Caltex (Philippines), Inc. vs.

Enrico Palomar

18 SCRA 247 – Statutory Construction – Construction; defined – Noscitur A Sociis

In 1960, Caltex (Philippines), Inc. announced its “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest”. The mechanics of the
contest were as follows:

1. Participants must estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will
dispense during a specified period;

2. Contest is open to all car owners or licensed drivers;

3. Participants need not buy any Caltex products to be eligible. No fee is required.

4. Participants just need to fill out a form and drop their entries at the nearest Caltex station.

To publicize their contest, Caltex sought the assistance of the Philippine Postal Office. However, then
acting Postmaster Enrico Palomar denied the request of Caltex as Palomar deemed that the contest is a
violation of the Postal Law (Chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code [RAC]).

Palomar cited Section 1954 of the RAC:

SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. — No matter belonging to any of the following classes,
whether sealed as first-class matter or not, shall be imported into the Philippines through the mails, or
to be deposited in or carried by the mails of the Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any
officer or employee of the Bureau of Posts:

Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner pertaining to, or
conveying or purporting to convey any information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar
scheme depending in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise for
obtaining any money or property of any kind by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations,
or promises.

According to Palomar, the contest is a lottery hence, communications pertaining thereto cannot be
mailed by Caltex via Philippine Post.

Feeling aggrieved, Caltex brought the issue before the regular courts thru a petition for declaratory
relief. Caltex argued that their contest is not a lottery; that under prevailing jurisprudence, lottery
consists of the following elements:

a. consideration;

b. prize;

c. chance.
Caltex insists that their contest is not a lottery because the first element, consideration, is missing. Said
element is missing because participants are not required to pay anything – there’s no consideration on
the part of the participants.

Palomar assailed the petition as he argued that the same is not proper. He insisted that he was merely
applying the law and that there is no legal issue at all; that there is no need for the courts to call for a
construction on the statute in question. Palomar further argued that even if the said contest, assuming
arguendo, is not considered a lottery, the same is considered as a gift enterprise which is still prohibited
by the Postal Law to be mailed.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Caltex’s petition for declaratory relief is proper.

2. Whether or not the Caltex contest is a lottery/gift enterprise.

HELD:

1. Yes. The petition is proper. Construction of a law is in order if what is in issue is an inquiry into the
intended meaning of the words used in a certain law. As defined in Black’s Law Dictionary: Construction
is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law
with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst
others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.

2. No.

The contest is not a lottery. The contention of Caltex is well taken, i.e., the first element is lacking (no
consideration).
The contest is also not a gift enterprise. The Supreme Court went on to discuss that under prevailing
jurisprudence and legal doctrines as well as definitions provided by legal luminaries, there is no explicit
definition as to what a gift enterprise is. However, under the Postal Law, the term “gift enterprise” was
used in association with the term “lottery”. As such, the principle of noscitur a sociis, a principle in
statutory construction, is applicable. Under this principle, it is only logical that the term under a
construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the
word associated therewith. Hence, applying noscitur a sociis, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a
consideration, so also must the term “gift enterprise” be so construed. Therefore, since the contest does
not include a consideration, it is neither a lottery nor a gift enterprise. Caltex should be allowed to avail
of the Philippine postal service.

National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. Eisma

GR L-61236, 31 January 1984 (127 SCRA 419)En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 concur with comments,
1 took no part, 1 on leave
Facts:

On 5 March 1982, the National Federation of Labor filed with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment(Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City), a petition for direct certification as the sole
exclusivecollective bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees at the Lumbayao
manufacturing plantof the Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. (Zambowood). On 17 April 1982, such
employees charged the firmbefore the same office for underpayment of monthly living allowances. On 3
May 1982, the union issued anotice of strike against the firm, alleging illegal termination of Dionisio
Estioca, president of the said localunion; unfair labor practice; nonpayment of living allowances; and
“employment of oppressive alienmanagement personnel without proper permit. The strike began on 23
May 1982.On 9 July 1982, Zambowood filed a complaint with the trial court against the officers and
members of theunion, for “damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary
injunction and/orrestraining order.” The union filed a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of
the restrainingorder, and opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, contending
that the incidents of picketing are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas
Pambansa 227 (LaborCode, Article 217) and not to the Court of First Instance. The motion was denied.
Hence, the petition forcertiorari.

Issue:

Whether construction of the law is required to determine jurisdiction.

Held:

The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation comeonly
after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them.Jurisdiction
over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority whichorganizes
the court; and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred bylaw in
words that do not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is
derivedexclusively from the statutes of the forum, the issue should be resolved on the basis of the law
or statutein force. Therefore, since (1) the original wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiters with
jurisdiction;since (2) Presidential Decree 1691 reverted the jurisdiction with respect to money claims of
workers orclaims for damages arising from employer-employee relations to the labor arbiters after
PresidentialDecree 1367 transferred such jurisdiction to the ordinary courts, and since (3) Batas
Pambansa 130 madeno change with respect to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters
with respect to moneyclaims of workers or claims for damages arising from employer-employee
relations; Article 217 is to beapplied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor
arbiter is therein provided forexplicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court of first instance judge
then, a regional trial court judgenow, certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority conferred on him
by law when he entertained thesuit for damages, arising from picketing that accompanied a strike. The
Supreme Court, thus, granted the writ of certiorari, and nullified and set aside the 20 July 1982
orderissued by the court a quo. It granted the writ of prohibition, and enjoined the Judge of said court,
orwhoever acts in his behalf in the RTC to which this case is assigned, from taking any further action on
thecivil case (Civil Case 716 [2751]), except for the purpose of dismissing it. It also made permanent
therestraining order issued on 5 August 1982.