P H I L O S O P H I C A L INQUIRY, V O L .

X X X No 1-2, W I N T E R - SPRING 2008

Aristotle as the First Historian of Philosophy

Vasiiis Kaifas
Aristotle University o f Thessaloniki

I
It is conveyed f r o m the biographical tradition that Plato had attributed Aristotle
the forename "the reader". Such description might indicate Aristotle's broad erudition.
Nevertheless, it might bear an ironic tone, i f we consider that philosophers were not
always i n favor o f erudition and particularly Plato does not seem to appreciate much
those that believed that they gained w i s d o m being exclusively "bred" by the written
opinions o f the predecessors.' Regardless o f Plato's motive, it is a fact that Aristotle
inaugurates an innovative approach o f written texts, w h i c h reminds us o f our o w n
reading habits.^ I n the Topics he recommends to the future dialectician the use o f
written texts o f the past f o r the construction o f indexes, w h i c h w o u l d constitute a
useful reserve o f timely views:

"We should select also f r o m the written handbooks o f argument, and should
draw up sketch-lists o f them upon each several k i n d o f subject, putting them
d o w n under separate headings, e.g. ' O n G o o d ' , or ' O n L i f e ' - and that ' O n
G o o d ' should deal w i t h every f o r m o f good, beginning w i t h the essence. I n
the margin, too, one should indicate also the opinions o f individual thinkers,
e.g. that Empedocles said that the elements o f bodies were four; f o r any one
might assent to the saying o f some reputable authority" (Topics 105b 12-18,
transl. Pickard-Cambridge).

Following Aristotle's advice, the person who is involved within a dialectical controversy
acquires one more advantage. Plausible argument takes additional benefits f r o m
reputable human opinions. However, the resort to generally accepted convictions,
to conceptions that lasted as t i m e elapsed not o n l y f o r t i f i e s the strength o f our
persuasion, but is also an indication o f their soundness. Speaking o f the divine nature
Aristotle as the First Historian of Philosophy 50

and perpetuity o f the sky, Aristotle considers decisive evidence f o r the truthfulness o f
his positions the fact that all w h o dealt w i t h the celestial issues had the same views.^
A n d he explains this coincidence by saying that the same truths reappear i n human
history, "recur to us not once nor t w i c e but over and over again".''
I n a sense then, human thought could be seen under an evolutionary p r i s m as a
continual recurrence o f the same basic questions and as a gradual enhancement o f our
answers, as an accumulating process o f knowledge and solutions. Some Aristotelian
texts display such an approach:

"Each t h i n k e r makes some statement about the natural w o r l d , and as an

i n d i v i d u a l contributes little or n o t h i n g to the inquiry; but a combination o f all
conjectures results i n something considerable... It is only fair to be grateful not
only to those whose views we can share but also to those w h o have expressed
rather superficial opinions. They too have contributed something; b y their
preliminary w o r k they have f o r m e d our mental experience" {Metaphysics a
993b2-4, 13-15, transl. Tredennick).

B u i l d i n g up our dialectic ability, r e f o r m u l a t i o n o f our basic queries, appraisal o f

the present, continuation and innovation . . . Aristotle appears to have many reasons
f o r the systematic study o f the older thinkers. Let us n o w see h o w exactly he takes
advantage o f this knowledge i n a philosophical way.

II

The numerous Aristotelian references to f o r m e r philosophers and the thorough

analysis o f their theses a l l o w us to say that it is f r o m A r i s t o t l e onwards that the
historical conception o f philosophy begins — it is o f t e n suggested that Aristotle is
the first historian o f philosophy.
Aristotle's innovation is founded upon Plato's different attitude. The truth is that
Plato is not particularly attracted by history. He does not hesitate to resort to acute
anachronisms; besides, w h e n he refers to the past, he takes no notice o f the near past
but reconstructs an ulterior, o b v i o u s l y m y t h i c a l one, thus f o l l o w i n g the tendency o f
the tragic poets and orators, w h o do not discriminate history f r o m mythology. I f we
exempt Parmenides, there are very f e w direct Platonic references to the Presocratics.
For example, Plato refers to Empedocles by name o n l y t w i c e , whereas A r i s t o t l e
mentions the same philosopher one hundred and thirty t w o times. Plato's concern is
to define the role o f the philosopher not only towards his competitors, namely towards
the poet, but also towards the politician, the orator or the one that he h i m s e l f describes
as "the sophist". I n essence, Plato sets the foundations o f philosophy. His interest
focuses on the safeguarding o f a p r i v i l e g e d scope f o r the n e w l y founded branch o f
knowledge, not on o u t l i n i n g its history.
Vasiiis Kaifas 51

Aristotle starts f r o m a completely d i f f e r e n t point o f view. As a member o f the

Platonic circle, he does not at a l l challenge the existence o f philosophy. He has
accepted his incorporation w i t h i n a philosophical school since the early years o f his
apprenticeship and it is as such that he recognizes Plato's authority. The issue during
Aristotle's era is that beyond the Platonists there are others that speak i n the name o f
philosophy: Isocrates was definitely one o f them — w h o was mostly critical o f the
Platonic conception o f philosophizing — , i n addition to Xenophon, Lysias, Alcidamas,
Aeschines and probably many other o f Socrates' descendants. It is o f great value then
to c l a r i f y the Platonic approach to philosophy especially and its differentiation f r o m
other contemporary philosophical approaches. Scholars say that Aristotle, a i m i n g at
the latter issues, publishes his Protrepticus having i n m i n d Antidosis
Aristotle o f t e n quotes the opinions o f earlier philosophers throughout his w o r k .
B u t o n l y i n b o o k A o f the Metaphysics does he attempt a narration o f the b i r t h
and evolution o f philosophy, starting f r o m Thales and reaching until Plato and his
students, respecting the time sequence. It is virtually f r o m this text that Aristotle's
picture as a historian o f philosophy derives. Causations and praises, concerning the
quality o f history o f philosophy that A r i s t o t l e f o r m s , aim at a reconstitution plan
that is attempted w i t h i n this text. A r i s t o t l e w o u l d argue f o r a p u r e l y theoretical
philosophy, f o r a philosophy that is oriented towards the study o f immaterial forms.
I n its historical manifestation such philosophy acquires f o r m because o f Plato and
his students. Aristotle thus, still speaking as a Platonist,^ engages i n presenting how
the Platonic theory o f Ideas gradually emerged starting f r o m the first steps o f the
theoretical quest i n 6^'' century B . C . Ionia.

Ill

In Metaphysics PC^ introduction Aristotle reconstructs i n great skill the queries o f

the (supposedly) average individual o f his era, o f the individual w h o bears "inherent
inclination to knowledge" (980a20), i n his attempt to answer the traditional question
"what is wisdom?". A c c o r d i n g to Aristotle, these people appreciate the scientist more
than the successful craftsman, causal knowledge more than descriptive knowledge,
theory more than experience. Through such k i n d o f ascertainments Aristotle reaches
a first definition o f " w i s d o m " : " w i s d o m is the knowledge o f certain principles and
causes" (982a2). I n due course he shall render this definition more specific. A l t h o u g h
it is not e x p l i c i t l y stated, the question does not regard what is general w i s d o m , but
what is philosophy. Aristotle appeals to "endoxa'\ as he states, namely to c o m m o n
conceptions concerning the philosopher and philosophy as w e l l (982a6), and based
upon these he attempts to designate what k i n d o f knowledge philosophy consists o f
- more precisely, o f w h i c h principles and causes philosophy is the knowledge. B y
f o r m u l a t i n g six dialectical syllogisms (namely syllogisms that have endoxa as major
premises), Aristotle infers that the pursued knowledge is "the theoretical knowledge
Aristotle as the First Historian of Philosophy 52

o f the first principles and causes" (982b9). This is the basic definition o f philosophy
that is accepted i n book A o f the Metaphysics.
I f philosophy is the theoretical knowledge o f the first principles and causes, the
next question then that n o r m a l l y arises examines w h i c h are these first principles and
causes. This query v/ould lead Aristotle to the narration o f the earlier philosophy, to
w h i c h the m a i n part o f book A is devoted. However, it is interesting to trace the w a y
through w h i c h the transition to the past w o u l d take place. Someone w o u l d probably
expect f r o m Aristotle, being i n advance aware o f the practice that he f o l l o w s i n his
didactic w o r k s , to proceed " i n d u c t i v e l y " : to cite views o f earlier thinkers, to focus
on crucial problems and difficulties and finally to provide us w i t h his o w n solution.
Nevertheless, what he practices here is almost the opposite. He states e x p l i c i t l y that
he h i m s e l f knows exactly w h i c h the first causes are and, b y indicating the research
that he has conducted i n the Physics, confines himself to their enumeration: it certainly
refers to the f o u r w e l l k n o w n Aristotelian causes - mater, f o r m , agent and telos. I n
what w a y he h i m s e l f reached this quadruple distinction, he does not disclose here or
i n the Physics. What does the retrospection to earlier philosophers serve then? The
j u s t i f i c a t i o n that Aristotle provides is the f o l l o w i n g :

"Let us avail ourselves o f the evidence o f those w h o have before us approached

the investigation o f reality and philosophized about truth. For clearly they
too have recognized certain principles and causes, and so it w i l l be o f some
assistance to our present i n q u i r y i f we study their teaching; because we shall
either discover some other k i n d o f cause, or have more confidence i n those
w h i c h we have just described" (983b 1-7, transl. Tredennick).

The retrospection to the past appears to be a validating process. The validity o f a basic
position — o f the assumption o f the f o u r causes — shall be decided according to its
consistency w i t h the older views. Aristotle then proceeds to the examination o f the
views o f earlier thinkers concerning the principles o f the beings and o f the natural
causality. The fact that this analysis takes the f o r m o f a historical narration should
not be considered as a self-evident option. N o one before Aristotle had attempted
anything similar. N o one had attempted to define precisely w h e n philosophy was
b o m , w h i c h problems it endured, w h i c h ways it f o l l o w e d or i n what w a y it reached
the present. Therefore we face before us the first w r i t t e n sample o f the history o f
philosophy. A r i s t o t l e starts w i t h Thales, the "founder o f this k i n d o f p h i l o s o p h y "
(983b20) and concludes w i t h Plato and his students. His historical reconstruction
reveals the gradual and sequential emergence o f the f o u r causes. Thales was the first
that perceived i n a w^ay the material cause. I n due course Parmenides, Empedocles
and Anaxagoras perceived vaguely the efficient cause. The Pythagoreans and m a i n l y
Plato conceived the f o r m a l cause, although according to Aristotle no one realized the
importance o f the final cause, even though Empedocles implied it by means o f philotes
and neikos, Anaxagoras through nous and Plato w i t h the Good. The conclusion at
Vasiiis Kaifas 53

the end o f the historical process confirms, as we had expected it as a matter o f fact,
the Aristotelian approach.

"Nevertheless we have learned that m u c h f r o m them: that not one o f those

who discuss principle or cause has mentioned any other type than those we
have distinguished i n the Physics. Clearly it is after these types that they are
groping, however uncertainly... It appears, then, that all these thinkers too
(being unable to arrive at any other cause) testify that we have classified the
causes rightly, as regards both number and nature. Further, it is clear that all
the principles must be sought either along these lines or i n some similar way.
Let us next examine the possible difficulties arising out o f the statements o f
each o f these thinkers, and out o f his attitude to the first principles" (988a20-
23, b 16-21 transl. Tredennick).

What f o l l o w s is the critique o f the earlier theories, the i n d i c a t i o n o f weaknesses

and controversies g i v i n g special emphasis on Plato's theory o f Ideas. The critique
shall mark certain central issues and problems o f vital importance f o r every future
metaphysics. Those o f the thinkers that support the unity o f Aristotelian metaphysics
claim that the critical examination o f book A prepares the way f o r the "aporias'' that
occupy the whole book B o f the Metaphysics (as being problems that trouble Aristotle
himself). These '"aporiaf' shall constitute the indispensable introduction to Aristotle's
"first philosophy" and shall be dealt w i t h at any rate i n the f o r t h c o m i n g books o f his
work. The rudimentary significance o f aporiai f o r the formation o f every philosophical
research is actually emphasized by Aristotle at the beginning o f book A .

" I t is necessary, w i t h a v i e w to the science w h i c h we are investigating, that

we first describe the questions w h i c h should first be discussed. These consist
o f a l l the divergent views w h i c h we held about the first principles; and also
o f any other v i e w apart f r o m these w h i c h happens to have been overlooked.
N o w f o r those w h o w i s h to get r i d o f perplexities it is a good plan to go into
them thoroughly; f o r the subsequent certainty is a release f r o m the previous
perplexities, and release is impossible when we do not k n o w the knot. The
perplexity o f the m i n d shows that there is a ' k n o t ' i n the subject... Hence we
should first have studied all the difficulties, both f o r the reasons given and also
because those w h o start an i n q u i r y w i t h o u t first considering the difficulties
are like people w h o do not k n o w where they are going; besides, one does not
even k n o w whether the thing required has been f o u n d or not. To such a man
the end is not clear; but it is clear to one w h o has already faced the difficulties.
Further, one w h o has heard all the conflicting theories, like one w h o has heard
both sides i n a lawsuit, is necessarily more competed to j u d g e " {Metaphysics
B , 995a24-b4, transl. Tredennick).

We shall return to this important text.

Aristotle as the First Historian of Philosophy 54

IV

" A r i s t o t l e as the first historian o f philosophy". The title o f m y article reasonably

refers to the k i n d o f history o f philosophy that Aristotle introduces, specifically to the
question whether Aristotle is objective as a historian o f the earlier philosophy. M a n y
scholars have dealt w i t h the issue to a great extent, especially after the extremely
negative positions that H a r o l d Cherniss f o r m u l a t e d i n his t w o memorable books,
Aristotle s Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy and Aristotle s Criticism of Plato
and the Academy J I do not doubt that this issue is v i r t u a l l y significant, especially
i f someone intends to utilize Aristotle as the basic source f o r the study o f the early
Greek philosophy. A s far as Aristotelian philosophy itself is concerned, the crucial
issue is f o r someone to c o m p r e h e n d w h y A r i s t o t l e constantly resorts to earlier
philosophers, what exactly the dialogue w i t h the philosophical dogmas o f the past
has to o f f e r to h i m .
Cherniss examined every A r i s t o t e l i a n reference to the earlier philosophers i n
detail, and his conclusions were entirely negative: "There are no ' d o x o g r a p h i c a l '
accounts i n the works o f A r i s t o t l e , because Aristotle was not a doxographer but a
philosopher seeking to construct a complete and final philosophy. For h i m — as f o r
every philosopher — the doctrines o f his predecessors were materials to be remoulded
f o r his o w n purpose".^ Someone could deduce that Cherniss' critique is j u s t i f i e d i n
both o f the basic points on w h i c h he focused his criticism. First, Aristotle is really a
philosopher and not a doxographer. Consequently, he is not interested i n the accurate
conveyance o f the earlier theories but i n using h i m f o r his o w n philosophical purposes.
Second, Aristotle sets a historical narration that appears to be defined b y its o w n end.
He reconstructs the history o f philosophy retrospectively as a process that is gradually
directed towards his o w n philosophical perception.
For the first point o f critique there is little we can comment on. It w o u l d have been
disastrous f o r someone to attempt to study the Presocratics having Aristotle as the
sole source. However, the question is whether this k i n d o f critical notes renders the
whole historical reconstruction o f Aristotle as misleading and useless. Chemiss seems
to suggest such an idea. Before we reach a certain conclusion, we should admit that
Aristotle's history so p o w e r f u l that his hermeneutical pattem is still not replaced b y
some better one. Suffice i t to compare any M o d e r n history o f Greek philosophy w i t h
the respective Aristotelian reconstruction so as to trace its catalytic influence.
I n m y opinion, the second point o f Cherniss' critique is more f r u i t f u l . It is a fact
that the final outcome o f the Aristotelian historical narration is w e l l k n o w n i n advance:
the emergence o f the f o u r causes marks the history o f early Greek philosophy. Hence,
one could think that the aim o f the historical retrospection is merely to c o n f i r m the
value o f A r i s t o t l e ' s p h i l o s o p h y as being the natural e f f e c t and c o m p l e t i o n o f a l l
previous intellectual process.
Nevertheless, this analysis is insufficient. There is no doubt that the key to the
Vasiiis Kaifas 55

history o f philosophy that A r i s t o t l e creates here is a reconstruction i n retrospect,

w h i c h takes into consideration the necessary principle o f the final cause.^ Aristotle
is a defender not only o f natural teleology but also o f the I d e o l o g i c a l perception o f
human history ( o f arts and institutions). What matters i n Aristotle's perspective are
not individual thinkers and their contributions, but rather the emergence o f truth and
the pressure exerted by facts and the ''phenomena' themselves. For that reason, at
the turning points o f this historical narration he is using expressions such as: "but
as men proceeded i n this way, the very circumstances o f the case led them on and
compelled them to seek f u r t h e r " ( 9 8 4 a l 8 - 1 9 ) ; "men were again compelled by truth
itself to investigate the next first p r i n c i p l e " (984b9).
Yet, this general position does not point toward an absolutely linear evolution o f
philosophical thought. Readers o f Aristotle's history are astonished at the fact that
the Pythagoreans are mentioned f o r the first time immediately before Plato, w h i l e
Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Democritus have already preceded. Some claim that
when Aristotle speaks o f the Pythagoreans, he refers to Philolaus i n particular and
to later representatives o f the School. But, it is far more probable that what interests
A r i s t o t l e is to present Pythagoreans' influence o n the m a t h e m a t i c a l v e r s i o n o f
Plato's theory o f Ideas, and this is w h y he places the Pythagoreans just before Plato.
Elaborating again on the relafion between Anaxagoras and Empedocles, Aristotle notes:
"Anaxagoras o f Clazomenae, prior to Empedocles i n point o f age, but posterior i n
his activities" ( 9 8 4 a l 2 - 1 3 ) . As Alexander has already recognized, Aristotle's remark
is not chronological but axiological.'^ Besides, a little further on, Aristotle w o u l d
characterize Anaxagoras' positions as more innovative than Empedocles' (986b6)."
Aristotle then, as Aubenque notes, "acquires some liberties w i t h history" on certain
occasions, despite the linearity that governs the history o f philosophy that he creates.
Certain problems appear to have their o w n history. Retrospective comprehension,
namely projecting onto the past a hypothetical necessity, cannot also act as an explicit
explanation o f the historical process o f the older theories.'^
Finally, I am w i l l i n g to agree w i t h Chemiss that Aristotle many times distorts, i n
m y o p i n i o n absolutely consciously, the sayings o f his predecessors. This attitude is
rather astonishing and, j u d g i n g w i t h our criteria, it is entirely inappropriate. However,
it is important f o r us to understand w h y Aristotle is doing such a thing. W h y is it so
crucial f o r Aristotle to bring closer to h i m the older theories by means o f translating
them i n his o w n philosophical idiom?
Let us isolate certain Aristotelian judgments conceming earlier philosophers. O n
Empedocles: " i f one f o l l o w s up and appreciates the statements o f Empedocles w i t h
a v i e w to his real meaning and not his obscure language" (985a4-7). O n the early
philosophers: "they are like untrained soldiers i n a battle, w h o rush about and o f t e n
strike good blows, but w i t h o u t science; i n the same way these thinkers do not seem
to understand their o w n statements" ( 9 8 5 a l 3 - 1 7 ) . O n Anaxagoras: " i f one were to
infer that Anaxagoras recognized t w o elements, the inference w o u l d accord closely
Aristotle as the First Historian of Philosophy 56

w i t h a v i e w w h i c h , although he d i d not articulate it himself, he must have accepted as

developed by others;... at the same time, i f one were to f o l l o w his doctrine c a r e f u l l y
and interpret its meaning, perhaps it w o u l d be seen to be more up-to-date" (989a31-
b6).'^
W h a t do statements o f this sort indicate? P r i n c i p a l l y , they display A r i s t o t l e ' s
critical i n c l i n a t i o n , his tendency to proceed beyond the first level o f identification
o f the d o c t r i n e s o f his predecessors. M o r e o v e r , they d e m o n s t r a t e that e v e r y
" r e c o n s t r u c t i o n " o f older theories is entirely conscious and intentional. A r i s t o t l e
emphasizes the contrast between the subconscious intention o f the older philosopher
and his o w n final f o r m u l a t i o n , w h i c h remains incomplete., He o f t e n commits h i m s e l f
to "co-articulate" along w i t h the older philosopher "what i n essence he intended to
express", as i n the case o f Anaxagoras. Due to A r i s t o t l e ' s corrective intervention
older views "are restored" and modernized. A c c o r d i n g to Aubenque's f o r m u l a t i o n ,
Aristotle "introduces a f o r m o f history o f philosophy that compares, someone could
say, the psychological self-consciousness o f the philosophers w i t h their absolute
self-consciousness". '"^
It is here that a crucial question is marked. W h y does Aristotle devote such a long
time to the discussion o f earlier philosophers, w h y does he make such an e f f o r t to
reformulate their views i n a w a y that he h i m s e l f considers creative?

V
Before we proceed, let us summarize Aristotle's method i n Metaphysics. I n order
to f o u n d a new branch o f knowledge, the one that he w o u l d later describe as "first
philosophy", he starts w i t h a p r e l i m i n a r y examination that involves f o u r stages:

1. Formation o f the first principles o f the science i n question by means o f

the dialectical elaboration o f endoxa.
2. Historical retrospection o f earlier philosophy w i t h a proclaimed aim, that
is to c o n f i r m his o w n position.
3. Critique o f earlier theories.
4. Formulation o f essential aporiai, w h i c h w i l l give direction to his future
quest.

This method, having this certain sequence o f these f o u r stages, is not f o l l o w e d i n any
other Aristotelian w o r k — however, nowhere else does Aristotle deal w i t h the history
o f the earlier philosophy. Yet, the data that his examination yields i n every stage are
collected and utilized i n all his theoretical works. For instance, i n On the Soid, where
Aristotle devotes a w h o l e book to r e v i e w i n g earlier theories as w e l l , the sequence
is literally reversed. The f o r m u l a t i o n o f the basic aporiai on the soul precedes. The
analytic discussion o f older theories f o l l o w s , where yet the citation is thematic and
not chronological. F i n a l l y the soul is defined. The theoretical excuse that is p r o v i d e d
Vasiiis Kaifas 57

in On the Soul concerning the methodology o f the examination is as f o l l o w s :

"For our study o f the soul it is necessary, while ('ama') formulating the problems
o f w h i c h in our further advance we are to find the solutions, to call into council
the views o f those o f our predecessors w h o have declared any opinion on this
subject, i n order that we may p r o f i t by whatever is sound i n their suggestions
and avoid their errors" (On the Soul 403b20-24, transl. J.A. Smith).

What is underlined i n this abstract, as i n the respecfive one o f the Metaphysics (995a24-
b4) that we cited previously, is equally the importance o f the critical examination o f
the past as w e l l as o f the aporiai that constitute groundwork o f the study o f the soul.
Furthermore, I w o u l d like to focus m y attention here on the use o f the adverb "ama""
( " w h i l e " , "simultaneously"). Aristotle states that the study and critique o f early views
regarding the soul is a process that takes place simultaneously w i t h the f o r m u l a t i o n
o f essential aporiai. The same position is i m p l i c i t l y maintained i n the text f r o m the
Metaphysics (995a24-27): the cores o f our primary aporiai, A r i s t o t l e argues, are the
various perceptions o f the predecessors. The fundamental aporiai w i t h i n a scope o f
knowledge, namely the d i f f i c u l t i e s that have to be spotted and solved i n order f o r
a new knowledge to emerge, arise literally through the awareness and the critical
review o f the conceptions o f the predecessors. Consequently, the dialogue w i t h the
philosophical past is a completely indispensable research process that is identical w i t h
the f o r m u l a t i o n o f essential aporiai and w i t h the foundation o f a field o f knowledge.
We realize then that, even when Aristotle f o r once toys w i t h the role o f the historian
o f philosophy (or, i f y o u like, when he contrives this role), his main concern remains
the critical dialogue w i t h the philosophical systems o f the past.
Aristotle's greatest philosophical discovery is probably the explicit realization
that the first principles o f a science (its axioms, its laws, we w o u l d describe them
today) are not c o n f i r m e d w i t h i n the science itself. I n order f o r the process o f the
scientific p r o o f to start, i n order f o r the productive structure o f the science to get
established, the first principles have to be already there. H o w do we reach the first
principles then, since we cannot use any proof? Aristotle's answer is, as it is w e l l
k n o w n , " i n d u c t i o n " . Exactly how Aristotelian induction functions is not yet entirely
clear. The generalization that is based on empirical observations (that is our current
understanding o f induction) is a process that is accepted by Aristotle but has a limited
s c o p e . I n the Topics we find a more complete approach:

" [ D i a l e c t i c ] has a further use i n relation to the principles used i n the several
sciences. For i t is impossible to discuss them at all f r o m the principles proper
to the particular science i n hand, seeing that the principles are p r i m i t i v e i n
relation to everything else; it is through reputable opinions about them that
these have to be discussed, and this task belongs properly, or most appropriately,
Aristotle as the First Historian of Philosophy 58

to dialectic; f o r dialectic is a process o f criticism wherein lies the path to the

principles o f all inquiries" (Topics 101a36-b4, transl. Pickard-Cambridge).

Aristotelian dialectic is a method that enables us to formulate syllogisms conceming

every problem on the basis o f endoxa It does not aim at the t m t h but at the confirmation
or rejection o f a position that is widespread or probable. However, dialectical exchange
i n Aristotle, as J. B m n s c h w i g has aptly pointed out, is not a free discussion but rather
a f o r m o f agon, or contest w i t h clear, predetermined r u l e s . I t presupposes o n l y
t w o interlocutors, w h i c h are n o r m a l l y equivalent to each other, w h o contend w i t h a
dialectical problem, namely w i t h a statement that is uttered as a disjunction or dilemma
and is mostly replied w i t h a definitive yes or no. The solution to the p r o b l e m should
be neither confused nor obvious. The interlocutors bear distinct and not alternate
roles: the one always questions and the other always answers, w h i l e questions and
answers f o l l o w certain specifications. We should imagine that the dialectical game
takes place before an audience that approves o f it, has a referee probably and has a
final winner and a l o s e r . N e e d l e s s to say that, this description brings to m i n d the
dramatized conditions ofdialegesthaf o f the Platonic works.
What exactly does dialectic offer to the conception o f the first principles o f science?
A c c o r d i n g to A r i s t o t l e it can o f f e r t w o services. I t is an inspective method, namely it
can examine the endurance o f philosophical propositions under inspection. I t is also
an inventive method: it orients us towards the right principles.'^
A s far as the inspective dimension o f dialectic is concerned, suffice it to say that
the celebrated Aristotelian aporiai, f r o m w h i c h his o w n research invariably starts,
are literally dialectical problems, namely disjunctive statements w h i c h Aristotle sets
under inspection. Dialectic provides the philosopher w i t h the opportunity to formulate
v a l i d aporias^^ and to f o l l o w both controversial processes o f a dilemma being based
upon endoxa. The philosopher judges according to endoxa by means o f his dialectical
ability the consequences o f accepting or rejecting a principle.^'

' W e must, as i n a l l other cases, set the phenomena b e f o r e us and, a f t e r

discussing the d i f f i c u l t i e s , go on to prove, i f possible, the t r u t h o f a l l the
reputable opinions about these affections or, f a i l i n g this, o f the greater number
and the most authoritative; f o r i f we both resolve the d i f f i c u l t i e s and leave the
reputable opinions undisturbed, we shall have proved the case s u f f i c i e n t l y "
{Nicomachean Ethics 1145b2-7, transl. Ross).^^

W h e n the philosopher is convinced that a principle is right, he w o u l d attempt to raise

the objections against i t . I f he attains to refute a l l dialectical objections, he w i l l have
o f f e r e d an i m p l i c i t p r o o f I t is i n this w a y that Aristotle approaches the principle o f
non-contradiction i n book F o f the Metaphysics, where he states that those w h o seek
a strict p r o o f o f this principle are illiterate, f o r they ignore that there are no proofs
Vasiiis Kaifas 59

f o r everything, but he accepts the potentiality o f an "negative or inspective p r o o f ,

under the condition o f course that the one w h o doubts this principle w o u l d dare to
formulate his objection i n a positive way.^^
The inventive dimension o f dialectic is equally important. We saw previously
a g o o d example o f a p p l i c a t i o n o f the d i a l e c t i c a l m e t h o d , w h e n we r e f e r r e d to
the w a y according to w h i c h A r i s t o t l e reaches the first principles o f philosophy i n
his introduction to the Metaphysics. Let me paraphrase his reasoning. I n order to
trace w h i c h principles philosophy is the knowledge o f , we have to examine first
common conceptions, the endoxa, concerning the philosopher. We believe then that
the philosopher is the one w h o knows everything, the one w h o knows the d i f f i c u l t
things, the one w h o knows the more exact matters, the one w h o is able to teach, the
one w h o cultivates the sole free knowledge, the one w h o gives but never receives
orders. W h a t can we extract then f r o m these convictions? F r o m the endoxon that
e.g. philosophy is free knowledge, Aristotle infers that philosophy is the knowledge
o f the first principles and causes. H o w can this be done? B y means o f the f o l l o w i n g
complex dialectical syllogism:

( M a j o r premise, endoxon) Philosophy is free knowledge.

( M i n o r premises) 1. Free knowledge is the knowledge that does not depend
on any other earlier knowledge. 2. Knowledge that does not depend on any
other knowledge is the knowledge o f the things that do not depend on other
things. 3. Things that do not depend on other things are the first principles
and causes.
(Conclusion) Philosophy is the knowledge o f the first principles and causes.

Starting f r o m the endoxon "philosophy is the sole free knowledge", by means o f a

dialectical syllogism we approached the pursued definition o f philosophy. It is w o r t h
noting, however, how the specific endoxon derived. I n other words, where did Aristotle
find this c o n v i c t i o n and w h y d i d he consider that it is plausible and widespread?
The question is not even set w i t h i n the Aristotelian text. However, the reader w h o
is f a m i l i a r w i t h the Platonic tradition is w e l l aware that this position is f o u n d i n the
Republic and i n Theaetetus as well.^'' It is certainly obvious that many contemporaries
w i t h A r i s t o t l e w o u l d not accept this c o n v i c t i o n o f Plato. For example, Isocrates
w o u l d have been w i l l i n g to moderate the autonomy o f philosophy by displaying its
dependence on political effectiveness. Consequently, when Aristotle refers to induction
or to access to the first principles starting f r o m endoxa, he has i n m i n d an ineffable
selection process o f the appropriate endoxa through the rich supply that the earlier
philosophy offers h i m . I n this he is facilitated by the particularly vague definition o f
endoxa, w h i c h are designated as "those a l l or most or the wise believe i n , and o f the
wise either all or most or the most w e l l k n o w n and famous".^^ We n o w realize w h y
there is no Aristotelian text w i t h o u t an extensive reference to and critique o f earlier
Aristotle as the First Historian of Philosophy 60

philosophers. The principle o f research i n every field o f knowledge is the controversy

w i t h the theories o f the predecessors. Controversy shall o f f e r the appropriate endoxa,
the only starting point we have i n our disposal i n order to have access to the first
principles. Aristotle is the first philosopher that perceives philosophy as a f o r m o f
dialogue w i t h the earlier thinkers. Where Plato contended w i t h d i f f e r e n t ways o f
l i v i n g , Aristotle contends w i t h d i f f e r e n t philosophical conceptions.
The "agon'\ certainly, as a fundamental way o f expressing truth is c o m m o n to
the teacher and the p u p i l , as it is also the same, I guess, throughout the whole ancient
Greek conception o f reality. Aristotle appears to be f u l l y aware o f the "agonistic''
character o f philosophical knowledge, as it is made explicit i n an important passage
i n On the Heavens'.

"This is a habit w h i c h we a l l share, o f relating an inquiry not to the subject-

matter itself, but to our opponent i n argument. A m a n w i l l even pursue a
question i n his o w n m i n d no farther than the point at w h i c h he finds nothing
to say against his o w n arguments. Therefore to be a good investigator a man
must be alive to the objection inherent i n the genus o f his subject, an awareness
w h i c h is the result o f h a v i n g studied a l l its d i f f e r e n t i a e " (On the Heavens
294b6-13, transl. Guthrie).^^

However, i n order to struggle against a different conception, someone has to translate

it first i n his o w n philosophical i d i o m . I n the forensic or political field a dialectical
"zetemd" can comprise a m b i g u i t i e s w i t h o u t the outcome o f the struggle b e i n g
suspended. The judge finally reaches a verdict and "Demos" decides. Yet, w i t h i n
the philosophical field the adverse parties cannot speak a different language. What
Aristotle then does is to "co-articulate" the philosophical concerns o f the predecessors,
revealing "what some Presocratic philosopher wanted to say" and not what he really
said. Aristotelian texts o f f e r numerous examples where the conception o f an earlier
philosopher is modernized i n order to accept A r i s t o t l e ' s assault subsequently. I n
this way he h i m s e l f acquires a w o r t h y dialectical opponent and philosophy crucial
philosophical "problems".
The history o f philosophy is consequently indispensable as a reservoir o f endoxa.
These endoxa, being appropriately r e f o r m u l a t e d , shall be incorporated w i t h i n a
p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m . For that reason, there is no p o i n t f o r the philosopher to
f u n c t i o n as being a historian, reproducing what exactly a predecessor said, but there
is great significance i n exposing "not the thing that has happened, but a k i n d o f thing
that m i g h t happen, i.e. what is possible as being probable or necessary", namely i n
reconstructing what he should have said. Therefore, as Aristotle taught us, f o l l o w -
ing his teacher, "poetry is something more philosophical and o f graver import than
history, since its statements are o f the nature rather o f universals".^^
Vasiiis Kaifas 61

Notes

' Phaedrus 248b, 275a onw.

^ See D ü r i n g , \., Aristoteles, Greek transl., v o l I , Athens 1991, p. 5 1 .
^ On the Heavens 270b5-15.
^ On the Heavens 2 7 0 b 19 ( t r a n s l . G u t h r i e ) . T h e same t h o u g h t is also f o r m u l a t e d i n
Meteorology 339b27, i n Metaphysics 1074b 10 and i n Politics 1329b25 and therefore should
be considered in its literal sense.
^ See Jaeger, W., Aristoteles, E n g l i s h t r a n s i , O x f o r d 1948, p. 69.

^ To be precise, speaking as a Platonist critic - besides, it is very w e l l k n o w n that w h e n

he proceeds to a critique o f Ideas in the 9^'' chapter he still speaks o f the Platonists i n the first
p l u r a l . Regarding Plato's exceptional position w i t h i n A r i s t o t l e ' s historical reconstruction plan
see Frede, M . , " A r i s t o t l e ' s A c c o u n t o f the O r i g i n s o f P h i l o s o p h y " , Rhizai 1 (2004), p. 9-44.

^ Cherniss, H . , Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy, B a l t i m o r e 1935, and

Chemiss, H . , Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy, B a l t i m o r e 1944. For a critique
o f Cherniss' extremely negative attitude see Guthrie, W . K . C , " A r i s t o t l e as H i s t o r i a n " , Jowr^a/
of Hellenic Studies 11 ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 3 5 - 4 1 . See also M a n s i o n , S., " L e role de 1' expose et de la c r i -
tique des philosophes anterieures chez A r i s t o t e " , i n the collective w o r k Aristote et les pro-
blemes de methode, L o u v a i n 1961. For a summary o f the relevant controversy see Collobert,
C , " A r i s t o t l e ' s R e v i e w o f the Presocratics: Is A r i s t o t l e F i n a l l y a Historian o f Philosophy?",
Journal of History of Philosophy 40 (2002), p. 281-95.

^ Cherniss, H . , Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy, p. 347.

^ Aubenque, P., Le probleme de I'etre chez Aristote, Paris 1962, p. 88. T h i s means that in
book A o f the Metaphysics Aristotle adopts in an indirect w a y the idea o f progress in philosophy,
since the idea o f progress is comprised i n p r i n c i p l e w i t h i n the teleological w o r l d - i m a g e . See
C o l l o b e r t , op. cit., p. 283.
'° A l e x a n d e r o f A p h r o d i s i a s , Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria, ed. M . H a y d u c k ,
B e r l i n 1891, p. 27.26.
" He w o u l d c l a i m the same t h i n g i n On the Heavens c o n c e m i n g certain c o s m o l o g i c a l
v i e w s d e r i v i n g f r o m the A t o m i s t s and Plato.
A u b e n q u e , ibid, p. 8 1 .
S i m i l a r v i e w s are repeatedly f o r m u l a t e d i n A o f the Metaphysics. See 9 8 6 b 6 on the
Pythagoreans; 988b 14 on their f a i l u r e to conceive the final cause. See also Metaphysics B
1002b27-28, On the Heavens 301a9, Physics 188a6.
'"^ Aubenque, ibid., p. 79.
See O w e n , G . E . L . , "Tithenai ta phainomena", p. 83-103 i n M a n s i o n , S. (ed.), Aristote
et les problemes de methode, Louvain 1961.
Topics 100a 18-20.
B r u n s c h w i g , J., " I n t r o d u c t i o n " , Aristote, Topiques, v o l . I , Paris 1967, p. x x i i i .
Ibid., p. x x i i onw. See also M o r a u x , P., " L a j o u t e dialectique d ' apres le h u i t i e m e l i -
vre des Topiques", p. 277-31 i n G. E. L . O w e n (ed.), Aristotle on Dialectic, The Topics, Ox-
f o r d 1968.
See B o l t o n , R., " A r i s t o t l e ' s C o n c e p t i o n o f M e t a p h y s i c s as a Science", p. 321-61 i n
Aristotle as the First Historian of Philosophy 62

Scaltsas, T., Charles, D., and Gill, M . L., (eds.), Unity, Identity and Explanation in Aristotle s
Metaphysics, Oxford 1994.
Topics 104a8.
Ibid 101a34-36.
See On the Heavens 279b4-l 1. For a discussion of Aristotelian aporia and its significance
see Aubenque, P., "Sur la notion aristotelicienne d' aporie", p. 3-19, m Aristote et les problemes
de methode, 2"^^ edition, Louvain 1980.
Metaphysics 1006al2-13. For Reeve (Reeve, C. D. C , Substantial Knowledge. Aristotle s
Metaphysics, Indianapolis 2000, p. 25-26) the philosopher, "as a generally educated person",
makes use of the "aporematic method", especially of the one named peirastiki, that allows
him to control, even in aspects that cannot be fully controlled in scientific terms, whether the
claims of the supposed adepts are right or wrong (see Nicomachean Ethics 1094b23, Parts
of Animals 639a4).
Republic A99di, 536e, Theaetetus 172d.
2^ Topics 100b21-23.
Despite the critique I have exerted on Chemiss' negative attitude towards Aristotle, I
cannot but subscribe to his inferences conceming the expediency of the Aristotelian "aporetic"
method: "This 'aporetic' method is liable to all the disabilities and dangers which Aristotle
himself sagaciously indicates as consequences of the tendency to debate rather than investigate;
but it is this tendency itself more than any theory of the unity of human thought that impelled
him to adopt the 'aporetic' method in his lectures. Aristotle had behind him the tradition of
Plato's dialogues and his own early writings and deep within him the Greek predilection for
the agon" {ibid, p. 349).
^'^ Poetics 1451a36-b7 (transl. Bywater).

' Translated by Anastasia Marinopoulou.