance Law for acting as an agent in the solicitation for insurance of
Eugenio S. Isidro without securing a certificate of authority to act as such agent from the office of the
Insurance Commission. Aisporna reasoned that as the wife of the true agent, she naturally helped him in
his work and at that time her husband was not around and so she only left a note on her husband’s desk
to renew the policy. Ergo, the trial court found Aisporna guilty and on appeal, CA affirmed the former’s
decision as the latter is guilty of the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act which provides:

The CA found Aisporna guilty of violation of the first paragraph of Section 189 of the
Insurance Act which provides: “No insurance company doing business within the Philippine Islands, nor
any agent thereof, shall pay any commission or other compensation to any person for services in
obtaining new insurance unless such person shall have first procured from the Insurance Commissioner
a certificate of authority to act as an agent of such company hereinafter provided. No person shall act as
agent, subagent, or broker, in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance, or receive
for services in obtaining new insurance any commission or other compensation from any insurance
company doing business in the Philippine Islands, or agent thereof, without first procuring a certificate
of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner, which must be renewed annually on the first
day of January, or within six months thereafter. Such certificate shall be issued by the Insurance
Commissioner only upon the written application of persons desiring such authority such application
being approved and countersigned by the company such person desires to represent and shall be upon a
form approved by the Insurance Commissioner, giving such information as he many require. The
Insurance Commissioner shall have the right to refuse to issue or renew and to revoke any such
certificate in his discretion. No such certificate shall be valid, however, in any event after the first day of
July of the year following the issuing of such certificate. Renewal certificates may be issued upon the
application of the company.
 Any person or company violating the provisions of this section shall be fined in the sum of five
hundred pesos. On the conviction of any person acting as agent, subagent, or broker, of the commission
of any offense connected with the business of insurance, the Insurance Commissioner shall immediately
revoke the certificate of authority issued to him and no such certificate shall thereafter be issued to such
convicted person.” Petitioner argues the errors made by CA:

1. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT RECEIPT OF

COMPENSATION IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE CRIME DEFINED BY THE FIRST
PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 189 OF THE INSURANCE ACT.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING DUE WEIGHT TO EXHIBITS F, F-
1, TO F-17, INCLUSIVE SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH PETITIONER'S GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING HEREIN PETITIONER.

ISSUE: Whether or not the agent mentioned in the first paragraph of Section 189 of Insurance Law is

governed by the definition of an insurance agent found on its second paragraph?

RULING: CA seemed to imply that the definition of an insurance agent under the second paragraph of
Section 189--a person is an insurance agent if he solicits and obtains an insurance for compensation-- is
not applicable to the insurance agent mentioned in the first paragraph--there is no necessity that a
person solicits an insurance for compensation to be called an insurance agent. Legislative intent means
that statutes must be interpreted as a whole and with harmony among its parts. Receiving
compensation is an essebntial aground in violating paragraph 1. Whereas the CA ruled that Aisporna did
not receive any compensations, thus the decision is overturned, and petitioner is acquitted.

Chinabank v. Ortega

G.R. No. L-34964 January 31, 1973

MAKALINTAL, J.:

FACTS:

 On December 17, 1968 Vicente Acaban filed a complaint in the court a quo against Bautista
Logging Co., Inc., B & B Forest Development Corporation and Marino Bautista for the
collection of a sum of money.
  Acaban sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of B & B Forest Development
Corporation with the China Banking Corporation and issued a notice of garnishment through
Chinabank’s cashier, Tan Kim Liong.
 Tan Kim LIong replied with the provisions of R.A No. 1405 which prohibits the disclosure of
any information relative to bank deposits. Thereupon, Acaban filed a motion to hold Liong
for contempt in court which was denied by the trial court.
 Liong was ordered "to inform the Court within five days from receipt of this order whether
or not there is a deposit in the China Banking Corporation of defendant B & B Forest
Development Corporation, and if there is any deposit, to hold the same intact and not allow
any withdrawal until further order from this Court." And for him to comply to the order
within 10 days otherwise he will be arrested and confined.
 To this, China Banking Corporation and Tan Kim Liong appealed to SC on certiorari arguing
on the grounds of R.A No. 1405: “Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or
banking institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the
Government of the Philippines … are hereby considered as of absolutely confidential nature
and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official,
bureau or office”; “Sec 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a banking
institution to disclose to any person any information concerning said deposits.” And such
violation will result in: “Sec. 5. subject offender upon conviction, to an imprisonment of not
more than five years or a fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos or both, in the
discretion of the court.”

ISSUE: Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process
garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405.

RULING:

NO. The Court ruled “that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit
under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment.”
And that, “if the existence of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution
process.”

B. Verba Legis— “he plain meaning rule or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute
is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
interpretation”

PADILLA, et al. v. Congress

G.R. No. 231671 July 25, 2017

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
 GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION V. NLRC

G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992

ROMERO, J.:

FACTS:

Imelda L. Salazar, respondent, was employed as general systems analyst at Globe-Mackay Cable
and Radio Corporation. Salazar, was said to be very close to Delfin Saldivar, who was also employed at
same company as manager for technical operation’s support. Also, the latter was found to be in
partnership with Yambao, owner and manager of Elecon Engineering Services, and had taken GMCR’s
airconditioner for personal use. Salazar was implicated here as she was found to have violated the
companny’s regulations by involving herself in transactions conflicting with the company’s interests,
such as signing into articles of partnership between Saldivar and Yambao and having knowledge of the
loss and whereabouts of the airconditioner but failing to inform her employer.

GMCR placed Salzar under preventive suspension and gave her 30 days to explain her side,
instead of doing so, Salazar filed a complaint against GMCR for illegal suspension which she
subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal, vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay and
damages.

Labor Arbiter ordered petitioner company to reinstate private respondent to her former or
equivalent position and to pay her full backwages and other benefits she would have received were it
not for the illegal dismissal. Petitioner was also ordered to pay private respondent moral damages of
P50,000.00. On appeal, public respondent National Labor Relations Commission, affirmed the
reinstatement but limited backwages to a period of two (2) years and deleted the award for moral
damages.

Thus, GMCR appealing to this court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Salazar, respondent, was illegally dismissed.

RULING:

YES. Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:

Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate
the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An
employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the
time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement.
There was no just cause in dismissing Salazar from her employment and the Labor Code
recognized the “security of tenure,” and under the legal rule of verbal legis, “if a statute is clear,
plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation.” WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public respondent National
 Labor Relations Commission dated December 29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner GMCR is
ordered to REINSTATE private respondent Imelda Salazar and to pay her backwages equivalent
to her salary for a period of two (2) years only.
BASBACIO v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 109445 November 7, 1994
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
A land dispute between the Boyons and Felicito Basbacio, petitioner, resulting into the killing of
Frederico Boyon and the latter having been convicted of frustrated murder along with his son-in-law,
Wilfredo Baldrerrama. On the petitioner’s appeal, the CA rendered a decision acquitting Basbacio on the
ground that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between him and Balderrama, as the former’s
presence at the scene of the crime was insufficient to show conspiracy.

Hence, Babacio claiming for compensation under R.A No. 7309 sec. 3(a), which provides for the
payment of compensation to "any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but
subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal." Board of Claims of the Department of
Justice, but the claim was denied on the ground that while petitioner's presence at the scene of the
killing was not sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, yet, there was basis for finding that
he was "probably guilty." Secretary of Justice affirmed this and that Basbacio’s acquittal was not based
on innocence but upon finding reasonable doubt.

Basbacio appealed on certiorari arguing through his counsel that sec. 3(a) is clear and does not
call for interpretation. The "mere fact that the claimant was imprisoned for a crime which he was
subsequently acquitted of is already unjust in itself," and that there is only one requirement for
conviction in criminal cases and that is proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to
present such proof, the presumption that the accused is innocent stands.

ISSUE: WON Basbacio qualifies for R.A No. 7309?

RULING: NO. Although Babacio was acquitted not because of the question whether he was guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, R.A No. 7309 is not applicable in this case because there is reasonable
ground. That he was not necessarily unjustly accused but that accusation against him is based on
“probable guilt” in terms of his relation to the co-accused and the bad blood between him and the
victim.

C. Statute as a Whole- Whole statute rule is a principle of statutory construction that

a statute should be considered in its entirety, and that the words used within it should be given
their ordinary meaning unless there is a clear indication to the contrary.

JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, INC v. NLRC

 G.R. No. 109835 November 22, 1993

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS: