[G.R. No. 133090.

January 19, 2001]

REXIE EFREN A. BUGARING AND ROYAL BECHTEL BUILDERS, INC., petitioners, vs. HON.
DOLORES S. ESPAOL, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, respondent.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of
Appeals[1] affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite,
declaring petitioner Rexie Efren A. Bugaring guilty in direct contempt of court.

The incident subject of the petition occurred during a hearing held on December 5, 1996 of Civil
Case No. 1266-96 entitled Royal Becthel[2] Builders, Inc. vs. Spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz
Alvaran, et al., for Annulment of Sale and Certificates of Title, Specific Performance and Damages
with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order in the sala of respondent
judge Dolores S. Espaol of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite.

Pursuant to a motion filed by the previous counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., the trial court
issued an order on February 27, 1996 directing the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite to
annotate at the back of certain certificates of title a notice of lis pendens. Before the Register of
Deeds of the Province of Cavite could comply with said order, the defendant Spouses Alvaran on
April 15, 1996, filed a motion to cancel lis pendens. On July 19, 1996, petitioner, the newly
appointed counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., filed an opposition to the motion to cancel lis
pendens. On August 16, 1996, the motion to cancel lis pendens was granted by the court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the defendants. On November
5, 1996, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve, and on November 6, 1996, filed a Rejoinder
to Opposition and a Motion for Contempt of Court.[3]
During the hearing of the motion for contempt of court held on December 5, 1996, the following
incident transpired:
ATTY. BUGARING: For the plaintiff, your Honor, we are ready.
ATTY CORDERO: Same appearance for the defendant, your Honor.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, we are ready with respect to the prosecution of our motion
for contempt, your Honor. May we know from the record if the Register of Deeds is properly notified
for todays hearing.
COURT: Will you call on the Register of Deeds.
INTERPRETER: Atty. Diosdado Concepcion, He is here, your Honor.
ATTY. BUGARING: We are ready, your Honor.
COURT: There is a motion for contempt in connection with the order of this Court which directed
your office to register lis pendens of the complaint in connection with this case of Royal Becthel
Builder, Inc. versus spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz Alvaran, et al.
ATTY. CONCEPCION: Your Honor, I just received this morning at ten o clock [in the morning] the
subpoena.
ATTY. BUGARING: May we put it on record that as early as November 6, 1996, the Office of the
Register of Deeds was furnished with a copy of our motion, your Honor please, and the record will
bear it out. Until now they did not file any answer, opposition or pleadings with respect to this
motion.
ATTY. CONCEPCION: Well I was not informed because I am not the Register of Deeds. I am only
the Deputy Register of Deeds and I was not informed by the receiving clerk of our office regarding
this case. As a matter of fact I was surprised when I received this morning the subpoena, your
Honor.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, may we put that on record that the manifestation of the
respondent that he was not informed.
COURT: That is recorded. This is a Court of record and everything that you say here is recorded.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes your Honor please, we know that but we want to be specific because we
will be [filing] a case against this receiving clerk who did not [inform] him your Honor please, with
this manifestation of the Deputy of the Register of Deeds that is irregularity in the performance of
the official duty of the clerk not to inform the parties concerned.
COURT: Counsel, the Court would like to find out who this fellow who is taking the video recording
at this proceedings. There is no permission from this Court that such proceedings should be taken.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor, my Assistant. I did not advise him to take a video he just
accompanied me this morning.
COURT: Right, but the video recording is prepared process and you should secure the permission
of this Court.
ATTY. BUGARING: Actually, I did not instruct him to take some video tape.
COURT: Why would he be bringing camera if you did not give him the go signal that shots should
be done.
ATTY. BUGARING: This Court should not presume that, your Honor please, we just came from an
occasion last night and I am not yet come home, your Honor please. I could prove your Honor
please, that the contents of that tape is other matters your Honor please. I was just surprised why
he took video tape your Honor please, that we ask the apology of this Court if that offend this Court
your Honor please.
COURT: It is not offending because this is a public proceedings but the necessary authority or
permission should be secured.
ATTY. BUGARING: In fact I instructed him to go out, your Honor.
COURT: After the court have noticed that he is taking a video tape.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, in fact that is not my personal problem your Honor please,
that is personal to that guy your Honor please if this representation is being .
COURT: That is very shallow, dont give that alibi.
ATTY. BUGARING: At any rate, your Honor please, we are going to mark our documentary
evidence as part of our motion for contempt, your Honor please.
COURT: What has the Register of Deeds got to say with this matter?
ATTY. CONCEPCION: Well as I have said before, I have not received any motion regarding this
contempt you are talking. I am willing now to testify.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor I am still of the prosecution stage, it is not yet the defense. This is a
criminal proceedings, contempt proceedings is a criminal.
ATTY. CONCEPCION: Your Honor please, may I ask for the assistance from the Fiscal.
COURT: If this is going to proceed, we need the presence of a Fiscal or a counsel for the Register
of Deeds.
ATTY. CONCEPCION: Can I appoint an outside lawyer not a Fiscal but a private counsel, your
Honor.
COURT: That is at your pleasure. The Court will consider that you should be amply represented.
ATTY. CONCEPCION: As a matter of fact I have a lawyer here, Atty. Barzaga if he is willing
ATTY. BARZAGA[4]: Yes, your Honor, I will just review the records.
ATTY. BUGARING: Anyway your Honor please, I will not yet present my witness but I will just mark
our documentary exhibits which are part of the record of the case and thereafter your Honor
please.
COURT: You wait for a minute counsel because there is a preparation being done by newly
appointed counsel of the respondent, Atty. Barzaga is considered as the privately hired counsel of
the register of deeds and the respondent of this contempt proceedings. How much time do you
need to go over the record of this case so that we can call the other case in the meanwhile.
ATTY. BARZAGA: Second call, your Honor.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------
COURT: Are you ready Atty. Barzaga?
ATTY. BARZAGA: Yes, your Honor. Well actually your Honor, after reviewing the record of the case
your Honor, I noticed that the motion for contempt of Court was filed on November 6, 1966 and in
paragraph 6 thereof, your Honor it is stated that, the record of the case shows up to the filing of this
motion, the Register as well as the Deputy Register Diosdado Concepcion of the Office of the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, did not comply with the Court Orders dated February
27, 1996, March 29, 1996, respectively. However, your Honor, Atty. Diosdado Concepcion has
shown to me a letter coming from Atty. Efren A. Bugaring dated September 18, 1996 addressed to
the Register regarding this notice of Lis Pendens pertaining to TCT Nos. T-519248, 519249 and
519250 and this letter request, your Honor for the annotation of the lis pendens clearly shows that
it has been already entered in the book of primary entry. We would like also to invite the attention
of the Hon. Court that the Motion for Contempt of Court was filed on November 6, 1996. The letter
for the annotation of the lis pendens was made by the counsel for the plaintiff only on September
18, 1996, your Honor. However, your Honor, as early as August 16, 1996 an Order has already
been issued by the Hon. Court reading as follows, Wherefore in view of the above, the motion of
the defendant is GRANTED and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, is hereby directed
to CANCEL the notice of lis pendens annotated at the back of Certificate of Title Nos. 519248,
51949 (sic) and 51950 (sic).
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, may we proceed your Honor, will first mark our
documentary evidence.
COURT: You wait until the Court allows you to do what you want to do, okay. The counsel has just
made manifestation, he has not prayed for anything. So let us wait until he is finished and then wait
for the direction of this Court what to do to have an orderly proceedings in this case.
ATTY. BARZAGA: Considering your Honor, that the issues appear to be a little bit complicated your
Honor, considering that the order regarding the annotation of the lis pendens has already been
revoked by the Hon. Court your Honor, we just request that we be given a period of ten days from
today your Honor, within which to submit our formal written opposition your Honor.
COURT: Counsel, will you direct your attention to the manifestation filed earlier by Atty. Tutaan in
connection with the refusal of the Register of Deeds to annotate the lis pendens because of certain
reasons. According to the manifestation of Atty. Tutaan and it is appearing in the earlier part of the
record of this case, the reason for that is because there was a pending subdivision plan, it is so
stated. I think it was dated March, 1996. May I have the record please.
ATTY. BARZAGA: Yes, your Honor.
COURT: This Court would like to be enlightened with respect to that matter.
ATTY. BARZAGA: Well, according to Atty. Diosdado Concepcion he could already explain this, your
Honor.
COURT: Have it properly addressed as part of the manifestation so that this court can be guided
accordingly. Because this Court believes that the root of the matter started from that. After the
submission of the . what are you suppose to submit?
ATTY. BARZAGA: Comment your Honor, on the motion to cite Atty. Diosdado Concepcion in
contempt of Court.
COURT: After the submission of the Comment and furnishing a copy of the comment to the
counsel for the plaintiff, this Court is going to give the counsel for the plaintiff an equal time within
which to submit his reply.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, it is the position of this representation your Honor please,
that we will be marking first our documentary evidence because this is set for hearing for today,
your Honor please.
COURT: If you are going to mark your evidence and they do not have their comment yet what are
we going to receive as evidence.
ATTY. BUGARING: If your Honor please
COURT: Will you listen to the Court and just do whatever you have to do after the submission of
the comment.
ATTY. BUGARING: I am listening, your Honor please, but the record will show that the motion for
contempt was copy furnished with the Register of Deeds and Diosdado Concepcion.
COURT: Precisely, if you are listening then you will get what the Court would want to do. This
should be an orderly proceedings and considering that this is a Court of record the comment has to
be in first then in your reply you can submit your evidence to rebut the argument that is going to be
put up by the respondent and so we will be able to hear the case smoothly.
ATTY. BUGARING: My point here your Honor please, is that the respondent had been long time
furnished of this contempt proceedings. With a copy of the motion they should have filed it in due
time in accordance with the rules and because it is scheduled for trial, we are ready to mark our
evidence and present to this Court, your Honor.
COURT: (Banging the gavel) Will you listen.
ATTY. BUGARING: I am listening, your Honor.
COURT: And this Court declares that you are out of order.
ATTY. BUGARING: Well, if that is the contention of the Court your Honor please, we are all officers
of the Court, your Honor, please, we have also ---- and we know also our procedure, your Honor.
COURT: If you know your procedure then you follow the procedure of the Court first and then do
whatever you want.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor please, because we could feel the antagonistic approach of
the Court to this representation ever since I appeared your Honor please and I put on record that I
will be filing an inhibition to this Hon. Court.
COURT: Do that right away. (Banging the gavel)
ATTY. BUGARING: Because we could not find any sort of justice in town.
COURT: Do that right away.
ATTY. BUGARING: We are ready to present our witness and we are deprive to present our
witness.
COURT: You have presented a witness and it was an adverse witness that was presented.
ATTY. BUGARING: I did not.
COURT: With respect to this, the procedure of the Court is for the respondent to file his comment.
ATTY. BUGARING: Well your Honor please, at this point in time I dont want to comment on
anything but I reserve my right to inhibit this Honorable Court before trying this case.
COURT: You can do whatever you want.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, that is our prerogative your Honor.
COURT: As far as this Court is concerned it is going to follow the rules.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, we know all the rules.
COURT: Yes, you know your rules thats why you are putting the cart ahead of the horse.
ATTY. BUGARING: No your Honor, Ive been challenged by this Court that I know better than this
Court. Modestly (sic) aside your Honor please, Ive been winning in many certiorari cases, your
Honor.
COURT: Okay, okay, do that, do that. I am going to cite you for contempt of Court. (Banging the
gavel) You call the police and I am going to send this lawyer in jail. (Turning to the Sheriff)
ATTY. BUGARING: I am just manifesting and arguing in favor of my client your Honor please.
COURT: You have been given enough time and you have been abusing the discretion of this Court.
ATTY. BUGARING: I am very sorry your Honor, if that is the appreciation of the Court but this is
one way I am protecting my client, your Honor.
COURT: That is not the way to protect your client that is an abuse of the discretion of this Court.
(Turning to the Sheriff) Will you see to it that this guy is put in jail. (pp. 29-42. Rollo)

Hence, in an Order dated December 5, 1996, Judge Espaol cited petitioner in direct contempt of
court, thus:
During the hearing of this case, plaintiffs and counsel were present together with one (1) operating
a video camera who was taking pictures of the proceedings of the case while counsel, Atty. Rexie
Efren Bugaring was making manifestation to the effect that he was ready to mark his documentary
evidence pursuant to his Motion to cite (in contempt of court) the Deputy Register of Deeds of
Cavite, Diosdado Concepcion.
The Court called the attention of said counsel who explained that he did not cause the appearance
of the cameraman to take pictures, however, he admitted that they came from a function, and that
was the reason why the said cameraman was in tow with him and the plaintiffs. Notwithstanding
the flimsy explanation given, the counsel sent out the cameraman after the Court took exception to
the fact that although the proceedings are open to the public and that it being a court of record, and
since its permission was not sought, such situation was an abuse of discretion of the Court.
When the respondent, Deputy Register of Deeds Concepcion manifested that he needed the
services of counsel and right then and there appointed Atty. Elpidio Barzaga to represent him, the
case was allowed to be called again. On the second call, Atty. Bugaring started to insist that he be
allowed to mark and present his documentary evidence in spite of the fact that Atty. Barzaga was
still manifesting that he be allowed to submit a written pleading for his client, considering that the
Motion has so many ramifications and the issues are complicated.
At this point, Atty. Bugaring was insisting that he be allowed to mark his documentary evidence and
was raring to argue as in fact he was already perorating despite the fact that Atty. Barzaga has not
yet finished with his manifestation. As Atty. Bugaring appears to disregard orderly procedure, the
Court directed him to listen and wait for the ruling of the Court for an orderly proceeding.
While claiming that he was listening, he would speak up anytime he felt like doing so. Thus, the
Court declared him out of order, at which point, Atty. Bugaring flared up and uttered words insulting
the Court; such as: that he knows better than the latter as he has won all his cases of certiorari in
the appellate Courts, that he knows better the Rules of Court; that he was going to move for the
inhibition of the Presiding Judge for allegedly being antagonistic to his client, and other invectives
were hurled to the discredit of the Court.

Thus, in open court, Atty. Bugaring was declared in direct contempt and order the Courts sheriff to
arrest and place him under detention.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and the fact that Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring committed an
open defiance, even challenging the Court in a disrespectful, arrogant, and contumacious manner,
he is declared in direct contempt of Court and is sentenced to three (3) days imprisonment and
payment of a fine of P3,000.00. His detention shall commence immediately at the Municipal Jail of
Imus, Cavite.[5]
Pursuant to said Order, the petitioner served his three (3) day sentence at the Imus Municipal Jail,
and paid the fine of P3,000.00.[6]

While serving the first day of his sentence on December 5, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order citing him in direct contempt of court. The next day, December 6,
1996, petitioner filed another motion praying for the resolution of his motion for reconsideration.
Both motions were never resolved and petitioner was released on December 8, 1996.[7]

To clear his name in the legal circle and the general public, petitioner filed a petition before the
Court of Appeals praying for the annulment of the Order dated December 5, 1996 citing him in
direct contempt of court and the reimbursement of the fine of P3,000.00 on grounds that
respondent Judge Dolores S. Espaol had no factual and legal basis in citing him in direct contempt
of court, and that said Order was null and void for being in violation of the Constitution and other
pertinent laws and jurisprudence.[8]

The Court of Appeals found that from a thorough reading of the transcript of stenographic notes of
the hearing held on December 5, 1996, it was obvious that the petitioner was indeed arrogant, at
times impertinent, too argumentative, to the extent of being disrespectful, annoying and sarcastic
towards the court.[9] It affirmed the order of the respondent judge, but found that the fine of
P3,000.00 exceeded the limit of P2,000.00 prescribed by the Rules of Court,[10] and ordered the
excess of P1,000.00 returned to petitioner. On March 6, 1998, it rendered judgment, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed order dated
December 5, 1996 issued by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the
excess fine of P1,000.00 is ORDERED RETURNED to the petitioner.
Before us, petitioner ascribes to the Court of Appeals this lone error:
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE ASSAILED
ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH TO PETITIONERS SUBMISSIONS SMACKS OF
OPPRESSION AND ABUSE OF AUTHORITY, HENCE IT COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF
LAW IN ITS QUESTIONED DECISION.
Petitioner insists that a careful examination of the transcript of stenographic notes of the subject
proceedings would reveal that the contempt order issued by respondent judge had no factual and
legal basis. It would also show that he was polite and respectful towards the court as he always
addressed the court with the phrase your honor please.
We disagree.
Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as amended by Administrative Circular No. 22-95
provides:
Direct contempt punished summarily. - A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near
a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect
toward the court or judge, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer
as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be
summarily adjudged in contempt by such court or judge and punished by a fine not exceeding two
thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a superior court, or a
judge thereof, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one
(1) day, or both, if it be an inferior court.
We agree with the statement of the Court of Appeals that petitioners alleged deference to the trial
court in consistently addressing the respondent judge as your Honor please throughout the
proceedings is belied by his behavior therein:
1. the veiled threat to file a petition for certiorari against the trial court (pp. 14-15, tsn, December 5,
1996; pp. 41-42, Rollo) is contrary to Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates that a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts.
2. the hurled uncalled for accusation that the respondent judge was partial in favor of the other
party (pp. 13-14, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 40-41, Rollo) is against Rule 11.04, Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers from attributing to a judge motives not
supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.
3. behaving without due regard to the trial courts order to maintain order in the proceedings (pp.
9-13, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 36-40, Rollo) is in utter disregard to Canon 1 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics which makes it a lawyers duty to maintain towards the courts (1) respectful
attitude in order to maintain its importance in the administration of justice, and Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to observe and maintain the respect
due to the Courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
4. behaving without due regard or deference to his fellow counsel who at the time he was making
representations in behalf of the other party, was rudely interrupted by the petitioner and was not
allowed to further put a word in edgewise (pp. 7-13, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 34-39, Rollo) is
violative of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Canon 22 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics which obliges a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues, and
5. the refusal of the petitioner to allow the Registrar of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, through
counsel, to exercise his right to be heard (Ibid) is against Section 1 of Article III, 1997 Constitution
on the right to due process of law, Canon 18 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which mandates
a lawyer to always treat an adverse witness with fairness and due consideration, and Canon 12 of
Code of Professional Responsibility which insists on a lawyer to exert every effort and consider it
his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

The Court cannot therefore help but notice the sarcasm in the petitioners use of the phrase your
honor please. For, after using said phrase he manifested utter disrespect to the court in his
subsequent utterances. Surely this behavior from an officer of the Court cannot and should not be
countenanced, if proper decorum is to be observed and maintained during court proceedings.[12]
Indeed, the conduct of petitioner in persisting to have his documentary evidence marked to the
extent of interrupting the opposing counsel and the court showed disrespect to said counsel and
the court, was defiant of the courts system for an orderly proceeding, and obstructed the
administration of justice. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential
to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders,
and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice.[13] Direct
contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge, as in the case at bar, and
can be punished summarily without hearing.[14] Hence, petitioner cannot claim that there was
irregularity in the actuation of respondent judge in issuing the contempt order inside her chamber
without giving the petitioner the opportunity to defend himself or make an immediate
reconsideration. The records show that petitioner was cited in contempt of court during the hearing
in the sala of respondent judge, and he even filed a motion for reconsideration of the contempt
order on the same day.[15]
Petitioner argued that while it might appear that he was carried by his emotions in espousing
the case of his client - by persisting to have his documentary evidence marked despite the
respondent judges contrary order - he did so in the honest belief that he was bound to
protect the interest of his client to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence.
The Court of Appeals aptly stated:
But a lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his clients cause (Buenaseda v. Flavier, 226
SCRA 645, 656). He should not forget that he is an officer of the court, bound to exert every effort
and placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice pursuant to
Canon 12, Canons of Professional Responsibility (Gomez v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis
City, 249 SCRA 432, 439). He should not , therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the
ends of justice per Rule 10.03. Canon 10 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, or unduly
delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes, in accordance with
Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the same Canons (Ibid).
Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of
justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice
contravenes such lawyers duty.[16]
Although respondent judge was justified in citing petitioner in direct contempt of court, she erred in
imposing a fine in the amount of P3,000.00 which exceeded the ceiling of P2,000.00 under
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 22-95 which took effect on November 16, 1995. It was
not established that the fine was imposed in bad faith. The Court of Appeals thus properly ordered
the return of the excess of P1,000.00. Aside from the fine, the three days imprisonment meted out
to petitioner was justified and within the 10-day limit prescribed in Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court, as amended.
It is our view and we hold, therefore, that the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error
in its assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite is ordered to return to the
petitioner, Rexie Efren A. Bugaring, the sum of P1,000.00 out of the original fine of P3,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

Whether or not Atty. Bugaring was properly declared in contempt of court? YES
G.R. No. L-36800 October 21, 1974
JORGE MONTECILLO and QUIRICO DEL MAR, petitioners,
vs.
FRANCISCO M. GICA, MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, JOSE N. LEUTERIO, and RAMON G.
GAVIOLA, Justices of the Court of Appeals, respondents. In Re Quirico del Mar, For
Disciplinary action as member of the Philippine Bar, respondent.

ESGUERRA, J.:p
Petitioner Atty. Quirico del Mar of Cebu City in G. R. No. L-36800, and as respondent in contempt
proceedings both in the Court of Appeals and in this Court, virtually focused the limelight on himself
and relegated to insignificance the limelight on himself and relegated to insignificance the principal
issue raised in the petition for certiorari to review the entitled "Francisco M. Gica vs. Hon. Santiago
O. Tañada, et al" which was denied due course by this Court's resolution dated May 14, 1973, for
lack of merit.
Although the petition for certiorari has been denied, it becomes imperatively necessary to elucidate
upon the antecedents of this case even if Our only justification in so doing is to seek a reason or
motive for the acts of contempt perpetrated by respondent Quirico del Mar that might serve to
lighten the enormity of his wrongdoing as a member of the Bar.
As a result of an alleged slander committed by Jorge Montecillo on Francisco M. Gica (the former
allegedly calling the latter "stupid" or a "fool'), Mr. Gica filed a criminal complaint for oral defamation
against Montecillo (Criminal Case No. R-28782 in Branch VII of the Cebu City Court) and a case
for damages arising from the same incident (Civil Case No. R-13075 in Branch VI of the Cebu City
Court). Montecillo was acquitted in Criminal Case No. R-28782, and in Civil Case No. R-13075, the
Cebu City Court found that Montecillo did not call Gica "stupid". Finding the counter-claim of
Montecillo meritorious, the City Court rendered judgment against Gica for him to pay Montecillo
five hundred pesos as moral damages, two hundred pesos as compensatory damages and three
hundred pesos as attorney's fees, plus costs.
Francisco Gica appealed from the decision of the City Court of Cebu in Civil Case No. R-13075 to
the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by Hon. Santiago O. Tañada but the Court of First
Instance upheld the decision of the City Court. The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals
by petition for review by petitioner Francisco M. Gica and it was docketed therein as CA-G.R. No.
46504-R.
The Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals in a decision penned by the Hon. Magno S. Gatmaitan
and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr. (promulgated
on Sept. 27, 1972), reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu; ruled in favor of
petitioner Gica on the ground that the preponderance of evidence favored petitioner Francisco M.
Gica on the principle that positive must prevail over the negative evidence, and that "some words
must have come from Montecillo's lips that were insulting to Gica". The appellate court concluded
that its decision is a vindication of Gica and instead, awarded him five hundred pesos as damages.
It is from this point that trouble began for respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar when, as counsel for
Montecillo, he moved for a reconsideration of the Appellate Court's decision with a veiled threat by
mentioning the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "Knowingly rendering unjust judgment"
and "judgment rendered through negligence", and the innuendo that the Court of Appeals allowed
itself to be deceived. When the Appellate Court denied the motion for reconsideration in its
Resolution of October 24, 1972, it observed that the terminology of the motion insinuated that the
Appellate Court rendered an unjust judgment, that it abetted a falsification and it permitted itself to
be deceived. It admonished Atty. del Mar to remember that threats and abusive language cannot
compel any court of justice to grant reconsideration. Respondent del Mar persisted and in his
second motion for reconsideration, filed without leave of court, made another threat by stating that
"with almost all penal violations placed under the jurisdiction of the President of the Philippines,
particularly Articles 171, 204 and 205 of the Revised Penal Code, as Commander in Chief of the
AFP, by virtue of the proclamation of martial law, the next appeal that will he interposed, will be to
His Excellency, the President of the Philippines."
The Appellate Court in its resolution of Nov. 27, 1972, noticed that notwithstanding its admonition in
its resolution of Oct. 24, 1972, for Atty. del Mar to refrain from abusive language and threats, he
reiterated his threats, and that the Appellate Court, impelled to assert its authority, ordered
respondent del Mar to explain within 10 days (and to appear on January 10, 1973) why he should
not be punished for contempt of court.
On December 5, 1972, respondent del Mar made a written explanation wherein he said that the
Appellate Court could not be threatened and he was not making any threat but only informing the
Appellate Court of the course of action he would follow. On the same date, respondent sent a letter
to the Justices of the 4th Division of the Court of Appeals informing them that he sent a letter to the
President of the Philippines, furnishing them a copy thereof, and requesting the Justices to take
into consideration the contents of said letter during the hearing of the case scheduled for January
10, 1973. Not content with that move, on December 8, 1972, respondent sent another letter to the
same Justices of the Court of Appeals wherein he reminded them of a civil case he instituted
against Justices of the Supreme Court for damages in the amount of P200,000 for a decision
rendered not in accordance with law and justice, stating that he would not like to do it again but
would do so if provoked. We pause here to observe that respondent del Mar seems to be of that
frame of mind whereby he considers as in accordance with law and justice whatever he believes to
be right in his own opinion and as contrary to law and justice whatever does not accord with his
views. In other words, he would like to assume the role of this Court, personally and individually, in
the interpretation and construction of the laws, evaluation of evidence and determination of what is
in accordance with law and justice.

The documented incidents as narrated in the Appellate Court's Resolution of March 5, 1973,
cannot more eloquently depict the very manifest and repeated threats of respondent del Mar to
bludgeon the Justices of the Fourth Davison into reconsidering its decision which happened to be
adverse to respondent's client. Respondent del Mar, instead of presenting lucid and forceful
arguments on the merits of his plea for a reconsideration to convince the Justices of the Fourth
Division of the alleged error in their decision, resorted to innuendos and veiled threats, even
casting downright aspersion on the Justices concerned by insinuating that for their decision they
could be criminally and civilly liable for knowingly rendering unjust judgment, or doing it through
ignorance.

We quote with approval this portion of the Appellate Court's Resolution (March 5, 1973):
A just man can never be threatened, p. 145, rollo, is not at all true; any man, just or unjust, can be
threatened; if he is unjust, he will succumb, if he is just, he will not, but the offense is committed,
whether the threats do or do not succeed. As to his (respondent del Mar's reference to the New
Society, p. 150, in his letter to his Excellency, complaining against those justices, let it be said that
precisely it was under the Former Society that there had been so much disrespect for the
constituted authorities, there was abuse, worse than abuse, there was arrogant abuse, of the so-
called civil liberties, against the authorities, including the courts, not excluding even the President;
it is this anarchy that is the program to cure in the New.

This Resolution of the Appellate Court of March 5, 1973, fittingly concluded that "counsel del Mar is
found guilty of contempt and condemned to pay a fine of P200.00 and ordered suspended from the
practice of law and pursuant to Sec. 9 of Rule 139, let certified copies of these papers be elevated
to the Honorable Supreme Court". We upheld the Court of Appeals and gave full force and effect to
this order of suspension from the practice of law when in Our resolution dated Nov. 19, 1973, the
Judicial Consultant of this Court was directed to circularize all courts about the order of the Court of
Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law.

Not satisfied with the wrong that he had already done against Associate Justices Magno S.
Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon Gaviola, Jr., respondent del Mar sued the three Justices
for damages in Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, trying to hold them
liable for their decision in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R; that the case for damages (R-13277)was
terminated by compromise agreement after Mr. del Mar himself moved for the dismissal of his
complaint apologized to the Court of Appeals and the Justices concerned, and agreed to pay
nominal moral damages in favor of the defendants-justices. This is the undeniable indication that
respondent del Mar did not only threaten the three Justices of the Appellate Court but he actually
carried out his threat, although he did not succeed in making them change their minds in the case
they decided in accordance with the exercise of their judicial discretion emanating from pure
conviction.

To add insult to injury, respondent del Mar had the temerity to file his motion on October 10, 1973,
before Us, asking that his suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals be
ignored because of the amicable settlement reached in Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu which was the action for damages filed against the three Justices of the
Appellate Court.

Respondent del Mar's ire at the Appellate Court, fanned by the wind of frustration, turned against
Us when We denied on May 14, 1973, his petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Appellate Court, G. R. No. L-36800, for on May 25, 1973, he filed his motion for reconsideration
and wrote a letter addressed to the Clerk of this Court requesting the names of the Justices of this
Court who supported the resolution denying his petition, together with the names of the Justices
favoring his motion for reconsideration. This motion for reconsideration We denied for lack of merit
in Our resolution dated June 15, 1973. He, then, filed a manifestation dated July 1, 1973, before
Us, stating brazenly, among other things, "I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of
Court furnished me with certified true copies of the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court
confirming the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge
Montecillo, I would have filed against the Justices supporting the same, civil and criminal suit as I
did to the Justices of the Court of Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by
Mr. Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the City Court and the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
not with a view to obtaining a favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of exposing to the
people the corroding evils extant in our Government, so that they may well know them and work for
their extermination" (Emphasis supplied. In one breath and in a language certainly not
complimentary to the Appellate Court and to Us, respondent del Mar again made his veiled threat
of retribution aimed at the Appellate Court and at Us for Our judicial acts in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R
and G. R. No. L-36800.

Our immediate reaction to this manifestation, dictated by the impulse of placing on a pedestal
beyond suspicion the integrity and honor of this Court and that of any of our other courts of justice,
was to require by Resolution of July 16, 1973, respondent del Mar to show cause why disciplinary
action should not be taken against him for the contemptuous statements contained in his
manifestation.

At this juncture, We pause to reexamine the act of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R
and our own in G. R. No. L-36800 to determine what error we might have committed to generate
such a vengeful wrath of respondent del Mar which drove him to make his contemptuous
statements.

The crucial issue in the case of oral defamation filed by Francisco M. Gica against Jorge Montecillo
is as to what was the statement really uttered by Montecillo on the occasion in question —
"binuang man gud na" (That act is senseless or done without thinking) or "buang man gud na
siya" (He is foolish or stupid). If the statement uttered was the former, Montecillo should be
exonerated; if the latter, he would be liable. The Appellate Court on evaluating the evidence ruled
that the preponderance thereof favored Gica "on the principle that the positive evidence must
prevail over the negative" and, therefore, what was really uttered by Montecillo on that occasion
was "buang man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid), thus making him liable for oral defamation.
When We denied in G. R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the Appellate Court's
decision in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R, We did so because We could find no reason for disturbing the
Appellate Court's finding and conclusion on the aforementioned lone question of fact which would
warrant overturning its decision.
On July 13, 1973, Our resolution of May 14, 1973, denying the petition for review on certiorari of
the decision of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R, became final and executory and the
Court of Appeals was so informed.
To Our resolution of July 16, 1973, requiring respondent del Mar to show cause why he should not
be disciplined for his statements contained in his manifestation of July 1, 1973, he submitted an
explanation dated August 1, 1973, wherein he stated that "..., he is attaching hereto the criminal
case he filed with the President of the Philippines (copy marked as Annex "A") and the civil case he
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (copy marked as Annex "B") against Justices
Magno S. Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr., which embody the corroding
evils he complained of as extant in the Government needing correction. He would have followed
suit were it not for the fact that he is firmly convinced that human efforts in this direction will be
fruitless. As manifested, he, therefore, decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion
leaving to God the filling-up of human deficiencies" (Emphasis supplied).

This so-called explanation is more, in its tenor, of a defiant justification of his contemptuous
statements contained in the manifestation of July 1, 1973. Its contents reveal a continued veiled
threat against the Justices of this Court who voted to deny del Mar's petition for review on certiorari
of the decision of the Court of Court Appeals in CA-G R. No. 46504-R.
Our resolution of September 4, 1973, required respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar to appear
personally at the hearing of his explanation on November 5, 1973. On September 26, 1973,
respondent filed an additional explanation with this Court, wherein he stated, among other things:
"Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the Government. It is this state of
things that convinced me that all human efforts to correct and/or reform the said evils will be
fruitless and, as stated in my manifestation to you, I have already decided to retire from a life of
militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling-up of human deficiencies."

Again We noticed that the tenor of this additional explanation is a toned-down justification(as
compared to his explanation of August 1, 1973) of his previous contemptuous statements without
even a hint of apology or regret. Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft,
corruption and injustice allegedly rampant in and outside of the government as justification for his
contemptuous statements. In other words, he already assumed by his own contemptuous
utterances that because there is an alleged existence of rampant corruption, graft, and injustice in
and out of the government, We, by Our act in G. R. No. L-36800, are among the corrupt, the
grafters and those allegedly committing injustice. We are at a complete loss to follow respondent
del Mar's logic and We certainly should, with understanding condescension, commiserate in the
pitiable state of mind of a brother in the legal profession who seems to have his reasoning and
sense of proportion blurred or warped by an all-consuming obsession emanating from a one-track
mind that only his views are absolutely correct and those of others are all wrong.

When this Court in the resolution dated November 19, 1973, directed the Judicial Consultant to
circularize to all courts concerning the order of the Court of Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico del
Mar from the practice of law, respondent del Mar filed a motion for reconsideration on December
12, 1973, requesting Us to reconsider said directive. In Our resolution dated December 17, 1973,
respondent del Mar, after he had been interpellated by the Court, was given a period of five days to
submit a memorandum in support of his explanation. In view of respondent's manifestation that
there was no need for further investigation of the facts involved, in accordance with Section 29 of
Rule 138, We resolved that the matter be deemed submitted for decision.

In the memorandum entitled "Explanation" dated December 20, 1973, respondent del Mar stated
that he suffered repeated strokes of high blood pressure which rendered him dizzy and unstable
mentally and physically; that his sight is blurred and his reasoning is faulty; he easily forgets things
and cannot readily correlate them; that for any and all mistakes he might have committed he asked
for forgiveness; he reiterated that "blunders" were committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision
and that the Justices thereof knowingly rendered the same in violation of Article 204 of the Penal
Code; he persisted in his view that the Court of Appeals committed an error in its decision; justified
his act of invoking Article 204 of the Penal Code in trying to make the Appellate Justices liable; that
he was high in his academic and scholastic standing during his school days; that "with all the
confusion prevailing nowadays, the undersigned has decided for reasons of sickness and old age
to retire from the practice of law. He hopes and expects that, with the approval thereof by the
Supreme Court, he could have himself released from the obligation he has contracted with his
clients as regards all his pending cases."

It is Our observation that the tenor of this explanation although pleading mental and physical
ailment as a mitigation of the contemptuous acts, is still that of arrogant justification for
respondent's previous statements. We quote:
The undersigned was asked if he had not filed against the Justices of the Supreme Court a case
for damages against them. He answered in the affirmative, but the case was dismissed by Judge
Villasor, of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, because of an American ruling that a justice of the
Supreme Court of the Philippines cannot be civilly held liable. The ruling cited was rendered during
the American regime in the Philippines which was still subject to the jurisdiction of the American
laws. But the Philippines is now independent and Article 204 of the Penal Code still remains
incorporated therein for observance and fulfillment. Up to now, there is not yet any definite ruling of
the Supreme Court thereon
While still persistently justifying his contemptuous statements and at the same time pleading that
his physical and mental ailment be considered so that We may forgive respondent del Mar he
shrewdly stated at the end of his explanation that he has decided for reasons of sickness and old
age to retire from the practice of law, in practical anticipation of whatever penalty We may decide to
impose on him and thus making it appear that he has voluntarily done so with honor and in
complete evasion of whatever this Court may decide to do in this case.

With full realization that a practicing lawyer and officer of the court facing contempt proceedings
cannot just be allowed to voluntarily retire from the practice of law, an act which would negate the
inherent power of the court to punish him for contempt in defense of its integrity and honor, We
resolve, by resolution of January 10, 1974, to deny said prayer of Atty. del Mar without prejudice to
his making arrangement directly with his clients.

To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to the duty of
maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey
the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do remind
them of said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount importance. A lawyer must
always remember that he is an officer of the court exercising a high privilege and serving in the
noble mission of administering justice.

It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude (People vs. Carillo,
77 Phil. 572). As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court
to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees
the stability of our democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a very
shaky foundation. (In re Sotto 82 Phil. 595).
As We stated before:
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And,
he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some such
frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's
decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of
right. He should give due allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men are
encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.
... To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps much more effective, in calling
the Court's attention to the issues involved. The language vehicle does not run short of
expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive
(Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer G. R. No. L-22979, June 26, 1967; 20 SCRA 441, 444-445)
Criminal contempt has been defined as a conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority
of the court or a judge acting judicially. It is an act obstructing the administration of justice which
tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect (17 C. J. S. 7).
We have held that statements contained in a motion to disqualify a judge, imputing to the latter
conspiracy or connivance with the prosecutors or concocting a plan with a view to securing the
conviction of the accused, and implicating said judge in a supposed attempt to extort money from
the accused on a promise or assurance of the latter's acquittal, all without basis, were highly
derogatory and serve nothing but to discredit the judge presiding the court in an attempt to secure
his disqualification. Statements of that nature have no place in a court pleading and if uttered by a
member of the bar, constitute a serious disrespect. We said:
As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily
the high esteem and regard towards the court so essential to the proper administration of justice
(Emphasis supplied). (People vs. Carillo, 43 O.G. No. 12, p. 5021; De Joya et al vs. C. F. I. of Rizal
and Rilloraza 52 0. G. 6150).
As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R was based on its
evaluation of the evidence on only one specific issue. We in turn denied in G. R. No. L-36800 the
petition for review on certiorari of the decision because We found no reason for disturbing the
appellate court's finding and conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of Appeals and this
Court exercised judicial discretion in a case under their respective jurisdiction. The intemperate
and imprudent act of respondent del Mar in resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts
reconsider their respective stand in the decision and the resolution that spelled disaster for his
client cannot be anything but pure contumely for said tribunals.
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land
when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the
integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his
allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in
disposing of the case of his client.
We note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery of respondent in assuming that his
personal knowledge of the law and his concept of justice are superior to that of both the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals. His pretense cannot but tend to erode the people's faith in the
integrity of the courts of justice and in the administration of justice. He repeatedly invoked his
supposed quest for law and justice as justification for his contemptuous statements without
realizing that, in seeking both abstract elusive terms, he is merely pursuing his own personal
concept of law and justice. He seems not to comprehend that what to him may be lawful or just
may not be so in the minds of others. He could not accept that what to him may appear to be right
or correct may be wrong or erroneous from the viewpoint of another. We understand that
respondent's mind delves into the absolute without considering the universal law of change. It is
with deep concern that We view such a state of mind of a practicing lawyer since what We expect
as a paramount qualification for those in the practice of law is broadmindedness and tolerance,
coupled with keen perception and a sound sense of proportion in evaluating events and
circumstances.
For a lawyer in the twilight of his life, with supposed physical and mental ailments at that, who
dares to challenge the integrity and honor of both the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, We
have nothing but commiseration and sympathy for his choosing to close the book of his long years
of law practice not by voluntary retirement with honor but in disciplinary action with ignominy and
dishonor. To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will choose to enter
this profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder for them to imprint in their hearts and
minds that an attorney owes it to himself to respect the courts of justice and its officers as a fealty
for the stability of our democratic institutions.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R, dated March 5,
1973, suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law, as implemented by Our resolution
of November 19, 1973, is hereby affirmed.
Respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar for his misconduct towards the Supreme Court, shall be, as he is
hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders of this Court, such suspension to
take effect immediately. (In re Almacen, No. L-27654, Feb. 18, 1970, 31 SCRA, p. 562.)
The Judicial Consultant of this Court is directed to circularize all courts and the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines regarding the indefinite suspension of Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Fernandez, Muñoz Palma and
Aquino, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.
G.R. No. 82238-42 November 13, 1989
ANTONIO T. GUERRERO and GEORGE D. CARLOS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ADRIANO R. VILLAMOR, respondent.
Antonio T. Guerrero for Himself and his co-petitioner.

FERNAN, C.J.:
Consequent to the dismissal on February 18,1987 of Criminal Cases Nos. N-0989, N-0990,
N-0991, N-0992, and N-0993 for Qualified Theft against one Gloria Naval by respondent Judge
Adriano R. Villamor of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16 of Naval, Sub-province of Biliran,
Leyte, the offended party, herein petitioner George D. Carlos, thru his lawyer and herein co-
petitioner Antonio T. Guerrero filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch XXI of Cebu City an
action for damages, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6478, against respondent judge for
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in the aforesaid consolidated criminal cases.
The complaint and summons in Civil Case No. CEB-6478 were served on respondent judge on
December 10, 1987. On the following day, he issued in Criminal Cases Nos. N-0989-0993 an
Order of Direct Contempt of Court against herein petitioners, finding them guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of direct contempt and sentencing them both to imprisonment of five (5) days
and a fine of P500.00 for degrading the respect and dignity of the court through the use of
derogatory and contemptuous language before the court.

The derogatory and contemptuous language adverted to by respondent judge are the allegations
in the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-6478 reading:
12. That the dismissal of criminal cases Nos. 0989, 0990, 0991, 0992 and 0993 for qualified
theft was arrived at certainly without circumspection—without any moral or legal basis—a
case of knowingly rendering unjust judgment since the dismissal was tantamount to
acquittal of the accused Gloria P. Naval who is now beyond the reach of criminal and civil
liability because the defendant Hon. Adriano R. Villamor was bent backwards with his eyes
and mind wilfully closed under these circumstances which demanded the scrutiny of the
judicial mind and discretion free from bias...;
xxx xxx xxx
14. By the standard of a public official and a private person the conduct of defendant
Honorable Judge—not only shocking, but appalling—giving the plaintiff before his court the
run-around is at the very least distasteful, distressing and mortifying and moral damages t
herefore would warrant on this kind of reprehensible behavior ...
15. That the aforecited manifestly malicious actuations, defendant judge should also visit
upon him ... for, reducing plaintiff his agonizing victim of his disdain and contempt for the
former who not only torn asunder and spurned but also humiliated and spitefully scorned. 1

To stop the coercive force of the Order of Contempt issued by respondent judge, petitioners filed
the instant petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction or restraining order. On March 22, 1988,
the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining and restraining respondent Judge Adriano
R. Villamor from enforcing his order of Direct Contempt of Court dated December 11, 1987 in
Criminal Cases Nos. N-0989 to N0993. 2

Petitioner submits two issues for resolution in this petition: first, whether or not respondent judge
can issue an Order of Contempt against petitioner in Criminal Cases Nos. N-09890993 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 16 of Naval, Biliran, Leyte by reason of the alleged contemptuous
language in the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-6478 for damages against respondent filed in
Cebu; and secondly, whether or not the language employed in the complaint in Civil Case No.
6478 against respondent judge in another court before another judge is contemptuous and
whether the same is absolutely privileged being made in a judicial proceeding.3

Petitioners assert that no direct contempt could have been committed against respondent judge in
the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 6478 because whatever was mentioned therein was
not made "before" respondent judge while in session or in recess from judicial proceedings or in
any matter involving the exercise of judicial function of the Court while it is at work on a case
before it. Furthermore, petitioners contend that the words used in the subject complaint were
merely words descriptive of plaintiff's cause of action based on his reaction and remorse and the
wilfull infliction of the injury on him and that the same are all privileged communications made in
the course of judicial proceedings because they are relevant to the issue and therefore cannot be
contemptuous.

In his Comment dated April 14, 1988, respondent Judge maintains that petitioners harp too much
on the fact that the five criminal cases are closed cases and therefore the language or words
employed to describe, opine, criticize or condemn the dismissal of said criminal cases in no way
obstruct or hamper, ruin or disturb the dignity and authority of the court presided over by
respondent judge, as said court was no longer functioning as such in the dispensation of justice.
This, according to respondent judge, is a very dangerous perception for then the court becomes
vulnerable to all forms of verbal assaults, which would shake the foundation of judicial authority
and even of democratic stability, so that the absence of such proceedings should not be made a
shield to sully the court's prestige.

I. Determinative of the first issue is the distinction we made in the case of Delima vs.
Gallardo: 4 Contempt of court may be either direct or constructive. It is direct when committed in
the presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt proceedings before the same
5 and constructive or indirect contempt is one committed out or not in the presence of the courts. 6

It is an act done in a distance which tends to be little, degrade, obstruct, interrupt or embarass the
court and justice. 7
As the terms connote, the word direct" would relate to an act stemming immediately from a source,
cause or reason and thus, the rule under the law that it be done in the presence of or so near a
court or judge while "indirect" would signify an act done not straight to the point and thus, legally
speaking would pertain to acts done out or not in the presence of the court.
Based on the foregoing distinctions and the facts prevailing in the case at bar, this Court sustains
petitioners' contention that the alleged derogatory language employed in the complaint in Civil
Case No. CEB-6478 did not constitute direct contempt but may only, if at all, constitute indirect
contempt subject to defenses that may be raised by said, petitioners in the proper proceedings.
Stress must be placed on the fact that the subject pleading was not submitted to respondent judge
nor in the criminal cases from which the contempt order was issued but was filed in another court
presided by another judge and involving a separate action, the civil case for damages against
respondent judge, Although the allegations in the complaint for damages criticized the wisdom of
respondent judge's act of dismissing Criminal Cases Nos. N-0989 to 0993, such criticism was
directed to him when he was no longer in the process of performing judicial functions in connection
with the subject criminal cases so as to constitute such criticisms as direct contempt of court. As
categorically stated Ang vs. Castro: 8 "(T)he use of disrespectful or contemptuous language against
a particular judge in pleadings presented in another court or proceeding is indirect, not direct,
contempt as it is not tantamount to a misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as
to interrupt the administration of justice." (Emphasis supplied) Petitioners' alleged disrespectful
language falling, if at all, under the classification of indirect contempt, petitioners may be adjudged
guilty thereof and punished therefor only after charge and hearing as provided under Section 3,
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, thus:
Section 3. Indirect contempts to be punished after charge and hearing. — After charge in writing
has been filed and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel, a person
guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for contempt:
xxx xxx xxx
Not only was the Order of District Contempt dated December 11, 1987 issued without charge and
hearing, it was likewise irregularly issued as an incident in Criminal Cases Nos. N-0989 to N-0993,
which had long been terminated. Said Order must therefore be, as it is hereby set aside for being
null and void.

II. The second issue raised by petitioners has been resolved in Lubiano vs. Gordolla, 9 in this
wise:
Respondent would argue that the statements in question, being relevant and pertinent to the
subject of inquiry in said case, are covered by the mantle of absolute privileged communication;
and that, as such, they cannot be used as basis for any action, however false and malicious the
statements may be. We find no necessity to dwell at length on the issue as to whether or not the
statements in question are relevant, for in either case this Court will not be inhibited from
exercising its supervisory authority over lawyers who misbehave or fail to live up to that standard
expected of them as members of the Bar. Indeed, the rule of absolute privileged communication
absolves beforehand the lawyer from civil and criminal liability based on the statements made in
the pleadings. But like the member of the legislature who enjoys immunity from civil and criminal
liability arising from any speech or debate delivered ill the Batasan or in any committee thereof, but
nevertheless remains subject to the disciplinary authority of the legislature for said speech or
debate, a lawyer equally subject to this Court's supervisory and disciplinary powers for lapses in
the observance of his duty as a member of the legal profession.
While technically, to rule on whether or not the statements under consideration are contemptuous
would be premature in the absence of any contempt proceedings against petitioners, we deem it
wise to do so to avoid circuity of action in view of our finding that the statements complained of are
not contemptuous. We agree with petitioners that the same are merely descriptive therein plaintiff's
cause of action based on his reaction what he perceived as a willful infliction of injury on him by
therein defendant judge. Strong words were used to lay stress on the gravity and degree of moral
anguish suffered by petitioner Carlos as a result of the dismissal of the subject criminal cases to
justify the award of damages being sought.
We have consistently held that the power to punish for contempt should be used sparingly, so
much so that judges should always bear in mind that the power of the court to punish for contempt
should be exercised for purposes that are impersonal the power being intended as a safeguard not
for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.10 Any abuse of the contempt
citation powers will therefore be curtailed and corrected.
Be that as it may, lawyers, on the other hand, should bear in mind their basic duty "to observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers and ...(to) insist on similar
conduct by others." 11 This respectful attitude towards the court is to be observed, "not for the sake
of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance." 12 And it is "through a scrupulous preference for respectful language that a lawyer
best demonstrates his observance of the respect due to the courts and judicial officers ... 13
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Order of Direct
Contempt of Court dated December 11, 1987 is declared NULL and VOID. The Temporary
Restraining Order issued on March 22, 1988 is hereby made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Guerrero and Mr. Carlos should be punished of direct
contempt? NO
1. it is only indirect contempt
2. Even if there is indirect contempt, it is null and void for being without hearing
3. Premature, there is no contempt proceedings
4. covered by the rule on absolute privileged communication (absolved from criminal
and civil charges, does not include disciplinary measures)
5. the strong words were used to stress the anguish suffered by petitioner for purposes
of damages
G.R. No. 71169 December 22, 1988
JOSE D. SANGALANG and LUTGARDA D. SANGALANG, petitioners, FELIX C. GASTON and
DOLORES R. GASTON, JOSE V. BRIONES and ALICIA R. BRIONES, and BEL-AIR VILLAGE
ASSOCIATION, INC., intervenors-petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and AYALA CORPORATION, respondents.

G.R. No. 74376 December 22, 1988

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ROSARIO DE JESUS TENORIO, and CECILIA
GONZALVEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 76394 December 22,1988
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDUARDO and BUENA ROMUALDEZ respondents.
G.R. No. 78182 December 22, 1988
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DOLORES FILLEY, and J. ROMERO & ASSOCIATES, respondents.
G.R. No. 82281 December 22, 1988
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VIOLETA MONCAL, and MAJAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
respondents.
Sangco, Anastacio, Castaneda & Duran Law Office for petitioners & private intervenors-
petitioners.
Raul S. Sison Law Offices for intervenor-petitioner Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. Renato L. Dela
Fuente for respondent Ayala Corporation.
G.R. No. L-74376:
Raul S. Sison Law Offices for petitioner.
Sergio L. Guadiz for private respondents.
G.R. No. L-76394:
Raul S. Sison Law Offices for petitioner.
Gruba, Tanlimco Lamso and Apuhin Law Offices for respondents.
G.R. No. L-78182:
Funk & Associates for petitioners.
Tee Tomas & Associates for respondents.
G.R. No. L-82281:
Funk & Associates for petitioner.
Castillo, Laman, Tan & Associates for private respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:
Before the Court are five consolidated petitions, 1 docketed as G.R. Nos. 71169, 74376, 76394,
78182, and 82281 hereof, in the nature of appeals (by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court) from five decisions of the Court of Appeals, denying specific performance and damages.
The proceedings were commenced at the first instance by Jose Sangalang, joined by his wife
Lutgarda Sangalang, both residents of No. 110 Jupiter Street, Makati, Metro Manila (G.R. No.
71169) to enforce by specific performance restrictive easement upon property, specifically the Bel-
Air Village subdivision in Makati, Metro Manila, pursuant to stipulations embodied in the deeds of
sale covering the subdivision, and for damages. Later, the Sangalangs were joined by Felix
Gaston, a resident of No. 64 Jupiter Street of the same municipality, and by Mr. and Mrs. Jose and
Alicia Briones, both of No. 66 Jupiter Street. Pending further proceedings, the Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc. (BAVA), an incorporated homeowners' association, entered its appearance as
plaintiff-in-intervention.
BAVA itself had brought its own complaints, four in number, likewise for specific performance and
damages to enforce the same 'deed restrictions.' (See G.R. Nos. 74376, 76394, 78182, and
82281.)
ANTECEDENTS FACTS
I. G.R. No. 71169
The facts are stated in the decision appealed from. We quote:
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(1) Bel-Air Village is located north of Buendia Avenue extension (now Sen. Gil J. Puyat Ave.)
across a stretch of commercial block from Reposo Street in the west up to Zodiac Street in the
east, When Bel-Air Village was planned, this block between Reposo and Zodiac Streets adjoining
Buendia Avenue in front of the village was designated as a commercial block. (Copuyoc TSN, p.
10, Feb. 12, 1982).
(2) Bel-Air Village was owned and developed into a residential subdivision in the 1950s by Makati
Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as MDC), which in 1968 was merged with
appellant Ayala Corporation.
(3) Appellees-spouses Sangalang reside at No. 11O Jupiter Street between Makati Avenue and
Reposo Street; appellees-spouses Gaston reside at No. 64 Jupiter Street between Makati Avenue
and Zodiac Street; appellees-spouses Briones reside at No. 66 Jupiter Street also between Makati
Avenue and Zodiac Street; while appellee Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (hereinafter referred to
as BAVA) is the homeowners' association in Bel-Air Village which takes care of the sanitation,
security, traffic regulations and general welfare of the village.
(4) The lots which were acquired by appellees Sangalang and spouse, Gaston and spouse, and
Briones and spouse in 1960, 1957 and 1958, respectively, were all sold by MDC subject to certain
conditions and easements contained in Deed Restrictions which formed a part of each deed of
sale. The pertinent provisions in said Deed Restrictions, which are common to all lot owners in Bel-
Air Village, are as follows:
I-BEL-AIR ASSOCIATION
The owner of this lot/s or his successors in interest is required to be and is automatically a member
of the Bel-Air Association and must abide by such rules and regulations laid down by the
Association in the interest of the sanitation, security and the general welfare of the community.
The association will also provide for and collect assessments, which will constitute as a lien on the
property junior only to liens of the government for taxes and to voluntary mortgages for sufficient
consideration entered into in good faith.
II-USE OF LOTS
Subject to such amendments and additional restrictions, reservations, servitudes, etc., as the Bel-
Air Association may from time to time adopt and prescribe, this lot is subject to the following
restrictions:
a. This lot/s shall not be subdivided. However, three or more lots may be consolidated and
subdivided into a lesser number of lots provided that none of the resulting lots be smaller in area
than the smallest lot before the consolidation and that the consolidation and subdivision plan be
duly approved by the governing body of the Bel-Air Association.
b. This lot/s shall only be used for residential purposes.
c. Only one single family house may be constructed on a single lot, although separate servants'
quarters or garage may be built.
d. Commercial or advertising signs shall not be placed, constructed, or erected on this lot. Name
plates and professional signs of homeowners are permitted so long as they do not exceed 80 x 40
centimeters in size.
e. No cattle, pigs, sheep, goats, ducks, geese, roosters or rabbits shall be maintained in the lot,
except that pets may be maintained but must be controlled in accordance with the rulings of the
Association. The term "pets' includes chickens not in commercial quantities.
f. The property is subject to an easement of two (2) meters within the lot and adjacent to the rear
and sides thereof not fronting a street for the purpose of drainage, sewage, water and other public
facilities as may be necessary and desirable; and the owner, lessee or his representative shall
permit access thereto by authorized representatives of the Bel-Air Association or public utility
entities for the purposes for which the easement is created.
g. This lot shall not be used for any immoral or illegal trade or activity.
h. The owner and/or lessee of this lot/s shall at all times keep the grass cut and trimmed to reduce
the fire hazard of the property.
xxx xxx xxx
VI-TERM OF RESTRICTIONS
The foregoing restrictions shall remain in force for fifty years from January 15, 1957, unless sooner
cancelled in its entirety by two thirds vote of members in good standing of the Bel-Air Association.
However, the Association may, from time to time, add new ones, amend or abolish particular
restrictions or parts thereof by majority rule.
VII--ENFORCEMENT OF RESTRICTIONS
The foregoing restrictions may be enjoined and/or enforced by court action by the Bel-Air
Association, or by the Makati Development Corporation or its assigns, or by any registered owner
of land within the boundaries of the Bel-Air Subdivision (Sub-division plan PSD-49226 and Lot 7-B,
Psd-47848) or by any member in good standing of the Bel-Air association." (Exh. 1 -b; Exh. 22,
Annex "B"). (Appellant's Brief, pp. 4- 6)
(5) When MDC sold the above-mentioned lots to appellees' predecessors-in-interest, the whole
stretch of the commercial block between Buendia Avenue and Jupiter Street, from Reposo Street
in the west to Zodiac Street in the east, was still undeveloped. Access, therefore, to Bel-Air Village
was opened to all kinds of people and even animals. So in 1966, although it was not part of the
original plan, MDC constructed a fence or wall on the commercial block along Jupiter Street. In
1970, the fence or wall was partly destroyed by typhoon "Yoling." The destroyed portions were
subsequently rebuilt by the appellant. (Copuyoc TSN, pp. 31-34, Feb. 12, 1982). When Jupiter
Street was widened in 1972 by 3.5 meters, the fence or wall had to be destroyed. Upon request of
BAVA, the wall was rebuilt inside the boundary of the commercial block. (Copuyoc TSN, pp. 4447,
Feb. 12,1982).
(6) When the appellant finally decided to subdivide and sell the lots in the commercial block
between Buendia and Jupiter, BAVA wrote the appellant on May 9, 1972, requesting for
confirmation on the use of the commercial lots. The appellant replied on May 16, 1972, informing
BAVA of the restrictions intended to be imposed in the sale and use of the lots. Among these
restrictions are: that the building shall have a set back of 19 meters; and that with respect to
vehicular traffic along Buendia Avenue, entrance only will be allowed, and along Jupiter Street and
side streets, both entrance and exit will be allowed.
(7) On June 30, 1972, appellant informed BAVA that in a few months it shall subdivide and sell the
commercial lots bordering the north side of Buendia Avenue Extension from Reposo Street up to
Zodiac Street. Appellant also informed BAVA that it had taken all precautions and will impose upon
the commercial lot owners deed restrictions which will harmonize and blend with the development
and welfare of Bel-Air Village. Appellant further applied for special membership in BAVA of the
commercial lot owners. A copy of the deed restrictions for the commercial lots was also enclosed.
The proposed deed restrictions shall include the 19 meter set back of buildings from Jupiter Street,
the requirement for parking space within the lot of one (1) parking slot for every seventy five (75)
meters of office space in the building and the limitation of vehicular traffic along Buendia to
entrance only, but allowing both vehicular entrance and vehicular exit through Jupiter Street and
any side street.
In its letter of July 10, 1972, BAVA acknowledged the above letter of appellant and informed the
latter that the application for special membership of the commercial lot owners in BAVA would be
submitted to BAVA's board of governors for decision.
(8) On September 25, 1972, appellant notified BAVA that, after a careful study, it was finally
decided that the height limitation of buildings on the commercial lots shall be increased from 12.5
meters to 15 meters. Appellant further informed BAVA that Jupiter Street shall be widened by 3.5
meters to improve traffic flow in said street. BAVA did not reply to said letter, but on January 22,
1973, BAVA wrote a letter to the appellant informing the latter that the Association had assessed
the appellant, as special member of the association, the amount of P40,795.00 (based on 81,590
square meters at P.50 per square meter) representing the membership dues to the commercial lot
owners for the year 1973, and requested the appellant to remit the amount which its board of
governors had already included in its current budget. In reply, appellant on January 31, 1973
informed BAVA that due to the widening of Jupiter Street, the area of the lots which were accepted
by the Association as members was reduced to 76,726 square meters. Thus, the corresponding
dues at P.50 per square meter should be reduced to P38,363.00. This amount, therefore, was
remitted by the appellant to BAVA. Since then, the latter has been collecting membership dues
from the owners of the commercial lots as special members of the Association. As a matter of fact,
the dues were increased several times. In 1980, the commercial lot owners were already being
charged dues at the rate of P3.00 per square meter. (Domingo, TSN, p. 36, March 19, 1980). At
this rate, the total membership dues of the commercial lot owners amount to P230,178. 00
annually based on the total area of 76,726 square meters of the commercial lots.
(9) Meantime, on April 4, 1975, the municipal council of Makati enacted its ordinance No. 81,
providing for the zonification of Makati (Exh. 18). Under this Ordinance, Bel-Air Village was
classified as a Class A Residential Zone, with its boundary in the south extending to the center line
of Jupiter Street (Exh. 18-A).
Thus, Chapter III, Article 1, Section 3.03, par. F. of the Ordinance provides:
F. Bel-Air Village area, as bounded on the N by Polaris and Mercedes streets and on the NE by
Estrella Street; on the SE by Epifanio de los Santos Avenue and on the SW by the center line of
Jupiter Street. Then bounded on the N by the abandoned MRR Pasig Line; on the E by Makati
Avenue; on the S by the center line of Jupiter Street and on the W by the center line of Reposo
Street." (Exh. 18-A)
Similarly, the Buendia Avenue Extension area was classified as Administrative Office Zone with its
boundary in the North-North East Extending also up to the center line of Jupiter Street (Exh. 18b).
Thus, Chapter III, Article I, Section 3.05, par. C. of the Ordinance provides:
C. The Buendia Avenue Extension areas, as bounded on the N-NE by the center line of Jupiter
Street, on the SE by Epifanio de los Santos Avenue; on the SW by Buendia Avenue and on the
NW by the center line of Reposo Street, then on the NE by Malugay Street; on the SE by Buendia
Avenue and on the W by Ayala Avenue Extension." (Exh. 18-B)
The Residential Zone and the Administrative Office Zone, therefore, have a common boundary
along the center line of Jupiter Street.
The above zoning under Ordinance No. 81 of Makati was later followed under the Comprehensive
Zoning Ordinance for the National Capital Region adopted by the Metro Manila Commission as
Ordinance 81 -01 on March 14, 1981 (Exh. 19). However, under this ordinance, Bel-Air Village is
simply bounded in the South-Southeast by Jupiter Street-not anymore up to the center line of
Jupiter Street (Exh. B). Likewise, the blockdeep strip along the northwest side of Buendia Avenue
Extension from Reposo to EDSA was classified as a High Intensity Commercial Zone (Exh. 19-c).
Thus, the Zoning District Boundaries -Makati, in Annex B of the Ordinance provides:
R-I-Low Intensity Residential
xxxxxxxxx
4. Bel-Air 1, 3, 4
Bounded on the North -- J.P. Rizal and Amapola St.
South - Rockwell
Northwest - P. Burgos
Southeast - Jupiter
Southwest - Epifanio de los Santos Ave. (EDSA)
5. Bel-Air 2
Bounded on the Northwest - J.P. Rizal
Southwest - Makati Avenue
South --- Jupiter
Southeast -- Pasig Line
East - South Avenue" (Exh. 19-b)
xxxxxxxxx
C-3-High Intensity Commercial Zone
2. A block deep strip along the northwest side of Buendia Ave. Ext. from Reposo to EDSA." (Exh,
19-c)
Under the above zoning classifications, Jupiter Street, therefore, is a common boundary of Bel-Air
Village and the commercial zone.
(10) Meanwhile, in 1972, BAVA had installed gates at strategic locations across Jupiter Street
which were manned and operated by its own security guards who were employed to maintain,
supervise and enforce traffic regulations in the roads and streets of the village. (Villavicencio, TSN,
pp, 22-25, Oct. 30, 1980; BAVA Petition, par. 11, Exh. 17).
Then, on January 17, 1977, the Office of the Mayor of Makati wrote BAVA directing that, in the
interest of public welfare and for the purpose of easing traffic congestion, the following streets in
Bel-Air Village should be opened for public use:
Amapola Street - from Estrella Street to Mercedes Street
Amapola Street -junction of Palma Street gate going to J. Villena Street
Mercedes Street -- from EDSA to Imelda Avenue and Amapola junction
Zodiac Street - from Mercedes Street to Buendia Avenue
Jupiter Street -- from Zodiac Street to Reposo Street connecting Metropolitan Avenue to Pasong
Tamo and V. Cruz Extension intersection
Neptune Street - from Makati Avenue to Reposo Street Orbit Street - from F. Zobel-Candelaria
intersection to Jupiter Street
Paseo de Roxas - from Mercedes Street to Buendia Avenue (Exh. 17, Annex A, BAVA Petition)
On February 10, 1977, BAVA wrote the Mayor of Makati, expressing the concern of the residents
about the opening of the streets to the general public, and requesting specifically the indefinite
postponement of the plan to open Jupiter Street to public vehicles. (Exh. 17, Annex B, BAVA
Petition).
However, BAVA voluntarily opened to the public Amapola, Mercedes, Zodiac, Neptune and Paseo
de Roxas streets. (Exh. 17-A, Answer of Makati par. 3-7).
Later, on June 17,1977, the Barangay Captain of Bel-Air Village was advised by the Office of the
Mayor that, in accordance with the agreement entered into during the meeting on January 28, 1
977, the Municipal Engineer and the Station Commander of the Makati Police were ordered to
open for public use Jupiter Street from Makati Avenue to Reposo Street. Accordingly, he was
requested to advise the village residents of the necessity of the opening of the street in the interest
of public welfare. (Exh. 17, Annex E, BAVA Petition).
Then, on June 10, 1977, the Municipal Engineer of Makati in a letter addressed to BAVA advised
the latter to open for vehicular and pedestrian traffic the entire portion of Jupiter Street from Makati
Avenue to Reposo Street (Exh. 17, BAVA Petition, par. 14).
Finally, on August 12, 1977, the municipal officials of Makati concerned allegedly opened,
destroyed and removed the gates constructed/located at the corner of Reposo Street and Jupiter
Street as well as the gates/fences located/constructed at Jupiter Street and Makati Avenue forcibly,
and then opened the entire length of Jupiter Street to public traffic. (Exh. 17, BAVA Petition, pars.
16 and 17).
(11) Before the gates were-removed, there was no parking problem or traffic problem in Jupiter
Street, because Jupiter Street was not allowed to be used by the general public (Villavicencio,
TSN, pp. 24-25, Oct. 30, 1980). However, with the opening of Zodiac Street from Estrella Street to
Jupiter Street and also the opening to the public of the entire length of Jupiter Street, there was a
tremendous increase in the volume of traffic passing along Jupiter Street coming from EDSA to
Estrella Street, then to Zodiac Street to Jupiter Street, and along the entire length of Jupiter Street
to its other end at Reposo Street. (Villavicencio, TSN, pp. 30-32, Oct. 30, 1980).
In the meantime, the purchasers of the commercial lots between Jupiter Street and Buendia
Avenue extension had started constructing their respective buildings in 1974-1975. They
demolished the portions of the fence or wall standing within the boundary of their lots. Many of the
owners constructed their own fences or walls in lieu of the wall and they employed their own
security guards. (TSN, p. 83, Feb. 20,1981; TSN, pp. 53-54; 72-74, March 20,1981; TSN, pp.
54-55, July 23, 1981).
(12) Then, on January 27, 1978, appellant donated the entire Jupiter Street from Metropolitan
Avenue to Zodiac Street to BAVA (Exh. 7)- However, even before 1978, the Makati Police and the
security force of BAVA were already the ones regulating the traffic along Jupiter Street after the
gates were opened in 1977. Sancianco TSN, pp. 26-30, Oct. 2,1981).
In October, 1979, the fence at the corner of Orbit and Neptune Streets was opened and removed
(BAVA Petition, par. 22, Exh. 17). The opening of the whole stretch of Orbit Street from J.P. Rizal
Avenue up to Imelda Avenue and later to Jupiter Street was agreed to at the conference attended
by the President of BAVA in the office of the Station Commander of Makati, subject to certain
conditions, to wit:
That, maintenance of Orbit St. up to Jupiter St. shall be shouldered by the Municipality of Makati.
That, street lights will be installed and maintenance of the same along Orbit St. from J.P. Rizal Ave.
up to Jupiter St. shall be undertaken by the Municipality.
That for the security of the residents of San Miguel Village and Bel-Air Village, as a result of the
opening of Orbit Street, police outposts shall be constructed by the Municipality of Makati to be
headed by personnel of Station No. 4, in close coordination with the Security Guards of San Miguel
Village and Bel-Air Village." (CF. Exh. 3 to Counter-Affidavit, of Station Commander, Ruperto Acle
p. 253, records)" (Order, Civil Case No. 34948, Exh. 17-c).
(13) Thus, with the opening of the entire length of Jupiter Street to public traffic, the different
residential lots located in the northern side of Jupiter Street ceased to be used for purely residential
purposes. They became, for all purposes, commercial in character.
(14) Subsequently, on October 29, 1979, the plaintiffs-appellees Jose D. Sangalang and Lutgarda
D. Sangalang brought the present action for damages against the defendant-appellant Ayala
Corporation predicated on both breach of contract and on tort or quasi-delict A supplemental
complaint was later filed by said appellees seeking to augment the reliefs prayed for in the original
complaint because of alleged supervening events which occurred during the trial of the case.
Claiming to be similarly situated as the plaintiffs-appellees, the spouses Felix C. Gaston and
Dolores R. Gaston, Jose V. Briones and Alicia R. Briones, and the homeowners' association
(BAVA) intervened in the case.
(15) After trial on the merits, the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig, Metro Manila,
rendered a decision in favor of the appellees the dispositive portion of which is as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby accordingly rendered as follows:
ON PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT:
Defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiffs-spouses Sangalang the following damages:
1. The sum of P500,000.00 as actual and consequential damages;
2. The sum of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages;
3. The sum of P500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. The sum of P100,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
5. The costs of suit.
ON INTERVENORS FELIX and DOLORES GASTON'S COMPLAINT:
Defendant is ordered to pay to the spouses Felix and Dolores Gaston, the following damages:
1 . The sum of P400,000.00 as consequential damages;
2 The sum of P500,000.00 as moral damages;
3 The sum of P500,000.00 as exemplary damages:
4 The sum of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
5 The costs of suit.
ON INTERVENORS JOSE and ALICIA BRIONES' COMPLAINT:
Defendant is ordered to pay to the spouses Jose and Alicia Briones, the following damages:
1 . The sum of P400,000.00 as consequential damages;
2 The sum of P500,000.00 as moral damages;
3 The sum of P500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4 The sum of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
5 The costs of suit.
ON INTERVENOR BAVA'S COMPLAINT:
Defendant is ordered to pay intervenor BAVA, the following damages:
1. The sum of P400,000.00 as consequential damages;
2. The sum of P500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
3. The sum of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
4. The costs of suit.
The above damages awarded to the plaintiffs and intervenors shall bear legal interest from the
filing of the complaint.
Defendant is further ordered to restore/reconstruct the perimeter wall at its original position in 1966
from Reposo Street in the west to Zodiac Street in the east, at its own expense, within SIX (6)
MONTHS from finality of judgment.
SO ORDERED.
(Record on Appeal, pp. 400-401) 2
xxxxxxxxx
On appeal, the Court of Appeals 3 rendered a reversal, and disposed as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, finding the decision appealed from as not supported by the facts and the law on
the matter, the same is hereby SET ASIDE and another one entered dismissing the case for lack of
a cause of action. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 4
II. G.R. No. 74376
This petition was similarly brought by BAVA to enforce the aforesaid restrictions stipulated in the
deeds of sale executed by the Ayala Corporation. The petitioner originally brought the complaint in
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, 5 principally for specific performance, plaintiff [now, petitioner]
alleging that the defendant [now, private respondent] Tenorio allowed defendant [Tenorio's co-
private respondent] Gonzalves to occupy and convert the house at 50 Jupiter Street, Bel-Air
Village, Makati, Metro Manila, into a restaurant, without its knowledge and consent, and in violation
of the deed restrictions which provide that the lot and building thereon must be used only for
residential purposes upon which the prayed for main relief was for 'the defendants to permanently
refrain from using the premises as commercial and to comply with the terms of the Deed
Restrictions." 6 The trial court dismissed the complaint on a procedural ground, i.e., pendency of an
Identical action, Civil Case No. 32346, entitled "Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. v. Jesus Tenorio."
The Court of Appeals 7 affirmed, and held, in addition, that Jupiter Street "is classified as High
density commercial (C-3) zone as per Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01 for National
Capital Region," 8 following its own ruling in AC-G.R. No. 66649, entitled "Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc. vs. Hy-Land Realty & Development Corporation, et al."
III. G.R. No. 76394
xxxxxxxxx
Defendants-spouses Eduardo V. Romualdez, Jr. and Buena Tioseco are the owners of a house
and lot located at 108 Jupiter St., Makati, Metro Manila as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 332394 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal. The fact is undisputed that at the time the
defendants acquired the subject house and lot, several restrictions were already annotated on the
reverse side of their title; however, for purposes of this appeal we shall quote hereunder only the
pertinent ones, to wit:
(b,) This lot/shall be used only for residential purposes.
xxxxxxxxx
IV. Term of Restriction
The foregoing restriction(s) shall remain in force for fifty years from January 15, 1957, unless
sooner cancelled in its entirety by two-thirds vote of the members in good standing of the Bel-Air
Association. However, the Association may from time to time, add new ones, amend or abolish
particular restrictions or parts thereof by majority rule.
During the early part of 1979, plaintiff noted that certain renovations and constructions were being
made by the defendants on the subject premises, for which reason the defendants were advised to
inform the plaintiff of the kind of construction that was going on. Because the defendants failed to
comply with the request of the plaintiff, the latter's chief security officer visited the subject premises
on March 23, 1979 and found out that the defendants were putting up a bake and coffee shop,
which fact was confirmed by defendant Mrs. Romualdez herself. Thereafter, the plaintiff reminded
defendants that they were violating the deed restriction. Despite said reminder, the defendants
proceeded with the construction of the bake shop. Consequently, plaintiff sent defendants a letter
dated April 30, 1979 warning them that if they will not desist from using the premises in question for
commercial purposes, they will be sued for violations of the deed restrictions.
Despite the warning, the defendants proceeded with the construction of their bake shop. 9
xxxxxxxxx
The trial court 10 adjudged in favor of BAVA. On appeal, the Court of Appeals 11 reversed, on the
strength of its holding in AC-G.R. No. 66649 earlier referred to.
BAVA then elevated the matter to the Court by a petition for review on certiorari. The Court 12
initially denied the petition "for lack of merit, it appearing that the conclusions of the respondent
Court of Appeals that private respondents' bake and coffee shop lies within a commercial zone and
that said private respondents are released from their obligations to maintain the lot known as 108
Jupiter Street for residential purposes by virtue of Ordinance No. 81 of the Municipality of Makati
and Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01 of the Metropolitan Manila Commission, are in
accord with law and jurisprudence," 13 for which BAVA sought a reconsideration. Pending
resolution, the case was referred to the Second Division of this Court, 14 and thereafter, to the Court
En Banc en consulta. 15 Per our Resolution, dated April 29, 1988, we consolidated this case with
G.R. Nos. 74376 and 82281. 16
IV. G.R. No. 78182.
xxxxxxxxx
The case stemmed from the leasing by defendant Dolores Filley of her building and lot situated at
No. 205 Reposo Street, Bel-Air Village Makati, Metro Manila to her co-defendant, the advertising
firm J. Romero and Associates, in alleged violation of deed restrictions which stipulated that Filley's
lot could only be used for residential purposes. Plaintiff sought judgment from the lower court
ordering the defendants to "permanently refrain" from using the premises in question "as
commercial" and to comply with the terms of the deed restrictions.
After the proper proceedings, the court granted the plaintiff the sought for relief with the additional
imposition of exemplary damages of P50,000.00 and attorney's fees of P10,000.00. The trial court
gave emphasis to the restrictive clauses contained in Filley's deed of sale from the plaintiff, which
made the conversion of the building into a commercial one a violation.
Defendants now seek review and reversal on three (3) assignments of errors, namely:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE REGULATIONS PROMULGATED BY
THE MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES IN MAKATI AND THE MINISTRY OF HUMAN SETTLEMENT'S
CHANGING THE CHARACTER OF THE AREAS IN QUESTION HAD RENDERED THE
RESTRICTIVE EASEMENT ON THE TITLE OF THE APPELLANTS VACATED.
II.
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT BECAUSE THE APPELLEE(S) HAD ALLOWED
THE USE OF THE PROPERTY WITHIN THE VILLAGE FOR NON- RESIDENTIAL PURPOSES,
IT IS NOW ESTOPPED FROM ENFORCING THE RESTRICTIVE PROHIBITIONS SUBJECT
MATTER OF THIS CASE.
III.
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THERE EXISTED A BILATERAL CONTRACT
BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND THAT SINCE APPELLEE HAD NOT PERFORMED ITS
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THIS ARRANGEMENT THE APPELLANT IN TURN WAS UNDER NO
OBLIGATION TO ANNOTATE THE RESTRICTIVE PROHIBITIONS ON THE BACK OF THE
TITLE.
Appellants anchor their appeal on the proposition that the Bel-Air Village area, contrary to plaintiff-
appellee's pretension of being a strictly residential zone, is in fact commercial and characterize the
restrictions contained in appellant Filley's deed of sale from the appellee as completely outmoded,
which have lost all relevance to the present-day realities in Makati, now the premier business hub
of the nation, where there is a proliferation of numerous commercial enterprises established
through the years, in fact even within the heart of so-called "residential" villages. Thus, it may be
said that appellants base their position on the inexorable march of progress which has rendered at
naught the continued efficacy of the restrictions. Appellant on the other hand, relies on a rigid
interpretation of the contractual stipulations agreed upon with appellant Filley, in effect arguing that
the restrictions are valid ad infinitum.
The lower court quite properly found that other commercial establishments exist in the same area
(in fact, on the same street) but ignored it just the same and said-
The fact that defendants were able to prove the existence of several commercial establishments
inside the village does not exempt them from liability for violating some of the restrictions evidently
choosing to accord primacy to contractual stipulation. 17
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The Court of Appeals 18 overturned the lower court, 19 likewise based on AC-G.R. No. 66649. The
respondent Court observed also that J. Romero & Associates had been given authority to open a
commercial office by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission.
V. G.R. No. 82281
The facts of this case have been based on stipulation. We quote:
COMES NOW, the Parties, assisted by their respective counsel and to this Honorable Court,
respectfully enter into the following stipulations of facts, to wit:
1. The parties admit the personal circumstances of each other as well as their capacities to sue
and be sued.
2. The parties admit that plaintiff BAVA for short) is the legally constituted homeowners' association
in Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila.
3. The parties admit that defendant Violets Moncal is the registered owner of a parcel of land with a
residential house constructed thereon situated at No. 104 Jupiter Street, Bel-Air Village, Makati,
Metro Manila; that as such lot owner, she is a member of the plaintiff association.
4. The parties admit that defendant Majal Development Corporation (Majal for short) is the lessee
of defendant Moncal's house and lot located at No. 104 Jupiter Street.
5. The parties admit that a deed restrictions is annotated on the title of defendant Moncal, which
provides, among others, that the lot in question must be used only for residential purposes;' that at
time Moncal purchased her aforesaid lot in 1959 said deed restrictions was already annotated in
the said title.
6. The parties admit that when Moncal leased her subject property to Majal, she did not secure the
consent of BAVA to lease the said house and lot to the present lessee.
7. The parties admit that along Jupiter Street and on the same side where Moncal's property is
located, there are restaurants, clinics placement or employment agencies and other commercial or
business establishments. These establishments, however, were sued by BAVA in the proper court.
8. The parties admit that at the time Moncal purchased the subject property from the Makati
Development Corporation, there was a perimeter wall, running along Jupiter Street, which wall was
constructed by the subdivision owner; that at that time the gates of the entrances to Jupiter Street
were closed to public traffic. In short, the entire length of Jupiter which was inside the perimeter
wall was not then open to public traffic
9. The parties admit that subsequent thereto, Ayala tore down the perimeter wall to give way to the
commercial building fronting Buendia Avenue (now Gil J. Puyat Avenue).
10. The parties admit that on August 12, 1977, the Mayor of Makati forcibly opened and removed
the street gates constructed on Jupiter Street and Reposo Street, thereby opening said streets to
the public.
11. The parties admit plaintiffs letters of October 10, 23 and 31, 1984; as well as defendants'
letters-reply dated October 17 and 29, 1984. 20
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The trial court 21 dismissed the petitioner's complaint, a dismissal affirmed on appeal, 22 According
to the appellate court, the opening of Jupiter Street to human and vehicular traffic, and the
commercialization of the Municipality of Makati in general, were circumstances that had made
compliance by Moncal with the aforesaid "deed restrictions" "extremely difficult and unreasonable,"
23 a development that had excused compliance altogether under Article 1267 of the Civil Code.

VI. The cases before the Court; the Court's decision.

In brief, G.R. Nos. 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281 are efforts to enforce the "deed restrictions" in
question against specific residents (private respondents in the petitions) of Jupiter Street and with
respect to G.R. No. 78182, Reposo Street. The private respondents are alleged to have converted
their residences into commercial establishments (a restaurant in G.R. No. 74376, a bakery and
coffee shop in G.R. No. 76394, an advertising firm in G.R. No. 78182; and a construction company,
apparently, in G.R. No. 82281) in violation of the said restrictions. 24
Their mother case, G. R. No. 71169 is, on the other hand, a petition to hold the vendor itself, Ayala
Corporation (formerly Makati Development Corporation), liable for tearing down the perimeter wall
along Jupiter Street that had therefore closed its commercial section from the residences of Bel-Air
Village and ushering in, as a consequence, the full "commercialization" of Jupiter Street, in
violation of the very restrictions it had authored.
As We indicated, the Court of Appeals dismissed all five appeals on the basis primarily of its ruling
in AC-G.R. No. 66649, "Bel-Air Village, Inc. v. Hy-Land Realty Development Corporation, et al.," in
which the appellate court explicitly rejected claims under the same 'deed restrictions" as a result of
Ordinance No. 81 enacted by the Government of the Municipality of Makati, as well as
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance No. 8101 promulgated by the Metropolitan Manila Commission,
which two ordinances allegedly allowed the use of Jupiter Street both for residential and
commercial purposes. It was likewise held that these twin measures were valid as a legitimate
exercise of police power.
The Court of Appeals' reliance on Ordinance Nos. 81. and 8101 is now assailed in these petitions,
particularly the Sangalang, et al. petition.
Aside from this fundamental issue, the petitioners likewise raise procedural questions. G.R. No.
71169, the mother case, begins with one.

1. G.R. No. 71169

In this petition, the following questions are specifically put to the Court:
May the Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court reverse the decision of the trial court on issues
which were neither raised by AYALA in its Answers either to the Complaint or Supplemental
Complaint nor specifically assigned as one of the alleged errors on appeal? 25

May the Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court arbitrarily ignore the decisive findings of fact of
the trial court, even if uncontradicted and/or documented, and premised mainly on its own
unsupported conclusions totally reverse the trial court's decision? 26

May the Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court disregard the trial court's documented findings
that respondent Ayala for its own self-interest and commercial purposes contrived in bad faith to do
away with the Jupiter Street perimeter wall it put up three times which wall was really intended to
separate the residential from the commercial areas and thereby insure the privacy and security of
Bel Air Village pursuant to respondent Ayala's express continuing representation and/or covenant
to do so? 27

a.
The first question represents an attack on the appellate court's reliance on Ordinances Nos. 81
and 81-01, a matter not supposedly taken up at the trial or assigned as an error on appeal. As a
rule, the Court of Appeals (then the Intermediate Appellate Court) may determine only such
questions as have been properly raised to it, yet, this is not an inflexible rule of procedure. In
Hernandez v. Andal, 28 it was stated that "an unassigned error closely related to an error properly
assigned, or upon which the determination of the question raised by the error properly assigned is
dependent, will be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as
error." 29
In Baquiran v. Court of Appeals, 30 we referred to the " modern trend of procedure . . . according]
the courts broad discretionary power" 31 and in which we allowed consideration of matters "having
some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or the lower court ignore[d]. 32
And in Vda. de Javellana v. Court of Appeals, 33 we permitted the consideration of a 'patent error' of
the trial court by the Court of Appeals under Section 7, of Rule 51, of the Rules of Court, 34
although such an error had not been raised in the brief. But what we note is the fact that the Ayala
Corporation did raise the zoning measures as affirmative defenses, first in its answers 35 and
second, in its brief, 36 and submitted at the trial as exhibits. 37 There is accordingly no cause for
complaint on the part of the petitioners for Ayala's violation of the Rules. But while there was
reason for the consideration, on appeal, of the said zoning ordinances in question, this Court
nevertheless finds as inaccurate the Court of Appeals' holding that such measures, had "in effect,
[made] Jupiter Street ... a street which could be used not only for residential purposes," 38 and that
"[It lost its character as a street for the exclusive benefit of those residing in Bel-Air Village
completely." 39
Among other things, there is a recognition under both Ordinances Nos. 81 and 8 1-01 that Jupiter
Street lies as the boundary between Bel-Air Village and Ayala Corporation's commercial section.
And since 1957, it had been considered as a boundary not as a part of either the residential or
commercial zones of Ayala Corporation's real estate development projects. Thus, the Bel-Air
Village Association's articles of incorporation state that Bel-Air Village is 'bounded on the NE., from
Amapola St., to de los Santos Ave., by Estrella St., on the SE from Extrella St., to Pedestrian Lane
by E. De los Santos Ave., on the SW., from Pedestrian Lane to Reposo St., by Jupiter Street
. . . . 40 Hence, it cannot be said to have been "for the exclusive benefit" of Bel-Air Village residents.
We come to the perimeter wall then standing on the commercial side of Jupiter Street the
destruction of which opened the street to the public. The petitioners contend that the opening of the
thoroughfare had opened, in turn, the floodgates to the commercialization of Bel-Air Village. The
wall, so they allege, was designed precisely to protect the peace and privacy of Bel-Air Village
residents from the din and uproar of mercantile pursuits, and that the Ayala Corporation had
committed itself to maintain it. It was the opinion of the Court of Appeals, as we said, that Ayala's
liability therefor, if one existed, had been overtaken by the passage of Ordinances Nos. 81 and
82-01, opening Jupiter Street to commerce.
It is our ruling, we reiterate, that Jupiter Street lies as a mere boundary, a fact acknowledged by the
authorities of Makati and the National Government and, as a scrutiny of the records themselves
reveals, by the petitioners themselves, as the articles of incorporation of Bel-Air Village Association
itself would confirm. As a consequence, Jupiter Street was intended for the use by both -the
commercial and residential blocks. It was not originally constructed, therefore, for the exclusive use
of either block, least of all the residents of Bel-Air Village, but, we repeat, in favor of both, as
distinguished from the general public.
When the wall was erected in 1966 and rebuilt twice, in 1970 and 1972, it was not for the purpose
of physically separating the two blocks. According to Ayala Corporation, it was put up to enable the
Bel-Air Village Association "better control of the security in the area, 41 and as the Ayala
Corporation's "show of goodwill " 42 a view we find acceptable in the premises. For it cannot be
denied that at that time, the commercial area was vacant, "open for [sic] animals and people to
have access to Bel-Air Village." 43 There was hence a necessity for a wall.
In any case, we find the petitioners' theory, that maintaining the wall was a matter of a contractual
obligation on the part of Ayala, to be pure conjecture. The records do not establish the existence of
such a purported commitment. For one, the subdivision plans submitted did not mention anything
about it. For another, there is nothing in the "deed restrictions" that would point to any covenant
regarding the construction of a wall. There is no representation or promise whatsoever therein to
that effect.
With the construction of the commercial buildings in 1974, the reason for which the wall was built-
to secure Bel-Air Village from interlopers had naturally ceased to exist. The buildings themselves
had provided formidable curtains of security for the residents. It should be noted that the
commercial lot buyers themselves were forced to demolish parts of the wall to gain access to
Jupiter Street, which they had after all equal right to use.
In fine, we cannot hold the Ayala Corporation liable for damages for a commitment it did not make,
much less for alleged resort to machinations in evading it. The records, on the contrary, will show
that the Bel-Air Village Association had been informed, at the very outset, about the impending use
of Jupiter Street by commercial lot buyers. We quote:
xxxxxxxxx
1. Exh. I of appellee, the memorandum of Mr. Carmelo Caluag, President of BAVA, dated May 10,
1972, informing the BAVA Board of Governors and Barrio Council members about the future use of
Jupiter Street by the lot owners fronting Buendia Avenue. The use of Jupiter Street by the owners
of the commercial lots would necessarily require the demolition of the wall along the commercial
block adjoining Jupiter Street.
2. Exh. J of appellee, the minutes of the joint meeting of BAVA Board of Governors and the Bel-Air
Barrio Council where the matter that "Buendia lot owners will have equal rights to use Jupiter
Street," and that Ayala's "plans about the sale of lots and use of Jupiter Street" were precisely
taken up. This confirms that from the start BAVA was informed that the commercial lot owners will
use Jupiter Street and that necessarily the wall along Jupiter Street would be demolished.
3. Exh. 10, the letter of Mr. Demetrio Copuyoc to the President of BAVA, dated May 16, 1972,
expressly stating that vehicular entrance and exit to the commercial lots would be allowed along
Jupiter and side streets.
4. Exhs. 27, 27-A, 27-B, the letter of Atty. Salvador J. Lorayes dated June 30, 1972, with enclosed
copy of proposed restriction for the commercial lots to BAVA. He proposed restriction again
expressly stated that "Vehicular entrances and exits are allowed thru Jupiter and any side streets."
5. Exh. L of appellee, the minutes of the meeting of the members of BAVA, dated August 26, 1972,
where it is stated "Recently, Ayala Corporation informed the Board that the lots fronting Buendia
Avenue will soon be offered for sale, and that future lot owners will be given equal rights to use
Jupiter Street as well as members of the Association."
6. Exh. 25, the letter of Atty. Lorayes dated September 25, 1972, informing BAVA of the widening of
Jupiter Street by 3.5 meters to improve traffic flow in said street to benefit both the residents of Bel-
Air and the future owners of the commercial lots. 44
The petitioners cannot successfully rely on the alleged promise by Demetrio Copuyoc, Ayala's
manager, to build a "[f]ence along Jupiter with gate for entrance and/or exit 45 as evidence of
Ayala's alleged continuing obligation to maintain a wall between the residential and commercial
sections. It should be observed that the fence referred to included a "gate for entrance and or exit"
which would have defeated the purpose of a wall, in the sense the petitioners would put in one,
that is to say, an impenetrable barrier. But as Ayala would point out subsequently, the proposed
fence was not constructed because it had become unnecessary when the commercial lot owners
commenced constructions thereon.
Be that as it may, the Court cannot visualize any purported obligation by Ayala Corporation to keep
the wall on the strength of this supposed promise alone. If truly Ayala promised anything assuming
that Capuyoc was authorized to bind the corporation with a promise it would have been with
respect to the fence. It would not have established the pre-existing obligation alleged with respect
to the wall.
Obligations arise, among other things, from contract. 46 If Ayala, then, were bound by an obligation,
it would have been pursuant to a contract. A contract, however, is characterized by a "meeting of
minds between two persons . 47 As a consensual relation, it must be shown to exist as a fact,
clearly and convincingly. But it cannot be inferred from a mishmash of circumstances alone
disclosing some kind of an "understanding," when especially, those disparate circumstances are
not themselves incompatible with contentions that no accord had existed or had been reached. 48
The petitioners cannot simply assume that the wall was there for the purpose with which they now
give it, by the bare coincidence that it had divided the residential block from the commercial section
of Bel-Air. The burden of proof rests with them to show that it had indeed been built precisely for
that objective, a proof that must satisfy the requirements of our rules of evidence. It cannot be
made to stand on the strength of plain inferences.

b.
This likewise answers the petitioners' second query, whether or not the Court of Appeals had
"arbitrarily ignore(d) the decisive findings of the trial court."49 i.e., findings pointing to alleged acts
performed by the Ayala Corporation proving its commitment to maintain the wall abovesaid.
Specifically, the petitioners refer to, among other things: (1) Ayala's alleged announcement to Bel-
Air Village Association members that "[the perimeter wall along Jupiter Street will not be
demolished," 50 (2) Ayala's alleged commitment "during the pendency of the case in the trial court"
to restore the wall; (3) alleged assurances by Copuyoc that the wall will not be removed; (4)
alleged contrivances by the corporation to make the association admit as members the commercial
lot buyers which provided them equal access to Jupiter Street; and (5) Ayala's donation to the
association of Jupiter Street for "private use" of Bel-Air residents. 51
682 (1903), where it was held that "whether the plaintiffs services were solicited or whether they
were offered to the defendant for his assistance, inasmuch as these services were accepted and
made use of by the latter, we must consider that there was a tacit and mutual consent as to the
rendition of services." (At 686.) In that case, the defendant had enormously benefitted from the
services that entitled the plaintiff to compensation on the theory that no one may unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of another (Solutio indebiti) The facts of this case differ.
As we stated, the Ayala Corporation's alleged conduct prior to or during the proceedings below are
not necessarily at war with claims that no commitment had been in fact made.
With respect to Ayala's alleged announcement before the association, the Court does not agree
that Ayala had categorically assumed as an obligation to maintain the wall "perpetually," i.e., until
the year 2007 (the expiration date under the "deed restrictions.") There is nothing in its statement
that would bare any commitment. In connection with the conference between the parties "during
the pendency" of the trial, it is to be noted that the Ayala Corporation denies having warranted the
restoration of the said wall therein. What, on the other hand, appears in the records is the fact that
Ayala did make that promise, but provided that the Mayor allowed it. It turned out, however, that
the Mayor balked at the Idea. 52 But assuming that Ayala did promise to rebuild the wall (in that
conference), it does not seem to us that it did consequently promise to maintain it in perpetuity.
It is unfair to say, as the trial court did, that the Ayala had "contrived to make future commercial lot
owners special members of BAVA and thereby acquire equal right with the regular members
thereof to use Jupiter Street 53 since, as we stated, the commercial lot buyers have the right, in any
event, to make use of Jupiter Street, whether or not they are members of the association. It is not
their memberships that give them the right to use it. They share that right with Bel-Air residents
from the outset.
The objective of making the commercial lot owners special members of the Bel-Air Village
Association was not to accord them equal access to Jupiter Street and inferentially, to give them
the right to knock down the perimeter wall. It was, rather, to regulate the use of the street owing
precisely to the "planned" nature of Ayala's development project, and real estate development in
general, and this could best be done by placing the commercial lot owners under the association's
jurisdiction.
Moreover, Ayala's overtures with the association concerning the membership of commercial lot
buyers therein have been shown to be neither perfidious nor unethical nor devious (paraphrasing
the lower court). We quote anew:
xxxxxxxxx
(7) On June 30, 1972, appellant informed BAVA that in a few months it shall subdivide and sell the
commercial lots bordering the north side of Buendia Avenue Extension from Reposo Street up to
Zodiac Street. Appellant also informed BAVA that it had taken all precautions and will impose upon
the commercial lot owners deed restrictions which will harmonize and blend with the development
and welfare of Bel-Air Village. Appellant further applied for special membership in BAVA of the
commercial lot owners. A copy of the deed restrictions for the commercial lots was also enclosed.
The proposed deed restrictions shall include the 19 meter set back of buildings from Jupiter Street,
the requirement for parking space within the lot of one (1) parking slot for every seventy five (75)
meters of office space in the building and the limitation of vehicular traffic along Buendia to
entrance only, but allowing both vehicular entrance and vehicular exit through Jupiter Street and
any side street.
In its letter of July 10, 1972, BAVA acknowledged the above letter of appellant and informed the
latter that the application for special membership of the commercial lot owners in BAVA would be
submitted to BAVA's board of governors for decision.
(8) On September 25,1972, appellant notified BAVA that, after a careful study, it was finally decided
that the height limitation of buildings on the commercial lots shall be increased from 12.5 meters to
15 meters. Appellant further informed BAVA that Jupiter Street shall be widened by 3.5 meters to
improve traffic flow in said street. BAVA did not reply to said letter, but on January 22, 1973, BAVA
wrote a letter to the appellant informing the latter that the Association had assessed the appellant,
as special member of the association, the amount of P40,795.00 (based on 81,590 square meters
at P.50 per square meter) representing the membership dues of the commercial lot owners for the
year 1973, and requested the appellant to remit the amount which its board of governors had
already included in its current budget. In reply, appellant on January 31, 1973 informed BAVA that
due to the widening of Jupiter Street, the area of the lots which were accepted by the Association
as members was reduced to 76,726 square meters. Thus, the corresponding due at P.50 per
square meter should be reduced to P38,363.00. This amount, therefore, was remitted by the
appellant to BAVA. Since then, the latter has been collecting membership dues from the owners of
the commercial lots as special members of the Association. As a matter of fact, the dues were
increased several times. In 1980, the commercial lot owners were already being charged dues at
the rate of P3.00 per square meter. (Domingo, TSN, p. 36, March 19, 1980). At this rate, the total
membership dues of the commercial lot owners amount to P230,178.00 annually based on the
total area of 76,726 square meters of the commercial lots. 54
xxxxxxxxx
The alleged undertaking, finally, by Ayala in the deed of donation (over Jupiter Street) to leave
Jupiter Street for the private use of Bel-Air residents is belied by the very provisions of the deed.
We quote:
xxxxxxxxx
IV. That the offer made by the DONOR had been accepted by the DONEE subject to the condition
that the property will be used as a street for the use of the members of the DONEE, their families,
personnel, guests, domestic help and, under certain reasonable conditions and restrictions, by the
general public, and in the event that said lots or parts thereof cease to be used as such, ownership
thereof shall automatically revert to the DONOR. The DONEE shall always have Reposo Street,
Makati Avenue, and Paseo de Roxas open for the use of the general public. It is also understood
that the DONOR shall continue the maintenance of the street at its expense for a period of three
years from date hereof." (Deed of Donation, p. 6, Exh. 7) 55
xxxxxxxxx
The donation, on the contrary, gave the general public equal right to it.
The Court cannot then say, accepting the veracity of the petitioners' facts" enumerated above, that
the Ayala Corporation may be held liable for specific performance of a demandable obligation, let
alone damages.
The Court adds that Ayala can hardly be held responsible for the alleged deterioration of "living
and environmental conditions" 56 of the Bel-Air area, as a consequence of "Ayala's authorized
demolition of the Jupiter perimeter wall in 1974-1975. " 57 We agree with Ayala that until 1976,
"there was peace and quiet" at Jupiter Street, as the petitioners' (Sangalang, Gaston, and Briones)
complaints admit. Hence, the degeneration of peace and order in Bel-Air cannot be ascribed to the
destruction of the wall in 1974 and 1975.
What Ayala submits as the real cause was the opening of Jupiter Street to vehicular traffic in 1977.,
58 But this was upon orders of the Mayor, and for which the homeowners' association had precisely

filed suit (Civil Case No. 34998) 59 to contest the act of the Mayor.

c.
This likewise disposes of the third question presented. The petitioners' reliance on Ayala's alleged
conduct (proving its alleged commitment), so we have ruled, is not well-taken. Ayala's alleged acts
do not, by themselves, reflect a commitment to maintain the wall in dispute. It cannot be therefore
said that the Court of Appeals "arbitrarily ignore(d]" 60 the lower court's findings. Precisely, it is the
duty of the appellate court to review the findings of the trial judge, be they of fact or law. 61 It is not
bound by the conclusions of the judge, for which reason it makes its own findings and arrives at its
own conclusions. Unless a grave abuse of discretion may be imputed to it, it may accept or reject
the lower tribunal's determinations and rely solely on the records.
Accordingly, the Court affirms the Court of Appeals' holding that the Ayala Corporation, in its
dealings with the petitioners, the Bel-Air Village Association in particular, had "acted with justice,
gave the appellees [petitioners] their due and observed honesty and good faith." 62 "Therefore,
under both Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code, the appellant [Ayala] cannot be held liable for
damages." 63
2. G.R. Nos. 74376, 76394, 78182, & 82281
Our decision also resolves, quite anticlimactically, these companion cases. But we do so for
various other reasons. In the Sangalang case, we absolve the Ayala Corporation primarily owing to
our finding that it is not liable for the opening of Jupiter Street to the general public. Insofar as
these petitions are concerned, we likewise exculpate the private respondents, not only because of
the fact that Jupiter Street is not covered by the restrictive easements based on the "deed
restrictions" but chiefly because the National Government itself, through the Metro Manila
Commission (MMC), had reclassified Jupiter Street into high density commercial (C-3) zone, 64
pursuant to its Ordinance No. 81-01. Hence, the petitioners have no cause of action on the
strength alone of the said "deed restrictions.
In view thereof, we find no need in resolving the questions raised as to procedure, since this
disposition is sufficient to resolve these cases.
It is not that we are saying that restrictive easements, especially the easements herein in question,
are invalid or ineffective. As far as the Bel-Air subdivision itself is concerned, certainly, they are
valid and enforceable. But they are, like all contracts, subject to the overriding demands, needs,
and interests of the greater number as the State may determine in the legitimate exercise of police
power. Our jurisdiction guarantees sanctity of contract and is said to be the "law between the
contracting parties, 65 but while it is so, it cannot contravene 'law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy. 66 Above all, it cannot be raised as a deterrent to police power, designed
precisely to promote health, safety, peace, and enhance the common good, at the expense of
contractual rights, whenever necessary. In Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership v. Feati Bank and
Trust Co., 67 we are told:
xxxxxxxxx
2. With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obligations
assumed by the defendant-appellee referring to the restrictions incorporated in the deeds of sale
and later in the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title issued to defendant-appellee it should
be stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not
absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the power
to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people.' Invariably described as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable
of powers" and "in a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of government," the exercise
of the power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust
or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guarantee. As this Court held through Justice Jose P. Bengson in Philippine Long
Distance Company vs. City of Davao, et al. police power 'is elastic and must be responsive to
various social conditions; it is not confined within narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting on
past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life.' We were even more
emphatic in Vda. de Genuino vs. The Court of agrarian Relations, et al., when We declared: "We
do not see why public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should not be
made to prevail through the state's exercise of its police power."
Resolution No. 27, 1960 declaring the western part of High way 54, now E. de los Santos Avenue
(EDSA, for short) from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone,
was obviously passed by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police
power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the
people in the locality. Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area,
especially where Lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. The lots themselves not only front the highway;
industrial and commercial complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery
which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endless
stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health,
safety or welfare of the residents in its route. Having been expressly granted the power to adopt
zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its
Municipal Council, was reasonably, if not perfectly, justified under the circumstances, in passing
the subject resolution. 68
xxxxxxxxx
Undoubtedly, the MMC Ordinance represents a legitimate exercise of police power. The petitioners
have not shown why we should hold otherwise other than for the supposed "non-impairment"
guaranty of the Constitution, which, as we have declared, is secondary to the more compelling
interests of general welfare. The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious or arbitrary or
unreasonable to warrant the reversal of the judgments so appealed. In that connection, we find no
reversible error to have been committed by the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, these petitions are DENIED No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Fernan, (C.J.), Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, J., on leave.
Paras, J., Took no part;
Feliciano, J., Took no part;
Padilla, J., Took no part;
 
Footnotes
1 Consolidated pursuant to our Resolution dated July 18, 1988.
2 ollo, G.R. No. 71169, 102-113. The decision of the Court of Appeals makes mention of specified
areas in Makati having been converted into a "High Intensity Commercial Zone" as well as "Low
Intensity Residential" (see page 9 of this Decision). This should be either "high" or "low" density.
3 Jurado Desiderio, J.; Campos, Jr., Jose and Camilon, Serafin, JJ., Concurring. Pascual, Crisolito
J., Dissenting. The decision set aside, dated October 1, 1982, was penned by Hon. Gregorio
Pineda, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, Metro
Manila, Branch XXI.
4 Rollo, Id., 128.
5 Civil Case No. 49217, Hon. Rafael T. Mendoza, Presiding Judge; rollo, G.R. No. 74376, 82.
6 Rollo. Id.
7 Camilon, Serafin, J.; Pascual. Crisolito Campos Jr., Jose, and Jurado, Desiderio, JJ. Concurring.
8 Rollo, Id., 34; emphasis in original.
9 Rollo, G.R. No. 76394, 24-25.
10 Civil Case No. 33112; see Id., 8, 10.
11 Jurado, Desiderio, J.; Campos, J., Jose and Camilon, Serafin JJ. Concurring; Pascual, Crisolito
J., Chairman, on leave.
12 First Division.
13 Rollo, Id., 81.
14 Per Resolution, dated February 22, 1988.
15 Per Resolution, dated April 4, 1988.
16 See fn. 1, supra.
17 Rollo, G.R, No. 78182, 36-38.
18 Camilon, Serafin, J.; Pronove, Ricardo and Cacdac, Bonifacio, JJ., Concurring.
19 Civil Case No. 27719, Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 145.
20 Rollo, G.R. No. 82281, 33-35.
21 Civil Case No. 8936, Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch CXL, Hon. Ansberto P. Paredes,
presiding, see Id., 32.
22 Bengzon, Eduardo, J.; Kapunan, Santiago and Buena, Arturo, JJ., Concurring.
23 Rollo, Id., 38.
24 See supra, 103-108.
25 Id., 32.
26 Id., 38.
27 Id., 50-51.
28 78 Phil. 196 (1947).
29 Supra, 209; emphasis supplied.
30 No. L-14551, July 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 873.
31 Supra 877.
32 Supra.
33 No. L-60129, July 29, 1983, 123 SCRA 799.
34 The rule states: Questions that may be decided. No which does not affect the jurisdiction over
the subject matter will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors and properly argued
in the brief, save as the court, as its option, may notice plain errors See rollo, G.R. No. 71169, Id.,
168. The pertinent paragraph of the answer states:
10. That in 1975, the Municipal Government of Makati enacted a zoning ordinance and classified
the blocks between Buendia Avenue Extension and Jupiter Street as an administrative office zone
with the north-northeast boundary of the zone extending up to the center line of Jupiter street.
Under the said ordinance, Bel-Air Village has likewise been called into a residential zone, with its
boundary at the southwest being delimited only up to the center line of the Jupiter Street. Similarly,
under Ordinance No. 81-01 of the Metro Manila Commission, Jupiter Street has been made a
common boundary of the commercial blocks along the north side of the Buendia Avenue Extension
and the Bel-Air Village Subdivision, so that the said street is subject to the common use of the
owners of both the commercial blocks as well as the residential areas.
11. That the restoration reconstruction of the wall on the blocks along the southern side of Jupiter
Street will come the entire southside portion of Jupiter Street and will illegally deprive the abutting
lot owners on the commercial blocks of their rights to have the street kept open and to have access
to the street, in violation of Act 496, as amended by Republic Act 440.
36 See Id., 169.
37 Exhibits Nos. "18" and "19"; see Id., 168.
38 Id., 116.
39 Id.
40 Id., 66.
41 Rollo, G.R. No. 71169, Id., 124.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id., 124-126; emphasis in original.
45 Id., 52.
46 CIVIL CODE, art. 1157, par. (2).
47 Supra, art. 1305.
48 This case should be distinguished from Perez v. Pomar, 2 Phil.
49 Rollo, Id., 38.
50 Id., 40.
51 Id., 47.
52 Id., 183-185.
53 Id., 92.
54 Id., 105-106.
55 Id., 193; emphasis in original.
56 Id., 45.
57 Id.
58 Id., 108-110.
59 Id., 193.
60 Id., 38.
61 RULES OF COURT, Rule 46, sec. 18.
62 Rollo, G.R. No. 71169, Id., 126.
63 Id.
64 See rollo, G.R. No. 71169, Id., 117.
65 CIVIL CODE, supra, art. 1159.
66 Supra, art. 1306.
67 No. L-24670, December 14, 1979, 94 SCRA 533.
68 Supra, 545-547.
G.R. No. L-14277             April 30, 1960
MANUEL L. FERNANDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ELOY B. BELLO, Judge Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, respondent.
Manuel L. Fernandez in his own behalf.

Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia for respondent.
LABRADOR, J.:

Petition for certiorari with injunction filed by Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez to annul two orders dated
June 16 and July 29, 1958, of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Hon. Eloy B. Bello,
presiding. The first order reprimands petitioner for his improper conduct as counsel in Special
Proceedings No. 3931, entitled "Guardianship of the Minors Federico and Pedro both surnamed
Perreyras, Timotea Perreyras, petitioner-guardian," orders him to return to the guardian within 15
days the sum of P200.00 collected by him, and causes a copy of the order to be sent to the
Supreme Court for corresponding disciplinary action on the petitioner (Annex J).

The second order denies petitioner's motion for reconsideration and warns him not to use improper
terms in his pleadings. (Annex L.)

The circumstances leading to the issuance of the above orders may be briefly stated as follows:
1. Timotea Perreyras, through Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez as her counsel, instituted Special
Proceedings No. 3931, for her appointment as guardian over the persons and properties of her
brothers, the minors Federico and Pedro Perreyras.
2. Upon her appointment and upon her qualifying as such, she petitioned the court for authority to
sell a nipa land owned in common with the wards for the purpose of paying outstanding obligations
to Maximiano Umañgay. The request was granted by Judge Villamor, and on August 24, 1951, a
deed of sale, prepared and notarized by Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez, was executed by the guardian
in favor of Maximiano Umañgay for the sum of P1,000. This sale was approved by Judge
Pasicolan on December 17, 1952 (Annex C).
3. The nipa land sold by the guardian had previously been sold with right to repurchase to Ricardo
Perreyras and Maximiano Umañgay by Florentino Perreyras, father (now deceased) of the
guardian and the wards. The interest in the land of Ricardo Perreyras and Maximiano Umañgay
were, in turn, sold for P200.00 to Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez. Of the purchase price of P1,000,
P200.00 was paid to Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez, redemption price of the nipa land and as assignee
of the credit in favor of Maximiano Umañgay and Ricardo Perreyras. The other P200.00 was given
to said attorney, in payment of his legal fees for services rendered by him as counsel of the father
of the wards in a civil case. However, the record does not show that these payments were
authorized by the court.
On January 21, 1958, Judge Eloy Bello, who took over the court from Judge Pasicolan, issued an
order requiring Timotea Perreyras to show cause why she should not be punished for contempt for
failing to account for the property and money of the wards. After hearing the guardian Timotea
Perreyras, the court issued another order date January 20, 1958, exonerating her of the contempt
charges, disapproving all payments made by her, including that made to Atty. Manuel L.
Fernandez, and requiring Attys. Manuel L. Fernandez and Braulio Fernandez to show cause why
they should not be suspended from the practice of law and declared in contempt of court. In the
same order, the court charged said attorneys of having abused their relationship with the guardian
and having taken money from her without previous approval of the court (Annex D). Atty. Braulio
Fernandez submitted a written explanation, and the court, considering it satisfactory, exonerated
him of the preferred charges. On January 30, 1958, the court again issued another order directing
Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez to submit in ten days a written answer to the charges stated in the order
of January 27, 1958 (Annex G). On February 1, 1958, he submitted an explanation (Annex H.),
admitting receipt of the sum of P400.00 from the guardian, but alleging that when he received the
amount he was no longer the attorney of the guardian as their relation had terminated when the
guardian secured the services of Atty. Braulio Fernandez; that he acted in good faith and the
guardianship proceedings were instituted by him only to help the minors the action being less
expensive than an intestate proceeding, and that he was paid only P50.00 for his services to the
guardian. So he asked that the charges be dismissed and that the guardian be warned not to make
unjustifiable complaints against him.
On February 10, 1953, Timotea Perreyras and Maximiano Umañgay were summoned to appear for
further examination on the proceeds of the sale of the nipa land. After hearing their testimonies, the
court on June 16, 1958, found Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez guilty of contempt of court because he
had taken the amount of P400.00 from the proceeds of the sale without previous approval from the
court. The court also found the conduct of counsel to be anomalous for the reason that he
instituted the guardianship proceedings only to enable him to collect unpaid attorney's fees due
him from the father of the wards (Annex J). This is the first order sought to be annulled in this
appeal.

The second order is that denying the motion for reconsideration of respondent attorney.
It is claimed by petitioner in this appeal that the proceedings conducted in the court below are
irregular because no formal charge was filed against him.

There is no merit in this contention. The court motu proprio preferred the charges in its order dated
January 20, 1958, and in another order dated January 27, 1958, the petitioner was duly advised
thereof and was given an opportunity to file a written answer thereto. It has been held in the
following case that there has been sufficient compliance with the requirements of law:
The institution of charges by the prosecuting officer is not necessary to hold person guilty of civil or
criminal contempt amenable to trial and punishment by the court. All that the law requires is that
there be a charge in writing duly filed in court and an opportunity to the person charged to be heard
by himself or counsel. The charge may be made by the fiscal, by the judge, or even by a private
person. The above requirements were complied with by the filing of the order on September 30,
and the giving of full opportunity to the respondent to appear and defendant himself. The
contention that a formal information filed by a prosecuting officer is necessary to begin proceedings
must be overruled. (People vs. B. M. Venturanza, et al., defendants, Jose Y. Torres, appellant, 98
Phil., 211; 52 Off. Gaz. [2] 769.).

The court below found petitioner guilty of contempt court on two grounds, the first is that he
instituted the guardianship proceedings for the sole purpose of facilitating payment to him of the
debts of the wards. The facts do not, however, bear out this finding. Before the guardianship
proceedings were instituted, the wards were indebted in the sum of P200.00 to Ricardo Perreyras
and Maximiano Umañgay, and as the wards had no money with which to pay the debt, the only
way to settle it is by selling the nipa land. But the land could not have been sold by the minors
without intervention of a guardian. So the petitioner must have believed that guardianship
proceedings was the proper remedy. The judges of the court below, from whom Judge Bello took
over, must have been satisfied that the procedure taken by the petitioner was more beneficial to
the wards when they appointed a guardian and approved the sale of the land. As there is no
evidence of bad faith on the part of petitioner, the finding on this point of the court below should be
reversed.
However, the finding of the court that the purchase price of the land is P1,000 was in custodia legis
and could not be taken and used in payment of debts without its previous authority is correct. As a
lawyer the petitioner is charged with the knowledge that the property and effects of the wards are
under the control and supervision of the court, and that they could not be and expended without
the latter's permission, more especially so when the money taken was to pay the debt of the father
of the wards. The reprimand is, therefore, fully justified. But the order for the refund of the
P200.00 and the closing of the guardianship proceedings after such return, would deprive
petitioner of the fees that he was entitled to receive from the father of the guardian and the
wards, for services rendered in a civil case, which services are admitted to have been due
from their father. While the reprimand is in order for petitioner's mistake, the mistake is no
sufficient ground for the non-payment of the fees he lawfully earned and which his client could not
pay before his death. The duty of courts is not alone to see that lawyers act in a proper and lawful
manner; it is also their duty to see that lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees. Certainly the
court can not deny them that right; there is no law that authorizes them to do so.
In his answer before this Court respondent judge justifies his order for the return of the P200.00 on
the ground that petitioner is "below average standard of a lawyer." The opinion of a judge as to the
capacity of a lawyer is not the basis of the right to a lawyer's fee. It is the contract between the
lawyer and client and the nature of the services rendered. Petitioner claims that he won a civil case
for his client, the deceased father of the guardian and the wards. That P200.00 is the amount of
the fee of petitioner is admitted by the guardian. We find that the court's order directing petitioner to
return the P200.00, and in effect denying him the right to collect the same, is not justified, to say
the least. This portion of the final order is hereby modified in the sense that the return of the
P200.00 is without prejudice to petitioner's right to demand payment for the services rendered the
deceased out of the proceeds of the property left by him (deceased).

In this Court the judge below desires that portions of petitioner's motion for reconsideration be
stricken out for employing strong language. We believe the said strong language must have been
impelled by the same language used by the judge below in characterizing the act of the petitioner
as "anomalous and unbecoming" and in charging petitioner of obtaining his fee "through
maneuvers of documents from the guardian-petitioner." If any one is to blame for the language
used by the petitioner, it is the judge himself who has made insulting remarks in his orders, which
must have provoked petitioner, and the judge below has nothing to blame but himself. If a judge
desires not to be insulted he should start using temperate language himself; he who sows the wind
will reap a storm.

Wherefore, the orders are modified as above indicated. Without costs.

Paras, C.J., Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Endencia, Barrera and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., reserves his vote.

Whether or not Atty. Fernandez is guilty of contempt? NO

1. the lawyer had the right to compensated although his act of using the money in
custodia legis is improper. The reprimand is proper but the reimbursement is
unjustified.
2. The lawyer was only provoked by the insulting remarks in the order of the judge.