LOCAL AUTONOMY

Pimentel v. Aguirre, G. R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000

Facts: In 1997, President Ramos issued A. O. No. 372 which caught the ire of Senator Aquilino Pimentel because of certain 2
provisions which state 1) All government departments and agencies, including state universities and colleges, government-
owned and controlled corporation and local government units will identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce
total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriation for non-personal service items, along the
following suggested areas… and 2) Pending of assessment and evaluation of the Development Budget Coordinating Committee
of the emergency fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) to LGUs shall be
withheld. Pimentel claims that both provisions do not comply with Section 284 of LGC, which provides for the 4 requisites before
the President may interfere in local fiscal matters 1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government 2)
consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of various local
leagues 3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the DOF, DILG and DBM and 4) any adjustment in the
allotment shall in no case be less than 30% of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding
the current one. Specially, Pimentel claims that there was no showing that there was actually an unmanaged public sector deficit
and that there was no consultations conducted with the different leagues of local governments.

Held: Pimentel is partly correct. Reasons:

1. The Supreme Court is prepared to believe the Solicitor General’s assurance that the first provision above stated is merely an
advisory or guiding policy for local executives to follow, thus local autonomy is not interfered upon.
2. The second provision is violative of local fiscal autonomy because its basic feature, the automatic release of the shares of
LGUs in the national internal revenue, is missing. This is mandated in Article 10, Sec. 6 of the Constitution. Furthermore,
Section 286 of the LGC provides that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within 5 days after every quarter
of the year and shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever
purpose. The withholding of 10% of the IRA is definitely a holdback.

Province of Batangas v. Romulo

Facts: President Estrada issued EO 48 establishing a program for Devolution Adjustment and Equalization to enhance the
capabilities of LGUs in the discharge of devolved functions. The oversight committee under Executive Secretary Zamora passed
resolutions which the President approved. The same provides for guidelines that committee formulated for LGUs to identify
projects eligible for funding under LGSEF and submit project proposals and other requirements to DILG for appraisal before the
committee serves notice to DBM for release of funds. Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare certain items of
the GAA for 1999, 2000 and 2001 void insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year P5billion for the IRA of
LGSEF and imposed conditions for its release.

Ruling: The assailed provision infringes both the constitution and LGC. The withholding of a portion of the IRA encroaches upon
the fiscal autonomy of LGUs. The fundamental law provides for the President‘s general supervision and not control. The former
sees to it that rules are followed but has no authority to set down the rules on the discretion to implement them; while the latter
lays down the rules in doing the act. The RA is the LGU‘s just share in taxes and the release is automatic and to subject the
same to conditions is constitutionally impossible. The committee‘s authority is limited to the implementation of the LGC and not
to subvert the same. Congress may amend the LGC, but in a law for said purpose and not through the GAA.

Sampiano v. Indar
Facts: Mayor Sampiano filed an electoral protest against Ongka. Pending its resolution, COMELEC allowed Sampiano to
temporarily assume the post of Mayor. Ongka wrote PNB to suspend the release of IRA to the Municipality of Balbagan, Lanao
del Sur. The Chief legal counsel of PNB allowed its release. To prevent the release, Ongka filed an action for prohibition and
mandamus which Judge Indar granted and lasted for 11 days.

Ruling: The automatic release of the IRA under section 286 does not prevent the proper court from deferring or suspending its
release to particular officials where there is a legal question presented to the court pertaining to the rights of parties to receive
the IRA while such rights are still to be determined.

Pimentel, Jr. v. Ochoa

Facts: Pimentel filed a petition for prohibition and certiorari questioning the constitutionality of RA 10147 allocating P21Billion to
the CCTP which is alleged to amount to a recentralization of government functions that have already been devolved. AO 16
institutionalized a coordinated inter-agency network among various governmental agencies with DSWD taking lead. LGUs would
be responsible for the availability of education and health supply and technical assistance. DSWD executed Mas with
participating LGUs to outline the obligations of the parties during the 5year implementation period.

Ruling: The CCTP is valid. An exception to Section 17, X is provided in paragraph C thereof, wherein unless an LGU is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding is provided by the
national government under the GAA even if the program involves delivery of basic goods and services. The LGC does not imply
complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services. The national
government is not precluded from taking a direct hang in the formulation and implementation of national development programs
where it is implemented locally and with coordination with LGUs concerned.

Villafuerte v. Robredo
Facts: Villafuerte filed a petition assailing the three memorandum circulars issued by Robredo pertaining to the full disclosure of
local budget and finances and other guidelines regarding budget. Villafuerte argues that the circulars violate the principle of local
and fiscal autonomy.

Ruling: The circulars merely reiterated what was already provided in the law and that the order on public disclosure is
consistent with the policy of promoting good governance through transparency and accountability in the government.

SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF BATAAN, v. CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, JR.,

G.R. No. 174964, October 05, 2016
 DECISION
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorart1 of the Decision2 dated February 7, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 85902 upholding the Decision dated November 29, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bataan which
granted the petition for a writ of mandamus in Special Civil Action No. 7043.

Antecedent Facts
Lot Nos. 2193 and 2194 of the Bataan Cadastre, containing 1,222 square meters and 10,598 sq m, respectively, were
registered in the name of the Province of Bataan. Both lots were embraced in Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. N-182, and
occupied by the Bataan Community Colleges (BCC) and the Medina Lacson de Leon School of Arts and Trades (MLLSAT), both
State-run schools.3

On February 26, 1998, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8562, authored by Congressman
Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. (Cong. Garcia), converting the MLLSAT into a polytechnic college, to be known as the Bataan Polytechnic
State College (BPSC), and integrating thereto the BCC.4 Section 24 of R.A. No. 8562 provides that:
All parcels of land belonging to the government occupied by the Medina Lacson de Leon School of Arts and Trades and the
Bataan Community Colleges are hereby declared to be the property of the Bataan Polytechnic State College and shall be titled
under that name: Provided, That should the State College cease to exist or be abolished or should such parcels of land
aforementioned be no longer needed by the State College, the same shall revert to the Province of Bataan.

On the basis of the above provision, Cong. Garcia wrote to then Governor of Bataan Leonardo Roman, and the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Bataan (petitioner), requesting them to cause the transfer of the title of the aforesaid lots to BPSC. No transfer
was effected.5

Thus, Cong. Garcia, along with the faculty members and some concerned students of BPSC (collectively, the respondents) filed
a Special Civil Action for Mandamus with the RTC of Balanga, Bataan against the Governor and the petitioner. Initially, the
Board of Trustees of the BPSC was impleaded as an unwilling plaintiff but was eventually included as co-petitioner in the civil
suit pursuant to Resolution No. 14, Series of 2000 of the BPSC.6

In their Comment, the Governor and the petitioner took issue with the standing of the respondents, arguing that they were not
the real parties in interest who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. They
asserted that the subject properties were owned by the Province of Bataan and not the State, for them to be simply transferred
to the BPSC by virtue of the law.7

In its Decision dated November 29, 2002, the RTC granted the writ of mandamus. The fallo of the RTC decision
WHEREFORE, a writ of mandamus is hereby issued, ordering respondents to forthwith:
1. Deliver the owner's duplicate copy of [OCX] No. N-182 to the Register of Deeds of Bataan, free from any hen or encumbrance;
2. Execute the corresponding deed of conveyance of the parcels of land in issue in favor of the [BPSC]; and
3. Cause the transfer and registration of the title to and in the name of the [BPSC].
SO ORDERED.8

The Governor and the petitioner appealed to the CA alleging that the subject lots were the patrimonial properties of the Province
of Bataan, and as such they cannot be taken by the National Government without due process of law and without just
compensation. They also pointed out that certain loan obligations of the Province of Bataan to the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) were secured with a mortgage on the lots; and since the mortgage lien was duly annotated on its title, OCT No. N-182,
the writ of mandamus violated the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. The Governor and the petitioner reiterated that the
respondents had no legal standing since they were not the real parties in interest. 9

In the Decision10 dated February 7, 2006, the CA affirmed the RTC.

The CA rejected the claim that the subject lots were the patrimonial properties of the Province of Bataan, declaring that the
petitioner failed to provide proof that the Province of Bataan acquired them with its own private or corporate funds, and for this
reason the lots must be presumed to belong to the State, citing Salas, etc., et al. v. Hon. Jarencio, etc., et al.11 Concerning the
mortgage to the LBP, the appellate court agreed with the RTC that the consent of the LBP to the transfer of title to BPSC must
be obtained, and the mortgage lien must be carried over to the new title. The CA also held that BPSC is a real party in interest
on the basis of Section 24 of R.A. No. 8562, and was correctly impleaded as a co-petitioner. The subsequent motion for
reconsideration was denied in the CA Resolution12 dated September 20, 2006; hence, this petition.
Issues
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND ARE PATRIMONIAL PROPERTIES OF THE PROVINCE OF
BATAAN WHICH CANNOT BE TAKEN WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION.
II
WHETHER OR NOT A WRIT OF MANDAMUS MAY BE ISSUED AGAINST THE PETITIONER TO COMPEL THE TRANSFER
OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION.13

The petitioner insists that the subject lots are not communal lands, or legua comunal as they were known under the laws of
colonial Spain, but are the patrimonial properties of the Province of Bataan, which were issued a Torrens title by the Cadastral
Court on August 11, 1969 in Cadastral Case No. 5;14 that while in Salas,15 the title of the State over the disputed lot was
expressly recognized by the City of Manila, this is not so in the case at bar; 16 that in the exercise of its proprietary rights over the
subject lots, the Province of Bataan has used them as collateral for its loan obligations with the LBP; 17 that in its Manifestation
and Motion dated February 24, 2000, the Board of Trustees of BPSC even acknowledged the titles of the Province of Bataan
over the subject properties.18

In addition to the above contentions, the petitioner proffers an alleged novel argument that R.A. No. 8562 infringes on the State's
underlying policy of local autonomy for its territorial and political subdivisions, found in Article X of the 1987 Constitution
(formerly Article XI, 1973 Constitution) and now fleshed out in a landmark legislation, R.A. No. 7160, better known as the Local
Government Code of 1991 (LGC). Thus, for this Court to still sustain its ruling in Salas would render the State's policy of local
autonomy purely illusory.19
Ruling of the Court
The decision of the CA is affirmed.
A. Under the well-entrenched and time-honored Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain are under the absolute control and
ownership of the State.
The State's ownership of and control over all lands and resources of the public domain are beyond dispute. Reproducing almost verbatim from
the 1973 Constitution,20 Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[a]ll lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources
are owned by the State, x x x." In Section 1, Article XIII of the Amended 1935 Constitution, it was also provided that "[a]ll agricultural timber, and
mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State x x x."
Thus, in Cariño v. Insular Government,21 a case of Philippine origin, the Supreme Court of the United States of America acknowledged that
"Spain in its earlier decrees embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the Crown x x x." In Hong Hok v.
David,22 citing Cariño, the Court likewise said that the theory is a manifestation of the concept of the Regalian Doctrine, or jura regalia,23 which is
enshrined in our 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions. As adopted in our republican system, this medieval concept is stripped of royal overtones;
and ownership of all lands belonging to the public domain is vested in the State.24 Under this well-entrenched and time-honored Regalian
Doctrine, all lands of the public domain are under the absolute control and ownership of the State.

B. Local government property devoted to governmental purposes, such as local administration, public education, and
public health, as may be provided under special laws, is classified as public.
In The Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, et al. 25 cited by the CA, the Province of Zamboanga del Norte
sought to declare unconstitutional R.A. No. 3039, which ordered the transfer of properties belonging to the Province of
Zamboanga located within the territory of the City of Zamboanga to the said City, for depriving the province of property without
due process and just compensation. In said case, the Court classified properties of local governments as either (a) properties for
public use, or (b) patrimonial properties, and held that the capacity in which the property is held by a local government is
dependent on the use to which it is intended and for which it is devoted. If the property is owned by the municipal corporation in
its public and governmental capacity, it is public and Congress has absolute control over it; but if the property is owned in its
private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control, in which case, the municipality
cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just compensation. 26 In upholding the validity of R.A. No. 3 039, the
Court noted that it affected "lots used as capitol site, school sites and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites and the high
school playground sites - a total of 24 lots - since these were held by the former Zamboanga province in its governmental
capacity and therefore are subject to the absolute control of Congress." 27

According to the Court, there are two established norms to determine the classification of the properties: that of the Civil Code,
particularly Articles 423 and 424 thereof, and that obtaining under the law of Municipal Corporations. Articles 423 and 424 of the
Civil Code provide, as follows:
Art. 423. The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into property for public use and patrimonial property.

Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of the provincial roads, city streets,
municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said
provinces, cities, or municipalities.

All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the
provisions of special laws.

In Province of Zamboanga del Norte,28 properties for the free and indiscriminate use of everyone are classified under the Civil
Code norm as for public use, while all other properties are patrimonial in nature. In contrast, under the Municipal Corporations
Law norm, to be considered public property, it is 'enough that a property is held and devoted to a governmental purpose, such
as local administration, public education, and public health. 29 Nonetheless, the Court clarified that the classification of properties
in the municipalities, other than those for public use, as patrimonial under Article 424 of the Civil Code, is "without prejudice to
the provisions of special laws,"30 holding that the principles obtaining under the Law of Municipal Corporations can be
considered as "special laws"31

Moreover, in the 2009 case of Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines,32 the Court reiterated that Article 420(2)
of the Civil Code makes clear that properties "which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth," are public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs
to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion when it is
"intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth."33

C. Property registered in the name of the municipal corporation but without proof that it was acquired with its
corporate funds is deemed held by it in trust for the State.
The Court takes instructions from the case, of Salas as to properties belonging to the municipal government. In Salas, at issue
was the constitutionality of R.A. No. 4118 passed on June 20, 1964,34whereby Congress reserved a lot, long titled in the name
of the City of Manila, as communal property, and converted it into disposable land of the State for resale in small lots to its bona
fide occupants. On February 24, 1919, Lot No. 1, Block 557 of the Cadastre of the City of Manila, containing 9,689.80 sq m, was
declared by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch 4, acting as a land registration court in Case No. 18, G.L.R.O. Record
No. 111, as owned by the City of Manila in fee simple. On August 21, 1920, OCT No. 4329 was issued in the name of the City of
Manila over the said lot. On various dates in 1924, the City of Manila sold portions of Lot No. 1, Block 557 to a certain Pura
Villanueva (Villanueva). OCT No. 4329 was cancelled, and transfer certificates of title (TCT) were issued to Villanueva for the
portions sold to her, while TCT No. 22547 was issued to the City of Manila for the remainder of Lot No. 1 containing 7,490.10 sq
m, now designated, as Lot No. 1-B-2-B of Block 557.35

On September 21, 1960, the local board of the City of Manila wrote to the President of the Philippines seeking assistance in
declaring the aforesaid lot as patrimonial property of the city for the purpose of reselling the same in small lots to the actual
occupants thereof. R.A. No. 4118 was passed by Congress on June 20, 1964 for this purpose. 36 On February 18, 1965, Manila
Mayor Antonio Villegas (Mayor Villegas) was furnished a copy of a subdivision plan for TCT No. 22547. He interposed no
objection to the implementation of R.A. No. 4118, and TCT No. 22547 was duly surrendered to the Land Authority. 37

Inexplicably, now claiming that R.A. No. 4118 was unconstitutional, Mayor Villegas brought on December 20, 1966 an action for
injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary injunction, to restrain, prohibit and enjoin the Land Authority and the Register of
Deeds of Manila from implementing R.A. No. 4118. On September 23, 1968, the RTC declared the said law unconstitutional for
depriving the City of Manila of its property without due process and just compensation. 38
Acting on the petition for review, the Court declared that Lot 1-B-2-B of Block 557 was a communal property held in trust by the
City of Manila for the State, and therefore subject to the paramount power of Congress to dispose of. Thus:

[T]he City of Manila, although declared by the Cadastral Court as owner in fee simple, has not shown by any shred of evidence
in what manner it acquired said land as its private or patrimonial property. It is true that the City of Manila as well as its
predecessor, the Ayuntamiento de Manila, could validly acquire property in its corporate or private capacity, following the
accepted doctrine on the dual character - public and private - of a municipal corporation. And when it acquires property in its
private capacity, it acts like an ordinary person capable of entering into contracts or making transactions for the transmission of
title or other real rights. When it comes to acquisition of land, it must have done so under any of the modes established by law
for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights. In the absence of a title deed to any land claimed by the City of Manila as
its own, showing that it was acquired with its private or corporate funds, the presumption is that such land came from the State
upon the creation of the municipality (Unson vs. Lacson, et al., 100 Phil. 695). Originally the municipality owned no patrimonial
property except those that were granted by the State not for its public but for private use. Other properties it owns are acquired
in the course of the exercise of its corporate powers as a juridical entity to which category a municipal corporation pertains.

Communal lands or "legua comunal" came into existence when a town or pueblo was established in this country under the laws
of Spain (Law VII, Title III, Book VI, Recopilacion de las Leyes de Indios). The municipalities of the Philippines were not entitled,
as a matter of right, to any part of the public domain for use as communal lands. The Spanish law provided that the usufruct of a
portion of the public domain adjoining municipal territory might be granted by the Government for communal purposes, upon
proper petition, but, until granted, no rights therein passed to the municipalities, and, in any event, the ultimate title remained in
the sovereign (City of Manila vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 327).

xxxx
It may, therefore, be laid down as a general rule that regardless of the source or classification of land in the possession of a
municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held in trust for the
State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary purposes. It holds such lands subject to the
paramount power of the legislature to dispose of the same, for after all it owes its creation to it as an agent for the performance
of a part of its public work, the municipality being but a subdivision or instrumentality thereof for purposes of local administration.
Accordingly, the legal situation is the same as if the State itself holds the property and puts it to a different use (2 Mc
Quilin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed. p. 197, citing Monagham vs. Armatage, 218 Minn. 27, 15 N. W. 2nd 241).

True it is that the legislative control over a municipal corporation is not absolute even when it comes to its property devoted to
public use, for such control must not be exercised to the extent of depriving persons of their property or rights without due
process of law, or in a manner impairing the obligations of contracts. Nevertheless, when it comes to property of the municipality
which it did not acquire in its private or corporate capacity with its own funds, the legislature can transfer its administration and
disposition to an agency of the National Government to be exposed of according to its discretion. Here it did so in obedience to
the constitutional mandate of promoting social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of the
people.39 (Underscoring ours)

D. R.A. No. 8562 was not intended to expropriate the subject lots titled in the name of the Province of Bataan, but to
confirm their character as communal land of the State and to make them available for disposition by the National Govt.
The case of Rabuco v. Hon. Villegas,40 decided in 1974, is a virtual reprise of the 1968 case of Salas. In Rabuco, the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 312041 was challenged, which provided for the subdivision of Lot No. 21-B, Block 610 of the
Cadastre of the City of Manila, containing about 10,198 sq m into residential lots, and the sale thereof to the tenants and bona
fide occupants. The law declared Lot No. 21-B "reserved as communal property" and then ordered it converted into "disposable
and alienable lands of the State."42

The Court ruled that, like R.A. No. 4118 in Salas, R.A. No. 3120 was intended to implement the social justice policy of the
Constitution and the government's program of land for the landless. Thus, the sale of the subdivided lots to the bona fide
occupants by authority of Congress was not an exercise of eminent domain or expropriation without just compensation, which
would have been in violation of Section 1(2),43 Article III of the 1935 Constitution, but simply a manifestation of its right and
power to deal with State property.44 "It is established doctrine that the act of classifying State property calls for the exercise of
wide discretionary legislative power which will not be interfered with by the courts." 45 In Rabuco, the rule in Salas was reiterated
that property of the public domain, although titled to the local government, is held by it in trust for the State. It stated:
The Court [in Salas] reaffirmed the established general rule that "regardless of the source or classification of land in the
possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is
held in trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary purposes. It holds such
lands subject to the paramount power of the legislature to dispose of the same, for after all it owes its creation to it as
an agent for the performance of a part of its public work, the municipality being but a subdivision or instrumentality thereof for
purposes of local administration. Accordingly, the legal situation is the same as if the State itself holds the property and puts it to
a different use" and stressed that "the property, as has been previously shown, was not acquired by the City of Manila with its
own funds in its private or proprietary capacity. That it has in its name a registered title is not questioned, but this title should be
deemed to be held in trust for the State as the land covered thereby was part of the territory of the City of Manila granted by the
sovereign upon its creation."46

E. The State's policy to promote local autonomy and to devolve the powers of the National Government to its political
subdivisions has for its purpose to improve the quality of local governance.
Sections 2 and 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, relied upon by the petitioner, provide:
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for
the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all
other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.

Pursuant to its mandate, the Congress passed the LGC in 1991 to spell out the above-declared policy of the State, which is now
amplified in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7160. It states, as follows:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the
State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide
for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local
government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall
proceed from the National Government to the local government units.

xxxx
Also invoked by the petitioners are Sections 18 and 22 of the LGC, which state as follows:
Sec. 18. Power to Generate and Apply Resources. — Local government units shall have the power and authority to establish an
organization that shall be responsible for the efficient and effective implementation of their development plans, program
objectives and priorities; to create their own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges which shall accrue
exclusively for their use and disposition and which shall be retained by them; to have a just share in national taxes which shall
be automatically and directly released to them without need of any further action; to have an equitable share in the, proceeds
from the utilization and development of the national wealth and resources within their respective territorial jurisdictions including
sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits; to acquire, develop, lease, encumber, alienate, or otherwise
dispose of real or personal property held by them in their proprietary capacity and to apply their resources and assets for
productive, developmental, or welfare purposes, in the exercise or furtherance of their governmental or proprietary powers and
functions and thereby ensure their development into self-reliant communities and active participants in the attainment of national
goals.

Sec. 22. Corporate Powers. - x x x

xxxx
(d) Local government units shall enjoy full autonomy in the exercise of their proprietary functions and in the management of their
economic enterprises, subject to the limitations provided in this Code and other applicable laws.

In the instant petition, it is essentially the petitioner's assertion that the State's policy of local autonomy and decentralization
endows the Province of Bataan with patrimonial rights to use or dispose of the subject lots according to its own development
plans, program objectives and priorities.

The Court disagrees.

Local autonomy and decentralization of State powers to the local political subdivisions are the results of putting restraints upon
the exercise by the Presidents of executive powers over local governments. Section 4, Article X of the 1987 Constitution reads
in part: "The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments." As with the counterpart
provisions of our earlier Constitutions, the aforesaid provision has been interpreted to exclude the President's power of control
over local governments.47 The Constitutions of 1935, 1973 and 1987 have uniformly differentiated the President's power of
supervision over local governments and his power of control of the executive departments, bureaus and offices. 48 In Pimentel,
Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre,49 it was held that Section 4 confines the President's power over local governments to one of general
supervision, thus:
Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President. The members of the Cabinet and other
executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are subject to the power of control of the President, at whose will and
behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. In contrast, the heads
of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the electorate, to whom they are
directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the President's supervision only, not control, so long as their acts
are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold or alter any
authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law. 50

On the other hand, local autonomy and decentralization of State powers to the local political subdivisions have for their object to
make governance directly responsive at the local levels by giving them a free hand to chart their own destiny and shape their
future with minimum intervention from central authorities, thereby rendering them accountable to their local
constituencies.51 Thus, [h]and in hand with the constitutional restraint on the President's power over local governments is the
state policy of ensuring local autonomy"52 As farther explained in Pimentel, Jr.:
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely relinquished all its powers over
local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political
subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In
turn, economic, political and social development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth
and development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated
and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and
Congress. As we stated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., municipal governments are still agents of the national
government.53 (Citation omitted).
It is clear, then, that local autonomy and decentralization do not deal directly with Issues concerning ownership, classification,
use or control of properties of the public domain held by local governments. The State retains power over property of the public
domain, exercised through Congress.

F. The grant of autonomy to local governments, although a radical policy change under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions, does not affect the settled rule that they possess property of the public domain in trust for the State.
The 1973 Constitution devoted an entire Article, Article XI, consisting of five sections, to laying down its policy for the
empowerment of the local governments. The 1987 Constitution, in turn, fully devotes all 21 sections of its Article X for local
government. It introduces significant new provisions, such as the establishment of autonomous regions (Section 18) and the
guarantee of just share of the local governments in the national taxes and equitable share in the proceeds from the utilization of
the national wealth (Sections 6 and 7). It was unlike in the 1935 Constitution, which simply provided in Section 10 of Article VII,
dealing with the Executive Department, that "[t]he President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus or offices,
exercise general provision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully
executed."

The erudite Justice Enrique Fernando (Justice Fernando), in his highly instructive separate concurring opinion in Rabuco,54 did
at first admit to doubts as to the continuing authoritativeness of Province of Zamboanga del Norte and Salas, both promulgated
before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, in view of the significant innovations introduced therein pertaining to the autonomy
of local governments. He stated that the goal of the 1973 Constitution was "the fullest autonomy to local government units
consistent with the basic theory of a unitary, not a federal, polity," 55 hoping thereby to attain "their fullest development as self-
reliant communities."56 According to him, under the 1973 Constitution, "[tjhings have changed radically," 57 noting that under the
1935 Constitution, "[i]t could hardly be assumed x x x that x x x the [local governments] could justifiably lay claim to real
autonomy."58 He observed thus:
We start with the declared principle of the State guaranteeing and promoting the autonomy of local government units. We have
likewise noted the earnestness of the framers as to the attainment of such declared objective as set forth in the specific article
on the matter. It is made obligatory on the National Assembly to enact a local government code. What is more, unlike the
general run of statutes, it cannot be amended except by a majority vote of all its members. It is made to include "a more
responsive and accountable local government structure with an effective system of recall," with an expressed reference to
"qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties of local officials, [as well as] all other matters
relating to the organization and operation of the local units." Mention is likewise made of the "powers, responsibilities, and
resources," items that are identified with local autonomy. As if that were not enough, the last sentence of this particular provision
reads: "However, any change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose." To the extent that the last section requires that the creation, division, merger,
abolition or alteration of a boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio, must be in accordance with the criteria established
in the local government code and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in such unit or units, the
adherence to the basic principle of local self government is quite clear. Equally significant is the stress on the competence of a
province, city, municipality or barrio "to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law." The care and circumspection with which the framers saw to the enjoyment of real local self-government not
only in terms of administration but also in terms of resources is thus manifest. Their intent is unmistakable. Unlike the case
under the 1935 Constitution, there is thus a clear manifestation of the presumption now in favor of a local government unit. It is a
well-nigh complete departure from what was. Nor should it be ignored that a highly urbanized city "shall be independent" not
only of the national government but also of a province. Would it not follow then that under the present dispensation, the moment
property is transferred to it by the national government, its control over the same should be as extensive and as broad as
possible, x x x.59 (Citations omitted)

Up to that point, it could almost be presumed that Justice Fernando would dissent from the lucid ponencia of Justice Claudio
Teehankee (Justice Teehankee), borne of logical doubts as to whether Province of Zamboanga del Norte and Salas still
retained their unimpaired doctrinal force under the then new 1973 Constitution. But two considerations kept him reined in, so to
speak. One was Justice Teehankee's "reference to the ratio decidendi of [Salas] as to the trust character impressed on
communal property of a municipal corporation, even if already titled," 60 "regardless of the source of classification of land in the
possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity." 61 Justice
Fernando acknowledged that the local government "holds such [communal property] subject to the paramount power of the
legislature to dispose of the same, for after all it owes its creation to it as an agent for the performance of a part of its public
work, the municipality being but a subdivision or instrumentality thereof for purposes of local administration."62

Rabuco stressed that the properties in controversy were not acquired by the City of Manila with its own private funds. Thus,
according to Justice Fernando, "That [the City of Manila] has in its name a registered title is not questioned, but this title should
be deemed to be held in trust for the State as the land covered thereby was part of the territory of the City of Manila granted by
the sovereign upon its creation."63 This doctrine, according to Justice Fernando, has its basis in the Regalian Doctrine and is
unaffected by the grant of extensive local autonomy under the 1973 Constitution. "It is my view that under the [1973]
Constitution, as was the case under the 1935 charter, the holding of a municipal corporation as a unit of state does not impair
the plenary power of the national government exercising dominical rights to dispose of it in a manner it sees fit, subject to
applicable constitutional limitations as to the citizenship of the grantee." 64

The other consideration noted by Justice Fernando in the ponencia of Justice Teehankee in Rabuco he found further compelling
was "the even more fundamental principle of social justice, which was given further stress and a wider scope in the present
Constitution."65 He concluded that R.A. No. 3120, like R.A. No. 4118, was intended to implement the social justice policy of the
Constitution and the government program of land for the landless, and was not "intended to expropriate the property involved
but merely to confirm its character as communal land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the National
Government."66

G. The Province of Bataan has the duty to provide an adequate security for its loans with the LBP, without defeating
BPSC's right to hold title to the contested lots.
The RTC ordered the Province of Bataan to deliver the owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. N-182 to the Register of Deeds of
Bataan, free from any lien or encumbrance, to execute the corresponding deed of conveyance in favor of BPSC, and to cause
the transfer and registration of the title to and in the name of the said college. The Province of Bataan erroneously believed that
it could mortgage the subject lots, notwithstanding that it held the same in trust for the State and despite the fact that the said
lots were actually being occupied by two government schools. As the RTC urged, then, the Province of Bataan must address
this issue of security for its loans with LBP. It cannot complain that its compliance with the order of the RTC might violate the
non-impairment clause of the Constitution, since its duty to provide a replacement security for its loans with LBP is clear.

H. BPSC is entitled to a writ of mandamus.

Section 3, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a writ of mandamus shall issue where a tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty, to command the respondent to do
the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner. Herein petitioner has argued that the mandamus applicants are not entitled
thereto because they are not real parties in interest. It is a rule re-echoed in a long line of cases that every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest, meaning "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit."67

At issue in this petition is Section 24 of R.A. No. 8562, which directs that "[a]ll parcels of land belonging to the government occupied by the
[MLLSAT] and the [BCC] are hereby declared to be the property of the [BPSC] and shall be titled under that name." There is no dispute that the
Congress has expressly intended to entrust to BPSC the titles to the subject lots. Being the sole beneficiary of Section 24 of R.A. No. 8562,
BPSC is the real party in interest, and is entitled to mandamus to enforce its right thereunder. 68

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 7,
2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 85902 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

TWO FOLD CHARACTER OF A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION; ITS SIGNIFICANCE

Veterans Federation of the Phils. v. Reyes

Facts: VFP was organized under RA2640. VFP received a letter from the DND Usec to conduct management audit of VFP
pursuant to said RA where it is stated that the same Is under the control and supervision of the DND Sec. VFP complained of
the broadness of the audit and requested a supervision until the issues is threshed out, which DND denied.

Ruling: VFP is a public corporation. In Laurel v. Desierto, public office was defined as the right, authority and duty conferred by
law, by which for a given period is invested with sovereign functions to be exercised for the benefit of the public. The protection
of interests of war veterans which promotes social justice and patriotism certainly fall in said category. The fact that VFP has no
budgetary appropriation is only a product of erroneous application of the law by public officers of the DBM which will not bar
subsequent application.

Fontanilla v. Maliaman
Facts: A truck owned by NIA and driven officially by its regular driver, Garcia hit a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla which
resulted to his death. The spouses Fontanilla such Garcia an NIA as the former‘s employer. The Court awarded damages to the
Fontanillas. The SolGen argues that NIA does not perform solely and primarily governmental functions and is therefore not liable
for Garcia‘s tortious acts.
Ruling: NIA is liable. NIA is a government agency with a juridical capacity separate and distinct from the government. It is not a
mere agency of the government, but a government body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it is liable for the
negligence of Garcia. NIA was not created for the purposes of local government. While NIA is essentially a service agency,
aimed at promoting public interest, such fact did not make NIA essentially and purely a governmental function corporaton. The
purpose of constructing, improving, rehabilitating and administering all national irrigation systems in the country, including all
communal and pump irrigation projects is purely incidental to the principal aim of NIA to irrigate lands.

Is Boy Scout of the Phils a Pub. Corp?

BSP v. COA
Facts: COA issued Resolution no. 99-011 defining its policy coming BSP‘s audit. BSP was created as a public corporation and
in BSP v. NLRC it was held that BSP as constituted under its charter was a GOCC under Article X(B)(2)(1) of the Constitution,
and that BSP is a government instrumentality under the Administrative Code. For the purposes of Audit supervision, the BSP
shall be classified among the government corporations to be audited using the term audit approach.

Ruling: BSP is a public corporation. It does not fall under the Constitutional prohibition under Section 16, Article XII
otwithstanding amendments to its charter. Public Corporations are treated by law as agencies or instrumentalities of the
government not subject to tests of ownership, control and economic viability but to different criteria relating to their purpose or
interest constitutional policies or objectives and their administrative relationship to governmenta or department offices. Thus it
remains under the ambit of COA‘s jurisdiction.

QUASI-PUBLIC CORP.

PSPCA v. COA

Facts: PSPCA was incorporated by virtue of Act 1285. It was initially imbued with 1.) power to apprehend violators of animal
rights laws, and 2.) 50% share of the fines imposed and collected through its efforts. CA No. 148 recalled said powers. President
Quezon issued EO No. 63 directing the organization and detail of special officers to watch, capture and prosecute offenders of
animal cruelty laws. COA‘s audit team visited PSPCA to conduct a survey, to which it demurred on the ground that it was a
private entity citing Article IX of the Constitution.

Ruling: The PSPCA is not subject to COA‘s audit. The charter test under Sec. 7 Art. XIII of the 1935 Constitution cannot be
applied as laws generally do not have a retroactive effect. The mere fact that a corporation has been created by a special law
doesn‘t necessarily qualify it as a public corporation. PSPCA was formed under PB1902 and contained no proscription similar to
the charter test. The amendments made by CA148 made it clear that PSPCA was a private Corporation. Additionally, its
employees are registered with SSS and not GSIS. The fact that a private corporation is impressed with public interest does not
make it a public corporation. They may be considered quasi-public corporations. The true criterion is found in the totality of the
corporation to the state. It is public if it is created by the latter‘s own agency or instrumentality.

Marilao Water District Association, Inc. v. IAC

Facts: Marilao Water District was formed through a resolution of the Sanguniang Bayan of Marilao which was forwarded to the
LWUA and duly filed. MWCA filed a petition before the RTC claiming MWD‘s creation was defective and illegal. MWD countered
that RTC lacked jurisdiction as its dissolution falls under SEC‘s exclusive and original jurisdiction. MWCA countered that SEC
does not have jurisdiction as it was not organized under the Corporation Code and under Sec. 45 of EO 198, the RTC holds
jurisdiction.

Ruling: Jurisdiction is lodge with the RTC. The water districts created by EO 198, although quasi-public corporations and
authorized to exercise powers, rights and privileges given to private corporation is distinct from those created under the
corporation code. The resolutions creating them, their charters, are filed with LWUA and not the SEC.

CREATION AND ABOLITION OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION

Pelaez V. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569

Facts: In 1964, President Macapagal issued several EOs creating 33 new municipalities, mainly in Northern Luzon and
Mindanao. The President based his power from Sec. 68 of the Revised Penal Code of 1917. Vice Pres. Emmanuel Pelaez filed
a petition for writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, restraining him from passing in audit any
expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive order and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Pelaez contends that: 1) Sec 68 of the Revised Administration Code has been impliedly repealed by R.A 2370, the Barrio
Charter Act. 2) Sec. 68 is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and 3) Sec. 68 can allow the president to
interfere in local government affairs.

Held: Pelaez is correct. Reasons:

1. The Barrio Charter Act states that “barrios may not be created nor their boundaries altered or their names changed except by
act of Congress of the corresponding municipal board upon petition of the majority of voters in the areas affected and the
recommendation of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated” This implies that if the President
cannot create barrios, what more municipalities? (But I think this is not a very good argument coz it’s implying way to much).
2. A law must be: a) Complete in itself so that there is nothing left for the delegate to do but to implement the statute and b) Fix a
standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinable The standard set by Sec. 68 is “as the public welfare may require” This
standard, in relation to the law in question, is so broad that is virtually unfettered.
3. The creation of Municipal Corporation is essentially legislative in character. If the president can create municipalities,
situations may arise where he can submit local officials to his dictation by creating a new municipality and including therein the
barrio wherein the officials preside, thus said officials’ positions would suddenly becomes vacant. The power of control by the
president over local government is denied by the 1935 Constitution
SULTAN OSOP B. CAMID vs. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT [G.R. No. 161414. January 17, 2005]

FACTS:
This case involves the municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur, which is a town that is not supposed to exist yet but is insisted by
some as actually alive and thriving. Andong was created through Executive Order No. 107 issued by Pres. Macapagal in 1965,
which was declared void in the case of Pelaez vs. Auditor General (1965). \

Sultan Camid alleges that Andong ―has metamorphosed into a full-blown municipality with a complete set of officials appointed
to handle essential services for the municipality and its constituents.‖ He however concedes that since 1968, no person has
been appointed, elected or qualified to serve any of the elective local government positions in Andong. He also alleges that the
town has its own high school, Bureau of Posts, DECS Office, among others. According to him, public officials of Andong have
been serving their constituents in their own little ways and means despite absence of public funds. To bolster his claims, he
presented to the Court a DENR-CENRO Certification of the total land area of the Municipality of Andong. He also submitted a
Certification issued by the Provincial Statistics Office of Marawi City concerning Andong’s population (14,059). He also lists
several government agencies and private groups that have allegedly recognized Andong.

Camid assails the DILG certification of 18 municipalities certified as ―existing‖ per DILG records. These 18, were among the 33
municipalities whose creation was voided by the Court in the Pelaez case. He imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the DILG for not classifying Andong as a regular existing municipality and in not including it in its records and official database.
Camid also argues that EO 107 remains valid because of the decision of court in Municipality of San Narciso vs. Hon. Mendez,
where the court affirmed the unique status of the municipality of San Andres in Quezon as a de facto municipal corporation. He
insists that inspite of insurmountable obstacles, Andong lives on. Hence, its existence should be given judicial affirmation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a municipality whose creation by executive fiat, which was previously voided by the Court, may attain recognition
in the absence of any curative or implementing statute.

RULING:
The Court said that the case is not a fit subject for the special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus, as it pertains to the de
novo appreciation of factual questions. Also, the Pelaez case and its offspring cases ruled that the President has no power to
create municipalities, yet limited its nullificatory effects to the particular municipalities challenged in actual cases before this
Court. However, with the promulgation of the Local Government Code in 1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the municipalities
similarly created by executive order but not judicially annulled. The de facto status of such municipalities as San Andres, Alicia
and Sinacaban was recognized by the Court, and Section 442(b) of the Local Government Code deemed curative whatever
legal defects these municipalities had labored under.

Andong is not similarly entitled to recognition as a de facto municipal corporation. This is because there are eminent differences
between Andong and the other municipalities. The most prominent is that, the EO which created Andong was expressly
annulled by the Court in 1965. The court said that if it would affirm Andong’s de facto status by reason of its alleged continued
existence despite its nullification, it would in effect condone defiance of a valid order of the Court. Court decisions cannot
lose their efficacy due to the sheer defiance by the parties aggrieved.

Andong does not meet the requisites set forth by Sec. 442(d) of the Local Government Code (LGC), as it requires that, for the
municipality created by EO to receive recognition, they must ―have their respective set of elective officials holding office at the
time of the effectivity of the LGC. Andong has never elected its municipal officers at all. The national government ceased to
recognize the existence of Andong, depriving it of its share of the public funds, and refusing to conduct municipal elections in the
void municipality. Andong is not listed as among the municipalities of Lanao del Sur in the Ordinance apportioning the seats of
Congress in the 1987 Constitution. Finally, Andong has not been reestablished through statute. In contrast, the 18 municipalities
in the DILG certification, were recognized as such because subsequent to the ruling in the Pelaez case, legislation was enacted
to reconstitute these municipalities.

Section 442(d) of the LGC does not serve to affirm or reconstitute the judicially-dissolved municipalities such as Andong, which
had been previously created by presidential issuances or executive orders. On the other hand, the municipalities judicially-
dissolved in cases such as Pelaez, San Joaquin, and Malabang, remain inexistent, unless recreated through specific
legislative enactments, as done with the eighteen (18) municipalities certified by the DILG.

Tan v. COMELEC 142 SCRA 727

Facts: B.P. No. 885 was passed allowing for the creation of the province of Negros del Norte on the Island of Negros. Petitioner
Patricio Tan claimed that B.P. no 885 violated Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution which states: “No province, city,
municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in
the unit or units affected”. Specifically, the remaining areas in the province of Negros Occidental were not allowed to participate
in the plebiscite for the creation of Negros del Norte. Petitioner also claims the proposed province of Negros del Norte failed to
meet the requirements of Sec. 197 of the LGC of 1983, specially that a future province must have at least an area of 3,500 sq.
km. Negros del Norte, Petitioner avers, is actually only 2,856.56 sq km. Respondent claims the issue was already rendered
moot and academic as the new province of Negros del Norte was already proclaimed. Moreover, the area of Negros del Norte is
really 4,019.95 sq km, since the waters falling under the jurisdiction and control of Negros del Norte must be included in the total
area of the province.

Held: Tan is correct. The plebiscite is declared null and void Reasons:
1) The phrase “subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected” must be construed to
mean that the remaining areas in the province of Negros Occidental should have been allowed to participate in the said
plebiscite. The reason is that cities belonging to Negros Occidental will be added to Negros del Norte, thus Negros Occidental’s
land area will be dismembered. Certainly, the people of Negros Occidental should have been allowed to vote in the plebiscite as
they are directly affected by the diminution in land size of their province.
2) A reading of the last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 LGC of 1983 says. “The territory need not be contiguous if
it comprises 2 or more islands”. The use of the word ‘territory” clearly reflects that the law refers only to the land mass and
excludes the waters over which the political unit has control. In other words, Negros del Norte failed to meet the required land
area of 3,500 sq. km for it to become a province.
Paredes v. Executive Secretary 128 SCRA 6

Facts: By virtue of B.P. Blg 56, certain barangays in the municipality of Mayoyao, Ifugao held a plebiscite to determine whether
they want to constitute themselves into the new municipality of Aguinaldo. Governor Zosimo Paredes et. al. however claimed
that the rest of the barangays on Mayoyao should be allowed to participate in the plebiscite by virtue of Art. XI, Sec of the 1973
Constitution as the other barangays are also affected by the creation of the municipality of Aguinaldo.

Held: Paredes is wrong. Presumption of constitutionality should be applied in this case. B.P. Blg. 56 is a reflection of local
autonomy on the part of the barangay wanting to constituent themselves into a new municipality. Said barangays should be
given leeway in becoming self-reliant communities. Moreover, the people in said barangays are the ones who will constitute the
new municipality of Aguinaldo, not the other barangays of Mayoyao excluded from B.P. Blg. 56

Mun. of Candijay, Bohol v. Ca 251 SCRA 182

Facts: The municipality of Candijay petitioned the RTC of Tagbilaran, Bohol, claiming that its boundary line actually covered
barrio Pagahat, since the municipality of Alicia claims to have current territorial jurisdiction over said barrio. The RTC awarded
Pagahat to Candijay Alicia appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA ruled in favor of Alicia on the grounds that 1) applying the
rule of equiponderance of evidence (a principle in Civil Procedure) with Candijay as plaintiff and Alicia as defendant in the lower
court, the court must rule in favor of the defendant. The equiponderance of evidence rule states:

“Where the scale shall stand upon equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one side or the other,
the court will find for the defendant. Under said principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the
weakness of defendant’s claim. Even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no
preponderance of evidence on his side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action.” In this case, both
municipalities failed to satisfactorily back their claims that they owned barrio Pagahat: and 2) if Candijay’s boundary line claim
was true, then not only would they claim Pagahat but also other certain barrios as well, which would as a result, certainly expand
Candijay’s territory far beyond than what the law allows her, Candijay petitioned is review on certiorari with the SC, claiming that
1) the CA misapplied the equiponderance of evidence rule and 2) the municipality of Alicia had no juridical personality, having
been created under avoid E.O. ( E.O. No.265) since Sec. 68 of the RAC of 1917 from which the said E.O. derived its authority,
was declared unconstitutional in Pelaez v. Audition General (See III-b 1).

Held: The Municipality of Candijay is incorrect Reasons:

1. The SC sees no need in reviewing the equiponderance rule as it was not arrived whimsically or capriciously by the CA
2. The Municipality of Alicia was created by virtue of E.O. 265 in 1949. 16 years late when Pelaez v. Auditor General was
promulgated. And yet even after, various government acts, most notably the recognition by the 1987 Constitution of Alicia as
one of the 20 municipalities of the Third District of Bohol, indicate the State’s recognition and acknowledgement of the existence
thereof. Alicia therefore, can claim the benefits of Sec. 442 (d) of the LGC of 1991 which states “Municipal District organized
pursuant to presidential issuances and E.O. and which have their respective set of municipal officials holding officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of the code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. Sec. 442 (d) is therefore
a curative law in favor of Alicia. The objection against it being a municipal corporation should have been done before the LGC
was enacted in 1991.

Municipality of Jimenez v. Baz, Jr. 265 SCRA 182

Facts: In 1949, President Quirino issued E.O. 258, creating the municipality of Sinacaban in the Province of Misamis
Occidental. In 1988 by virtue of said E.O. Sinacaban filed a claim with the provincial Board of Misamis Occidental against the
municipality of Jimenez territorial possession of about 5 barrios. Jimenez in its reply with the provincial Board that same year
and later on with the RTC in 1990, said that Sinacaban had no juridical personality to file a suit because it was created under a
void E.O. as promulgated in Pelaez Auditor General and 2) the disputed barrios belong to Jimenez since in 1950 the
municipalities entered into an agreement duly approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental back then which
recognized Jimenez’s jurisdiction over the disputed barrio in 1992, the RTC ruled in favor of Sinacaban using as its basis the
curative benefits of Sec. 2 of the LGC of 1991. Angrily, Jimenez added in its petition with the Supreme Court the RTC’s decision
was null and void because it failed to decide the case within one year mandated by the LGC of 1983 and the Constitution.

Held: Jimenez is incorrect Reasons:

1. Sinacaban can claim the benefits of Sec.442 (d) of the LGC of 1991, since various government acts through the years after
the Pelaez case of 1965 indicate the recognition by the years after the Pelaez case 1965 indicate the recognition by the state of
the municipality of Sinacaban, most notably when the 1987 Constitution recognized Sinacaban as part of the 2nd District of
Misamis Occidental.
2. Whatever agreement Sinacaban and Jimenez entered into 1950 must still conform with the territorial metes and bounds set
forth in E.O. 258, otherwise the agreement in void (A relocation survey was ordered but the results of the survey was not stated
in the case)
3. Even granting that the RTC was deliberately slow, its decision is not rendered void. The only remedy left would be to file
administrative sanctions against it.

Mendenilla v. Onandia 5 SCRA 536

Facts: In 1954, the mayor of the municipality of Legaspi appointed Emilio Mendenilla as Chief of Police. Then, in 1959,
Congress passed R.A. 2234 converting the municipality of Legaspi into the City of Legaspi R.A. 2234 provides that the position
of Chief of Police of the city of Legaspi is to be appointed by the President. Therefore, when Jose Manuel Onandia was
appointed by the President City Chief of Police, Mendenilla assailed the legality of such a move, claiming that his position as
chief of police was not abolished when Legaspi was converted from a city to a municipality 2) Under R.A. 557 his employment
status as Chief of Police may not be abolished except in the manner specified in R.A. 557 and 3) The Civil Service Law
guarantees his security of tenure.

Held: Mendenilla is incorrect Reasons:

1. The position of Chief of Police of a municipality is totally different from the position of the Chief of Police of a city. Therefore,
R.A. 2234 abolished the position of municipality Chief of Police and replaced it with a city Chief of police. In support of this
contention, the Supreme Court cited Sec. 96, Article XVII of the charter which provides that the City Mayor the Vice Mayor, etc.
are allowed to continue in office upon the effectivity of the charter until the expiration of their terms in office. Nowhere does it
mention the Chief of Police in the said list of officials. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

2. Notwithstanding both R.A. 557 and the Civil Service Law, it is within the legal competence of Congress to enact R.A. 2234.
Congress has the plenary power to make laws, meaning its power to make any kind of law is, in theory, unlimited. \

Quiz: If the municipality of a municipal judge is converted into a city, can the judge continue to serve in the new city? Answer:
Yes. A judge is not a municipal official. He does not derive his power or his appointment from a city charter; he derives them
from the Constitution and other Laws.

Samson v. Aguirre, 315 SCRA 53

Facts: R.A. 8535 was signed into law creating the City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays in Quezon City. Quezon City councilor
Moises Samson questioned the constitutionality of said R.A. claiming that 1) certifications as to income, land area and
population of Novaliches were not presented during the deliberations that led to the passage of R.A. 85352) a certification
attesting to the fact that the mother LGU, Quezon City, would not be adversely affected by the creation of Novaliches city in
terms of income, land area and population, was also not presented 3) a copy of the petition of concerned barangays calling or
the creation of City of Novaliches was not presented to the Quezon City Council, as mandated by the Implementing Rules of the
LGC, 1991 and 4) R.A. 8535 failed to specify the seat of government of the proposed City of Novaliches as mandated by Sec.
11 (a) of the LGC, 1991.

Held: Samson is wrong. Reasons:

1. The presumption of constitutionally of laws shall be applied in this case, meaning that Samson has burden of proof to show
that R.A. 8535 was unconstitutional. Samson did not present any proof that no certifications were presented during the
deliberations. And even granting that no certifications were indeed presented, the representatives of the DOF, NSO, DENR and
even Quezon City mayor Ismael Mathay were present during the deliberations. The official statements attesting to the income,
land area and population of Novaliches could serve the certifications contemplated by law

2. Mathay was present during the deliberation. If Quezon City would object to the creation of the City of Novaliches, he would be
the first representative to do so. But he didn’t.
3. The failure to provide the QC council a petition of concerned barangays calling for the creation of the City of Novaliches is not
fatal as such petition is meant only to inform the QC council of such creation. With the mass media publicizing the creation of the
city of Novaliches, Samson could not claim he was not informed of the proposed creation

4. The failure of R.A.8535 to provide a seat of government for Novaliches is not fatal. Sec. 12 of the LGC provides that a
government center shall be established by the LGU as far as practicable. Government centers can also serve as seats of govt.
5. The fact that the City of Novaliches was not included among the 17 cities and municipalities listed in the ordinance attached to
the 1987 constitution does not mean that a constitutional amendment is necessary in order for Novaliches to become a city. The
ordinance attached to the Constitution merely apportions the seat of the House of Representatives to the different legislative
districts in the country. Nowhere, does it provide that Metro Manila shall be forever composed of 17 cities and municipalities.

NOTE: the proposed City of Novaliches was later voted down in a plebiscite held for that purpose

Cawaling vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 146319, October 26, 2001

Cawaling vs. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 146342, October 26, 2001

Facts:
On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an "Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon
By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor." The
COMELEC a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification proclaimed the
creation of the City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite.
Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer, the petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the
plebiscite on the following grounds:
A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-day period from the approval of R.A. 8806, in
violation of Section 54 thereof; and
B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20) day extensive information campaign in the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite.
Petitioner instituted another petition declaring enjoin R.A. No. 8806 unconstitutional, contending, in essence, that:
1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991
(in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that only "a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be
converted into a component city"; and
2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the "one subject-one bill" rule prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of
the Constitution.
Petitioner contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city may be created only by converting "a municipality
or a cluster of barangays," not by merging two municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806 has done.

Issue:
(1) WON a component city may be created by merging two municipalities.
(2) WON there exist a "compelling" reason for merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in order to create the City of
Sorsogon
(3) WON R.A. No. 8806 violatethe "one subject-one bill" rule enunciated in Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution
(4) WON R.A No 8806 is unconstitutional

Held:
Yes. Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The phrase "A municipality or a cluster of
barangays may be converted into a component city" is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be
created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution allows the merger of local government units to create a province city,
municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria established by the Code. the creation of an entirely new local
government unit through a division or a merger of existing local government units is recognized under the Constitution, provided
that such merger or division shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code.

(2) This argument goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which we are not competent to rule. In Angara v. Electoral
Commission, this Court, made it clear that "the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation." In the exercise of judicial power, we are allowed only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable," and "may not annul an act of the political departments simply because we feel it is unwise or
impractical.

3) No. There is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the creation of the City of Sorsogon. The
abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject
separate and distinct from the creation of Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable
consequence of the merger. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general
object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation.

(4) No. Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation
of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts.
The theory is that every law, being the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it
is in accord with the fundamental law. This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a
petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one. In other
words the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt, for to doubt is to sustain. We hold that petitioner has failed to
present clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. No. 8806.

CENTRAL (POBLACION) BARRIO, CITY OF DAVAO, vs CITY TREASURER

Facts:
On August 29, 1962, the City of Davao passed Resolution No. 732 declaring as officially and legally existing, pursuant
to Republic Act 2370, the several barrios of the city. Among these were barrios Agdao, Bucana and Poblacion.
Subsequently, barrio Poblacion, also called barrio Central, claiming that it was created under Section 27 of the Code of
Mindanao and Sulu, asked from Davao City for its alleged 10% share in taxes collected on real property located within the
barrio, as provided in Section 23 of Republic Act 3590. Davao City's Treasurer, however, refused to release the share for said
barrio, on the ground that the amount pertaining to said barrio, in relation to those of barrios Agdao and Bucana, cannot be
determined, because the respective boundaries of said barrios were not yet fixed as required by law.
On September 3, 1964, however, the Secretary of Finance, acting on the request of the same barrio Central or
Poblacion for release of its 10% share in real property taxes, stated that barrios Agdao and Bucana were created only in 1963 in
violation of Republic Act 2370 that prohibited creation of barrios out of chartered cities, so that said barrios are not recognized
under Republic Act 3590 providing for the abovementioned share of 10% in realty taxes. Accordingly, he ruled that the allocated
10% share of taxes for barrios Agdao, Bucana and Central should accrue and be given to barrio Central only, after all conditions
therefor are met.
On December 2, 1964, barrio Central filed in the Court of First Instance of Davao, thru its barrio captain, a petition for
declaratory relief with mandamus, against Davao City's Treasurer, Council, Auditor and Mayor, alleging the facts mentioned
earlier in this decision. Among others, the petition questioned the legality of Resolution No. 732 of Davao City's Council creating
barrios Agdao and Bucana; the actuations of the Auditor in passing in audit an alleged expenditure of P50,000 out of the 10%
fund; and the failure of the council to delimit the territorial boundaries of the three barrios concerned. And it prayed that the court
order payment to petitioner by respondents of its 10% share in realty taxes as provided by Republic Act 3590, declare illegal the
creation of barrios Agdao and Bucana, and prohibit the Auditor from approving expenditures out of its 10% share.
Respondents moved to dismiss but their motion was denied. On January 29, 1965, respondents answered, stating
among other averments, that barrio Central is inexistent or not a part of Davao City; that there are other barrios claiming the
10% share in real property taxes corresponding to the territory claimed by petitioner; that Republic Act 3590 providing for the
10% share applies only to barrios in municipalities and municipal districts, not to those in cities; and that the alleged expenditure
in question was legal and not taken from the 10% share allocated for barrios.
After issues were thus joined the case was set for trial. On August 2, 1965, however, the Court, upon motion of the
Fiscal, dismissed the case without prejudice, on the ground that the issues were rendered academic by the passage of Republic
Act 4354, on June 19, 1965, amending the Charter of Davao City. Petitioner, having failed in its motion for reconsideration, took
the present appeal.

Issue: Whether the dismissal order was proper.

Held:
Yes. Republic Act 4354, in Section 2, enumerated the barrios comprising the City of Davao. Petitioner barrio Central or
Poblacion was not mentioned therein. Accordingly, there prima facie arises the conclusion that said law abolished barrio Central
as part of Davao City. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The court a quo had sufficient and tenable reason to dismiss the suit
in the face of said law, for being academic. A non-existent barrio, or a barrio not situated in Davao City, cannot present a claim
against it or its officials for a share in taxes under Republic Act 3590. Said law must be presumed, until squarely challenged and
declared by the courts to be otherwise, as constitutional, especially because the power to create or abolish municipal
corporations resides in Congress (Mendenilla v. Onandia, L-17803, June 30, 1962). Petitioner may of course assail the
constitutionality of said new law. The present suit, however, is not for that purpose. Nothing in the pleadings questions said law's
validity, for the reason that said law came after the pleadings were joined. Neither was there amendment to said pleadings. The
court a quo, therefore, rightly dismissed the present suit, without prejudice, that is, not thereby precluding the filing of a suit to
assail the validity of Republic Act 4354.

DAR vs Sarangani

Facts:
The Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel, Sarangani passed Resolution No. 97-08 adopting a 10 year comprehensive development
plan of the municipality and its land use. On January 30, 1998, pursuant to Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 08, Series of 1997,
and to accelerate the development and urbanization of Alabel, the Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel passed Resolution No. 98-03,
reclassifying lots that were located within the built-up areas, based on the 1995-2005 Land Use Plan of the municipality, from
agricultural to non-agricultural uses. Later, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sarangani approved Resolution No. 98-018 or the
Resolution Adopting the Ten-Year Municipal Comprehensive Development Plan and the Land Use Development Plan and
Zoning Ordinance of the Municipality of Alabel, Sarangani Per Resolution No. 97-08 and Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08, S. of
1997 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel.

A portion of the area involving 376.5424 hectares, however, was covered by the CARP commercial farms deferment scheme.
The Zoning Certification issued by the office of the Municipal Planning and Development Council (MPDC)showed that
respondents properties located at Barangay Maribulan, Alabel were among those reclassified from agricultural and pasture land
to residential, commercial institutional, light industrial and open space in the 1995-2005 land use plan of Alabel. The respondent
then field an application for land use conversion of certain parcels of land.

Meanwhile, members of the Sarangani Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association, Inc. (SARBAI) sent a letter-petition to the
DAR Secretary oppposing the application for land use conversion filed by SACI. SARBAI alleged that its members were merely
forced to sign the waiver of rights, considering that the commercial farm deferment period ended on June 15, 1998. Later, the
PLUTC agreed to recommend the disapproval of a portion of a property which was still viable for agriculture. The conversion
was deferred subject to the submission of certain requirements. Later, the DAR Secretary cio R. Morales, Jr. denied SACI’s
application for land use conversion. SACI appealed to the Office of the President. The Office of the President dismissed the
appeal and affirmed in toto the challenged DAR Orders.

Issues: 1. WON a notice of coverage is an indispensable requirement for the acquisition of land
2. WON the DAR should use the comprehensive land use plans and ordinance of the local sanggunian as primary reference

Held:
1. No, Under the circumstances, a notice of coverage is not an indispensable requirement before DAR can acquire the subject
lots or commercial farms, which are covered by a deferment period under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or
R.A. No 6657 upon its effectivity on June 15, 1998

2. Yes, Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160, empowers the local government units to reclassify agricultural lands.
Memorandum Circular No. 54 Prescribing the Guidelines Governing Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160 specified the scope and
limitations on the power of the cities and municipalities to reclassify agricultural lands into other uses. It provided that all
ordinances authorizing reclassification of agricultural lands shall be subject to the review and approval of the province in the
case of component cities or municipalities, or by the HLURB for highly urbanized or independent component cities in
accordance with Executive Order No. 72, Series of 1993.Hence, with regard to agricultural lands that have been reclassified for
non-agricultural uses by the local government unit concerned, the CA is correct in declaring that DAR should refer to the
comprehensive land use plans and the ordinances of the Sanggunian in assessing land use conversion applications, thus:
While DAR retains the responsibility for approving or disapproving applications for land use conversion filed by individual
landowners on their landholdings, the exercise of such authority should be confined to compliance with the requirements and
limitations under existing laws and regulations, such as the allowable percentage of agricultural [area] to be reclassified,
ensuring sufficient food production, areas non-negotiable for conversion and those falling under environmentally critical areas or
highly restricted for conversion under the NIPAS law. Defincases may not be exercised in such a manner as to defeat the very
purpose of the LGU concerned in reclassifying certain areas to achieve social and economic benefits in pursuit of its mandate
towards the general welfare. Precisely, therefore, the DAR is required to use the comprehensive land use plans and
accompanying ordinances of the local Sanggunian as primary references in evaluating applications for land use conversion filed
by individual landowners. In this case, petitioners have already complied with the standard requirements laid down under the
applicable rules and regulations of the DAR.
The conversion of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses shall be strictly regulated and may be allowed only when the
conditions prescribed under R.A. No. 6657 are present. In this regard, the Court agrees with the ratiocination of the
requirements prescribed by law and existing rules and regulations have been complied with. This holds true in the present
case where, because of the creation of the Province of Sarangani and in view of its thrust to urbanize, particularly its provincial
capital which is the Municipality of Alabel, thelocal government has reclassified certain portions of its land area from agricultural
to non-agricultural.
Thus, to reiterate, in accordance with E.O. No. 72, Series of 1993, and subject to the limitations prescribed by law, DAR should
utilize the comprehensive land use plans in evaluating the land use conversion application of respondents whose lands have
already been reclassified by the local government for non-agricultural uses. This is not to say, however, that every property of
respondents which is included in the comprehensive land use plan of the Municipality of Alabel shall be automatically granted
non-coverage. As mentioned earlier, said application is subject to the limitations and conditions prescribed by law. One such
limitation 376.5424 hectares, a portion totalling 154.622 [or 154.1622] hectares which are planted to bananas and coconuts, are
-year deferment scheme, which has expired on June 15, 1998. By law, these lands are subject to redistribution to CARP
beneficiaries upon the lapse of the ten-year period, counted from the date of the effectivity of the CARL or R.A. No. 6657 on
June 15,1988, which was way before the creation of the Province of Sarangani and the eventual reclassification of the
agricultural lands into non-agricultural in the Municipality of Alabel where respondents properties are located.
In short, the creation of the new Province of Sarangani, and the reclassification that was effected by the Municipality of Alabel
did not operate to supersede the applicable provisions of R.A. No. 6657.Moreover, Section 20 of the LGC of 1991 on the
reclassification of lands explicitly states that [n]othing in this section shall be construed as repealing, amending or modifying in
any manner the provisions of R.A. No.6657. Thus, where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation. There is only room for application.

League of Cities v. Comelec

Action: These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas
assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and
respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
Fact: During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress
did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA
9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a
municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator
Aquilino Pimentel, ―the mad rush‖ of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue
Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which
sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not
approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and
forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice
of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood
bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills
in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood
Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President’s signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality
approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share
the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

Issue: The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:

1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

Held: We grant the petitions. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus
unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive
application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government
Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the
national taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a
municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an
intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law
passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption
would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC (Consolidation of Rulings)

During the 11th Congress, 57 bills seeking the conversion of municipalities into component cities were filed before the House of
Representatives. However, Congress acted only on 33 bills. It did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12thCongress, R.A. No. 9009 became effective revising Section 450 of the Local Government Code. It increased the
income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from P20 million annual income to P100 million locally-generated
income. In the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. Each
of the cityhood bills contained a common provisionexempting the particular municipality from the 100 million income requirement
imposed by R.A. No. 9009. Are the cityhood laws converting 16 municipalities into cities constitutional?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
November 18, 2008 Ruling
No. The SC (voting 6-5) ruled that the exemptions in the City Laws is unconstitutional because sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution
requires that such exemption must be written into the LGC and not into any other laws. ―The Cityhood Laws violate sec. 6, Art.
X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.‖
―The criteria, as prescribed in sec. 450 of the LGC, must be strictly followed because such criteria prescribed by law, are
material in determining the ―just share‖ of local government units (LGUs) in national taxes.”

Navarro v. Ermita

The NSO certified that Dinagat Islands’ population is 120,813. Its land area is 802.12 square kilometers and its average annual
income is P82,696,433.23, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance. On October 2, 2006, the President
approved into law R.A. 9355 creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. On December 3, 2006, the COMELEC conducted the
mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the LGC which yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and
63,502 negative votes. With the approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of
Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed the interim set of provincial officials who took their oath of office on January
26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials
who assumed office on July 1, 2007.

Meanwhile, on November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro and other former political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed
before the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355
alleging that that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and
would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation
(IRA), and rich resources from the area. Is R.A. No. 9355 constitutional?

Suggested Answer:
February 10, 2010 Ruling
No. The SC ruled that the population of 120,813 is below the Local Government Code (LGC) minimum population requirement
of 250,000 inhabitants. Neither did Dinagat Islands, with an approximate land area of 802.12 square kilometers meet the LGC
minimum land area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers. The Court reiterated its ruling that paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, which exempts proposed provinces composed of one or
more islands from the land area requirement, was null and void as the said exemption is not found in Sec. 461 of the LGC.
―There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and regulations implementing the said
law, the basic law prevails, because the rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law,‖ held
the Court. (GR No. 180050, Navarro v. Ermita, May 12, 2010)

The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat filed their respective motions for reconsideration of
the Decision. In its Resolution dated May 12, 2010, the Supreme Court denied the said motions.
April 12, 2011 Ruling

Yes. In Navarro vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. no. 180050, April 12, 2011), the Honorable Supreme Court ruled that Republic
Act No. 9355 is as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of
the officials thereof are declared VALID.
The SC also ruled that the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of
1991 stating, ―The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more
islands,‖ is declared VALID.

According to the SC, ―with respect to the creation of barangays, land area is not a requisite indicator of viability. However, with
respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of viability and projected
capacity to provide services, i.e., income, population, and land area, are provided for.
―But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt
from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to
be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for
the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
xxx ―There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to
provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or
group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore,
logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for
component cities) of the LGC, but fellester.blogspot.com was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when
the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional
oversight in Section 461 of the LGC – and to reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold
the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
xxx―Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy, contiguity
and minimum land area requirements for prospective local government units should be liberally construed in order to achieve
the desired results. The strict interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010 Decision could prove to be counter-productive, if
not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical. Picture an intended province that consists of several municipalities and
component cities which, in themselves, also consist of islands. The component cities and municipalities which consist of islands
are exempt from the minimum land area requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the
province would be made to comply with the minimum land area criterion of 2,000 square kilometers, even if it consists of several
islands. fellester.blogspot.com This would mean that Congress has opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a province
with contiguous land area over one composed of islands — and negate the greater imperative of development of self-reliant
communities, rural progress, and the delivery of basic services to the constituency. This preferential option would prove more
difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered because the islands are separated by
bodies of water, as compared to one with a contiguous land mass.
xxx ―What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not conclusive in
showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time
fellester.blogspot.com of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the
minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has
been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as
mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagat’s existence as a province, they must be seen from
the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province.

DOUGLAS R. CAGAS v. COMELEC

A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a COMELEC Division in an election protest may not directly assail the
order before the Supreme Court through a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to to seek the review of said
interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the Division.
FACTS:
Petitioner Douglas R. Cagas was proclaimed the winner for the gubernatorial race for the province of Davao del Sur.
Respondent Claude P. Bautista, his rival, filed an electoral protest alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and
violations of election laws, rules and resolutions. The protest was raffled to the COMELEC First Division.
In his affirmative defense, Cagas argued that Bautista did not make the requisite cash deposit on time and that Bautista did not
render a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of. The COMELEC First Division denied the special
affirmative defences. Thus, Cagas prayed that the matter be certified to the COMELEC En Banc. Bautista countered that the
assailed orders, being merely interlocutory, could not be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc. The COMELEC First Division
issued an order denying Cagas’ motion for reconsideration, prompting him to file a petition for certiorari before the SC.
ISSUE:
WON Supreme Court has the power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC

HELD:
Petition DENIED.
Although Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution confers on the Court the power to review any decision, order or ruling of
the COMELEC, it limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an
interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an
interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC.
There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for certiorari assailing the
denial by the COMELEC First Division of the special affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The proper remedy is for the
petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First Division to first decide the protest on its merits, and if the result should aggrieve him, to
appeal the denial of his special affirmative defenses to the COMELEC En Banc along with the other errors committed by the
Division upon the merits.
It is true that there may be an exception to the general rule, which is when an interlocutory order of a Division of the COMELEC
was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, as the Court conceded in Kho v. Commission on
Elections. However, the said case has no application herein because the COMELEC First Division had the competence to
determine the lack of detailed specifications of the acts or omissions complained of as required by Rule 6, Section 7 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, and whether such lack called for the outright dismissal of the protest.

How are existing sub-provinces converted to provinces?

Grino v. COMELEC, 213 SCRA 672

Facts: Pursuant to Sec. 462, LGC, a plebiscite to determine whether the sub-province of Guimaras (its mother province was
Iloilo) wants to become a regular province was held simultaneously with the May 11, 1992 elections. The participants in the said
plebiscite were the residents of Iloilo (except Iloilo city) and the 3 municipalities of Guimaras.
Surprisingly, the ballots issued in the said 3 municipalities did not provided any space for the election of governor, vicegovernor
and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province of Iloilo. LDP Iloilo governor-candidate Simplicio Grino
claims that the COMELEC erred in not allowing the said 3 municipalities to vote for the provincial officials of Iloilo, since at the
time of the plebiscite Guimaras was still a sub-province of Iloilo. Grino says if Guimaras voted for regular “provincehood” then
there would have been no need for them at all to vote for the provincial officials of Iloilo. But what if Guimaras votes to remain as
a sub-province? Should special election be held for the 3 municipalities so that they can vote for the provincial official of Iloilo?

Held: Obviously, Grino’s petition was rendered moot and academic when Guimaras voted to become regular province. Besides
it’s too late to undo what COMELEC has done. If Guimaras did vote to remain as a sub province, Grino’s petition would have
been meritorious.

Conversion of a component city into a highly urbanized city and reclassification (IRR LGC)

Ceniza v. COMELEC 95 SCRA 763

Facts: on Dec. 22 1979, the interim Batasang Pambansa enacted B.P. Blg. 51 providing for local elections on Jan 30, 1980. Its
section 3, the subject of controversy, reads as follows:
xxx Until cities are reclassified into highly urbanized and component comes in accordance with standard established in the LGC
as province for in Art XI, Sec 4 (1) of the Constitution. Any city now existing with an annual regular income derived from
infrastructure and general funds of not less than P40M at the time of the approval of the act shall be classified as a highly
urbanized city. All other cities shall be considered components of the provinces where they are geographically located. xxx The
registered voters may be entitled to voter in the election of the official of the province of which that city is a component. If it’s
charter so provides. However, voters in a highly urbanized city, as hereinabove defined shall no participate nor vote in the
election of the official of the province in which the highly urbanized city is geographical located.

Robert Ceniza et.al. filed a case as tax payers and registered voters in the cities of Cebu ad Mandaue assailing Sec. 3
Specially, they questioned the use of annual income of a given city as basis for classification of whether or not a particular city is
a highly urbanized city whose voters may no participate in the election of provincial officials of the province in which the city is
geographically located. Ceniza and his fellow goons claim Sec.3 regulates the exercise of freedom of suffrage and violates the
equal protection of the law. Moreover, they attacked R.A. 5519 the law creating the City of Mandaue, which went to effect
without the benefit of ratification by the residents of Mandaue in the plebiscite or referendum. They particularly cited the charter’s
provision denying Mandaue the right to participate in provincial elections.

Held: Ceniza et. at. is mistaken. Reasons:

1. The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of LGU’s Corollary to independence however, is the
concomitant loss of right to participate in provincial affairs, more particularly the selection of elective provincial officials since
these provincial officials have ceased to exercise any government jurisdiction and authority over said city.
2. Regular annual income of a given city is substantial distinction for classification. The revenue of a city would show whether or
not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent economic, social and political unit. Thus, the equal
protection of the laws in not violated.
3. Freedom of suffrage is not imperiled since the Constitution does not give the city voter the right to participate in provincial
elections for territorial reasons
4. The city of Mandaue came into existence. In 1969, the constitutional requirement that the creation, alteration, etc. of a city,
province, etc. is subject to a plebiscite only came into being when the 1973 Constitution was enacted and therefore cannot be
applied retroactively.

Tobias v. Abalos 239 SCRA 106

Facts: Robert Tobias, et.al. invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong City, assailed the constitutionality
of R.A. No. 7675, known as “An act Converting the City of Mandaluyong into a Highly urbanized city known as the City of
Mandaluyong.” They cited, among others, Art. VIll, Sec. 49 of R.A. 7675, which provides that “As a highly urbanized city, the City
of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections after
the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new
legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same region” Said provision Tobias claims is not
germane to the title of R.A. 7675 thus being contrary to the one title-one subject rule since it creates a legislative district
whereas the title expressly provides only for the conversion of Mandaluyong into highly urbanized city. Also, Tobias, et. al.
contend that the people of san Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite as the same involves a change in
their legislative district.

Held: Tobias, et.al. are grossly erroneous Reasons:

1. The creation of a new legislative district is a natural logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city.
2. The contention that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. 7675 as the same
involved a change in their legislative district is benefit of merit. The reason is that the principle subject involved I the plebiscite
was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary
thereto. Thus the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they have nothing to do with the
changed in status of neighboring Mandaluyong.
Miranda v. Aguirre 314 SCRA 603

Facts: On May 5, 1994 R.A. 7720 was passed converting the municipality of Santiago, Isabel into an independent component
city. On Feb 14, 1998 R.A. 8528 was passed amending R.A. 7720 on 2 points: 1 Sec. 2 of R.A. 7720 is hereby amended by
deleting the words, “an independent” so that the municipality of Santiago will be converted into a component city only and 2) the
voters of Santiago could now vote again for the provincial officials of the province of Isabela. Jose Miranda, the mayor of
Santiago and other petitioners assailed the constitutionality of R.A. 8528. He says that said law lacks the provision requiring that
the plebiscite be held for its ratification. Alexander Aguirre, the Executive Secretary and other respondents on the other hand
countered that (1) Miranda et. al. had no standing to file their petition 2) the issue is a political question and 3) R.A. 8528 did not
created divide, etc or after any boundaries of Santiago it merely reclassified Santiago from an independent component city into a
component city.

Held: Aguirre and his cohorts are gravely mistaken. Reasons:

1. Miranda had standing, he field the petition in his capacity as mayor of Santiago.
2. The issue is justiciable, Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. 8528, since it runs contrary to article X, Sec 10 of the
1987 Constitution. The court has the power to decide the constitutionality of any law.
3. The reclassification will downgrade Santiago’s status from an independent component city into a component city. Far
reaching changes will then take place. Its political independence will diminish. The city mayor will be placed under the
administrative supervision of the provincial governor. Ordinance and resolution passed by the city council of Santiago will have
to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabel. Taxes collected by the city would then be shared with the province. All these
changes merit the need of a plebiscite so that the people at Santiago can air their side on the issue. Moreover, if a plebiscite can
be held for the upgrading of an LGU, should not a plebiscite be held for its downgrading as well?

NOTE: Mendoza’s strong dissent was anchored on Art. X Sec. 10 of the 1987 Constitution. Said section refers to alteration of
boundaries of Santiago were substantially altered nor any of its income, population or land area been radically changes
Santiago was neither recreated into another LGU nor abolished, much less its boundaries alter. (This good justice is implying
the reclassification was administrative in nature.

JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATIONvs. LIDUA, SR., G.R. No. 169588. October 7, 2013.

FACTS: Jadewell, pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000, was authorized to render any motor vehicle immobilized by placing its
wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked. Balajadia and the other respondents dismantled, took and carried away the
clamps attached to the wheel of the vehicles, which took place on May 7, 2003. Jadewell filed a complaint for robbery against
the respondents with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23,2003. However, the Informations were filed with the MTC on
October 2, 2003. Balajadia filed amotion to quash.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE: The MTC granted the motion to quash and dismissed the case and Jadewell‟s subsequent MR
Jadewell‟s petition for certiorari with RTC was likewise denied. Their MR was also denied.

CONTENTION OF JADEWELL: They argued that the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Baguio City, not the filing of the criminal information before Court, is the reckoning point in determining whether or not the
criminal action had prescribed.

CONTENTION OF BALAJADIA: Respondents argued that Zaldivia v. Reyes held that the proceedings mentioned in Section 2
of Act No. 3326, as amended, refer to judicial proceedings. Thus, the SC, in Zaldivia, held that the filing of the Complaint with
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor was not a judicial proceeding. The prescriptive period commenced from the alleged date
of the commission of the crime on May 7, 2003 and ended two months after on July 7, 2003.

ISSUE: Whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23,2003 tolled the prescription period
of the commission of the offense

HELD: No. As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of anInformation tolls the prescriptive
period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance.The respondent judge was correct when he applied the rule
in Zaldivia v. Reyes. In Zaldivia v. Reyes, 211 SCRA 277 (1992), the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal
alsofeatured similar facts and issues with the present case. In that case, the offense was committed onMay 11, 1990. The
Complaint was received on May 30, 1990, and the Information was filed withthe Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on
October 2, 1990.

When the representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period
was running. It continued to run until the filing of the Information. They had two months to file the Information and institute the
judicial proceedings by filing the Information with the Municipal Trial Court. The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the
Information is unfortunate as it resulted in the dismissal of the case against the private respondents. It stands that the doctrine of
Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances and their prescription period. It also upholds the necessity of filing the Information in court in
order to toll the period. Zaldivia also has this to say concerning the effects of its ruling: The Court realizes that under the above
interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor‟s office if, intentionally or not,
he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a
misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is
not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.

BAGABUYO VS COMELEC
FACTS:
Cagayan de Oro only had one legislative district before. In 2006, CdO congressman Jaraula sponsored a bill to have two
egislative districts in CdO instead. The law was passed (RA 9371) hence two legislative districts were created. Bagabuyo
assailed the validity of the said law and he went immediately to the Supreme Court. He was contending that the 2nd district was
created without a plebiscite which was required by the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.

HELD:
No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the
House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; the criteria
established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger,
abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in
Cagayan de Oro’s territory, population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required.

ALDABA VS. COMELEC

Facts: This is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591), creating a legislative
district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan, for violating the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in
a city.
On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos City Charter,2 by creating a separate legislative district for the city.
The population of Malolos City was 223,069. The population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no
dispute that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics Office
(NSO) that ―the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population
growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000.‖

Issue: RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit
representation in Congress as provided under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the 1987 Constitution.

Held: We grant the petition and declare RA 9591 unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution
Ruling: YES. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have ―a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand.‖
House Bill No. 3693 cites the undated Certification of Regional Director Alberto N. Miranda of Region III of the National Statistics
Office (NSO) as authority that the population of the City of Malolos ―will be 254,030 by the year 2010.‖ The Certification states
that the population of ―Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291.‖ The Certification further states that it was ―issued
upon the request of Mayor Danilo A. Domingo of the City of Malolos in connection with the proposed creation of Malolos City as
a lone congressional district of the Province of Bulacan.‖
First, certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are declared official by the National
Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). Second, certifications based on demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO
Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Third, intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every
year.
Moreover, the Certification states that ―the total population of Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291.‖ The Certification
also states that the population growth rate of Malolos is 3.78% per year between 1995 and 2000. Based on a growth rate of
3.78% per year, the population of Malolos of 175,291 in 2000 will grow to only 241,550 in 2010.
Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be based on an official and credible
source. That is why the OSG cited Executive Order No. 135, otherwise the population projection would be unreliable or
speculative.

AQUINO III V. COMELEC

Facts: This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon
C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled ―An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and
Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.‖
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on
12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009 creating an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur
by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.
The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2 distributed among four (4) legislative
districts. Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in
order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac,
Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a
new second legislative district.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional
standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.
Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard.
The provision reads:
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is
unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

Issue: w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a
province?
Held: We deny the petition.
Ruling: There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a
legislative district.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase ―each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand‖ from the phrase ―or each province‖ point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only
required for a city, but not for a province.26
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province which, by virtue of and upon
creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. – (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following
requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the
indispensable income requirement

UMALI vs. COMELEC

FACTS:
On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed Resolution No.183-2011, requesting the President
to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city of the province of Nueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city
(HUC). Acceding to the request, the President issued Presidential Proclamation No. 418, Series of 2012, proclaiming the City of
Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to "ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein, as provided for in Section 453 of the
Local Government Code of 1991.
COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued Minute Resolution No.12-0797, for purposes of the plebiscite for the conversion
of Cabanatuan City from component city to highly-urbanized city, only those registered residents of Cabanatuan City should
participate in the said plebiscite. Aurelio M. Umali, Governor of Nueva Ecija, filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration,
maintaining that the proposed conversion in question will necessarily and directly affect the mother province of Nueva Ecija. His
main argument is that Section 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in conjunction with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. He
argues that while the conversion in question does not involve the creation of a new or the dissolution of an existing city, the spirit
of the Constitutional provision calls for the people of the local government unit (LGU) directly affected to vote in a plebiscite
whenever there is a material change in the rights and responsibilities. The phrase "qualified voters therein" used in Sec. 453 of
the LGC should then be interpreted to refer to the qualified voters of the units directly affected by the conversion and not just
those in the component city proposed to be upgraded. Petitioner Umali justified his position by enumerating the various adverse
effects of the Cabanatuan City’s conversion and how it will cause material change not only in the political and economic rights of
the city and its residents but also of the province as a whole.
Julius Cesar Vergara, city mayor of Cabanatuan, interposed an opposition on the ground that Sec. 10, Art. X does not apply to
conversions, which is the meat of the matter. He likewise argues that a specific provision of the LGC, Sec. 453, as couched,
allows only the qualified voters of Cabanatuan City to vote in the plebiscite. Lastly, private respondent pointed out that when
Santiago City was converted in 1994from a municipality to an independent component city pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA)
7720, the plebiscite held was limited to the registered voters of the then municipality of Santiago.
COMELEC rule against petitioner maintaining that Cabanatuan City is merely being converted from a component city into an
HUC and that the political unit directly affected by the conversion will only be the city itself. It argues that in this instance, no
political unit will be created, merged with another, or will be removed from another LGU, and that no boundaries will be altered.
The conversion would merely reinforce the powers and prerogatives already being exercised by the city, with the political unit’s
probable elevation to that of an HUC as demanded by its compliance with the criteria established under the LGC. Thus, the
participation of the voters of the entire province in the plebiscite will not be necessary.

ISSUE: WON Nueva Ecija should be included in the plebiscite not only those in Cabanatuan City.
RULING:
Yes. Pursuant to established jurisprudence, the phrase "by the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453 should be construed in a
manner that will avoid conflict with the Constitution. If one takes the plain meaning of the phrase in relation to the declaration by
the President that a city is an HUC, then, Sec. 453 of the LGC will clash with the explicit provision under Sec. 10, Art. X that the
voters in the "political units directly affected" shall participate in the plebiscite. Such construction should be avoided in view of
the supremacy of the Constitution. Thus, the Court treats the phrase "by the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453 to mean the
qualified voters not only in the city proposed to be converted to an HUC but also the voters of the political units directly affected
by such conversion in order to harmonize Sec. 453 with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
In identifying the LGU or LGUs that should be allowed to take part in the plebiscite, what should primarily be determined is
whether or not the unit or units that desire to participate will be "directly affected" by the change. In Tan v. COMELEC, which
involved the division of Negros Occidental for the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte, that the LGUs whose
boundaries are to be altered and whose economy would be affected are entitled to participate in the plebiscite. As held:
It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it imperative that there be first obtained "the approval of
a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is
substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the existing province of Negros
Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries in order that there can be created
the proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be
affected

EFFECT OF CONVERSION OF A MUN. TO A CITY ON THE TERM OF THE MAYOR

ROBERTO LACEDA, SR., vs. RANDY L. LIMENA and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

Laceda, Sr., and Limena were candidates for Punong Barangay of Barangay. Limena filed a petition for disqualification and/or
declaration as an ineligible candidate against Laceda before the COMELEC, contending that Laceda had already served as
Punong Barangay for Brgy. Panlayaan for three consecutive terms since 1994, and was thus prohibited from running for the
fourth time.
Laceda admitted having served as Punong Barangay of Panlayaan for three consecutive terms. However, he asserted that
when he was elected for his first two terms, Sorsogon was still a municipality, and that when he served his third term, the
Municipality of Sorsogon had already been merged with the Municipality of Bacon to form a new political unit, the City of
Sorsogon, pursuant to Republic Act No. 8806. Thus, he argued that his third term was actually just his first in the new political
unit and that he was accordingly entitled to run for two more terms.
Laceda likewise argued that assuming he had already served three consecutive terms, Rep. Act No. 9164 which imposes the
three-term limit, cannot be made to apply to him as it would violate his vested right to office. He alleged that when he was
elected in 1994 the prohibition did not exist. Had he known that there will be a law preventing him to run for the fourth time, he
would not have run for office in 1994 as he was looking forward to the election in 2007.
The COMELEC declared Laceda disqualified. Laceda moved for reconsideration but was denied.

Issue: Whether the 3 term limit rule will apply

Ruling:
Laceda insists that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in basing its decision on the requisites enunciated in
Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections for the application of the three-term prohibition in Section 43 of the Local Government
Code. Laceda argues that said case is inapplicable since it involved the position of municipal mayor while the instant case
concerned the position of Punong Barangay. He likewise insists that he served his third term in a new political unit and therefore
he should not be deemed already to have served a third term as Punong Barangay for purposes of applying the three-term limit.
In this case, while it is true that under Rep. Act No. 8806 the municipalities of Sorsogon and Bacon were merged and converted
into a city thereby abolishing the former and creating Sorsogon City as a new political unit, it cannot be said that for the purpose
of applying the prohibition in Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 9164, the office of Punong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan,
Municipality of Sorsogon, would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the office of Punong Barangay
of Barangay Panlayaan, Sorsogon City. The territorial jurisdiction of Barangay Panlayaan, Sorsogon City, is the same as before
the conversion. Consequently, the inhabitants of the barangay are the same. They are the same group of voters who elected
Laceda to be their Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms and over whom Laceda held power and authority as their
Punong Barangay. Moreover, Rep. Act No. 8806 did not interrupt Laceda's term.

ABOLITION

SULTAN USMAN SARANGANI, SORAIDA M. SARANGANI and HADJI NOR HASSAN v. COMELEC and HADJI ABOLAIS
R. OMAR, MANAN OSOP and ATTY. NASIB D. YASSIN G.R. No. 135927 June 26, 2000
CASE: petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which seeks to nullify the Order issued by the COMELEC dated
June 29, 1998, finding Padian Torogan in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur as "ghost precinct"
FACTS:
On September 15, 1997, a petition for annulment of several precincts and annulment of book of voters in Madalum, Lanao Del
Sur was filed with the COMELEC by, among others, Hadji Oblais R. Omar thru counsel Atty. Nasib D. Yasin, herein private
respondents. Among the precincts sought to be annulled was Padian Torogan.
On September 18, 1997, the COMELEC, thru the Clerk of the Commission sent telegrams to the respective BEI of the
questioned precincts in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur, including Padian Torogan, to file their answer to the petition for abolition of
precincts and annulment of book of voters.
On October 31, 1997, the incumbent mayor of Madalum, Lanao Del Sur, Usman T. Sarangani, herein petitioner, together with
other oppositors who were allegedly barangay chairmen of the 23 barangays, filed an "Answer in Opposition" which included
the affidavits of the barangay chairmen of the affected precincts attesting to the fact that the move to annul the book of voters
and abolish the questioned election precincts were for the purpose of diminishing the bailiwicks of the incumbent mayor of
Madalum, Lanao del Sur.
After hearing and submission of formal offer of exhibits and memoranda by the parties, the COMELEC issued an Order dated
February 11, 1998, referring the case to its Law Department for appropriate investigation.
The COMELEC Law Department conformably issued a memorandum dated April 29, 1998 directing Atty. Muslemin Tahir, the
Provincial Election Supervisor of Marawi City, Lanao del Sur "to conduct a rigorous incisive investigation on the alleged ghost
precincts and thereafter submit a report on the investigation conducted." Consequently, Atty. Tahir created a TASK FORCE
INVESTIGATION TEAM by virtue of a memorandum dated June 13, 1998 directing Election Officers Casan Macadato, Sacrain
Guro and Anuar Datudacula "to conduct ocular inspection on the alleged twelve (12) ghost barangays in the Municipality of
Madalum, Lanao Del Sur."
On June 18, 1998, an ocular inspection was conducted on the alleged ghost precincts. It was found out that: in Barangay Padian
Torogan, there are only two structures: One is a concrete house with no roof, and the other is a wooden structure without walls
and roof. This obviously means that no single human being could possibly reside in these two structures. Also, it came out that
the name Padian-Torogan means a cemetery not a residential place. So this contradicts the records being brought by the
COMELEC Team from the Census saying that the area has 45 households with a total population of 285. In Barangay named
Rakutan, the ocular inspection was stopped by the Madalum Municipal Chief of Police Mahdi Mindalano, armed with UZI
pistolized Machine Gun
On the basis of the foregoing, Election Officer Casan Macadato submitted to the Provincial Election Supervisor of COMELEC in
Marawi City its 1st Indorsement dated June 19, 1998 reporting the results of the ocular inspection that Padian Torogan and
Rakutan were uninhabited.
On June 29, 1998, the COMELEC issued the assailed Order finding "Padian Torogan as ghost precinct."

ISSUE: Whether the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Padian-Torogan as ghost
precinct. NO.

HELD: The petition states that precinct No. 27A located in Barangay Padian Torogan was the one declared as a ghost precinct
by the COMELEC although the assailed Order did not mention any specific precinct but simply declared "Padian Torogan as
ghost precinct." To be clear, what was necessarily contemplated by the assailed Order would be the election precinct in the said
place.

The determination of whether a certain election precinct actually exists or not and whether the voters registered in said precinct
are real voters is a factual matter. On such issue, it is a time-honored precept that factual findings of the COMELEC based
on its own assessments and duly supported by evidence, are conclusive upon this Court, more so, in the absence of a
substantiated attack on the validity of the same.

Upon review of the records, the Court finds that the COMELEC had exerted efforts to investigate the facts and verified that there
were no public or private buildings in the said place, hence its conclusion that there were no inhabitants. If there were no
inhabitants, a fortiori, there can be no registered voters, or the registered voters may have left the place. It is not impossible for a
certain barangay not to actually have inhabitants considering that people migrate.
A barangay may officially exist on record and the fact that nobody resides in the place does not result in its automatic cessation
as a unit of local government. Under the Local Government Code of 1991, the abolition of a local government unit (LGU) may be
done by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision. In the case of a barangay,
except in Metropolitan Manila area and in cultural communities, it may be done by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or
Sangguniang Panglunsod concerned subject to the mandatory requirement of a plebiscite 16 conducted for the purpose in the
political units affected.

The findings of the administrative agency cannot be reversed on appeal or certiorari particularly when no significant facts
and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have substantially
affected the outcome of the case. The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of an election by means
available to it.

The assailed order having been issued pursuant to COMELEC's administrative powers and in the absence of any finding of
grave abuse of discretion in declaring a precinct as non-existent, said order shall stand.
Judicial interference is unnecessary and uncalled for. No voter is disenfranchised because no such voter exist. The
sacred right of suffrage guaranteed by the Constitution is not tampered when a list of fictitious voters is excluded from
an electoral exercise.

Suffrage is conferred by the Constitution only on citizens who are qualified to vote and are not otherwise disqualified by law.
On the contrary, such exclusion of non-existent voters all the more protects the validity and credibility of the electoral
process as well as the right of suffrage because the "electoral will" would not be rendered nugatory by the inclusion of
some ghost votes. Election laws should give effect to, rather than frustrate the will of the people.

SALVA vs. MAKALINTAL G.R. No. 132603 (September 8, 2000)

FACTS:
The petitioners filed with the RTC a class suit against the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, Sangguniang Pambayan of
Calaca, Batangas, and the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) for annulment of Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345
both enacted by the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2987. Ordinance No. 05 declared
the abolition of Barangay San Rafael and its merger with Barangay Dacanlao, Municipality of Calaca, Batangas and accordingly
instructed the COMELEC to conduct the required plebiscite. Resolution No. 345 affirmed the effectivity of Ordinance No. 05,
thereby overriding the veto exercised by the governor of Batangas. Ordinance No. 05 was vetoed by the Governor of Batangas
for being ultra vires, particularly, as it was not shown that the essential requirements regarding the attestations or certifications
of several government agencies were obtained. The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2987, providing for the rules and
regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998, to decide the issue of the abolition
of barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao, Calaca, Batangas. The trial court denied the petition saying
that any petition or action questioning an act, resolution or decision of the COMELEC must be brought before the Supreme
Court. The petitioners contend that when the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial functions under Section 52 of the Omnibus
Election Code, its acts are subject to the exclusive review by this Court; but when the COMELEC performs a purely ministerial
duty, such act is subject to scrutiny by the Regional Trial Court. Petitioners submit that the conduct of a plebiscite, pursuant to
Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345, is not adjudicatory or quasi-judicial in nature but simply ministerial or administrative
in nature and only in obedience to the aforesaid Ordinance and Resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent court has jurisdiction to enjoin the comelec from implementing its resolution no. 2987, series of
1998, which provided for the rules and regulations for the conduct of the plebiscite scheduled on february 28, 1998 to decide on
the abolition of barangay san rafael and its merger with barangay dacanlao, calaca, batangas, pending the determination of civil
case no. 3442 for the annulment of ordinance no. 05, resolution no. 345 and comelec resolution no. 2987.

HELD:
Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution provides in part that: SEC. 7. xxx. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution
or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
The Court ruled that ―…What is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC reviewable by
certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and
taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. Briefly, COMELEC Resolution
No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant
to the COMELECs quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of
plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not be deemed as a final order reviewable by certiorari by this Court. Any question
pertaining to the validity of said resolution may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.

Classification of provinces, cities and municipalities (Read E.O. 349)

Herrera vs COMELEC
Facts: In its Resolution no. 68, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Guimaras requested the COMELEC to have the province
subdivided into two provincial districts. Acting upon the request, the Provincial Election Supervisor conducted two consultative
meetings with the provincial and municipal officials, barangay captains, barangay kagawads, representatives of all political
parties, and other interested parties. A consensus was reached in favor of the division. The PES then issued a memo
recommending the division of the province.
Guimaras was then reclassified from 5th class to 4th class province under the Memo Circular No. 97-1 issued by the Bureau of
Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance.
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2950 which allotted 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats to Guimaras—1st district
(Buenavista and San Lorenzo)= 3 seats and 2nd district (Jordan, Nueva Valencia, and Sibunag)= 5 seats. The petitioners
questioned Resolution No. 2950, pointing out that:
1.the districts do not comprise a compact, contiguous and adjacent area.
2.the consultative meetings did not express the true sentiment of the voters of the province.
3.the apportionment of the two districts are not equitable.
4.there is disparity in the ratio of the number of voters that a Board Member represents.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No. 2950?

Held: COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion. The petition is dismissed.
Ratio: 1. The municipalities belonging to each district are compact, contiguous and adjacent. Contiguous and adjacent means
adjoining, nearby, abutting, having a common border, connected, and/or touching along boundaries often for considerable
distances. On its face, the map of Guimaras shows that the municipalities grouped together are contiguous or adjacent.
2. There were two consultative meetings held by the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor. As required by COMELEC
Resoluiton No. 2313, all interested parties were duly notified and represented.
3. Under Republic Act 6636, a 4th class province shall have 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan members. Also, under Republic Act
7166, provinces with 1 legislative district shall be divided into 2 districts for purposes of electing the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The province of Guimaras, being a 4th class province and having only 1 legislative district, shall
have 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan members and 2 districts.
4. Under Republic Act 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2313, the basis for division shall be the number of inhabitants of the
province concerned not the number of listed or registered voters. The districting of the Province of Guimaras was based on the
official 1995 Census of Population as certified by the National Statistics Office.
BOUNDARY DISPUTES

Province of Antique vs Calabocal

SUMMARY. The provinces of Antique and Oriental Mindoro are both claiming jurisdiction over Liwagao Island. Petitioners claim that
the case involves a boundary dispute and as per the LGC, RTC does not have jurisdiction. The RTC ruled that it has jurisdiction and
that the case is one of recovery and not a boundary dispute. The SC ruled that the RTC has jurisdiction but the case is a boundary
dispute as defined by the LGC.
DOCTRINE.A boundary dispute may involve "a portion or the whole" of a local government unit's territorial area. Nothing in this
provision excludes a dispute over an island. So long as the island is being claimed by different local government units, there exists a
boundary dispute.LGC 118 (c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be jointly
referred for settlement to the Sanggunians of the provinces concerned.
As the Court has previously ruled, it is "only upon the failure of these intermediary steps will resort to the RTC follow, as specifically
provided in Section 119 of the [Local Government Code.]"
FACTS.
 Sometime between the years 1978 and 1979, Mayor Bago, then Mayor of the Municipality of Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro,
agreed to lend the administration of Liwagao Island to Mayor Lim, then Mayor of the Municipality of Caluya, Antique.
 The agreement was made orally and without executing any formal documents to this effect. The condition attached to the
agreement was that the island would be returned upon termination of either party's terms in office.
 The terms of both mayors ended in 1987. Mayor Lim allegedly returned Liwagao Island to the Mun. of Bulalacao. However,
the Mun. of Caluya continued to exercise administration over the island.
 Apr 2002: Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Oriental Mindoro passed a resolution confirming its jurisdictional rights and
dominion over Liwagao Island. However, according to respondents, the Municipality of Caluya and the Province of Antique
continued to claim and exercise authority over Liwagao Island (collecting real property taxes).
 Feb 2012: SP of Oriental Mindoro passed a resolution calling for the Conduct of a Joint Session between the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Oriental Mindoro and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Antique for the
Settlement of Jurisdictional Claim over the Island of Liwagao.
 The Vice Governor of Antique was willing to conduct a joint session to settle the boundary dispute but the SP of Antique
issued a resolution informing the Mindoro that it was not amenable to any form of settlement over the jurisdiction of Liwagao
Island as the same rightfully belongs to their province.
 SP of Oriental Mindoro issued a resolution directing the Provincial Legal Office to file the necessary legal action to claim
Liwagao Island.
 Antique: the maps of [NAMRIA] and DENR show Liwagao Island to be part of Antique.All national agencies of the
government have always considered the island to be part of Caluya. Likewise, the people living there have always
recognized Caluya's jurisdiction over the island as evidenced by the fact that they have registered their births, paid real
property taxes and voted in Antique.
: lack of jurisdiction of the RTC. They argued that "under LGC 118 par(c), jurisdiction over boundary disputes between
municipalities of different provinces is vested on the Sangguniang Panlalawigans of the provinces involved."
RTC: Defense of lack of jurisdiction is denied. This is not a boundary dispute but for recovery.
 Petitioners:This case involves a boundary dispute. The RTC erred in assuming jurisdiction over respondents' petition
because "the SPs of both the provinces of Antique and Oriental Mindoro, sitting jointly, have primary, original and exclusive
jurisdiction over this boundary dispute.They contend that under the LGC, "a boundary dispute between municipalities of
different provinces shall be referred first for settlement to the sanggunians of the provinces jointly" and if no settlement is
reached, the case shall be jointly tried by the sanggunians concerned. After trial, the aggrieved party may appeal the
decision to the RTC having jurisdiction over the area. The RTC "cannot exercise appellate jurisdiction over [respondents'
petition] since there was no petition [for the adjudication of the boundary dispute] that was filed and decided by the SPs of
Antique and Oriental Mindoro.
 Respondents:the RTC has jurisdiction over their petition because the same is not an appeal but an "an original legal action
to recover and get back the Island of Liwagao.The boundary lines between the Province of Oriental Mindoro and the
Province of Antique "[have] long been set forth and known to the parties."Factual circumstances has rendered it impossible
for the SPs to resolve the issue involving the Island of Liwagao. Prior to filing the petition before the RTC, it had already
made several attempts to "amicably discuss the issue on jurisdictional claim."However, the SP of Antique categorically
proclaimed that it was not amenable to any form of settlement.

ISSUES & RATIO.

1. WON RTC has jurisdiction over the respondents' petition for recovery of property and declaration of territorial and political
jurisdiction/dominion over Liwagao Island.YES.

The Case involves a boundary dispute:

Respondents: this case stems from an original action for "recovery/declaration of territorial and political jurisdiction/dominion"
and not a boundary dispute; hence, it is not within the purview of LGC 118.
 The LGC IRR defines a boundary dispute as follows: There is a boundary dispute when a portion or the whole of the
territorial area of an LGU is claimed by two or more LGUs.Boundary disputes between or among LGUs shall, as much as
possible, be settled amicably1.
 Based on this definition, a boundary dispute may involve "a portion or the whole" of a local government unit's territorial area.
Nothing in this provision excludes a dispute over an island. So long as the island is being claimed by different local
government units, there exists a boundary dispute.
 Respondents are asserting their lawful jurisdiction over Liwagao Island as against another local government unit that
currently has jurisdiction over the same. Therefore, whether the case is denominated as recovery of possession or claim of
ownership, respondents' objective is the same: for respondents to regain their alleged territorial jurisdiction over Liwagao
Island. Respondent itself acknowledges that the conflict is a "boundary row" between itself and the Province of Antique. As
stated in Resolution No. 1454-2012, the Province of Oriental Mindoro claims to "adhere to the basic principle of amicably
settling said boundary dispute, as laid down in the provision of the Local Government Code of 1991[.]" Thus, they are bound
by their own assertions and cannot now claim that the conflict does not involve a boundary dispute.

Settlement of Boundary Dispute Governed by LGC 1991

 Under LGC 118 and 1192: "the respective legislative councils of the contending local government units have jurisdiction
over their boundary disputes."

1 LGC IRR Rule III Art 15

 Specifically: LGC 118 (c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be
jointly referred for settlement to the Sanggunians of the provinces concerned.
 As the Court has previously ruled, it is "only upon the failure of these intermediary steps will resort to the RTC follow, as
specifically provided in Section 119 of the [Local Government Code.]"
 The specific procedure is outlined in the IRR of the LGC3.

City of Pasig v. COMELEC et.al. 314 SCRA 179

Facts: 2 petitions were raised by the City of Pasig and the municipality of Cainta respectively. Both Questioned the priority of the
suspension of the scheduled plebiscites for the proposed creation of Barangay Karangalan and barangay Napico (pursuant to 2
ordinances passed by both cities) Cainta had contended that the proposed barangays involve areas included in the boundary
dispute between her and Pasig; hence the suspension of the scheduled plebiscites is justified. Pasig however contends
otherwise. Despite this, the COMELEC ruled against Cainta and the plebiscite for the creation of barangay Napico pushed
through. The core issues now are 1) whether or not the said barangay dispute is a prejudicial question which must be resolved
before any plebiscite can be held and 2) Whether the plebiscite already conducted ratifying the creation of Barangay Napico has
rendered the issue as to it moot and academic.

Held: Cainta is correct. Reasons

1. Pasig cannot deny that there is a pending boundary dispute between her and Cainta Surely, whether the area in controversy
shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the City of the Pasig has material bearing to
the proposed barangay Karangalan and Napico. The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of an
LGU cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of an LGU.
It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts
are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of LGUs will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of
government powers which will ultimately the people’s welfare.
2. As was done before in Tan v. COMELEC, the plebiscite already conducted for the creation of Barangay Napico an be
annulled and set aside.
Held: SC held that the plebiscite should be held in abeyance.

MARIANO V. COMELEC
Facts:
Two petitions are filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854, An Act Converting The Municipality of Makati Into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati, as unconstitutional.
Section 52 of RA 7854 is said to be unconstitutional for it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law in
violation of Art. VI, Sec. 5(4) requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within 3 years following the
return of every census. Also, the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the
Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.
Issue: Whether or not the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional
Held:
Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The
Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law.
As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a
general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting RA 7854 and providing for an increase in
Makati’s legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with
a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation
where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time.
The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.
Petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the
Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said section provides that a city with a
population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990
census stood at 450,000, its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of
250,000.

Municipality of Kananga v. Madrona

FACTS: When a boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga and the City of Ormoc. By agreement, the parties
submitted the issue to amicable settlement. No amicable settlement was reached. The City of Ormoc filed before the RTC of
Ormoc City a complaint to settle the boundary dispute. Petitioner municipality filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, but the RTC denied the same. RTC: it had jurisdiction over the action under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129. that Section 118 of the Local Government Code had been substantially complied with, because both
parties already had the occasion to meet and thresh out their differences. In fact, both agreed to elevate the matter to the trial

2 SECTION 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Dispute. - Boundary disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as possible, be
settled amicably. To this end: (a) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more Barangays in the same city or municipality shall be referred for settlement to the Sangguniang
Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned. (b) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same province shall be referred for settlement to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan concerned. (c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to the
Sanggunians of the provinces concerned. (d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or
more highly urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective Sanggunians of the parties. (e) In the event the Sanggunian fails to effect an amicable
settlement within sixty (60) days from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the
Sanggunian concerned which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification referred to above.
SECTION 119. Appeal. - Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may elevate the decision of the Sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional
Trial Court having jurisdiction over the area in dispute. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the appeal within one (1) year from the filing thereof. Pending final resolution of the
disputed area prior to the dispute shall be maintained and continued for all legal purposes.
3 RULE III Settlement of Boundary Disputes x x x x ARTICLE 17. Procedures for Settling Boundary Disputes. — The following procedures shall govern the settlement of boundary

disputes:
(a) Filing of petition — The sanggunian concerned may initiate action by filing a petition, in the form of a resolution, with the sanggunian having jurisdiction over the dispute. x x x
(g) Failure to settle — In the event the sanggunian fails to amicably settle the dispute within sixty (60) days from the date such dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a
certification to that effect and copies thereof shall be furnished the parties concerned.
(h) Decision — Within sixty (60) days from the date the certification was issued, the dispute shall be formally tried and decided by the sanggunian concerned. Copies of the
decision shall, within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation thereof, be furnished the parties concerned, DILG, local assessor, COMELEC, NSO, and other NGAs concerned.
(i) Appeal — Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may elevate the decision of the sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court
having jurisdiction over the dispute by filing therewith the appropriate pleading, stating among others, the nature of the dispute, the decision of the sanggunian concerned and
the reasons for appealing therefrom. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the case within one (1) year from the filing thereof. Decisions on boundary disputes promulgated jointly
by two (2) or more sangguniang panlalawigans shall be heard by the Regional Trial Court of the province which first took cognizance of the dispute.
court via Resolution No. 97-01. It also held that Section 118 governed venue; hence, the parties could waive and agree upon it
under Section 4(b) of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: WON Section 118 of the LGU on boundary dispute settlement applies. WON respondent court may exercise original
jurisdiction over the settlement of a boundary dispute between a municipality and an independent component city.

HELD: No, Section 118 does not apply. Yes, RTC has jurisdiction.
POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; SECTION 118 THEREOF; PROCEDURE FOR SETTLEMENT OF
BOUNDARY DISPUTES BETWEEN A COMPONENT CITY OR MUNICIPALITY AND A HIGHLY URBANIZED CITY; ORMOC
IS NOT A HIGHLY URBANIZED CITY IN CASE AT BAR. — ―Sec. 118.Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary
Disputes. — Boundary disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as possible, be settled amicably. To
this end: ―(a)Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or municipality shall be referred for
settlement to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned. ―(b)Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more
municipalities within the same province shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned. ―(c)
Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to the
sanggunians of the provinces concerned. ―(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one hand
and a highly urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or more highly urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred for settlement to the
respective sanggunians of the parties. ―(e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty (60)
days from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be
formally tried by the sanggunian concerned which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification
referred to above.‖
Under Section 118 of the Local Government Code, the settlement of a boundary dispute between a component city or a
municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other — or between two or more highly urbanized cities — shall
be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the local government units involved. There is no question that
Kananga is a municipality constituted under Republic Act No. 542. By virtue of Section 442(d) of the LGC, it continued to exist
and operate as such. However, Ormoc is not a highly urbanized, but an independent component, city created under Republic
Act No. 179. Section 118 of the LGC applies to a situation in which a component city or a municipality seeks to settle a boundary
dispute with a highly urbanized city, not with an independent component city. While Kananga is a municipality, Ormoc is an
independent component city. Clearly then, the procedure referred to in Section 118 does not apply to them.
SECTION 451 THEREOF; CITY; CLASSIFICATION; ORMOC IS DEEMED AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY IN CASE
AT BAR. — Under Section 451 of the LGC, a city may be either component or highly urbanized. Ormoc is deemed an
independent component city, because its charter prohibits its voters from voting for provincial elective officials. It is a city
independent of the province. In fact, it is considered a component, not a highly urbanized, city of Leyte in Region VIII by both
Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, which calls for a plebiscite; and the Omnibus Election Code, which apportions representatives to the
defunct Batasang Pambansa. There is neither a declaration by the President of the Philippines nor an allegation by the parties
that it is highly urbanized. On the contrary, petitioner asserted in its Motion to Dismiss that Ormoc was an independent chartered
city.

Municipality of Sta Fe vs Municipality of Aritao GR No. 140474; 21 September 2007

Facts:
In October 16, 1980, petitioner Municipality of Sta. Fe, in Nueva Vizcaya, filed before the RTC of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya
for the determination of boundary dispute involving the barangays of Bantinan and Canabuan. The trial was almost over when
the court realized its oversight under existing law. On December 9, 1988, the court suspended the proceedings and referred the
case to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Nueva Vizcaya. In turn, the Sanggunian concerned passed on the matter to its
Committee on Legal Affairs, Ordinances & Resolutions which adopted the former Provincial Board’s Resolution No. 64
adjudicating the two barangays as part of respondent’s territory. The Sanggunian approved the Committee’s recommendation
but endorsed the boundary dispute to the RTC for further proceedings & preservation of the status quo pending finality of the
case.
In the RTC, respondent moved to consider Resolution 64 as final and executory. The RTC denied the motion ruling that since
there was no amicable settlement in the Sanggunian, the latter cannot issue a ―decision‖ favoring a party. The court held that,
under the law in force, the purpose of such referral was only to afford the parties an opportunity to amicably settle with the
intervention and assistance of the Provincial Board and that in case no such settlement is reached, the court proceedings shall
be resumed. Subsequently, respondent filed a motion praying for the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction since the
power to try and decide municipal boundary disputes already belonged to the Sanggunian Panlalawigan & no longer with the
trial court. The RTC granted the motion. The CA then affirmed. According to the CA, a new legislation can be given retroactive
effect so long as it is curative in nature. Thus, the LGC vesting jurisdiction to the Sanggunian was given retroactive effect. Since
the Local Government Code of 1991 is the latest will of the people expressed through Congress on how boundary disputes
should be resolved, the same must prevail over previous ones. It must be emphasized that the laws on the creation of local
government units as well as settling boundary disputes are political in character, hence, can be changed from time to time and
the latest will of the people should always prevail. In the instant case, there is nothing wrong in holding that Regional Trial
Courts no longer have jurisdiction over boundary disputes.
Issue: WON the CA erred in affirming the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Held: No
The RTC correctly dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Under the rules, it was the responsibility of the court to dismiss an
action ―whenever it appears that [it] has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.‖ Indeed, the RTC acted accordingly because at
the time of the filing of the motion to dismiss its want of jurisdiction was evident. It was duty-bound to take judicial notice of the
parameters of its jurisdiction as the choice of the proper forum was crucial – for the decision of a court or tribunal without
jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time by this Court as it would never become final and executory.
Likewise, the standing rule is that dismissal of a case for lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings since jurisdiction is conferred by law and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and
to render judgment on the action; otherwise, the inevitable consequence would make the court’s decision a ―lawless‖ thing. As
correctly pointed out by the RTC it will be a futile act for the Court to rule on the case concerning a boundary dispute if its
decision will not after all be followed by the people concerned because the decision is totally unacceptable to them.
Supporting laws: October 1, 1917 (Revised Administrative Code)- jurisdiction with the provincial boards of the provinces in which
the municipalities are situated; June 17, 1970 (RA 6128)- jurisdiction with the CFI of the Province where the municipalities are
situated; February 10, 1983 (BP 337 or the 1983 Local Government Code); January 1, 1992 (LGC); - Sangguniang
Panlalawigan where the municipalities are situated, appeal with the RTC.
The Sanggunian Panlalawigan has an expanded role in resolving cases of municipal boundary disputes. Aside from having the
function of bringing the contending parties together and intervening or assisting in the amicable settlement of the case, the
SPanlalawigan is now specifically vested with ORIGINAL jurisdiction to actually hear and decide the dispute in accordance with
the procedures laid down in the law and its IRRs. The trial court now has no power to try, at the first instance, cases of municipal
boundary disputes. Only in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction can the proper RTC decide the case, on appeal, should any
party aggrieved by the decision of the Spanlalawigan elevate the same (Mun of Sta Fe v Mun of Aritao 140474 Sept 21, 2007)
G.R. No. 169435

Municipality of Nueva Era vs Municipality of Marcos

FACTS
The Municipality of Nueva Era was created from the settlements of Bugayong, Cabittaoran, Garnaden, Padpadon, Padsan,
Paorpatoc, Tibangran, and Uguis which were previously organized as rancherias, each of which was under the independent
control of a chief. Governor General Francis Burton Harrison, acting on a resolution passed by the provincial government of
Ilocos Norte, united these rancherias and created the township of Nueva Era by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 66 [5]
dated September 30, 1916.
The Municipality of Marcos, on the other hand, was created on June 22, 1963 pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3753 entitled
―An Act Creating the Municipality of Marcos in the Province of Ilocos Norte.‖
There is no issue insofar as the first paragraph is concerned which named only Dingras as the mother municipality of Marcos.
The problem, however, lies in the description of Marcos’ boundaries as stated in the second paragraph, particularly in the
phrase: ―on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary.‖
ISSUE WON the eastern boundary of Marcos extends over and covers a portion of Nueva Era.
HELD
No part of Nueva Era’s territory was taken for the creation of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753. Only the barrios (now barangays) of
Dingras from which Marcos obtained its territory are named in R.A. No. 3753. Since only the barangays of Dingras are
enumerated as Marcos’ source of territory, Nueva Era’s territory is, therefore, excluded. Only Dingras is specifically named by
law as source territory of Marcos. Hence, the said description of boundaries of Marcos is descriptive only of the listed barangays
of Dingras as a compact and contiguous territory. Considering that the description of the eastern boundary of Marcos under R.A.
No. 3753 is ambiguous, the same must be interpreted in light of the legislative intent.

STA. LUCIA REALTY & DEVELOPMENT, INC. vs. City of Pasig G.R. No. 166838, June 15, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. (Sta. Lucia) is the registered owner of several parcels of land with Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 39112, 39110 and 38457, all of which indicated that the lots were located in Barrio Tatlong
Kawayan, Municipality of Pasig. The parcel of land covered by TCT No. 39112 was consolidated with that covered by TCT No.
518403, which was situated in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Municipality of Cainta, Province of Rizal. The two combined lots were
subsequently partitioned into three, for which TCT Nos. 532250, 598424, and 599131, now all bearing the Cainta address, were
issued. TCT No. 39110 was also divided into two lots, becoming TCT Nos. 92869 and 92870. The lot covered by TCT No.
38457 was not segregated, but a commercial building owned by Sta. Lucia East Commercial Center, Inc., a separate
corporation, was built on it.
Upon Pasig’s petition to correct the location stated in TCT Nos. 532250, 598424, and 599131, the Land Registration Court, on
June 9, 1995, ordered the amendment of the TCTs to read that the lots with respect to TCT No. 39112 were located in Barrio
TatlongKawayan, Pasig City. On January 31, 1994, Cainta filed a petition for the settlement of its land boundary dispute with
Pasig before the RTC, Branch 74 of Antipolo City.
On November 28, 1995, Pasig filed a Complaint against Sta. Lucia for the collection of real estate taxes, including penalties and
interests, on the lots covered by TCT Nos. 532250, 598424, 599131, 92869, 92870 and 38457, including the improvements
thereon
Sta. Lucia, in its Answer, alleged that it had been religiously paying its real estate taxes to Cainta, just like what its
predecessors-in-interest did, by virtue of the demands and assessments made and the Tax Declarations issued by Cainta on
the claim that the subject properties were within its territorial jurisdiction.Sta. Lucia further argued that since 1913, the real estate
taxes for the lots covered by the above TCTs had been paid to Cainta.
The RTC ruled in favor of Pasig. Upon Pasig's motion for execution pending appeal, the same was granted by the RTC. The CA
ruled in favor of Sta. Lucia.

ISSUE: Whether Sta. Lucia should continue paying its real property taxes to Cainta, as it alleged to have always done, or to
Pasig, as the location stated in Sta. Lucia’s TCTs.

HELD:
Under Presidential Decree No. 464, or the ―Real Property Tax Code,‖ the authority to collect real property taxes is vested in
the locality where the property is situated. This requisite was reiterated in Republic Act No. 7160, or the Local Government
Code. Thus, while a local government unit is authorized under several laws to collect real estate tax on properties falling under
its territorial jurisdiction, it is imperative to first show that these properties are unquestionably within its geographical boundaries.
The Court cited the case of Mariano, Jr. v Commission on Elections which stated that ―the importance of drawing with precise
strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for
they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government
only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires.‖ Clearly therefore, the local
government unit entitled to collect real property taxes from Sta. Lucia must undoubtedly show that the subject properties are
situated within its territorial jurisdiction; otherwise, it would be acting beyond the powers vested to it by law.
The Pasig RTC should have held in abeyance the proceedings in Civil Case No. 65420, in view of the fact that the outcome of
the boundary dispute case before the Antipolo RTC will undeniably affect both Pasig’s and Cainta’s rights. In fact, the only
reason Pasig had to file a tax collection case against Sta. Lucia was not that Sta. Lucia refused to pay, but that Sta. Lucia had
already paid, albeit to another local government unit. Evidently, had the territorial boundaries of the contending local government
units herein been delineated with accuracy, then there would be no controversy at all. In the meantime, to avoid further
animosity, Sta. Lucia is directed to deposit the succeeding real property taxes due on the subject

Rules of interpretation, (Sec 5, LGC)

*Sec. 5. Rules of Interpretation. In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply:
a. Any provision on a power of local government shall be liberally interpreted its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereof
shall be reserved in favor of devolution of powers and the lower LGU. Any and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the
power shall be interpreted in favor of LGU concerned.
b. In case of doubt, any tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be construed strictly against the LGU enacting it, and liberally in
favor of the tax buyer. Any tax exemption, relief of incentive granted by any LGU pursuant to the provisions of this code shall be
construed strict against the person claiming it.
c. The general welfare provision of this code shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers LGUs in accelerating economic
development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community.
d. Rights and obligations existing on the effective of this code and a rising out contact or any other source of presentation
involving an LGU shall be governed by the original terms conditions of contracts or the law in force at the time such rights were
vested.
e. In the resolution of controversies arising under this code where no legal provision of jurisprudence applies, resort may be had
to the customers and traditions of the place where the controversies took place.

Principle of devolution (See Sec 17 [4] (c) and (i) LGC}

* Sec 17, LGC. Basic Services and Facilities.
a. LGUs shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions
currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices
devolved to them pursuant to this code. Local government shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other
functions and responsibilities as are necessary appropriate or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services
and facilities enumerated herein;
[4] For a city
All the services and facilities of the municipally and province, and in addition thereto, the following:
a. Adequate communication and transportation facilities.
b. Support for education, police and fire services and facilities
b. National agencies or offices concerned shall devolve to LGUs the responsibility for the provision of basic service and facilities
enumerated in this section within six months from the effect of this code

As used in this code the term devolution refers to the act by which the National Government confers power and authority upon
the various LGUs to perform specific functions and responsibilities.
c. The devolution contemplated in this Code shall include the transfer to LGUs of the records ,equipment, and other assets and
personnel of national agencies and offices corresponding to the develop powers, function and responsibilities personnel of said
national agencies or office shall be absorb by the local government units to which they belong or in whose areas they are
assigned to the extend that it is administratively viable as determined by the said oversight community Provided, That the right
accorded to such personnel pursuant to civil service law, rules of similar regulation shall not be impaired Provided for their, That
regional directors who are career service executed officers and other officers of similar rank in the said regional offices who
cannot be absorbed by the LGU shall be retained by the National Government, without any revolution of rank, salary or tenure.

PLAZA II v. CASSION
FACTS The City of Butuan, through its Sanggunian, passed SP Resolution 427-92 authorizing the City Mayor to sign the
―Memorandum of Agreement for the Devolution of the DSWD to the City of Butuan‖. Pursuant to the MoA, Mayor Plaza issued
EO No. 06-92 reconstituting the City Social Services Development Office (CSSDO), devolving or adding thereto 19 additional
DSWD employees headed by Virginia Tuazon as Officer-in-charge. Its office was transferred from the original CSSDO building
to the DSWD building.
Aggrieved by the development, Respondents refused to recognize Tuazon as their new head & to report at the DSWD building
contending that the issuance of EO No. 06-92 & Tuazon‘s designation as the CSSDO‘s Officer-in-charge are illegal.
Respondents failed to report for work despite Mayor Plaza‘s series of orders directing them to do so. Thereafter, they were
administratively charged for grave misconduct & insubordination and were preventively suspended for 60 days.
Upon expiration of their suspension, the respondents informed the Mayor that they are willing to return to work but only to their
old office, not the DSWD building. They also failed to report to Tuazon at the DSWD building despite the Mayor‘s instructions to
do so.
Mayor Plaza then dropped the respondents from the rolls pursuant to the CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38, Series of 1993
which provides that ―officers & employees who are absent for at least 30 days without approved leave…may be
dropped from the service without prior notice.

ISSUE 1. Whether EO No. 06-92 directing the devolution of 19 national DSWD employees to the city DSWD to be headed by
petitioner Tuazon should be upheld as valid.
2. Whether private respondents were denied due process when they were dropped from the rolls.

HELD 1. Sec.17 of the LGC authorizes the devolution of personnel, assets & liabilities, records basic services, and
facilities of a national government agency to LGUs. Under this Code, the term ―devolution‖ refers to the act by which the
government confers power and authority upon the various LGUs to perform specific functions & responsibilities.
Mayor Plaza is empowered to issue EO No. 06-92 in order to give effect to the devolution decreed by the LGC. As the local chief
executive of Butuan City, Mayor Plaza has the authority to reappoint devolved personnel & may designate an employee to take
charge of a department until the appointment of a regular head.
EO No. 06-92 did not violate respondents‘ security of tenure as they were not transferred to another office without their consent.
Transfer is a movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level or salary without break in
service & may be imposed as an administrative penalty. The change of respondents’ place of work from the CSSDO to the
DSWD building is not a transfer. It was only a physical transfer of their office to a new one done in the interest of public service.
2. Dropping from the rolls is not an administrative sanction. Thus, private respondents need not be notified or heard. Their
assertion that they were denied due process is, therefore, untenable.

Republic vs. Daclan

Facts:
Sometime in May 1972, the Agoo Breeding Station was established by the Department of Agriculture, through the Bureau of
Animal Industry (BAI), Region I, for the purpose of breeding cattle that would be distributed to the intended beneficiaries
pursuant to the livelihood program of the national government. In support of the said project, plaintiffs6 executed four documents
denominated as Deed of Donation in favor of defendant Republic of the Philippines donating to the latter four parcels of land.
These parcels of land are located at Barrio Nazareno, Agoo, La Union. The donation was subject to the conditions that these
parcels of land 1) shall be used solely for the establishment of a breeding station, and 2) shall not be used for any other
purpose, except with the previous consent of the donors or their heirs.
Sometime in 1991, the powers and functions of certain government agencies, including those of the Department of Agriculture
(DA), were devolved to the local government units pursuant to Republic Act No. 7160. Thus, defendant Province of La Union
assumed the powers and functions of the DA, in the operation of the breeding station.
In particular, the deeds of donation8 stipulated –
a. That the land herein mentioned shall be used for the establishment of a breeding station and shall not be used for any oth er
purpose, except with the previous consent of the DONOR or his heirs;

xxxx
c. That in case of non-use, abandonment or cessation of the activities of the BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, possession or
ownership shall automatically revert to the DONOR and all permanent improvements existing thereon shall become the property
of the DONOR; x x x9

All in all, the petitioners in G.R. No. 197267 – Federico Daclan, Josefina Collado, Teodoro Daclan, Jose Daclan (the Daclans) –
and several others donated around 13 hectares of land to the Republic. The uniform deeds of donation covering these parcels of
land contained the same conditions, including the above stipulations relative to exclusive purpose/use and automatic reversion.
Sometime after the donations were made, the La Union Medical Center (LUMC) was constructed on a 1.5-hectare portion of the
13-hectare donated property.
In a September 4, 2003 Letter to the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, the Daclans and other donors demanded the
return of their donated lands on the ground that the breeding station has ceased operations and that the land has been
abandoned.
Issue: Whether the Daclans can ask for the return of their donated properties
Held:
Devolution cannot have any effect on the donations made by the Daclans to the Republic. As defined, ―devolution refers to
the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform
specific functions and responsibilities.‖ It includes ―the transfer to local government units of the records, equipment, and other
assets and personnel of national agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers, functions and responsibilities.‖33
While the breeding station may have been transferred to the Province of La Union by the Department of Agriculture as a
consequence of devolution, it remained as such, and continued to function as a breeding station; and the purpose for which the
donations were made remained and was carried out. Besides, the deeds of donation did not specifically prohibit the subsequent
transfer of the donated lands by the donee Republic. The Daclans should bear in mind that ―contracts take effect between the
parties, their assigns and heirs, except in cases where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible
by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. Thus, as a general rule, rights and obligations derived from contract are
transmissible.

The Daclans lament the supposed failure of the Province to provide ―agricultural extension and on-site research services and
facilities‖ as required under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code of 1991, which failure they
believe, constituted a violation of the stipulation contained in the deeds of donation to develop and improve the livestock industry
of the country. Yet this cannot be made a ground for the reversion of the donated lands; on the contrary, to allow such an
argument would condone undue interference by private individuals in the operations of government. The deeds of donation
merely stipulated that the donated lands shall be used for the establishment of a breeding station and shall not be used for any
other purpose, and that in case of non-use, abandonment or cessation of the activities of the BAI, possession or ownership shall
automatically revert to the Daclans. It was never stipulated that they may interfere in the management and operation of the
breeding station. Even then, they could not directly participate in the operations of the breeding station.

Thus, even if the BAI ceased to exist or was abolished as an office, its activities continued when its functions were devolved to
the local government units such as the Province of La Union. It cannot be said that the deeds of donation may be nullified just by
the fact that the BAI became defunct; its functions continued in the government offices/local government units to which said
functions were devolved.

Lastly, the CA cannot validly order the return to the Daclans of the donated 1.5-hectare portion where the LUMC is situated,
because such portion was not donated by them. They admitted that the 1.5-hectare portion where the LUMC is constructed
does not form part of the lands they donated to the government, but belonged to other donors who are not parties to the instant
case. As far as the Daclans are concerned, whatever they donated remains part of the breeding station and so long as it
remains so, no right of reversion accrues to them. Only the original owner-donor of the 1.5-hectare portion where the LUMC is
constructed is entitled to its return.
Badua v. Cordillera Bodong Administration
FACTS: Spouses Leonor and Rosa Badua were occupying a parcel of land in Abra. The said land is being claimed by David
Quema. Quema said he sold the land to a certain Dra. Erotida Valera but then he was able to repurchase the land later from the
same doctor. The Baduas however contend that they were the ones who bought the land from Valera but that they cannot
produce the deed of sale because it was with the vice governor. Quema sued the Baduas not before the regular courts but
rather before the Maeng Tribal Court. The said tribal court is composed of elders respected in the community and that it is
alleged that their decision is likewise respected. The tribal court is also a branch of the Cordillera Bodong Administration. Non-
compliance to the tribal court‘s decision would result to community ostracism. The tribal court resolved the issue by granting the
land to Quema. The Baduas were then ordered to vacate the land. The Baduas refused. Thereafter the Baduas received a
warning order from the Cordillera People‘s Liberation Army (CPLA) – the military branch of the Cordillera Bodong
Administration. This brought fear to the couple which led to Leonor‘s running away and Rosa‘s arrest. They were threatened by
the CPLA hence they appeal before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Maeng Tribal Court is a competent court.
HELD: No, the Maeng Tribal Court is not a competent court. The Cordillera AUTONOMOUS Region never came into existence.
Hence, the Cordillera Bodong Council – which would have received judicial power, granted CAR‘s autonomy – never possessed
judicial power. What we currently have is the Cordillera ADMINISTRATIVE Region. Hence, the Maeng Tribal Council, its
supposed branch, likewise never received judicial power. Therefore, it cannot validly decide on cases, neither can it enforce its
decision.