SSP Report Report

Guideline for performing
Ship Security
Assessment
according to the International Code for the Security of
Ships and Port Facilities (The ISPS Code)
as mandated by SOLAS Chapter XI-2
Vessel: ……………………………………………………….….………..
Operator: …………………………………………………………….……
Trading area/ports: ………………………………………………..…....
Responsible for Ship Security Assessment (name/rank):
……………………………………………………………………….………
SSA performed, date: …………………………………………………...
Related Ship Security Plan, date: …………………………….………..
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LIST OF CONTENT
LIST OF CONTENT .................................................................................................................2
1. ABOUT THIS SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT GUIDELINE.........................................3
2. THE IMO FRAMEWORK ................................................................................................6
2.1 THE AMENDMENTS TO THE 1974 SOLAS CONVENTION, CHAPTER XI ...............................6

2.2 THE INTERNATIONAL SHIP AND PORT FACILITY SECURITY (ISPS) CODE ............................6
2.3 IMO REQUIREMENTS TO THE SSA..................................................................................7
2.4 GLOSSARY ....................................................................................................................8
2.5 FUTURE REVISIONS .......................................................................................................9
2.6 REFERENCES ................................................................................................................9
3. THE SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT PROCESS .......................................................10
STEP 1: IDENTIFICATION OF POSSIBLE MOTIVES......................................................................11

STEP 2: IDENTIFICATION OF KEY SHIPBOARD OPERATIONS ......................................................12
STEP 3: IDENTIFICATION OF EXISTING SECURITY MEASURES, PROCEDURES, AND OPERATIONS .13
STEP 4: IDENTIFICATION OF POSSIBLE THREAT SCENARIOS .....................................................14
STEP 5: THREAT AND VULNERABILITY (RISK) ASSESSMENT .....................................................15
STEP 6: DEVELOPMENT OF ONBOARD SHIP SECURITY SURVEY CHECKLIST ..............................16
STEP 7: ONBOARD SHIP SECURITY SURVEY ...........................................................................17
STEP 8: IDENTIFICATION OF WEAKNESSES, REMEDIAL ACTIONS ...............................................18
4. REQUIREMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SSP.....................................19
APPENDIX A – IDENTIFICATION OF MOTIVES..................................................................22
APPENDIX B – KEY SHIPBOARD OPERATIONS ...............................................................25
APPENDIX C – THREAT SCENARIOS AND ASSESSMENT ..............................................28
APPENDIX D - SHIP SECURITY SURVEY – CHECKLIST...................................................34
APPENDIX E - SUMMARY OF SECURITY MEASURES (PART B, SECTION 9).................48

Ship Security Assessment Guideline About this Guideline
1. ABOUT THIS SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT GUIDELINE
This Ship Security Assessment (SSA) Guideline is made to assist owners and operators of
ships to carry out security assessments in a rational, standardised and systematic way. It is
prepared in accordance with the requirements of Part A of International Ship and Port Facility
Code (“the ISPS Code”, or, “the Code”), and taking into account the guidance in Part B. The
next Section 2 provides further background on the ISPS Code.
This SSA Guideline is prepared by also considering the requirements in the USCG Navigation
and Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC) 10-02 Security Guidelines for Vessels. Even though
the ISPS Code (IMO - world-wide) and NVIC (USCG - US water) are two different, security
regimes, NVIC 10-02 has been developed to assist vessel operators and owners to align with
the security requirements under development in IMO at time of publication (October 2002).
We are therefore of the opinion that this Guideline meets the NVIC requirements to ship
security assessment. (Further, it should be noted that the USCG expects foreign flag vessels
to verify compliance with Part B of the ISPS Code, and not merely Part A. Eg, the USCG
requires that, “Verification of compliance could be established by flag administration
documents or endorsements that indicate that the Ship Security Certificate was issued based
upon full compliance with Part B” (from the Federal Register/Vol. 6, No 250/Dec 30, 2002.
This Guideline is primarily designed as a self assessment tool for Company and Ship Security
Officers and other people responsible for security ashore or onboard. It is divided into 4
Sections, plus appendices (A-E) which are provided in a format such that companies can use
them for their own vessels:
LIST OF CONTENT
1. ABOUT THIS SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT GUIDELINE
2. THE IMO FRAMEWORK

2.1 The Amendments to the 1974 SOLAS Convention, Chapter XI
2.2 The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code ”Good to know” – prior to
2.3 IMO Requirements to the SSA start of the SSA
2.4 Glossary
2.5 Future Revisions
2.6 References
3. THE SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Step 1: Identification of Possible Motives
Step 2: Identification of Key Shipboard Operations
Step 3: Identification of Existing Security Measures, Procedures, and Operations Self-assessement
Step 4: Identification of Possible Threat Scenarios guideline, including
Step 5: Threat and Vulnerability (Risk) Assessment development of
Step 6: Development of Onboard Ship Security Survey Checklist checklist
Step 7: Onboard Ship Security Survey
Step 8: Identification of Weaknesses
4. REQUIREMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SSP ”From SSA to SSP”
APPENDIX A - IDENTIFICATION OF MOTIVES

APPENDIX B - KEY SHIPBOARD OPERATIONS
APPENDIX C - THREAT SCENARIOS AND ASSESSMENT Forms etc. for
APPENDIX D - SHIP SECURITY SURVEY self-assessment
APPENDIX E - SUMMARY OF SECURITY MEASURES (ISPS CODE PART B)

The vessel owner and operator have the primary responsibility for ensuring the physical
security and safety of their vessels. Therefore, in addition to meeting the requirements of the
ISPS Code, this SSA Guideline is also prepared as a means to promote sound security
practices. The Guideline does not, relieve owners or operators of their legal responsibilities
neither with respect to the ISPS Code nor to any other parties, such as P&I clubs, crew, etc.
The SSA is an essential and integral part of the process of developing and updating the Ship
Security Plan (SSP). The relation between this SSA and the SSP can be illustrated in the
following way (see also Section 4):
Threat
information from
Background port
material required assessments
to conduct SSA
SSA SSP
Identify key Decide on corrective
shipboard operations security measures
Identify existing Prepare SSP Implementation

security measures (based on the SSA) of SSP
Identify threats & Review of SSP Onboard

vulnerability (risk) (by adm., RSO) verification
Develop and perform Possible adjustment

ship security survey Issuance of ISSC
of SSP
Identify weaknesses in Approval of SSP

measures, processes
It should further be noted that this Guideline does not provide any guarantee for the approval
of the SSP by the Contracting Government or the recognised security organization to which
this work has been delegated; it is up to the owner or operator to demonstrate that the
proposed security process described in this Guideline is duly documented and meets the
requirements of the ISPS Code.
Appreciating that every ship is unique – in design, operations, cargo, voyage pattern, etc. – a
ship owner/operator may wish to demonstrate that specific recommended security measures
are/are not appropriate for his specific ships. For the same reason of uniqueness, this
Guideline provides a method for owners/operators to balance the appropriate security
measures by evaluating his ship’s:
1. Key shipboard operations
2. Existing security measures.
3. Assessed threats, and,
4. Consequences and/or vulnerabilities (risk).

Finally, it should be recalled that achieved security is highly dependent on the human
element. Vigilance, prevention and response can only be as good as the crew’s skills,
knowledge, experience and attitude related to security. In addition to guiding you with carrying
out a SSA, we hope that this Guideline will promote good and sustainable security culture.

Ship Security Assessment Guideline The IMO framework
2. THE IMO FRAMEWORK
2.1 THE AMENDMENTS TO THE 1974 SOLAS CONVENTION, CHAPTER XI
Against a background of potential threat to maritime shipping and ports, IMO’s Diplomatic
Conference on Marine Security in December 2002 adopted new regulations to enhance
maritime security through amendments to SOLAS Chapter XI. Chapter XI has been split into
two chapters, where Chapter XI-1, “Special measures to enhance maritime safety” has been
expanded to include additional requirements to Ship Identification Numbers and the carriage
of a Continuous Synopsis Record. Chapter XI-2, ”Special measures to enhance maritime
security”, addresses the mandatory requirements such as the provision of Ship Alert System
and refers to the ISPS Code., Only the ISPS Code, and its application for ships (not ports), is
dealt with in this document.
2.2 THE INTERNATIONAL SHIP AND PORT FACILITY SECURITY (ISPS) CODE
Owners and operators of ships have the primary responsibility for ensuring the physical
security – and safety, indeed – of their ships, and the new security measures are centred
around a proposed ISPS Code. Part A of the ISPS Code will be mandatory , whereas Part B
of the ISPS Code has been drafted as a guidance and is recommendatory. The regulations
and the ISPS Code will apply to the following ships on international voyages:
- All passenger ships including HSLC ships
- All cargo ships and HSLC above 500 gt
- MOU in transit.
In addition, the ISPS Code will apply to port facilities serving such ships engaged on
international voyages. The Code will take effect from July 1, 2004.
An important part of the Code is the way risk is treated: because each ship and each port
facility is different, the Contracting Government shall determine and set the appropriate
security level (see section 2.1 and 7 of Part A, and 1.8 and 4.8 of Part B):
- Security Level 1: Normal; the level at which Port & Ship

Security
Level (1-3)
ships and port facilities normally operate.
Security
Level 3
- Security Level 2: Heightened; the level
Security
applying for as long as there is a heightened Level 2
risk of security incident. Security

Level 1
Additional
- Security Level 3: Exceptional; the level Security
Measures
Required
applying for the period of time when there is a
probable or imminent risk of a security incident.
The security levels create a link between the ship and the port facility since it triggers the
implementation of appropriate security measures for the ship and the port facility. Further, it
presents a methodology for performing security assessments so that plans and procedures to

react to changing security levels can be established. This SSA Guideline provides such a
methodology.
A Ship Security Plan (SSP) shall address the appropriate measures for the ship to move from
security level 1 to 2 and from 2 to 3. Security level 1 is the level to which the SSA Guideline
should be based, but the SSP must specify the additional protective measures to be
implemented for the heightened security levels (2 and 3).
Further, prior to commencing the SSA, the Company Security Officer (CSO) shall ensure that
advantage is taken of information available on threat assessment for the voyage pattern and
the ports at which the ship is calling. For ships trading between two (or more) fixed ports,
these ports must be taken into account in the SSA. For ships on the spot market, however,
ports of call may be difficult to envisage, and for such situations your company should select
typical and representative voyage pattern and ports you want to use in the SSA (and the
related SSP).
This Guideline deals with the part of the ISPS Code which is relevant to the SSA process
only. Therefore, other requirements and guidance set forth in the Code are not further
described here, and we refer to the Code for details about other ship security measures, port
facilities and the responsibilities of the Contracting Governments.
2.3 IMO REQUIREMENTS TO THE SSA
The SSA is an essential part of the process of developing and updating the SSP, and the
Company Security Officer (CSO) shall ensure that the SSA gives answers to the following
questions:
3.What existing security

measures, procedures
and operations are in
2. Which key shipboard
place?
operations, systems,
areas and personnel to 4. How can
protect? anybody attack
my ship?
1. Does a particular
motive exist to 5. What are the
attack my ship? likelihood and
consequences?
Security Officer
In the ISPS Code language, Part A of the Code stipulates that the SSA shall include an on-
scene security survey where, at least, the following elements are included (see also figure,
previous Section 1.1):

1. Identification of existing security measures, procedures and operations.

2. Identification and evaluation of key ship board operations that are important to
protect.
3. Identification of possible threats to the key ship board operations and the likelihood of
their occurrence, in order to establish and prioritise security measures.
4. Identification of weaknesses, including human factors in the infrastructure, policies
and procedures.
Part B of the ISPS Code, gives further guidance as to how a SSA shall be carried out. The
CSO shall also ensure that the assessment is carried out by competent persons with skills to
evaluate the security of the ship. Importantly, the SSA shall be documented (electronic format
is accepted too), reviewed, accepted, and retained by the Company.
2.4 GLOSSARY
To provide a more precise understanding of the ISPS Code and this SSA Guideline, the
following definitions from Part A should be noted (see section 2 of Part A):
• Ship Security Plan (SSP) means a plan developed to ensure the application of measures
onboard the ship designed to protect persons onboard, cargo, cargo transport units, ship’s
stores, or the ship from the risks of a security incident.
• Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) means a plan developed to ensure the application of
measures designed to protect the port facility and ships, persons, cargo, cargo transport
units, and ship’s stores within the port facility from the risk of a security incident.
• Ship Security Officer (SSO) means the person onboard the ship, accountable to the
Master, designated by the Company as responsible for the security of the ship, including
implementation and maintenance of the SSP and for liaison with the CSO and the PFSO.
• Company Security Officer (CSO) means the person designated by the Company for
ensuring that a Ship Security Assessment (SSA) is carried our; that a ship security plan
(SSP) is developed, submitted for approval, and thereafter implemented and maintained,
and for liaison with the Port Facility Security Officers (PFSO) and the Ship Security Officer
(SSO).
• Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO) means the person designated as responsible for the
development, implementation, revision, and maintenance of the PFSP and for liaison with
the SSO and the CSO.
• Declaration of Security (DOS) is an agreement reached between a ship, and either a port
facility or another ship with which it interfaces, which provides a means for ensuring that
the critical security concerns are properly addressed and security will remain in place
throughout the ships’s interface with the port facility or the other ship.. Security for the ship
is properly addressed by delineating the responsibilities for security arrangements and
procedures between a ship and waterfront facility.

• Security incident means any deliberate suspicious act threatening the security of the ship
(incl. a mobile offshore drilling unit), its crew, passengers, stores and cargo, or a port
facility.
• Security level means the qualification of the degree of risk that a security incident will be
attempted or will occur.
2.5 FUTURE REVISIONS
It is the responsibility of the user of this Guideline to review the SSA process in the light of the
current development in maritime security, and to revise the SSA, and the SSP, as and when
necessary.
2.6 REFERENCES
This document is based on the outcome of the Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security
held in London in December 2002 where amendments to the SOLAS 74 were adopted. The
ISPS Code is included in the two documents SOLAS/CONF.5/DC/2 dated 11 December 2002
(Part A) and SOLAS/CONF.5/DC/2/Add.1 dated 12 December 2002.
It is also based on the USCG’s circular, Security Guidelines for Vessels (NVIC 10-02), see
Section 1 of this paper. It is further based on the experience and work of people with
considerable experience in maritime operations in general and security in particular.

Ship Security Assessment Guideline The SSA process
3. THE SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT PROCESS
The ship security assessment (SSA) process is divided into 8 steps as described below:
Initial screening, Step 1-3:
Step 1: Identify any particular motives that may exist to threat or harm your ship, persons,
cargo, or operations.
Step 2: Identify critical operations, activities, and persons that are important to protect.
Step 3: Get an overview of security measures in place. This is an in-office screening and not a
comprehensive review. Prioritise
operations, areas, systems, and
Step 1: Step 2: Step 3:
personnel for threat assessment, focus Motives Key ship Existing security
board measures Initial
operations
on those found most critical and with a screening
low level of protective security measures. Step 4: Step 5:

Threat Vulnerability
(risk) – likelihood,
Threat assessment, Step 4-5: scenarios
consequences Threat
assessment
Step 4: Identify threat scenarios, or security
Step 6: Step 7:
incident scenarios, that reflect the Security Ship
survey security
motives and prioritised operations, areas, checklist survey Onboard
audit
systems and personnel. If no particular
Step 8:
motives are identified, and no Weaknesses
Identification
prioritization can be made, use a of needs
standard list of possible threat scenarios.
Step 5: Assess likelihood and potential Focused Ship Develop
Security Plan SSP
consequences of the scenarios. Do it
roughly and qualitatively. Likelihood may
be classified as “unlikely” and “not
unlikely”, and consequences as “moderate”, “high” and “extreme”. Prioritise scenarios
found “not unlikely” in combination with consequence severity “high” or “extreme”.
Onboard audit, Step 6-7:
Step 6: Develop a ship security survey checklist that reflects the prioritised scenarios, existing
measures assumed to be in place, and critical operations.
Step 7: Survey your ship with the checklist. Identify measures in place and comment on
deficiencies, training needs, safety conflicts, manning constraints, security equipment
Identification of needs, Step 8:
Step 8: Evaluate identified improvement needs through the ship security survey in terms of
required security measures and weaknesses of existing measures.( and of possible
remedial actions?)
After these 8 steps, the SSA is complete. The steps should be documented and is a basis for
the development of a SSP. Remember also to document the limitations/assumptions of the
SSA (trading area, onboard systems, etc.) The remainder of this SSA Guideline gives detailed
descriptions for each step (1-8) including related checklists and other tools.
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Ship Security Assessment Guideline Step 1
STEP 1: IDENTIFICATION OF POSSIBLE MOTIVES
References: Part of threat identification (Part A, 8.4.3)
Are there any particular

Objective: To trigger a creative process to identify what motives for unlawful acts
against my ship?
types of motives for security incidents that do
exist, and which motives that are particular for
my ship and trade.
Outcome: Prioritised list of relevant motives that may exist.
Application: The identified motives form a basis for the identification of possible threat
scenarios (Step 4).
What to do: Use proposed worksheet (Appendix A). The worksheet is not complete and it
should be used as a guideline only. Add your own questions – be creative!
Political
Economical
11.september
Symbolic
Fear
1. The worksheet (Appendix A) is divided in five motive categories:

a. Political
b. Symbolic
c. Economical
d. Fear, and,
e. Other.
It is important that you think exclusively on motives, and that you are conscious about
the category of the motive.
2. In the end, make an overall assessment and evaluate which motives that should be
considered.
Keep the outcome from this evaluation of motives fresh in mind when you later on go through
Step 4, “Identification of possible threat scenarios”. But first you should identify key shipboard
operations (Step 2) and your existing security measures (Step 3).
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STEP 2: IDENTIFICATION OF KEY SHIPBOARD OPERATIONS
References: Part A, 8.4.2; Part B, 8.3, 8.6, 8.8
Objective: To identify operations, systems, areas, and What operations, systems,

areas, and personnel are
personnel critical to protect if subject to a important to protect to
avoid a security incident?
security incident.
Outcome: A list of security-critical operations, systems,

areas, and personnel onboard.
Application: To prioritise the most critical operations, systems, areas, and personnel to
protect with respect to a security incidents.
What to do:
1. Obtain and record the information required to conduct the ship security assessment, such
as general layout of ship, stowage arrangement plans, etc (ref. Part B, 8.5)
2. Identify critical ship operations where security incidents may take place (e.g., cargo
operations, bunkering, repair work, change of crew/passengers, etc.).
3. List systems, physical areas, and personnel that may be targeted and used in security
incidents. Which are important to protect? The attached worksheet (Appendix B) gives
some initial ideas as to how to structure this activity. The worksheet includes all elements
that is recommended to be covered by the ship security plan (Part B, 9.1-9.6). The SFI
Group System may also be used to further trigger some ideas.
4. Go through the list, discuss and identify the critical operations, systems, areas, and
personnel that may be important to protect to prevent threats or security incidents.
The figure below illustrates the main critical operations (as in Appendix B) and systems,
areas, operations, and personnel that may be relevant for your vessel (list is not exhaustive –
your list may look different).
Navigation
Security capacity
CRITICAL OPERATIONS communication
system
Security
1 People accessing the ship communication
system
2 Ship navigation and operation
Emergency
• Loading Ship stores
3 Cargo handling response
• Voyage
4 Ship stores handling Crew,
• Discharging/ passengers,
5 Security monitoring embarkation visitors
6 Emergency response
The ship (hull,
propellers, …)
Cargo
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STEP 3: IDENTIFICATION OF EXISTING SECURITY MEASURES, PROCEDURES, AND
OPERATIONS
References: Part A, 8.4.1; Part B, 8.5, 8.7 (partly 8.14)
Objective: To identify and describe existing security

What existing security
measures, procedures and operations. measures, procedures and
operations do I have in
place?
Outcome: List of existing security measures related to
critical operations, areas, systems, and
personnel.
Application: To get an overview of existing measures to be used :

a. To identify critical operations that may have insufficient security
b. Onboard during the ship security survey (Step 7).
What to do: This is an office screening of your existing security measures rather than an
onboard survey (this you will do later on!). Use Appendix B to help you through:
1. Identify security measures in place for each critical operation, and give some key words
for what kind of measures that do exist.
2. Refer to the list for critical operations (Step 2), and prioritise those operations, systems,
areas, and personnel found critical with limited/weak security measures in place (the
upper-right corner of the right-hand box, see below).
The figure illustrates the described process: From identifying key shipboard operations (Step
2), to assessing existing security measures (this Step 3).
Operations, systems, areas,

and personnel critical to protect Security measures, procedures
if subject to a security incident? in place? (this Step 3)
(from Step 2)
Low High Yes No Comments 3
High 1
1 …...……… …...………
5 4
…..………. Critical
2 …..……….
operations
3 ……..……. ……..…….
Low
4 ……..……. ……..……. 6 2
5 ……..……. ……..…….
Security measures in place?
6 ……..……. ……..……. Yes No
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STEP 4: IDENTIFICATION OF POSSIBLE THREAT SCENARIOS
References: Part A, 8.4.3¸ Part B, 8.9
Objective: To identify the most relevant scenarios for

How can anybody
security incidents that reflect critical operations, attack my ship?
existing measures, particular motives, and the

trade of the ship.
Outcome: List of relevant security incident scenarios, or threats.
Application: To assess relevant threats of the ship to prioritise the vital few for planning of
security measures. The threat scenarios will further be evaluated with respect
to vulnerability (Step 5).
What to do: Identification of possible security threats is surrounded by uncertainty; hence

do not try to do this too detailed. This is a brainstorming type of session, and there is no
standard answer. Take into account the specifics of your ship in terms of crew, cargo, trade
area, ports, and similar.
1. If no particular motives are identified for your ship (Step 1), use the standard list of
possible threat scenarios as mentioned in the ISPS Code, Part B, 8.9. (figure below).
2. If motives do exist (Step 1), however, use a more detailed list of security incident
scenarios. Appendix C contains a proposed list for your use. When assessing the
possible threats to your ship, use the information identified and assessed in the previous
Steps 1-3:
a. Motives (Step 1)
b. Prioritised, critical operations (Step 2)
c. Security measures in place (Step 3).
Hijacking Others take Unauthorised Tampering

Means,
methods ISPS Code, Part control over access with cargo
B, 8.9.2 ship Part B, 8.9.4 Part B, 8..3
At berth
At anchor
At sea
Use the Damage to Damage to Smuggling Use the

Security ship as a or destruction cargo or of ship to carry
incidents weapon of the ship passenger weapons perpetrators
Part B, 8.9.7 Part B, 8.9.1 onboard Part B, 8.9.5 Part B, 8.9.6
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STEP 5: THREAT AND VULNERABILITY (RISK) ASSESSMENT
References: Part A, 8.4.3; Part B, 8.9, 8.10
Do some of the scenarios

Objective: To assess ship vulnerability to threats – appear more likely than
security incident scenarios – in terms of others and what could the
consequences be?
likelihood and potential consequences.
Outcome: List of the vital few scenarios implying the

highest risk.
Application: To give guidance with respect to operations, areas, systems and personnel
that should be evaluated and surveyed to identify whether additional security
measures are required.
What to do: Use the list of threat scenarios developed (Step 4/Appendix C). Do not try to
quantify consequences and likelihood, but indicate if they are “low” or “high”:
1. Assess whether some scenarios are more likely than others. Take into account motives,
existing measures and critical operations when assessing the likelihood. Likelihood may
be categorised in terms of “unlikely” and “not unlikely”.
2. Assess potential outcome of the scenarios. A consequence categorisation (“moderate”,
“high” and “extreme”) is provided in Appendix C.
3. Prioritise the scenarios that are “not unlikely” in combination with consequence severity
“high” and “extreme” (the two upper-right squares in the right-hand figure, below).
Scenarios
Consequences Likelihood
1 …...………
1
unlikely
6 4
Not
2 …..……….
3
3 ……..…….
4 ……..…….
Unlikely
5 ……..……. 2 5
6 ……..…….
Moderate High Extreme

Consequences
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STEP 6: DEVELOPMENT OF ONBOARD SHIP SECURITY SURVEY CHECKLIST
References: Part A, 8.4, Part B, entire section 8 (8.14 in

particular)
What should I check

Objective: Develop an onboard security survey checklist onboard my ship and
what is the status?
specific for your ship based on the
information gathered through Steps 1-5 and
relevant parts of the ISPS Code, Part A and
B.
Outcome: An onboard ship security survey checklist, to be used in Step 7.
Application: The checklist shall be used to perform, and document, an onboard ship
security survey.
What to do: Build your ship specific checklist by using Appendix D, the information
gathered so far and, most importantly, your own experience related to your ship and your
trading area(s). Appendix D is not meant to be a comprehensive checklist but rather a generic
guide which will assist you in the work to build a specific checklist for your ship:
Generic checklist
Ship Security Checklist Tailormade checklist

Ship Security Checklist
Ship Security
Check itemChecklist Yes No Comments Ship Security Checklist
Ship Security
Check itemChecklist Yes No Comments
Check Security
itemChecklist
Ship Security Yes No Comments
management Check item Yes No Comments
Check Security
item management
Yes No Comments
1.……….
Check Security
item management
Yes No Comments Security management
1.……….
Security management
2.………. .……….
1.……….
Security management
2.……….
1.……….
2.………. .………. Existing measures
1.………
2.………. .……….
. .……….
2.………. .………. .……….
.………. .……….
.………. Scenario related
.………. .……….
.………. .………. Physical ssecurity
.……….
.………. .………. Physical ssecurity
.………. 1.……….
Physical ssecurity ISPS Code related
.………. 1.……….
Physical ssecurity
.……….
1.……….
Physical security
.………. .……….
1.……….
.……….
1.……….
.……….
.……….
.……….
1. Identify operations, areas, systems, and personnel related to the threat scenarios developed
in Step 5.
2. Select the most relevant security areas from Appendix D.
3. Add the existing security measures – and the gaps – identified in Step 3.
4. Identify any additional items to verify onboard according to your own experience.
Importantly, Appendix E provides you with an overview over measures recommended by the
ISPS Code related to security level 1, 2, and 3. You should also consider this according to
what security level you are currently evaluating for.
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STEP 7: ONBOARD SHIP SECURITY SURVEY
References: Part A 8.3; Part B 8.14 and 8.10 (in particular)
Objective: To perform, and document, an onboard ship What security measures

are lacking and what are
security survey. the weaknesses of the
existing?
Outcome: Confirmation of security measures assumed

to be in place, identification of non-existent/
insufficient security measures.
Application: Security measures identified as non-existent/insufficient create the basis for

the SSP. They also define the remedial actions to be taken. The SSP shall be
written to include the duties and responsibilities of those onboard and ashore
for implementing these security measures at varying security levels.
What to do:
1. Perform an onboard assessment of the ship security by using your checklist developed
in Step 6.
2. Go through each item on the checklist and make remarks about the weaknesses, such
as:
a. Conflict between security and safety measures
b. Conflicts between shipboard duties and security assignments
c. Watch keeping and manning constraints with implications on crew fatigue,
alertness, and performance
d. Security training deficiencies
e. Insufficient, poorly maintained, sub-standard security equipment/systems.
Ship Security Survey Checklist
Issue to check: No Yes Comment
1…...……..
2………….
3…………. Existing security measures

in place, ok, but: conflict
4…………. with safety- evacuation
5………….
6………….
7………….
8………….
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STEP 8: IDENTIFICATION OF WEAKNESSES, REMEDIAL ACTIONS
References: Part A 8.4.4; Part B 8.3, 8.7, 8.8, 8.9, 8.14
Objective: To identify issues for which security What security

improvements are needed
improvements may be needed based on the to reduce vulnerability and
weaknesses?
onboard survey. Propose remedial actions.
Outcome: A list with identified needs for security

improvements; outline of proposals for remedial action.
Application: The identified needs form the basis for the Ship Security Plan by having
identified what to plan for.
What to do:
1. Go through the checklist from the ship security survey and evaluate the areas where
remarks have been made.
2. Identify improvement needs per area.
3. Propose remedial actions for the same “security gaps”.
Ship Security Survey Checklist Issues for improvement
Issues to check: No Yes Comment
1…...……..
2………….
3…………. Existing security measures in

place, ok, but: conflict safety-
4…………. evacuation
5………….
6………….
7………….
8………….
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Ship Security Assessment Guideline Requirements and recommendations to the SSP
4. REQUIREMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SSP
This section provides an overview of some important requirements of the ISPS Code to the
Ship Security Plan (SSP) and some recommendations as to how to structure the SSP.
The SSA is, as stated earlier, and essential an integral part of the process of developing and
updating the ship security plan (SSP). The SSA shall be documented, reviewed, accepted
and retained by the Company, and the submission of a SSP, or amendments, for approval
shall be accompanied by the documented SSA on the basis of which the SSP, or the
amendments, has been developed. The ISPS Code, Part A and B, section 9, provides
detailed requirements to the SSP.
There is not only one right way to structure and prepare a good SSP. Based on experience
already done with the making and review of SSP’s, a few general recommendations should
be noted:
1. Start with the SSP requirements in the ISPS Code, Part B in particular. The
Code provides comprehensive information to the content of the SSP.
2. Keep it simple and practical (and remember, what’s in the SSP, you must
follow)!
3. Use a structured, systematic approach.
4. The documented SSA process is a very important basis for the SSP – the
output from the SSA process has provided you with a huge amount of
information and knowledge, and has significantly raised your security
awareness, making it easier to prepare the SSP.
So, how should a good SSP look like? As mentioned, every SSP will look different, and the
SSP that fits your ship is not necessarily the right one for another ship. This SSA Guideline
will not go into detail in the making of a high-quality SSP, but a good guidance as to how to
structure the SSP can be found by looking at a few external sources. One such guideline can
be found in the recommendations to the SSP from the USCG (NVIC 10-02), “Vessel Security
Plan Outline””:
1. Introduction
2. Ship data, drawings
3. Ship organisation/ ship security organisation
3. Company Security Officer (CSO)
4. Ship Security Officer (SSO)
5. Plan documentation
6. Communication and co-ordination with port, waterfront facility, law enforcement,
company, the CSO and the SSO
7. Ship Security Assessment
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8. Maritime Security Levels and associated measures

9. Security Actions
10. Ensuring the performance of all ship security duties
11. Monitoring restricted areas to ensure that only authorised persons have access
12. Controlling access to the ship
13. Monitoring of deck areas and areas surrounding the ship
14. Controlling the embarkation of persons and their effects
15. Supervising the handling of cargo and ship stores
16. Ensuring that port-specific security communication is readily available
17. Ship/waterfront facility interface
18. Training and drills
19. Contingency Plans & Standard Operating Procedures (SOP’s) maintenance
The International Chamber of Shipping (www.marisec.org) is also about to develop an outline

of an approved SSP. Results from this work will be presented in early-2003.
Another source of information can be found by looking at the (preliminary) checklist to a SSP
prepared by an RSO (Det Norske Veritas). Remember, it is the RSO who is going to approve
your SSP. The following checklist – based on the ISPS Code, indeed – will most likely be
modified in the coming weeks and months as more SSP’s are approved, yet it provides a
good idea to the required content & structure of an SSP:
1 General
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Ship, port, and trade specific data
1.3 Ship data
2 Ship Security Assessment
2.1 General
2.2 Qualifications
2.3 Expert assistance
2.4 Prerequisites
2.5 Information required
2.6 Threats and vulnerabilities
2.7 Identification of measures
2.8 Examination of access
2.9 Existing security measures
2.10 Potential vulnerabilities
2.11 On-scene security survey
3 SSP Details
3.1 General
3.2 Company statement
3.3 Master’s discretion
3.4 Ship organization and communication
3.5 Company Security Officer
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3.6 Ship Security Officer

3.7 Qualifications of the SSO
3.8 Shipboard personnel
3.9 Shipboard personnel qualifications
3.10 Training, exercises and drills
3.11 Audits
3.12 Periodic review
3.13 Reporting of security incidents
3.14 Interface with port facilities
3.15 Dangerous goods
3.16 Declaration of security
3.17 Administration of SSP
3.18 Security equipment
3.19 Ship security alert system
3.20 Records
3.21 Crewing and charterers
4 Ship Security Measures to be Implemented based no the Security Level
4.1 Access to the ship (Sections: General, Security Level 1, 2, and 3)
4.2 Restricted areas (General, Security Level 1, 2, and 3)
4.3 Handling of cargo (General, Security Level 1, 2, and 3)
4.4 Delivery of ship stores (General, Security Level 1, 2, and 3)
4.5 Handling of unaccompanied luggage (General, Security Level 1, 2, and 3)
4.6 Monitoring the security of the ship (General, Security Level 1, 2, and 3)
4.7 Differing security levels
4.8 Activities not covered by the ISPS Code
4.9 Response to security threats
4.10 Response to security actions
4.11 Contigency procedures, evacuation
4.12 DNV (RSO) recommendation
5 Conclusions and Recommendations for further Work [in the certification, plan approval
process]
Relevant report forms, e.g. on reporting of unlawful acts, should also be included in the SSP.
Other RSO’s have their own, and probably alternative, checklists to the content of an SSP.
It should also be mentioned that the Company is obligated to ensure that the SSP contains a
clear statement emphasising the Master’s authority. The Master has the overriding authority
and responsibility to make decisions with respect to the security of his ship, and to request the
assistance of the Company, or of any Contracting Government, as may be necessary. The
Company shall ensure that the Company Security Officer, the Master and the Ship Security
Officer are given the necessary support to fulfil their duties and responsibilities in accordance
with the Code.
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Ship Security Assessment Guideline Appendix A
APPENDIX A – IDENTIFICATION OF MOTIVES
Motivating factors?
Motive: Questions to be asked: Example: Comment:
Not likely Probable Likely
1. POLITICAL:
1.1 Does it exist political (incl. religious, ideological, Cargo (e.g. weapon parts, Norwegian whale, nuclear
ethnical, nationalistic) motives related to your ship cargo) and trade area/port (Middle East, US)
(flag, owner, crew) or trade (cargo, passengers, trade
area or port)?
1.2 Does your ship trade in an area with unstable political Countries with elections, demonstrations, civil war,
situation? riots (West Africa, Middle East)
1.3 Add other relevant questions:
2. SYMBOLIC:
2.1 Can your ship be used as a means to harm symbolic Well known buildings, statues, bridges, etc. (Golden
constructions on the trade? gate, Sidney opera, etc.)
2.2 Does your ship visit a port where international events Exhibitions, sports, political, etc. (Olympic Games,
take place? EXPO, WTO meeting, etc.)
2.3 Can your ship be used as means to harm important Areas for tourism, commercial exploitation of nature
environmental areas? (fish farming, beaches, coastal cities, etc.)
2.4 Does your ship itself represent or carry a symbolic Ship carries special cargo (e.g. weapons), support
value? operations (oil to war actions, equipment to industry
projects), represent attitudes at debate (cruise,
natural resources, etc.).
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2.5 Does the visibility or the profile of your ship, company Because of your policy (exploitation of labour, political
or brand represent a motive for unlawful acts? attitudes), the operations you are involved (natural
resources, weapons, etc.).
3. ECONOMICAL:
3.1 Gain:
3.1.1 Does your ship carry special cargo (economical value, Plutonium, equipment for mass destruction, etc.
restricted availability)?
3.1.2 Is it likely that terror related smuggling take place from Smuggling of people/goods from Africa to Italy.
ports your ship is visiting? (Intelligence)
3.1.3 Is it likely that your crew can take part in or embrace Ethnical motives and common cause.
terror related smuggling?
3.1.4 Is your ship trading in an area known for piracy? See Annual Piracy Report (ICC)
3.1.5 Does your ship, cargo or passengers represent risk Valuable ship, cargo and passengers used for threats
for Hijacking? and barging demands.
3.1.6 Add other relevant questions:
3.2 Damage to Society/Industry:

3.2.1 Can your ship be used to damage important nodal Block ports or canal, collide with bridges or offshore
points for trade or commercial activity? installations, etc.
3.2.2 Is the trade your ship represents critical to society? Critical equipment to industry projects (e.g. pipelines,
offshore installations, etc.), or for industry production
(gold, silver, silicates, etc.)
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3.2.4 Will an unlawful act against your ship or trade harm Reduced market due to reduced trust (cruise,
the state of the industry? passenger transport, etc.)
3.3 Damage to Company:

3.3.1 Does your ship itself or the cargo represent critical Significant loss because of specialised ship for
income for your company? special cargo, operation, etc.
3.3.2 Does your company have any “enemies” that are Political groups, business competitors, former
capable of committing unlawful acts? employees, etc.
4 FEAR:
4.1 Can your ship be used as a means to escalate Explosion, collision with construction, ammonia
consequences and thus create fear in the society? discharge, etc. Because of the consequences that
result (numerous fatalities of passengers, discharge
of radio actives, etc.)
5 OTHER:
5.1 Are there any other motives for use of unlawful acts Unlawful acts towards your ship will result in media
against your ship? attention.
OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF MOTIVES - Summarise the check-offs and evaluate which one that should be considered
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Ship Security Assessment Guideline Appendix B
APPENDIX B – KEY SHIPBOARD OPERATIONS
Appendix B may be used to,

1. Identify critical shipboard operations, systems, physical areas and personnel that may be subject to security incident (left column, input from Step 2). These
should be evaluated in relation to your trading area(s), the ship and operations characteristics, and so on.
2. Existing security measures for the same operations, systems, areas (right column input from Step 3 - includes elements from Part B 9.9-9.49)
From Step 2: From Step 3:

Operations with related systems, areas and personnel Security measures in
Comments
Criticality place
Low High Yes No
1. ACCESS CONTROL - Personnel, passengers, visitors, etc.
1.1 Access ladders
1.2 Access gangways
1.3 Access ramps
1.4 Access doors, side scuttles, windows and ports
1.5 Mooring ropes and anchor chains
1.6 Cranes and hosting gear
1.7 Access by ships side (freeboard)
1.8 Equipment and baggage brought onboard
1.9 Unaccompanied baggage found onboard
Add issues you find relevant:
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Security measures in
Operations with related systems, areas and personnel Criticality place Comments
Low High Yes No
2. RESTRICTED AREAS ON THE SHIP
2.1 Navigation bridge
2.2 Navigational means (radio, radar, GPS, etc.)
2.3 Machinery spaces, power supplies, steering rooms
2.4 Control rooms
2.5 Galley/pantry
2.6 Ventilation and air conditioning system
2.7 Spaces with access to potable water tanks, pumps or manifold
2.8 Hull, ballast tanks
2.9 Rudder and propeller
Add issues you find relevant
3. CARGO HANDLING
3.1 Cargo access points (hatches, ports, pipings)
3.2 Cargo storage spaces (incl. access points)
3.3 Spaces containing dangerous goods or hazardous substances
3.4 Cargo handling equipment
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Security measures in
Operations with related systems, areas and personnel Criticality place Comments
Low High Yes No
4. SHIP STORES HANDLING
4.1 Access points for delivery to ship
4.2 Storage spaces
4.3 Access points to storage spaces
5. SECURITY MONITORING
5.1 Lighting
5.2 Watch-out (voyage)
5.3 Security guards and deck watches, including patrols
5.4 Automatic intrusion detection advice
5.5 Surveillance monitoring
5.6 Security and surveillance equipment spaces
6. SAFETY OPERATIONS
6.1 Life boats and life belts
6.2 Alarms, signals and marking
6.3 Evacuation routes
6.4 Fire fighting system
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Ship Security Assessment Guideline Appendix C
APPENDIX C – THREAT SCENARIOS AND ASSESSMENT
The SSA should consider all possible threats, which may include (ISPS Code Part B, 8.9):
Hijacking Others take Unauthorised Tampering
Means,
1. Damage to, or destruction of, the ship (bombing, arson, sabotage) methods ISPS Code, Part control over access with cargo
B, 8.9.2 ship Part B, 8.9.4 Part B, 8..3
2. Hijacking or seizure of the ship/persons onboard
3. Tampering with cargo, ship equipment, systems ship stores At berth
4. Unauthorised access or use, incl. stowaways At anchor
5. Smuggling of weapons or equipment, weapons of mass destruction At sea
6. Use the ship to carry perpetrators and their personal equipment Security
Use the
ship as a
Damage to
or destruction
Damage to
cargo or
Smuggling
of
Use the
ship to carry
incidents weapon of the ship passenger weapons perpetrators
7. Use of the ship as weapon or as means to cause damage, destruction Part B, 8.9.7 Part B, 8.9.1 onboard Part B, 8.9.5 Part B, 8.9.6
This list below is not comprehensive but it provides you with a long range of scenario examples. Try to think “out of the box”, and find scenarios that are
relevant for your vessel and your trade. Make comments and evaluate consequences and likelihood on an appropriate level.
Consequence categories to be used:

Moderate: Little or no loss of life or injuries, minimal economic impact, or some environmental damage.
High: Multiple losses of life or injuries, major regional economic impact, long-term damage to a portion of the eco-system
Extreme: Numerous loss of life or injuries, major national or long term economic impact, complete destruction of multiple aspects of the eco-system over a
larger area
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From Step 4 From Step 5:

Possible Consequences
Relevant: Likelihood
Threat: - Human, Material, Environment
Comment:
Not Not
Yes No Moderate High Extreme
likely unlikely
1. Damage to, or destruction of, the ship
(bombing, arson, sabotage, vandalism)
• Hide explosives onboard, initiate with timer/remote
• Bring explosives onboard, suicidal/high risk action
• Place explosives in cargo, initiate with timer/remote
• Attach explosives to hull, initiate with timer/remote
• Explode ship by external craft, torpedo, mine, etc.
• Force oil/gas leakage: engine room / cargo tanks
• Set ship on fire
• Open bow port, cargo hatch (to sink or capsize)
• Drain holes, to sink or capsize
• Cut pipes (water intake) to change trim
• Activate pumps to change trim
• …….other
•
•
Comment:
Not Not
likely unlikely
2. Hijacking or seizure of the ship or of
persons on board
• Crew takes control over ship
• Passengers take control
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• Stowaways/boarded person take control

• Hijacking through (bomb) threat
• Hijacking of crew or passengers
• Unlawful detention of ship / crew or passenger by
port authority or state
• ……other
•
Comment:
Not Not
likely unlikely
3. Tampering with cargo, essential ship
equipment or systems or ship’s stores
• Block critical systems like propulsion, steering etc
• Contaminate bunker
• Damage ship systems, navigation, loading,
• False nav data/guidance (radar, VTS, pilot, chart)
• Contaminate drinking water or food
• Release gas onboard
• Contaminate cargo
• Destroy lifesaving equipment
• Destroy ship interiors
• ……other
•
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Comment:
Not Not
likely unlikely
4. Unauthorised access or use including
presence of stowaways
• Stowaways sneaking onboard /hiding in cargo
• Boarding ship at port or during voyage as
“passenger” or “crew”
• Boarding ship at port or during voyage as “pilot”,
“supplier”, “surveyor”, fake castaway
• Unauthorised boarding ship at pilot entrance or STS
operations
• Unauthorised boarding of ship at voyage via
vessel/craft/helicopter
• Unauthorised boarding ship at voyage via
shipwrecked
• (Unauthorised use, see item 5)
• ……other
•
Comment:
Not Not
likely unlikely
5. Smuggling weapons or equipment,
including weapons of mass destruction
• Hide goods in cargo
• Hide goods in crews luggage
• Hide goods in passengers luggage
• Hide goods in ship supplies
• ……other
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Comment:
Not Not
likely unlikely
6. Use of the ship to carry perpetrators
and their personal equipment
• Stowaways sneaking onboard /hiding in cargo
• Boarding ship at port or during voyage as
“passenger” or “crew”
• Boarding ship at port or during voyage as fake
“pilot”, “supplier”, “surveyor”, or similar
• …..other
•
Comment:
Not Not
likely unlikely
7. Use of the ship itself as a weapon or as
a means to cause damage or destruction
• Crew take control over ship
• Passengers take control
• Stowaways/boarded person take control
• Block critical systems like propulsion, steering etc in
a critical position (near terminal etc)
• Given a hijacked situation (item 4):
Take control over ship and hit another ship
Take control over ship and hit a landbased
construction / terminal / chemical plant or similar
Take control over ship and hit an offshore
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installation
Take control over ship and hit a rock / provoke
grounding
• ……other
•
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Ship Security Assessment Guideline Appendix D
APPENDIX D - SHIP SECURITY SURVEY – CHECKLIST
PURPOSE
The SSA should consider the continuing relevance of the existing security measures and
guidance, procedures and operations, under both routine and emergency conditions and
should determine security guidance.
For practical purposes, and for the design of this checklist, we assume that a Ship Security
Plan (SSP) is already in the making and/or onboard. If this is (still) not the case, please do not
put too much emphasis on the questions in this checklist that directly refers to the SSP.
ABBREVIATIONS
A: With direct reference to Part A of the ISPS Code

SSP: Ship Security Plan
SSO: Ship Security Officer
CSO: Company Security Officer
PFSO: Port Facility Security Officer
AIS: Automatic Identification System
SSA: Ship Security Assessment
PART 1 – SECURITY MANAGEMENT

Security
Code SECURITY MEASURES YES NO COMMENTS
Ref.
1. COMPANY SECURITY MANAGEMENT & POLICY
A Is the Master, Ship Security Officer (SSO), and crew familiar with
the company’s security objective and policy?
A Is a ship security plan (SSP) kept onboard, including company

policy on ship security?
Has the SSP been in operation for at least 3 months?
Is there a company policy, and related procedures, for the

company’s balance and handling of safety and security conflicting
issues?
Are adequate resources, including shore based support, provided

for the ship to meet the goals of the company security policy?
Are there procedures for emergency preparedness, response and

contingency manning?
Are there procedures for handling sensitive security related

information and communication?
Is there any agreement with a private security company?
Page 34
2. COMPANY SECURITY ORGANIZATION
Is the company security organization described in an organization

chart, including description of the following issues:
• Interrelations onboard (CSO vs Master responsibility etc),
• Handling of different types of ship-shore interrelations
(company, port facilities, maritime authorities)?
Are job descriptions, and/or responsibilities and authorities readily
available for shipboard personnel?
3. COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER (CSO)
A Has the company appointed a CSO(s)?
A Is it identified for which ships the CSO is responsible?
A Are there 24-hour contact details for the CSO available onboard?
Are the Ship Security Officer and the Master knowledgeable

about how to contact the CSO?
Is the CSO’s duties and responsibilities clearly described in the

ship security plan?
A Does the CSO arrange for internal audits of security activities?
A Is the CSO promptly addressing deficiencies and non-

conformities? Is the CSO’s corrective actions documented?
A Does the CSO provide adequate training for personnel

responsible for the security of the ship?
A Is the CSO ensuring effective communication and co-ordination

between the ship security officer and the relevant port facility
security officer?
A Is there evidence that the CSO is working to enhance the security

awareness and vigilance onboard?
A Is the CSO ensuring consistency between security requirements

and safety requirements?
Are the mentioned issues about the CSO described in the

company security plan?
Does the CSO have knowledge of current security threats and

patterns?
4. SHIP SECURITY OFFICER (SSO)
A Has the ship appointed a SSO?
A Has this person been acting as SSO for the last 3 months?
A Is the SSO qualified as a “security specialist” (e.g., through

special training and/or education?)
A Are the SSO’s duties and responsibilities, including his reporting

lines, clearly described in the SSP?
A Is there evidence that the SSO is undertaking regular security

inspections of the ship?
Page 35
inspections of the ship?
A Is there evidence that the SSO is reporting all security

deficiencies, non-conformities, and security incidents?
A Is there evidence that the corrective actions are implemented?
Is there a policy and procedures for how the SSO should handle
safety and security conflicting issues?
Does the SSO have knowledge of current security threats and

patterns?
Does the SSO have knowledge on how to recognize and detect

weapons, dangerous substances and devices?
Does the SSO have knowledge on how to recognize

characteristics and behavioral patterns of persons who are likely
to threaten security?
Does the SSO know techniques used to circumvent security

measures?
5. MASTER
A Is it established in the SSP that the Master has the overall

responsibility for the ship’s safety and security?
Is there evidence that the ship Master is aware of his full

responsibilities w.r.t.:
• The ship’s security planning,
• Ship security implementation and maintenance,
• The Master’s responsibility to request company assistance
if necessary, and so on?
• Has the Master read the SSP?
Is there evidence that the Master is performing ship security
verification according to company procedures, including the
formal verification of different books, including:
• The SSP,
• The training record book
• The deck log
• Cargo record book, etc
Does the Master have full understanding of the SSO’s duties
versus his/her own duties?
The Master has available onboard updated documented

information on who appoints the crew, who decided and decides
the employment of the crew, and who signed and sings the
charter party.
Is there evidence that the Master (and the SSO) is providing

ongoing motivation of crew with respect to ship security, as
described in the SSP?
Are security related duties delegated to officers under Master’s

command issued in a clear and simple way, as described in the
SSP?
5. SHIP’S PERSONNEL
Page 36
Is the crew familiar with the content of the company security

policy and the related procedures, as described in the SSP?
Is there evidence about the crew’s awareness in security related

issues (e.g., access control of people, cargo control, restricted
areas onboard, responsibilities in case of security threats, etc)?
Does the crew know who is appointed to the different security

duties?
Does the crew know how to respond to an attack or threat

situation? (e.g. activate alert system?)
6. TRAINING & QUALIFICATIONS
A Are there procedures for onboard for security training and drills
(both for officers and ratings)?
A Is the security training properly recorded?
A Are needs for security training identified and onboard training

programs made for new and existing crew?
A Have the crew received adequate training in security matters, as

described in the SSP?
7. SHIP SECURITY PLAN
A Is the ship security plan available onboard?
A Is the ship security plan approved by the Administration (RSO,

Recognized Security Organization)?
A Are all changes to the security plan approved by the

Administration?
A Is the ship able to move from security level 1 to level 2 by itself

without outside assistance?
A Are there procedures described for how to respond to instructions

from Contracting Governments on security level 3?
A Is the security plan property protected from unauthorised access

or disclosure?
Is there response procedure for fire or other emergency

conditions?
Does the SSP contain guidance and procedures to:
• Vessel details
• Organizational structure of security for the ship?
• Duties of personnel assigned security responsibility

described (CSO, SSO, Master, Officers & Ratings)?
• Details on the ship’s relationships with the company, port

facilities, other ships and relevant authorities with security
responsibility?
• Details on the communication systems to other ships and to
Page 37
port facilities?
• Details on basic security measures for Security Level 1?
• Details on how to upgrade the ship to Security Level 2

without delay?
• Details on how to respond to instructions from Contracting

Government on Security Level 3?
• Procedures for security actions in case of threats or

breaches of security?
• Procedure on regular review/audits and updating of the

SSP?
• Procedures on reporting security incidents?
• Procedures for auditing security activities?
• Procedures to assess security equipment?
Is the ship protecting security sensitive information, available

either electronically or on paper?
8. SHIP SECURITY SURVEYS, SECURITY AUDITS
A Are (internal) security audits performed onboard according to

procedures in the SSP?
A Are the internal audits conducted by personnel independent of the

activities being audited?
9. SECURITY RECORDS
A Are records of training, drills and exercises kept onboard?
A Are records of reports of security incidents kept onboard?
A Are records of breaches of security kept onboard?
A Are records of changes in security level kept onboard?
A Are records of maintenance, calibration and testing of security

measures and related equipment kept onboard?
A Are records of communications relating to the security of the ship

are kept onboard?
A Are records of internal audits and reviews of security activities?
Are records with memos from onboard security meetings are kept
onboard?
10. SHIP/SHORE INTERFACE
Is the SSO communicating and co-ordinating security issues with

the PFSO?
Is the ship fitted with a valid Ship Security Certificate?
Page 38
Is port specific security information (e.g. threats and their

protective measures) readily available?
Are there procedures for advising the PFSO if the ship has a
higher security level than the port?
Is the SSO in close liaison with the PFSO to agree on measures

to respond to higher security levels?
Is there a procedure available for the SSO to prepare a

Declaration of Security for the purpose of co-ordination of SSO
and PFSO responsibilities?
Is there a form available for the SSO to prepare a Declaration of

Security? (ISPS code Part B, Appendix 1 is a suggested format)
Page 39
PART 2 - ONBOARD SECURITY MEASURES

Security
Code SECURITY MEASURES YES NO COMMENTS
Ref.
1. ACCESS TO THE SHIP
Does the SSP contain security measures covering the access to

the ship?
Are access ladders identified and monitored?
Are access gangways identified and monitored?
Are access ramps identified and monitored?
Are access doors, side scuttles, windows, hatches and ports

identified and monitored?
Are mooring ropes and anchor chains identified and monitored?
Are cranes and hoisting gear identified and monitored?
Are other access points identified in the SSA?
Are identity documents of all persons seeking to board the ship

checked?
Are there procedures and records available for how to check this?
Are the reasons for the people boarding the ship confirmed by
checking joining instructions, passenger tickets, boarding passes,
work orders etc?
Are the personal effects of passengers controlled?
Is the embarkation of crew controlled?
Are the personal effects of crew controlled?
Are there procedures on how to check any other people

accessing the ship (e.g. visitors, vendors, repair technicians, port
facility personnel etc.)
Are designated secure areas established (in coordination with the

port facility) where inspections and searching of people, baggage
(including carry on items), personal effects, vehicles and their
contents can take place?
Are vehicles destined to be loaded on board car carriers, ro-ro

and other passenger ships searched prior to loading in
accordance with the frequency required in the SSP?
Are checked persons and their personal effects segregated from May be deleted from
unchecked persons and their personal effects? Part B in Dec.
Is the embarking segregated from the disembarking passengers?
Are unattended spaces adjoining areas to which passengers and

visitors have access secured, by locking or other means?
Are security briefings provided to all ship personnel on possible

threats, the procedures for reporting suspicious persons, objects
or activities and the need for vigilance?
Page 40
Are there procedures for how to raise alarm and to react if

unauthorized boarding is detected?
Are there procedures for checking with PFSO if identity and

purpose checks of people have been performed prior to entering
the ship/port interface?
Are there procedures for additional measures to take while in port

(of another Contracting Government)?
Is the ship embarking persons or loading stores or cargo at a port

of from another ship where either the port facility of the other ship
is in violation with or is not required to comply with chapter XI-2 or
Part A.
Will the ship receive people, stores or cargo unloaded from an

aircraft of unknown security status?
Are there procedures for checking persons or goods boarding the

ship as a result of a rendering assistance at sea?
Are locations and functions of each actual or potential access

point to the ship identified?
Are evacuation routes and assembly stations defined and

maintained?
1. ACCESS TO THE SHIP – RECOMMENDED ADDITIONAL MEASURES FOR SECURITY LEVEL 2
Are additional personnel assigned to patrol deck areas during

silent hours to deter unauthorized access?
Is the number of access points to the ship limited, identifying

those to be closed and the means of adequately securing them?
Is the access to the ship deterred, including the provision of boat

patrols on the waterside of the ship?
Is the shore-side of the ship established as a restricted area, in

close co-operation with the port facility?
Are the frequency and detail of searches of people, personal

effects, and vehicles increased?
Are visitors to the ship being escorted?
Are additional specific security briefings provided to all ship

personnel on any identified threats, in order to re-emphasize the
procedures for reporting suspicious persons, objects, or activities
and stressing the need for increased vigilance?
1. ACCESS TO THE SHIP – RECOMMENDED ADDITIONAL MEASURES FOR SECURITY LEVEL 3
A At security level 3, is the ship prepared to respond to and

implement any security instructions issued by the Contracting
Government that has set the security level 3?
Is the access to the ship limited to a single, controlled, access

point?
Are only those responding to the security incident or threat

thereof granted access?
Page 41
Have persons on board received directions?
Is embarkation or disembarkation suspended?
Are cargo handling operations, deliveries etc. suspended?
Is evacuation of the ship planned for?
Is the movement of the ship reconsidered or terminated?
2. RESTRICTED AREAS
A Are restricted areas defined, and, where relevant, clearly

marked?
A Is the ship’s personnel (Master, SSO, crew) able to identify the

restricted areas onboard?
Is surveillance equipment, eg, security alarms, used to monitor

the restricted areas?
Are guards or patrols used to monitor the restricted areas?
Are automatic intrusion detection devices used to alert the ship’s

personnel of unauthorized access?
Are there measures to prevent unauthorized persons to access

the navigational bridge?
Are there measures onboard to prevent unauthorized persons to

access the machinery spaces (Category A)?

access the control stations (defined in ISPS Code, Chapter II-2)?

access spaces containing security and surveillance equipment
and systems and their controls and lighting system controls?

access ventilation and air-conditioning systems and other similar
spaces?

access spaces with access to potable water tanks, pumps, or
manifolds?

access spaces containing dangerous goods or hazardous
substances?

access spaces containing cargo pumps and their controls?

access cargo spaces and spaces containing ship’s stores?

access crew accommodation?

access any other areas as determined by the CSO, through the
SSA to which access must be restricted to maintain the security
of the ship?
Page 42
2. RESTRICTED AREAS – RECOMMENDED ADDITIONAL MEASURES FOR SECURITY LEVEL 2
Are additional restricted areas particularly adjacent to access

points identified and monitored?
Are surveillance equipment continuously monitored?
Are additional personnel dedicated to guard and patrol restricted

areas?
2. RESTRICTED AREAS – RECOMMENDED ADDITIONAL MEASURES FOR SECURITY LEVEL 3

Are additional restricted areas on the ship set up in proximity to

the security incident, or the believed location of the security
threat, to which access is denied?
Are restricted areas searched as part of the search of the ship?
3. HANDLING OF CARGO
Are there routines in place for checking of cargo, cargo transport

units and cargo spaces prior to, and during, cargo handling
operations?
Is there evidence, through records, that the procedures (cargo

control) are followed?
Is the handling of cargo supervised by the ship personnel (SSO)?
Are there procedures for handling of dangerous goods or

hazardous substances?
Is an updated inventory kept on any dangerous goods or

hazardous material carried on board?
Are any checks carried out (procedures for) to ensure that cargo
being loaded matches the cargo documentation?
Is the procedures for cargo checking communicated to PFSO?
Are there procedures ensuring, in liaison with the port facility, that
vehicles to be loaded on board car-carriers, ro-ro and passenger
ships are subjected to search prior to loading, in accordance with
the frequency required in the SSP?
Is checking of seals or other methods used to prevent tampering?
Is cargo being checked visually or by examinations?
Is canning or detection equipment, mechanical devices or dogs

being used?
3. HANDLING OF CARGO – RECOMMENDED MEASURES FOR SECURITY LEVEL 2
Page 43
Are more detailed checking of cargo, cargo transport units, and

cargo spaces performed? Are records on the same kept
onboard?
Are checks intensified to ensure that only the intended cargo is

loaded?
Is the searching of vehicles to be loaded on car-carriers, ro-ro and

passenger ships intensified?
Is the frequency increased in checking of seals or other methods

used to prevent tampering?
Is cargo being checked with increased frequency and detail of

visual and physical examination?
Is the frequency of the use of scanning/detection equipment,

mechanical devices, or dogs increased?
Are enhanced security measures coordinated with the shipper or

other responsible party in addition to establishing agreement and
procedures?
3. HANDLING OF CARGO – RECOMMENDED MEASURES FOR SECURITY LEVEL 3

Is the loading or unloading of cargo suspended?
Is the inventory of dangerous goods and hazardous substances

carried on board verified?
4. SHIP’S STORE
Are there procedures in place for supervision of the delivery of

ship stores (to prevent acceptance without inspection)?
Are there procedures for handling of ship’s stores to prevent

acceptance unless ordered?
Is there evidence, through records, that the procedures (ship’s

store control) are followed?
Is an updated inventory on any dangerous goods or hazardous

material carried on board?
Is ship’s stores and package integrity being checked?
For ships regularly using the port facility; are procedures

established with the port facility to cover notification and timing of
deliveries and their documentation?
Are stores checked if matching the order prior to being loaded on

board?
Is immediate secure stowage of ship’s stores ensured?
Page 44
4. SHIP’S STORE – RECOMMENDED ADDITIONAL MEASURES FOR SECURITY LEVEL 2
Are checks exercised prior to receiving stores on board and

intensifying inspections?
4. SHIP’S STORE – RECOMMENDED ADDITIONAL MEASURES FOR SECURITY LEVEL 3

Are ship’s stores more extensively being checked?
Is the handling of ship’s stores restricted or suspended?
Does the ship refuse to accept new deliveries of ship’s stores on

board the ship?
5. UNACCOMPANIED BAGGAGE
Are there procedures in place for how to handle and where to

store unaccompanied baggage?
Is there evidence the procedures are followed?
Is any unaccompanied baggage being appropriately screened

(100%) and searched (by port or ship), before it is loaded
onboard the ship?
Are there procedures and measures in place for close co-

operation with the port facility to ensure that unaccompanied
baggage is handled securely after screening?
5. UNACCOMPANIED BAGGAGE - RECOMMENDED ADDITIONAL MEASURES FOR SECURITY LEVEL 2
Is 100% of unaccompanied baggage being x-ray screened?
5. UNACCOMPANIED BAGGAGE - RECOMMENDED ADDITIONAL MEASURES FOR SECURITY LEVEL 3

Are such baggage subjecting to more extensive screening, for

example x-raying it from at least two different angles?
Is the handling of unaccompanied baggage restricted or

suspended?
Is the ship refusing to accept unaccompanied baggage on board?
6. MONITORING THE SECURITY OF THE SHIP
A Are there procedures for inspection, testing, calibration and

maintenance of any security equipment onboard?
Page 45
Are restricted areas being monitored? (see also item 2)
Are deck areas being monitored?
Are surrounding areas being monitored?
Is the security communication equipment readily available?
Is security information readily available onboard?
Is and automatic intrusion detection device fitted onboard?
If so, does it activate an audible and/or visual alarm at a location

that is continuously attended or monitored?
Is security equipment installed onboard maintained, working

properly, and readily available?
Are procedures established to ensure that monitoring equipment

will be able to perform continuously, including consideration of the
possible effects of weather conditions or of power disruptions?
Are the ship's deck and access points illuminated at all times
while conducting ship/port interface activities or at a port facility or
anchorage?
Is the ship using the maximum lighting available while underway,

consistent with safe navigation? (Having regard to the provisions
of the 1972 COLREGS)
Is the lighting sufficient to ensure the ship’s personnel to be able

to detect activities beyond the ship, on both the shore side and
the waterside?
Is the lighting coverage including the area on and around the

ship?
Is the lighting coverage facilitating personnel identification at

access points?
Is the lighting coverage provided through coordination with the

port facility?
6. MONITORING THE SECURITY OF THE SHIP – RECOMMENDED MEASURES FOR SECURITY LEVEL 2
Is the frequency and detail of security patrols increased?
Is the coverage and intensity of lighting increased?
Is the use of security and surveillance equipment increased?
Is additional personnel assigned as security lookouts?
Is coordination with waterside boat patrols, and foot or vehicle

patrols on the shore-side, ensured when provided?
6. MONITORING THE SECURITY OF THE SHIP – RECOMMENDED MEASURES FOR SECURITY LEVEL 3

Page 46
Are all lighting switched on?
Is the vicinity of the ship illuminated?
Are all on board surveillance equipment capable of recording

activities on, or in the vicinity of, the ship?
Is the length of time such surveillance equipment can continue to

record maximized?
Is underwater inspection of the hull of the ship prepared for?
Are measures initiated, including the slow revolution of the ship’s

propellers, if practicable, to deter underwater access to the hull of
the ship?
OTHER
A Is the ship fitted with a security alert system?
A Is the security alert system working as intended? (Not raising

alarm on board, transmitting information to shore?)
A Are there at least 2 locations onboard where the alert system

could be activated (on the bridge and at least one other location)?
A Is the alert system protected from inadvertent initiation?
A Are there procedures for the use of the ship security alert system
A Are the locations for the activation of the alert system identified?
(Must be kept in a restricted/confidential document)
Is the ship fitted with AIS?
Is the AIS in operation at all times?
Is the ship’s number permanently marked according to the ISPS

code?
Is the ship issued with a Continuous Synopsis Record (issued by

the Administration) according to SOLAS chapter XI, regulation 5?
Is the Continuous Synopsis Record updated?
Is the history of the changes of the Record available?
If firearms are being held onboard, are there procedures/orders

for their use?
Page 47
Ship Security Assessment Guideline Appendix E
APPENDIX E - SUMMARY OF SECURITY MEASURES (PART B, SECTION 9)
Measures
1. Access to the Ship by ship’s
personnel, passengers, visitors, Security Level 1 Security Level 2 SecuritySecurity Level 3
etc.
The SSP should establish the security At security level 1, the SSP should establish the At security level 2, the SSP should establish the At security level 3, the ship should comply with the
measures covering all means of security measures to control access to the security measures to be applied to protect against a instructions issued by those responding to the
access to the ship identified in the ship, where the following may be applied: heightened risk of a security incident to ensure security incident or threat thereof. The SSP should
SSA. This should include any: higher vigilance and tighter control, which may detail the security measures which could be taken by
1. checking the identity of all persons seeking to include: the ship, in close co-operation with those responding
1. Access ladders; board the ship and confirming their reasons for and the port facility, which may include:
2. access gangways; doing so by checking joining instructions, 1. assigning additional personnel to patrol deck
3. access ramps; passenger tickets, boarding passes, work orders areas during silent hours to deter unauthorised 1. limiting access to a single, controlled, access
4. access doors, side scuttles, etc; access; point;
windows and ports; 2. in liaison with the port facility the ship should 2. limiting the number of access points to the ship, 2. granting access only to those responding to the
5. mooring lines and anchor chains; ensure that designated secure areas are identifying those to be closed and the means of security incident or threat thereof;
6. cranes and hoisting gear, and established in which inspections and searching of adequately securing them; 3. directions of persons on board;
7. other access points identified in the people, baggage (including carry on items), 3. deterring waterside access to the ship, including, 4. suspension of embarkation or disembarkation;
SSA. personal effects, vehicles and their contents can for example, in liaison with the port facility, 5. suspension of cargo handling operations,
take place provision of boat patrols deliveries etc;
3. in liaison with the port facility the ship should 4. establishing a restricted area on the shore-side of 6. evacuation of the ship;
ensure that vehicles destined to be loaded on the ship, in close co-operation with the port 7. movement of the ship;
board car carriers, ro-ro and other passenger facility; 8. preparing for a full or partial search of the ship.
ships are subjected to search prior to loading, in 5. increasing the frequency and detail of searches of
accordance with the frequency required in the people, personal effects, and vehicles being
SSP; embarked or loaded onto the ship;
4. segregating checked persons and their personal 6. escorting visitors on the ship;
effects from unchecked persons and their 7.providing additional specific security briefings to
personal effects; all ship personnel on any identified threats, re-
6. segregating embarking from disembarking emphasising the procedures for reporting
passengers; suspicious persons, objects, or activities and the
7. identification of access points that should be stressing the need for increased vigilance; and,
secured or attended to prevent unauthorized 8. carrying out a full or partial search of the ship.
access;
8. securing, by locking or other means, access to
unattended spaces adjoining areas to which
passengers and visitors have access; and
9. providing security briefings to all ship personnel
on possible threats, the procedures for reporting
suspicious persons, objects or activities and the
need for vigilance.
Page 48 Version 1 (03-05-22)

2. Restricted Areas on the Ship. Security Level 1 Security Level 2 SecuritySecurity Level 3
The SSP should identify the restricted At security level 1, the SSP should establish the At security level 2, the frequency and intensity of the At security level 3, the ship should comply with the
areas to be established on the ship, security measures to be applied to restricted areas, monitoring of, and control of access to restricted instructions issued by those responding to the
specify their extent, times of which may include: areas should be increased to ensure that only security incident or threat thereof. The SSP should
application the security measures to authorized persons have access. The SSP should detail the security measures which could be taken by
be taken to control access to them 1. locking or securing access points; establish the additional security measures to be the ship, in close co-operations with those
and those to be taken to control 2. using surveillance equipment to monitor the applied, which may include: responding and the port facility, which may include:
activities within them. Restricted areas areas;
may include: 3. using guards or patrols; and 1. establishing restricted areas adjacent to access 1. the setting up of additional restricted areas on the
4. using automatic intrusion detection devices to points; ship in proximity to the security incident, or the
1. navigation bridge, mach. spaces of alert the ship’s personnel of unauthorised access. 2. continuously monitoring surveillance equipment; believed location of the security threat, to which
category A and other control and access is denied; and
stations as defined in Ch.II-2; 3. dedicating additional personnel to guard and 2. searching of restricted areas as part of a search of
2. spaces containing security and patrol restricted areas. the ship.
surveillance equipment and
systems and their controls and
lighting system controls;
3. ventilation and air-conditioning
systems and other similar spaces;
4. spaces with access to potable
water tanks, pumps, or manifolds;
5. spaces containing dangerous
goods or hazardous substances;
6. spaces containing cargo pumps
and their controls;
7. cargo spaces and spaces
containing ship’s stores;
8. crew accommodation; and
9. any other areas as determined by
the CSO, through the SSA to which
access must be restricted to
maintain the security of the ship.
3. Handling of Cargo.
Security Level 1 Security Level 2 Security Level 3
The security measures relating to At security level 1, the SSP should establish the At security level 2, the SSP should establish the At security level 3, the ship should comply with the
cargo handling should: security measures to be applied during cargo additional security measures to be applied during instructions issued by those responding to the
handling, which may include: cargo handling, which may include: security incident or threat thereof. The SSP should
1. prevent tampering, and detail the security measures which could be taken by
2. prevent cargo that is not meant for 1. routine checking of cargo, cargo transport units 1. detailed checking of cargo, cargo transport units the ship, in close co-operation with those responding
carriage from being accepted and and cargo spaces prior to, and during, cargo and cargo spaces; and the port facility, which may include:
stored on board the ship. handling operations; 2. intensified checks to ensure that only the
2. checks to ensure that cargo being loaded intended cargo is loaded; 1. suspension of the loading or unloading of cargo;
The security measures should include matches the cargo documentation; 3. intensified searching of vehicles to be loaded on and
inventory control procedures at 3. ensuring, in liaison with the port facility, that car-carriers, ro-ro and passenger ships; and 2. verify the inventory of dangerous goods and
Page 49 Version 1 (03-05-22)

access points to the ship. Once on vehicles to be loaded on board car-carriers, ro-ro 4. increased frequency and detail in checking of hazardous substances carried on board, if any,
board the ship, cargo should be and passenger ships are subjected to search seals or other methods used to prevent and their location.
capable of being identified as having prior to loading, in accordance with the frequency tampering.
been approved for loading onto the required in the SSP; and
ship. In addition, security measures 4. checking of seals or other methods used to Detailed checking of cargo may be accomplished by
should be developed to ensure that prevent tampering. the following means:
cargo, once on board, is not tampered 1. increasing the frequency and detail of visual and
with. Checking of cargo may be accomplished by the physical examination;
following means: 2. increasing the frequency of the use of scanning/
1. visual and physical examination; and detection equipment, mech. devices, dogs; and
2. using scanning/detection equipment, mechanical 3. co-ordinating enhanced security measures with
devices, or dogs. the shipper or other party in accordance with an
established agreement and procedures.
4. Delivery of Ship’s Stores. Security Level 1 Security Level 2 Security Level 3
The security measures relating to the At security level 1, the SSP should establish the At security level 2, the SSP should establish the At security level 3, the ship should comply with the
delivery of ship’s stores should: security measures to be applied during delivery of additional security measures to be applied during instructions issued by those responding to the
ship’s stores, which may include: delivery of ship’s stores by exercising checks prior security incident or threat thereof. The SSP should
1. ensure checking of ship’s stores to receiving stores on board and intensifying detail the security measures which could be taken by
and package integrity; 1. checking to ensure stores match the order prior to inspections. the ship, in close co-operation with those responding
2. prevent ship’s stores from being being loaded on board; and and the port facility, which may include:
accepted without inspection; 2. ensuring immediate secure stowage of ship’s
3. prevent tampering; and stores. 1. subjecting ship’s stores to more extensive
4. prevent ship’s stores from being checking;
accepted unless ordered. 2. preparation for restriction or suspension of
handling of ship’s stores; and
For ships regularly using the port 3. refusal to accept ship’s stores on board the ship.
facility it may be appropriate to
establish procedures involving the
ship, its suppliers and the port facility
covering notification and timing of
deliveries and their doc. There should
always be some way of confirming
that stores presented for delivery are
accompanied by evidence that they
have been ordered by the ship.
5. Handling Unaccompanied
Baggage.
The SSP should establish the security At security level 1, the SSP should establish the At security level 2, the SSP should establish the At security level 3, the ship should comply with the
measures to be applied to ensure that security measures to be applied when handling additional security measures to be applied when instructions issued by those responding to the
unaccompanied baggage (i.e. any unaccompanied baggage to ensure that handling unaccompanied baggage which should security incident or threat thereof. The SSP should
baggage, including personal effects, unaccompanied baggage is screened or searched include 100 percent x-ray screening of all detail the security measures which could be taken by
which is not with the passenger or up to and including 100 percent, which may include unaccompanied baggage. the ship, in close co-operation with those responding
ship’s personnel member at the point use of x-ray screening. and the port facility, which may include:
of inspection or search) is identified
Page 50 Version 1 (03-05-22)

and subjected to appropriate 1. subjecting such baggage to more extensive

screening, including searching, before screening, for example x-raying it from at least two
it is loaded on board the ship. different angles;
It is not envisaged that such baggage 2. preparation for restriction or suspension of
will be subjected to screening by both handling of unaccompanied baggage; and
the ship and the port facility, and in 3. refusal to accept unaccompanied baggage on
cases where both are suitably board the ship.
equipped, the responsibility for
screening should rest with the port
facility. Close co-operation with the
port facility is essential and steps
should be taken to ensure that
unaccompanied baggage is handled
securely after screening.
6. Monitoring the Security of the
Ship.
The ship should have the capability to At security level 1, the SSP should establish the At security level 2, the SSP should establish the At security level 3, the ship should comply with the
monitor the ship, the restricted areas security measures to be applied which may be a additional security measures to be applied to instructions issued by those responding to the
on board and areas surrounding the combination of lighting, watch keepers, security enhance the monitoring and surveillance security incident or threat thereof. The SSP should
ship. Such monitoring capabilities may guards or use of security and surveillance equipment capabilities, which may include: detail the security measures which could be taken by
include use of: to allow ship’s security personnel to observe the ship the ship, in close co-operation with those responding
in general, and barriers and restricted areas in 1. increasing the frequency and detail of security and the port facility, which may include:
1. lighting; particular. patrols;
2. watch-keepers, security guards and 2. increasing the coverage and intensity of lighting 1. switching on of all lighting on, or illuminating the
deck watches including patrols, and The ship's deck and access points to the ship should or the use of security and surveillance and vicinity of, the ship;
3. automatic intrusion detection be illuminated at all times while conducting ship/port equipment; 2. switching on of all on board surveillance
devices and surveillance equipment. interface activities or at a port facility or anchorage. 3. assigning additional personnel as security equipment capable of recording activities on, or in
While underway, when necessary, ships should use lookouts; and the vicinity of, the ship;
The SSP should establish the the maximum lighting available consistent with safe 4. ensuring co-ordination with waterside boat 3. maximising the length of time such surveillance
procedures and equipment needed at navigation, having regard to the provisions of the patrols, and foot or vehicle patrols on the shore- equipment can continue to record;
each security level and the means of 1972 COLREGS. The following should be side, when provided. 4. preparation for underwater inspection of the hull of
ensuring that monitoring equipment considered when establishing the appropriate level the ship; and
will be able to perform continually, and location of lighting: Additional lighting may be necessary to protect 5. initiation of measures, including the slow revolution
including consideration of the possible against a heightened risk of a security incidents. of the ship’s propellers, if practicable, to deter
effects of weather conditions or of 1. the ship’s personnel should be able to detect When necessary, the additional lighting underwater access to the hull of the ship.
power disruptions. activities beyond the ship, on both the shore side requirements may be accomplished by co-ordinating
and the waterside; with the port facility to provide additional shore side
2. coverage should include the area on and around lighting.
the ship;
3. coverage should facilitate personnel identification
at access points; and
4. coverage may be provided through co-ordination
with the port facility.
Page 51 Version 1 (03-05-22)

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Tel: +47 22 40 15 00
Fax: +47 22 40 15 15
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Visiting address:
Rådhusgaten 25, NO-0158 Oslo
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Guideline for performing

as mandated by SOLAS Chapter XI-2

Trading area/ports: ………………………………………………..…....

Responsible for Ship Security Assessment (name/rank):

SSA performed, date: …………………………………………………...

Related Ship Security Plan, date: …………………………….………..

Page 1 Version 1 (03-05-22)

LIST OF CONTENT .................................................................................................................2

1. ABOUT THIS SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT GUIDELINE.........................................3

2. THE IMO FRAMEWORK ................................................................................................6

2.1 THE AMENDMENTS TO THE 1974 SOLAS CONVENTION, CHAPTER XI ...............................6

3. THE SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT PROCESS .......................................................10

STEP 1: IDENTIFICATION OF POSSIBLE MOTIVES......................................................................11

4. REQUIREMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SSP.....................................19

APPENDIX A – IDENTIFICATION OF MOTIVES..................................................................22

APPENDIX B – KEY SHIPBOARD OPERATIONS ...............................................................25

APPENDIX C – THREAT SCENARIOS AND ASSESSMENT ..............................................28

APPENDIX D - SHIP SECURITY SURVEY – CHECKLIST...................................................34

APPENDIX E - SUMMARY OF SECURITY MEASURES (PART B, SECTION 9).................48

Page 2 Version 1 (03-05-22)

1. ABOUT THIS SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT GUIDELINE

1. ABOUT THIS SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT GUIDELINE

2. THE IMO FRAMEWORK

3. THE SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT PROCESS

4. REQUIREMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SSP ”From SSA to SSP”

APPENDIX A - IDENTIFICATION OF MOTIVES

Page 3 Version 1 (03-05-22)

Identify existing Prepare SSP Implementation

Identify threats & Review of SSP Onboard

Develop and perform Possible adjustment

Identify weaknesses in Approval of SSP

Page 4 Version 1 (03-05-22)

Page 5 Version 1 (03-05-22)

2. THE IMO FRAMEWORK

2.1 THE AMENDMENTS TO THE 1974 SOLAS CONVENTION, CHAPTER XI

- Security Level 1: Normal; the level at which Port & Ship

risk of security incident. Security

Page 6 Version 1 (03-05-22)

2.3 IMO REQUIREMENTS TO THE SSA

3.What existing security

Page 7 Version 1 (03-05-22)

1. Identification of existing security measures, procedures and operations.

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2.5 FUTURE REVISIONS

Page 9 Version 1 (03-05-22)

3. THE SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT PROCESS

low level of protective security measures. Step 4: Step 5:

Page 10 Version 1 (03-05-22)

STEP 1: IDENTIFICATION OF POSSIBLE MOTIVES

References: Part of threat identification (Part A, 8.4.3)

Are there any particular

Outcome: Prioritised list of relevant motives that may exist.

1. The worksheet (Appendix A) is divided in five motive categories:

Page 11 Version 1 (03-05-22)

STEP 2: IDENTIFICATION OF KEY SHIPBOARD OPERATIONS

References: Part A, 8.4.2; Part B, 8.3, 8.6, 8.8

Objective: To identify operations, systems, areas, and What operations, systems,

Outcome: A list of security-critical operations, systems,

Page 12 Version 1 (03-05-22)

STEP 3: IDENTIFICATION OF EXISTING SECURITY MEASURES, PROCEDURES, AND

References: Part A, 8.4.1; Part B, 8.5, 8.7 (partly 8.14)

Objective: To identify and describe existing security

Application: To get an overview of existing measures to be used :