G.R. No.

175822 October 23, 2013

CALIFORNIA CLOTHING INC. and MICHELLE S. YBAÑEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SHIRLEY G. QUIÑONES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the ; Rules of Court are the Court of
Appeals Decision1 dated August 3, 2006 and Resolution2 dated November 14, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 80309. The assailed decision reversed and set aside the June 20, 2003 Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC), Branch 58, in Civil Case No. CEB-26984; while the assailed
resolution denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Michelle Ybañez (Ybañez).

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:

On July 25, 2001, respondent Shirley G. Quiñones, a Reservation Ticketing Agent of Cebu Pacific Air
in Lapu Lapu City, went inside the Guess USA Boutique at the second floor of Robinson’s Department
Store (Robinson’s) in Cebu City. She fitted four items: two jeans, a blouse and a shorts, then decided
to purchase the black jeans worth P2,098.00.4 Respondent allegedly paid to the cashier evidenced by
a receipt5 issued by the store.6

While she was walking through the skywalk connecting Robinson’s and Mercury Drug Store (Mercury)
where she was heading next, a Guess employee approached and informed her that she failed to pay
the item she got. She, however, insisted that she paid and showed the employee the receipt issued in
her favor.7 She then suggested that they talk about it at the Cebu Pacific Office located at the
basement of the mall. She first went to Mercury then met the Guess employees as agreed upon.8

When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the Guess employees allegedly subjected her to
humiliation in front of the clients of Cebu Pacific and repeatedly demanded payment for the black
jeans.9 They supposedly even searched her wallet to check how much money she had, followed by
another argument. Respondent, thereafter, went home.10

On the same day, the Guess employees allegedly gave a letter to the Director of Cebu Pacific Air
narrating the incident, but the latter refused to receive it as it did not concern the office and the same
took place while respondent was off duty.11 Another letter was allegedly prepared and was supposed
to be sent to the Cebu Pacific Office in Robinson’s, but the latter again refused to receive it.12
Respondent also claimed that the Human Resource Department (HRD) of Robinson’s was furnished
said letter and the latter in fact conducted an investigation for purposes of canceling respondent’s
Robinson’s credit card. Respondent further claimed that she was not given a copy of said damaging
letter.13 With the above experience, respondent claimed to have suffered physical anxiety, sleepless
nights, mental anguish, fright, serious apprehension, besmirched reputation, moral shock and social
humiliation.14 She thus filed the Complaint for Damages15 before the RTC against petitioners
California Clothing, Inc. (California Clothing), Excelsis Villagonzalo (Villagonzalo), Imelda Hawayon
(Hawayon) and Ybañez. She demanded the payment of moral, nominal, and exemplary damages,
plus attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.16

In their Answer,17 petitioners and the other defendants admitted the issuance of the receipt of
payment. They claimed, however, that instead of the cashier (Hawayon) issuing the official receipt, it
was the invoicer (Villagonzalo) who did it manually. They explained that there was miscommunication
between the employees at that time because prior to the issuance of the receipt, Villagonzalo asked
Hawayon " Ok na ?," and the latter replied " Ok na ," which the former believed to mean that the item
has already been paid.18 Realizing the mistake, Villagonzalo rushed outside to look for respondent
and when he saw the latter, he invited her to go back to the shop to make clarifications as to whether
or not payment was indeed made. Instead, however, of going back to the shop, respondent
suggested that they meet at the Cebu Pacific Office. Villagonzalo, Hawayon and Ybañez thus went to
the agreed venue where they talked to respondent.19 They pointed out that it appeared in their
conversation that respondent could not recall whom she gave the payment.20 They emphasized that
they were gentle and polite in talking to respondent and it was the latter who was arrogant in
answering their questions.21 As counterclaim, petitioners and the other defendants sought the
payment of moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.22
On June 20, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing both the complaint and counterclaim of
the parties. From the evidence presented, the trial court concluded that the petitioners and the other
defendants believed in good faith that respondent failed to make payment. Considering that no motive
to fabricate a lie could be attributed to the Guess employees, the court held that when they demanded
payment from respondent, they merely exercised a right under the honest belief that no payment was
made. The RTC likewise did not find it damaging for respondent when the confrontation took place in
front of Cebu Pacific clients, because it was respondent herself who put herself in that situation by
choosing the venue for discussion. As to the letter sent to Cebu Pacific Air, the trial court also did not
take it against the Guess employees, because they merely asked for assistance and not to embarrass
or humiliate respondent. In other words, the RTC found no evidence to prove bad faith on the part of
the Guess employees to warrant the award of damages.23

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 58, in Civil Case No. CEB-26984 (for: Damages) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Defendants Michelle Ybañez and California Clothing, Inc. are hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant
Shirley G. Quiñones jointly and solidarily moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) and attorney’s fees in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).

SO ORDERED.24

While agreeing with the trial court that the Guess employees were in good faith when they confronted
respondent inside the Cebu Pacific Office about the alleged non-payment, the CA, however, found
preponderance of evidence showing that they acted in bad faith in sending the demand letter to
respondent’s employer. It found respondent’s possession of both the official receipt and the subject
black jeans as evidence of payment.25 Contrary to the findings of the RTC, the CA opined that the
letter addressed to Cebu Pacific’s director was sent to respondent’s employer not merely to ask for
assistance for the collection of the disputed payment but to subject her to ridicule, humiliation and
similar injury such that she would be pressured to pay.26 Considering that Guess already started its
investigation on the incident, there was a taint of bad faith and malice when it dragged respondent’s
employer who was not privy to the transaction. This is especially true in this case since the purported
letter contained not only a narrative of the incident but accusations as to the alleged acts of
respondent in trying to evade payment.27 The appellate court thus held that petitioners are guilty of
abuse of right entitling respondent to collect moral damages and attorney’s fees. Petitioner California
Clothing Inc. was made liable for its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence in the hiring and
selection of its employees; while Ybañez’s liability stemmed from her act of signing the demand letter
sent to respondent’s employer. In view of Hawayon and Villagonzalo’s good faith, however, they were
exonerated from liability.28

Ybañez moved for the reconsideration29 of the aforesaid decision, but the same was denied in the
assailed November 14, 2006 CA Resolution.

Petitioners now come before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court based on the following grounds:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LETTER SENT TO THE
CEBU PACIFIC OFFICE WAS MADE TO SUBJECT HEREIN RESPONDENT TO RIDICULE,
HUMILIATION AND SIMILAR INJURY.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES AND

ATTORNEY’S FEES.30

The petition is without merit.

Respondent’s complaint against petitioners stemmed from the principle of abuse of rights provided for
in the Civil Code on the chapter of human relations. Respondent cried foul when petitioners allegedly
embarrassed her when they insisted that she did not pay for the black jeans she purchased from their
shop despite the evidence of payment which is the official receipt issued by the shop. The issuance of
the receipt notwithstanding, petitioners had the right to verify from respondent whether she indeed
made payment if they had reason to believe that she did not. However, the exercise of such right is
not without limitations. Any abuse in the exercise of such right and in the performance of duty causing
damage or injury to another is actionable under the Civil Code. The Court’s pronouncement in Carpio
v. Valmonte31 is noteworthy:

In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or omission, whether done
willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for the damage or
injury he sustained. Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of equity but also universal
moral precepts which are designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good
conscience and which are meant to serve as guides for human conduct. First of these fundamental
precepts is the principle commonly known as "abuse of rights" under Article 19 of the Civil Code. It
provides that " Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith."x x x32 The elements of
abuse of rights are as follows: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3)
for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.33

In this case, petitioners claimed that there was a miscommunication between the cashier and the
invoicer leading to the erroneous issuance of the receipt to respondent. When they realized the
mistake, they made a cash count and discovered that the amount which is equivalent to the price of
the black jeans was missing. They, thus, concluded that it was respondent who failed to make such
payment. It was, therefore, within their right to verify from respondent whether she indeed paid or not
and collect from her if she did not. However, the question now is whether such right was exercised in
good faith or they went overboard giving respondent a cause of action against them.

Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the exercise
of legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acted in bad faith, with intent to
prejudice another.34 Good faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the
individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and
unscrupulous advantage of another.35 Malice or bad faith, on the other hand, implies a conscious and
intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.36

Initially, there was nothing wrong with petitioners asking respondent whether she paid or not. The
Guess employees were able to talk to respondent at the Cebu Pacific Office. The confrontation
started well, but it eventually turned sour when voices were raised by both parties. As aptly held by
both the RTC and the CA, such was the natural consequence of two parties with conflicting views
insisting on their respective beliefs. Considering, however, that respondent was in possession of the
item purchased from the shop, together with the official receipt of payment issued by petitioners, the
latter cannot insist that no such payment was made on the basis of a mere speculation. Their claim
should have been proven by substantial evidence in the proper forum.

It is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners went overboard and tried to force
respondent to pay the amount they were demanding. In the guise of asking for assistance, petitioners
even sent a demand letter to respondent’s employer not only informing it of the incident but obviously
imputing bad acts on the part of respondent.1âwphi1 Petitioners claimed that after receiving the
receipt of payment and the item purchased, respondent "was noted to hurriedly left (sic) the store."
They also accused respondent that she was not completely being honest when she was asked about
the circumstances of payment, thus:

x x x After receiving the OR and the item, Ms. Gutierrez was noted to hurriedly left (sic) the store. x x x

When I asked her about to whom she gave the money, she gave out a blank expression and told me,
"I can’t remember." Then I asked her how much money she gave, she answered, "P2,100; 2 pcs
1,000 and 1 pc 100 bill." Then I told her that that would (sic) impossible since we have no such
denomination in our cash fund at that moment. Finally, I asked her if how much change and if she
received change from the cashier, she then answered, "I don’t remember." After asking these simple
questions, I am very certain that she is not completely being honest about this. In fact, we invited her
to come to our boutique to clear these matters but she vehemently refused saying that she’s in a
hurry and very busy.37

Clearly, these statements are outrightly accusatory. Petitioners accused respondent that not only did
she fail to pay for the jeans she purchased but that she deliberately took the same without paying for
it and later hurriedly left the shop to evade payment. These accusations were made despite the
issuance of the receipt of payment and the release of the item purchased. There was, likewise, no
showing that respondent had the intention to evade payment. Contrary to petitioners’ claim,
respondent was not in a rush in leaving the shop or the mall. This is evidenced by the fact that the
Guess employees did not have a hard time looking for her when they realized the supposed non-
payment.

It can be inferred from the foregoing that in sending the demand letter to respondent’s employer,
petitioners intended not only to ask for assistance in collecting the disputed amount but to tarnish
respondent’s reputation in the eyes of her employer. To malign respondent without substantial
evidence and despite the latter’s possession of enough evidence in her favor, is clearly impermissible.
A person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise, he opens
himself to liability.38

The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must
not be excessive or unduly harsh.39 In this case, petitioners obviously abused their rights.

Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of Articles 20 and 2 of the Civil
Code which read:40

Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals or good customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

In view of the foregoing, respondent is entitled to an award of moral damages and attorney s fees.
Moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant s wrongful act or omission is the proximate
cause of the plaintiffs physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury in the cases specified
or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.41 Moral damages are not a
bonanza. They are given to ease the defendant s grief and suffering. They should, thus, reasonably
approximate the extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done.42 They are awarded not to
enrich the complainant but to enable the latter to obtain means, diversions, or amusements that will
serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone.43 We find that the amount of P50,000.00 as
moral damages awarded by the CA is reasonable under the circumstances. Considering that
respondent was compelled to litigate to protect her interest, attorney s fees in the amount of
ofP20,000.00 is likewise just and proper.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated August 3, 2006 and Resolution dated November 14, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80309,
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160689 March 26, 2014

RAUL H. SESBREÑO, Petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN I. COROMINA (SUBSTITUTED BY ANITA COROMINA,
ELIZABETH COROMINA and ROSIEMARIE COROMINA), VICENTE E. GARCIA (SUBSTITUTED
BY EDGAR JOHN GARCIA), FELIPE CONSTANTINO, RONALD ARCILLA, NORBETO ABELLANA,
DEMETRIO BALICHA, ANGELITA LHUILLIER, JOSE E. GARCIA, AND VISA YAN ELECTRIC
COMPANY (VECO), Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

This case concerns the claim for damages of petitioner Raul H. Sesbreño founded on abuse of rights.
Sesbreño accused the violation of contract (VOC) inspection team dispatched by the Visayan Electric
Company (VECO) to check his electric meter with conducting an unreasonable search in his
residential premises. But the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13, in Cebu City rendered judgment
on August 19, 1994 dismissing the claim;1 and the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the dismissal on
March 10, 2003.2

Hence, this appeal by Sesbreño.

Antecedents

At the time material to the petition, VECO was a public utility corporation organized and existing under
the laws of the Philippines. VECO engaged in the sale and distribution of electricity within
Metropolitan Cebu. Sesbreño was one of VECO’s customers under the metered service contract they
had entered into on March 2, 1982.3 Respondent Vicente E. Garcia was VECO’s President, General
Manager and Chairman of its Board of Directors. Respondent Jose E. Garcia was VECO’s Vice-
President, Treasurer and a Member of its Board of Directors. Respondent Angelita Lhuillier was
another Member of VECO’s Board of Directors. Respondent Juan Coromina was VECO’s Assistant
Treasurer, while respondent Norberto Abellana was the Head of VECO’s Billing Section whose main
function was to compute back billings of customers found to have violated their contracts.

To ensure that its electric meters were properly functioning, and that none of it meters had been
tampered with, VECO employed respondents Engr. Felipe Constantino and Ronald Arcilla as violation
of contract (VOC) inspectors.4 Respondent Sgt. Demetrio Balicha, who belonged to the 341st
Constabulary Company, Cebu Metropolitan Command, Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City,
accompanied and escorted the VOC inspectors during their inspection of the households of its
customers on May 11, 1989 pursuant to a mission order issued to him.5

The CA summarized the antecedent facts as follows:

x x x. Reduced to its essentials, however, the facts of this case are actually simple enough, although
the voluminous records might indicate otherwise. It all has to do with an incident that occurred at
around 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon of May 11, 1989. On that day, the Violation of Contracts (VOC)
Team of defendants-appellees Constantino and Arcilla and their PC escort, Balicha, conducted a
routine inspection of the houses at La Paloma Village, Labangon, Cebu City, including that of plaintiff-
appellant Sesbreño, for illegal connections, meter tampering, seals, conduit pipes, jumpers, wiring
connections, and meter installations. After Bebe Baledio, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño’s maid,
unlocked the gate, they inspected the electric meter and found that it had been turned upside down.
Defendant-appellant Arcilla took photographs of the upturned electric meter. With Chuchie Garcia,
Peter Sesbreño and one of the maids present, they removed said meter and replaced it with a new
one. At that time, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño was in his office and no one called to inform him of the
inspection. The VOC Team then asked for and received Chuchie Garcia’s permission to enter the
house itself to examine the kind and number of appliances and light fixtures in the household and
determine its electrical load. Afterwards, Chuchie Garcia signed the Inspection Division Report, which
showed the condition of the electric meter on May 11, 1989 when the VOC Team inspected it, with
notice that it would be subjected to a laboratory test. She also signed a Load Survey Sheet that
showed the electrical load of plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño.

But according to plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño there was nothing routine or proper at all with what the
VOC Team did on May 11, 1989 in his house. Their entry to his house and the surrounding premises
was effected without his permission and over the objections of his maids. They threatened, forced or
coerced their way into his house. They unscrewed the electric meter, turned it upside down and took
photographs thereof. They then replaced it with a new electric meter. They searched the house and
its rooms without his permission or a search warrant. They forced a visitor to sign two documents,
making her appear to be his representative or agent. Afterwards, he found that some of his personal
effects were missing, apparently stolen by the VOC Team when they searched the house.6

Judgment of the RTC

On August 19, 1994, the RTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint.7 It did not accord
credence to the testimonies of Sesbreño’s witnesses, Bebe Baledio, his housemaid, and Roberto
Lopez, a part-time salesman, due to inconsistencies on material points in their respective testimonies.
It observed that Baledio could not make up her mind as to whether Sesbreño’s children were in the
house when the VOC inspection team detached and replaced the electric meter. Likewise, it
considered unbelievable that Lopez should hear the exchanges between Constantino, Arcilla and
Balicha, on one hand, and Baledio, on the other, considering that Lopez could not even hear the
conversation between two persons six feet away from where he was seated during the simulation
done in court, the same distance he supposedly had from the gate of Sesbreño’s house during the
incident. It pointed out that Lopez’s presence at the gate during the incident was even contradicted by
his own testimony indicating that an elderly woman had opened the gate for the VECO personnel,
because it was Baledio, a lady in her 20s, who had repeatedly stated on her direct and cross
examinations that she had let the VECO personnel in. It concluded that for Lopez to do nothing at all
upon seeing a person being threatened by another in the manner he described was simply contrary to
human experience.

In contrast, the RTC believed the evidence of the respondents showing that the VOC inspection team
had found the electric meter in Sesbreño’s residence turned upside down to prevent the accurate
registering of the electricity consumption of the household, causing them to detach and replace the
meter. It held as unbelievable that the team forcibly entered the house through threats and
intimidation; that they themselves turned the electric meter upside down in order to incriminate him for
theft of electricity, because the fact that the team and Sesbreño had not known each other before
then rendered it unlikely for the team to fabricate charges against him; and that Sesbreño’s non-
presentation of Chuchie Garcia left her allegation of her being forced to sign the two documents by
the team unsubstantiated.

Decision of the CA

Sesbreño appealed, but the CA affirmed the RTC on March 10, 2003,8 holding thusly:

x x x. plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño’s account is simply too implausible or far-fetched to be believed. For

one thing, the inspection on his household was just one of many others that the VOC Team had
conducted in that subdivision. Yet, none but plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño complained of the alleged
acts of the VOC Team. Considering that there is no proof that they also perpetrated the same illegal
acts on other customers in the guise of conducting a Violation of Contracts inspection, plaintiff-
appellant Sesbreño likewise failed to show why he alone was singled out. It is also difficult to believe
that the VOC Team would be brazen enough to want to antagonize a person such as plaintiff-
appellant Sesbreño. There is no evidence that the VOC Team harbored any evil motive or grudge
against plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño, who is a total stranger to them. Until he came along, they did not
have any prior criminal records to speak of, or at least, no evidence thereof was presented. It is
equally difficult to believe that their superiors would authorize or condone their alleged illegal acts.
Especially so since there is no indication that prior to the incident on May 11, 1989, there was already
bad blood or animosity between plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño and defendant appellees to warrant such
a malevolent response. In fact, since availing of defendant-appellee VECO’s power services, the
relationship between them appears to have been uneventful.
It becomes all the more apparent that the charges stemming from the May 11, 1989 incident were
fabricated when taken together with the lower court’s evaluation of the alleged theft of plaintiff-
appellant Sesbreño’s personal effects. It stated that on August 8, 1989, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño
wrote the barangay captain of Punta Princesa and accused Chuchie Garcia and Victoria Villarta alias
Victoria Rocamora of theft of some of his things that earlier he claimed had been stolen by members
of the VOC Team. When he was confronted with these facts, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño further
claimed that the items allegedly stolen by Chuchie Garcia were part of the loot taken by defendants-
appellees Constantino and Arcilla. Yet not once did plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño or any of his
witnesses mention that a conspiracy existed between these people. Clearly, much like his other
allegations, it is nothing more than an afterthought by plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño.

All in all, the allegations against defendants-appellees appear to be nothing more than a put-on to
save face. For the simple truth is that the inspection exposed plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño as a likely
cheat and thief.

xxxx

Neither is this Court swayed by the testimonies of Baledio and Lopez.1âwphi1 The lower court rightly
described their testimonies as fraught by discrepancies and inconsistencies on material points and
even called Lopez a perjured witness. On the other hand, it is odd that plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño
chose not to present the witness whose testimony was very crucial. But even though Chuchie Garcia
never testified, her absence speaks volumes. Whereas plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño claimed that the
VOC Team forced her to sign two documents that made her appear to be his authorized agent or
representative, the latter claimed otherwise and that she also gave them permission to enter and
search the house. The person most qualified to refute the VOC Team’s claim is Chuchie Garcia
herself. It is axiomatic that he who asserts a fact or claim must prove it. He cannot transfer that
burden to the person against whom he asserts such fact or claim. When certain evidence is
suppressed, the presumption is that it will adversely affect the cause of the party suppressing it,
should it come to light. x x x9

Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration,10 Sesbreño appealed.

Issue

Was Sesbreño entitled to recover damages for abuse of rights?

Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

Sesbreño’s main contention is that the inspection of his residence by the VOC team was an
unreasonable search for being carried out without a warrant and for being allegedly done with malice
or bad faith.

Before dealing with the contention, we have to note that two distinct portions of Sesbreño’s residence
were inspected by the VOS team – the garage where the electric meter was installed, and the main
premises where the four bedrooms, living rooms, dining room and kitchen were located.

Anent the inspection of the garage where the meter was installed, the respondents assert that the
VOC team had the continuing authority from Sesbreño as the consumer to enter his premises at all
reasonable hours to conduct an inspection of the meter without being liable for trespass to dwelling.
The authority emanated from paragraph 9 of the metered service contract entered into between
VECO and each of its consumers, which provided as follows:

9. The CONSUMER agrees to allow properly authorized employees or representatives of the

COMPANY to enter his premises at all reasonable hours without being liable to trespass to dwelling
for the purpose of inspecting, installing, reading, removing, testing, replacing or otherwise disposing of
its property, and/or removing the COMPANY’S property in the event of the termination of the contract
for any cause.11
Sesbreño contends, however, that paragraph 9 did not give Constantino, Arcilla and Balicha the
blanket authority to enter at will because the only property VECO owned in his premises was the
meter; hence, Constantino and Arcilla should enter only the garage. He denies that they had the right
to enter the main portion of the house and inspect the various rooms and the appliances therein
because those were not the properties of VECO. He posits that Balicha, who was not an employee of
VECO, had no authority whatsoever to enter his house and conduct a search. He concludes that their
search was unreasonable, and entitled him to damages in light of their admission that they had
entered and inspected his premises without a search warrant.12

We do not accept Sesbreño’s conclusion.1avvphi1 Paragraph 9 clothed the entire VOC team with
unquestioned authority to enter the garage to inspect the meter. The members of the team obviously
met the conditions imposed by paragraph 9 for an authorized entry. Firstly, their entry had the
objective of conducting the routine inspection of the meter.13 Secondly, the entry and inspection were
confined to the garage where the meter was installed.14 Thirdly, the entry was effected at around 4
o’clock p.m., a reasonable hour.15 And, fourthly, the persons who inspected the meter were duly
authorized for the purpose by VECO.

Although Balicha was not himself an employee of VECO,16 his participation was to render police
assistance to ensure the personal security of Constantino and Arcilla during the inspection, rendering
him a necessary part of the team as an authorized representative. Under the circumstances, he was
authorized to enter considering that paragraph 9 expressly extended such authority to "properly
authorized employees or representatives" of VECO.

It is true, as Sesbreño urges, that paragraph 9 did not cover the entry into the main premises of the
residence. Did this necessarily mean that any entry by the VOS team into the main premises required
a search warrant to be first secured?

Sesbreño insists so, citing Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the clause guaranteeing the
right of every individual against unreasonable searches and seizures, viz:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

He states that a violation of this constitutional guaranty rendered VECO and its VOS team liable to
him for damages by virtue of Article 32 (9) of the Civil Code, which pertinently provides:

Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs,
defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of
another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

xxxx

(9) The right to be secured in one’s person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures;

x x x x.

Sesbreño’s insistence has no legal and factual basis.

The constitutional guaranty against unlawful searches and seizures is intended as a restraint against
the Government and its agents tasked with law enforcement. It is to be invoked only to ensure
freedom from arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of State power. The Court has made this clear in
its pronouncements, including that made in People v. Marti,17 viz:

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it
is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the
proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and
without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure
cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.18

It is worth noting that the VOC inspectors decided to enter the main premises only after finding the
meter of Sesbreño turned upside down, hanging and its disc not rotating. Their doing so would enable
them to determine the unbilled electricity consumed by his household. The circumstances justified
their decision, and their inspection of the main premises was a continuation of the authorized entry.
There was no question then that their ability to determine the unbilled electricity called for them to see
for themselves the usage of electricity inside. Not being agents of the State, they did not have to first
obtain a search warrant to do so.

Balicha’s presence participation in the entry did not make the inspection a search by an agent of the
State within the ambit of the guaranty. As already mentioned, Balicha was part of the team by virtue of
his mission order authorizing him to assist and escort the team during its routine inspection.19
Consequently, the entry into the main premises of the house by the VOC team did not constitute a
violation of the guaranty.

Our holding could be different had Sesbreño persuasively demonstrated the intervention of malice or
bad faith on the part of Constantino and Arcilla during their inspection of the main premises, or any
excessiveness committed by them in the course of the inspection. But Sesbreño did not. On the other
hand, the CA correctly observed that the inspection did not zero in on Sesbreño’s residence because
the other houses within the area were similarly subjected to the routine inspection.20 This, we think,
eliminated any notion of malice or bad faith.

Clearly, Sesbreño did not establish his claim for damages if the respondents were not guilty of abuse
of rights. To stress, the concept of abuse of rights prescribes that a person should not use his right
unjustly or in bad faith; otherwise, he may be liable to another who suffers injury. The rationale for the
concept is to present some basic principles to be followed for the rightful relationship between human
beings and the stability of social order.21 Moreover, according to a commentator,22 "the exercise of
right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice
of others[;] [i]t cannot be said that a person exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices
another." Article 19 of the Civil Code23 sets the standards to be observed in the exercise of one’s
rights and in the performance of one’s duties, namely: (a) to act with justice; (b) to give everyone his
due; and (c) to observe honesty and good faith. The law thereby recognizes the primordial limitation
on all rights – that in the exercise of the rights, the standards under Article 19 must be observed.24

Although the act is not illegal, liability for damages may arise should there be an abuse of rights, like
when the act is performed without prudence or in bad faith. In order that liability may attach under the
concept of abuse of rights, the following elements must be present, to wit: (a) the existence of a legal
right or duty, (b) which is exercised in bad faith, and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.25 There is no hard and fast rule that can be applied to ascertain whether or not the principle
of abuse of rights is to be invoked. The resolution of the issue depends on the circumstances of each
case.

Sesbreño asserts that he did not authorize Baledio or Chuchie Garcia to let anyone enter his
residence in his absence; and that Baledio herself confirmed that the members of the VOC team had
intimidated her into letting them in.

The assertion of Sesbreño is improper for consideration in this appeal.1âwphi1 The RTC and the CA
unanimously found the testimonies of Sesbreño’s witnesses implausible because of inconsistencies
on material points; and even declared that the non-presentation of Garcia as a witness was odd if not
suspect. Considering that such findings related to the credibility of the witnesses and their
testimonies, the Court cannot review and undo them now because it is not a trier of facts, and is not
also tasked to analyze or weigh evidence all over again.26 Verily, a review that may tend to supplant
the findings of the trial court that had the first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses themselves should be undertaken by the Court with prudent hesitation. Only when
Sesbreño could make a clear showing of abuse in their appreciation of the evidence and records by
the trial and the appellate courts should the Court do the unusual review of the factual findings of the
trial and appellate courts.27 Alas, that showing was not made here.

Nor should the Court hold that Sesbreño was denied due process by the refusal of the trial judge to
inhibit from the case. Although the trial judge had issued an order for his voluntary inhibition, he still
rendered the judgment in the end in compliance with the instruction of the Executive Judge, whose
exercise of her administrative authority on the matter of the inhibition should be respected.28 In this
connection, we find to be apt the following observation of the CA, to wit:

x x x. Both Judge Paredes and Judge Priscila Agana serve the Regional Trial Court and are therefore
of co-equal rank. The latter has no authority to reverse or modify the orders of Judge Paredes. But in
ordering Judge Paredes to continue hearing the case, Judge Agana did not violate their co-equal
status or unilaterally increased her jurisdiction. It is merely part of her administrative responsibilities as
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, of which Judge Paredes is also a
member.29

Lastly, the Court finds nothing wrong if the writer of the decision in the CA refused to inhibit from
participating in the resolution of the motion for reconsideration filed by Sesbrefio. The motion for her
inhibition was grounded on suspicion of her bias and prejudice,30 but suspicion of bias and prejudice
were not enough grounds for inhibition.31

Suffice it to say that the records are bereft of any indication that even suggested that the Associate
Justices of the CA who participated in the promulgation of the decision were tainted with bias against
him.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the pet1t1on for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on March 10, 2003; and DIRECTS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 157547 February 23, 2011
HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON, Petitioners,
-versus -
ELVIN* CHAN AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from the issuance of an
unfunded check prohibited and punished under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22).

Antecedents

On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila (MeTC) an information charging the late Eduardo Simon (Simon) with a violation of BP 22,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 275381 entitled People v. Eduardo Simon. The accusatory portion
reads:

That sometime in December 1996 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Elvin Chan to apply on account or
for value Landbank Check No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 payable to cash in the amount of
P336,000.00 said accused well knowing that at the time of issue she/he/they did not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which
check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor,
said accused failed to pay said Elvin Chan the amount of the check or to make arrangement for full
payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.

CONTRARY TO LAW. [1]

More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin Chan commenced in the MeTC in
Pasay City a civil action for the collection of the principal amount of P336,000.00, coupled with an
application for a writ of preliminary attachment (docketed as Civil Case No. 915-00).[2] He alleged in
his complaint the following:

xxx
2. Sometime in December 1996 defendant employing fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation encashed
a check dated December 26, 1996 in the amount of P336,000.00 to the plaintiff assuring the latter that
the check is duly funded and that he had an existing account with the Land Bank of the Philippines,
xerox copy of the said check is hereto attached as Annex A;

3. However, when said check was presented for payment the same was dishonored on the ground
that the account of the defendant with the Land Bank of the Philippines has been closed contrary to
his representation that he has an existing account with the said bank and that the said check was duly
funded and will be honored when presented for payment;

4. Demands had been made to the defendant for him to make good the payment of the value of the
check, xerox copy of the letter of demand is hereto attached as Annex B, but despite such demand
defendant refused and continues to refuse to comply with plaintiffs valid demand;

5. Due to the unlawful failure of the defendant to comply with the plaintiffs valid demands, plaintiff has
been compelled to retain the services of counsel for which he agreed to pay as reasonable attorneys
fees the amount of P50,000.00 plus additional amount of P2,000.00 per appearance.

ALLEGATION IN SUPPORT OF PRAYER

FOR PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT

6. The defendant as previously alleged has been guilty of fraud in contracting the obligation upon
which this action is brought and that there is no sufficient security for the claims sought in this action
which fraud consist in the misrepresentation by the defendant that he has an existing account and
sufficient funds to cover the check when in fact his account was already closed at the time he issued
a check;

7. That the plaintiff has a sufficient cause of action and this action is one which falls under Section 1,
sub-paragraph (d), Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines and the amount due the
plaintiff is as much as the sum for which the plaintiff seeks the writ of preliminary attachment;

8. That the plaintiff is willing and able to post a bond conditioned upon the payment of damages
should it be finally found out that the plaintiff is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment.[3]

On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary attachment, which was
implemented on August 17, 2000 through the sheriff attaching a Nissan vehicle of Simon.[4]

On August 17, 2000, Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs
attachment bond for damages,[5] pertinently averring:

xxx
On the ground of litis pendentia, that is, as a consequence of the pendency of another action between
the instant parties for the same cause before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X (10)
entitled People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Simon, docketed thereat as Criminal Case No. 275381-
CR, the instant action is dismissable under Section 1, (e), Rule 16, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, xxx
xxx
While the instant case is civil in nature and character as contradistinguished from the said Criminal
Case No. 915-00 in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X (10), the basis of the instant civil
action is the herein plaintiffs criminal complaint against defendant arising from a charge of violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 as a consequence of the alleged dishonor in plaintiffs hands upon
presentment for payment with drawee bank a Land Bank Check No. 0007280 dated December 26,
1996 in the amount of P336,000- drawn allegedly issued to plaintiff by defendant who is the accused
in said case, a photocopy of the Criminal information filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila
on June 11, 1997 hereto attached and made integral part hereof as Annex 1.

It is our understanding of the law and the rules, that, when a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to
institute it separately xxx.

On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed Simons urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge
plaintiffs attachment bond for damages, stating:

1. The sole ground upon which defendant seeks to dismiss plaintiffs complaint is the alleged
pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause, contending among others
that the pendency of Criminal Case No. 275381-CR entitled People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo
Simon renders this case dismissable;

2. The defendant further contends that under Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
filing of the criminal action, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged
is impliedly instituted with the criminal action which the plaintiff does not contest; however, it is the
submission of the plaintiff that an implied reservation of the right to file a civil action has already been
made, first, by the fact that the information for violation of B.P. 22 in Criminal Case No. 2753841 does
not at all make any allegation of damages suffered by the plaintiff nor is there any claim for recovery
of damages; on top of this the plaintiff as private complainant in the criminal case, during the
presentation of the prosecution evidence was not represented at all by a private prosecutor such that
no evidence has been adduced by the prosecution on the criminal case to prove damages; all of
these we respectfully submit demonstrate an effective implied reservation of the right of the plaintiff to
file a separate civil action for damages;
3. The defendant relies on Section 3 sub-paragraph (a) Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which
mandates that after a criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until
final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action; however, the defendant overlooks and
conveniently failed to consider that under Section 2, Rule 111 which provides as follows:

In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party during the pendency of criminal case provided the right is reserved as required in the
preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.

In as much as the case is one that falls under Art. 33 of the Civil Code of the Philippines as it is based
on fraud, this action therefore may be prosecuted independently of the criminal action;

4. In fact we would even venture to state that even without any reservation at all of the right to file a
separate civil action still the plaintiff is authorized to file this instant case because the plaintiff seeks to
enforce an obligation which the defendant owes to the plaintiff by virtue of the negotiable instruments
law. The plaintiff in this case sued the defendant to enforce his liability as drawer in favor of the
plaintiff as payee of the check. Assuming the allegation of the defendant of the alleged circumstances
relative to the issuance of the check, still when he delivered the check payable to bearer to that
certain Pedro Domingo, as it was payable to cash, the same may be negotiated by delivery by who
ever was the bearer of the check and such negotiation was valid and effective against the drawer;

5. Indeed, assuming as true the allegations of the defendant regarding the circumstances relative to
the issuance of the check it would be entirely impossible for the plaintiff to have been aware that such
check was intended only for a definite person and was not negotiable considering that the said check
was payable to bearer and was not even crossed;

6. We contend that what cannot be prosecuted separate and apart from the criminal case without a
reservation is a civil action arising from the criminal offense charged. However, in this instant case
since the liability of the defendant are imposed and the rights of the plaintiff are created by the
negotiable instruments law, even without any reservation at all this instant action may still be
prosecuted;

7. Having this shown, the merits of plaintiffs complaint the application for damages against the bond is
totally without any legal support and perforce should be dismissed outright.[6]

On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simons urgent motion to dismiss with
application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages,[7] dismissing the complaint of Chan
because:

xxx
After study of the arguments of the parties, the court resolves to GRANT the Motion to Dismiss and
the application to charge plaintiffs bond for damages.

For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur:
(a) identity of parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the identity in
the two (2) cases should be such that the judgment, which may be rendered in one would, regardless
of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. xxx

A close perusal of the herein complaint denominated as Sum of Money and the criminal case for
violation of BP Blg. 22 would readily show that the parties are not only identical but also the cause of
action being asserted, which is the recovery of the value of Landbank Check No. 0007280 in the
amount of P336,000.00. In both civil and criminal cases, the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
reliefs being founded on the same facts, are identical.

Plaintiffs claim that there is an effective implied waiver of his right to pursue this civil case owing to the
fact that there was no allegation of damages in BP Blg. 22 case and that there was no private
prosecutor during the presentation of prosecution evidence is unmeritorious. It is basic that when a
complaint or criminal Information is filed, even without any allegation of damages and the intention to
prove and claim them, the offended party has the right to prove and claim for them, unless a waiver or
reservation is made or unless in the meantime, the offended party has instituted a separate civil
action. xxx The over-all import of the said provision conveys that the waiver which includes indemnity
under the Revised Penal Code, and damages arising under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code
must be both clear and express. And this must be logically so as the primordial objective of the Rule
is to prevent the offended party from recovering damages twice for the same act or omission of the
accused.

Indeed, the evidence discloses that the plaintiff did not waive or made a reservation as to his right to
pursue the civil branch of the criminal case for violation of BP Blg. 22 against the defendant herein. To
the considered view of this court, the filing of the instant complaint for sum of money is indeed legally
barred. The right to institute a separate civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts to
present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity
to make such reservation. xxx

Even assuming the correctness of the plaintiffs submission that the herein case for sum of money is
one based on fraud and hence falling under Article 33 of the Civil Code, still prior reservation is
required by the Rules, to wit:

In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party during the pendency of criminal case provided the right is reserved as required in the
preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.

xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court resolves to:

1. Dismiss the instant complaint on the ground of litis pendentia;

2. Dissolve/Lift the Writ of Attachment issued by this court on August 14, 2000;

3. Charge the plaintiffs bond the amount of P336,000.00 in favor of the defendant for the damages
sustained by the latter by virtue of the implementation of the writ of attachment;

4. Direct the Branch Sheriff of this Court to RESTORE with utmost dispatch to the defendants
physical possession the vehicle seized from him on August 16, 2000; and

5. Direct the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of P5,000.00 by way of attorneys fees.

SO ORDERED.

Chans motion for reconsideration was denied on December 20, 2000,[8] viz:

Considering that the plaintiffs arguments appear to be a mere repetition of his previous submissions,
and which submissions this court have already passed upon; and taking into account the
inapplicability of the ratio decidendi in the Tactaquin vs. Palileo case which the plaintiff cited as clearly
in that case, the plaintiff therein expressly made a reservation to file a separate civil action, the Motion
for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

On July 31, 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasay City upheld the dismissal of Chans
complaint, disposing:[9]

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.
On September 26, 2001, Chan appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for review,[10]
challenging the propriety of the dismissal of his complaint on the ground of litis pendentia.

In his comment, [11] Simon countered that Chan was guilty of bad faith and malice in prosecuting his
alleged civil claim twice in a manner that caused him (Simon) utter embarrassment and emotional
sufferings; and that the dismissal of the civil case because of the valid ground of litis pendentia based
on Section 1 (e), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was warranted.

On June 25, 2002, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,[12] overturning the RTC, viz:

xxx
As a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first is the social injury produced
by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired through the imposition of the corresponding penalty,
and the second is the personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which injury is sought to be
compensated through indemnity which is also civil in nature. Thus, every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable.

The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from the commission of the
offense in the criminal case since the civil action is either deemed instituted with the criminal action or
is separately instituted.

Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective on
December 1, 2000, provides that:

(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from
the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institute the civil action prior to the
criminal action.

Rule 111, Section 2 further states:

After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be
instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.

However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission, the rule has been changed.

In DMPI Employees Credit Association vs. Velez, the Supreme Court pronounced that only the civil
liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action. Speaking through Justice Pardo, the Supreme Court held:

There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil action under Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The reservation and waiver referred to refers
only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does
not include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines arising from the same act or omission which may be prosecuted separately without a
reservation.

Rule 111, Section 3 reads:

Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34, and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended
party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action.

The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil actions
which became effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to this case.
Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure. xxx

Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-124, an independent civil action for damages on account of the fraud
committed against respondent Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil Code, may proceed independently
even if there was no reservation as to its filing.

It must be pointed that the abovecited case is similar with the instant suit. The complaint was also
brought on allegation of fraud under Article 33 of the Civil Code and committed by the respondent in
the issuance of the check which later bounced. It was filed before the trial court, despite the pendency
of the criminal case for violation of BP 22 against the respondent. While it may be true that the
changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil action became
effective on December 1, 2000, the same may be given retroactive application and may be made to
apply to the case at bench, since procedural rules may be given retroactive application. There are no
vested rights in the rules of procedure.

In view of the ruling on the first assigned error, it is therefore an error to adjudge damages in favor of
the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 13, 2001 rendered by the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 108 affirming the dismissal of the complaint filed by
petitioner is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court
for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

On March 14, 2003, the CA denied Simons motion for reconsideration.[13]

Hence, this appeal, in which the petitioners submit that the CA erroneously premised its decision on
the assessment that the civil case was an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176
of the Civil Code; that the CAs reliance on the ruling in DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative Inc. v.
Velez[14] stretched the meaning and intent of the ruling, and was contrary to Sections 1 and 2 of Rule
111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; that this case was a simple collection suit for a sum of
money, precluding the application of Section 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.[15]
In his comment,[16] Chan counters that the petition for review should be denied because the
petitioners used the wrong mode of appeal; that his cause of action, being based on fraud, was an
independent civil action; and that the appearance of a private prosecutor in the criminal case did not
preclude the filing of his separate civil action.

Issue

The lone issue is whether or not Chans civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded check (Civil
Case No. 915-00) was an independent civil action.

Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

A
Applicable Law and Jurisprudence on the
Propriety of filing a separate civil action based on BP 22

The Supreme Court has settled the issue of whether or not a violation of BP 22 can give rise to civil
liability in Banal v. Judge Tadeo, Jr.,[17] holding:

xxx
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:

Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify
the latter for the same.

Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the offended
party may be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the
wrongful act of another. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of
the penalty imposed by law for the commission of a crime (Quemel v. Court of Appeals, 22 SCRA 44,
citing Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil 692). Every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action
for the punishment of the guilty party, and also to civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of
the damage, and indemnification for the losses (United States v. Bernardo, 19 Phil 265).
xxx
Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus be denied. The payee of the check is entitled to receive
the payment of money for which the worthless check was issued. Having been caused the damage,
she is entitled to recompense.

Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave the
offended private party defrauded and empty-handed by excluding the civil liability of the offender,
giving her only the remedy, which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a
separate civil suit. To do so may leave the offended party unable to recover even the face value of the
check due her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense of the payee. The
protection which the law seeks to provide would, therefore, be brought to naught.
xxx

However, there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in
contravention of BP 22. This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, effective December 1, 2000,
which relevantly provides:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with
the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution
starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal,
temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or
information, the filing fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such
damages.

Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.

Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case,
but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil
action. (1a)

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.[18]

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing
fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages
claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts
alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently
awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of the Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

Section 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for
the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.

The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced
Civil Case No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. It is axiomatic that the
retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel
adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a general rule,
no vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws.[19] Any new rules may validly be made
to apply to cases pending at the time of their promulgation, considering that no party to an action has
a vested right in the rules of procedure,[20] except that in criminal cases, the changes do not
retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what is
required at the time of the commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity would be
unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the Constitution.[21]
Moreover, the application of the rule would not be precluded by the violation of any assumed vested
right, because the new rule was adopted from Supreme Court Circular 57-97 that took effect on
November 1, 1997.

Supreme Court Circular 57-97 states:

Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the following rules and
guidelines shall henceforth be observed in the filing and prosecution of all criminal cases under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 which penalizes the making or drawing and issuance of a check without funds or
credit:

1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include
the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed
or recognized.[22]
2. Upon the filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the
filing fees based upon the amount of the check involved which shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed, in accordance with the schedule of fees in Section 7 (a) and Section 8 (a), Rule
141 of the Rules of Court as last amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-94 effective August 1,
1994. Where the offended party further seeks to enforce against the accused civil liability by way of
liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, he shall pay the corresponding filing
fees therefor based on the amounts thereof as alleged either in the complaint or information. If not so
alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the amount of such fees
shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
3. Where the civil action has heretofore been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the
latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with the
pertinent procedure outlined in Section 2 (a) of Rule 111 governing the proceedings in the actions as
thus consolidated.
4. This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation and shall take effect
on November 1, 1997.

The reasons for issuing Circular 57-97 were amply explained in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing
Corporation v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corporation,[23] thus:
xxx
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that upon filing of the criminal cases for violation of
B.P. 22, the civil action for the recovery of the amount of the checks was also impliedly instituted
under Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under the present revised
Rules, the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil
action. The reservation to file a separate civil action is no longer needed. The Rules provide:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.

(a) xxx

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing
fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages
claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the
amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are
subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a
first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

The foregoing rule was adopted from Circular No. 57-97 of this Court. It specifically states that the
criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. It
also requires the complainant to pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved.
Generally, no filing fees are required for criminal cases, but because of the inclusion of the civil action
in complaints for violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the payment of docket fees upon the filing of
the complaint. This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with B.P. 22 cases
as creditors actually use the courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in
criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to
collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof.
The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is expected to significantly lower the number of
cases filed before the courts for collection based on dishonored checks. It is also expected to
expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for criminal
and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid
down by the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The Rules even prohibit the
reservation of a separate civil action, which means that one can no longer file a separate civil case
after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate proceedings are
allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage
the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have previously observed that a separate civil
action for the purpose of recovering the amount of the dishonored checks would only prove to be
costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and would further delay the final disposition
of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioners rights may be fully
adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability
is clearly unwarranted. In view of this special rule governing actions for violation of B.P. 22, Article 31
of the Civil Code cited by the trial court will not apply to the case at bar.[24]

The CAs reliance on DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez[25] to give due course to the civil
action of Chan independently and separately of Criminal Case No. 275381 was unwarranted. DMPI
Employees, which involved a prosecution for estafa, is not on all fours with this case, which is a
prosecution for a violation of BP 22. Although the Court has ruled that the issuance of a bouncing
check may result in two separate and distinct crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22,[26] the
procedures for the recovery of the civil liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes are different
and non-interchangeable. In prosecutions of estafa, the offended party may opt to reserve his right to
file a separate civil action, or may institute an independent action based on fraud pursuant to Article
33 of the Civil Code,[27] as DMPI Employees has allowed. In prosecutions of violations of BP 22,
however, the Court has adopted a policy to prohibit the reservation or institution of a separate civil
action to claim the civil liability arising from the issuance of the bouncing check upon the reasons
delineated in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation, supra.

To repeat, Chans separate civil action to recover the amount of the check involved in the prosecution
for the violation of BP 22 could not be independently maintained under both Supreme Court Circular
57-97 and the aforequoted provisions of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, notwithstanding the
allegations of fraud and deceit.

B
Aptness of the dismissal of the civil action
on the ground of litis pendentia

Did the pendency of the civil action in the MeTC in Manila (as the civil aspect in Criminal Case No.
275381) bar the filing of Civil Case No. 915-00 in the MeTC in Pasay City on the ground of litis
pendentia?

For litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence of the following
requisites is necessary, namely: (a) there must be identity of parties or at least such as represent the
same interest in both actions; (b) there must be identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the
reliefs being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the
judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in respect of the other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of the existence of the
third becomes nil.[28]

A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal Case No. 275381 ineluctably shows that all the
elements of litis pendentia are attendant. First of all, the parties in the civil action involved in Criminal
Case No. 275381 and in Civil Case No. 915-00, that is, Chan and Simon, are the same. Secondly, the
information in Criminal Case No. 275381 and the complaint in Civil Case No. 915-00 both alleged that
Simon had issued Landbank Check No. 0007280 worth P336,000.00 payable to cash, thereby
indicating that the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for, as well as the facts upon which the reliefs
sought were founded, were identical in all respects. And, thirdly, any judgment rendered in one case
would necessarily bar the other by res judicata; otherwise, Chan would be recovering twice upon the
same claim.

It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in Pasay City properly dismissed Civil Case No. 915-00 on the
ground of litis pendentia through its decision dated October 23, 2000; and that the RTC in Pasay City
did not err in affirming the MeTC.

WHEREFORE, we grant the petition for review on certiorari, and, accordingly, we reverse and set
aside the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on June 25, 2002. We reinstate the decision
rendered on October 23, 2000 by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, in Pasay City.

Costs of suit to be paid by the respondent.

SO ORDERED.