VII.
Qualifications of Witnesses
A.Mental Incapacity or Immaturity
1.Rule 130, Secs. 20 & 21
Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. — Except as provided in the
next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving,
can make their known perception to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or
conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be
ground for disqualification. (18a)
Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or
immaturity. — The following persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for
examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making
known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them
incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined
and of relating them truthfully. (19a)
2.People v. De Jesus129 SCRA 4 (1984) – Accused raped 28
year old Clara Mina, an unmarried, feeble-minded woman.
W/N Clara Mina allowed to testify? Yes because able to relay
her perception. The court is satisfied that the complainant
can perceive and transmit in her own way her own
perceptions to others. She is a competent witness.
3.People v. Salomon 229 SCRA 402 (1994) – Sylvia Soria was
raped in the rice fields, she was a mental retardate. Her
mental condition did not vitiate her credibility. Her
testimony was positive, clear, plain and coherent. Moreover,
a woman will not expose herself to humiliation of a rape
trail, with attendant publicity.
4.People v. Mendoza 254 SCRA 18 (1996) – burned the
wife, 5 year old son testified. Court allowed the 5 year old’s
son’s testimony because any child, regardless of age, can be a
competent witness if he can perceive, and perceiving, can
make his perception known to others and of relating
truthfully facts respecting which he is examined.
Requirements of a childs competency:
(a) capacity of observation [OBSERVATION]
(b) capacity of recollection [RECOLECTION]
(c) capacity of communication [COMMUNICATION]
“From the mouths of children we can get the truth”. The son
knew his testimony could very well send his father to jail.
B.Spousal Immunity
(1) Rule 130, Section 22
Section 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. — During their
marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against
the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil
case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or
ascendants. (20a)
(2) People v. Castañeda 88 SCRA 562 (1979) – Husband forged
signature of the wife in order to sell a conjugal property. Wife
filed a case for falsification of public documents against her
husband, and she testified. Defense objected on the basis of
spousal immunity. Sustained by lower court. SC said does not
fall under the spousal immunity. It falls under 2nd exception:
crime committed by one against the other. It need not be a
physical wrong (as previously stated in Cargill). Better rule is
that when an offense attacks or vitally impairs the conjugal
relation, it comes wi/in the exception
(3) People v. Francisco 78 Phil. 694 (1947) – “DETENTION
PRISONER ALLOWED TO GO HOME” detention prisoner
allowed to go home, accompanied by guard, killed son, wife
testified against him. SC said that the husband already waived
all his objections to the testimony. It was him who accused his
wife so the wife should be allowed to rebut his allegations.
The reasons for banning the testimony of a spouse against the
other spouse without his/her consent are:
 (1) identity of interest;
(2) the consequent danger of perjury;
(3) policy of the law which deems it necessary to guard the
security and confidences of private life; and
4), because where a want of domestic tranquility exists, there
is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile
testimony of the other
(4) Lezama v. Rodriguez23 SCRA 1166 (1968) – La Paz Ice
plant put under the receivership of Dineros. There was a
judgment of $150k in favor of creditor Roque. Dineros filed an
annulment of judgment against the CFI. Dineros alleges
collusion between husband and wife to obtain said judgment
against La Paz by making it look like there is a valid claim; wife
cannot be compelled to testify against husband as an adverse
party. Only allowed when interests are separate or when the
spouse is merely introduced as a formal party.
(5) Alvarez vs. Ramirez 473 SCRA 72 (2005) – Maximo Alvarez
(husband) charged with arson for burning the house of his
sister-in-law when his estranged wife was there. Court allowed
wife Esperanza to testify, applied the rule in Cargill: when an
offense directly attacks marital relations, it’s treated as an
exception to marital privilege rule. The state has no interest to
preserve marital relations since the husband tried to hurt the
wife when he almost burned the house. And they have been de
facto separated already for 6 months. There was an attack
against the wife.
When marital relations are so strained, Court has no reason to
uphold it.
??? But the attack was
Sir: what if living separately?
C.Dead Man's Statute
 The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the
temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction
in question on the part of the surviving party and further to put
the two parties to a suit upon terms of equality in regard to the
opportunity of giving testimony. It is designed to close the lips
of the party plaintiff when death has closed the lips of the party
defendant, in order to remove from the surviving party the
temptation to falsehood and the possibility of fictitious claims
against the deceased.
(1) Rule 130, Section 23
Section 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse
party. — Parties or assignor of parties to a case, or persons in whose
behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or
other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of
unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such
deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot
testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such
deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.
(2) Guerrero v. St. Claire's Realty & Co.124 SCRA 553 (1983) –
Andres Guerrero became the owner of a land by virtue of a will.
He let his sister Cristina stay on the land. When Andres died,
his heirs wanted to recover land but discovered that the land
was in the name of their cousin Manuel because Cristina sold
the land to them. Heirs of Andres filed a case against the heirs
of Manuel to annul the deed of sale executed to St. Clare’s
Realty. They presented Laura and Cervantes, the heirs of
Cristina, who testified that the land was merely lent to Cristina.
Defendants said that the testimony of witnesses fall under the
dead man’s statute. It does not. Defendants were not executor
or administrator; they were being sued as claimants of the
land. Morever, there was no claim against the estate. Also
witnesses Laura and Cervantes were not parties or assignors.
They were simply witnesses to the transaction.
(3) Abraham v. Recto-Kasten 4 SCRA 298 (1962) – promissory
note executed by Ysmael. There was a claim filed by Florencia
(wife of the of deceased creditor) against estate of Ysmael.
Florencia testified. Counsel of the administratix opposed to the
testimony of Florencia but lengthily cross-examined her as to
the matters she testified about. The Court ruled that there was
a waiver of dead man’s statute due to cross-examination.
(4) Goñi v. CA 144 SCRA 222 (1986) – Villanueva purchased
3 lands from TABACLERA. Cause he didn’t have enough money,
he offered to sell them to Villegas. However, TABACLERA
wanted assurance so Vicente became the guarantor for
Villegas. So Villanueva entered into a contract to sell 3 lands to
Vicente. Nagka pera si Villanueva so he went to Vicente to
cancel the promise to sell. Since nabayaran na ni Vicente, they
just agreed that Vicente will lease the other 2 lands for 5 years.
The payment for lease will be deducted from the amount
Vicente paid. Deed of sale for 3 lots issued to Villlanueva, 2 lots
to Vicente. Villanueva died so intestate proceedings
commenced. Vicente filed a case against estate of Villanueva
for recovery of property (3 fields) on the basis of the contract
to sell. Heirs of Villanueva filed a counterclaim for the delivery
of 2 lands that were delivered to Vicente. Waiver of DMS
because they cross-examined Vicente and filed a counter-claim
against him.
(5) Tongco v. Vianzon 50 Phil. 698 (1927) – Tongco died. 2
cases: 1) cadastral case file by the wife to grant her exclusive
ownership of properties left by Tongco. and 2) recovery of
possession with damages filed by the estate against the wife.
DMS does not apply to the testimony of the wife. Case 1: not
filed against the estate. It was a cadastral case. Case 2: does not
apply because it was an action filed BY the estate, not against it.
(6) Lichauco v. Atlantic Gulf 84 Phil. 330 (1949) – Fitzsimmons
was the president of Atlantic Co. He was one of the largest
stockholders, holding 1000 stocks. OF this 1000 stocks, 545
not paid. Fitzsimmons died. During intestate proceedings,
corporation made a claim on his estate upon his death. He
allegedly owed some money to the Corporation for the unpaid
value of the shares. During the Trial, VP and treasurer testified
as to his account. W/N disqualified? NO. The officers /
stockholders of a corporation are not disqualified from
testifying for or against the Corporation. Does not fall under
DMS. The statute only speaks of parties or assigns.
(7) Razon v. IAC 207 SCRA 234 (1992) - the deceased’s estate
filed a claim against the corporation to recover stock
certificates of Jose Chuidian. Razon testified, saying that it was
he who paid for the stock certificates. And he had possession of
stocks ever since. LC excluded the testimony of Razon because
it applied the DMS. Razon alleged that there was a
misapplication of the DMS. it was held that the DMS did not
apply because it was the estate that filed the claim and the
claim was NOT against the estate.
VIII.Privileged Communications
A.Marital Privilege
(a) Rule 130, Sec. 24(a)
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage,
cannot be examined without the consent of the other as to
any communication received in confidence by one from the
other during the marriage except in a civil case by one
against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed
by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or
ascendants;
(b) People v. Carlos 47 Phil. 626 (1925) – Carlos stabbed the
doctor who treated his wife a fan knife. He submitted himself
to the police the next day but alleged it was in self defense. TC
held that it was murder and was done with evident
premeditation. They presented a letter sent by the wife to the
husband, which says that the wife fears that husband might
resort to physical violence against the doctor. The letters were
obtained by the police. W/N admissible? Yes. For documents of
communication coming into the possession of a third person, a
distinction should obtain, analogous to that already indicated
for a client's communications; i. e., if they were obtained from
the addressee by voluntary delivery, they should still be
privileged (for otherwise the privilege could by collusion be
practically nullified for written communications); but if they
were obtained surreptitiously or otherwise without the
addressee's consent, the privilege should cease. However,
court excluded the evidence because it violates the
constitutional guarantee of being able to confront the witness.
This cannot happen in the case of an unanswered letter.
B. Attorney-Client Privilege
(1) Rule 130, Section 24(b)
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be
examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or
his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to,
professional employment, nor can an attorney's secretary,
stenographer, or clerk (SSC) be examined, without the consent of
the client and his employer [Both CLIENT & EMPLOYER],
concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in
such capacity;
(2) Uy Chico v. Union Life29 Phil. 163 (1915) - Uy Chico was
contesting the power of the estate of his father to compromise
the insurance policies to ½ of its face value. He he owned the
goods and said he did not give such authority. The insurance
company sought to show that Uy Chico gave his consent. BUT
his lawyer testified, saying that the insurance policies were
given to him by Uy Chico for the purpose of compromising. It is
evident that a communication made by a client to his attorney
for the express 
purpose of its being communicated to a third
person is essentially inconsistent with the 
confidential
relation. The attorney was merely acting upon the instructions
of Uy Chico; cannot said to be privileged.
(3 ) Regala v. Sandiganbayan262 SCRA 124 (1996)
GENERAL RULE in our jurisdiction (as well as in the US) is that
a lawyer may NOT invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge
the name or identity of his client.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE:
(1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability
exists that revealing the client’s name would implicate that
client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s
advice.
(2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his
identity is privileged.
(3) Where the government’s lawyers have no case against an
attorney’s client unless, by revealing the client’s name, the said
name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of
testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the
client’s name is privileged.
(4) Barton v. Leyte Asphalt46 Phil. 938 (1924) and Mineral Oil
Co. – Barton was the agent of Leyte Asphalt. It bound itself to
sell products of Leyte. [bituminous limestone]. However, it
sued Leyte for breach bcos it was not able to meet the
demands. So now Leyte presented a letter by Barton to its
lawyer. W/N this falls under the ambit of Atty – Client
privilege? NO. ACP does not extend to a copy of a letter written
by the client to his lawyer which comes into possession of an
adverse party
Dissenting: Compared to the case of Uy Chico, there was no
proof that the client delivered that letter for the purpose of its
being communicated.
(5) Orient Insurance v.54 Phil. 919 (1930) Revilla - contract
for fees are not privileged. Privilege primarily refers to
communications from client to attorney, an idea which of
course includes communications from attorney to client
relative to privileged matters
(6) Hickman v. Taylor 329 U.S. 495 (1947) - “work product
rule”, memoranda, statements and mental impressions of a
lawyer in anticipation of litigation fall outside the scope of the
ACP.
In this case, a boat sank so the owners of the boat employed a
law firm to defend them from potential suits. The lawyer
privately interviewed the survivors and took signed
statements from them. When one of the survivors sued the
owners of the boat, it sent interrogatories to the owners in
order for them to summarize the contents of the statements
taken by the lawyer. The Court held that though it was not
privileged, it formed part of the “work product” of the lawyer,
which cannot be simply produced without
justification/necessity, as it would reveal the mental processes
of the lawyer.
(7) Upjohn Company v. U.S. 449 U.S. 383 (1981) –
Pharmaceutical company’s foreign subsidiary allegedly made
deals with foreign government to secure foreign business. The
company formed an investigation panel to interview the
employees. The government asked for the transcript of such
interviews and questionnaires. The lower Courts applied to
control group test and held that since the employees are not in
the position of control, the ACP not applicable. The SC however
rejected the application of the Control Group test because it
would make it harder for lawyers to obtain information from
employees. Statements made even my lower ranking
employees are covered by the ACP. The Court said that this
falls under the “Work-Product doctrine” wherein the subject
matter would reveal the mental processes of the attorney and
therefore privileged.
(8) In re Grand Jury Investigation732 F.2d 447 (1983)-FBI was
investigating the theft of various checks made payable to IBM.
IBM’s checks were made payable to Durant for payment of
legal services. During the investigation, Durant refused to
reveal the identity of his client, invoking ACP. The Court held
that We have long recognized the general rule that matters
involving the payment of fees and the identity of clients are not
generally privileged. A significant exception to this principle of
non-confidentiality holds that such information may be
privileged when the person invoking the privilege is able to
show that a strong possibility exists that disclosure of the
information would implicate the client in the very matter for
which legal advice was sought in the first case. Exception was
not established.
(9) U.S. v. McPartlin 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir.1979) - sludge
hauling contract; Benton and McPartlin were both co-parties in
this case. Matters that are divulged to a co-party’s counsel with
the understanding that it is a disclosure in confidence remains
to be privileged information.
(10) U.S. v. Gordon-Nikkar 518 F.2d 972 (5th Cir.1975) –
Marchand and Nikkar were charged with possession of cocaine
with intent to distribute. Marchand pleaded guilty, and also
testified as to the statements made by the Atty. Of Nikkar,
which urged them to give perjured statements. This statement
was challenged because of the ACP. Court said that it was not
privileged. Because at that time, there were at least 5 people at
Atty. Estrumsa’s office. So communication divulged to
strangers can hardly be privileged. And even assuming that
these were privileged, these conversations covered an intent to
commit perjury. ACP is not a shield to commit a crime.
(11) U.S. vs. Nobles 422 US 225 (1975) – a black man was
convicted of robbery of a federal bank. He was linked to the
case because of the testimony of 2 witnesses: 1) bank teller 2)
a salesman. The defense wanted to discredit the testimonies of
these 2 eyewitnesses by presenting an investigator who
interviewed these 2 prior to the case. In the interview they said
they only saw the back of the robber and the all black people
looked the same. The investigator made notes on the interview.
The Court asked for these notes to corroborate his testimony.
Invoked ACP. GENERAL RULE IS:
The GR is that the work output doctrine applies to a lawyer’s
records and notes that he makes as he prepares for a case.
However, the reality is that a lawyer uses the aid of
investigators, etc. to help build material to build his case.
Consequently, the doctrine must by extension apply to the
records of investigators and these other persons assisting the
lawyer.
However, the privilege derived from the work product doctrine
is not absolute.
Like other qualified privileges, it may be
waived. Here, respondent sought to adduce the testimony of
the investigator and contrast his recollection of the contested
statements with that of the prosecution's witnesses.
Respondent, by electing to present the investigator as a
witness, waived the privilege with respect to matters covered
in his testimony.
it was held that the WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE is inapplicable
and may be waived when the defense its own investigator as a
witness, thus opening the investigator and the product of his
work, to cross-examination.
(12) People vs. Sandiganbayan 275 SCRA 505 (1997) –
falsified certificate of arraignment. Lawyer testified regarding
this.
Confidential communications relating to past crimes is covered
by the attorney-client privilege. On the other hand, the
announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not
included within the confidences which his attorney is bound to
respect.
(KK: Communication regarding a future crime is not covered
by attorney client-privilege)
While the crime was committed
already (the falsification of the certificate of arraignement),
meaning that it was a past crime, what Sansaet was testifying
 about was communications leading to the commission of such
crime. It was not covered by attorney-client privilege because
it was communication made by a client regarding his intent to
commit a crime.
Hence, such statements by Atty. Sansaet is
not covered by the attorney-client privilege.
He was also a
conspirator in the crime. Communications regarding unlawful
purposes are not covered by the attorney-client privilege.
In
order that a communication between a lawyer and his client
may be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in
furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an unlawful
purpose prevents the privilege from attaching.

IT IS THE LAW WHICH DEFINES WHAT PRIVILEGED IS. So even if confidential,

doesn't necessarily mean PRIVILEGED.