CivPro- JDMO

Flores v Mallare-Phillips
Facts:
Flores sued the respondents for refusing to pay him certain amount of money as alleged in the
complaint:
-first cause of action alleged in the complaint was against respondent Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to
pay the amount of P11,643.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from
petitioner on various occasions from August to October, 1981;
-second cause of action was against respondent Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the
amount of P10,212.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from petitioner on
several occasions from March, 1981 to January, 1982.
The action was opposed by an action to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Under Sec 19 of BP 129,
the regional trial court had exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more than
P20,000. That although, the other respondent was indebted in the amount of P10, 212.00, his
obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other respondent.
The trial court by Judge Mallare (one of the respondents) dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction.
Plaintiff appealed by certiorari in Supreme Court.
Issue: WON the trial court correctly ruled on the application of the permissive joinder of parties under
the Rules of Court.
Ruling:
In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of Rule
3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if instead of
joining or being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount
demanded in each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.
In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on
joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that,
after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason
that the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither of which
falls within its jurisdiction.
Section 6 of Rule 3 which provides as follows:
Permissive joinder of parties.-All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or
arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally,
or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as
defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all
such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent
any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any
proceedings in which he may have no interest.

SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs.

MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO, defendants, MANILA
SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU BRANCH) bonding company and defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968

FACTS: Spouses Serafin and Felicitas commenced a civil case against spouses Sibonghanoy to recover
from them a sum of P1, 908.00 with legal interest. A writ of attachment was issued by the court against
the defendants’ properties but the same was soon dissolved. After trial, the court rendered judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs and after the same had become final and executor, the court issued a writ of
execution against the defendants. The writ being unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of the
 CivPro- JDMO

writ of execution against the Surety’s bond. Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the
ground that the same was issued without summary hearing. This was denied by the RTC. The Surety
appealed in the CA, which was denied. This time, the surety just asked for an extension in order for
them to file the motion for reconsideration. But instead of filing for a motion for reconsideration, it filed
a motion to dismiss saying that by virtue of R.A. 296 which is the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1948,
section 88 of which placed within the exclusive original jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil action
where the value of the subject matter does not exceed P2,000.00. The Court of First Instance therefore
has no jurisdiction over the case. The question of jurisdiction was filed by the Surety only 15 years from
the time the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance.

ISSUE: WON THE CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED DUE TO THE LACK OF JURISDICTION

HELD: No. After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is
too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court. The rule is that jurisdiction over
the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusive by law as by law and as the lack of it affect the
very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present cases, a party may be
barred by laches from involving this plea for the first time on appeal for the purpose of annulling
everything done in the case. A party cannot invoke a court’s jurisdiction and later on deny it to escape a
penalty.

G. R. No. 162322 March 14, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
BANTIGUE POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

This Rule 45 Petition requires this Court to address the issue of the proper scope of the delegated
jurisdiction of municipal trial courts in land registration cases. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines
(Republic) assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 70349, which affirmed the
Decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan, Batangas2 in LRC Case No. N-98-20, LRA Record
No. 68329, granting respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation’s (Corporation) application for
original registration of a parcel of land. Since only questions of law have been raised, petitioner need not
have filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed CA Decision before filing this Petition for Review.

The Facts

On 17 July 1997, respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Rosario, Batangas an application for original registration of title over a parcel of land with an
assessed value of ₱4,330, ₱1,920 and ₱8,670, or a total assessed value of ₱14,920 for the entire
property, more particularly described as Lot 8060 of Cad 453-D, San Juan Cadastre, with an area of more
or less 10,732 square meters, located at Barangay Barualte, San Juan, Batangas. 3
 CivPro- JDMO

On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on 22 October 1997.4 On 7
August 1997, it issued a second Order setting the initial hearing on 4 November 1997.5

Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration on 8 January 1998 while the
records were still with the RTC.6

On 31 March 1998, the RTC Clerk of Court transmitted motu proprio the records of the case to the MTC
of San Juan, because the assessed value of the property was allegedly less than ₱100,000.7

Thereafter, the MTC entered an Order of General Default8 and commenced with the reception of
evidence.9 Among the documents presented by respondent in support of its application are Tax
Declarations,10 a Deed of Absolute Sale in its favor,11 and a Certification from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of Batangas City that the lot in question is within the alienable and disposable zone.12
Thereafter, it awarded the land to respondent Corporation.13

Acting on an appeal filed by the Republic,14 the CA ruled that since the former had actively participated
in the proceedings before the lower court, but failed to raise the jurisdictional challenge therein,
petitioner is thereby estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court on appeal.15 The CA
further found that respondent Corporation had sufficiently established the latter’s registrable title over
the subject property after having proven open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land by itself and its predecessors-in-interest even before the outbreak of
World War II.16

Dissatisfied with the CA’s ruling, petitioner Republic filed this instant Rule 45 Petition and raised the
following arguments in support of its appeal:

I.

THE REPUBLIC CANNOT BE ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURT OVER THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLE EVEN FOR THE FIRST TIME
ON APPEAL

II.

THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL
REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLE.17

The Court’s Ruling

We uphold the jurisdiction of the MTC, but remand the case to the court a quo for further proceedings
in order to determine if the property in question forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.

The Republic is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction in this case.
 CivPro- JDMO

At the outset, we rule that petitioner Republic is not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
lower court, even if the former raised the jurisdictional question only on appeal. The rule is settled that
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.18 Jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law.19 It cannot be acquired
through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the
court.20 Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time on
appeal.21

The ruling of the Court of Appeals that "a party may be estopped from raising such [jurisdictional]
question if he has actively taken part in the very proceeding which he questions, belatedly objecting to
the court’s jurisdiction in the event that the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to
him"22 is based on the doctrine of estoppel by laches. We are aware of that doctrine first enunciated by
this Court in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.23 In Tijam, the party-litigant actively participated in the proceedings
before the lower court and filed pleadings therein. Only 15 years thereafter, and after receiving an
adverse Decision on the merits from the appellate court, did the party-litigant question the lower court’s
jurisdiction. Considering the unique facts in that case, we held that estoppel by laches had already
precluded the party-litigant from raising the question of lack of jurisdiction on appeal. In Figueroa v.
People,24 we cautioned that Tijam must be construed as an exception to the general rule and applied
only in the most exceptional cases whose factual milieu is similar to that in the latter case.

The facts are starkly different in this case, making the exceptional rule in Tijam inapplicable. Here,
petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration when the records were still
with the RTC.25 At that point, petitioner could not have questioned the delegated jurisdiction of the
MTC, simply because the case was not yet with that court. When the records were transferred to the
MTC, petitioner neither filed pleadings nor requested affirmative relief from that court. On appeal,
petitioner immediately raised the jurisdictional question in its Brief.26 Clearly, the exceptional doctrine
of estoppel by laches is inapplicable to the instant appeal.

Laches has been defined as the "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled
to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it."27 In this case, petitioner Republic has not
displayed such unreasonable failure or neglect that would lead us to conclude that it has abandoned or
declined to assert its right to question the lower court's jurisdiction.

II

The Municipal Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the case.

In assailing the jurisdiction of the lower courts, petitioner Republic raised two points of contention: (a)
the period for setting the date and hour of the initial hearing; and (b) the value of the land to be
registered.

First, petitioner argued that the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the application, because
the RTC set the date and hour of the initial hearing beyond the 90-day period provided under the
Property Registration Decree.28

We disagree.
 CivPro- JDMO

The Property Registration Decree provides:

Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. - The court shall, within five days from filing of the
application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than
forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order. x x x.

In this case, the application for original registration was filed on 17 July 1997.29 On 18 July 1997, or a
day after the filing of the application, the RTC immediately issued an Order setting the case for initial
hearing on 22 October 1997, which was 96 days from the Order.30 While the date set by the RTC was
beyond the 90-day period provided for in Section 23, this fact did not affect the jurisdiction of the trial
court. In Republic v. Manna Properties, Inc.,31 petitioner Republic therein contended that there was
failure to comply with the jurisdictional requirements for original registration, because there were 125
days between the Order setting the date of the initial hearing and the initial hearing itself. We ruled that
the lapse of time between the issuance of the Order setting the date of initial hearing and the date of
the initial hearing itself was not fatal to the application. Thus, we held:

x x x [A] party to an action has no control over the Administrator or the Clerk of Court acting as a land
court; he has no right to meddle unduly with the business of such official in the performance of his
duties. A party cannot intervene in matters within the exclusive power of the trial court. No fault is
attributable to such party if the trial court errs on matters within its sole power. It is unfair to punish an
applicant for an act or omission over which the applicant has neither responsibility nor control,
especially if the applicant has complied with all the requirements of the law.32

Indeed, it would be the height of injustice to penalize respondent Corporation by dismissing its
application for registration on account of events beyond its control.

Moreover, since the RTC issued a second Order on 7 August 1997 setting the initial hearing on 4
November 1997,33 within the 90-day period provided by law, petitioner Republic argued that the
jurisdictional defect was still not cured, as the second Order was issued more than five days from the
filing of the application, again contrary to the prescribed period under the Property Registration
Decree.34

Petitioner is incorrect.

The RTC’s failure to issue the Order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing within five days from
the filing of the application for registration, as provided in the Property Registration Decree, did not
affect the court’s its jurisdiction. Observance of the five-day period was merely directory, and failure to
issue the Order within that period did not deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction over the case. To rule that
compliance with the five-day period is mandatory would make jurisdiction over the subject matter
dependent upon the trial court. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the
Constitution or the law.35 It cannot be contingent upon the action or inaction of the court.

This does not mean that courts may disregard the statutory periods with impunity. We cannot assume
that the law deliberately meant the provision "to become meaningless and to be treated as a dead
letter."36 However, the records of this case do not show such blatant disregard for the law. In fact, the
RTC immediately set the case for initial hearing a day after the filing of the application for registration,37
 CivPro- JDMO

except that it had to issue a second Order because the initial hearing had been set beyond the 90-day
period provided by law.

Second, petitioner contended38 that since the selling price of the property based on the Deed of Sale
annexed to respondent’s application for original registration was ₱160,000,39 the MTC did not have
jurisdiction over the case. Under Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended,40 the
MTC’s delegated jurisdiction to try cadastral and land registration cases is limited to lands, the value of
which should not exceed ₱100,000.

We are not persuaded.

The delegated jurisdiction of the MTC over cadastral and land registration cases is indeed set forth in the
Judiciary Reorganization Act, which provides:

Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear
and determine cadastral or land registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or
opposition, or contested lots where the value of which does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos
(₱100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the
respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real
property. Their decision in these cases shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the
Regional Trial Courts. (As amended by R.A. No. 7691) (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, the MTC has delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases in two instances: first,
where there is no controversy or opposition; or, second, over contested lots, the value of which does
not exceed ₱100,000.

The case at bar does not fall under the first instance, because petitioner opposed respondent
Corporation’s application for registration on 8 January 1998.41

However, the MTC had jurisdiction under the second instance, because the value of the lot in this case
does not exceed ₱100,000.

Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the value of the land should not be determined with reference to its
selling price. Rather, Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act provides that the value of the
property sought to be registered may be ascertained in three ways: first, by the affidavit of the claimant;
second, by agreement of the respective claimants, if there are more than one; or, third, from the
corresponding tax declaration of the real property.42

In this case, the value of the property cannot be determined using the first method, because the records
are bereft of any affidavit executed by respondent as to the value of the property. Likewise, valuation
cannot be done through the second method, because this method finds application only where there
are multiple claimants who agree on and make a joint submission as to the value of the property. Here,
only respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation claims the property.

The value of the property must therefore be ascertained with reference to the corresponding Tax
Declarations submitted by respondent Corporation together with its application for registration. From
the records, we find that the assessed value of the property is ₱4,330, ₱1,920 and ₱8,670, or a total
 CivPro- JDMO

assessed value of ₱14,920 for the entire property.43 Based on these Tax Declarations, it is evident that
the total value of the land in question does not exceed ₱100,000. Clearly, the MTC may exercise its
delegated jurisdiction under the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended.

III

A certification from the CENRO is not sufficient proof that the property in question is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.

Even as we affirm the propriety of the MTC’s exercise of its delegated jurisdiction, we find that the lower
court erred in granting respondent Corporation’s application for original registration in the absence of
sufficient proof that the property in question was alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

The Regalian doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State.44 The applicant
for land registration has the burden of overcoming the presumption of State ownership by establishing
through incontrovertible evidence that the land sought to be registered is alienable or disposable based
on a positive act of the government.45 We held in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. that a CENRO
certification is insufficient to prove the alienable and disposable character of the land sought to be
registered.46 The applicant must also show sufficient proof that the DENR Secretary has approved the
land classification and released the land in question as alienable and disposable.47

Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be accompanied by (1) a
CENRO or PENRO48 Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.49

Here, respondent Corporation only presented a CENRO certification in support of its application.50
Clearly, this falls short of the requirements for original registration.1âwphi1

We therefore remand this case to the court a quo for reception of further evidence to prove that the
property in question forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. If respondent
Bantigue Point Development Corporation presents a certified true copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary, the application for original registration should be granted. If it fails to
present sufficient proof that the land in question is alienable and disposable based on a positive act of
the government, the application should be denied.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. Let this case be
REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court of San Juan, Batangas, for reception of evidence to prove that
the property sought to be registered is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

SO ORDERED.

CALIMLIM vs. HON. RAMIREZ

G.R. No. L-34362
November 19, 1982
118 SCRA 399
VASQUEZ, J.:
 CivPro- JDMO

Facts:
Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a petition in the respondent Court to compel Manuel Magali
to surrender the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 9138 in order that the same may be cancelled and a new
one issued in the name of the said corporation. Not being the registered owner and the title not being in
his possession, Manuel Magali failed to comply with the order of the Court directing him to surrender
the said title. This prompted Independent Mercantile Corporation to file an ex-parte petition to declare
TCT No. 9138 as cancelled and to issue a new title in its name. The said petition was granted by the
respondent Court and the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan issued a new title in the name of the
corporation, TCT No. 68568. Petitioner, upon learning that her husband's title over the parcel of land
had been cancelled, filed a petition with the respondent Court, sitting as a cadastral court, praying for
the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 but the court dismissed the petition.
Petitioner thereafter filed in the LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 but the
same was dismissed therein. Petitioners then resorted to the filing of a complaint in for the cancellation
of the conveyances and sales that had been made with respect to the property, covered by TCT No.
9138, against Francisco Ramos who claimed to have bought the property from Independent Mercantile
Corporation. Private respondent Francisco Ramos, however, failed to obtain a title over the property in
his name in view of the existence of an adverse claim annotated on the title thereof at the instance of
the herein petitioners. Francisco Ramos filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the same is barred
by prior judgement or by statute of limitations. Resolving the said Motion, the respondent Court
dismissed the case on the ground of estoppel by prior judgment.

Issue:
Whether or not dismissal of the case is proper on the ground of estoppel by prior judgment

Held:
No. It is error to consider the dismissal of the petition filed by the herein petitioner in LRC
Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 as a bar by prior judgment against the filing of
the subsequent civil case. In order to avail of the defense of res judicata, it must be shown, among
others, that the judgment in the prior action must have been rendered by a court with the proper
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proceeding in which the prior judgment or order was rendered. If
there is lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit or of the parties, the judgment or order
cannot operate as an adjudication of the controversy. This essential element of the defense of bar by
prior judgment or res judicata does not exist in the case.
The petition filed by the petitioners in LRC Record No. 39492 was an apparent invocation of the
authority of the respondent Court sitting as a land registration court. Reliance was apparently placed on
Section 112 of the Land Registration Act wherein it provides that a Court of First Instance, acting as a
land registration court, is a court of limited and special jurisdiction. As such, its proceedings are not
adequate for the litigation of issues pertaining to an ordinary civil action, such as, questions involving
ownership or title to real property.

[G.R. No. L-3262. March 11, 1907. ]

SATURNINA BAUTISTA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SANTIAGO CALIXTO, Defendant-Appellant.

W. L. Wright, for Appellant.

Gibbs, Gale & Carr, for Appellee.

 CivPro- JDMO

SYLLABUS

1. PROMISSORY NOTE; OBLIGATION; CONSIDERATION. — The surrender to the defendant of a written

obligation for the payment of which the plaintiff claimed that he was liable is a sufficient consideration
for a new promise than made by the defendant.

2. ID.; ID.; INTEREST. — The document in question in this case not by its terms bearing interest, and no
demand having been made for its payment, interest can be allowed only from the commencement of
the action.

DECISION

WILLARD, J. :

In October, 1904, the defendant executed a written obligation whereby he promised to pay to the order
of the plaintiff, six months after date, P9,000. This obligation was given in consideration of the surrender
by the plaintiff to the defendant of another obligation for P10,000, dated the 6th of August, 1904, and
signed by Marcaida & Co. The defendant was a partner in this firm. No part of this P9,000 has been paid.

The foregoing facts are established by a preponderance of evidence. Such evidence shows that the
obligation for P9,000, although it bears the date of the 4th of January, 1898, was executed in October,
1904. In view of these facts, the two defenses made by the appellant, namely, want of consideration
and the statute of limitation can not be sustained.

The court below, however, did not limit itself to the obligation for P9,000, but ordered judgment against
the defendant for the interest on P10,000, for a part of the time after January 4, 1898. The court found
that in 1894 the plaintiff delivered P10,000, to the defendant for safe keeping for five or six days; that
she was induced to make such deposit by the statements made by the defendant and other that the
money was liable to be stolen if she kept it in her house, that when she asked for the return of the
money, within five or six days, the defendant told her that he had invested it in the firm of Marcaida &
Co., and gave her the obligation for P10,000, above referred to; that she could not read, and knew
nothing about Marcaida & Co., and did not understand that they were her debtors, but always
understood and believed that the defendant himself he was her debtor. The testimony of the plaintiff
supported those findings. When the defendant testified as a witness in his own behalf, he was asked by
his counsel to state the facts in connection with the original delivery of the P10,000, to him. This
evidence was ruled out by the court on the ground that it was immaterial and he was not permitted by
that court to give his version of the transaction. Under these circumstances the judgment of the court
below in its entirety can not, in any event, be sustained. Before the defendant can be made liable for the
original indebtedness of P10,000, he must have an opportunity, and notwithstanding the court’s view
that the testimony was immaterial, it afterwards found the facts as testified to by the plaintiff, which
facts the defendant was given no opportunity to contradict.

The allowance by the court of interest on P10,000 from January 4, 1898, was based on the theory that
the defendant was liable for the original loan made to Marcaida & Co.
 CivPro- JDMO

If these errors committed by the court below relating to the admission of testimony were prejudicial, a
new trial must be had.

We are satisfied, however, from an examination of the whole case, that all the transaction, which took
place prior to October, 1904, were immaterial, except for the purpose of showing a consideration for
the obligation executed at that time by the defendant. This is the view which seems to be taken by the
appellee in his brief in this court. The evidence shows that whatever obligation rested upon the
defendant by virtue of the original delivery to him of the P10,000, was merged in the new obligation of
P9,000, and that, after the execution of the latter, it expressed the only liability which rested upon him
in favor of the plaintiff.

That liability must be limited by the terms of that document considering that it was execute in October,
1904. It does not bear interest by its terms. Interest can be recovered, then, only from the
commencement of the action, there being no evidence in the case of any demand for payment made
prior to that time.

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and judgment is entered for the plaintiff for the sum of
P9,000, Philippine currency, with interest thereon at 6 per cent per annum from the 9th day of October,
1905, and the costs of the Court of First Instance. No costs will be allowed to either party in this court.
After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered in accordance therewith and ten days
thereafter the record be remanded to the court from whence it came for proper action. So ordered.

PASCUA, Donna Phoebe M.

Remedial Law Review I
Case #1
G.R. No. 171095, June 22, 2015
MAYOR MARCIAL VARGAS and ENGR. RAYMUNDO DEL ROSARIO, Petitioners,
vs.
FORTUNATO CAJUCOM, Respondent.
FACTS:
On August 15, 2000, respondent filed a Complaint for mandamus and abatement of nuisance
against petitioners and a number of private persons namely, Rodel Puno, Vicente Mata, Tony
Maderia, Rene Maderia, and German Maderia (Puna, et al.) at RCT-Cabanatuan City.
Respondent alleged that he had intended to start a gasoline station business on his lot in Aliaga,
Nueva Ecija, but several illegal structures built on the road shoulder by Puno, et al. were obstructing
access to his site. His demands for the removal of the structures fell on deaf ears. He tried to seek
assistance from petitioners but, the latter similarly did not act. Respondent prayed for the court to
command petitioners to cause the removal of all buildings and structures built on the concerned
road shoulder by Puno, et al. On February 14, 2001, the court rendered a Decision in favor of
respondent.
As the decision became final and executory, respondent filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Execution, which was issued on May 25, 2001. However, as of June 13, 2001, the judgment has not
been executed.
On April 13, 2005, respondent filed a motion to compel petitioners to implement the Writ of
Execution and to Explain Why They Should Not Be Cited for Contempt of Court.
 CivPro- JDMO

Petitioners filed their own Motion to Quash Writ of Execution with Explanation Why Public
Defendants Should Not Be Cited for Contempt of Court on the following grounds: (1) that it
allegedly would compel the municipal engineer to exercise the powers and duties of the mayor; (2)
that it forces the mayor to perform a discretionary duty;(3) that there was no exhaustion of
administrative remedies; and, (4) that the judgment obligee had no well-defined, clear and certain
right to warrant the grant of mandamus.
On September 15, 2005, the RTC issued its assailed Order denying the motion filed by petitioners.
The court held that the mayor can be compelled to do his duty by writ of mandamus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not grounds exist to quash the writ of execution
RULING:
No. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states:
Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. − Execution shall issue as a matter of
right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the
expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected. (1a)
When a judgment is final and executory, it may no longer be modified in any respect, except to
correct clerical errors or to make nunc pro tunc entries, or when it is a void judgment. Otherwise,
the court which rendered judgment only has the ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution.
The grounds to quash the writ of execution go into the substance and merits of the case which had
been decided with finality, and have no bearing on the validity of the issuance of the writ of
execution.
Petitioners may not raise in their opposition to the writ of execution issues that they should have
raised in the case during the trial proper or against the judgment via an appeal. They may not object
to the execution by raising new issues of fact or law, except under the following circumstances:
(1) the writ of execution varies the judgment;
(2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution
inequitable or unjust;
(3) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution;
(4) it appears that the controversy has been submitted to the judgment of the court;
(5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for
interpretation thereof; or
(6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is
defective in substance, or issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt
has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority
The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
**********
Case #2
G.R. No. 213197, October 21, 2015
REMEGIO A. CHING, Petitioner,
vs.
SAN PEDRO COLLEGE OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner is an original incorporator and member of respondent SPCBA, a domestic non-stock and
non-profit corporation. In a letter, dated September 19, 2001, petitioner tendered his irrevocable
resignation. To SPCBA, the tenor of the resignation was not only as a trustee and treasurer, but also
as its member. For said reason, petitioner was paid the amount of P20M representing the buy-out
price of his interest in SPCBA.
The First Case
 CivPro- JDMO

On June 10, 2010, petitioner filed an intra-corporate case before the RTC for the inspection of
corporate books. He sought the recognition of his right to inspect the corporate books of SPCBA as
its member, alleging that his resignation letter covered his trusteeship and treasurership positions
only and not his membership in SPCBA. In its February 14, 2011, The RTC agreed with petitioner.
SPCBA then went to the CA seeking the reversal of the RTC decision. On March 1, 2011, SPCBA filed
a "notice of appeal” although the correct mode of appeal was through a petition for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. For taking the wrong mode, the CA dismissed the appeal. The SC
affirmed the CA decision. It further denied with finality SPCBA’s motion for reconsideration in the
February 29, 2012 minute resolution.
Earlier, on February 16, 2012, SPCBA's Board of Trustees resolved to "affirm and/or confirm the
previous removal of Mr. Remigio A. Ching, not only as Trustee and Treasurer, but also as a Member
of the Corporation, primarily due to the payment unto said Mr. Remegio A. Ching, the buy out of
sum of Twenty Million Pesos, for all his rights as Trustee, Treasurer and Member of the
Corporation."
On April 4, 2012, the judgment of the Court, which effectively affirmed the conclusions of the RTC,
became final and executory.
The Present Case
On April 26, 2012, SPCBA filed a complaint to declare petitioner legally and/or validly removed as
trustee, treasurer and member pursuant to the February 16, 2012 Joint Resolution. SPCBA sought
to prevent petitioner from filing a nuisance and/or harassment suits against it and for the RTC to
affirm/confirm his removal as a member on the basis of the February 16, 2012 Board Resolution.
On the matter of his membership in SPCBA, petitioner countered that res judicata had already set in
following the decision rendered by the RTC. Thus, the issue on his membership could not be made
an issue again. In its December 11, 2012, RTC ruled that the principle of res judicata already barred
respondent from claiming that he was not a member of SPCBA.
In a petition for certiorari filed by SPCBA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the CA reversed the
RTC order. The CA reasoned out that there was a marked difference in the causes of action between
the cases. It stated that the present case introduced a fact which did not exist at the time the first
case was filed and terminated, giving SPCBA a new cause of action under Section 91 of the
Corporation Code pertaining to termination of membership or expulsion of a member from a nonstock
corporation. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but was denied by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in not affirming the application by the RTC in the second case of the
principle of res judicata
RULING:
Yes. The issue on petitioner’s membership, as finally settled in the first case, is res judicata.
Res judicata is commonly understood as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same
claim, demand or cause of action. In jurisprudence, it is referred to as bar by former judgment. It
requires that a former judgment or order must be final; that the judgment or order must be on the
merits; that it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; and that there must be, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of
subject matter and cause of action.
In this case, SPCBA's rejection of the claim that res judicata exists is based on the lack of one of the
aforementioned requisites, that is, the lack of similarity between the causes of action of the first and
second cases. While the present case was based on the invocation of its right to be protected against
harassment suit and its right to remove members, the first case was based on the claim of petitioner
to exercise his right to inspect the books of the corporation. Thus, to respondent, without that
similarity, no res judicata can set in. SPCBA is mistaken.
 CivPro- JDMO

Under the present Rules of Court, the doctrine of res judicata appears in Section 47 of Rule 39 as
follows:
Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order rendered
by a court or judge of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final
order, may be as follows:
xxxx
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged
or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between
the parties and their successors-in-interest, by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the
same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors-in-interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its
face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto.
Issue preclusion finds application when a fact or question has been squarely put in issue, judicially
passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction. For issue
preclusion to be applicable, (1) the issue or fact sought to be precluded must be identical to the
issue or fact actually determined in a former suit, (2) the party to be precluded must be party to or
was in privity with a party to the former proceeding; (3) there was final judgment on the merits in
the former proceedings, and (4) in compliance with the basic tenet of due process, that the party
against whom the principle is asserted must have had full and fair opportunity to litigate issues in
the prior proceedings.
The issue of petitioner’s membership was fully determined or disposed of by the RTC in the first
case, in a decision which became final and executory on April 4, 2012. The parties are the same and
the issues are essentially the same.
The issue of petitioner's membership was indispensable in the first case because his prayer to be
permitted to inspect the books of SPCBA depended on its resolution. This indispensability of factual
determination in a prior case supports the conclusion that res judicata in the concept of issue
preclusion is applicable.
In sum, the confluence of all the elements of res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of
judgment or issue preclusion bars respondent from relitigating the same issue of petitioner's
membership.
The petition is granted.
**********
Case #3
G.R. No. 206653, February 25, 2015
YUK LING ONG, Petitioner,
vs.
BENJAMIN T. CO, Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner, a British-Hong Kong national, and respondent, a Filipino citizen were married on
October 3, 1982. Sometime in November 2008, petitioner learned that her marriage with
respondent was declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code in a decision in December 11, 2002 by RTC in Paranaque City.
It appears that on April 26, 2001, respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity before the RTC. The recorded address of the petitioner
was 600 Elcano St., Binondo, Manila. There was no showing of its status, whether pending,
 CivPro- JDMO

withdrawn or terminated.
On July 19, 2002, respondent filed another similar petition, indicating petitioner’s address as 23 Sta.
Rosa Street, Unit B-2 Manresa Garden Homes, Quezon City.
On July 29, 2002, the RTC issued summons. In the Server’s Return, substituted service of summons
with the copy of the petition was effected on August 1, 2002 after several futile attempts to serve
the same personally on petitioner. The said documents were received by Mr. Roly Espinosa, a
security officer. On December 11, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision finding respondent’s marriage
with petitioner as void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for annulment of judgment, claiming that she was never
notified of the cases filed against her. She prayed that the decision be nullified on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud, as respondent deliberately indicated a wrong address to prevent her participation
in the proceedings, and lack of jurisdiction because of an invalid substituted service of summons.
On the service of summons, petitioner stated that there was no sufficient explanation showing
impossibility of personal service before process server resorted to substituted service of summons.
Moreover, that the alleged substituted service was made on a security guard of their townhouse
and not on a member of her household.
The CA upheld the December 11, 2002 decision of the RTC and further ruled that the substituted
service of summons was valid. It found that there was a customary practice in petitioner’s
townhouse that the security guard would first entertain any visitors and receive any
communication in behalf of the homeowners, making it impossible for the process server to
personally serve the summons upon petitioner. The CA also declared a presumption of regularity in
the process server’s duties and functions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner
RULING:
No. Under Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, if the defendant does not voluntarily
appear in court, jurisdiction can be acquired by personal or substituted service of summons:
Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by
handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by
tendering it to him.
Sec. 7. Substituted Service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
The process server resorted to substituted service of summons on August 1, 2002, after only two
(2) days from the issuance of the summons. The server’s return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the
attempts undertaken by the process server to personally serve the summons on petitioner. It
simply stated that the summons was received "by Mr. Roly Espinosa of sufficient age and discretion,
the Security Officer thereat." It did not expound on the competence of the security officer to receive
the summons.
Moreover, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty was never intended to
be applied even in cases where there are no showing of substantial compliance with the
requirements of the rules of procedure. Such presumption does not apply where it is patent that the
sheriff's or server's return is defective.
The petition is granted.
**********
Case #4
 CivPro- JDMO

G.R. No. 126603, June 29, 1998

ESTRELLITA J. TAMANO, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A.
TAMANO, ADIB A. TAMANO and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
FACTS:
On May 31, 1958, Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano (Tamano) married private respondent in
civil rites. Their marriage supposedly remained valid and subsisting until his death on May 18,
1994. On June 2, 1993, Tamano also married petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano (Estrellita) in civil rites
in Malabang, Lanao del Sur.
On November 23, 1994, private respondent Zorayda, joined by her son Adib A. Tamano (Adib), filed
a Complaint for Declaration of Nullify of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the ground that it
was bigamous. Private respondents alleged that Tamano never divorced Zorayda and that Estrellita
was not single when she married Tamano as the decision annulling her previous marriage with
Romeo C. Llave never became final and executory for non-compliance with publication
requirements.
Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the RTC-Quezon City has no jurisdiction over
the subject and nature of the action. She alleged that "only a party to the marriage" could file an
action for annulment of marriage against the other spouse, hence, it was only Tamano who could
file an action for annulment of their marriage. Moreover, she contended that since Tamano and
Zorayda were both Muslims and married in Muslim rites the jurisdiction to hear and try the instant
case was vested in the Shari'a courts pursuant to Art. 155 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws.
The lower court denied the motion and ruled that the instant case was properly cognizable by the
RTC since Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code and not
exclusively in accordance with PD No. 1083 or the Code of Muslim Personal laws.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
involving Muslims married in Muslim rites
RULING:
Yes. Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, RTCs have jurisdiction over all actions
involving the contract of marriage and marital relations. Personal actions, such as the instant
complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage, may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or
any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
The complaint alleged that Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the provisions
of the Civil Code. The fact that they were married under Muslim laws was first mentioned only in
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC was not divested of jurisdiction to hear and try
the instant case despite the allegation in the Motion for Reconsideration that Estrellita and Tamano
were likewise married in Muslim rites.
A court's jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to
dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of the complaint.
Assuming that indeed petitioner and Tamano were likewise married under Muslim laws, the same
would still fall under the general original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.
Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in
civil and Muslim rites. Consequently, the Shari'a courts are not vested with original and exclusive
jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Consequently,
the Regional Trial Courts are not divested of their general original jurisdiction under Sec. 19, par.
(6) of BP Blg. 129 which provides —
 CivPro- JDMO

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction: . . . (6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions . . .
The petition is denied.
**********
Case #5
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2422 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 13-4129-RTJ], July 20, 2015
FLOR GILBUENA RIVERA, Complainant,
vs.
HON. LEANDRO C. CATALO, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 256,
MUNTINLUPA CITY, Respondent.
FACTS:
On February 1, 2012, complainant filed her Amended Petition before the RTC, praying for the
issuance of new owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 3460. The case was
raffled to the branch presided by respondent judge. The amended petition alleged that complainant
was one of the heirs of Juan Gilbuena (Gilbuena); that TCT No. 3460 was registered under the name
of Gilbuena; and that the owner's duplicate copy of the said title had remained missing despite their
diligent efforts to locate the same.
On May 18, 2012, respondent judge granted the petition on the basis of complainant’s evidence
since no opposition was raised. The RTC decision became final and executory on July 3, 2012 and
the Certificate of Finality was issued on July 6, 2012.
On October 15, 2012, the Registry of Deeds stated that upon examination of the documents
submitted to their office, it appeared that TCT No. 3460 had long been cancelled as early as April 2,
1924; that on August 16, 2012, the RD issued a letter recalling the approval of the annotation of the
Affidavit of Loss on TCT No. 3460 after it was discovered that the said title was already cancelled
and, therefore, could no longer be the subject of any transaction; that the discovery of the
cancellation of the title was sometime in August 2012, when their office found out that several titles
had already originated from said title; that the truth was that the title was not lost, rather, it was
cancelled by virtue of valid transactions and conveyance as early as April 2, 1924; and that the basis
of the petition for issuance of new owner's duplicate, which was an affidavit of loss, was totally
false, untrue and fabricated.
Acting thereon, respondent judge issued an order requiring the complainant and all the parties
concerned to attend a hearing on November 7, 2012. The complainant did not appear in court. On
June 21, 2013, respondent judge recalled and set aside the May 18, 2012 decision of the RTC.
Aggrieved, complainant filed the subject administrative complaint before the Court alleging that
respondent judge committed gross misconduct for recalling a final and executory judgment.
Complainant prays that respondent be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all his
retirement benefits.
For his part, the respondent judge explained that although a final judgment is immutable and
unalterable, such rule is not absolute as it admits exceptions such as those concerning void
judgments.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) opined that respondent judge was administratively
liable, not for gross misconduct, but for gross ignorance of the law. According to the OCA, when the
May 18, 2012 decision became final and executory on July 3, 2012, it became immutable and
unalterable. Thus, respondent judge inexcusably and wrongfully ignored such basic principle when
he decided to motu proprio recall his own final decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the final and executory judgment is absolutely immutable and unalterable
 CivPro- JDMO

RULING:
No. Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect. However, there are recognized exceptions to this general rule such as (1) the correction of
clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, (2) void
judgments, and (3) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision
rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
Under the second exception, a void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It neither
is a source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all
claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of
execution based on it is void. It may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw
and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head. Under the law, if there are
facts and circumstances that would render a judgment void or unjust after its finality, and render its
execution a complete nullity, such judgment cannot exude immutability.
Respondent judge correctly recalled the judgment because the second and third exceptions on the
doctrine of finality of judgments were squarely applicable. After the finality of the RTC decision on
July 3, 2012, it was discovered that TCT No. 3460 had been cancelled as early as April 2, 1924.
Complainant failed to support his stand when she was given the opportunity to do so.
Respondent judge realized an execution of such judgment would definitely be unjust and
inequitable as it would be sanctioning fraud and irregularity. It would judicially permit the issuance
of a new owner's duplicate copy of a title which was no longer in existence.
Where there is no original, there can be no duplicate.
Respondent judge correctly rectified his questionable decision. Had he not acted responsibly, the
void judgment would have spawned double and conflicting titles and would have wreaked havoc on
the revered Torrens System of land registration. Hence, he committed no gross ignorance of the
law.
The complaint is dismissed.
**********
Case #6
G.R. No. 194176, September 10, 2014
LIMUELL C. NARCISO, et. al., Petitioners,
vs.
PACIFIC TRADERS & MANUFACTURING CORPORATION (PTMC)/TABOK WORKERS MULTIPURPOSE
COOPERATIVE (TWMPC), Respondents.
FACTS:
The petitioners were hired on different dates by Pacific Traders Manufacturing Corporation
(PTMC). Tabok Muti-Purpose Cooperative, a cooperative duly registered with the CDA, engages in
job out works for PTMC. The petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PTMC and
TWMPC in 2004, alleging that they were referred to TWMPC by PTMC because the latter refused to
sign a casual or probationary employment contract with them. TWMPC on the other hand treated
them with indifference, and when they reported the latter’s failure to provide them proper labor
benefits, TWMPC terminated them from employment without just or authorize cause.
PTMC denied the allegation that petitioners were its regular employees as they were assigned to the
company by TWMPC, one of its legitimate labor contractors. When their contracts expired, the
petitioners executed their respective “Releases and Quitclaims”; at the time of the filing of their
complaints, the company had long terminated its relations with petitioners. TWMPC affirmed that
petitioners were its employees; their disagreement started when the Board of Directors
contemplated “pakyaw” system instead of the per hour arrangement, to which petitioners objected,
 CivPro- JDMO

thus they agreed to leave TWMPC provided they were paid separation pay; despite this verbal
agreement, petitioners still filed with the DOLE and NLRC. The DOLE case was eventually settled, but
the NLRC case proceeded.
The LA in its decision, dismissed the case filed by petitioners, holding them not regular employees of
PTMC and not illegally dismissed, but ordered TWMPC to pay them separation pay and other labor
benefits. Both petitioners and TWMPC appealed the ruling to the NLRC, but both appeals were
dismissed by the NLRC for failure to attach the requisite Certificate of Non-Forum
Shopping. Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the dismissal and submitted a Motion to Admit
Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping pleading for a liberal application of procedural rules in the
interest of substantial justice; still, the NLRC denied reconsideration, thus petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA to assail the dismissal of their appeal.
Holding that petitioners failed to cite a compelling reason for relaxation of the rules, the CA dismissed
the petition for certiorari, ruling that petitioners failed to attach the Certification Against Non-Forum
shopping within the reglementary period for filing the Memorandum Appeal. Thus, petitioners
resorted to a petition for review on certiorari, assailing the CA decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case for failure to attach the Certificate of Non-Forum
shopping
RULING:
No. A certificate of non-forum shopping is a requisite for the perfection of an appeal. This is clearly
enunciated in Section 4, Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC (2005 NLRC
Rules),thus:
Sec. 4. Requisites For Perfection Of Appeal. – a) The appeal shall be: 1) filed within the
reglementary period provided in Section 1 of this Rule; 2) verified by the appellant himself in
accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended; 3) in the form of a
memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support
thereof, the relief prayed for, and with a statement of the date the appellant received the
appealed decision, resolution or order; 4) in three (3) legibly typewritten or printed copies; and
5) accompanied by i) proof of payment of the required appeal fee; ii) posting of a cash or surety
bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; iii) a certificate of non-forum shopping; and iv) proof
of service upon the other parties.
The petitioners aver that the CA should have granted their petition for certiorari and relaxed the
NLRC Rules of Procedure because on page 53 of their memorandum on appeal is the caption
“Verification and Certification.” However, the counsel for the petitioners inadvertently deleted the
paragraphs intended for the certification of non-forum shopping. They assert that they were in a
hurry in preparing the memorandum due to the very limited time of 10 days to file the same. They
proffer these as justifiable causes for their non-compliance with the NLRC Rules of Procedure and
submit that their belated filing of the certificate in their motion for reconsideration was substantial
compliance. They further aver that the outright dismissal of their appeal on a mere technicality would
seriously impair the orderly administration of justice.
The petitioners’ arguments are devoid of merit. The subsequent compliance with the requirement
does not excuse a party’s failure to comply therewith in the first instance. While the Court, in certain
cases, has excused non-compliance with the requirement to submit a certificate of non-forum
shopping, such liberal posture has always been grounded on special circumstances or compelling
reasons which made the strict application of the rule clearly unjustified or inequitable.
Here, the reasons cited by the petitioners for their failure to attach the certificate in their appeal
memorandum can hardly be considered as special circumstances or compelling reasons to warrant
a liberal application of the rules of procedure. Moreover, based on the facts of the case, a strict
 CivPro- JDMO

application of a technical rule will not prejudice the administration of justice in view of the
petitioners’ unmeritorious claims.
It is true that in labor cases, technical rules are not necessarily fatal and they can be liberally applied.
However, this principle can only operate if, all things being equal, any doubt or ambiguity would be
resolved in favor of labor. Should the case be substantively unmeritorious, technicalities and
limitations in procedural rules must be fully enforced.
In fine, in the absence of justifiable and compelling reasons, a liberal application of procedural rules
is not warranted in this case. The Court thus agrees with the CA that no grave abuse of discretion is
attributable to the NLRC when it found no justification to excuse the absence of a certificate of
nonforum
shopping in the petitioners’ memorandum on appeal.
The petition is denied.
**********
Case #7
G.R. No. 202989, March 25, 2015
COMGLASCO CORPORATION/AGUILA GLASS, Petitioner,
vs.
SANTOS CAR CHECK CENTER CORPORATION, Respondent.
FACTS:
In 2000, Santos Car Check Center (respondent) and Comglasco Corporation (petitioner) entered into
a contract of lease for five years of a showroom in Iloilo City. However, petitioner advised respondent
that it is pre-terminating the lease effective December 1, 2001, to which respondent did not accede,
citing that their contract was for five years. On January 15, 2002, petitioner vacated the premises and
stopped paying any rentals. Despite several demands, petitioner ignored the demand letters, hence
respondent filed a case for breach of contract.
In its answer, petitioner averred that business setbacks caused by the 1997 financial crisis caused it
to pre-terminate the contract, which allows pre-termination with cause in the first three years of the
contract and without cause after the third year. Invoking Article 1267 of the Civil Code, it averred
that it is authorised to pre-terminate the contract before the lapse of the three years.
Respondent moved for a judgment on the pleading, which the RTC granted. The trial court held
petitioner liable for unpaid rentals from January 16, 2002 to August 15, 2003, as well as attorney’s
fees, litigation expenses and exemplary damages.
Petitioner appealed to the CA, but the same was denied. Hence, petitioner filed a petition for review
on certiorari with the SC, arguing that judgment on the pleadings was not proper in the case as it
cannot be deemed to have admitted the material allegations in the complaint in its Answer, having
pleaded a valid cause (business reverses caused by the 1997 financial crisis). It further averred that
the RTC should have ordered the reception of evidence for that purpose, after which a summary
judgment would have been proper.
ISSUE:
Whether or not judgment on the pleadings is proper in the case.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioner maintains that the RTC was wrong to rule that its Answer to Santos’ complaint
tendered no issue, or admitted the material allegations therein; that the court should have heard it
out on the reason it invoked to justify its action to pre-terminate the parties’ lease; that therefore a
summary judgment would have been the proper recourse, after a hearing.
Petitioner’s alleged poor financial condition cannot release it from the binding effect of the contract
of lease. As held in Central Bank v. Court of Appeals, cited by respondents, mere pecuniary inability to
fulfill an engagement does not discharge a contractual obligation, nor does it constitute a defense to
 CivPro- JDMO

an action for specific performance.

Article 1267 of the Civil Code which provides:
“When the service has become so difficult as to be manifestly beyond the contemplation of the
parties, the obligor may also be released therefrom, in whole or in part.”
Relying on Article 1267 of the Civil Code to justify its decision to pre-terminate its lease with
respondent, petitioner invokes the 1997 Asian currency crisis as causing it much difficulty in meeting
its obligations. But in PNCC vs. CA,the Court held that the payment of lease rentals does not involve a
prestation "to do" envisaged in Articles 1266 and 1267 which has been rendered legally or physically
impossible without the fault of the obligor-lessor. Article 1267 speaks of a prestation involving
service which has been rendered so difficult by unforeseen subsequent events as to be manifestly
beyond the contemplation of the parties. To be sure, the Asian currency crisis befell the region from
July 1997 and for sometime thereafter, but petitioner cannot be permitted to blame its difficulties on
the said regional economic phenomenon because it entered into the subject lease only on August 16,
2000, more than three years after it began, and by then petitioner had known what business risks it
assumed when it opened a new shop in Iloilo City.
The SC agrees with the CA that petitioner cannot cite Article 1267 of the Civil Code, and that it must
be deemed to have admitted the material allegations in the complaint. Section 1, Rule 34 reads:
Sec. 1. Judgment on the pleadings. – Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on motion of that
party, direct judgment on such pleading. However, in actions for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall
always be proved.
A judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded, and is based exclusively upon the
allegations appearing in the pleadings of the parties and the accompanying annexes It is settled that
the trial court has the discretion to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by a party if
there is no controverted matter in the case after the answer is filed. A genuine issue of fact is that
which requires the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or
false issue.
Under Rule 35, on Summary Judgments, petitioner had recourse to move for summary judgment,
wherein it could have adduced supporting evidence to justify its action on the parties’ lease, but it
did not do so. Section 2 of Rule 35 provides:
Sec. 2. Summary judgment for defending party. – A party against whom a claim, counterclaim,
or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with
supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor as to all
or any part thereof.
The RTC acted correctly in resorting to Section 1 of Rule 34, on Judgment on the Pleadings, to cut
short a needless trial.
The petition is denied.
**********
Case #8
G.R. No. 185331, June 8, 2016
SPOUSES ABELARDO VALARAO AND FRANCISCA VALARAO, Petitioners,
vs.
MSC AND COMPANY, Respondent.
FACTS:
MSC and Company (respondent) entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Spouses Valarao
(petitioners) to develop the latter’s landholding in Angat, Bulacan for residential use. The parties
entered into a subsequent Contract Agreement where petitioners undertook to reimburse
 CivPro- JDMO

respondent’s expenses for the project’s topographic survey, site relocation, subdivision plans and
specifications. They also agreed to give an advance payment of P8.55M as mobilization expenses for
land development which will be paid upon the contract's execution. However, petitioners failed to
pay after demand and even after MSC completed 30% of the project.
Respondent instituted a complaint for collection of sum of money, damages and rescission. The RTC
rendered its decision in favor of respondent, ordering the petitioners to pay the former P16.3 M and
other reliefs. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. The CA’s decision became final on
March 19, 2008.
Petitioners brought the matter to the SC via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, claiming that they have timely submitted a Motion for Reconsideration on March 11,
2008.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of finality or immutability of judgment has set in
RULING:
Yes. The CA decision on February 21, 2008 had become final and executory. The alleged timely
submitted Motion for Reconsideration filed on March 11, 2008 was not properly filed in its due form
considering that the copy of the motion attached to the petition lacked material portions, including
the end of its prayer and the required signature of counsel.
Further, the counsel of petitioners failed to file a timely Motion for Extension or Petition with the SC
despite the receipt of the May 28, 2008 resolution denying his motion for reconsideration. The
doctrine of finality or immutability of judgment has already set in. Under this doctrine, a decision that
has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and
whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which
violates this principle must immediately be struck down.
The doctrine admits of certain exceptions, which are usually applied to serve substantial justice,
particularly in the following instances: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro
tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision, rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable. None of these circumstances attends the present case.
Although there are exceptions to this doctrine, none of the circumstance attends the abovementioned
case.
The petition is denied.
**********
Case #9
G.R. No. 165569, July 29, 2010
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS, GLENDA A. VARGAS, MA. SOCORRO S. GUANHING, in their
capacities as Dean and Assistant Dean, respectively, of the College of Nursing of the
University of Santo Tomas, and RODOLFO N. CLAVIO, in his capacity as Registrar of the
University of Santo Tomas, Petitioners,
vs.
DANES B. SANCHEZ, Respondent.
FACTS:
This case began with a Complaint for Damages filed by respondent Danes B. Sanchez (respondent)
against the University of Santo Tomas (UST) and its directors and officers (petitioner) for their
alleged unjustified refusal to release the respondents Transcript of Records (ToR).
In his Complaint, respondent alleged that he graduated from UST on April 2, 2002 with a Bachelors
Degree of Science in Nursing. He was included in the list of candidates for graduation and attended
 CivPro- JDMO

the graduation ceremonies. On April 18, 2002, respondent sought to secure a copy of his ToR with
the UST Registrars Office, paid the required fees, but was only given a Certificate of Graduation by
the Registrar. Despite repeated attempts by the respondent to secure a copy of his ToR, and
submission of his class cards as proof of his enrolment, UST refused to release his records, making it
impossible for him to take the nursing board examinations, and depriving him of the opportunity to
make a living.
The respondent prayed that the RTC order UST to release his ToR and hold UST liable for actual,
moral, and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and the costs of suit.
Instead of filing an Answer, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss where they claimed that they refused
to release respondents ToR because he was not a registered student, since he had not been enrolled
in the university for the last three semesters. They claimed that the respondents graduation,
attendance in classes, and taking/passing of examinations were immaterial because he ceased to be
a student when he failed to enroll during the second semester of school year 2000-2001. They also
sought the dismissal of the case on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action.
After the parties filed their responsive pleadings, petitioners filed a Supplement to their Motion to
Dismiss, alleging that respondent sought administrative recourse before the Commission on Higher
Education (CHED) through a letter-complaint dated January 21, 2003. Thus, petitioners claimed that
the CHED had primary jurisdiction to resolve matters pertaining to school controversies, and the
filing of the instant case was premature.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CHED exercises quasi-judicial power over controversies involving school matters
and has primary jurisdiction over respondents demand for the release of his ToR
2. Whether or not the Complaint states a cause of action
RULING:
1st Issue:
No. The rule on primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises quasijudicial
or adjudicatory functions. Thus, an essential requisite for this doctrine to apply is the actual
existence of quasi-judicial power. However, petitioners have not shown that the CHED possesses any
such power to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and
draw conclusions. Indeed, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7722 otherwise known as the Higher
Education Act of 1994, certainly does not contain any express grant to the CHED of judicial or
quasijudicial
power.
2nd Issue:
Yes. Under Rule 16, Section 1(g) of the Rules of Court, a Motion to Dismiss may be made on the ground
that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action.
To clarify the essential test required to sustain dismissal on this ground, the test of the sufficiency of
the facts found in a petition, to constitute a cause of action, is whether admitting the facts alleged, the
court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the petition.
Stated otherwise, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears
solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for.
The Complaint makes the following essential allegations: that petitioners unjustifiably refused to
release respondents ToR despite his having obtained a degree from UST; that petitioners claim that
respondent was not officially enrolled is untrue; that as a result of petitioners unlawful actions,
respondent has not been able to take the nursing board exams since 2002; that petitioners actions
violated Articles 19-21 of the Civil Code; and that petitioners should be ordered to release
respondents ToR and held liable for P400,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages, P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees and costs of suit, and P15,000.00 as actual damages.
 CivPro- JDMO

Based on the parties’ allegations, the issues in this case are far from settled. Was respondent
enrolled or not? Was his degree obtained fraudulently? If so, why was he permitted by the
petitioners to graduate? Was there fault or negligence on the part of any of the parties? Clearly,
these are factual matters which can be best ventilated in a full-blown proceeding before the trial
court.
The petition is denied.
**********
Case #10
G.R. No. 203775, August 5, 2014
ASSOCIATION OF FLOOD VICTIMS and JAIME AGUILAR HERNANDEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ALAY BUHAY COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION, INC.,
and WESLIE TING GATCHALIAN, Respondents.
FACTS:
On 28 August 2012, the SC affirmed COMELEC Resolution SPP 10-013, dated 11 October 2011,
cancelling the certificate of registration of the Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) Party-List which
won in the party-list elections in the 2010 national elections. The disqualification of the ABC PartyList
resulted in the re-computation of the party-list allocations in the House of Representatives, in
which the COMELEC followed the formula outlined in the case of Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. Commission on Elections.
The COMELEC then issued Minute Resolution No. 12-0859, in which it resolved:
1. TO GRANT the September 14, 2012 Urgent Motion for Proclamation of Alay Buhay
Community Development Foundation, Inc. (Alay Buhay) Party-List;
2. TO DENY the September 20, 2012 Very Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion of Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens of the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens) Party-List;
3. TO NOTE the September 24, 2012 Opposition to Senior CitizensParty-List’s "Very Very
UrgentEx-Parte Motion" of Alay Buhay Community Development Foundation, Inc. (Alay
Buhay) Party-List;
4. TO CONFIRM the herein RE-COMPUTATION OF THE ALLOCATION OF SEATS of the PartyList
System of Representation in the House of Representatives in the May 10, 2010
Automated National and Local Elections;
5. TO PROCLAIM Alay Buhay Community Development Foundation, Inc. (Alay Buhay) PartyList
as a winning party-list group in the Party-List System of Representation in the House of
Representatives in the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections; and
6. TO DECLARE the First (1st) NOMINEE of Alay Buhay Community Development Foundation,
Inc. (Alay Buhay) Party-List, as the FIRST (1st) SITTING REPRESENTATIVE in the Party-List
System of Representation in the House of Representatives in accordance with the Order of
Nominees per the List appearing in its March 17, 2010 Certificate of Nomination.
On 25 October 2012, petitioners Association of Flood Victims and Jaime Aguilar Hernandez
(Hernandez) filed with the SC a special civil action for certiorari and/or mandamus under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. Petitioners assert that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
issued Minute Resolution No. 12-0859. Furthermore, petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ of
mandamus to compel publication of the COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 12-0859.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners have legal capacity to sue
RULING:
No. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure read:
SECTION 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. – Only natural or juridical persons, or
 CivPro- JDMO

entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. The term "plaintiff" may refer to the
claiming party, the counter-claimant, the cross-claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.) -party
plaintiff. The term "defendant" may refer to the original defending party, the defendant in a
counterclaim, the cross-defendant, or the third (fourth, etc.) -party defendant.
SECTION 2. Parties in interest. – A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest.
Under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 3, only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may
be parties in a civil action, which must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest. Article 44 of the Civil Code lists the juridical persons with capacity to sue, thus:
Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created
by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which
the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each
shareholder, partner or member. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court mandates that "[f]acts showing the capacity of a party to sue
or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal
existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party, must be averred."
In their petition, it is stated that petitioner is is still in the process of incorporation, thus cannot be
considered a juridical person or an entity authorized by law, which can be a party to a civil action.
Petitioner is an unincorporated association not endowed with a distinct personality of its own. An
unincorporated association, in the absence of an enabling law, has no juridical personality and thus,
cannot sue in the name of the association. Such unincorporated association is not a legal entity
distinct from its members. If an association, like petitioner, has no juridical personality, then all
members of the association must be made parties in the civil action.
Moreover, there was no accompanying document showing that the other members of the Association
of Flood Victims authorized petitioner Hernandez to represent them and the association in the
petition. The members cannot represent their association in any suit without valid and legal
authority. Neither can their signatures confer on the association any legal capacity to sue.
In Dueñas v. Santos Subdivision Homeowners Association, the SC held that the Santos Subdivision
Homeowners Association (SSHA), which was an unincorporated association, lacks capacity to sue in
its own name, and that the members of the association cannot represent the association without valid
authority.
Since petitioner Association of Flood Victims has no legal capacity to sue, petitioner Hernandez, who
is filing this petition as a representative of the Association of Flood Victims, is likewise devoid of legal
personality to bring an action in court. Neither can petitioner Hernandez sue as a taxpayer because
he failed to show that there was illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation or that public funds
are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
Besides, petitioners have no locus standi or legal standing. Locus standi or legal standing is defined
as:
x x x a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain a direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term
"interest" means a material interest, an. interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished
from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The gist of the question
of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
 CivPro- JDMO

to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
In this case, petitioners failed to allege personal or substantial interest . in the questioned
governmental act which is the issuance of COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 12-0859, which
confirmed the re-computation of the allocation of seats of the Party-List System of Representation in
the House of Representatives in the 10 May 2010 Automated National and Local Elections. Petitioner
Association of Flood Victims is not even a party-list candidate in the 10 May 2010 elections, and thus,
could not have been directly affected by COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 12-0859.
The petition is dismissed.
**********
Case #11
G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976
ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor) and PONCIANO BONILLA (their
father) who represents the minors, petitioners,
vs.
LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA, MANUEL BARCENA,
AGUSTINA NERI, widow of JULIAN TAMAYO and HON. LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of the Court of
First Instance of Abra, respondents.
FACTS:
On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio and Salvacion and wife of
Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in CFI-Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land
located in Abra.
On May 9, 1975, defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint, but before the hearing on the
motion, the plaintiff moved to amend the complaint in order to include certain allegations. On July
17, 1975, plaintiffs filed their amended complaint.
On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
Fortunata died and, therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. Said motion to dismiss was heard on
August 14, 1975. In said hearing, counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death of Fortunata, and
asked for substitution by the petitioners herein; but the court after the hearing immediately
dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person cannot be a real party in interest and has no
legal personality to sue.
The plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the trial court for lack
of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a deceased litigant can be substituted by her minor heirs in a pending case
RULING:
Yes. While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his
heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion. Under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "after
a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the
legal representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased, within such time
as may be granted ... ."
In the present case, an action to quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and
principally property and property rights and therefore is one that survives even after her death. It
is, therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the legal representative of the deceased
plaintiff to appear and to be substituted for her. It is even the duty of the court, if the legal
representative fails to appear, to order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased.
Under the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the court is directed to appoint a guardian
 CivPro- JDMO

ad litem for the minor heirs. In the instant case, the counsel for the deceased plaintiff has suggested
to the respondent Court that the uncle of the minors be appointed to act as guardian ad litem for
them. Unquestionably, the respondent Court has gravely abused its discretion in not complying
with the clear provision of the Rules of Court in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff and
refusing the substitution of parties in the case.
The order of the respondent Court dismissing the complaint is set aside.
**********
Case #12
G.R. No. 191526, October 5, 2015
SPOUSES FLORENTINO AND CONSOLACION TABALNO, Petitioners,
vs.
PAULINO T. DINGAL, SR. AND JUANITA GALOLA VDA. DE DINGAL, Respondents.
FACTS:
The case rooted from a forcible entry case filed by Paulino Dingal, Sr. (Paulino) before the MCTCAbuyog,
Leyte against petitioners.
On March 31, 2008, the MCTC ordered the petitioners to vacate the premises and restore its
possession to Paulino; demolish any and all structures illegally constructed therein at their
expense; and pay Paulino P50,000.00 as damages for the use and occupation of the lot in dispute,
P30,000.00 as attorney's fees, and P3,500.00 as litigation expenses.
Petitioners appealed the decision to the RTC. Paulino filed a Motion to Dismiss the appeal and
prayed for the issuance of a writ of execution.
During the pendency of the case, Paulino died. Hence, his wife filed an omnibus ex parte Motion for
Substitution which was granted by the RTC. The petitioners contested the same and charged the
RTC with grave abuse of discretion in granting the substitution of Paulino by his wife Juanita. They
argue that, under Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the husband and the wife shall sue or be
sued jointly, except as may be provided by law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the wife may substitute her deceased husband in a pending case
RULING:
Yes. There are three kinds of actions available for the recovery of possession of real property:
(1) accion interdictal or ejectment case; (b) accion publiciana; and (3) accion reivindicatoria. These
actions survive the death of a party. Under Section 16, Rule 3of the Rules of Court, the heirs of a
deceased party may be substituted for the latter on a pending action where the claim is not thereby
extinguished.
Forcible entry, as well as unlawful detainer, belongs to the class of action known as accion
interdictal - where the issue is the right of physical or material possession of the subject real
property that, therefore, survives the death of a party.
Forcible entry cases are actions in personam - affecting only the particular person sought to be held
liable - that generally do not survive a party's death. Nonetheless, because it is a real action that
primarily and principally affects property and property rights, it survives the death of either party.
The forcible entry case filed by Paulino against petitioners, survived his death. Hence, pursuant to
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, Juanita, the surviving spouse and heir of Paulino, could have
and had properly been substituted for him in the forcible entry case.
The Court noted that Juanita did not join the proceeding pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 3 when she,
as Paulino's wife, should have sued jointly with Paulino. Rather, Juanita joined the proceeding
pursuant to Section 16 of Rule 3 which allows her, as her husband's heir, to substitute for Paulino in
the case. In other words, she was merely taking over her husband's place, not belatedly joining as
an additional party, to protect Paulino's rights and interests that the proceedings may affect.
 CivPro- JDMO

The petition is dismissed.

**********
Case #13
G.R. No. 204729, August 6, 2014
LOURDES SUITES (Crown Hotel Management Corporation), Petitioner,
vs.
NOEMI BINARO, Respondent.
FACTS:
Lourdes Suites, a hotel operator, entered into two (2) contracts with respondent for room
accommodations for two groups of students. It filed a Collection for Sum of Money against the
respondent claiming that the latter failed to pay the balance representing the charges for damages
to the furniture, lost key and excess guests. In her Response, respondent alleged that she is not
liable for the said amount because petitioner billed the charges twice.
The MeTC found that the petitioner failed to successfully prove by preponderance of evidence the
existence of an obligation in its favor and that the respondent has an unpaid account in the amount
of Php47,810.00. Hence, the said trial court dismissed the case with prejudice on the ground of lack
of cause of action.
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the RTC stating that a dismissal based
on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action cannot be deemed a dismissal with
prejudice under the Rules. Petitioner further argued that lack of cause of action is not a valid
ground for dismissal of case, much more a dismissal with prejudice. The RTC was not convinced and
dismissed the petition.
Upon filing the petition with the Court, the petitioner stated as one of the issues that the existence
of a cause of action is determined only by the facts alleged in the complaint, but the MeTC Decision
was anchored on the evidence of Defendant, now Respondent
ISSUE:
Whether or not the MeTC is correct in dismissing the case with prejudice on the ground of lack of
cause of action
RULING:
No. The RTC correctly upheld the MTC Decision. Petitioner argues that even after the presentation
of evidence by both parties, a complaint cannot be dismissed with prejudice based on lack of cause
of action because: (1) this ground is not expressly provided for under the Rules on Small Claims
Cases; and (2) if there was a failure to prove a cause of action the only available remedy would be a
demurrer filed by the defendant.
On one hand, failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading, and is a
ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, lack of cause [of] action
refers to a situation where the evidence does not prove the cause of action alleged in the pleading.
The remedy in the first is to move for dismissal of the pleading, while the remedy in the second is to
demur to the evidence. The procedure would consequently be to require the pleading to state a
cause of action, by timely objection to its deficiency; or, at the trial, to file a demurrer to evidence, if
such motion is warranted.
The courts are not precluded from dismissing a case for lack of cause of action (i.e. insufficiency of
evidence). In civil cases, courts must determine if the plaintiff was able to prove his case by a
preponderance of evidence which is defined as "x x x the probability of the truth. It is evidence that
is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto."
The dismissal of the complaint with prejudice is likewise not an exercise of wanton or palpable
discretion. It must be noted that this case is an action for small claims where decisions are rendered
final and unappealable, hence, a [d]ecision dismissing the same is necessarily with prejudice.
 CivPro- JDMO

The petition is denied.

**********
Case #14
G.R. No. 138497, January 16, 2002
IMELDA RELUCIO, petitioner,
vs.
ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ, respondent.
FACTS:
On September 15, 1993, herein private respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez (plaintiff below) filed a
petition for "APPOINTMENT AS SOLE ADMINISTRATIX OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF
PROPERTIES, FORFEITURE, ETC.," against defendant Alberto Lopez and petition Imelda Relucio in
RTC-Makati City.
In the petition, private-respondent alleged that sometime in 1968, defendant Lopez, who is legally
married to the private respondent, abandoned the latter and their four legitimate children; that he
arrogated unto himself full and exclusive control and administration of the conjugal properties; that
defendant Lopez, after abandoning his family, maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited with
herein petitioner since 1976.
Defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio, during their period of cohabitation since 1976, have
amassed a fortune in their names singly or jointly or their dummies and proxies. It was alleged that
the properties have been acquired principally if not solely through the actual contribution of
money, property and industry of defendant Lopez with minimal, if not nil, actual contribution from
petitioner Relucio.
In order to avoid his obligations to his legal wife and children, defendant Lopez placed substantial
portions of these conjugal properties in the name of petitioner Relucio with whom he had two
illegitimate children.
On December 8, 1993, a Motion to Dismiss the Petition was filed by herein petitioner on the ground
that private respondent has no cause of action against her. Respondent judge dismissed the motion
on the ground that petitioner is impleaded as a necessary or indispensable party because some of
the subject properties are registered in her name and defendant Lopez, or solely in her name. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent's petition for appointment as sole administratrix of the conjugal
property, accounting, etc. against her husband Alberto J. Lopez established a cause of action against
petitioner
2. Whether or not petitioner's inclusion as party defendant is essential in the proceedings for a
complete adjudication of the controversy
RULING:
1st Issue:
No. The elements of a cause of action are: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in
violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.
To sustain a Motion to Dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim
for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has been merely defectively stated or is ambiguous,
indefinite or uncertain.
In the present case, the complaint is by an aggrieved wife against her husband. Nowhere in the
allegations does it appear that relief is sought against petitioner. Respondent's causes of action
 CivPro- JDMO

were all against her husband.

The first cause of action is for judicial appointment of respondent as administratrix of the
conjugal partnership or absolute community property arising from her marriage to Alberto J. Lopez.
Petitioner is a complete stranger to this cause of action. Article 128 of the Family Code refers only
to spouses, to wit:
"If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her
obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for
judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal
partnership property xxx"
The second cause of action is for an accounting "by respondent husband." The accounting of
conjugal partnership arises from or is an incident of marriage. Petitioner has nothing to do with the
marriage between respondent Alberto J. Lopez. Hence, no cause of action can exist against
petitioner on this ground.
The third cause of action is essentially for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez' share in property co-owned
by him and petitioner. It does not involve the issue of validity of the co-ownership between Alberto
J. Lopez and petitioner. The issue is whether there is basis in law to forfeit Alberto J. Lopez' share, if
any there be, in property co-owned by him with petitioner.
Respondent's asserted right to forfeit extends to Alberto J. Lopez' share alone. The cause of action
that arises from the failure of Alberto J. Lopez to surrender such share pertains to Alberto J. Lopez,
not petitioner.
2nd Issue:
No. A real party in interest is one who stands "to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the
suit." In this case, petitioner would not be affected by any judgment in the Special Proceedings case.
If petitioner is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an indispensable party. An indispensable
party is one without whom there can be no final determination of an action. Petitioner's
participation in the Special Proceedings case is not indispensable.
Nor can petitioner be a necessary party in the case. A necessary party as one who is not
indispensable but who ought to be joined as party if complete relief is to be accorded those already
parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action.
In the context of her petition in the lower court, respondent would be accorded complete relief if
Alberto J. Lopez were ordered to account for his alleged conjugal partnership property with
respondent, give support to respondent and her children, turn over his share in the co-ownership
with petitioner and dissolve his conjugal partnership or absolute community property with
respondent.
The petition is granted.
**********
Case #15
G.R. No. 195561, March 14, 2012
GOODLAND COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
ASIA UNITED BANK, ABRAHAM CO, ATTY. JOEL T. PELICANO AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF MAKATI CITY, Respondents.
FACTS:
On January 17, 2003, petitioner filed the first suit assailing the REM over its property covered by TCT
No. 114645. The petitioner stated that Gilbert Guy signed the blank REM deed with the understanding
that the document shall not be completed and not to be registered with the Register of Deeds as it
would only serve as “comfort document” to prove petitioner’s willingness to execute a REM in the
future if so demanded by respondent AUB.
 CivPro- JDMO

In contravention of such agreement and despite the fact that no notary public was present when Mr.
Guy signed the REM, AUB and its officers made it appear that the REM dated February 29, 2000 with
the stated consideration of Php 202 million was duly completed and notarized, and was subsequently
registered with the Register of Deeds. Disparities in the copy of the REM on file with the Office of the
Clerk of Court of Pasig City were likewise discovered by petitioner (community tax certificates used
were issued in 2001).
On January 29, 2002, petitioner sent its written objections to the spurious REM and demanded from
AUB its immediate cancellation. Upon request of petitioner, the NBI also investigated the falsification
and found forgery in the signature of respondent Pelicano (Notary Public).
On November 30, 2006, petitioner filed the second case against herein respondents AUB and its
officers. While the first case sought the annulment of the REM based on alleged irregularities in its
execution, the second case prayed for injunctive relief and/or nullification of the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale which petitioner alleged to be procedurally and legally defective.
Respondents contended that petitioner is guilty of forum shopping, as it has previously filed a case
for the annulment of the REM which is pending before the trial court. Said case was based on the
same cause of action, that is, petitioners perceived irregularities in the execution and registration of
the REM.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of forum shopping in filing the second case
RULING:
Yes. There is forum shopping when the following elements are present: "(a) identity of parties, or at
least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions[;] (b) identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts[;] and (c) the identity of the two preceding
particulars[,] such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration; said requisites [are] also
constitutive of the requisites for auter action pendant or lis pendens."
All the foregoing elements are present in this case.
The prayer for relief in the two cases was based on the same attendant facts in the execution of REMs
over petitioner’s properties in favor of AUB. While the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage,
consolidation of ownership in AUB and issuance of title in the latter’s name were set forth only in the
second case, these were simply the expected consequences of the REM transaction in the first case.
These eventualities are precisely what petitioner sought to avert when it filed the first case.
Undeniably then, the injunctive relief sought against the extrajudicial foreclosure, as well as the
cancellation of the new title in the name of the creditor-mortgagee AUB, were all premised on the
alleged nullity of the REM due to its allegedly fraudulent and irregular execution and registration –
the same facts set forth in the first case. In both cases, petitioner asserted its right as owner of the
property subject of the REM, while AUB invoked the rights of a foreclosing creditor-mortgagee.
There is also identity of parties. The parties in both cases are substantially the same as they represent
the same interests and offices/positions, and who were impleaded in their respective capacities with
corresponding liabilities/duties under the claims asserted.
The test in determining whether or not the causes of action in the first and second cases are identical
is: would the same evidence support and establish both the present and former cause of action? If so,
the former recovery is a bar; if otherwise, it does not stand in the way of the former action.
Since the violations of petitioner’s right as owner in the two cases both hinge on the binding effect of
the REM, i.e., both cases will rise or fall on the issue of the validity of the REM, it follows that the same
evidence will support and establish the first and second causes of action. The procedural infirmities
or non-compliance with legal requirements for extrajudicial foreclosure raised in the second case
were but additional grounds in support of the injunctive relief sought against the foreclosure which
 CivPro- JDMO

was, in the first place, illegal on account of the mortgage contract’s nullity.
As previously held by the Court, there is still forum shopping even if the reliefs prayed for in the two
cases are different, so long as both cases raise substantially the same issues.
The identity of the causes of action in the two cases entails that the validity of the mortgage will be
ruled upon in both, and creates a possibility that the two rulings will conflict with each other.
Moreover, the records are barren of any showing that plaintiff reported in Civil Case No. 03-045 the
fact that it subsequently filed Civil Case No. 06-1032. Under Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the plaintiff is required under oath to certify, among others, his undertaking to report
to the court the fact of filing of a similar case, failing which shall be cause for the dismissal of the case,
to wit:
"(c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending,
he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint
or initiatory pleading has been filed.
…non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court,
without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party
or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for
summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for
administrative sanctions."
A decision in either case will amount to res judicata in the other considering that both courts were
called upon to rule on the same issue of whether the REM was falsified.
The petitions are denied.
**********
Case #16
G.R. No. 131457, April 24, 1998
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON. REY B. BAULA,
MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Respondents.
FACTS:
On March 29, 1996, the Office of the President (OP) issued its decision approving the conversion of a
one hundred forty-four (144)-hectare land from agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional area. A
massive hunger strike started, forcing the OP through then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C.
Corona, to issue the so-called Win-Win Resolution, substantially modifying its earlier Decision after
it had already become final and executory. The said Resolution modified the approval of the land
conversion to agro-industrial area only to the extent of forty-four (44) hectares, and ordered the
remaining one hundred (100) hectares to be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
Petitioners claimed that the OP was prompted to issue the said resolution after a very well-managed
hunger strike led by fake farmer-beneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded in pressuring and/or politically
blackmailing the OP. They alleged that the Resolution was a purely political decision to appease the
farmers, leading to the revival and modification of the March 29, 1996 Decision which has been
declared final and executory.
Petitioners further alleged that respondent Corona committed grave abuse of discretion and acted
beyond his jurisdiction when he issued the questioned Resolution. They availed of this extraordinary
writ of certiorari because there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. They never filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the subject Resolution because it is patently
illegal or contrary to law and it would be a futile exercise to seek a reconsideration.
 CivPro- JDMO

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, opposed the petition and prayed that it be dismissed
outright on the following grounds:
1. The proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a petition for review
directly with the CA in accordance with Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court;
2. The petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Win-Win
Resolution before filing the present petition; and
3. Petitioner NQSRMDC is guilty of forum-shopping.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners should have filed a petition for review in accordance with Rule 43 of
the Rules
2. Whether or not the petitioners are guilty of forum shopping
3. Whether the assailed Resolution, issued after the original decision had become final and executory,
had any legal effect
4. Whether the farmer-beneficiaries of the land in question are real parties in interest
RULING:
1st Issue:
No. Under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of any quasi-judicial
agency exercising quasi-judicial functions, including the OP, may be taken to the CA by filing a
verified petition for review within fifteen (15) days from notice of the said judgment, final order or
resolution, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
However, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is inapplicable because the present
petition contains an allegation that the challenged Resolution is patently illegal and was issued with
grave abuse of discretion and beyond his (respondent Secretary Renato C. Corona) jurisdiction when
said Resolution substantially modified the earlier OP Decision of March 29, 1996 which had long
become final and executory. The crucial issue raised here involves an error of jurisdiction, not an
error of judgment which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule 43. Thus, the appropriate remedy to
annul and set aside the assailed Resolution is an original special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65, as what the petitioners have correctly done.
2nd Issue:
No, the petitioners are not guilty of forum shopping. The test for determining whether a party has
violated the rule against forum shopping is where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration.
On one hand, the petition for certiorari in the CA sought the nullification of the DAR Secretary’s order
to proceed with the compulsory acquisition and distribution of the subject property. On the other
hand, the civil case in RTC-Malaybalay, Bukidnon was for the annulment and cancellation of title
issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, with damages, was based on the following
grounds: (1) the DAR, in applying for cancellation of petitioner NQSRMDCs title, used documents
which were earlier declared null and void by the DARAB; (2) the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title was
made without payment of just compensation; and (3) without notice to NQSRMDC for the surrender
of its title.
The present petition is entirely different from the said two cases as it seeks the nullification of the
assailed Win-Win Resolution of the OP, which Resolution was issued long after the previous two cases
were instituted.
3rd Issue:
No. When the OP declared the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory in an order, as no one
has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to
re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the OP has no more
authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary,
 CivPro- JDMO

which second motion became the basis of the assailed “Win-Win” Resolution.
Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate
that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29,
1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in “exceptionally
meritorious cases,”, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first
motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996
to lapse into finality.
Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its
March 29,1996 Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the
rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.
4th Issue:
No. A real party in interest is a party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment or is the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. Real interest means a present substantial interest, as
distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.
In their motion, movants contend that they are the farmer-beneficiaries of the land in question, hence,
are real parties in interest. Apparently, the alleged master list was made pursuant to the directive in
the dispositive portion of the assailed Win-Win Resolution which directs the DAR to carefully and
meticulously determine who among the claimants are the qualified farmer-beneficiaries. In other
words, those movants are merely recommendee farmer-beneficiaries.
Undoubtedly, movant’s interest over the land in question is a mere expectancy. Thus, they are not
real parties in interest.
**********
Case #17
G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and
represented by their parents, et. al., Petitioners
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U.
ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, Respondents.
FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation
and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr.,
Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to (1) cancel all existing Timber Licensing
Agreements (TLA) in the country; (2) cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing, or appraising new TLAs; and (3) grant the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable
under the premises.”
Petitioners alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claimed
that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests
constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in
trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that petitioners have no cause
of action against him; and that the issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly
pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the government.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to prevent further damage
 CivPro- JDMO

to remaining forests
RULING:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come.
The subject matter of complaint is of common and general interest to all the citizens of the
Philippines. Petitioners’ personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include,
inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources
to the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present
as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. The minors’ assertion of their
right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to
ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
**********
Case #18
G.R. No. 160053, August 28, 2006
SPS. RENATO & ANGELINA LANTIN, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JANE AURORA C. LANTION, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City,
Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 13, PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, ELIZABETH C. UMALI,
ALICE PERCE, JELEN MOSCA, REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR LIPA CITY, BATANGAS, THE CLERK OF
COURT and EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BATANGAS,
Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners took several loans (in PHP and USD) from respondent Planters Development Bank and
executed real estate mortgages and promissory notes to cover the loans. They defaulted on the
payments so respondent bank foreclosed the mortgaged lots. The foreclosed properties, in partial
satisfaction of petitioners’ debt, were sold at a public auction where the respondent bank was the
winning bidder.
On November 8, 2003, petitioners filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity and/or Annulment of
Sale and/or Mortgage, Reconveyance, Discharge of Mortgage, Accounting, Permanent Injunction, and
Damages with the RTC of Lipa City, Batangas. Petitioners alleged that only their peso loans were
covered by the mortgages and that these had already been fully paid, hence, the mortgages should
have been discharged. They challenged the validity of the foreclosure on the alleged non-payment of
their dollar loans as the mortgages did not cover those loans.
It is the contention of the petitioners that, since the validity of the loan contracts were squarely put
in issue, necessarily this meant also that the validity of the venue stipulation also was at issue.
Moreover, according to the petitioners, the venue stipulation in the loan documents is not an
exclusive venue stipulation. The venue in the loan agreement was not specified with particularity.
Besides, they alleged that the rule on venue of action was established for the convenience of the
plaintiff, herein petitioners. Further, petitioners also contend that since the complaint involves
several causes of action which did not arise solely from or connected with the loan documents, the
cited venue stipulation should not be made to apply.
Private respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue since the loan
contracts restricted the venue of any suit in Metro Manila. They claimed that the language of the
stipulation is clearly exclusive.
 CivPro- JDMO

The respondent judge dismissed the case for improper venue. Petitioners sought reconsideration.
They argued that the trial court in effect prejudged the validity of the loan contracts because the trial
court based its dismissal on a venue stipulation provided in the agreement. The motion for
reconsideration was denied and the lower court held that the previous order did not touch upon the
validity of the contracts but merely ruled on the procedural issue of venue.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when she dismissed the case for
improper venue
RULING:
No. The general rules on venue of actions shall not apply where the parties, before the filing of the
action, have validly agreed in writing on an exclusive venue. The mere stipulation on the venue of an
action, however, is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties
must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive
words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as
limiting venue to the specified place.
The pertinent provisions of the several real estate mortgages and promissory notes executed by the
petitioner respectively read as follows:
In the event of suit arising out of or in connection with this mortgage and/or the promissory
note/s secured by this mortgage, the parties hereto agree to bring their causes of auction
(sic) exclusively in the proper court of Makati, Metro Manila or at such other venue chosen by
the Mortgagee, the Mortgagor waiving for this purpose any other venue.
I/We further submit that the venue of any legal action arising out of this note shall exclusively be
at the proper court of Metropolitan Manila, Philippines or any other venue chosen by the
BANK, waiving for this purpose any other venue provided by the Rules of Court
Clearly, the words "exclusively" and "waiving for this purpose any other venue" are restrictive and used
advisedly to meet the requirements.
The petition is dismissed.
**********
Case #19
G.R. No. 181970, August 3, 2010
BERNARDO DE LEON, Petitioner,
vs.
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY substituted by the CITY OF PARAÑAQUE, RAMON ARELLANO,
JR., RICARDO PENA and REYMUNDO ORPILLA, Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction before the RTCMakati
City against respondent Public Estates Authority ("PEA"), a government-owned corporation,
as well as its officers, herein private respondents. The suit for damages hinged on the alleged
unlawful destruction of petitioner’s fence and houses constructed on a parcel of land, which
petitioner claimed has been in the possession of his family for more than 50 years. Petitioner prayed
that – one, lawful possession of the land in question be awarded to him; two, PEA be ordered to pay
damages for demolishing the improvements constructed on his land; and, three, an injunctive relief
be issued to enjoin PEA from committing acts which would violate his lawful and peaceful possession
of the subject premises.
The court granted the application for writ of preliminary injunction. It issued the Order that
petitioner has a legal right over the subject matter of the instant case and is entitled to the injunctive
relief demanded for and may suffer irreparable damage or injury if such right is not protected by
Law.
 CivPro- JDMO

PEA appealed to the SC via a Petition for Certiorari insisting that the subject lot was a salvage zone
until it was reclaimed through government efforts in 1982. The land was previously under water on
the coastline which reached nine to twenty meters deep. In 1989, PEA started constructing R-1 Toll
Expressway Road for the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, which project directly traversed Lot 5155. PEA
argued that the documentary evidence presented by petitioner to bolster his fallacious claim of
possession and ownership were procured only in 1992, thus negating his very own allegation that he
and his predecessors-in-interest have been in occupation since time immemorial.
Ruling squarely on the issue adduced before it, the Supreme Court declared that the lot was a public
land so that petitioner’s occupation thereof, no matter how long ago, could not confer ownership or
possessory rights. The SC reversed the decision of the CA.
In due course, PEA moved for the issuance of a writ of execution praying that petitioner and persons
claiming rights under him be ordered to vacate and peaceably surrender possession of the subject
lot. The writ was granted.
Petitioner insists that what the SC decided on was to simply dismiss his complaint for damages and
nothing more, and that the RTC erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a writ of
execution placing PEA in possession of the disputed property. He insists that he can only be removed
from the disputed property through an ejectment proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a writ of execution
placing PEA in possession of the disputed property
RULING:
No. As a general rule, a writ of execution should conform to the dispositive portion of the decision to
be executed; an execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment or award. The
settled general principle is that a writ of execution must conform strictly to every essential particular
of the judgment promulgated, and may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce, nor
may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed.
However, it is equally settled that possession is an essential attribute of ownership. Where the
ownership of a parcel of land was decreed in the judgment, the delivery of the possession of the land
should be considered included in the decision, it appearing that the defeated party’s claim to the
possession thereof is based on his claim of ownership. Furthermore, adjudication of ownership
would include the delivery of possession if the defeated party has not shown any right to possess the
land independently of his claim of ownership which was rejected.
This is precisely what happened in the present case. This Court had already declared the disputed
property as owned by the State and that petitioner does not have any right to possess the land
independent of his claim of ownership. In addition, a judgment for the delivery or restitution of
property is essentially an order to place the prevailing party in possession of the property. If the
defendant refuses to surrender possession of the property to the prevailing party, the sheriff or other
proper officer should oust him. No express order to this effect needs to be stated in the decision; nor
is a categorical statement needed in the decision that in such event the sheriff or other proper officer
shall have the authority to remove the improvements on the property if the defendant fails to do so
within a reasonable period of time. The removal of the improvements on the land under these
circumstances is deemed read into the decision, subject only to the issuance of a special order by the
court for the removal of the improvements.
In the present case, it would be redundant for PEA to go back to court and file an ejectment case
simply to establish its right to possess the subject property. To further require PEA to file an
ejectment suit to oust petitioner and his siblings from the disputed property would, in effect, amount
to encouraging multiplicity of suits.
The petition is denied.
 CivPro- JDMO

**********
Case #20
G.R. No. 165025, August 31, 2011
FEDMAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
FEDERICO AGCAOILI, Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner is the owner and developer of a condominium project known as Fedman Suites Building
(FSB). On June 18, 1975, Interchem Laboratories Incorporated (Interchem) purchased FSB’s Unit 411
under a contract to sell. Thereafter, FDC executed a Master Deed with Declaration of Restrictions, and
formed the Fedman Suite Condominium Corporation (FSCC) to manage FSB and hold title over its
common areas. On October 10, 1980, Interchem, with FDC’s consent, transferred all its rights in Unit
411 to respondent Agcaoili.
In December 1983, the centralized air-conditioning unit of FSB’s fourth floor broke down. So
respondent, being thereby adversely affected, wrote to Genato, vice-president and board member of
FSCC, demanding the repair of the air-conditioning unit. Not getting any immediate response,
respondent sent follow-up letters to FSCC reiterating the demand, but the letters went unheeded. He
then informed FDC and FSCC that he was suspending the payment of his condominium dues and
monthly amortizations.
On August 30, 1984, FDC cancelled the contract to sell involving Unit 411 and cut off the electric
supply to the unit. Respondent filed a complaint for injunction and damages against FDC and FSCC in
the RTC. He alleged that the disconnection of the electric supply of Unit 411 on April 22, 1986 had
unjustly deprived him of the use and enjoyment of the unit; that the disconnection had seriously
affected his law practice and had caused him sufferings, inconvenience and embarrassment; that FDC
and FSCC violated the compromise agreement; that he was entitled to actual damages amounting to
₱21,626.60, as well as to moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees as might be proven
during the trial; that the payment of interest sought by FDC and FSCC under the contract to sell was
illegal. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent. FDC appealed, but the CA affirmed the
RTC.
Petitioner claimed that there was a failure to pay the correct amount of docket fee herein because the
complaint did not specify the amounts of moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees;
that the payment of the prescribed docket fee by respondent was necessary for the RTC to acquire
jurisdiction over the case; and that, consequently, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court can acquire jurisdiction over the case despite the plaintiff’s failure to pay
the full amount of filing fees required by law
RULING:
No. The filing of the complaint or other initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket
fee are the acts that vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the claim. In an action where the reliefs
sought are purely for sums of money and damages, the docket fees are assessed on the basis of the
aggregate amount being claimed. Ideally, therefore, the complaint or similar pleading must specify
the sums of money to be recovered and the damages being sought in order that the clerk of court may
be put in a position to compute the correct amount of docket fees. If the amount of docket fees paid
is insufficient in relation to the amounts being sought, the clerk of court or his duly authorized deputy
has the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment, and the plaintiff will be required to pay the
deficiency. The non-specification of the amounts of damages does not immediately divest the trial
court of its jurisdiction over the case, provided there is no bad faith or intent to defraud the
Government on the part of the plaintiff.
 CivPro- JDMO

The prevailing rule is that if the correct amount of docket fees are not paid at the time of filing, the
trial court still acquires jurisdiction upon full payment of the fees within a reasonable time as the
court may grant, barring prescription. The "prescriptive period" that bars the payment of the docket
fees refers to the period in which a specific action must be filed, so that in every case the docket fees
must be paid before the lapse of the prescriptive period.
Even where the clerk of court fails to make a deficiency assessment, and the deficiency is not paid as
a result, the trial court nonetheless continues to have jurisdiction over the complaint, unless the party
liable is guilty of a fraud in that regard, considering that the deficiency will be collected as a fee in lien
within the contemplation of Section 2, Rule 141 (as revised by A.M. No. 00-2-01-SC). The reason is
that to penalize the party for the omission of the clerk of court is not fair if the party has acted in good
faith.
In the case at bar, the docket fees paid by respondent were insufficient considering that the complaint
did not specify the amounts of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Nonetheless,
it is not disputed that respondent paid the assessed docket fees. Such payment negated bad faith or
intent to defraud the Government. Nonetheless, respondent must remit any docket fee deficiency to
the RTC’s clerk of court.
The petition for review is denied.

G.R. No. 141853 February 7, 2001

TERESITA V. IDOLOR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. GUMERSINDO DE GUZMAN and ILUMINADA DE GUZMAN and HON.
PRUDENCIO A. CASTILLO, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 220, Quezon City, respondents.
FACTS:
On March 21, 1994, to secure a loan of P520,000.00, petitioner Teresita Idolor executed in favor of
private respondent Gumersindo De Guzman a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage with right of extra-judicial
foreclosure upon failure to redeem the mortgage on or before September 20, 1994. The object of said
mortgage is a 200-square meter property with improvements located at Barangay Ramon Magsaysay,
Quezon City.
On September 21, 1996, private respondent Iluminada de Guzman, wife of Gumersindo de Guzman,
filed a complaint against petitioner Idolor before the Office of the Barangay Captain of Barangay Ramon
Magsaysay, Quezon City, which resulted in a "Kasunduang Pag-aayos" wherein Idolor asked for a 90-day
grace period to settle the questioned amount and that failure to settle it on or before December 21,
1996 would result to an execution of a deed of sale with the agreement to repurchase without interest
within one year in favor of private respondents.
Petitioner failed to comply with her undertaking; thus private respondent Gumersindo filed a motion for
execution before the Office of the Barangay captain who subsequently issued a certification to file
action.
On March 21, 1997, respondent Gumersindo De Guzman filed an extra judicial foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage pursuant to the parties agreement set forth in the real estate mortgage dated March
21, 1994.
On May 23, 1997, the mortgaged property was sold in a public auction to respondent Gumersindo, as
the highest bidder and consequently, the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City on June 23, 1997.
On June 25, 1998, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 220, a complaint
for annulment of Sheriff's Certificate of Sale with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
 CivPro- JDMO

order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction against private respondents, Deputy Sheriffs Marino
Cachero and Rodolfo Lescano and the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City alleging among others alleged
irregularity and lack of notice in the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings subject of the real estate
mortgage. In the meantime, a temporary restraining order was issued by the trial court.
On July 28, 1998, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining private respondents,
the Deputy Sheriffs and the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City from causing the issuance of a final deed of
sale and consolidation of ownership of the subject property in favor of the De Guzman spouses.
Spouses de Guzman filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari seeking
annulment of the trial court's order dated July 28, 1998 which granted the issuance of a preliminary
injunction. On September 28, 1999, the respondent court granted the petition and annulled the assailed
writ of preliminary injunction. Teresita Idolor filed her motion for reconsideration which was denied in a
resolution dated February 4, 2000.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner claims that her proprietary right over the subject
parcel of land was not yet lost since her right to redeem the subject land for a period of one year had
neither lapsed nor run as the sheriff's certificate of sale was null and void; that petitioner and the
general public have not been validly notified of the auction sale conducted by respondent sheriffs; that
the newspaper utilized in the publication of the notice of sale was not a newspaper of general
circulation.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in finding that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in enjoining the
private and public respondents from causing the issuance of a final deed of sale and consolidation of
ownership of the subject parcel of land in favor of private respondents.

HELD:
No, the SC agrees with the CA.
Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. Before an
injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: 1) there must be aright
in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; 2) the act against which the injunction is to be
directed is a violation of such right. Hence the existence of a right violated, is a prerequisite to the
granting of an injunction. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Failure to
establish either the existence of a clear and positive right which should be judicially protected through
the writ of injunction or that the defendant has committed or has attempted to commit any act which
has endangered or tends to endanger the existence of said right, is a sufficient ground for denying the
injunction. The controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ is that the
court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before
their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated. It is to be resorted to only when
there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any
standard of compensation.
In the instant case, we agree with the respondent Court that petitioner has no more proprietary right to
speak of over the foreclosed property to entitle her to the issuance of a writ of injunction. It appears
that the mortgaged property was sold in a public auction to private respondent Gumersindo on May 23,
1997 and the sheriff's certificate of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on
June 23, 1997. Petitioner had one year from the registration of the sheriff's sale to redeem the property
but she failed to exercise her right on or before June 23, 1998, thus spouses de Guzman are now entitled
to a conveyance and possession of the foreclosed property. When petitioner filed her complaint for
annulment of sheriff's sale against private respondents with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction on June 25, 1998, she failed to show sufficient interest or title in the property
 CivPro- JDMO

sought to be protected as her right of redemption had already expired on June 23, 1998, i.e. two (2)
days before the filing of the complaint. It is always a ground for denying injunction that the party
seeking it has insufficient title or interest to sustain it, and no claim to the ultimate relief sought - in
other words, that she shows no equity. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual
existing right is not aground for an injunction.
Petitioner next contends that the execution of the "Kasunduang Pag-aayos" dated September 21, 1996
between her and spouses de Guzman before the Office of the Lupon Tagapamayapa showed the express
and unequivocal intention of the parties to novate or modify the real estate mortgage. Petitioner insists
that the "Kasunduang Pag-aayos" was not a mere promissory note contrary to respondent court's
conclusion since it was entered by the parties before the Lupon Tagapamayapa which has the effect of a
final judgment. We are not persuaded.
Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or change of the obligation by a
subsequent one which terminates it, either by changing its objects or principal conditions, or by
substituting a new debtor in place of the old one, or by subrogating a third person to the rights of the
creditor. Under the law, novation is never presumed. The parties to a contract must expressly agree that
they are abrogating their old contract in favor of a new one. Accordingly, it was held that no novation of
a contract had occurred when the new agreement entered into between the parties was intended to
give life to the old one.
A review of the "Kasunduang Pag-aayos" which is quoted earlier does not support petitioner's
contention that it novated the real estate mortgage since the will to novate did not appear by express
agreement of the parties nor the old and the new contracts were incompatible in air points. In fact,
petitioner expressly recognized in the Kasunduan the existence and the validity of the old obligation
where she acknowledged her long overdue account since September 20, 1994 which was secured by a
real estate mortgage and asked for a ninety (90) days grace period to settle her obligation on or before
December 21, 1996 and that upon failure to do so, she will execute a deed of sale with a right to
repurchase without interest within one year in favor of private respondents. Where the parties to the
new obligation expressly recognize the continuing existence and validity of the old one, where, in other
words, the parties expressly negated the lapsing of the old obligation, there can be no novation.
Petition is DENIED. The decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated September 28, 1999 is hereby
AFFIRMED.

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1250 February 28, 2001

[Formerly OCA IPI No. 97-332-MTJ]
RIMEO S. GUSTILO, complainant,
vs.
HON. RICARDO S. REAL, SR., Presiding Judge, 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Victorias-Manapla,
Negros Occidental, respondent.

FACTS:
In a verified complaint dated June 15, 1997, Rimeo S. Gustilo charged respondent Judge Ricardo S. Real,
Sr., of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Victorias-Manapla, Negros Occidental with gross misconduct,
gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law, and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act relative to Civil Case No. 703-M entitled "Weddy C. Libo-on v. Rimeo S. Gustilo, et al. " for recounting
of ballots of Precinct Nos. 27 and 27-A, Barangay Punta Mesa, Manapla, Negros Occidental.
Complainant avers that he was a candidate for punong barangay of Barangay Punta Mesa, Manapla,
Negros Occidental in the May 12, 1997 elections. His lone opponent was Weddy C. Libo-on, then the
incumbent punong barangay and the representative of the Association of Barangay Captains (ABC) to
the Sangguniang Bayan of Manapla and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental. Both
 CivPro- JDMO

complainant and Libo-on garnered eight hundred nineteen (819) votes during the elections, resulting in
a tie. The breaking of the tie by the Board of Canvassers was in complainant's favor and he was
proclaimed duly elected punong barangay of Punta Mesa, Manapla.
On May 20, 1997, his opponent filed an election protest case, docketed as Civil Case No. 703-M, before
the MCTC of Victorias-Manapla, Negros Occidental. Libo-on sought the recounting of ballots in two
precincts, preliminary prohibitory injunction, and damages.
On May 21, 1997, respondent ordered the issuance of summons to the parties and set the hearing on
June 6, 1997.
On May 27, 1997, however, Libo-on filed a motion to advance the hearing to May 29 and 30, 1997.
The next day, respondent granted Libo-on's motion. The hearing was advanced to May 29 and 30, 1997
cancelling the hearing for June 6, 1997. Complainant avers that he was not furnished a copy of this
Order dated May 28, 1997.
On May 29, 1997, respondent judge issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) and annulled the
proclamation of complainant as the duly elected punong barangay of Punta Mesa, Manapla.
Complainant declares that no copy of this Order dated May 29, 1997 was served on him. Moreover, it
was only in the afternoon of May 29, 1997 that complainant received a copy of Libo-on's petition in Civil
Case No. 703-M and respondent's Order dated May 21, 1997.
On May 30, 1997, complainant took his oath of office as punong barangay. That same day, he also filed a
petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Silay City, Negros Occidental, Branch 69
docketed as Special Civil Action No. 1936-69.
On June 5, 1997, the RTC lifted the TRO issued by respondent and declared as null and void the order
nullifying complainant's proclamation as duly elected punong barangay.
Believing that respondent could not decide Civil Case No. 703-M impartially, complainant moved for his
inhibition.
On June 11, 1997, respondent denied complainant's motion for inhibition and after hearing Libo-on's
motion for permanent injunction, issued a second TRO "to maintain the status quo between the
contending parties."

ISSUE:
Whether or not whenever an application for a TRO is filed, the court may act on the application only
after all parties have been notified and heard in a summary hearing.

HELD: Yes
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 20-95 provides:
2. The application for a TRO shall be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a summary hearing
conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the records are transmitted to the branch selected by
raffle. The records shall be transmitted immediately after raffle (Emphasis supplied).
4. With the exception of the provisions which necessarily involve multiple-sala stations, these rules shall
apply to single-sala stations especially with regard to immediate notice to all parties of all applications
for TRO.
The foregoing clearly show that whenever an application for a TRO is filed, the court may act on the
application only after all parties have been notified and heard in a summary hearing. In other words, a
summary hearing may not be dispensed with. In the instant case, respondent admits that he issued the
injunctive writ sought on May 29, 1997 after receiving the applicant's evidence ex parte. His failure to
abide by Administrative Circular No. 20-95 in issuing the first TRO is grave abuse of authority,
misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.
Note that the RTC of Silay City corrected respondent's errors by declaring null and void his Order dated
May 29, 1997. Nonetheless, he compounded his previous errors of judgment by proceeding to hear
 CivPro- JDMO

Libo-on's motion for permanent injunction and issuing a second TRO on June 11, 1997 on the ground
that "extreme urgency" and "grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise" if no injunctive remedy
were granted. Respondent insists that his act did not reverse the Order of the RTC in Special Civil Action
No.1936-69, since the second TRO he issued satisfied the notice and hearing requirements of Circular
No. 20-95.
Before an injunctive writ can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: (1) there
must be aright in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against which
injunction to be directed is a violation of such right.11 The onus probandi is on movant to show that
there exists a right to be protected, which is directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined.
Further, there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial and that there
is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent a serious damage.12 In this case,
complainant had been duly proclaimed as the winning candidate for punong barangay. He had taken his
oath of office. Unless his election was annulled, he was entitled to all the rights of said office. We do not
see how the complainant's exercise of such rights would cause an irreparable injury or violate the right
of the losing candidate so as to justify the issuance of a temporary restraining order "to maintain the
status quo."

G.R. No. 168637

MICHAEL LAGROSAS, complainant,
vs.
BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIC, PHILS., respondent.

FACTS:
Michael J. Lagrosas was employed by Bristol-Myers Squibb (Phil.), Inc./Mead Johnson Phil. from January
6, 1997 until March 23, 2000 as Territory Manager in its Medical Sales Force Division.
On February 4, 2000, Ma. Dulcinea S. Lim, also a Territory Manager and Lagrosas’ former girlfriend,
attended a district meeting of territory managers at McDonald’s Alabang Town Center. After the
meeting, she dined out with her friends. She left her car at McDonald’s and rode with Cesar R.
Menquito, Jr. When they returned to McDonald’s, Lim saw Lagrosas’ car parked beside her car. Lim told
Menquito not to stop his car but Lagrosas followed them and slammed Menquito’s car thrice. Menquito
and Lim alighted from the car. Lagrosas approached them and hit Menquito with a metal steering wheel
lock. When Lim tried to intervene, Lagrosas accidentally hit her head.
Upon learning of the incident, Bristol-Myers required Lagrosas to explain in writing why he should not
be dismissed for assaulting a co-employee outside of business hours. While the offense is not covered
by the Code of Discipline for Territory Managers, the Code states that "other infractions not provided for
herein shall be penalized in the most appropriate manner at the discretion of management." In his
memo, Lagrosas admitted that he accidentally hit Lim when she tried to intervene. He explained that he
did not intend to hit her as shown by the fact that he never left the hospital until he was assured that
she was all right. On March 23, 2000, Bristol-Myers dismissed Lagrosas effective immediately. Lagrosas
then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, etc.
 CivPro- JDMO

The Labor Arbiter Renaldo O. Hernandez rendered a Decision declaring the dismissal illegal. He noted
that while Lagrosas committed misconduct, it was not connected with his work. The incident occurred
outside of company premises and office hours. He also observed that the misconduct was not directed
against a co-employee who just happened to be accidentally hit in the process. Nevertheless, Labor
Arbiter Hernandez imposed a penalty of three months suspension or forfeiture of pay to remind
Lagrosas not to be carried away by the mindless dictates of his passion.
On appeal, the NLRC set aside the Decision of Labor Arbiter Hernandez. It held that Lagrosas was validly
dismissed for serious misconduct in hitting his co-employee and another person with a metal steering
wheel lock. However, upon Lagrosas’ motion for reconsideration, the NLRC issued a Resolution reversing
its earlier ruling. It ratiocinated that the incident was not work-related since it occurred only after the
district meeting of territory managers. It emphasized that for a serious misconduct to merit dismissal, it
must be connected with the employee’s work.
Bristol-Myers filed a motion for reconsideration, which the NLRC denied. Later, Labor Arbiter Hernandez
issued a writ of execution. Notices of garnishment were then served upon the Philippine British
Assurance Co., Inc. for the supersedeas bond posted by Bristol-Myers and the Bank of the Philippine
Islands for the balance of the judgment award.
Bristol-Myers moved to quash the writ of execution contending that it timely filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court gave due course to Bristol-Myers’ petition and
issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the enforcement of the writ of execution and
notices of garnishment. Upon the expiration of the TRO, the appellate court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction dated September 17, 2004.
On January 28, 2005, the appellate court considered the misconduct as having been committed in
connection with Lagrosas’ duty as Territory Manager since it occurred immediately after the district
meeting of territory managers. It also held that the gravity and seriousness of the misconduct cannot be
denied. Lagrosas employed such a degree of violence that caused damage not only to Menquito’s car
but also physical injuries to Lim and Menquito.
Lagrosas filed a motion for reconsideration which the appellate court denied.
In the meantime, Bristol-Myers moved to release the TRO cash bond and injunction cash bond in view of
the Decision dated January 28, 2005. On August 12, 2005, the appellate court denied the motion as
premature since the decision is not yet final and executory due to Lagrosas’ appeal to this Court.
Bristol-Myers filed a motion for reconsideration. On October 28, 2005, the appellate court partially
granted the petition and allowed the discharge and release of the cash bond for the expired TRO but
disallowed the release of the inunction cash bond since the writ of preliminary injunction was issued
pendente lite because there is a pending appeal with the Supreme Court, the Decision dated January 28,
2005 is not yet final and executory.
Hence, the instant petitions.

ISSUES:
1) Was the dismissal of Lagrosas valid?
2) Was the CA correct in disallowing the discharge and release of the injunction cash bond.

HELD:
The dismissal was invalid.
Serious misconduct as a valid cause for the dismissal of an employee is defined simply as improper or
wrong conduct. It is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment. To
be serious within the meaning and intendment of the law, the misconduct must be of such grave and
aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. However serious such misconduct, it must,
 CivPro- JDMO

nevertheless, be in connection with the employee’s work to constitute just cause for his separation. The
act complained of must be related to the performance of the employee’s duties such as would show him
to be unfit to continue working for the employer.
It is clear that Lagrosas was not guilty of serious misconduct. It may be that the injury sustained by Lim
was serious since it rendered her unconscious and caused her to suffer cerebral contusion that
necessitated hospitalization for several days. But we fail to see how such misconduct could be
characterized as work-related and reflective of Lagrosas’ unfitness to continue working for Bristol-
Myers.
The injunction cash bond posted by Bristol-Myers should be discharged and released
It is settled that the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous
irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and
adjudicated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully.
A preliminary injunction may be granted only when, among other things, the applicant, not explicitly
exempted, files with the court where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party
or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay such
party or person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining
order if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the
requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued.
The injunction bond is intended as a security for damages in case it is finally decided that the injunction
ought not to have been granted. Its principal purpose is to protect the enjoined party against loss or
damage by reason of the injunction, and the bond is usually conditioned accordingly.
In this case, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the implementation
of the writ of execution and notices of garnishment "pending final resolution of this case or unless the
[w]rit is sooner lifted by the Court."
By its Decision dated January 28, 2005, the appellate court disposed of the case by granting Bristol-
Myers’ petition and reinstating the Decision dated September 24, 2002 of the NLRC which dismissed the
complaint for dismissal. It also ordered the discharge of the TRO cash bond and injunction cash bond.
Thus, both conditions of the writ of preliminary injunction were satisfied.
Notably, the appellate court ruled that Lagrosas had no right to the monetary awards granted by the
labor arbiter and the NLRC, and that the implementation of the writ of execution and notices of
garnishment was properly enjoined. This in effect amounted to a finding that Lagrosas did not sustain
any damage by reason of the injunction. To reiterate, the injunction bond is intended to protect
Lagrosas against loss or damage by reason of the injunction only. Contrary to Lagrosas’ claim, it is not a
security for the judgment award by the labor arbiter.
Considering the foregoing, we hold that the appellate court erred in disallowing the discharge and
release of the injunction cash bond.

G.R. No. 172138 September 8, 2010

NELSON JENOSA and his son NIÑO CARLO JENOSA, SOCORRO CANTO and her son PATRICK CANTO,
CYNTHIA APALISOK and her daughter CYNDY APALISOK, EDUARDO VARGAS and his son CLINT EDUARD
VARGAS, and NELIA DURO and her son NONELL GREGORY DURO, Petitioners,
vs.
REV. FR. JOSE RENE C. DELARIARTE, O.S.A., in his capacity as the incumbent Principal of the High School
Department of the University of San Agustin, and the UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN, herein represented
by its incumbent President REV. FR. MANUEL G. VERGARA, O.S.A., Respondents.

FACTS:
 CivPro- JDMO

On 22 November 2002, some students of the University, among them petitioners Niño Carlo Jenosa,
Patrick Canto, Cyndy Apalisok, Clint Eduard Vargas, and Nonell Gregory Duro (petitioner students), were
caught engaging in hazing outside the school premises.
Thereafter, dialogues and consultations were conducted among the school authorities, the
apprehended students and their parents. During the 28 November 2002 meeting, the parties agreed
that, instead of the possibility of being charged and found guilty of hazing, the students who
participated in the hazing incident as initiators, including petitioner students, would just transfer to
another school, while those who participated as neophytes would be suspended for one month. The
parents of the apprehended students, including petitioners, affixed their signatures to the minutes of
the meeting to signify their conformity. In view of the agreement, the University did not anymore
convene the Committee on Student Discipline (COSD) to investigate the hazing incident.
On 5 December 2002, the parents of petitioner students (petitioner parents) sent a letter to the
University President urging him not to implement the 28 November 2002 agreement. According to
petitioner parents, the Principal, without convening the COSD, decided to order the immediate transfer
of petitioner students.
On 3 January 2003, petitioners filed a complaint for injunction and damages with the Regional Trial
Court. Petitioners assailed the Principal’s decision to order the immediate transfer of petitioner students
as a violation of their right to due process because the COSD was not convened.
On 5 February 2003, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction and directed respondents to
admit petitioner students during the pendency of the case.
On 21 April 2003, petitioners wrote the DepEd and asked that it direct the University to release the
report cards and other credentials of petitioner students. On 8 May 2003, the DepEd sent a letter to the
University advising it to release petitioner students’ report cards and other credentials if there was no
valid reason to withhold the same. On 14 May 2003, the DepEd sent another letter to the University to
follow-up petitioners’ request. On 20 May 2003, the University replied that it could not release
petitioner students’ report cards due to their pending disciplinary case with the COSD.
On 28 May 2003, petitioners filed another complaint for mandatory injunction praying for the release of
petitioner students’ report cards and other credentials docketed as Civil Case No. 03-27646.
On 17 June 2003, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction and directed the University to
release petitioner students’ report cards and other credentials. Respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration. Respondents alleged that they could not comply with the writ because of the on-going
disciplinary case against petitioner students.
On 26 June 2003, the COSD met with petitioners for a preliminary conference on the hazing incident. On
7 July 2003, the University, through the COSD, issued its report finding petitioner students guilty of
hazing. The COSD also recommended the exclusion of petitioner students from its rolls effective 28
November 2002.
On 14 July 2003, the trial court issued an Order denying both motions for reconsideration. On 1
September 2003, respondents filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
In its 16 June 2005 Decision, the Court of Appeals granted respondents’ petition and ordered the trial
court to dismiss Civil Case Nos. 03-27460 and 03-27646 for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
because of petitioners’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies or for being premature. According to
the Court of Appeals, petitioners should have waited for the action of the DepEd or of the University
President before resorting to judicial action.

ISSUE:
May the Court deny a litigant relief if his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest as to the
controversy in issue?
 CivPro- JDMO

HELD:
Yes
In this case, we rule that the Principal had the authority to order the immediate transfer of petitioner
students because of the 28 November 2002 agreement. Petitioner parents affixed their signatures to the
minutes of the 28 November 2002 meeting and signified their conformity to transfer their children to
another school. Petitioners Socorro Canto and Nelia Duro even wrote a letter to inform the University
that they would transfer their children to another school and requested for the pertinent papers needed
for the transfer. In turn, the University did not anymore convene the COSD. The University agreed that it
would no longer conduct disciplinary proceedings and instead issue the transfer credentials of petitioner
students. Then petitioners reneged on their agreement without any justifiable reason. Since petitioners’
present complaint is one for injunction, and injunction is the strong arm of equity, petitioners must
come to court with clean hands.
Since injunction is the strong arm of equity, he who must apply for it must come with equity or with
clean hands. This is so because among the maxims of equity are (1) he who seeks equity must do equity,
and (2) he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim
which is also expressed in the principle that he who has done inequity shall not have equity. It signifies
that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue.
Here, petitioners, having reneged on their agreement without any justifiable reason, come to court with
unclean hands. This Court may deny a litigant relief if his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and
dishonest as to the controversy in issue.1avvphi1
Since petitioners have come to court with inequitable and unfair conduct, we deny them relief. We
uphold the validity of the 28 November 2002 agreement and rule that the Principal had the authority to
order the immediate transfer of petitioner students based on the 28 November 2002 agreement.