CASE #75: LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION: RE: JURISDICTION OF THE Court of Appeals ruled that the denial by the
that the denial by the SEC of the application for a writ of
INTESTATE COURT TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANO MALOTO vs.
MALOTO [G.R. No. L-32328. September 30, 1977.]
FACTS: When Adriana Maloto died in her residence in Iloilo City, her niece and
nephews Aldina, Constancio, Panfilo and Felino commenced an intestate
proceeding (Special Proceeding 1736) under the belief that she died without any
wiil. In the course of that proceeding, they executed an extrajudicial partition of
the estate with one-fourth (¼) share for each. The court approved the said
partition. Three years after the approval of the extrajudicial partition, a document
appeared purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana Maloto. In that
will, all the niece and nephew mentioned are constituted as heirs but with Aldina
and Constancio allegedly have bigger, different and more valuable that what they
obtained in the extrajudicial partition. There were also dispositions to certain
devisees and/or legatees and among who are Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic
Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor. Aldina and Constancio filed in the
previous intestate proceeding (SP 1736) motions for reconsideration, annulment
of proceedings and for the allowance of the last will and testament of Adriana
Maloto. In that same case, the Asilo de Molo, Roman Catholic Church of Molo and
Purificacion also filed petition for allowance of the will. Panfilo and Felino
opposed. The CFI of Iloilo (SP 1736) denied the motion to reopen the proceedings
on the ground that the said motion was filed out of time. MR was denied and
petitioners appealed. It was denied on the ground that it was filed late. The
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court.
The Court dismissed the petition and stated that the more appropriate remedy is
for them to initiate a separate proceeding for the probate of the will in question.
Acting in a motion for reconsideration and clarification, the Court resolved that
the matters in question did not constitute res adjudicataand may be raised in the
proceedings for probate. Herein petitioners then commenced the Special
Proceeding 2176 for the probate of the alleged last will and testament of Adriana
Maloto, but the previous intestate court (SP 1736) disallowed probate the will
with the finding that the will sought to be probated had been destroyed and
revoked by the testatrix.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Intestate Court properly issued the denial of the
petition for probate.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that it is not proper to make a finding in an
intestate estate proceeding that the discovered will has been revoked. As a
matter of fact, the intestate court stated in the order issued that the movants
should have filed a separate action for the probate of the will. The SC also stated
in another resolution that the more appropriate remedy of the petitioners in the
premises stated in the petition is for petitioners to initiate a separate proceeding
for the probate of the alleged will in question. The previous order of the intestate
court will not constitute as a bar to the present petition for probate of the alleged
will of Adriana Maloto. The dismissal of the petition for probate was set aside and
the lower court was directed to proceed with the hearing as a probate court on
the merits.
CASE #76: LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION; RE: JURISDICTION OF THE RTC AS A
PROBATE OR INESTATE COURT AND QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP ORTAÑEZ-
ENDERES vs. CA [G.R. No. 128525. December 17, 1999.]
FACTS: The deceased Dr. Juvencio Ortañez founded the Philinterlife and at the
time of his death in 1980, he owned 51% of the capital stock of the said company.
Upon his death, the special proceeding for the settlement of the intestate estate
commenced at the RTC of Quezon City. After the death of the decedent and
without the prior authorization of the intestate court, onehalf (1/2) of the shares
of stock in Philinterlife of the decedent were transferred to herein private
respondents. The petitioners filed a complaint with the SEC for the annulment of
the transfers of such shares of stock and prayed to preliminary injunction and TRO
against the private respondent to enjoin them from exercising their rights as
stockholders of Philinterlife on the ground that their shares of stock were
acquired through illegal and fraudulent schemes. On the other hand, private
respondents stated that the subject matter of the complaint is not within the
jurisdiction of the SEC but with the RTC. It was also averred that petitioners Ligaya
Novicio and children represented themselves to be the common law wife and
illegitimate children of the late Dr. Ortañez. The surviving spouse, Juliana Ortañez,
on her behalf and her minor son Antonio, executed a MOA with her other sons
Rafael and Jose, diving the state of the deceased composed of his ½ share in the
conjugal properties. In that MOA, Juliana and Rafael assigned their respective
shares of stock in Philinterlife to Jose. The private respondents contended that
they all became stockholders of the company when Jose sold his shares to them.
The SEC denied petitioner’s application for writ of preliminary injunction for
failure to make a valid case to entitle them to the relief applied for, and that the
pretended rights of the petitioners are still contentious, unsettled and of doubtful
character. The SEC En Banc ruled also that the matter properly belongs to the
jurisdiction of the regular court where the intestate proceedings are currently
pending. Petitioner cited in their reply the issuance of an Order by the intestate
court declaring that the shares of stock of Philinterlife belong to the estate. The
preliminary injunction was proper and valid
Issue: Whether or not petitioners can claim legal title over the shares of stocks in
Philinterlife for the issuance of an injunction on the basis of the Order issued by
the intestate court.
Held: No. The rule is well settled that the jurisdiction of the regional trial court as
a probate or intestate court relates only to matters having to do with the
settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not
extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings. The intestate court may pass upon the title to a certain property for
the purpose of determining whether the same should or should not be included in
the inventory but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to final
decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be constituted by
the parties. The court in charge of the intestate proceedings cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are
equally claimed to belong to outside parties. Therefore, the possibility of
irreparable damage without proof of violation of an actually existing right of
petitioners over the shareholdings presently in the possession of private
respondents is no ground for an injunction being a mere damnum absque injuria.
CASE #77: LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION; RE: RETIREMENT BENEFITS,
SALARY ADJUSTMENTS, AND UNUSED VACATION AND SICK LEAVES Heirs of the
Late Mario V. Changlionco Adm. Matter 190-RET., October 18, 1977
Facts: Atty. Mario V. Chanliongco died on July 12, 1976. He is entitled to
retirement benefits having served more than 38 years in the government. He is
also entitled to money value of terminal leave, life insurance and refund of
retirement premium. His heirs filed the claim for these benefits before the
Government Service Incentive System. Aside from his widow, Dra. Fidel
Chanliongco and son Mario II, other heirs filed the claim namely Angelina
Buenaventura and Mario, Jr, children both born out of wedlock to Angelina
Crespo. The life insurance proceeds and the refund of rent were already released
to the claimants, what is left is the retirement benefits and money value of leave.
Issue: How should the retirement benefits and money value of leave be
distributed among the heirs?
Held: Fidela B. Chanliongco, the widows, is entitled to ¼ of the retirement
gratuity which is P19,535.025. As her conjugal share in the leave, unpaid salary
and 10% adjustement, she is entitled to P6,725.72. As a legal heir she is entitled
to P1,688.18 for the leave, unpaid salary and 10% adjustment of Atty.
Chanliongco. Mario Chanliongco II, the legitimate son, is entitled to ½ share of the
returement gratuity which is P39,070.05. Hs share from money value of terminal
leave, unpaid salary and 10% adjustment is P3,376.36. Ma. Angelina
Buenaventura, the illegitimate daughter, is entitled to 1/8 share of returement
gratuity which is P9,767.51. She is also entitled to P844.10 as her share from
money value if terminal leave, unpaid salary and 10% adjustment of his father.
Her brother, Mario Jr. will receive a share equal to hers from the retirement
gratuity and share from money value of terminal leave, unpaid salary and 10%
adjustment.
CASE #78: LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION; RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION
BAGUNU v. PIEDAD G.R. No. 140975 December 8, 2000
FACTS: Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or ascendants. On
August 28, 1995, herein petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu, a collateral relative
within the fifth degree of Augusto (Ofelia is the daughter of Augusto’s first
cousin), moved to intervene in Special Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the
Matter of the Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H. Piedad," pending
before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 117, of Pasay City. Asserting
entitlement to a share of the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad, Ofelia assailed
the finality of the order of the trial court awarding the entire estate to respondent
Pastora Piedad contending that the proceedings were tainted with procedural
infirmities, including an incomplete publication of the notice of hearing, lack of
personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements of
allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of the estate. The trial court
denied the motion, prompting petitioner to raise her case to the Court of Appeals.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the appeal on the thesis that the issues
brought up on appeal only involved pure questions of law. Finding merit in that
argument, the appellate court dismissed the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ofelia, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, can
inherit alongside Pastora Piedad, a collateral relative of the third civil degree?
HELD: NO, Ofelia cannot inherit alongside Pastora from Augusto. The rule on
proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent
and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right
of representation can apply. Thus, Article 962 of the Civil Code provides: "ART.
962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant
ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place. "Relatives in
the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the provisions of article
1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and of article 987,
paragraph 2, concerning division between the paternal and maternal lines." By
right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by
operation of law, "raised to the same place and degree" of relationship as that of
a closer blood relative of the same decedent. The representative thereby steps
into the shoes of the person he represents and succeeds, not from the latter, but
from the person to whose estate the person represented would have succeeded.
In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending, never in
the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the right of representation may only take
place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such
children survive with their uncles or aunts. The right of representation does not
apply to "other collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which group
both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of preference
following, firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the
legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and
descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and
sisters/nephews and nieces, of the decedent. Among collateral relatives, except
only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with their
uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962, aforequoted, of
the Code, is an absolute rule. Respondent Pastora, being a relative within the
third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes petitioner Ofelia, a
relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding ab intestato to the estate of the
decedent. PETITION WAS DENIED.
CASE #79: LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION; REPRESENTATION IN COLLATERAL
LINES Salao, et al. v. Salao GR No.L-26699, March 16, 1976
FACTS: Spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio had four children namely
Patricio, Alejandra, Juan and Ambrosia. Manuel Salao died in 1885. Patricio, the
eldest son, died in 1186 and was survived by his only son, Valentin. Valentina died
in 1914 and her estate was administered by her daughter Ambrosia. The estate
was partitioned extrajudicially. The deed was signed by Valentina’s four legal
heirs, her children Alejandra, Juan and Ambrosia and her grandson Valentin, in
representation of his deceased father Patricio. One of the properties is the
Calunuran fishpond. Evidence show that before the death of Valentina, her
children Juan and Ambrosia were engaged in the fishpond business. Using the
capital from their late father’s estate and their own earnings, they were able to
buy the Calunuran fishpond and were able to secure a Torrens title for the
Calunuran fishpond. Juan Salao Sr. died in 1931 and Valentin died in 1933. The
intestate estate of Valentin Salao was partitioned extrajudicially between his two
daughters Benita Salao-Marcelo and VictorinaSalao-Alcuriza. His estate consisted
of the two fishponds he inherited from his grandmother Valentina.
About a year before her death, Ambrosia donated her one-half proindiviso share
in the two fishponds in question to her nephew, Juan Salao, Jr. Juan Salao, Jr.,
already owns the other half having inherited it from his father Juan Salao Sr. After
Ambrosia’s death, Benita Salao filed an action for the reconveyance of the
Canluran fishpond which was allegedly held in trust and which had become the
sole property of Juan Salao, Jr. Benita Salao informed Juan Jr. that she owns one-
third share in the two fishponds and Huan Jr. should deliver it to her. Juan Jr.
refused saying that Benita’s father, Valentin, does not have interest over the two
ponds as this was owned only by his father Juan Sr. and his aunt Ambrosia. Beniat
filed a complaint for annulment of donation to Juan Jr. and for the reconveyance
to them of the Calunuranfishponda before the CFI of Bataan. During the trial, Juan
Jr. died and he was substituted by his widow, Mercedes Pascual and his six
children. In the intestate proceedings for the settlement of Juan Jr.’s estate, the
two fishponds in question were adjudicated to his seven legal heirs in equal
shares with the condition that the properties will remain under administration
during the pendency of the action for reconveyance. The trial court found that
there was no community of property among Juan Sr., Ambrosia and Valentin over
the two fishponds. The court rationalized that the omission of Valentin during his
lifetime to assail the Torren titles of Juan and Ambrosia signified that he was not a
co-owner of the fishponds. It also held that the donation was validly executed and
even if it were void, Juan Jr. would nevertheless be the sole heir of his aunt
Ambrosia. Benita appealed since her action for reconveyance was dismissed.
Mercedes also appealed since their counterclaim for damages was also dismissed.
Both appeals were filed before the Court of Appeals. However, since the amounts
involved exceeded two hundred thousand pesos, the case was elevated to the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Benita Salao have successional rights to Ambrosia’s share.
Held: No, even if the donation made by Ambrosia in favor of her nephew, Juan Jr.,
were declared void, the plaintiffs would not have any successional rights to
Ambrosia's share. The sole legal heir of Ambrosia was her nephew, Juan, Jr., her
nearest relative within the third degree. Valentin Salao, if living in 1945 when
Ambrosia died, would have been also her legal heir, together with his first cousin,
Juan, Jr. (Juani). Benita Salao, the daughter of Valentin, could not represent him in
the succession to the estate of Ambrosia since in the collateral line,
representation takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters
whether they be of the full or half blood is (Art 972, Civil Code). The nephew
excludes a grandniece like Benita Salao or greatgandnephews like the plaintiffs
Alcuriza.
CASE #80: LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION; PRESENCE OF ADPOTED CHILDREN
SAGUINSIN v. LINDAYAG G.R. No. L-17759 December 17, 1962
FACTS: On November 10, 1959 Maria V. Lindayag died intestate in Olongapo,
Zambales. On May 27, 1960 her sister, Isabel V. Saguinsin filed a verified petition
for the issuance in her favor of letters of administration over the estate of said
deceased, alleging, among other things, that the latter left real and personal
properties situated in the Provinces of Zambales and Bulacan worth
approximately P100,000.00; that the names, ages and residences of her surviving
heirs were: (1) Dionisio Lindayag, 60 years of age, surviving husband, residing at
Olongapo, Zambales, (2) Isabel V. Saguinsin 54 years of age, sister of the
deceased, residing at Hagonoy, Bulacan (3) Aurea V. Sacdalan, 46 years of age,
sister of the deceased, and (4) Ines V. Calayag, 70 years of age, sister of the
deceased, both residing at Paombong, Bulacan; and that, as far as petitioner
knew, the decedent left no debts at the time of her death. On June 21, 1960
Dionisio V. Lindayag, the surviving spouse, in his behalf and in representation of
the minors Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag, filed a
motion to dismiss the petition on the ground lack of interest in the estate, she
being neither heir nor a creditor thereof. The motion alleged that the late Maria
V. Lindayag was survived by her husband — the movant — and their legally
adopted minor children named Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all surnamed
Lindayag the decedent having left no legitimate natural or illegitimate child. The
trial court ruled in favor of Lindayag. Saguinsin moved for reconsideration but the
same was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not Isabel V. Saguinsin, sister of the decedent, is an
“interested person” in the estate of deceased Maria V. Lindayag?
HELD: NO, petitioner Isabel V. Saguinsin is not an heir of her deceased sister and,
therefore, has no material and direct interest in her estate. An interested party
has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or
one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Petitioner's interest in
the estate of the deceased Maria V. Lindayag was disputed, through a motion to
dismiss her petition, by the surviving spouse on the ground that said deceased
was survived by him and by three legally adopted children — thus excluding
petitioner as an heir. In the course of the hearing held in connection with said
motion, evidence was introduced in support thereof which, according to the
lower court, established that said deceased was survived not only by her husband
but by three legally adopted children named Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all
surnamed Lindayag. Petitioner's view that when a motion to dismiss a complaint
or a petition is filed, only the facts alleged in the complaint or petition may be
taken into account is not entirely correct. To the contrary, the rule is that at said
hearing said motion may be proved or disproved in accordance with the rules of
evidence, and it has been held that for that purpose, the hearing should be
conducted as an ordinary hearing; and that the parties should be allowed to
present evidence, except when the motion is based on the failure of the
complaint or of the petition to state a cause of action (Asejo vs. Leonoso, 44 O. G.
No. 10, 3832). In the present case, the motion to dismiss the petition was
grounded on petitioner's lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings which,
as already stated heretofore, was fully substantiated by the evidence presented
during the hearing. Order appealed from is affirmed.
CASE #81: LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION; REVERSION ADOPTIVE BANAWA
V.S. MIRANO (SANTOS, J.)
Banawa v. Mirano
No. L-24750
May 16, 1980
Facts:
Banawa and Mendoza took their niece Maria Mariano to Mahabang Ludlod, Taa,
Batangas. The spouses reared the child because they were childless. Through a
general merchandise, they were able to generate income to acquire parcel of
lands.
Due to an illness, Mariano was survived by her sister Primitiva and the three
children of his brother Martin.

Two parcels of land are in dispute in this case: a parcel of land in Barrio Iba in Taal
Batangas (Iba property) and a parcel of sugar land in Carsuche (Carsuche
property). The petitioners assert that the Iba property were sold to Maria
Mariano. Defendant, on the other hand, claimed that the money used in buying
said land pertained to the spouses.
The Carsuche property brought a conflict of evidence between petitioners and
respondent. Petitioners assert that the sale of the property was made in a public
instrument in favor of Maria Mariano. The defendants for their part assert that it
was made in writing by Biscocho who is the original owner of the property.
The CFI declared Maria Mariano the owner of the two parcels of land. Defendants
appeal to the CA but it affirmed the decision of the trial court. Their motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied which led to this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Maria Mariano is entitled to both Iba and Carsuche property
Held:
If the money used by Mariano in purchasing the property was given by Banawa
and Mendoza, then the money had to belong to her. The contract entered into by
the vendor with Mariano is not a simulated contract because of the absence of
fraud, concealment or deception. The intention of the spouses to make Maria
Mariano the owner of the parcel of land was clearly shown by their conduct at the
time of the execution of the deed of sale.
Art. 1448 of the NCC is not applicable in this case because the deed of sale was
executed before its effectivity. Acquisitive prescription may not likewise be
invoked because petitioners were not able to secure a title.
Sec. 5 of Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court provides that "in case of death of the
child, his parents and relatives by nature, and not by adoption, shall be his legal
heirs, except as to property received or inherited by the adopted child from either
of his parents by adoption, which shall become property of the latter or their
legitime relatives who shall participate in the order established by the Civil Code
for intestate estates"
When the language of the law is clear and unequivocal, the law must be taken to
mean exactly what it says.
Wherefore, the decision of the CA is affirmed as to the Iba property but reversed
as to the Carsuche property which was acquired by Banawa and Mendoza.
CASE #82: LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION; RE: IRON CURTAIN RULE DIAZ V.S.
IAC (SANTOS, J.)
Facts:
Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together
with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses
Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out
of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy;
that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the
mother of Pablo Santero; that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his
parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; that Pascual Santero
died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; that Pablo
Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and
his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and
two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.
Issue: who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero — her niece
Felisa Pamuti-Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)?
Ruling:
Petitioners claim that the amendment of Articles 941 and 943 of the old Civil
Code (Civil Code of Spain) by Articles 990 and 992 of the new Civil Code (Civil
Code of the Philippines) constitute a substantial and not merely a formal change,
which grants illegitimate children certain successional rights. A careful evaluation
of the New Civil Code provisions, especially Articles 902, 982, 989, and 990,
claimed by petitioners to have conferred illegitimate children the right to
represent their parents in the inheritance of their legitimate grandparents, would
in point of fact reveal that such right to this time does not exist.
Article 982 is inapplicable to instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely
a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state that
Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception. Articles 902, 989, and
990 clearly speak of successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights are
transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these
illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may
be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the
fact that the persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and
the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said illegitimate
child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for
the purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate
family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility.
The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family;
and the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby
deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the
product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no
more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further ground of resentment.
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase
"legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" is broad enough to comprehend all the
kindred of the person spoken of. (Comment, p. 139 Rollo citing p. 2862 Bouvier's
Law Dictionary vol. 11, Third Revision, Eight Edition) The record reveals that from
the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate
heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the
six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein
are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate
Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to be the
sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero.
The word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not
only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless
the context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense —
which as already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar.
In the light of the foregoing, We conclude that until Article 992 is suppressed or at
least amended to clarify the term "relatives" there is no other alternative but to
apply the law literally. Thus, We hereby reiterate the decision of June 17, 1987
and declare Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole heir to the intestate estate of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, to the exclusion of petitioners.
CASE #83: LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION; RE: BARRIER RULE G.R. No. L-
51263 | February 28, 1983 Cresenciano Leonardo vs. Court of Appeals, Maria
Cailles, James Bracewell and Rural Bank of Parañaque, Inc. Ponente: De Castro,
J.
FACTS: v July 12, 1942: Francisca Reyes died intestate and was survived by 2
daughters, Maria and Silvestra Cailles, and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the son
of her daughter, Pascuala Cailles who predeceased her. v 1944: Sotero Leonardo
died. v 1949: Silvestra Cailles died without any issue. v September 1963:
Defendant/private respondent Maria Cailles mortgaged the disputed properties in
this case to respondent Rural Bank of Parañaque, Inc. v Court of First Instance of
Rizal
Ø October 29, 1964: Claiming to be the son of the late Sotero Leonardo,
plaintiff/petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo filed a complaint for ownership of
properties, sum of money and accounting in the CFI of Rizal seeking judgment: 1)
to be declared one of the lawful heirs of the deceased Francisca Reyes and
entitled to one-half share in the estate of said deceased jointly with Maria Cailles;
2) to have the properties left by Francisca Reyes partitioned between him and
Maria Cailles; and 3) to have an accounting of all the income derived from said
properties from the time defendants took possession thereof until said
accounting shall have been made, delivering to him his share therein with legal
interest. Ø In her Answer, Maria Cailles asserted exclusive ownership over the
subject properties and alleged that petitioner was an illegitimate child who could
not succeed by right of representation. Defendant/private respondent James
Bracewell claimed that said properties were already his by virtue of a valid and
legal deed of sale which Maria Cailles had subsequently executed in his favor. Ø
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. It made the following
pronouncements in its ruling: 1) Leonardo was deceased Francisca Reyes’ great
grandson and heir and was entitled to one-half share in the said deceased’s
estate, jointly with Maria Cailles. 2) The disputed properties were properties of
deceased Francisca Reyes and not of Maria Cailles and James Bracewell. 3) Any
sale of these properties by Maria Cailles (insofar as Leonardo’s share was
affected) was null and void. 4) Within 30 days from the finality of the CFI’s
decision, the properties should be partitioned between Maria Cailles and
Cresenciano Leonardo, share and share alike. 5) Within 30 days from the finality
of the CFI’s decision, Maria Cailles and James Bracewell should render an
accounting of the properties’ fruits and, 30 days thereafter, pay to Leonardo his
one-half share thereof with interest of 6% per annum. 6) Maria Cailles and James
Bracewell should jointly and severally pay Leonardo P2,000.00 as attorney's fees.
7) Defendants should pay the costs. 8) Defendants’ counterclaim was dismissed. v
Private respondents appealed to the CA. v Court of Appeals Ø February 21, 1979:
The CFI’s decision was reversed, and Leonardo’s complaint was dismissed. Ø The
CA denied private respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration. v Supreme Court
Private respondents filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the CA’s decision.
ISSUES: 1) WON the disputed properties are private respondents’ exclusive
properties – YES
2) WON petitioner has established his filiation -- NO
3) WON petitioner has a legal right to inherit by representation (Pertinent Issue) --
NO
HELD/RULING: (Makasiar [Chairman], Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Escolin, JJ.,
concur. Aquino, J., on leave. Abad Santos, J., I concur with the observation that I
would have dismissed the petition by minute resolution for lack of merit.) v HELD
#1:
YES. Ø The CFI decided the case in favor of Leonardo principally because
defendants' evidence did not sufficiently show that the 2 properties, which they
bought in 1908 and 1917, were the same as the properties sought by the plaintiff.
However, the CA found that the trial judge misinterpreted the evidence as to the
identification of the lands in question.
• The first property was bought by Maria Cailles under a deed of sale in 1908.
After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles paid the realty taxes from 1914 to
1948. Thereafter, as she and her son, Narciso Bracewell, left for Nueva Ecija,
Francisca Reyes managed the property and paid the land’s realty tax. However,
for unexplained reasons, Francisca paid and declared the same in her own name.
The deed of sale of 1908 clearly stated that the land sold to Maria Cailles is “en la
calle Desposorio” in Las Piñas, Rizal which was bounded by adjoining lands owned
by persons living at the time, including the Manila Railroad Co.’s railroad track.
With the exception of the area which was not disclosed in the deed, the
description fit the land sought by Leonardo, as this property was also located in
Desposorio St. and was bounded by the M.R.R. Co. With these natural boundaries,
there was indeed an assurance that the property described in the deed and in the
tax declaration is one and the same property. The change of owners of the
adjoining lands was immaterial since several decades had already passed between
the deed and the declaration, and during that period, many changes of abode
would likely have occurred. Besides, defendants had only one property in
Desposorio St., and they had paid this property’s realty taxes from May 29, 1914
up to May 28, 1948. Hence, the property was the same, if not identical to the
property in Desposorio St. sought after by Leonardo. • The second parcel was
purchased by Maria Cailles from Tranquilino Mateo under a deed of sale in 1917.
After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles likewise paid the realty tax from 1917
to 1948. Thereafter, when she and her son, Narciso Bracewell, established their
residence in Nueva Ecija, Francisca Reyes administered the property and declared
the property in her own name in 1949. Thinking that the property is Francisca’s
property, Leonardo filed the instant complaint, claiming a portion thereof as the
same allegedly represents his father’s share. There were no similar boundaries to
be relied upon. However, it was undeniable that after declaring it in her name,
Maria Cailles began paying the realty taxes thereon from July 24, 1917 until 1948.
Ø Petitioner took issue with the appellate court on the above findings of fact.
However, the petition in the SC was one for review on certiorari. Hence, only
questions of law may be raised. Generally, the CA’s findings of fact are final and
conclusive upon the SC. The exceptions are: 1) when the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation; 2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; 3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; 4)
when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; and 5) when the CA,
in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are
contrary to the submission of both appellant and appellee. None of the above
exceptions existed in the case at bar.
HELD #2: NO. Ø Petitioner claimed that he was the son of Sotero Leonardo, who
was the son of Pascuala (Francisca Reyes’ daughter). He further alleged that since
Pascuala predeceased Francisca Reyes and his father, Sotero, (who subsequently
died in 1944) survived Francisca Reyes, he could consequently succeed to
Francisca’s estate by right of representation.
He submitted in evidence his alleged birth certificate showing that his father is
Sotero Leonardo, married to Socorro Timbol, his alleged mother. The name of the
child described in the birth certificate was not that of the petitioner but of a
certain “Alfredo Leonardo” who was born on September 13, 1938. Petitioner did
not submit any durable evidence showing that he was “Alfredo Leonardo.”
v HELD #3: NO. Ø According to Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his parent. Even if it were true that petitioner was Sotero
Leonardo’s son, he still cannot inherit by right of representation, because he was
born outside wedlock. When he was born, his alleged putative father and mother
were not yet married, and his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting.
CA’s decision affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.
CASE #84: LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION; RE: BARRIER RULE G.R. No. L-
22469 | October 23, 1978 Tomas Corpus vs. Administrator and/or Executor of
the Estate of Teodoro R. Yangco, Rafael Corpus, Amalia Corpus, Jose A. V.
Corpus, Ramon L. Corpus, Enrique J. Corpus, S. W. Stagg, Soledad Asprer and
Cipriano Navarro Ponente: Aquino, J.
FACTS:
Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles, the
widow of Tomas Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had
begotten 5 children with Tomas Corpus, 2 of whom were Pablo Corpus and Jose
Corpus. v April 20, 1939: Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila at the age of 77 years.
Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were: 1)
his half brother, Luis R. Yangco, 2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel
Ossorio, 3) the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus, namely Amalia Corpus,
Jose A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus, and 4) the daughter of his half brother
Jose Corpus, namely Juana (Juanita) Corpus. v His will dated August 29, 1934 was
probated in the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 54863.
v 1941: The decree of probate was affirmed in the SC’s decision in Corpus vs.
Yangco, 73 Phil. 527. v October 1944: Juanita Corpus died at Palauig, Zambales. v
November 26, 1945: A project of partition was submitted by the administrator
and the legatees named in the will. That project of partition was opposed by the
estate of Luis R. Yangco whose counsel contended that an intestacy should be
declared because the will does not contain an institution of heir. It was also
opposed by Atty. Roman A. Cruz, who represented Juanita Corpus, Pedro
Martinez and Juliana de Castro. Juanita Corpus was already dead when Atty. Cruz
appeared as her counsel. Atty. Cruz alleged that the proposed partition was not in
conformity with the will, because the testator intended that the estate should be
"conserved" and not physically partitioned. v December 26, 1946: The probate
court held that a perpetual prohibition against alienation is prohibited, and that
condition in the will was deemed non-existent. It approved the project of
partition.
v G.R. No. L-1476 Ø From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro, Juanita
Corpus (deceased) and the estate of Luis R. Yangco appealed to the SC. Ø October
10 and 31, 1947: The appeals were dismissed after the legatees and the
appellants entered into compromise agreements. In the compromise dated
October 7, 1947, the legatees agreed to pay P35,000 to Pedro Martinez, the heirs
of Pio V. Corpus, the heirs of Isabel Corpus and the heir of Juanita Corpus. Herein
appellant Tomas Corpus signed that compromise settlement as Juanita Corpus’
sole heir. The estate of Luis R. Yangco entered into a similar compromise
agreement. Ø October 14 and November 4, 1947: As the resolutions dismissing
the appeals became final and executory, entries of judgment were made. Ø
October 24, 1947: Tomas Corpus signed a receipt wherein he acknowledge that
he received P2,000 from the Yangco estate as settlement in full of his share of the
compromise agreement. v September 20, 1949: The legatees executed an
agreement for the settlement and physical partition of the Yangco estate. The
probate court approved that agreement and noted that the 1945 project of
partition was pro tanto modified. v Court of First Instance of Manila Ø October 5,
1951: Tomas Corpus filed an action to recover his supposed share in Yangco
intestate estate. He alleged that the dispositions in Yangco's will imposing
perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void under article 785 of the
old Civil Code. Therefore, the 1949 partition was invalid, and the decedent's
estate should be distributed according to the rules on intestacy. Ø July 2, 1956:
The trial court dismissed the action on the grounds of res judicata and laches. It
held that the intrinsic validity of Yangco's will was passed upon in its order dated
December 26, 1946. v Tomas Corpus appealed to the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: WON Tomas Corpus has a right of action to recover his mother’s supposed
intestate share in Yangco’s estate
 HELD/RULING: (Barredo, [Actg. Chairman], Antonio, Concepcion Jr. and Santos,
JJ., concur.) NO. v The trial court held that Teodoro R. Yangco was an
acknowledged natural child. This was based on the statement in the will of his
father, Luis Rafael Yangco, dated June 14, 1907, that Teodoro and his 3 other
children were his acknowledged natural children. Ø Appellant assailed the
probative value of Luis R. Yangco’s will, which he said was a mere copy of Exhibit
20, as found in the record on appeal in Special Proceeding No. 54863. He
contended that it should not prevail over the presumption of legitimacy found in
section 69, Rule 123 of the old Rules of Court and over the Samuel W. Stagg’s
statement in his biography of Teodoro R. Yangco (i.e. that Luis Rafael Yangco
made a second marital venture with Victoria Obin, implying that he had a first
marital venture with Ramona Arguelles, Teodoro’s mother). These contentions
have no merit. The authenticity of the will of Luis Rafael Yangco, as reproduced in
the present case’s Exhibit 1 and as copied from the proceeding for the probate of
Teodoro R. Yangco's will’s Exhibit 20, is incontestable. The said will had become
part of a public or official judicial record. v On the other hand, the children of
Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus were presumed to be legitimate. A marriage
is presumed to have taken place between Ramona and Tomas. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio. It is disputably presumed: 1) "That a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage"; 2) "that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no
divorce, absolute or from bed and board, is legitimate", and 3) "that things have
happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of
life" (Sec. 5[z], [bb] and [cc], Rule 131, Rules of Court). v Under Articles 944 and
945 of the spanish Civil Code, "if an acknowledged natural or legitimated child
should die without issue, either legitimate or acknowledged, the father or mother
who acknowledged such child shall succeed to its entire estate; and if both
acknowledged it and are alive, they shall inherit from it share and share alike. In
default of natural ascendants, natural and legitimated children shall be succeeded
by their natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules established for
legitimate brothers and sisters." Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco's half brothers on the
Corpus side, who were legitimate, had no right to succeed to his estate under the
rules of intestacy. v Article 943 of the old Civil Code prohibits all successory
reciprocity mortis causa between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. Article 992
of the New Civil Code provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor
shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate
child". Following the rule in Article 992 of the New Civil Code, it was also held in
Cacho vs. Udan (L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693) that the legitimate
relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child. Since Teodoro R.
Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita
Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child,
appellant Tomas Corpus had no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed
hereditary share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangco's estate.
Juanita Corpus was not Yangco’s legal heir, because there is no reciprocal
succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. CFI’s judgment affirmed.
No costs.
CASE #85: LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION; PRINCIPLE OF ABSOLUTE
SEPARATION BETWEEN THE LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE FAMILY MANUEL vs
FERRER GR No. 117246, August 21, 1995 Vitug, J.
FACTS: Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and
Beatriz Guiling, initiated this suit. During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an
extra-marital affair with one Ursula Bautista. From this relationship, Juan Manuel
was born. Several years passed before Antonio Manuel, his wife Beatriz, and his
mistress Ursula finally crossed the bar. Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of
Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the marriage, a donation
propter nuptias over a parcel of land, with an area of 2,700 square meters, was
executed in favor of Juan Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel. Two other parcels of
land, were later bought by Juan and registered in his name. The couple were not
blessed with a child of their own. Their desire to have one impelled the spouses to
take private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised
her as their own "daughter." Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa
Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro (with a 10-year period of redemption)
over a one-half (1/2) portion of his land. Juan Manuel died intestate on 21
February 1990. Two years later, Esperanza Gamba also passed away. A month
after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an Affidavit of SelfAdjudication
claiming for herself the three parcels of land. Following the registration of the
document of adjudication with the Office of the Register of Deeds, the three titles
in the name of Juan Manuel were canceled and new titles, were issued in the
name of Modesta Manuel-Baltazar. Modesta executed in favor of her co-
respondent Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the
unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land that was sold to the latter by Juan
Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. These acts of Modesta
apparently did not sit well with petitioners. In a complaint filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, the petitioners sought the
declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments. The RTC dismissed the
complaint because the petitioners not being heirs ab intestato of their illegitimate
brother Juan Manuel, were not the real partiesin-interest to institute the suit.
Petitioners were also ordered to jointly and severally (solidarily) pay (a)
respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar the sum of P5,000.00 for moral damages,
P5,000.00 for exemplary damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and P500.00 for
litigation expenses and (b) Estanislaoa Manuel the sum of P5,000.00 for moral
damages, P5,000.00 for exemplary damages and P500.00 for attorney's fees.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Trial Court denied by the
trial court. Petitioners, not being the real "parties-in-interest" in the case, had
neither the standing nor the cause of action to initiate the complaint. Hence, the
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have the right to claim
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
deleted the portion for the award of moral and exemplary damages as well
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses in favor of private respondents. Article
992 of the Civil Code, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred
to in the rules on succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the
legitimate family and the illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession ab
intestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and
illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally disavow such
succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of
the decedent, it has no application, however, on testamentary dispositions. This
"barrier" between the members of the legitimate and illegitimate family in
intestacy is explained by a noted civilist. His thesis: "What is meant by the law
when it speaks of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, as legal or intestate
heirs of an illegitimate child? It must be noted that under Art. 992 of the Code,
there is a barrier dividing members of the illegitimate family from members of the
legitimate family. It is clear that by virtue of this barrier, the legitimate brothers
and sisters as well as the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such
brothers and sisters, cannot inherit from the illegitimate child. Consequently,
when the law speaks of 'brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces' as legal heirs
of an illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate brothers and sisters as well as to
the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters."
(Emphasis supplied) The Court, too, has had occasions to explain this "iron
curtain," firstly, in the early case of Grey v. Fabie 3 and, then, in the relatively
recent cases of Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court 4 and De la Puerta v. Court of
Appeals. 5 In Diaz, we have said: "Article 992 of the New Civil Code . . . prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child.
They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the
purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family
there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The
illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the
legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby
deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the
product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no
more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment."The
Court in several other cases has consistently applied the rule in Article 992. Thus,
it has ruled that where the illegitimate child had halfbrothers who were
legitimate, the latter had no right to the former's inheritance; that the legitimate
collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child; that
a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate
of the legitimate grandparent; that the natural daughter cannot succeed to the
estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural father; and
that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father. Indeed, the law on succession is animated by a
uniform general intent, and thus no part should be rendered inoperative by, but
must always be construed in relation to, any other part as to produce a
harmonious whole.
CASE #86: LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION; SURVIVING LEGITIMATE WIFE
AND BIGAMOUS WIFE
TOLENTINO vs PARAS G.R. No. L-43905. May 30, 1983 Melencio-Herrera, J.
FACTS: While marriage was still subsisting with first wife, Amado Tolentino
contracted another marriage with Ma. Clemente on Nov. 1, 1948. He was
convicted with bigamy. After serving his sentence, he continued living with
Clemente until he died. Ma. Clemente was the surviving spouse indicated in his
death certificate. Amelita Tolentino, the first wife, claims that she is the rightful
surviving spouse and petitions for correction of the death certificate. The lower
court dismissed petition for “lack of proper requisites under law”. To comply with
the requisites the petitioner filed another case against private respondent and the
Local Civil Registrar of Paombong, Bulacan, for her declaration as the lawful
surviving spouse, and the correction of the death certificate of Amado. Again it
was dismissed due to: 1) the correction of the entry in the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar is not the proper remedy because the issue involved is marital
relationship; 2) the Court has not acquired proper jurisdiction because as
prescribed under Art. 108, read together with Art. 412 of the Civil Code —
publication is needed in a case like this, and up to now, there has been no such
publication; and 3) in a sense, the subject matter of this case has been aptly
discussed in Special Proceeding No. 1587-M, which this Court has already
dismissed, also for lack of the proper requisites under the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tolentino is the rightful surviving spouse.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the Order of the respondent court be
set aside and the petitioner, Serafia Toletino be declared the surviving spouse of
of the deceased Amado Tolentino. Considering that Amado, upon his own plea,
was convicted of bigamy, that sentence furnishes the necessary proof of the
marital status of the petitioner and the deceased. The second marriage he
contracted was void from the beginning and thus has no force and effect. No
judicial decree is necessary to establish invalidity of a void marriage. While
documents, such as death and birth certificates, are public and entries therein are
presumed to be correct, such presumption is merely disputable and will have to
yield to more positive evidence establishing their inaccuracy. Therefore, it should
be the petitioner’s name on the death certificate and not the respondent.
CASE #87: LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION; RE: DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE
WHERE THE ESTATE IS LEFT TO A SURVIVING SPOUSE, LEGITIMATE SON, AND
TWO RECOGNIZED ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN HEIRS OF THE LATE MARIO VS.
CHANGLIONCO ADM. (MODESTO)
CASE #88: LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION; RE: DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE
WHERE THE DECESASED LEAVES A SURVIVING SPOUSE, LEGITIMATE MOTHER,
AND AN ADOPTED DAUGHTER DEL ROSARIO VS. CONANAN (MODESTO)
Facts:
The late FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO died last September 12, 1969 at Antipolo, Rizal in a
plane crash. Petitioner is the legitimate mother of the late FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO.
Oppositor DOROTEA OTERA DEL ROSARIO is the legitimate surviving wife of the
deceased. MARILOU DEL ROSARIO, is the legally adopted child of the late FELIX
and DOROTEA DEL ROSARIO CONANAN.
The Parties prayed that the Court declare who are the heirs of the deceased.
Ruling of RTC:
The instant case was filed under the provisions of Section 2, Rule 74 of the
Revised Rules of Court which among others provide that:
“Whenever the gross value of the estate; of a deceased person,
whether he died testate or intestate, does not exceed ten thousand
pesos, and that fact is made to appear to the Court of First Instance
having jurisdiction of the estate by the petition of an interested
person and upon hearing, xxx the court may proceed summarily,
without the appointment of an executor or administrator, and
without delay, to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any there
is, to determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate
in the estate, and to apportion and divide it among them after the
payment of such debts of the estate as the court shall then find to
be due; and such persons, in their own right, if they are of lawful age
and legal capacity, or by their guardians or trustees legally appointed
and qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive and
enter into the possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to
them respectively. The court shall make such order as may be just
respecting the costs of the proceedings, and all orders and judgment
made or rendered in the course thereof shall be recorded in the
office of the clerk, and the order of partition or award, if it involves
real estate, shall be recorded in the proper registrar's office.
The rule specifically limits the action to estates the gross value of which does not
exceed P10,000.00, The instant petition, however, clearly alleges that the value of
the real properties alone left by the deceased Felix del Rosario amounts to
P33,000.00 which is obviously over and above-the value of the estate allowed
under the rules. The petition must perforce be dismissed.
The law on intestate succession is clear that an adopted child concurring with the
surviving spouse of the adopter excludes the legitimate ascendants from
succession. The contention of the petitioner that Article 343 is applicable in the
instant case finds no basis for 'the said article is applicable in cases where there
are no other concurring intestate heirs of the adopted child.
On July 10, 1973, petitioner filed a notice of appeal
Issue:
Which of the following articles of the New Civil Code will apply, Article 343 or
Articles 341, 978 and 979?
Held:
The governing provision is article 343 of the New Civil Code, in relation to Articles
893 and 1000 of said law, which directs that:
Art. 343. If the adopter is survived by legitimate parents
or ascendants and by an adopted person. the latter shall
not have more successional rights than an
acknowledged natural child.
It is most unfair to accord more successional rights to the adopted, who is only
related artificially by fiction of law to the deceased, than those who are naturally
related to him by blood in the direct ascending line. The applicability of Article
343 does not exclude the surviving parent of the deceased adopter, not only
because a contrary view would defeat the intent of the framers of the law, but
also because in intestate succession, where legitimate parents or ascendants
concur with the surviving spouse of the deceased, the latter does not necessarily
exclude the former from the inheritance. This is affirmed by Article 893 of the
New Civil Code which states:
If the testator leaves no legitimate descendants, but leaves legitimate ascendants,
the surviving spouse shall have a right to one fourth (only) of the hereditary
estate.
Article 343 does not require that the concurring heirs should be the adopted child
and the legitimate parents or ascendants only. The language of the law is clear,
and a contrary view cannot be presumed.
Under Article 343, an adopted child surviving with legitimate parents of the
deceased adopter, has the same successional rights as an acknowledged natural
child, which is comprehended in the term "illegitimate children". Consequently ,
the respective shares of the surviving spouse, ascendant and adopted child should
be determined by Article 1000 of the New Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 1000. If legitimate ascendants, the surviving spouse
and illegitimate children are left, the ascendants shall be
entitled to onehalf of the inheritance, and the other half
shall be divided between the surviving spouse and the
illegitimate children so that such widow or widower shall
have one-fourth of the estate, the illegitimate children
the other fourth.
CASE #89: LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION; RE: RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION IN
THE COLLATERAL LINE SARITA VS. CANDIA G.R. NO. L-7768 NOVEMBER
14, 1912
FACTS: The spouses Apolinario Cedeño and Roberto Montesa acquired during
their marriage a piece of land, apparently of an area of 2 cavanes of corn upon
which they had planted fruit trees. Apolinario Cedeño died in 1895 and Roberta
Montesa in 1909. Andres Candia was holding and cultivating the
said land, but that as stated in the complainant, he did so merely under a lease
and paid the said spouses one hundred pesos semiannually; that, from May,
1909, he refused to pay the emphyteutic rent for the cultivation of the land,
appropriated the land and claimed ownership thereof; and that he also took
possession of four mares, twelve carabaos, and several pieces of furniture which
were in the house erected on the said land — a house worth 50 pesos —which he
also seized and claimed as his property. Andres Candia, a nephew of Roberta
Montesa as the son of her sister said Apolonio Cedeño, otherwise known as
Isidario Cedeño, was a cabeza de barangay of the pueblo of Sibonga, who, in
order to pay certain shortages of the cabeceria under his charge, on the 24th of
June, 1881, sold the said land to Juan Basa Villarosa, who held it in quiet and
peaceable possession for twenty-four years and at his death such possession was
continued by his sons, Sinforoso and Vicente Villarosa, from whom witness,
Andres Candia, acquired the property by purchase.
ISSUE: Whether or not the parties are entitled to the estate by way of order of
succession?
HELD: First. That Manuel Sarita, the principal plaintiff, in whose house, according
to Exhibit D, there was drawn up at his request the engagement of all the
plaintiffs to confide the suit to the attorney who has conducted it, has absolutely
no such right, because he cannot represent his grandfather Domingo, since, as
aforesaid, in the collateral line the right of representation can only take place in
favor of the children of brothers or sisters, but not in favor of the grandson of a
brother, such as is the said Manuel Sarita, the son of Sofia Cedeño who, in turn,
was the daughter of Domingo Cedeño.
Second. That, on the hypothesis that such hereditary right derived from the
intestate succession of Apolinario Cedeño, does exist, it could only be exercised
by Cristeta Cedeño, the children of Macario Cedeño, and those of Domingo
Cedeño, but not by Manuel Sarita, because in inheritances the nearer relative
excludes the more remote, excepting the right of representation in proper cases
(Civil Code, art 921); from which it is inferred that, in pushing forward Cristeta
Cedeño, the children of Macario Cedeño and those of Domingo Cedeño, to
exercise such a hereditary right, it should have been noticed that the personality
of these parties as the nearest relatives excluded that of Manuel Sarita, the son of
Sofia Cedeño, of a more remote degree. Third. That, on the same hypothesis, in
the eyes of the law no meaning whatever could be given to the document, Exhibit
H of the plaintiffs, wherein it is made to appear that the widow of Apolinario
Cedeño, Roberta Montesa implored of the heirs of her deceased husband that she
be allowed to continue in her possession of the land and the house of the family;
inasmuch as, as coowner of such property, she was entitled to one-half of it and,
besides, had a right of usufruct to one-half of the other half of the same, pursuant
to the provisions of articles 837 and 953 of the Civil Code, and until she was
satisfied for her part of usufruct, this half of the other half remained liable for the
payment of such part of usufruct. (Civil Code, art. 838.) Fourth. The hypothesis
disappears from the moment that it is proved that at the death of such alleged
predecessor in interest in the inheritance, the land in question was not owned by
him, it having been transferred in 1881, according to a conclusion established by
the trial judge. Therefore, the action for the recovery of possession, derived from
such alleged inheritance, cannot exist.
CASE #90: LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION; RE: COLLATERAL HEIRS AND
INSTITUTION OF THE WIDOW AS SOLE HEIR FUENTES V.S. CRUZ (CADIZ)
CASE #91: LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION; RE: AUNT VS. NEPHEWS AND
NIECES FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO VS. GAUDENCIO FERRARIS DE
BORROMEO (YERRO)
Bacayo v. Borromeo
G.R. No. L-19382 | August 31, 1965 | J. JBL Reyes
Petitioner: Filomena Abellana De Bacayo
Respondents: Gaudencia Ferraris De Borromeo, Catalina Feraris De Villegas,
Juanito Ferraris & Conchita Ferraris
Summary:
Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City consisting of 1/3 share in the estate
of her aunt Rosa Ferraris. Ten years have elapsed since the last time she was
known to be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening
her succession and distribute her estate among heirs. Hence, a petition for the
summary settlement of her estate was filed. Melodia left no surviving
descendant, ascendant or spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives: 1)
Filomena, an aunt and half-sister of her father; and 2) her nieces and nephews
who were children of her only brother of full blood who predeceased her. In the
settlement proceeding, Filomena was excluded as an heir pursuant to a resolution
issued by the CFI of Cebu. MR was also denied hence this action.
The SC held that the trial court was correct in ruling that under articles 1001,
1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code, in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces
exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the
succession. Thus, it is the nieces and nephews of Melodia, not Filomena, who
should inherit the intestate estate of Melodia.
FACTS:
Refer to the family tree:
Gaudenci
Melodia a 19, 1944 survived by the plaintiffs Dionisio Tolentino, Maria Tolentino and Petra
Anacleto Ferraris
Catalina
Ferraris Arturo
Grandfath Ferraris
er/Grand Rosa Ferraris Conchita
mother
Filomena
Abellana de Juanito
Bacayo
 Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she
transferred to Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided there
continuously until 1944. Up to the filing on December 22, 1960 of the
petition for the summary settlement of her estate, she has not been heard
of and her whereabouts are still unknown. More than ten (10) years having
elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she was declared
presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession and distributing
her estate among her heirs.
 Melodia left properties in Cebu City, consisting of 1/3 share in the estate of
her aunt, Rosa, valued at P6,000.
 Melodia left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was
survived only by collateral relatives, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt
and half-sister of her father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina,
Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who
were the children of Melodia's only brother of full blood, Arturo, who pre-
deceased her. These two classes of heirs claim to be the nearest intestate
heirs and seek to participate in her estate.
 CFI Cebu: in favor of the nieces and nephew. They are nearer in degree
(two degrees) than Filomena since nieces and nephews succeed by right of
representation, while Filomena is three degrees distant from Melodia, and
that other collateral relatives are excluded by brothers or sisters or children
of brothers or sisters of the decedent in accordance with Art. 1009 of the
NCC.
 Melodia’s contention: Under Art. 9751 of the NCC, no right of
representation could take place when the nieces and nephew of the
decedent do not concur with an uncle or aunt, but rather the former
succeed in their own right.
ISSUE: WON the aunt concur with the children of the decedent's brother in the
inheritance. – NO. The aunt will be excluded.
RATIO
 Filomena is correct in her contention that nephews and nieces alone do not
inherit by right of representation (i.e., per stripes) unless concurring with
brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided expressly by Article 975.
Nevertheless, in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujus
exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the
succession. This is readily apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and
1009 of the Civil Code.
o ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with
the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other
half.
o ART. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the
full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares.
o ART. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with
nephews and nieces, who are the children of the decedent's brothers
and sisters of the full blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and
the latter per stripes.
o ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sister nor children of
brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the
estate. The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or
preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole
blood.
 Note that under Art. 1009, the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and
nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles,
cousins, etc.) being called to the succession.
 Moreover, Tolentino's commentaries to Article 1009 expressly states that:
o The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in intestate
succession are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters or
children of brothers or sisters. They are, however, limited to relatives
within the fifth degree… Article 1009 does not state any order of
preference. However, this article should be understood in connection
with the general rule that the nearest relatives exclude the farther.
Collaterals of the same degree inherit in equal parts, there being no
right of representation. They succeed without distinction of lines or
preference among them on account of the whole blood relationship.
CASE #92: LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION RE: NEPHEWS AND NIECES
INHERIT IN THEIR OWN RIGHT GAUDENCIO BICOMONG, et al., plaintiffs-
appellees, vs. GERONIMO ALMANZA, et al., defendant. FLORENTINO CARTENA,
defendant-appellant.
Facts: Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas. Of this marriage there
were born three children namely: Perpetua Bagsic, Igmedia Bagsic, and Ignacio
Bagsic. Sisenanda Barcenas died ahead of her husband Simeon Bagsic. On June 3,
1885, Simeon Bagsic remarried Silvestra Glorioso. Of this second marriage were
born two children, Felipa Bagsic and Maura Bagsic. Simeon Bagsic died sometime
in 1901. Silvestra Glorioso also died. Ignacio Bagsic died on April 18, 1939 leaving
the plaintiff Francisca Bagsic as his only heir. Igmedia Bagsic also died on August
Tolentino. Perpetua Bagsic died on July 1, 1945. Surviving her are her heirs, the
plaintiffs Gaudencio Bicomong, Felicidad Bicomong, Salome Bicomong, and
Gervacio Bicomong. Of the children of the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died
also on April 14, 1952 leaving no heir as her husband died ahead of her. Felipa
Bagsic, the other daughter of the second Geronimo Almanza and her daughter
Cristeta Almanza. But five (5) months before the present suit was filed or on July
23, 1959, Cristeta Almanza died leaving behind her husband, the defendant
herein Engracio Manese (Exhibit 1-Manese) and her father Geronimo Almanza.
The subject matter of the complaint in Civil Case No. SP-265 concerns the one-half
undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the following described five (5) parcels of land
which she inherited from her deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso .Three sets of
plaintiffs filed the complaint on December 1, 1959, namely: (a) the Bicomongs,
1
ART. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of
the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by
representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if
they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.
children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the Tolentinos, children of Igmedia Bagsic; and (c)
Francisco Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna and San Pablo City against the defendants Geronimo Almanza and
Engracio Menese for the recovery of their lawful shares in the properties left by
Maura Bagsic. After the death of Maura Bagsic, the above-described properties
passed on to Cristela Almanza who took charge of the administration of the same.
Thereupon, the plaintiffs approached her and requested for the partition of their
aunt's properties. However, they were prevailed upon by Cristeta Almanza not to
divide the properties yet as the expenses for the last illness and burial of Maura
Bagsic had not yet been paid. Having agreed to defer the partition of the same,
the plaintiffs brought out the subject again sometime in 1959 only. This time
Cristeta Almanza acceded to the request as the debts, accordingly, had already
been paid. Unfortunately, she died without the division of the properties having
been effected, thereby leaving the possession and administration of the same to
the defendants. The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiffs and declared them to be
entitled to 10/24 share of the five parcels of land On appeal, defendant-appellant
Cartena contends that the provisions of Arts. 995, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil
Code, applied by the trial court in allowing plaintiffs-appellees to succeed to the
properties left by Maura Bagsic were not the applicable provisions. He asserts
that in the course of the trial of the case in the lower court, plaintiffs requested
defendants to admit that Felipa Bagsic, the sole sister of full blood of Maura
Bagsic, died on May 9. 1955. Since Maura Bagsic died on April 14, 1952, Felipa
succeeded to Maura's estate. In support thereof, he cites Art. 1004 of the New
Civil Code which provides that "should the only survivors be brothers and sisters
of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares," and he concludes with the
rule that the relatives nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones. On the
other hand, plaintiffs-appellees claim that the date of death of Felipa Bagsic was
not raised as an issue in the trial court. It was even the subject of stipulation of
the parties as clearly shown in the transcript of the stenographic notes that Felipa
Bagsic died on May 9. 1945. The Court of Appeals ruled that the facts of the case
have been duly established in the trial court and that the only issue left for
determination is a purely legal question involving the correct application of the
law and jurisprudence on the matter, hence the appellate court certified this case
to the Supreme Court. In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or a surviving spouse, Article 1003 of the New Civil Code provides that
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. It appearing
that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue, and her husband and all her
ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded by the surviving collateral
relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten (10) children
of her brother and two (2) sisters of half blood in accordance with the provision of
Art. 975 of the New Civil Code. By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned
nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in their own right. The contention of
the appellant that Maura Bagsic should be succeeded by Felipa Bagsic, her sister
of full blood, to the exclusion of the nephews and nieces of half blood citing Art.
1004, NCC is unmeritorious and erroneous for it is based on an erroneous factual
assumption, that is, that Felipa Bagsic died in 1955, which as indicated here
before, is not true as she died on May 9, 1945, thus she predeceased her sister
Maura Bagsic. SC: We find the judgment of the trial court to be in consonance
with law and jurisprudence.
To break it down: Co-heir gets the share by accretion.
CASE #95: ACRRETION; CONCUBINAGE NEPOMUCENO V. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he left a will wherein he instituted Sofia
Nepomuceno as the sole and only executor. It was also provided therein that he
was married to Rufina Gomez with whom he had 3 children. Petitioner (Sofia)
filed for the probate of the will but the legal wife and her children opposed
alleging that the will was procured through improper and undue influence and
that there was an admission of concubinage with the petitioner. The lower court
denied the probate on the ground of the testator's admission of cohabitation,
hence making the will invalid on its face. The Court of Appeals reversed and held
that the will is valid except the devise in favor of the petitioner which is null and
void in violation of Art. 739 and 1028.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court can pass on the intrinsic validity of a will
RULING: Yes, as an exception. But the general rule is that the court's area of
inquiry is limited to the an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of
the will. This general rule is however not inflexible and absolute. Given
exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the
situation constrains it to do and may pass upon certain provisions of the will. The
will itself admitted on its face the relationship between the testator and the
petitioner. The will was validly executed in accordance with law but the court
didn't find it to serve a practical purpose to remand the nullified provision in a
separate action for that purpose only since in the probate of a will, the court does
not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.
The devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739 which voids a donation made between
persons guilty of adultery/concubinage at the time of the donations. Under Art,
1028 it is also prohibited. To break it down: GR: EXTRINSIC VALIDITY LANG ANG
PAG PROBATE OR ALLOWANCE OF WILL. EXP: PAG INVALID ON THE FACE OF THE
WILL. Ang nangyari kasi, sa will mismo ni testator ay umamin s’ya na may kabit
sya. Imagine, nilagay niya sa will, in effect napaka blatant or obvious na violation
of the law na iyon alangan naman magbulagbulagan ang probate court. So moral
lesson huwag aamin sa will na may kabit, upang maging valid ang will.

CASE #93: ACCRETION POLICARPIO V.S. SALAMAT (YERRO)

CASE #94: ACCRETION; CO-HEIR GETS THE SHARE BY ACCRETION TORRES V

LOPEZ

Facts:. On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez executed his last will and testament,
in the second clause of which he declared: " I institute as the only and universal
heirs to all my property, my cousin Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de
Bueno. Tapos si Vicente Lopez predeceased Rodriguez Sabi ng petitioner: no
testamentary provision shall be valid when made by award in favor of his
guardian before the final accounts of the latter have been approved. This
provision is ofundoubted application to the situation before us; and the provision
made in the will of Tomas Rodriguez in favor of Vicente F. Lopez must be
considered invalid, owing to the incapacity of the latter. So it follows that there
has supervened a partial intestacy with respect to the half of the estate which was
intended for Vicente F. Lopez and that this half has descended to the appellant,
Margarita Lopez, as next of kin and sole heir at law of the decedent. Sabi ni
respondent: Teka lang dapat mag accrue sakin yung mana.

Issue: W/N accretion shall take place?

Ruling: WILLS; JOINT HEIRS UNDER WILL; ACCRETION. — When one of two joint
heirs called by will to an inheritance without special designation of shares dies
before the testator, the part pertaining to such heir will, upon the subsequent
death of the testator, go by accretion to the coheir; and the additional
circumstance that the predeceasing heir was, at the time of the making of the
will, disqualified to take, by reason of his being then the legal guardian of the
testator with accounts unsettled, does not make a case for intestate succession as
to his part of the estate.