The Social and Technological Dimensions of Scaffolding

The Social and Technological Dimensions of Scaffolding and Related Theoretical Concepts for
Learning, Education, and Human Activity

Author(s): Roy D. Pea
Source: The Journal of the Learning Sciences, Vol. 13, No. 3, Scaffolding (2004), pp. 423-451
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THE JOURNALOF THE LEARNINGSCIENCES,13(3), 423-451
Copyright? 2004, LawrenceErlbaumAssociates, Inc.
COMMENTARY
The Social and Technological

Dimensions of Scaffolding and Related
TheoreticalConcepts for Learning,
Education,and HumanActivity
Roy D. Pea
School of Education
StanfordUniversity
I amperhapsnotthe only one who feels thattheconceptof scaffoldinghasbecome so

broadin its meaningsin the field of educationalresearchand the learningsciences
thatit has become unclearin its significance.Perhapsthe field has puttoo muchof a
burdenon the term, and we need a more differentiatedontology to make progress.
Perhapsscaffoldinghas become a proxy for any culturalpracticesassociatedwith
advancingperformance,knowledge, and skills whethersocial, material,or repro-
duciblepatternsof interactivity(as in softwaresystems) areinvolved.This is surely
too much complexity to takeon at once. Given these burdensat the level of a scien-
tific accountof learningby the individual,I feel it is prematureto be extendingscaf-
folding considerationsby metaphoricalextensionto the level of a whole classroom
of learnersoreven to aculturallevel, as Davis andMiyake(thisissue) suggestin their
introductoryessay. I first see whetherI can garer some clarificationsandleverage
fromuses of thetermscaffoldingfor specific instancesandclasses of its uses by indi-
vidual learners(where the articlesin this issue focus theirattention).
As with many such concepts thatarefelt to have useful powerin theoreticaland
practicalschemes, it will be worthwhileto do some historicalexcavation,identify
and circumscribethe early uses and roots of the concept, and then determine
Correspondenceand requestsfor reprintsshouldbe sent to Roy D. Pea, School of Education,Stan-

ford University,CubberlyHall, Stanford,CA 94305. E-mail: roypea@stanford.edu

424 PEA
whetherin the rich body of work that has developed since its origins roughly 30
years ago one can craft a conceptualmap relatingscaffolding and its many affili-
ated concepts such that the vitality of the issues raised in its initial conceptualiza-
tion can be preservedand even extended.
My goals for this articlewere to first provide a personalview on the history of
scaffolding and relatedconcepts in its semiotic field and to then develop a frame-
workfor what I believe to be its definitionalcore and contrastivetermsandthe pri-
mary issues and opportunitiesthey presentfor us as learningscientists and educa-
tors. I then consider the contributionsmade and the issues raised in this issue's
collection of articles in terms of this framework.Reading the articles themselves
will be importantfor the reader,as my goal is not to review them here but to refer-
ence them. Collectively, the four articles by Reiser, Quintanaet al., Tabak,and
Sherin, Reiser, and Edelson (this issue) provide illuminatingconceptualizations
that help advance the theory of scaffolding for instructionalsupport,primarily
with a focus on learninghow to do scientific inquiryin the middle to high school
grades. They offer a distinction between "structuring"and "problematizing"
mechanismsof scaffolding for studentwork (Reiser,this issue), a scaffolding de-
sign frameworkencompassing an impressive arrayof categories arounddifferent
componentsof scientific inquiryillustratedwith manysoftwaresystems (Quintana
et al., this issue), the concepts of "distributedscaffolding"and "synergy"between
differentcomponentsof distributedscaffolding(Tabak,this issue), and an analyti-
cal frameworkarguingthat scaffolding should be conceived of as a comparative
analysis to be performedon learninginteractions(Sherin et al., this issue) rather
than software featuresor situations.There is much to be learnedfrom these arti-
cles, as they provide a synoptic view of scaffolding researchin science learning.
I recallfirstbecoming awareof the conceptof scaffoldingwhen I was a doctoral
studentin JeromeBruner'slaboratoryon South ParksRoad in the Departmentof
ExperimentalPsychology at OxfordUniversityaround1975. The context was one
in which a numberof graduatestudents,postdocs, and visiting fellows (including
CatherineUrwin, Michael Scaife, JohnChurcher,Alan Leslie, ChrisPratt,Alison
Garton,ReniraHuxley,KathySylva, andlatervisiting studentsAlison Gopnikand
Susan Sugarman)were studyingthe ontogenesis of language and thoughtand es-
pecially the emergenceof syntaxfrom the earlyprotolanguageand single wordpe-
riod of child language. Yet others were studying imitation,perception,play, and
other developmentalphenomena.We regularlyread paperstogether,had a lively
weekly seminar series, and reviewed and analyzed video data and its interpreta-
tions together.
The termscaffoldingwas one introducedby David Woodwith JerryBrunerand
Gail Ross in an articlepublishedin 1976 andthe relatedidea "inthe air"amongour
Oxfordgroupwas one thatJerrycalled "formats."The notionwas thatone of the po-
tentialexplanationsfor how it is thatbabies acquiremeaningin early parent-child
interactionis that there are regularlystructuredsituationsin which the range of

SOCIAL DIMENSIONS 425
meanings is actually quite limited and that these simple formatsprovide a highly
constrainedsituationin which the child can bootstrapsome of the conventionsof
turntaking and meaning making with words that are requiredof a language user
(e.g., Bruner,1975a, 1975b, 1977). BrunerandSherwood(1976) illustratedthisline
of argumentusing datafrom peekaboo interactionsbetween a motherand child.
In Wood et al.'s (1976) article, the term scaffolding was first used, and it de-
scribes how an interactionbetween a tutorand a child concerninghow to construct
a wooden pyramidalpuzzle employs "a 'scaffolding'process that enables a child
or novice to solve a problem,carryout a task or achieve a goal which would be be-
yond his unassistedefforts"(p. 90).
Formatsfor early language thus provideda form of scaffolding for learningto
use words and the acquisitionof meaning.
Inbothof these conceptualizations,whethermother-infantinteractionin the ser-
vice of languagedevelopmentor for the developmentof the puzzle-solving behav-
iorsdescribedin theWoodet al. (1976) article,the firstthingto notice is thatthe situ-
ations of learningare neitherformal educationalnor "designed"in the traditional
sense ofthe term(evenifthepuzzles weredesigned,as Tabak,thisissue, notes). Such
interactionsas we werestudyingwereones we conceivedto be naturallyoccurringin
an informalcontextandanexpressionof one of the socioculturallygroundedactivi-
ties typical of at least some families in Westernsocieties. Needless to say, the scaf-
folding achieved in these mother-infantencounterswas not computermediated.
The workthatthe concept scaffolding is intendedto do in these psychologists' ac-
countsof humandevelopmentis to bringto one's attentionthe functionthatparticu-
lar behaviorson the mother'spartappearto play in enablingthe performanceof a
more complicatedact thanwould have otherwisebeen possible. In this sense, scaf-
folding appearsto be an aptturnof phraseas bothnounandverb-noun becauseit is
a structure,guidedin specific formby tacitassessmentof a child'sindependentcapa-
bilities andneeds,andmountedtemporarilyon thelearner'sbehalfuntilthechildcan
self-sufficientlyproducethebehavioron his orherown-and verbbecausescaffold-
ing is also a processbecausedifferentaspectsof anactivitywill needto be scaffolded
in the conduct of performance over time unless independent performance is
achieved.If theparentcontinuedto do suchstructuringonce thechildbecomes capa-
ble of autonomousactivities, one would find it strange.
It was also currentat the time for our OxfordGroupand others such as Wood's
groupat Nottinghamto be readingand thinkingaboutthe philosophy of language
and accounts more broadlyof the psychology and developmentof language. We
were reading attemptsby PatriciaGreenfield (Greenfield & Smith, 1976), John
Dore (1972), ElizabethBates (1976), and othersto make sense of how it is thatin-
fants come to speak not only single words but also eventually sentences. So ac-
counts of how to do things with words (J. L. Austin), of speech acts (J. Searle), of
word meaning-as-use(L. Wittgenstein),and of functionalaccountsof languagein
the developmentof thinking(Vygotsky, G. de Laguna)were of vibrantinterestto

426 PEA
us. We wantedto know how the baby crackedthe linguistic code and became able
to do productivethings with words in interaction,and we were unsatisfied with
Chomsky's (1966) nativist account of language acquisition.
It is in this vein thatthe role of Vygotsky's (1978) concept of the zone of proxi-
mal development (ZPD) in conceptualizationsof scaffolding is noteworthy.De-
fined as the zone of activity in which a person can produce with assistance what
they cannotproducealone (or can only producewith difficulty), the ZPD concept
depended on a view of human developmentthat had a numberof importantand
distinctiveproperties.
The first centralpropertyis Vygotsky's (1962) sociohistorical conceptualiza-
tion of the developmentof language and concepts. Unlike Piaget, who was a ge-
netic Kantianarguingfor the child's constructionof the necessarycategoriesof ex-
perience (time, space, causality) from largely individualisticinteractionswith the
physical and representationalworlds (Toulmin,1972), Vygotsky as a Marxistwas
quite appositeto the view thathumannatureis a given. As MarxWartofsky(1983)
famously pointedout, thereis solid historicalevidence of the world's construction
of the child as much as the child's constructionof the world: "Childrenare, or be-
come, what they are takento be by others, and what they come to take themselves
to be, in the course of their social communicationand interactionwith others"(p.
190). I took this argumentto provide a vital issue for humanlearningaugmented
with informationtechnologies:
Accordingto thistheory,humannatureis nota productof environmentalforces,but

is of ourownmakingas a societyandis continuallyin theprocessof "becoming."
Humankind is reshapedthrougha dialectic,or "conversation"
of reciprocalinflu-
ences: Our productive activities change the world, thereby changing the ways in
whichtheworldcan changeus. By shapingnatureandhowourinteractions
withit
aremediated,we changeourselves.(Pea,1987,p. 93)
Second, as Vygotsky would have it, psychological development progresses

from an interpsychological to an intrapsychological plane-it is through the
child's experiencesof participatingin activitiesthatareinitiallyexternallyaccessi-
ble that the structuresand content of mental life that can be played out internally
become possible, an account reminiscentof Wittgenstein's(1958) conception of
learningas participationin "formsof life":
Theveryessenceof culturaldevelopment
is in thecollisionof matureculturalforms
of behaviorwith the primitiveforms that characterizethe child's behavior.
(Vygotsky,1981,p. 151)
It was perhapsnot untilMichael Cole, John-Steiner,Scribner,and Souberman's

translationandpublicationof selected Vygotsky essays in the landmark1978 vol-

SOCIALDIMENSIONS 427
ume, Mind in Society: The Developmentof Higher Mental Processes, prompting

the philosopherStephenToulmin(1978) to call Vygotsky "theMozartof Psychol-
ogy," that the fertility of the ZPD concept was made broadly evident to Western
psychologists and educational theorists. Michael Cole collaboratorJoe Glick's
(1983) chapteron "Piaget,Vygotsky andWerner"helps set a contextfor the arrival
of this work on the Americanscene and why it took root so quickly in an intellec-
tualenvironmentin which "fixedcapacity"conceptionsof intelligence were losing
favor. Glick distinguished "Vygotsky I" of Thought and Language (Vygotsky,
1962), a book thatVygotsky assembledhimself duringhis lifetime, and"Vygotsky
II"of Mind in Society (1978), an editorialconstructionselected for its contempo-
raryrelevanceto Americanpsychology. (I cannotexplore this distinctionhere, but
I recommendit to interestedreaders,especially those not enamoredby the "inter-
nalization"metaphorwith which Vygotsky has come to be identifiedwherebycul-
turalinfluences are interpersonallyinculcatedand subsequently"internalized.")
InMindin Society(VygotskyII),theunderlying objectappearsto be the

conceptual
mannerin whichsign systemstransform relationsandthe
organism-environment
meansby whichmindbecomessocialized(Glick,1983,p. 43).
Glick (1983) noted that the editors depicted these concepts by making several
observationsafter first quoting Vygotsky:
"The specializationof the hand-this implies the tool, and the tool implies specific
humanactivity,thetransformingreactionof manon nature...theanimalmerelyuses
externalnature,andbringsaboutchangesin it simplyby his presence;man,by his
changes,makesit servehisends,mastersit. Thisis thefinal,essentialdistinction
be-
tweenmanandotheranimals." Vygotskybrilliantlyextendedthisconceptof media-
tionin human-environment to theuseof signsas well as tools.Liketool
interaction
systems,signsystems(language,writing,numbersystems)arecreatedby societies
over the course of humanhistoryandchange with the form of society andthe level of
its culturaldevelopment.Vygotsky believed thatthe interalization of culturallypro-
duced sign systems brings aboutbehaviortransformationsand forms the bridge be-
tween early andlaterforms of individualdevelopment.Thus for Vygotsky,in the tra-
dition of Marx and Engels, the mechanism of individual development is rooted in
society and culture.(Vygotsky, 1978, Introduction,p. 7)
Glick (1983) also highlighted the importance to American psychology of

Vygotsky's process-orientedapproachto evaluatingmentalcapacityin Vygotsky's
conceptionof ZPD testing.Vygotsky's (1978) focus on the social foundationsof in-
dividualhighermentalfunctioningis exemplifiedin the ZPD concept,which he de-
finedas the distancebetweena child's "actualdevelopmentallevel as determinedby
independentproblemsolving" and the higherlevel revealedin "potentialdevelop-
ment as determinedthroughproblemsolving underadultguidanceor in collabora-

428 PEA
tion with more able peers"(p. 86). Vygotsky providedexamples of childrenwith

equivalentindependentproblemsolving who, whendynamicallyassessed, havedif-
ferentZPDs, andhe considersthe level of potentialdevelopmentmore relevantfor
instructionthanthe actualindependentdevelopmentallevel.
By the time of a widely readRogoff and Wertsch(1984) volume on Children's
Learning in the "Zoneof Proximal Development"(also see Wertsch, 1978, who
cited Wood et al., 1976), the ZPD was becoming a fundamentalcomponentof the
learning and education research literature.1Inspired not only by Vygotsky but
workin a similarvein by the clinical psychologist ReuvenFeuerstein,2Ann Brown
and colleagues (e.g., Brown & Ferrara, 1985; Campione, 1989; Campione &
Brown, 1984, 1990; Campione,Brown,Ferrara,& Bryant, 1984; for theirconnec-
tions with Michael Cole's "Laboratoryfor ComparativeHuman Cognition,"see
Cole & Griffin, 1983) were workingon what they called "dynamicassessment"in
which a cascadingsequenceof hints was providedto enable a dynamicassessment
of how much supporta learnerneeded to complete variousbenchmarktasks.
A preeminent example of work in this era was Scardamaliaand Bereiter's
(1983, 1985) researchusing what they have called "proceduralfacilitation"as a
pedagogicaltechniqueto supportthe use of more advancedwritingstrategies(also
see Applebee & Langer,1983, on "instructionalscaffolding"for readingand writ-
ing). Proceduralfacilitatorswere at first physical note cards with lead-in compo-
nents to sentencesthatwere designedto providestructuringdevices to scaffold the
young writer's writing activities and as such were explicit models of more ad-
vancedformsof writing.Therewas no questionin this workthatthe proceduralfa-
cilitatorswere intendedto be but a temporaryadjunctin the writing process. Pea
and Kurland(1987) reviewed the state of the artat this periodin bringingtogether
developmentalunderstandingof the writing process with the new computerwrit-
ing tools of adults and industrytowardwhat they called "developmentalwriting
environments"that would directly facilitatethe developmentof writing skills and
1Asreportedin Gindis (1997), EducationalResourceInformationCenter(managedby the U.S. De-

partmentof Education)recordsrevealedthreetimes more referencesto Vygotskianresearchin educa-
tion than Piagetianresearch.
2ReuvenFeuersteinis a clinicalpsychologistwho studiedwith JeanPiagetandhas for yearsbeen Ed-
ucationProfessorat Israel's Bar Ian University.Feuerstein'sinspiringwork on the social and cultural
conditionsfor modifiableintelligencewas rootedin his experiencesin the 1940s as codirectorandteacher
in the School forDisadvantagedandDisturbedChildrenin Bucharestandhis workwith child survivorsof
concentrationcamps.Feuerstein'stheoryof structuralcognitivemodifiabilityandthe Feuersteinmethod,
whichhe calls "instrumental enrichment"involvesemergentpracticesof dynamicassessmentin whichhe
places so called retardedchildrenandadults(manywith Down's syndrome)with often dramaticlearning
resultsin whathe calls "shapingenvironments"thatprovidestructuredmediationto enrichthe qualityof
theirinteractionswith otherssuch as parents,teachers,caregivers,andpeers so thattheirexperiencescan
be graspedand integratedmeaningfully(e.g., Feuerstein,Hoffman,Rand, & Miller, 1980; Feuerstein,
Rand,& Hoffman,1979;also see Kozulin& Rand,2000; Lidz, 1987). Formorerecentworkon dynamic
assessment,see Pellegrino,Chudowsky,and Glaser(2001).

not only be useful for text production(see Pea, 1987, for a relatedanalysis of cog-
nitive technologies for mathematicslearning).Inspiredby these efforts, Hawkins
and Pea (1987) developed the INQUIREsoftwaresystem for inquiryprocess sup-
portsin bridgingchildren'severydayand scientific thinkingwith modules such as
Questions,Notes, Schemes, and Patterns.
I believe thatthe seeds for the diffusionof the concept of scaffoldingarealready
latentin Vygotsky's (1962) influentialwritings,for unlike the child language and
play work fromBruner,Wood, andothersin which the concept was developedas a
prospective mechanism of human development in naturallyoccurring activities
andnot designed or technologicallymediatedones, Vygotsky's conceptionsof hu-
mandevelopmentbroughttogetherthe informalandthe formal,the naturalandthe
designed, to achieve his theoreticalends. For in Vygotsky's (1962, 1978) view,
even the naturallyoccurringinteractionsin which the mother scaffolds the baby
were culturallyconstitutedproductionswith a historythatmade them akin in kind
to the more historically recent instructionalinterventionsin formal educationby
which we seek to teach a scientific view of concepts. So scaffolding was destined
to become a concept, fueled with a Vygotskian (1978) sociohistoricalview of de-
velopment,which is appliedso broadlyas to encompassfeaturesof computersoft-
ware (e.g., Tikhomirov,1981; Pea, 1985a, 1985b), curriculumstructures,conver-
sationaldevices such questions, and physically literalexamples of scaffoldingthe
learningof a complex motoractivity like tennis (in which one may physically as-
sist the novice tennis player,helping positionthe body, arm,and racketto facilitate
a sense of making a first racketstroke).Nonetheless, there are noteworthydiffer-
ences between the ongoing culturalpractices of a communityin which informal
scaffolding takes place in adult-child interactionpatternsand the scaffolding in-
corporatedin formalized activities within systems of designed books, software,
materialsfor learningand other artifactscrafted specifically to promote learning
activities.
I believe thatwe have two primaryaxes for organizingthe theoreticalcontribu-
tions to supportsfor the processes of learning.One axis is social and most con-
cerned with interactive responsiveness that is contingent on the needs of the
learner,providingresourcesthatenable the learnerto do morethanhe or she would
alone. The other axis is technological and about designed artifacts,writtenabout
so articulatelyin HerbertSimon's (1969) TheSciences of the Artificial.
For many of the contributionsto the theory and researchon human develop-
ment, learning, and education, these two axes may be more or less dominantin
theirconceptualizations.For early language and conceptualdevelopment,I argue
thatthe social conception of between-people scaffolding and supportfor learning
is not primarilyaboutthe uses of technological artifactsbut aboutsocial practices
that have arisenover millennia in parentingand other forms of caring.
More recently,as computertools have become increasinglyused for supporting
learningand educationalprocesses in school and beyond, the concept of scaffold-

430 PEA
ing has been more commonly employed to describe what features of computer
tools and the processes employing them are doing for learning.
The theoreticalchallengeis thatforhumankind,tools andsymbolizingtechnolo-
gies (such as writtenlanguageandnumbersystems) areamongourmost significant
culturalachievementsand, as such, they havebecome partof the culturalresources
that we utilize to propagate society across generations, providing significant
value-addedto the social processes of between-people supportand caring in the
learningprocess. Also, in online learningenvironmentsthatare mediatedby com-
putertechnologies and computer-basedversions of symbolizing technologies for
representinglinguistic, mathematical,scientific, and other concepts and relation-
ships-but nonetheless incorporatingbetween-people supportcomponents-the
ways in which scaffolding is made possible are extraordinarilydiverse.
These two threadsof social process and tool/mediatingprocess in the scaffold-
ing concept came together most noticeably for Western conceptualizationsof
learningandeducationthroughthe translatedwritingsof Vygotsky in Thoughtand
Language (1962) and Mind in Society (1978). Perhapsas Brunerwrote the Intro-
ductionto Thoughtand Languagefor publicationin 1962, his firstencounterswith
Vygotsky's considerationsin these newly translatedwritingscame to play a semi-
nal role in his later work with Wood and Ross and in language developmentas
well. Vygotsky's concerns were also carriedforwardin the work of his students
Luria(Cole, 1978) andLeon'tiev (1981) andin activitytheorysince thattime (e.g.,
Engestr6m, 1987; Engestr6m,Miettinen, & Punamaki,1999) as well as cultural
psychology more broadly (Cole, 1996).
FRAMEWORKFOR THE DEFINITIONOF SCAFFOLDING
Like severalof the authorsin this special issue, I find it productiveto returnto the
discussions of scaffolding in Wood et al. (1976) and to consider currentwork on
scaffolding in this light. There are several components to this definition, which I
call here the what, why, and how of scaffolding. The what and why of scaffolding
may be consideredtogether,and the how of scaffolding can be taken separately.
First, as to the WHAT and the WHY of scaffolding:Scaffolding situationsare
those in which the learnergets assistanceor supportto performa taskbeyondhis or
her own reach if pursuedindependentlywhen "unassisted"(Wood et al., 1976, p.
90). Right away,one can see how fundamentalaspectsof this foundingsense of the
termdifferfrom the work reportedin the four articlesin this issue. In the scaffold-
ing activities of the adult when working with the child in the Wood et al. study,
thereis a diagnosis of the learner'sproficiencyandan adaptivelevel of supportthat
is providedby the adult,with the temporaldynamicsof the scaffoldingprocess im-
plying cycles of comparisonbetween the assessed level of performancethe learner
is exemplifying at any moment in time and the level of scaffolding that is respon-

sively providedand with the dynamicof the process proceedingthroughsuch dy-

namic assessment cycles toward the learner's autonomous performance.Stone
(1993, 1998a, 1998b) has also highlighted the dynamic natureof the scaffolding
process dependenton cycles of assessment and adaptivesupport.A fundamental
aspect of the scaffoldingprocess was thus consideredto be whatonly latercame to
be called "fading"of the scaffold, to use the term thatI believe was introducedin
Collins, Brown, and Newman (1989) and used by many others since:
Oncethelearnerhasa graspof thetargetskill,themasterreduces(orfades)hispartici-

pation, providing only limited hints, refinements,and feedback to the learner,who
smoothexecutionof thewholeskill.(p. 456)
practicessuccessivelyapproximating
Such fading, I argue, is an intrinsiccomponent of the scaffolding framework:

Withoutsuch a dismantlingmechanism,the kinds of behaviorsand supportsthat
have been more recently describedas scaffolding actually reflect the much more
pervasiveform of cognitive supportthat enables what some call "distributedcog-
nition" (e.g., Hutchins, 1995) and what I have called "distributedintelligence"
(Pea, 1993, 2002).
From this perspective,the main sense of distributedintelligence emerges from
the image of people in action whose activity is enabledby the configuringof dis-
tributedintelligence. However,thatintelligence is distributedacross people, envi-
ronmentsincludingdesigned artifacts,and situations.This is in contrastto intelli-
gence viewed as a possession of the individual embodied mind. I thus describe
intelligence as accomplishedratherthanpossessed. As I (Pea, 1993) noted in my
chapteron distributedintelligence and education
Therearebothsocialandmaterialdimensionsof thisdistribution. Thesocialdistri-

butionof intelligencecomesfromitsconstruction
in activitiessuchastheguidedpar-
ticipationin joint actioncommonto parent-childinteraction or apprenticeship,
or
throughpeople's collaborativeefforts to achieve sharedaims. The materialdistribu-
tion of intelligence originatesin the situatedinventionof uses of aspects of the envi-
ronmentor theexploitation
of theaffordances
of designedartifacts,eitherof which
may contributeto supportingthe achievementof an activity's purpose.(p. 50)
I believe that clearly delineatingthe boundariesbetween scaffolding with fad-

ing and more general distributedintelligence without fading is a centralproblem
for the learningsciences and for education,and the argumentstructuresand war-
rants used in markingthese boundarieswill be informative-as well as conten-
tious. So manynew forms of humanactivitythatinvolve computingwould be sim-
ply unachievablewithout the computingsupportsenabling the acts of distributed
intelligence. Fading is simply out of the question. People cannot do the activities
withoutthe technologies, or it becomes meaninglessto ask whetherthey can do so.

432 PEA
If the supportdoes not fade, then one should considerthe activity to be distributed
intelligence, not scaffolded achievement.I returnto this core issue later on.
Second, as to the HOWof scaffolding,the Wood et al. (1976) articlewas espe-
cially useful in defining several of the propertiesfor how such assistance func-
tioned for the learner.These propertiesfell into two primarygroups, with short-
hand names I use for them (not used by Wood et al.):
1. Channelingand focusing: Reducing the degrees of freedom for the task at

handby providingconstraintsthatincreasethe likelihood of the learner'seffective
action; recruitingand focusing attentionof the learnerby markingrelevanttask
features(in what is otherwise a complex stimulusfield), with the result of main-
taining directednessof the learner'sactivity towardtask achievement.
2. Modeling: Modeling more advancedsolutions to the task.
Although channeling and focusing appearto be closely related, they may be

distinguishedin the following way: Whereasthe scaffoldingprocess of channeling
reducesthe degrees of freedomfor the task at hand,thereis nonethelessthe poten-
tial for the learnernot to be focusing on the desiredtask componentor propertyin a
temporalsequence of task-relatedbehaviors.So the scaffolding process of focus-
ing is a more restrictive,limiting aspect of scaffolding.
CRITICALCONSIDERATIONOF THE ARTICLES IN THIS

SPECIAL ISSUE
In the remainderof my commentary,I reflect on the issues raised in the four arti-
cles in terms of the scaffolding concept and its relationto distributedintelligence
andraise questionsthatI feel warrantcontinuedattentiontowardmakingadvances
concerningthis centralconcept in the learningsciences and instructionaltheory.
The WHATand WHY of Scaffolding

It is significantthatthe dynamicassessmentintrinsicto the scaffoldingframework
thatI have outlined,which was integralto the originalWoodet al. (1976) definition
of the term, is absent in the software systems that are describedin the articles in
this issue as is acknowledgedby the authors,for example,Reiser (this issue): "The
sense in which tools can scaffold learnersundersuch conditions are clearly quite
differentthanexpertteacherswho can tailortheiradvice to an assessmentof the in-
dividual learnerstate" (p. 298). Thus, the microgenesis of scaffolding processes
evidentin the problem-solvingsupportby the adultas the child works on the pyra-
mid puzzle or in the peekaboo games characterizedby Bruner and Sherwood

(1976) or Cazden (1979) is not an ingredientto the presumedscaffolding of these

software systems.
The reasons for this absence are apparentand noted by authorssuch as Reiser
(this issue): Ourfield simply does not have the design knowledge as yet for how to
providediagnosticassessmentthatis responsiveto what the learnerneeds for such
complex cognitive tasks as the conduct of scientific inquiry.Intelligent tutoring
systems for proceduraldomains such as algebra problem solving or geometric
proof,by contrast,do seek to reasonaboutthe statesof individuallearnersandpro-
vide next-step,responsive support.Reiser (this issue) thus observes how "the ap-
proachin the scaffoldedcognitive tools has been to embed supportwithin the sys-
tem as promptsor representedin the structureof the tool itself,"leaving adaptation
"underthe controlof the learnerswho can exploreadditionalpromptsor assistance
available[or] attemptto follow or work aroundthe system's advice"(p. 298). The
scaffolding need in this case might even be called metascaffolding:If the learner
does not know how to structuretheir problem-solvingprocess for productivein-
quiry,how is it that they are expected to know how to decide among nonadaptive
choices for scaffolding?They need scaffolds for the scaffolds. This may be a use-
ful locus of teachersupportin whatTabak(this issue) in her articlecalls "synergis-
tic scaffolding"when studentsare using such software.
Nonetheless, Reiser's (this issue) effort to distinguishwhat he calls the "struc-
turing"and "problematizing"aspectsof scaffoldingbearscloser scrutinyon the is-
sue of adaptivesupportvital to the scaffolding definition. Reiser seeks to explain
by what "mechanisms"a softwaretool provides scaffolding for learnersand what
model will accountfor how the tool has benefited learners.Reiser (this issue) dif-
ferentiatestwo such mechanisms:task structuring("guidinglearnersthroughkey
componentsand supportingtheirplanningandperformance"[p. 273]) and content
problematizing("tools can shape students'performanceand understandingof the
task in terms of key disciplinarycontent and strategiesand thus problematizethis
importantcontent"[p. 273]).
Reiser's (this issue) goal is to make the problematizingmechanismof scaffold-
ing a more centralissue for our attentionin scaffoldingtheory anddesign, and this
is quitesignificant,as it could lead to productiveuses for the scaffoldingconcept in
instructionalactivity design. Reiser distinguishes structuringtasks to make them
moretractablefrom shapingtasks for learnersto make theirproblemsolving more
productive.I foundthis distinctionhardto maintainas I workedthroughreviewing
eitherthe softwaresystems he describesor those of the otherarticles.Forexample,
the same tool featuresmay both simplify andproblematizeby focusing learnerson
task componentsthatthey have not yet accomplished.Reiser (this issue) defines a
broadarrayof characteristicsthathe believes createproblematizingconditionsfor
scaffoldingincludingdirectingattentionof the studenttowardan issue that"needs
resolution,"a triggeringof affective componentssuch as "creatinginterest"in ad-
vancingunderstanding,establishinga sense of "dissonanceor curiosity,"andmore

434 PEA
generally,"engagingstudents."In the end, I startedto see thatI could identify ex-

amples of task simplificationwithoutproblematization,and so I grantthat any ex-
istence proof for the value of the distinctionReiser wantsto makeprovideswarrant
for his distinction. Yet it remains an open empirical question under what condi-
tions it is thata specific scaffoldingfeatureand affiliatedscaffoldingprocess work
to problematizetasks for any given learnerdependingon the natureof the tasks;
the learner'sbackgroundknowledge, capabilities,andinterests;andthe social con-
text. As Reiser (this issue) notes, "thesocial contextof collaborativeproblemsolv-
ing is often integralto the problematizingnatureof the tool" (p. 289), which sug-
gests thatthe problematizingbroughtaboutby scaffolding is less a mechanismin
the tool thana social functionof its interpretationin the particularsof the discourse
of a learningsituation.
I also was not sure what Reiser (this issue) meantby mechanism.For physical
tools, a mechanismis a method,procedure,or process involved in how something
works.Forlearning,one is familiarwith proposedmechanismsof learning,such as
assimilation-accommodation(Piaget, 1952) or knowledge compilation (Ander-
son, 1983). However, I found the hybrid use of the term confusing, as it is used
interpretivelyto markwhat Reiser as theoristbelieves to be what is happeningfor
the learneras the software scaffolding featuresare used in the conduct of a com-
plex task of inquiry.So it is neitherabout a descriptivefeaturefor a physical tool
nor a proposalaboutan internalmechanismfor learningbut a hypotheticalcharac-
terizationconcerninghow (external)scaffolds work for (internal)learning.When
mechanismis used in this way, it is importantto ask whatwill count as evidence for
claims concerninghow scaffolds work.
Reiser (this issue) provides illustrative examples of problematizingstudent
workin characterizinghow, as studentsinteractwith high school biology scaffold-
ing tools andcreateartifacts,they areconstrainedto using importantepistemic fea-
turesof the discipline embodied in softwaremenu choices: "Ratherthanjust writ-
ing down their explanation,the tool forces them to consider how to express their
hypothesis and its supportwithin a disciplinaryframeworksuch as naturalselec-
tion"(p. 291). Even with examplesof studentdiscoursewhen using this software,I
could still not determinewhat datacounts as evidence in supportof a claim for any
given instancethat a particularfeatureof a scaffolded cognitive tool functionedto
scaffold learningin terms of one, the other,or both of these two proposedmecha-
nisms. However,the distinctionhas promise and can be developed in its empirical
groundingin futurework.
The Sherinet al. articlein this issue also usefully foregroundsthe need for the
comparativeanalysis intrinsicto the scaffolding process definition in Wood et al.
(1976). Perhapsbecause the call for papersrequestedconceptualwork ratherthan
empiricalstudies,Sherinet al. (this issue) do not provideany empiricaldataon this
count except for theiroccasional referenceto comparisonsof the "hypotheticalbe-
havior of learnerswith and without the innovation"(p. 398). A challenge for the

learningsciences to work on whatkindsof dataandanalyses will help us betterun-

derstandthe role of scaffoldingprocesses using softwaretools towardthe targeted
autonomousperformances.
The HOW of Scaffolding: Channeling and Focusing,

Modeling
Channeling and focusing in the articles. The articles offer many exam-
ples that illustratethe channelingfunctionof scaffoldinglearneractivities includ-
ing systems dynamics model-buildingtask decompositionin Model-ItT, inquiry
process scaffoldingusing KnowledgeIntegrationEnvironmentor ProgressPortfo-
lio, planning notations, progress maps, and constrainedepistemic forms such as
"what I know" and "high level question" in Computer-SupportedIntentional
LearningEnvironments.Reducing task complexity is a function of many of the
categories of scaffolding defined by Quintanaet al. (this issue) such as process
managementguides for mapping complex stages in an inquiry process with re-
minders and guidance toward progress and task completion. Reiser (this issue)
also describes how some tool componentsautomatethe execution of some of the
taskcomponents.Manyof the softwarefeaturesdescribedin the articlesalso focus
a learner'sattentionby markingrelevanttask featuresto maintaindirectednessof
their activity towardtask achievement.
I found the category system comprising seven scaffolding guidelines and 20
scaffoldingstrategiesin Quintanaet al.'s (this issue) articlequiteinterestingandan
impressiveformulationof an exceptionallycomplex field of softwaresystems and
theiruses for science instructionand otherareasof learning.As one point of meth-
odology, it would seem importantto develop interraterreliabilitydataon classify-
ing softwaresystems or specific instructionalpracticesin termsof these guidelines
and strategies.As with any classification,even one done with the meritsof a com-
binationof top-down and bottom-upanalysis such as this one, only time will tell
whetherthese categories (forms of scaffolding) merit distinctionas their uses are
put to the test in design, analytic, and empiricalwork. What looks good as a theo-
reticaldistinctionmay be moot-or not-for the learningthat results from its de-
ployment in specific subject matterdomains and implementationsituations(e.g.,
dependingon the teacher'sroles, learningin groups ratherthan individually,stu-
dent backgroundsand interests,etc.).
Reiser (this issue) describeshow both featuresof the softwaretools andthe arti-
facts producedby studentsin using them reveal the problematizingmechanismof
scaffoldinginsofaras the tools studentsuse to access, analyze, andmanipulatedata
are structuredso thatthe implicit strategiesof the discipline are visible to students
and in that the work productscreatedby studentsare designed so as to represent
importantconceptualpropertiesof explanationsin the discipline (these featuresre-
flect scaffolding Strategy2b and scaffoldingGuideline 2 in Quintanaet al., this is-

436 PEA
sue). Reiser (this issue) characterizesthese issues in terms of the Galapagos

Finches software,which enables learners"toinvestigatechanges in populationsof
plantsand animalsin an ecosystem and serves as a platformfor learningprinciples
of ecosystems and naturalselection"(p. 286). The softwarescaffolds embody two
differentstrategiesfor examining ecosystem data:throughtime longitudinallyor
cross-sectionally (by some dimension such as male-female, young-adult). The
empiricalquestion one may ask is whetherthe forced choice of strategiesin using
such templatesto producethe students'artifactsyields continueduses of the strate-
gies andexpressionsof the discipline's strategiesin artifactsonce the studentis no
longer using the tool.
Thus, the generalissue with which I am concernedis whetherstudentsusing a
constrainedset of formsfor producingthe workartifactsof scaffoldedscientific in-
quiries are "parroting"back disciplinaryforms of thinkingratherthanperforming
with understandingof whattheyhavecreated(like the horseCleverHanswas doing
when he seemed to be counting and doing arithmeticbut was being scaffolded by
subtle cues from his owner;Pfungst, 1911). It remainsan empiricalissue whether
Reiser's (this issue) having "tools force them into decisions or commitmentsre-
quiredto use the vocabularyandmachineryof the interface"resultsin learnerswho
attendto such structuralfeaturesof knowledgeand inquirystrategiesin the science
domain without such scaffolding around.Anothersoftwaresystem called Animal
Landlorddistinguishes"observations"from"interpretations" (a preferredscientific
practice and epistemic distinction) as studentslook at animal behaviorvideos, and
theartifactsthattheyproducerequireuse of thisdistinction.Oncetheyhaveusedthis
system, what is known aboutwhetherstudentsare more likely offline to spontane-
ously differentiateobservationsfrom interpretationsin their uses of scientific in-
quiry strategiesand distinctions?
Modeling in the articles. Therearenumerousscaffolds describedby the au-

thorsin this issue thatseek to establishin bothinquiryprocess andproductartifacts
a model for more developmentallymaturescientific inquiryforms of activity.I see
two issues of concern here. My first issue is where is the data in supportof the
model attributionfor expertise? The second issue is the difference between a
"model-without-a-person" and a scaffolding "person-as-a-model."
On the first issue, all of the articles but perhapsmost clearly Quintanaet al.'s
(this issue) talk about the "targetpractices"of "expertknowledge"towardwhich
they hope their scaffolding softwarefeaturesand processes will guide the student
as learner(also see Sherinet al.'s, this issue, "idealizedtargetperformance").In the
characterizationsof the science inquirygoal statesfor learners,where do these at-
tributionsof expertknowledgecome from?Fromwhat I can tell, muchof it is built
from rational reconstructions and prototypical idealizations of inquiry (e.g.,
Krajcik,Berger,& Czeriak, 2002) and laboratorystudies (e.g., Klahr,2000), not
social practicestudiesor cognitive ethnographicstudiesof actualmaturescientific

practices. Such empirical work in this vein, identified with work in the field of
"science studies"(e.g., Bowker & Star, 1999; Galison, 1987, 1997; Knorr-Cetina,
1999; Latour & Woolgar, 1979/1986; Nersessian, 2004; Ochs & Jacoby, 1997;
Rheinberger,1997; Star, 1989), both challenge existing idealizations of science
practice on which the scaffolding models are based and introducenew forms of
scientific expertisethat such idealizationsrarelyinclude (e.g., distributedreason-
ing; see Dunbar,1999). These issues of empiricallygroundingthe targetstate for
learningin empiricalstudiesof scientists are significantones and warrantone's at-
tentionto the science studiesliteratureandthe increasingfocus on technology-me-
diated practices in scientific inquiry.To take but one case in point, extensive re-
search defining "novice-expert differences" reasoning and task performancein
science was used to informpedagogy (Chi, Glaser,& Farr,1988), butit did not suf-
ficiently heed the adaptiveexpertise of the maturepractitionerin contrastto rou-
tine expertise (Hatano& Oura,2003).
On the second issue concerning modeling, note that because the scaffolding
provided in the software systems characterizedin these articles lacks human
agency for the learnerto interactwith, they may be missing what could come to
be a key property of such modeling-a socially interactive other. One should
consider the likely importancein scaffolding processes of a model in the sense
of a role model, someone whose performancesand knowledge one could person-
ally aspire to as a culturalissue and involving at its core a sense of identity, an
affiliation with that person and their values, language, and activity components
as a partof a communityof practice (e.g., Holland, Lachicotte, Skinner,& Cain,
1998; Holland & Lave, 2001, Lave & Wenger, 1991). Having such a model may
have very different consequences for learning than working within a nonhuman
model structureof a task model that has been developed as a generic pattern
prompterfor scientific inquiry.
Reiser (this issue) acknowledges as importantbut does not treat empirically
in his article how the teachers'interpretiveand discourse practices, among other
propertiesof the classroom system, are essential to achieving the desired educa-
tional results from uses of the scaffolded cognitive tools. It would be good to see
references to such empirical work on such practices and how they contributeto
the benefits that software scaffolding may provide. Tabak (this issue) provides
fertile examples of what she calls "synergisticscaffolding,"an organizationthat
brings togethersoftwarefeaturesdesigned for scaffolding and teacher's scaffold-
ing activities. However,this concept is not developed in terms of what properties
of their interactions make such synergies work-or not. Such analyses would
comparativelyexamine whetherboth software and teacher scaffolding functions
could be achieved by software alone, by teacher alone, and what this says about
whether it is importantthat the teacher's supportis human and socially interac-
tive or simply that it needs to be interactiveand adaptivein nature(as software
may eventually enable).

438 PEA
Fading in the articles. I am struckwith the absence of referenceto empiri-

cal accounts of fading or transferin any of the articles in this issue, including the
Quintanaet al. article,which seeks to be synoptic in its scope, covering dozens of
systems in use in the field. Are thereknownresultsfrom measureddiagnosisof un-
aided performanceand differentforms of scaffolding provided(as requiredin the
comparativedefinition of scaffolding and in its original formulations)?Are there
theory-informedeffortsto fade such presumedscaffolds duringthe course of their
uses for the learners?What are the known empiricalresults from learners'uses of
scaffolds and their fading over time as unaidedperformancebecomes possible?
I am concernedthatthe reasonfor such silence is thatmanyof the softwarefea-
turesin the systems describedappearto functionnot as scaffolds-with-fadingbut as
scaffolds-for-performance in a way thatwill requirethem to continueto be used by
the learnersto be able to have themdeliverthe performancesthataredesired.Thus,
thereis distributedintelligence,not scaffold-with-fading.Some of these scaffolding
designs, such as the Quintanaet al. (this issue) category of "processmanagement
supports,"look like theycouldbe useful for the adultpracticingscientist,too; others
in sense makingmay ormaynotbe useful to the scientist,butwherethereis overtem-
beddingof scientificdisciplinarystrategiesin the tool menusit certainlycalls outfor
learningdatafrom scaffold-with-fadingto avoid the CleverHans interpretationof
studentperformancesin usingthesetools. Of course,scaffolding-with-fadingcanbe
useful for adultlearning,too, butI thinkthatmanyof the supportsdescribedin these
categorieswould functionusefully as aides to the distributedintelligence achieved
in the activities of adultsor childrenwithout such fading.
However,the surpriseis in the Sherinet al. article(thisissue) on thispoint:Sherin
et al. arguewith the assumptionin the originalWoodet al. (1976) articleon scaffold-
ing thatfading is a requiredcomponentof the definition.Yetunderstandingthe dy-
namicsof scaffoldingprocesses,includingthe selection andcalibrationof scaffold-
ing structuresduringinteractions,lies at the heartof developmentaltheoryand the
science of learningandroles that scaffoldingplays in them. Although Sherinet al.
havemadegood progressin helpingus analyzescaffolding,theymustnow movefor-
wardto makeheadwayon the issue of change over time. To not takeon this issue is
self-defeating and only a statementof the currentlimited state of the art that, as
Sherinet al. (thisissue) note, "inthe case of technologicalartifacts,thereis less of an
opportunityfor interactivetuningof scaffolding"(p. 403). Infact, it is not at all obvi-
ous thatSherinet al.'s frameworkcannotbe appliedto changesovertime, andin the
closing sections of their article,they even suggest thatit can be so extended.
Relation of Scaffolding With Fading to Distributed

Intelligence More Generally
In this section, I considerhow scaffoldingwith fading as one of its integralcompo-
nents relates to distributedintelligence more generally. As Stone (1998b) high-

lighted and Tabak(this issue) highlights, scaffolding is not at all a theoretically

neutralterm.It is rootedin ZPD conceptions of learningand developmentand ac-
tivity theoreticconceptualizationsof the relationsamong people, tools, and envi-
ronment. It is activity and performance centered (e.g., Engestrom, 1987;
Leont'iev, 1981; Vygotsky, 1978; Wertsch, 1991), not cognitive structureor task
analysis centeredto point to a very differenttheoreticaltraditionin cognitive sci-
ence (e.g., Anderson, 1983; Newell, 1990).
Tabak'sarticle(this issue) providesa rich discussion of how scaffoldingrelates
morebroadlyto mediationof activitywith culturaltools such as mathematicalrep-
resentational systems for place value multiplication and how this helps
problematize,in interestingways, the boundariesbetween (a) scaffolding consid-
ered in the context of instructionaldesign and learningsupportand (b) distributed
cognition more generally,which is commonly mediatedby culturaltools and scaf-
folds createdby othersor by oneself as designs for achieving activities that would
be errorprone, challenging, or impossible otherwise.
If one consideredscaffolding activity to be assisting performancegenerally,it
would problematically span an exceptional range of human behaviors that in-
cludes adults, not only children, and many activities that people do not consider
learning such as walking up stairs, sitting in chairs, flying in planes-each of
which is assisted performancethat would not be possible if unaided (stairs pro-
vide a physical scaffold for achieving greaterheight in a building, chairs provide
a scaffold for activity in an intermediatestate between standingand lying down,
planes provide a scaffold for rapid travel avoiding those pesky mountains,etc.).
Learning to scale heights without stairs, compose a sitting position without a
chair, and unaided fast motion in the air are not goals of these scaffolds, and no
one expects fading to be an integralpartof the use of stairs, chairs, and planes as
scaffolds. Closer to the examples of these articles on inquiry are the com-
puter-supportedactivities of adult scientists using advanced scientific visualiza-
tions for reasoning about qualitative and quantitativerelations about physical
variables as in global warming, or making inferences about statistical relations
in census data (without the revolutionaryadvances in exploratorystatisticaldata
analysis methods and software pioneered by Tukey, 1977), or longitudinaldata
modeling (using computationallyintensive analytic methods;e.g., Singer & Wil-
let, 2003). Insofar as I am aware, we are not asking adults using these methods
to function autonomously without such tools.
Although certainly not the first,3one of the most significant formulationsof
the uses of computing to enable people to do what they could not do at all or
could only do poorly without computing is in the seminal technical report on
"augmentingthe human intellect" written by Douglas Engelbart (1962, 1963)
shortly before he and his group developed the first personal computer at Stan-
ford Research Institute (SRI; Bardini, 2000; Hafner & Lyon, 1996; Waldrop,
2002). Engelbart (1962) wrote the following:

440 PEA
It has been jokingly suggested several times during the course of this study that
what we are seeking is an "intelligence amplifier."... At first this term was re-
jected on the groundsthat in our view one's only hope was to make a bettermatch
between existing humanintelligence and the problemsto be tackled, ratherthan in
making man more intelligent. But ... this term does seem applicableto our objec-
tive. Accepting the term "intelligenceamplification"does not imply any attemptto
increase native human intelligence. The term "intelligence amplification" seems
applicable to our goal of augmenting the human intellect in that the entity to be
producedwill exhibit more of what can be called intelligence than an unaided hu-
man could [italics added];we will have amplified the intelligence of the humanby
organizinghis intellectual capabilities into higher levels of synergistic structuring.
What possesses the amplified intelligence is the resulting H-LAM/T system [Hu-
man using Language, Artefacts, and Methodology in which he is Trained;italics
added], in which the LAM/T augmentationmeans represent the amplifier of the
human's intelligence. In amplifying our intelligence, we are applying the principle
of synergistic structuringthat was followed by naturalevolution in developing the
basic humancapabilities.What we have done in the developmentof our augmenta-
tion means is to constructa superstructurethat is a synthetic extension of the natu-
ral structureupon which it is built. In a very real sense, as representedby the
steady evolution of our augmentationmeans, the developmentof "artificialintelli-
gence" has been going on for centuries. (p. 19)
3SeeVannevarBush'sastounding1945essay"AsWeMayThink"(Bush, 1945a),imaginingthefu-
tureof computersas "memex"machinesthatwouldsupporthumanactivitiesfromscientificdiscovery
tobusinessdecisionmakingusingassociativeindexing[whichcametobe calledhypertext]:
Forexam-
ple
Considera futuredeviceforindividualuse,whichis a sortof mechanized privatefile andli-

brary.It needsa name... "memex" will do.A memexis a devicein whichanindividualstores
all his books,records,andcommunications, andwhichis mechanizedso thatit maybe con-
sultedwithexceedingspeedandflexibility.Itis anenlarged intimatesupplementtohismemory.
... Whollynewformsof encyclopedias willappear, readymadewitha meshof associative trails
runningthroughthem,readytobe droppedintothememexandthereamplified. Thelawyerhas
at his touchtheassociatedopinionsanddecisionsof his wholeexperience,andof theexperi-
enceof friendsandauthorities. Thepatentattorneyhason call themillionsof issuedpatents,
withfamiliartrailsto everypointof his client'sinterest.Thephysician,puzzledby a patient's
reactions,strikesthe trailestablishedin studyingan earliersimilarcase, andrunsrapidly
throughanalogouscasehistories,withsidereferences to theclassicsforthepertinent anatomy
andhistology.Thechemist,strugglingwiththesynthesisof anorganiccompound, hasall the
chemicalliterature beforehim in his laboratory, withtrailsfollowingthe analogiesof com-
pounds, and side to
trails theirphysicaland chemical behavior.(p. 106)
Bush was the firstPresidentialScience Advisor whose strategicandfuturisticthinkingalso directlyled

to Congressionalauthorizationfor the NationalScience Foundation(Bush, 1945b). Engelbartwas very
inspiredby Bush's vision in his inventions.

In Doug Engelbart's(1962) remarkablereportcreating a new frameworkfor

thinkingnot only aboutcomputingbut its relationto the historyof humanthinking
andactivity,he conjecturedthatcomputersrepresenta fourthstage in the evolution
of humanintellectualcapabilitiesbuildingon (a) thebiologically basedconceptma-
nipulationstage, (b) the speech and writing-basedstage of symbol manipulation,
and(c) theprinting-basedstageof manualexternalsymbolmanipulation,andnow
Inthisstage,symbolswithwhichthehumanrepresents theconceptshe is manipulat-

ing canbe arranged
beforehis eyes,moved,stored,recalled,operateduponaccord-
ingto extremelycomplexrules-all in veryrapidresponseto a minimumamountof
informationsuppliedby the human,by meansof specialcooperative technological
devices. In the limit of what we might now imagine, this could be a computer,with
whichwe couldcommunicaterapidlyandeasily,coupledto a three-dimensional
colordisplaywithinwhichit couldconstructextremelysophisticated imageswith
thecomputer beingableto executea widevarietyof processesonpartsorallof these
imagesin automatic responseto humandirection.Thedisplaysandprocessescould
providehelpfulservicesandcouldinvolveconceptsnot hithertoimagined(as the
pregraphicthinkerof stage2 wouldbe unableto predictthebargraph,theprocessof
longdivision,or a cardfile system).(p. 25)
This traditionof using computersas what came to be called "cognitivetechnol-

ogies" at Xerox Palo Alto ResearchCenter (PARC)in the 1970s and 1980s (see
history in Rheingold, 1985/2000) was fueled significantly when the new center
hiredalmost all of Engelbart'sSRI groupwhose talents were then turnedto creat-
ing the first commercially available personal computer,the Xerox Alto (Hiltzik,
2000). The interestingwrinkle in this history that then begins to connect up with
developmentalpsychology and learningis thatAlan Kay, the PARCimpresarioof
portable personal computing with his vision of a Dynabook, brought the
neo-Piagetian ideas and child-centeredsensibilities of MIT professor Seymour
Papertinto the design of the PARC'scognitive technologies with his leadershipof
PARC's Learning Research Group. The development of bit-mapped computer
screens, the SmallTalkobject-orientedand message-passing programminglan-
guage, constantpilot testing of PARCprogramuser interfaceswith childrento see
if they found themcompelling anduseful as "fantasyengines,"andpoint-and-click
interactivitywere all partof the emergenceof the artof humaninterfacedesign at
PARCin the early 1970s (Kay & Goldberg,1977), and laterthe Macintoshteam at
Apple Computertook on this legacy (and significantly,some of its key staff).
Now consider-with tonguein cheek-a differentspinon today'spersonalcom-
puterandits accessible user interfaceswith this design history:Imaginean account
of personalcomputingthatwas developednot by the likes of Kay but by educators
who insisted on scaffolding-with-fadingof the kinds of supportsprovidedby the
cognitivetechnologiesthatthe computeraffordedinsteadof integraluse of comput-

442 PEA
ers in a coevolved patternof activity in which the humanand the machineroles in

conducting complex inquiries and performingadvanced scientific modeling and
simulationsneededto transferto thelearner,alone,workingwithoutthecomputer.
Withdistributedintelligence,the point is often not aboutfading at all, butbeing
able to act in a context of assumptionsof availabilityof tools-representational,
material, and other people-for achieving ends. Educators, policymakers, and
learnersneed to weigh the perceived risks affiliatedwith the loss of such support
with the value of the incrementaleffort of learninghow to do the task or activity
unaidedshould such tools and supportsever become inaccessible, and the answer
has to do with the social and technological assumptionshumansmake. As we ap-
proach a world in the coming years with pervasive computing with always-on
Internetaccess, reliable quality of service networks,and sufficient levels of tech-
nological fluency, the context assumptionsthat help shape culturalvalues for dis-
tributedintelligence versus scaffolding with fading are changing.
So that is one of my concerns here. I believe the authorsin these articles have
been makingsignificantprogressin providingtechnologicalandpedagogical sup-
portsto the conductof scientific inquiryin its bootstrappingphases. I see two large
vistas of questions for the work ahead. First is the fascinating and challenging
question of sorting out empiricallywhich of the sense making, process manage-
ment, and articulationand reflection supportsthat they and others have created
should be conceived of as scaffolds-with-fadingto be pulled down and whisked
away once the learneris able to performas expected withouttheiruse-and which
of these supportsdeserveto serve in an ongoing way as partof a distributedintelli-
gence scientific workbench and as fundamentalaides to the doing of science
whose fading is unnecessaryand unproductive.
The second vista is engaged more with culturalvalues than with empiricism.
For the most part(except Tabakand briefly, Reiser, this issue), the articles in this
issue do not takeon developmentsof any specific social practicein science inquiry
whose performancesare scaffolded (for contrast,see Hutchins, 1995, on naviga-
tion in relationto its instrumentsand social practices).Yetthe issue looms large.If
one can assume regular access to the scaffolding supportsby the person using
them, and if theiruse may acceleratebroaderaccess to the forms of reasoningthat
employ them (such as science inquiry),the questionis pressing:Why fade? Tabak
provides a historical considerationof scaffolding and its relation to distributed
cognition, and Reiser hints at it. Sherin et al. (this issue) note that "it is not even
clear thatit makes intuitivesense to call the calculatora scaffold,"as it has become
so common that "if a calculator is a fixed component of mathematics prob-
lem-solving activity,can it still be called a scaffold?"(p. 390). Sherinet al. (this is-
sue) go on to correctlyobserve how "themore thatour learningartifactstransform
the task, the harderit will be to understandhow the learnermight be 'doing the
same thing"' (p. 395). So these value considerationsin relationto issues of scaf-
folding as an educationalconcept are a vital need, particularlyin termsof the his-

torically changing relationbetween scaffolding-with-fadingand distributedintel-

ligence.
What Does It Mean to Test Scaffolding Theory?

It is importantto begin testing the claims of scaffolding theory in which scaffold-
ing theory involves specific formulationsof what distinctiveforms and processes
of focusing, channeling,andmodeling areintegralto the developmentof expertise.
It also appearsthatembodiedwithin a theoryof scaffoldingneeds to be a theoryof
transferof learningfor autonomousperformanceas well, or, more likely I would
argue,a theoryof scaffoldingneeds to be situatedwith respectto a theoryof the de-
velopment of the distributedintelligence, as learningto "worksmart"(Bransford
& Schwartz,1999; Bransfordet al., 1998) will often involve, as adaptiveexpertise,
learningto establish one's own scaffolds for performance,4and fading these may
be beside the point-fading of supportsas a somewhatPuritanicalconcept that is
inappropriatefor modem times.
Among the considerationsin such a formulation,it seems to me, would be the
following:
1. A theoryof scaffoldingshould successfully predictfor any given learnerand

any given task what forms of supportprovidedby what agent(s) and designed arti-
facts would suffice for enablingthatlearnerto performat a desirablelevel of profi-
ciency on that task, which is known to be unachievablewithout such scaffolding.
Thus, one needs independentevidence that the learnercannot do the task or goal
unaided. One would imagine as a primaryconcern the need to take on issues of
over what range of situationsthis determinationwould be made or inferred.This
concernis also implied in the comparativeformulationof scaffoldingby Sherinet
al. (this issue).
Such a theory of scaffolding would also need to account for recognition pro-
cesses by which a learnerrecognizes a situationas an appropriateone for deploy-
4Teachingfor the design of distributedintelligence ... would encourageandrefine the natu-

ral tendencyfor people to continuallyre-createtheir own world as a scaffold to their activities.
... In mathematicsand science education, one might develop a metacurriculumoriented to
learningaboutthe role of distributedintelligence in enablingcomplex thought ... They would
come to see throughtheir activities where the bottlenecksof complex mentationreside. They
would recognize how physical, symbolic, and social technologies may providethe supportsto
allow for reachingconceptualheights less attainableif attemptedunaided.This goal might be
achievedthroughexaminationof living, everydayexamples (buildingfrom cases wherethey al-
readydo distributedintelligence in the world), and,perhaps,throughcase studiesof the roles of
informationstructures(e.g., matrices,flowcharts,templates)and social structures(workteams;
apprenticeships)in mediatinglearningand reasoningas activity systems of distributedintelli-
gence. (Pea, 1993, pp. 81-82)

444 PEA
ing the knowledge or skills in an autonomousmannerthat was developed through

scaffolding.
2. In readingthe articles, I was astonishedto find that they do not distinguish
learnersat different developmentallevels of knowledge or of distinctive beliefs
aboutknowledge and learning(e.g., Hofer & Pintrich, 1997), even within science
tasks or in termsof epistemological views on the natureof science-although ex-
tensive literatureis available in science education that uses such developmental
levels (e.g., Carey,Evans, Honda, Jay, & Unger, 1989; Halloun, 1997; Hammer,
1994; Kuhn, Amsel, & O'Loughlin, 1988; Linn & Songer, 1993; Redish,
Steinberg,& Saul, 1998; Roth & Roychoudhury,1994; Smith,Maclin, Houghton,
& Hennessey,2000; Songer & Linn, 1991). It would seem that scaffoldingtheory
by its very natureneeds to characterizea developmentaltrajectoryfor levels of per-
formanceon the tasks that it is designed to dynamically scaffold. The diagnoses
and adaptivesupportthat scaffolding as a process provideswould move stepwise
with the learnerup the developmentallevel sequence until such masteryhas been
achieved that the fading has been accomplished.5
It seems possible to imagine "mixed initiative"6designs of scaffolding pro-
cesses in which people andmachinesjoin togetherin helping someone learnsome-
thing in the sense thatcertainscaffolding activities can be the responsibilityof the
teacher(or peers) andotherscaffoldingactivitiesprovidedby the software.Even if
the softwarecannotdo an assessmentof the learnerandthenprovideadaptivescaf-
folding on its own, it seems entirelypossible thatthe teachercould do such an as-
sessment and thenbe in chargeof switching levels of scaffoldingthatareprovided
by the software.In this way, a scaffoldingpartnership,or synergy,as Tabakwould
call it, could be achievedin supportof the learner'sadvances.How these "divisions
of labor"should be achievedis a theoreticallyfertile areafor learningsciences re-
search (e.g., Stevens, 2000).
3. Testingscaffoldingtheoryfor the purposesof informinginstructionaldesign
has some distinctively different issues affiliated with it. The designer needs to
know how to scaffold what facets of the scientific inquiryprocess when, and with
what expected results, along a learning trajectoryin which new answers will be
given to what is needed. The complexity of the scientific inquiryprocess is such
thatit cannotall be scaffoldedat once. (Therearestronganalogshereto the writing
process and forms of scaffolding thathave been providedfor learningto write in-
5Davis (2003a, 2003b) has providedan example of work that can inform the making of such con-
nections in her studies of how studentswith differentbeliefs aboutscience learningused andbenefited
from differenttypes of scaffolding.
6Carbonell(1970) is most identifiedwith the concept of mixed initiativesystems for learningsup-
port.Carbonellcreatedthe first intelligenttutoringsystem, and its design was such thateithera human
teacheror the computerprogramcould ask questions. Today,such mixed initiative systems are com-
monly providedin customer-relationshipmanagementandcall centers,in complex planning,and more
recently to aid information-seekingbehavior.

eluding writer'sworkshopsand varioussoftwaretools.) Yet from readingthese ar-

ticles, the instructionaldesigner does not have at hand any rules for making deci-
sions about what kinds of scaffolds (among seven scaffolding guidelines and 20
scaffoldingstrategiesin Quintanaet al., this issue) to providein whatkindof adap-
tively relevantsequencingfor advancinga learner'scapabilities.
4. In the activitiesof scaffoldingfor learning,what specifically requiresthe so-
cial face-to-face of scaffolding versusthe interactivitythatmight be providedby a
software artifact?Is contingency of responding all that matters (e.g., Reeves &
Nass, 1996; implied in most of these articlesas well), or is it humanagency thatis
crucial in the scaffolding process? It is entirelypossible that issues of identityde-
velopment, community or culturalvalues, a sense of belonging/affiliation,faith,
trust,individualcaring, and responsibilityweigh into these mattersand that with-
out the "humantouch"of scaffolding and fading from agents that truly represent
these dimensionsof experience,scaffoldingandfadingfor learningmay be less ef-
fective (or unhelpful altogether).Reminding a child of a rule to be followed in a
game may provide both a metacognitivescaffolding promptbut also be emblem-
atic of a caring response that motivates its consideration (e.g., Lepper &
Woolverton,2002). In this respect, it is somewhat worrisomethat what is valued
by people in the uses of these scaffolds is too distantand relativelyinvisible in the
scaffoldingartifactsthataredevelopedandused by Reiser (this issue) andothersin
these articles.A learnercannothave a dialog with the scaffoldingsupportsin an in-
quiry system such as the BGuILEExplanationConstructor-likeone could a per-
son doing BGuILE-likeinterpersonalscaffolding in a classroom-about why one
needs to answera questionin a certainway. Conveyingthe rationalesfor perform-
ing different scientific practices by means of a prescriptionbuilt into a software
scaffold, as recommendedby scaffolding Strategy5b in Quintinaet al.'s article,
may not have enough of a humantouch.
CONCLUSION
Like the term communityin learningtheory and educationaluses of phrasessuch

as "community of practice," "community of learners" "online community of
learning,"it is importantto note that theoreticalissues are not settled by defini-
tions per se (Barab,Kling, & Gray,2004; Renninger& Shumar,2002). Yet defi-
nitional issues and category systems of kinds of scaffolds and scaffolding oc-
cupy a large proportion of the pages in these articles. The vital question,
ontologies aside, is this: What work does the concept of scaffolding do in theo-
ries of learning and instruction?How does the scaffolding concept, however ar-
ticulated, stand in relation to the specific goals of explanation,prediction, and
the coherence of theoreticalclaims for a theory of learning,encompassinglearn-
ing in everyday cognition, work practices, and in formal education? How does

446 PEA
the scaffolding concept stand in relation to its effective use in what Bruner
(1966, 1996) has called a "theoryof instruction"to guide the structureand se-
quencing of its instructionaldesigns, its situated practices, and its outcomes?
Reflecting on these questions, I recommendseveral new emphases (a) on estab-
lishing systematic empiricalinvestigationsof how the scaffolding process relates
to learning and not only to performanceand (b) in designing and researching
uses of mixed-initiative systems that combine human help from teachers and
peers with software system features that aid scaffolding processes.
One thing for sure: Scaffolds are not found in software but are functions of
processes that relate people to performancesin activity systems over time. The
goals of scaffolding researchgoing forwardshould be to study how scaffolding
processes-whether achieved in partby the use of software features,human as-
sistance, or other materialsupports-are best conceived in ways that illuminate
the natureof learning as it is spontaneouslystructuredoutside formal education
and as it can most richly inform instructionaldesign and educationalpractices.
In either case, to advancethe prospectsof learners,thickly texturedempiricalac-
counts are now needed of how scaffolding processes in such activity systems
work in comparisonto their independentperformances,even when (and perhaps
especially when) the results deviate from the best intentions of their designers.
We need to see best practices (when scaffolding systems work as planned) but
also the troublesthat arise when learnersturnout not to act in the ways that de-
signers hoped and when addressingtheir needs can stretchour imaginations,the-
ories, and designs. These articles have focused more on propertiesof software
and curriculum for science inquiry than they have learner performances and
transfer of learning considerations.
When software designed to scaffold complex learning is used, the burdenof
proof is on the researcherto (a) document how it is that it serves to advance a
learner'sperformancebeyond what they would have done workingalone (i.e., the
ZPD comparisonneeds to be warranted)and (2) what processes of fading need to
be employedto sustainthe learner'sautonomousperformanceof the capabilitiesin
questionacross transfersituationsthatmatter.Such proof needs to be providedfor
each learner,not only selected learnersor groups that serve to illustratethe best
practicesof scaffolding processes.
Finally, these articles provocativelycall one's attentionto the boundaryissue
between scaffolding defined with fading as a necessary condition and distributed
intelligence in which scaffolded support enables more advanced performances
than would be possible without such supportbut in which fading is not a cultural
goal. Such boundaryissues are at once empiricaland normativeas we debateval-
ues for what learnersshould be able to do with and without such designed scaf-
folds-debates nonetheless informed by empirical accounts of learners'perfor-
mances in the diversity of situations in which their knowledge and adaptive
expertise should come to play.

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The Social and Technological Dimensions of Scaffolding

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The Social and Technological Dimensions of Scaffolding and Related Theoretical Concepts for

Learning, Education, and Human Activity

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