Macintosh - Boyle, Bentley and Clarke On God, Necessity

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Boyle, Bentley and Clarke on

God, necessity, frigorifick atoms
and the void
J. J. MacIntosh
Published online: 21 Jul 2010.
To cite this article: J. J. MacIntosh (2001): Boyle, Bentley and Clarke on God,
necessity, frigorifick atoms and the void, International Studies in the Philosophy of
Science, 15:1, 33-50
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INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, VOL. 15, NO. 1, 2001
ARTICLE
Boyle, Bentley and Clarke on God,

necessity, frigori® ck atoms and the void1
J. J. MACINTOSH
Department of Philosophy, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada
Downloaded by [University of Chicago Library] at 07:53 03 June 2013
Abstract In this paper I look at two connections between natural philosophy and theology in
the late 17th century. In the last quarter of the century there was an interesting development of
an argument, earlier but sketchier versions of which can be found in classical philosophers and
in Descartes. The manoeuvre in question goes like this: ® rst, prove that there must, necessarily,
be a being which is, in some sense of ª greaterº , greater than humans. Second, sketch a proof
that such a being is necessary. Move from the fact that there must be at least one such being
to the conclusion that there is precisely one such being. Raise the question: could this necessary
being be matter, the entire material universe, or must it be God? Produce an argument from
natural philosophy to show that matter cannot be the required necessary being. Either explicitly
or implicitly run the obvious disjunctive syllogism and conclude with a few remarks about the
foolishness of atheism. The argument, which has classical roots, found a number of 17th-century
exponents. Cudworth provided the most important version, and Locke, Bentley and Clarke
adapted Cudworth’ s version with varying success. The argument touches on natural philosophy
in two ways. First, the basis of the argument invites consideration of a problem in the philosophy
of scienceÐ the relation between micro properties and macro propertiesÐ which was seen clearly
enough in some contexts but which was overlooked in others, particularly when the theological
aspect was uppermost. The second point of contact involves a direct application of a scienti® c
resultÐ the existence of a vacuumÐ to the theological issue.
1. Introduction
In this paper I consider two connections between natural philosophy and theology in the
late 17th century. In the last quarter of the century there was an interesting development
of an argument, earlier but sketchier versions of which can be found in classical
philosophers and in Descartes.2 The manoeuvre in question goes like this: ® rst, prove
that there must, necessarily, be a being which is, in some sense of ª greaterº , greater than
humans.3 Second, sketch a proof that such a being is necessary. Move from the fact that
there must be at least one such being to the conclusion that there is precisely one such
being. Raise the question: could this necessary being be matter, the entire material
universe, or must it be God? Produce an argument from natural philosophy to show that
matter cannot be the required necessary being. Either explicitly or implicitly run the
obvious disjunctive syllogism and conclude with a few remarks about the foolishness of
ISSN 0269-8595 print/ISSN 1469-9281 online/01/010033-18 Ó 2001 Inter-University Foundation
DOI: 10.1080/02698590020029297
34 J. J. MACINTOSH
atheism. The argument, which has classical roots, found a number of 17th-century
exponents, with the main development of the argument stemming from Cudworth’ s
True Intellectual System. Cudworth (1617± 1688) provided the most important version,
and Locke (1632± 1704), Bentley (1662± 1742) and Clarke (1675± 1729) adapted
Cudworth’ s version with varying success.4
Locke’ s version of the argument is the least convincing of the four, while Bentley’ s
is the most computational. Michael Ayers suggests, charitably enough, ª Philosophical
criticism of Locke’ s proof can be brief ¼ Crudely, it is either invalid or circularº (Ayers,
1991, 2, p. 182). The youthful Bentley’ s enthusiasm for directly adapting results from
natural philosophy is undoubtedly due to his being the ® rst Boyle lecturer. Boyle in his
will had left ª the Summe of Fifty pounds per Annum ¼ for some Learned divine ¼ To
Preach Eight Sermons in the yeare for proveing the Christian Religionº (Maddison,
1969, p. 274).5 Two months and one week later Bentley was in the pulpit ready to show
that the new experimental philosophy and sound theology between them could confute
ª the Folly and sottishness of Atheismº despite the fact that atheists make ª such a noisy
pretence to Wit and Sagacityº (Dyce, 1838, 3, p. 3).
2. The argument from similar or higher qualities

The argument touches on the views of the natural philosophers in two ways. First, the
basis of the argument invites consideration of a dif® cult problem in the philosophy of
science, one which was sometimes seen fairly clearly in the 17th century in an
experimental context (e.g. by Boyle) but which was overlooked on other occasions,
particularly when the theological aspect was uppermost. The second point of contact
involves a direct application of a scienti® c resultÐ whether or not a vacuum is possibleÐ
to the theological issue.
Though he admired (and employed) the ontological argument Cudworth felt that
most would ª Distrust, the Firmness and Solidity of such thin and Subtle Cobwebsº , so that
it was desirable to ® nd an argument which would be more ª Convictive of the Existence
of a God to the Generalityº (Cudworth, 1678, p. 725). The argument type Cudworth
opted for to ful® ll this end depends on the notion that various qualities require an
explanation in terms of similar or higher qualities: if something is material it must have
a cause which is either itself material or is in some way ª higherº than the material, and
similarly, if something is conscious, then a conscious (or higher) cause is required. As
Zeno of Citium put it, ª Nothing lacking consciousness and reason can produce by itself
beings with consciousness and reasonº .6 However, since God has produced both
material things and conscious things, and since God is immaterial and at best analogi-
cally conscious, 17th-century thinkers deemed it more appropriate to speak of similar or
higher qualities in this connection.
Here I shall merely sketch the argument, which I have discussed at more length
elsewhere (MacIntosh, 1997, 1994), because my current interest lies in the interaction
between theology and natural philosophy rather than in the details of the argument
itself.
Brie¯ y, then, following Cudworth:
1. Nothing can come from nothing, a maxim which Cudworth thinks is importantly
true, though liable to misunderstanding.7 Perhaps needless to say, the maxim is not
allowed to tell against God’ s ability to create ex nihilo.8
2. Something exists now.
BOYLE, BENTLEY AND CLARKE ON GOD 35
3. Therefore at every past time something must have existed, a result agreed upon by
atheists and believers alike.
4. Among the things which exist now are conscious beings.
5. But consciousness is something additional to matter, and could only be produced by
something which was itself conscious. Cudworth is as impatient as Clarke was later
to be about the possibility of emergent qualities. Materialists believe ª all Higher
Degrees of Perfections, that are in the world, to have Clombe up, or Emerged ¼ from that
which is altogether Dead and Senselessº , but this view Cudworth ® nds not only
indefensible but barely comprehensible (Cudworth, 1678, p. 727).9
6. Hence although existent material things could cause the material part of conscious
beings, there would, in the absence of a conscious being, be some part of a conscious
being which the material things could not have caused. But then, the conscious
beings would have some part which is uncaused, thus contradicting the maxim ex
nihilo, nihil ® t.10

7. This argument, however, applies at every past moment. Hence there has never been
a time when the universe did not contain at least one conscious being.
8. But the observable results are not consistent with a mere series of ® nite conscious
beings in the past. Hence there is, and has always been, a conscious being of extreme
power and wisdom (Cudworth, 1678, pp. 726± 730). Interestingly, this point, eased
in in passing, is really a way of invoking a more general design argument which, if it
is acceptable, might render the current more detailed argument otiose.
9. Moreover, this being exists necessarily. For if it existed contingently, Cudworth
argues, it could never have come into existence (Cudworth, 1678, p. 764). But then
it would not exist now. QED.11
The question of thinking matter was a vexed one at this period. Locke held that it was,
for all we know, possible for (suitably organized) matter to think, suggesting that our
apparently inability to conceive the way in which this could happen was due to a
ª weakness of our apprehensions [which] reaches not the power of Godº (Locke, 1823,
4, p. 468). Locke agreed that we have no idea how matter could think, but was properly
impressed by the fact that we also have no idea how an incorporeal mind could think.
ª Pray tell usº , he wrote in the margin of Thomas Burnet’ s attack on the Essay, ª how yu
conceive cogitation in an unsolid created substance. It is as hard, I confess, to me to be
conceived in an unsolid as in a solid substanceº (Porter, 1984, p. 48).
Like Cudworth, Bentley held that thinking matter was not a possibilityÐ
ª Omnipotence itself cannot create cogitative bodyº (Dyce, 1838, 3, p. 45), while
Clarke, though agreeing that it was indeed impossible, felt that the argument would go
through even if this possibility was allowed. All that was needed, Clarke suggested, was
that ª Perception or Intelligence be supposed to be a distinct Quality or Perfection
(though even but of Matter only, if the Atheist pleasesº (Clarke, 1738, 2, p. 545).
However, all four agreed that thought was not naturally a property of matter. Philoso-
phers such as Pascal, Boyle and Leibniz also produced arguments against the possibility
of thinking matter. Leibniz offered an interesting thought experiment:
perception and what depends on it are inexplicable by mechanical reasons, that is,
by ® gures and motions. If we pretend that there is a machine whose structure
enables it to think, feel, and have perception, one could think of it as enlarged
yet preserving its same proportions, so that one could enter it as one does a
mill. If we did this, we should ® nd nothing within but parts which push upon
36 J. J. MACINTOSH
each other; we should never see anything which would explain a perception.
(Monadology, §17, Gerhardt, 1875, 6, p. 609; trans. Loemker, 1969, p. 644)
Boyle concentrated on the inability of a physical system to deal with the physically
non-representable: things too large or small to be imaged, or things such as the
incommensurability of the diagonal and sides of a square which could not be physically
represented. Pascal offered a compressed reductio based on the notion that any physical
part of the body could explain certain central mental phenomena such as the feeling of
pleasure: ª What part of us feels pleasure? Is it our hand, our arm, our ¯ esh, or our
blood? It must obviously be something immaterialº (Pascal, 1952, fr 108, Brunschvicg
339b, trans. Krailsheimer 1966).
Nor can it be claimed that the matter has been put to rest subsequently. As even
a nodding acquaintance with cognitive science makes clear, there is a problem with both
top-down and bottom-up accounts of the relation between conscious and neurological
states: neither seems to give us an intelligible explanation. Accepting materialism for the
same reason that Churchill championed democracy (the alternatives are so appalling)
Jerry Fodor has noted that materialists need to offer an answer to the question ª How
could anything material be conscious?º He replies: ª I can tell you the situ-
ation ¼ straight off. Nobody has the slightest idea how anything material could be
conscious. Nobody even knows what it would be like to have the slightest idea about
how anything material could be consciousº (Fodor, 1992, p. 5). However, Locke’ s
pointÐ that substituting an incorporeal soul as an alternative for the human brain does
not amount to an explanatory advanceÐ remains a telling one.
3. The central question: can similar qualities explain?

Zeno of Citium and others say that consciousness (or some more eminent quality) is
required to produce consciousness, but what is the philosophical basis for such a claim?
The generalized version is this: qualities which are invoked to explain other qualities
must provide this explanation intelligibly. Once the point is put like this we ® nd ourselves
in familiar 17th-century territory. For it was precisely on this point that the 17th-century
corpuscularians attacked the scholastics. Their explanations were non-explanations, for
they either explained everything or nothing, and on either account were practically
useless. Such explanations had, in Russell’ s famous phrase, all the advantages of theft
over honest toil, but they had little else to commend them, a fact that Boyle noticed
clearly:
to explicate a phñ nomenon being to deduce it from something else in nature,
more known to us than the thing to be explained by it, how can the imploying
of incomprehensible (or at least uncomprehended) substantial forms, help us
to explain intelligibly this or that particular phñ nomenon? For to say, that such
an effect proceeds not from this or that quality of the agent, but from its
substantial form, is to take an easy way to resolve all dif® culties in general,
without rightly resolving any one in particular; and would make a rare
philosophy, if it were not far more easy than satisfactory. (Boyle, 1772, 3,
pp. 46± 47)12
But did the corpuscularians fare any better? For the corpuscularians physical change was
to be explained in terms of minute particles of matter and their motion, for those were
the only things which would provide us with intelligible explanations:
if an angel himself should work a real change in the nature of a body [said
Boyle], it is scarce conceivable to us men, how he could do it without the
assistance of local motion; since, if nothing were displaced, or otherwise moved
than before, (the like happening also to all external bodies to which it related,)
it is hardly conceivable, how it should be in itself other, than just what it was
before. (Boyle, 1772, 4, pp. 72± 73)
Leibniz, a de facto corpuscularian, 13 makes the same point, with a similar angelic
invocation:
I take it to be certain that all things come about through certain intelligible
causes, or causes which we could perceive if some angel wished to reveal them
to us. And since we may perceive nothing accurately except magnitude, ® gure,
motion, and perception itself, it follows that everything is to be explained
through these four. (Gerhardt, 1875, 7, p. 265; trans. Loemker, 1969, p. 173)
Earlier he wrote,
At the beginning I readily admitted that we must agree with those contempor-
ary philosophers who have revived Democritus and Epicurus and whom
Robert Boyle aptly calls corpuscular philosophers, such as Galileo, Bacon,
Gassendi, Descartes, Hobbes, and Digby, that, in explaining corporeal phe-
nomena, we must not unnecessarily resort to God or to any other incorporeal
thing, form or quality (Nec Deus intersit, nisi dignus vindice nodus inciderit14), but
that, so far as can be done, everything should be derived from the nature of
body and its primary qualitiesÐ magnitude, ® gure, and motion. (Gerhardt,
1875, 4, p. 106; trans. Loemker, 1969, p. 619)
Leibniz came to consider this a commonplace. Writing to Huygens about Boyle (29
December 1691) he remarked, ª we all know [that] everything happens mechanicallyº
(Huygens, 1888, 10, p. 228).
Thus such outstanding problem phenomena as gravity, light, electricity, and
magnetismÐ phenomena which occult qualities had been invoked to explainÐ were now
to be explained mechanically. That this programme was dif® cult was generally agreed.
In 1663 Boyle felt that ª the investigation of the true nature and adequate cause of
gravity, is a task of that dif® culty, that in spite of aught I have hitherto seen or read, I
must yet retain great doubts, whether they have been clearly and solidly made out by
any manº (Boyle, 1772, 2, p. 37). Locke was even more pessimistic:
it is evident, that by mere Matter and Motion, none of the great Phñ nomena
of Nature can be resolved, to instance but in that common one of Gravity,
which I think impossible to be explained by any natural Operation of Matter,
or any other Law of Motion, but the positive Will of a Superiour Being, so
ordering it. (Locke, 1989, §192, p. 246)
Given this, Bentley felt, we had a new and useful proof of God’ s existence:
What then if it be made appear that there is really such a power of gravity,
which cannot be ascribed to mere matter, perpetually acting in the constitution
of the present system? This would be a new and invincible argument for the
being of God; being a direct and positive proof that an immaterial living mind
doth inform and actuate the dead matter, and support the frame of the world.
(Dyce, 1838, 3, p. 163)
38 J. J. MACINTOSH
4. The general problem and three speci® c cases

There is, in fact, a general problem here: should we attempt to explain in any ultimate
way macro-properties in terms of micro-elements with the same properties? Or, in the
temporal domain, must an entity’ s possession of a given quality be explained in virtue
of some earlier entity’ s possessing that quality? Must the chickenness of the chicken be
explained in terms of some prior chickenhood, ovular or otherwise, in the universe?
Following Augustine, mediaeval philosophers accepted that new species could appear to
arise (ex Africa semper aliquid novi), but attributed this to God’ s initial creation of the
seeds of such species which were allowed to develop subsequently. Boyle had the same
viewÐ ª the seminall principles of Animals and plants ¼ were constituted at the begin-
ning of things (BP, 8, fol. 165v)º Ð and applied it to cases of apparently spontaneous
generation as well:
thoÃ there were cases in which the liveing Creatures that seem to spring of
themselves could not be well deriv’ d either from the proper thoÃ latent seeds of
Genitors of the same kind or from those analogicall seeds that in this Discourse
we have called seminall Principles; yet there will be noe necessity of ascribeing
these Productions with Epicurus to blind chance. Since besides the proper and
analogicall seeds of Plants & Animals there may be certain things which for
want of a ® tter name we may call Vicarious seeds, because they may supply the
want and performe the part of seminall Principles more properly soe call’ d. For
tis noe way unreasonable to suppose that as the great Maker of the world is an
omniscient Being, soe when he establish’ d the laws and settled the course of
Nature, he very well knew what Phñ nomena, must according to such Laws,
result from the concourse of such and such causes & circumstances: and soe,
that he did both order and foresee that the world being fram’ d such as he had
made it, a Portion of the universall matter constituteing a liveing Creature of
such or such a contrivance, should in such a conjunction of circumstances
appeare with Qualitys or Attributes that should entitle it to such a Denomina-
tion: and in another juncture of circumstances should soe appeare as to deserve
Another name (and soe onwards). (BP, 2, fol. 141)
Boyle sometimes saw the problem involved clearly, sometimes less clearly. Three test
cases are provided by his views on the spring of the air, the cohesion of bodies, and the
theoretical explanation of cold.
4.1 The spring of the air

Although Boyle inclined towards a kinetic theory of heat, he opted for, though he did
not urge, an account of the `spring’ of the air in terms of particles which were themselves
springy:
This notion may perhaps be somewhat further explained, by conceiving the air
near the earth to be such a heap of little bodies, lying one upon the other, as
may be resembled to a ¯ eece of wool. For this (to omit other likenesses betwixt
them) consists of many slender and ¯ exible hairs; each of which may indeed,
like a little spring, be easily bent or rolled up, but will also, like a spring, be still
endeavouring to stretch itself out again. For though both these hairs, and the
aeÈreal corpuscles to which we liken them, do easily yield to external pressures;
yet each of them (by virtue of its structure) is endowed with a power or
principle of self-dilation ¼
There is yet another way to explicate the spring of the air; namely, by
supposing with that most ingenious gentleman, Monsieur Des Cartes, that the
air is nothing but a congeries or heap of small and (for the most part) of ¯ exible
particles, of several sizes, and of all kinds of ® gures ¼ according to this
doctrine, it imports very little, whether the particles of the air have the
structure requisite to springs ¼ since their elastical power is not made to
depend upon their shape or structure, but upon the vehement agi-
tation ¼ which they receive from the ¯ uid aether, that swiftly ¯ ows between
them ¼
By these two differing ways ¼ may the springs of the air be explicated ¼ I
shall for the most part make use of [the former] in the following discourse; yet
am I not willing to declare peremptorily for either of them against the other.
(Boyle, 1772, 1, pp. 11± 12)15
Choosing to explain macro properties in terms of the same micro properties amounts to
claiming that the micro properties are properties that the explanatory elementary
itemsÐ the corpuscles, in Boyle’ s systemÐ have emanatively: that is, they are just the
unexplained, and perhaps inexplicable, basic properties.16 However, it should be noted
that Boyle, unlike the Epicureans, has a theological backup here: he thinks that things
can have properties which, though otherwise unexplained, are suf® ciently explained by
the fact that God has ordered them so. This is in fact the case, he believes with the laws
of nature. They are what God has made them, but he could have made them otherwise,
and indeed in other parts of the universe not our, but other, laws may obtain:
For, as he is the Creator of Matter, and the sole Introducer of local Motion
into it, so all the Laws of that Motion were at ® rst arbitrary to him; and
depended upon his Free Will: on whose account he might if he had pleas’ d,
have infus’ d into, or (if you please) confer’ d on, the whole mass of matter that
he created, either a farr greater, or a far less, measure of Motion, than now it
has. And he might also have setled other Laws of the Communication or
Transmission of Motion from Body to Body, than those that now obtain in the
Univers. As, instead of a hard Bodies communicating it’ s whole Motion to
another Body equal to it, that it hits against, and ® nds lying at rest; he might
have appointed that the Movent should impart but halfe it’ s Motion to the
Moveable. Wherefore thoÃ the supream Author of things, has by establishing the
Laws of Nature determin’ d and bound up other Beings to act according to
them, yet he has not bound up his own hands by them, but can envigorate,
suspend, over-rule, and reverse any of them as he thinks ® t. (BP, 7, fol. 113)17
4.2 Cohesion
There were dif® culties internal to the corpuscular schemeÐ Leibniz pointed out that
things could be pulled as well as pushed18Ð which was a way of pointing out that impact
phenomena didn’ t seem like the best way of accounting for the fact that things held
together, and clearly out® tting the elementary particles with hooks or other interlocking
shapes didn’ t really solve the problem since it would simply reappear at the level of the
hooks or whatever. Many clever thinkers of the time managed to hide this fact from
themselves, but Leibniz was not one of them. Boyle saw the problem clearly enough,
40 J. J. MACINTOSH
and then almost immediately proceeded to forget it. Boyle was tempted, as Leibniz was
not, by the Cartesian solution that the ® rmness of bodies is to be explained simply by
the particles being at rest relative to one another. In this context he notes explicitly that
cohesion is not to be explained in terms of the indivisibility of particles and, he adds, ª it
cannot with probability be pretended, that a corpuscle presumed incapable to be
divided, should consist of hooked parts [since] the question would recur concerning
them, and be still renewable in in® nitumº (Boyle, 1772, 1, p. 413). This is indeed the
exact problem. However, he goes on almost immediately to remark that ª if [the parts]
cohere to one another but by rest only,19 [they] may caeteris paribus be much more easily
dissociated and put into motion ¼ than they could be, if they were by little hooks and
eyes, or other kinds of fastenings intangled in one anotherº (Boyle, 1772, 1, p. 413). But
this is simply to sell the pass which he has just so ably defended.
4.3 Frigori® c atoms

Following the classical atomists, thinkers such as Galileo, Gassendi and Boyle’ s ª noble
friendº Kenelm Digby explained heat and cold in terms of atoms whose activity
produced heat (calori® c atoms) or cold (frigori® c atoms) (Dijksterhuis, 1961, p. 428).
Boyle, however, was strongly suspicious of their existence (Boyle, 1772, 3, p. 42) on
what were clearly conceptual grounds, while being unwilling completely to abandon
them in favour of a kinetic explanation of heat because of certain experimental results.
He has Carneades say of himself (that is, of Boyle) that he
waits till farther trials and speculations have resolved him in some points,
wherein he is not yet satis® ed: for, being of a temper backward enough to
acquiesce without suf® cient evidence, when the enquiry is dif® cult, and the
subject important; he seems to me to be kept in suspence, both by some
speculative doubts, and the phaenomena of divers experiments, some of which
are not delivered in his book ¼ I remember I heard him make enquiry, as to
those, that would have cold produced by corpuscles of cold; whether, and on
what account, those little fragments of matter are cold? whether those frig-
ori® ck particles, that must in multitudes crowd into water to turn it into ice,
have gravity or levity, or are indifferent to both? And how any of the three
answers, that may be made to this enquiry, will agree to some phaenomena,
that may be produced? what structure the corpuscles of cold can be of, that
should make them frigori® ck to that innumerable variety of bodies they are said
to pervade: And, whether the frigori® ck faculty of these bodies be loosable, or
not? As also, whether or no they be primitive bodies; and if it be said they are
not, whether there was not cold in the world before they were produced, and
whence that cold could proceed? And if it were said, they are primitive bodies,
he demanded, how it came to pass, that by putting a certain factitious body,
actually warm, into water, that was also warm, (both which appeared by a good
sealed weather-glass) there should presently be produced an actual coldness
(discernible by the same thermoscope?) These, and I know not what other
scruples and dif® culties, suggested to him by his thoughts, or his experiments,
were the things, that, I suppose, prevailed with a man of his temper to forbear
for a while the declaring of his sentiments about cold, lest the event of some
farther trial should shew him some cause to retract them.
There were two dif® culties on the other side:
The ® rst whereof was, whence water should, upon congelation, acquire so vast
a force, as he found it had, to lift up great weights, and burst containing bodies;
though it seemed by several circumstances, that the motion of the water is very
much diminished, when it is changed into ice. And the second problem is thus
conceived: if, as a brisk agitation of a body’ s insensible parts produces heat, so
the privation of that motion is, as Cardan and the Cartesians would have it, the
cause of cold; whence is it, that, if certain bodies be put together, there will be
a manifest and furious agitation of the small parts, and yet, upon this con¯ ict,
the mixture will not grow hot, but sensibly and even considerably cold? (Boyle,
1772, 3, pp. 752± 753; cf. 3, p. 42)
Subsequently Boyle offered a more detailed account of an experiment in which he

combined ª three saline bodiesº to produce an endothermic reaction (ª and that in a
wonderful degreeº ), and also one in which he used ª very good salt of tartarº and ª a
convenient quantity of spirit of vinegarº which, ª whilst the mixture was hissingº ,
produced a sudden drop in temperature, but this was an experiment which ª did not
always succeedº (Boyle, 1772, 3, pp. 760, 763).20 There was also experimental evidence
in the form of exothermic reactions which strongly suggested the correctness of a kinetic
theory, experiments which ª produce such an heat, that I could scarcely endure to hold
in my hand the phial, wherein much less than an ounce of each21 was mixed, though but
leisurely and almost by drops; as if heat were nothing but a various and nimble motion
of the minute particles of bodies. For in our experiment, as long as the confused
agitation lasted, so long the heat endured, and with that agitation it increased and
abated; and at length, when the motion ceased, the heat also vanishedº (Boyle, 1772,
1, p. 364). Since there were experimental and conceptual dif® culties with either hypoth-
esis Boyle contented himself with his usual stance of reporting what he considered to be
the objective facts, and letting the theoretical underpinning await further experimental
evidence.
In the case of frigori® c atoms Boyle is clearly aware, as he seemed not to be when
discussing the spring of the air, of the strangeness of explaining a quality in terms of that
very quality.22 As we noted above, the problem remains with us still, as the case of
cognitive science makes clear. But that, as Boyle would say, upon the by.
That, then, is one, somewhat buried, way in which the concerns of 17th-century
natural philosophers touched upon this particular theological argument: does the
argument’ s central premise have, indeed can it have, any satisfactory grounding? Is it
reasonable to claim that the occurrence of any given quality of a particular object must
always be explained in terms of similar (or relevantly higher) qualities of some other
entity?
5. Is God the Necessary Being?Ð the importance of the vacuum

The other way is more direct. Suppose we follow the argument up to the point where
it is admitted that there is some (single) necessary being.23 How should we deal with
Hume’ s about to be asked the question: ª why may not the material universe be the
necessarily-existent Being?º (Hume, 1935, p. 190).
One answer that the late 17th/early 18th century found was, rather surprisingly, a
result of the fact of the existence of the vacuum, whose acceptance Boyle had, by
experiment, done so much to promote. Boyle was in no doubt about the experimental
results but we ® nd him vacillating as usual about the underlying theory. Was there, or
42 J. J. MACINTOSH
was there not, a vacuum? Boyle was unwilling to pronounce one way or the other
(Boyle, 1772, 1, p. 135, 2, p. 500, etc.). There were a variety of reasons for this. One
was the fact that the term ª vacuumº was variously used by various users, so that it was
not altogether clear what it was that one would be af® rming or denying if a stand were
taken (Boyle, 1772, 5, p. 227). Another was his stated belief that we couldn’ t know
whether there were vacua until we knew the nature of bodies, which we so far did not
and perhaps never would (Boyle, 1772, 4, p. 43, 4, p. 446). Yet another was that the
empirical evidence was unclear. Ordinary air was certainly eliminated to a large degree
from Boyle’ s receiver, so that, for example, sound was not transmitted, but the
transmission of light, magnetism and gravity was unaffected. So was there a vacuum or
not? Boyle brushed aside a priori arguments such as that urged by Spinoza, that a
vacuum could not exist since if it did it would be nothing and nothing has no properties,
and what has no properties cannot exist. Boyle replied that he was aware of, but
unconvinced by, this argument (Hall & Hall, 1965, 2, pp. 102, 103). A probable fourth
reason was a desire not to alienate the Cartesians, who were, Boyle felt, fellow
corpuscularians in the battle against the scholastics.
6. Aristotle’s arguments
I want to consider yet another possible reason, one which is ignored in the literature,
perhaps because its main tenetÐ that Aristotle’ s arguments against the vacuum are
worth paying attention toÐ is usually written off as simply false. But that is a mistake,
and there is no need to think that Boyle fell into it. He may well have felt that the
arguments against a vacuum advanced by Aristotle were strong ones. Dijksterhuis puts
the opposite point of view most strongly. Aristotle’ s belief that there is no vacuum is, he
says,
based not on his establishment either of an internal contradiction in the
atomistic doctrine or of the fact that its consequences are contrary to experi-
ence, but solely on the incompatibility of the opposed view with his own
fundamentally different theories ¼ the whole argument is emotional rather
than logical in character, an expression of self-assertion rather than a refuta-
tion. (Dijksterhuis, 1961, p. 40)
This interpretation will not withstand a close look at Aristotle’ s text. His arguments are
intrasystemic, but the parts of his system on which they are based are precisely those
which he took to have a sound empirical basis. What we have in the Physics (as opposed
perhaps to De Caelo) are valid arguments with empirically plausible premises. Indeed,
Aristotle felt that the principles speci® c to any given science were empirically derived:
ª it is the business of experience to give the principles which belong to each subjectº
(Aristotle, 1984, 46a17± 21). Of course, as with any valid argument all these arguments
can do is demonstrate that either their conclusions are correct or that one or more of
their premises is false. However, that one of the premises is false is something that
requires an argument, and it was precisely this that gave rise to the theological
manoeuvre which Bentley was to perform.
Let us begin with a point of background: time seems to have a ® xed direction.
Aristotle wants, similarly, a preferred direction for one of the spatial dimensions. Right
and left, front and back, are relative to us, but, empirically, up and down are not.
Turning around alters the ® rst two, but even standing on one’ s head doesn’ t alter up
and down. So Aristotle’ s answer to the question: ª why do some things fall and others
not?º , and indeed to the question, ª why are some things heavier than others?º is given
in terms of a system of natural places and motions. The important thing to notice is that
this view is based on observation: it is an empirical claim.
Given this, if we imagine a Democritean void, we are, Aristotle thought, imagining
a situation in which there would be no natural places. So, for Leibnizian Suf® cient-
Reason-like reasons (Physics 214b30± 35) if there is a void there will be no reason for
things to move to here rather than there, in this direction rather than that: so they won’t
move. (In passing, we note that this result was accepted by Boyle who explicitly invoked
God for the initial push.24) However, if things do move in such a void, they’ ll move at
random. Aristotle sums up, explicitly and correctly (Physics 215a12), ª Either ¼ nothing
has a natural locomotion, or else there is no voidº . But experience, he felt, daily revealed
the negation of the left disjunct. The whole argument to this disjunctive conclusion
would have been accepted as both valid and sound by Aristotle’ s 17th-century oppo-
nents. Further, the choice of disjuncts is made on empirical, not on conceptual,

grounds.
Aristotle often, as in this case, assumes our acquiescence in what he takes to be
obvious empirical facts. Here he is, for example, reminding us of the implausibility of
light travelling:
Empedocles (and with him all others who used the same forms of expression)
was wrong in speaking of light as ª travellingº or being at a given moment
between the earth and its envelope, its movement being unobservable by us;
that view is contrary both to the clear evidence of argument and to the
observed facts; if the distance traversed were short, the movement might have
been unobservable, but where the distance is from extreme East to extreme
West, the strain upon our powers of belief is too great. (Aristotle, 1984,
418b21± 26)
The fact that he was wrong empirically should not blind us to the fact that he believed
his argument to be driven by facts. It is also worth noting that Robert Hooke, in 1675,
agreed that light was transmitted instantaneously and felt that the attempt by the
ª ingenious Monsieur Romerº to measure its speed was a failure (Hooke, 1705, pp. 77,
99, 108, 130).
However, for the sake of argument, let us assume that there is a void, and let us
further assume the possibility of motion in a void. We would then, says Aristotle,
absolutely correctly, be faced with the following conclusion: that ª a thing will either be
at rest or must be moved ad in® nitum, unless something more powerful gets in its wayº
(Aristotle, 1984, 215a20). In a hypothetical void, bodies would obey inertial laws, in
short. Again, there is the implicit, empirically backed, assumption that this is not how
the world is: both terrestrial and celestial motions tell against it.
Finally, there are two important arguments which depend on an empirically
tempting hypothesis: that velocity through a medium is inversely proportional to the
density of that medium (215b1± 11). Given this assumption, Aristotle points out that,
for a given propelling force, the velocity will approach in® nity as the resistance
approaches zero, and would, he thought, be unde® ned in the limit: ª the voidº , he says,
ª can bear no ratio to the fullº , that is, the required division by zero is not meaningful
(215b20).
The ® nal argument, a reductio, also trades on this empirically backed assumption
rather neatly. Suppose we do have a void and a body with a constant propelling force
traversing a given portion of it in a ® nite time, say Tv. Let the time taken to move
44 J. J. MACINTOSH
through the same distance in air be Ta, and let the density of air be Da. Now consider
a substance whose density is Da 3 Tv/Ta.
This is a substance with non-zero density since Da, Ta and Tv are all positive
quantities. Since the time of traversal is proportional to the density, the time taken for
our body to move the same distance through this new medium, Tn, say, is given by
Tn Ta
5
Tv Da
Da 3
Ta
i.e. Tn 5 Tv
But then it will take the same time to traverse a ® lled space as it will to traverse an empty
one, which Aristotle thinks is impossible, since it would mean that a resisting medium
had zero resistance, or else that a void had ® nite resistance (215b24± 216a8).
7. The refutation of Aristotle

Despite Dijksterhuis’ s claim that Aristotle’ s ª argument is emotional rather than logical
in characterº , Aristotle’ s arguments are in fact clearly valid and the premises are in each
case empirically plausible. He was mistaken, but he was neither foolish nor ª emotionalº .
The problem lay not with the arguments but with the plausible premises: they were what
had to be denied. Part of the reason for denying such reasonable premises came from
the fact that there were other pieces of evidence which also had to be accommodated. In
particular, there was the fact that some things are denser than others.25 But if space is
full of matter, and ifÐ a view shared by the Aristotelians and the corpuscularians,
including the CartesiansÐ there is but one kind of matter, then as Bentley pointed out,
following Newton:
since Gravity is found proportional to the quantity of matter, there is a
manifest Necessity of admitting a vacuum, another principal doctrine of the
atomical philosophy. Because if there were every where an absolute plenitude
and density, without any empty pores and interstices between the particles of
bodies, then all bodies of equal dimensions would contain an equal quantity of
matter; and consequently ¼ would be equally ponderous: so that gold, copper,
stone, wood, &c., would have the same speci® c weight; which experience
assures us they have not. (Dyce, 1838, 3, p. 150)
Nor will it do to assume that the difference might be one of texture, the pores in the
grosser body being ® lled with more subtle matter, for
that subtile matter itself must be of the same substance and nature with all
other matter, and therefore it also must weigh proportionally to its bulk; and
as much of it as at any time is comprehended within the pores of a particular
body must gravitate jointly with that body; so that if the presence of this
ethereal matter made an absolute fulness, all bodies of equal dimensions would
be equally heavy: which being refuted by experience, it necessarily follows, that
there is a vacuity. (Dyce, 1838, 3, pp. 150± 151)26
Notice what is happening in these passages: the notion of a void as place without matter
is claimed, on experimental grounds, to be necessary to explain the facts. The assump-
tion is one that Aristotle explicitly shared: that there is a single matter. But if it is single,
then we can’ t just say that it is now heavy, now light: for that difference needs
explaining, and the Aristotelian answer seemed and seems unacceptable. Thus, some of
the apparent facts must be only apparent. But that things are not equiponderant is clear:
so a void must be admitted, and the other apparent factsÐ that velocity is inversely
proportional to resistance, and so onÐ must be dropped.
Ultimately then, what happened here was that one empirically plausible hypothesis
had to be readjusted in the face of another, less tractable, empirically based argument.
Bentley and Clarke, in two different ways, immediately put this fact to use.
8. Theology and the vacuum

For Bentley the existence of the vacuum is combined with his already mentioned interest
in the theological aspects of gravity. If there is a vacuum (and there is) then we can
calculate the ratio of ª void spacesº to ª corporeal substanceº . A quick calculation assures
Bentley that ª the ordinary air in which we live and respire is of so thin a composition,
that 16,149 parts of its dimensions are mere emptiness and nothing, and the remaining
one only material and real substanceº (Dyce, 1838, 3, p. 151). Following on this
estimate, and continuing to make conservative estimates throughout, Bentley arrives at
his conclusion: ª we must pronounce, after such large concessions on that side, and such
great abatements on ours, that the sum of empty spaces within the concave of the
® rmament is 6,860 million million million times bigger than all the matter contained in
itº (Dyce, 1838, 3, p. 153). Now, says Bentley, suppose there was a time when the
matter was chaotically diffused throughout space, could it, without divine intervention,
have given rise to the present world system? Well, ª every particle ¼ would be above
nine million times their own length from any other particleº , and even allowing one of
them to be in linear motion, ª ’ tis above a hundred million millions odds to an unit that
it would not strike upon any other atom, but glide through an empty interval without
any contactº (Dyce, 1838, 3, p. 155). After a few more quick calculations Bentley
pointed out that ª To form a system ¼ ’ tis necessary that these squandered atoms should
convene and unite into great and compact masses, like the bodies of the earth and
planets ¼ But how could particles so widely dispersed combine into that closeness of
texture?º (Dyce, 1838, 3, p. 156). The only two available possibilities are (1) inertial
motion ª by which means some that have convenient ® gures for mutual coherence might
chance to stick together ¼ or there might arise some vertiginous motions or whirl-
pools ¼ whereby the atoms might be thrust and crowded to the middle of those
whirlpools, and there constipate one another into great solid globesº (Dyce, 1838, 3,
p. 156). Or (2) they might combine through the effect of ª mutual gravitation or
attractionº (Dyce, 1838, 3, p. 156). However, says Bentley, the ® rst is a non-starter in
the explanations stakes for ª common motion (without attraction)º could never produce
ª such great compact masses as the planets now areº . The second is equally unhelpful
as an explanation since gravitational attraction ª can neither be inherent and essential to
matter, nor ever supervene to it, unless impressed and infused into it by a divine powerº .
Finally, even if, without assuming a deity, matter had gravitational powers it would still
be the case that the ª atomes of a chaos could never so convene by it as to form the
present systemº (Dyce, 1838, 3, p. 157).27 Nor could they continue to constitute it. We
have, Bentley concludes, ª abundantly proved ¼ that the frame of the present world
could neither be made nor preserved without the power of Godº (Dyce, 1838, 3, p. 173).
Starting, as did Bentley, from the derivable existence of a vacuum, adding to
Bentley’ s arguments further results from experiments regarding falling bodies and
46 J. J. MACINTOSH
the behaviour of pendulums (Clarke, 1738, 2, p. 532), Clarke offers a crisper, less
computational, modal argument.
Clarke begins by arguing that ª Something has existed from all eternityº (Clarke, 1738,
2, p. 524), and then produces a further argument to show that this ª somethingº must
be a single ª Unchangeable and Independent Beingº (Clarke, 1738, 2, p. 526). We should
notice in passing that Clarke is not (quite) begging the question here, for the line
between mass nouns and count nouns was commonly blurred in the 17th and 18th
centuries.28 Both Locke and Boyle offer lists that jumble together mass nouns (such as
ª goldº or ª waterº ) and count nouns (such as ª horseº ) indiscriminately. See, for
example, Locke (1975, p. 2.23.6) for Locke, and compare Boyle’ s: ª such Bodys as we
call the Sun Moon ® x’ d stars Planetts Aire Earth Water Vegitables Minerals Animals
&cº (BP, 7, fol. 186v). So the possibility that the single being is matter is not ruled out
at this stage of the argument.
Clarke continues: ª That unchangeable and independent Being, which has Existed from
Eternity, without any external Cause of its Existence; must be Self-Existent, that is, Necess-
arily-existingº (Clarke, 1728, 2, p. 527). But ª the only true Idea of a Self-existent or
Necessarily-Existing Being, is the Idea of a Being, the supposition of whose Not-existing is an
express Contradictionº (Clarke, 1728, 2, p. 528). And from this, Clarke thinks, we are
now in a position to conclude (after a quick swipe at Toland on matter and motion)
ª that The Material World cannot possibly be the First and Original Being, Uncreated,
Independent, and of it self Eternalº (Clarke, 1728, 2, p. 530). The argument, which
invokes the actuality of the vacuum, is pretty, though unfortunately fallacious:
Now if there be a Vacuum, it follows plainly, that Matter is not a Necessary
Being. for if a Vacuum actually be, then `tis evidently more than possible for
Matter not to Be. If an Atheist will yet Assert, that Matter may be necessary,
though not necessary to be every where: I answer, this is an express Contradic-
tion. For absolute Necessity, is absolute Necessity every where alike. And if it be
no impossibility for Matter to be absent from one Place, `tis no Impossibil-
ity ¼ in the Nature of the Thing, that Matter should be absent from any other
Place, or from every Place. (Clarke, 1738, 2, p. 532)29
However, that there must be some necessary being is already established, and this
necessary being is either God or the material universe. But it is not the material
universe.30 So God exists, the atheist is confuted, and the £50.0.0 per annum which
Boyle left in his will to fund the Boyle Lectures against atheism can be paid to the Boyle
Lecturer with a clear conscience.
Notes
1. Throughout this paper references to the Royal Society’ s Boyle Papers (BP) are by volume number and folio
(recto unless otherwise speci® ed). Like many workers on the Boyle manuscripts I owe a considerable debt
of gratitude to the Librarian and staff of the Royal Society Library for their help and interest. My thanks
also to Michael Benn and Lawrence Principe, both of whom answered a number of questions concerning
Boyle’ s chemical activity. Work on this paper was supported in part by a research grant from the Social
Sciences and Humanities Council of Canada, and by a fellowship from the Humanities Institute of the
University of Calgary. An earlier version of this paper was given at the Annual History and Philosophy
of Science Conference held at the International University Centre in Dubrovnik, Croatia in April, 2000,
and I am grateful to members of the audience for comments and suggestions offered on that occasion.
2. ReneÂ Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, Meditation 3 (Adam & Tannery, 1964, 7, p. 49; trans.
Descartes, 1984, 2, p. 34): ª since I am a thinking thing ¼ it must be admitted that what caused me is
itself a thinking thingº .
3. At BP 7, fol. 100, Boyle suggests that such a move is available in natural theology. Speaking of Acts 2 he
says, ª ThoÃ it was not the busines of the Historian in this Narrative, to prove the Existence, or declare the
Nature of God; yet we may rationally deduce from what he transiently delivers, both that there is a most
excellent Being, of a Nature superiour to that of Man, as we have just now inferrd; and that this Being
has divers of those Property’ s or Attributes, that the Light of Natural Reason taught Philosophers to
ascribe to Godº .
4. Cudworth’ s version may be found in Cudworth (1678, pp. 726± 768); Locke’s in Locke (1975, book 4,
chap. 10, fol. 1± 12, pp. 619± 25); and Clarke’s in the 12th set of Boyle Lectures, A Demonstration of the
Being and Attributes of God, in Clarke (1738, 2, pp. 541± 546). Bentley’ s argument comes in the second
lecture of the ® rst set of Boyle Lectures (Bentley, 1692), but a better source is Dyce (1838, 3, pp. 36± 47),
since Dyce’ s edition incorporates Bentley’ s various fourth edition (1699) changes and corrections.
[Editing Bentley’s works, Dyce ª originally intended to have greatly increased the collection both from
printed and from MS sources: but the indifference of general readers to classical literature prevented my
carrying out the designº (Schrader, 1972, p. 145).] Bentley delivered a further set of Boyle lectures in
1694, but they were never published.
5. For a discussion of this bequest see Hunter (1994, pp. xxivÐ xxv, and notes).
6. ª Nihil quod animi quodque rationis est expers, id generare ex se potest animantem conpotemque
rationisº , quoted Cicero, De nat. deor. ii 22.
7. In the Physics Aristotle pointed out one type of exception to the principle: a privation± which, strictly, is
not-being± may function causally, and the privation does not survive in the result. Thus ª a thing may
`come to be from what is not’ ¼ in a quali® ed senseº (Aristotle, 1984, pp. 191b13± 15).
8. For Cudworth’ s detailed examination of this point see Cudworth (1678, pp. 738± 746). In the next
century, as is well known, Hume effectively demolished the ex nihilo maxim: ª the necessity of a cause to
every beginning of existence is not founded on any arguments either demonstrative or intuitive ¼ If we
de® ne a cause to be an object precedent and contiguou s to another, and where all the objects resembling the former
are plac’d in a like relation of priority and contiguity to those objects, that resemble the latter; we may easily
conceive, that there is no absolute nor metaphysical necessity, that every beginning of existence shou’d be
attended with such an objectº (Hume, 1978, p. 172).
9. For Clarke see, e.g., Clarke (1738, 3, pp. 787± 788).
10. The general point was familiar. Thus Aquinas: ª nothing can by its operation bring about an effect which
exceeds its active powerº (Aquinas, 1920, 1a2ae 109.5 c.), and more speci® cally: ª It is impossible for the
action of a material force to rise to the production of a force that is wholly spiritual and immaterialº
(Aquinas, 1952, 3.9 c.). Still earlier we have: ª Everything that came from the perishable will perish, since
it came from the perishable. Whatever came from imperishableness will not perish but will become
imperishable, since it came from imperishableness. So, many men went astray because they had not
known this difference; that is, they diedº (Eugnostos the Blessed, pp. 73± 74, The Nag Hammadi Library in
English, 3rd edn (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1978, p. 226).
11. Locke’ s move to necessity is equally swift. He moves from
(1) If there is a cogitative being now, then there has always been a cogitative being.
to
(2) Necessarily, if something cogitative exists now, then there has been from Eternity some cogitative
thing.
to
(3) If something cogitative exists now, then ª whatsoever is the ® rst eternal Being must necessarily be
cogitativeº .
Finally, given that something cogitative does exist now, Locke proceeds to detach the consequent to get
(4) The ª discovery of the necessary Existence of an eternal Mindº (Locke, 1975, 4.10, fol. 10± 12, pp.
623± 25).
12. Russell’s remark (about ª postulatingº ) may be found in chap. 7 of the Introduction to Mathematical
Philosophy. That invoking substantial forms was taking the easy way out was commonly held at the time.
Here is George Castle making the same point about Marchamont Nedham’s use of ª Fermentº : ª to make
the Pocky and Scorbutick Ferment in all diseases, as general a Refuge and Sanctuary for Ignorance, as
the Devil, and Occult qualities, among the vulgar renderers of causes, is very unworthy of a Philosopher,
and will at length so much debauch that most signi® cant term of Ferment, that it will bring it into
discredit with enquiring men, who cannot permit themselves to be satis® ed with words, except something
be represented by them. For in good earnest, I do not see how M. N. has better explained the Nature
of Disease, which he has treated of by the word Ferment, and other terms insigni® cant, as he uses them;
than if he had ¯ ed to the Asylum Ignorantiñ , Occult qualities. For there is not one question you can ask
48 J. J. MACINTOSH
him in Physick concerning the cause of any Disease or Symptom, but he is presently ready to answer,
That it ¯ ows from a Combination with a Pocky and Scorbutick Ferment; A very compendious way
indeed, of being a Philosopher; but no whit more satisfactory in Physick, than, Bellarmine, Thou lyest; in
answering all the dif® culties and objections in Divinityº (Castle, 1667, p. 103).
13. ª [H]owever much I agree with the Scholastics in this general and, so to speak, metaphysical explanation
of the principles of bodies, I am as corpuscular as one can be in the explanation of particular phenomena,
and it is saying nothing to allege that they have forms or qualities. One must always explain nature along
mathematical and mechanical lines, provided one knows that the very principles or laws of mechanics or
of force do not depend upon mathematical extension alone but upon certain metaphysical reasonsº
(Leibniz to Arnauld 4/14 July 1686, Gerhardt, 1875, 2, p. 58.)
14. ª Neither should a god intervene, unless there is a knot worthy of his cuttingº , Horace, Ars Poetica, p. 191.
15. Thus Boyle in 1660. By 1692 Bentley felt able to hold, less cautiously, that ª the air is now certainly
known to consist of elastic or springy particles that have a continual tendency and endeavour to expand
and display themselvesº (Dyce, 1838, 3, pp. 151± 152.)
16. For Boyle’ s account of emanative properties see BP 2, fol. 4. For discussion see Macintosh (1991).
17. For Boyle’ s view that differing parts of the universe may have different laws see Boyle (1772, 5,
pp. 139± 140).
18. For references to Leibniz’ s views see the Bennett/Remnant note on cohesion, in Leibniz (1981, p. xxxiv).
In the next century Hume has Cleanthes remark that ª the cohesion of the parts of matter is still
incomprehensibleº (Hume, 1935, pt I).
19. As Descartes had argued (Principles 2, p. 54; Adam & Tannery, 1964, 8A, p. 71), and as Boyle was
inclined to agree.
20. It seems likely that what Boyle was using was either sodium or potassium hydrogen tartrate (salt of tartar),
which may or not have contained potassium carbonate or bicarbonate as an impurity. If it was impure in
this way Boyle would get the effervescence he reports, not if not. Spirit of vinegar would be concentrated
acetic acid (CH3COOH), but the boiling point of acetic acid is only 118° and Boyle’s distillation process
would not have produced a concentration. Other endothermic results are reported in Of the Mechanical
Origin of Heat and Cold, e.g. at Boyle (1772, 4, pp. 237± 238), as well as a number of exothermic ones.
21. Boyle mixed the ª spirit and alkaliº of saltpetre. The spirit was nitric acid (which Glauber had prepared
from sulfuric acid and saltpetre in 1650), and the alkali was probably sodium carbonate. Boyle also notes
an exothermic reaction in ª An Experimental Discourse of Quicksilver Growing Hot with Goldº (Boyle,
1772, 4, pp. 219± 230).
22. The problem is a constant one. The entry for ª Metals (The)º , in Considine (1976, pp. 1530± 1531),
begins, ª In terms of classi® cation, several of the chemical elements are referred to as metals, principally
because of the metallic qualities which they exhibitº .
23. ª In this Propositionº [that ª The Self-existent and Original Cause of all things, must be an Intelligent Beingº ],
said Clarke, ª lies the main Question between us and the Atheists. For that something must be
Self-existent ¼ Eternal and In® nite and the Original Cause of all things; will not bear much Dispute. But
all Atheists ¼ maintain that the Self-existent Being is not an Intelligent Beingº (Clarke, 1738, 2, p. 543).
24. A similar point is used by the Cartesian Louis de la Forge to argue for occasionalism (De la Forge, 1997,
p. 146).
25. Aristotle saw this as a problem, and attempted to deal with it in Physics 4.9 (Aristotle, 1984, 216b21±
217b28).
26. Newton’s compressed but clear argument is in De® nition I and in Book III, Proposition VI, Corollaries
III and IV of the Principia (Newton, 1972, 1, pp. 39± 41, 2, p. 575). Clarke makes the same point at
Clarke (1738, 2, pp. 531± 532). In the next century Kant pointed out that the argument fails if we
challenge the assumption of a single kind of matter, but no one (including Kant) did challenge it (Kant,
1933, A173/B215± A175/B216).
27. For a further discussion of the gravitational argument in Bentley and Clarke see Dahm (1970, esp.
p. 184).
28. A blurring that the contemporary illiteracy over terms such as ª lessº and ª fewerº is reintroducing.
29. Clarke’s argument incorporates a well-known modal fallacy. From the fact that it is possible that, in each
place at any given time, matter may be non-existent, it does not follow that it is possible that, in every
place at a given time, matter may be non-existent. For each of my legs it is possible at time t for me to
lift that leg in the air without falling over, but it does not follow that it is possible for me to lift both my
legs simultaneously without falling over. Clarke’s conclusion may be true, but the argument offered for
it involves a simple fallacy of scope.
30. Hume uncharacteristically missed this point in the Dialogues. Ignoring Bentley’ s argument, and taking
Clarke’s point to be merely that matter can be conceived to be non-existent, Hume pointed out that the
Deity’ s non-existence is equally conceivable. Thus the premises of either argument± to the non-necessity
of matter, or the non-necessity of God± are equally well grounded: the absence of either is conceivable.
Hume’ s reading is certainly in accordance with Clarke’ s text, which he quotes, but Clarke actually has a
different argument, not from the conceivability of the absence of matter, but from the scienti® cally
grounded actuality of the absence of matter, and for this premise there seems to be no divine counterpart
easily available to Hume (Hume, 1935, p. 190).
References
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50 J. J. MACINTOSH
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Clarendon Press).
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Reidel).
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Pneuma, and Tranquillity: Epicurean and Stoic Themes in European Thought (New York, Cambridge
University Press), pp. 197± 219.
MACINTOSH, J.J. (1994) Locke and Boyle on miracles and God’ s existence, in: M. HUNTER (Ed.) Robert Boyle
Reconsidered (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), pp. 193± 241.
MACINTOSH, J.J. (1997) The argument from the need for similar or ª higherº qualities: Cudworth, Locke, and
Clarke on God’s existence, Enlightenment and Dissent, 16, pp. 29± 59.
MADDISO N, R.E.W. (1969) The Life of the Honourable Robert Boyle F. R. S. (London, Taylor & Francis).
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(Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press).

Â ditions
PASCAL, B. (1952) PenseÂes sur la Religion et sur quelques autres sujets, in: L. LAFUMA (Ed.), 3 vols (Paris, E
du Luxembourg).
PORTER, N. (1984) Marginalia Locke-a-na, in Thomas Burnet, John Locke, Noah Porter, Remarks Upon an
Essay Concerning Human Understanding: Five Tracts (New York, Garland).
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Note on contributor
Jack MacIntosh is in the Philosophy Department of the University of Calgary. His current research interests
lie in identity theory, philosophy of religion, and the history of philosophy. He has published a number of
articles in collections and journals such as The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Analysis, Australasian
Journal of Philosophy, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Dialogue, Enlightenment and Dissent, Franciscan Studies,
Intelligence and National Security, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Mind, Paci® c Philosophical
Quarterly, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Studia Leibnitiana, and The Thomist. Recent historical
publications include papers on Aquinas, Boyle, Clarke, Cudworth, Leibniz, Locke, Ockham, and Pascal.
Correspondence: Department of Philosophy, University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada T2N 1N4. E-mail:
macinto@acs.ucalgary.ca

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Boyle, Bentley and Clarke on God,

2. The argument from similar or higher qualities

nihilo, nihil ® t.10

3. The central question: can similar qualities explain?

4. The general problem and three speci® c cases

4.1 The spring of the air

4.3 Frigori® c atoms

Subsequently Boyle offered a more detailed account of an experiment in which he

5. Is God the Necessary Being?Ð the importance of the vacuum

nents. Further, the choice of disjuncts is made on empirical, not on conceptual,

7. The refutation of Aristotle

8. Theology and the vacuum

(Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press).

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