Analysis
Receding Power of Turkey’s Military: A Leap
Summary: The Turkish military,
which has long been seen as the
sole defender of the pro-secular
Turkish elite lifestyle, has been los-
ing power since the Islam-friendly
Justice and Development Party
(AKP) shot to single rule in 2002.
Under a series of reforms aimed at
winning European Union member-
ship, the AKP has sought to trim
the generals’ powers. However, the
AKP’s campaign to whittle down the
army’s influence may have less to
do with democratic or Islamist zeal,
and more with a desire to cement
its control. As the army loses ground
and a string of abortive coup plots
has further eroded its image, it is
once again the pro-secular main op-
position Republican Party (CHP) that
is riding to the rescue. However, the
CHP’s fierce opposition to pro-EU
reforms, and an inability to maintain
influence (or presence) in parlia-
ment, is leaving Turkey with few
viable options for reformation.
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for Democracy or Another Power Struggle?
by Amberin Zaman*
July 15, 2009
On July 11, as Idil Biret, one of Turkey’s
foremost pianists, began performing at
the Aya Irini concert hall in the Topkapi
palace complex, a group of demon-
strators clashed with police outside as
they tried to disrupt the event. They
chanted pro-Islamic slogans, shred-
ded Biret’s posters, and then prayed en
masse. Their fury was centered on news
that the spectators would be consum-
ing alcohol within close proximity of
the Prophet Mohammed’s holy relics
on display at the Topkapi museum.
Besides, how could anyone be steeped
in wine and music while the Chinese
in Eastern Turkistan were slaughtering
Muslim Uighur Turks? The demonstra-
tors demanded to know. The incident
has sharpened fears among Turkey’s
pro-secular elite that their freewheeling
lifestyles are at greater risk than ever
before because the army, which they
long viewed as the sole custodian of
Ataturk’s secular order, is weaker than it
has ever been.
Without question, the army’s influence
has been steadily waning ever since the
Islam-friendly Justice and Development
Party (AKP) shot to single rule in 2002.
Under a series of reforms aimed at
winning European Union membership,
the AKP has sought to trim the gener-
*
Amberin Zaman is the Turkey correspondent for The Economist and writes a weekly column for the Turkish daily Taraf. The views
expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the German Marshall Fund of the United
States (GMF).
als’ powers on paper at least. The single
biggest reduction in their political
weight came when the AKP relegated
the National Security Council, through
which the army would dictate domestic
and foreign policy, to an advisory role
and decreed that henceforth its secre-
tary general would be a civilian not a
general.
On June 26th, the military suffered an
even bigger blow when the AKP-domi-
nated parliament, in a post-midnight
session, rushed through legislation that
bars military courts from prosecuting
civilians, and allows civilian courts to
prosecute officers who commit crimes
within their jurisdiction. The measure
was adopted after another alleged coup
attempt was leaked to the press and the
law was approved soon after by Abdul-
lah Gul, the Turkish president, despite
considerable pressure from the gener-
als for him to strike it down. In a sop
to the generals, Gül did add a footnote
to his signature calling for the law to
be refined in ways that would address
their concerns. But this has not stopped
Gül’s detractors from accusing him of
leaning in favor of the government.
Analysis
Even so, the law has been widely hailed as a big leap for Turk-
ish democracy that will put an end to coups and bring the
meddlesome military under greater civilian control. But it
has left the secular elite feeling even more defenseless and has
reinforced their suspicions that the AKP’s “real agenda” is to
defang the army so it can impose religious rule.
More likely, the AKP’s campaign to whittle down the army’s
influence has less to do with democratic or Islamist zeal
than with a desire to cement its control. Otherwise put, the
constitutional amendment marks the latest stage in the AKP’s
ongoing power struggle against the generals. Their differences
have been more broadly framed as a tug of war between the
old elites and an encroaching class of pious Anatolian entre-
preneurs who have prospered under the AKP. Either way the
army is losing ground; a string of abortive coup plots and its
bungled campaign to block Gül’s ascent to the presidency
has further eroded the army’s image, and it is once again the
pro-secular main opposition Republican Party (CHP) that is
riding to the rescue. CHP leader Deniz Baykal has vowed to
appeal to the Constitutional Court to get the law overturned,
and herein lays the problem.
One of the biggest failings of Turkish democracy is that its
secular opposition has opted to become the fiercest opponent
of pro-EU reforms, rather than spearhead them. This has led
to accusations that the CHP is nothing more than a stalking
horse for the generals whose sole aim is to perpetuate their
dominance over politics. The CHP’s dogged resistance to
change has sapped its popularity. The party has not won a
single election for more than half a century. In 1999, the CHP
failed to get into the parliament altogether. Yet Deniz Baykal,
who has led the party for over two decades, is firmly glued to
his seat. This is thanks to internal party regulations that allow
the party leaders to appoint delegates who in turn vote them
back into power. (This is the case for virtually all-political
parties in Turkey, with perhaps the exception of the pro-
Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) whose leaders are
vetted by the outlawed Kurdish rebel group, PKK).
The CHP’s opposition to the law allowing army officers to
be tried in civilian courts looks doubly bad because it comes
amid revelations of an alleged plan by the army to discredit
the AKP. A copy of “The Plan to Combat Islamic Funda-
mentalism” was published on June 12 by Taraf, a liberal daily
newspaper, touching off a political storm that culminated
2
“The AKP’s campaign to whittle
down the army’s influence has less
to do with democratic or Islamist
zeal than with a desire to cement its
control. Otherwise put, the constitu-
tional amendment marks the latest
stage in the AKP’s ongoing power
struggle against the generals.”
in the parliament’s adoption of the law, clearing the way for
prosecution of the plan’s alleged perpetrators.
Signed by Dursun Cicek, a navy colonel serving in the army’s
psychological warfare unit, the plan calls for “mobilizing
agents” within the AKP to discredit the party and foment
internal divisions. More controversially, it speaks of planting
guns and explosives in the homes of members of Turkey’s
most influential Islamic brotherhood, led by Fetullah Gülen.
The generals count the Gulenists among their most formida-
ble enemies. The Gulenists are widely thought to have heavily
penetrated the police force and, to a far lesser degree, the
army itself. Indeed, it is generally assumed that it is these Gu-
lenist elements that leaked the plan as well as other military
documents that exposed the army’s alleged incompetence
in staving off major PKK attacks along the Iraqi border in
November 2007 and October 2008.
The controversy swirling around the alleged plan took an
embarrassing turn when a civilian prosecutor called in Colo-
nel Cicek for questioning, and then ordered his arrest within
a day of being cleared by military investigators. The colonel,
whose name has been linked to an earlier plan to besmirch
non-governmental organizations (including TUSIAD, the
largest industrialists’ lobby), was freed soon after for lack of
evidence. Cicek denied all the allegations, but other retired
Analysis
generals who are being investigated over their alleged at-
tempts to unseat the AKP could end up in jail. On July 13th,
a group of lawyers in the mainly Kurdish city of Van, lodged
a formal complaint against General Yasar Buyukanit, the
former chief of general staff, over his alleged involvement in
extrajudicial activities during his term in the mainly Kurdish
southeast region.
General Ilker Basbug, Buyukanit’s successor, has repeatedly
asserted that he will not tolerate coup plotters within the
army’s ranks. Yet, the alacrity with which he dubbed the latest
plan a fake “piece of paper” (it was allegedly cooked up in
April), and his failure to suspend Colonel Cicek from his du-
ties during the army’s own investigation, has raised questions
about his sincerity. A further test will come in August when
the army holds its annual supreme council meeting where
promotions, expulsions, and other personnel related matters
(including the fate of Colonel Cicek) are decided.
Meanwhile, all eyes are turned to the Constitutional Court,
which is expected to deliver an opinion on the CHP’s petition
soon. Whichever way it rules, the genie is out of the bottle.
The army is no longer untouchable, at least in the national
debate. The onus is on the AKP now to prove that it is not
selective about reforms and to push through other changes
that do not necessarily chime with its outlook. The onus is
also on the CHP to find a way to unseat its moribund leader
and give the millions of Turks, who neither want Sharia nor
coups, a credible alternative to the AKP.
Amberin Zaman, Correspondent, The Economist
Amberin Zaman is the Turkey correspondent for The Economist and
writes a weekly column for the Turkish daily Taraf.
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