Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
G.R. No. 182601 November 10, 2014
JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY
FERNANDEZ and RONALD MUNOZ, Petitioners, vs. MORENO GENEROSO
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court challenging the decision1 dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution2
dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 91541.
The appealed decision affirmed the Order dated March 16, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 96, Quezon City, denying Joey M. Pestilos,
Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces, Jerry Fernandez, and Ronald Munoz's
(petitioners) Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation, as well as
their subsequent motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedent Facts
The records of the case reveal that on February 20, 2005, at around 3: 15 in
the morning, an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno
Generoso (Atty. Generoso) at Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon
City where the petitioners and Atty. Generoso reside.3
Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batas an Hills
Police Station) to report the incident.4 Acting on this report, Desk Officer
SPOl Primitivo Monsalve (SPOJ Monsalve) dispatched SP02 Dominador Javier
(SP02 Javier) to go to the scene of the crime and to render assistance.5 SP02
Javier, together with augmentation personnel from the Airforce, A2C Alano
Sayson and Airman Ruel Galvez, arrived at the scene of the crime less than
one hour after the alleged altercation6 and they saw Atty. Generoso badly
beaten.7
Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This
prompted the police officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills
Police Station for investigation.8 The petitioners went with the police officers
to Batasan Hills Police Station.9 At the inquest proceeding, the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso
with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the attack.10
In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners were indicted for
attempted murder allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 20th h day of February, 2005, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring together, confederating with and
mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, qualified with evident
premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of
the crime of Murder directly by overt acts, by then and there stabbing one
Atty. MORENO GENEROSO y FRANCO, with a bladed weapon, but said
accused were not able to perform all the acts of execution which would
produce the crime of Murder by reason of some cause/s or accident other
than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, said complainant was able to WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION IS VOID FOR FAILURE TO STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW 1
parry the attack, to his damage and prejudice.
UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
The petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully arrested. No
arrest warrant was ever issued; they went to the police station only as a
On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular
response to the arresting officers' invitation. They even cited the Affidavit of
Preliminary Investigation12 on the ground that they had not been lawfully
Arrest, which actually used the word "invited. "
arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place since the
police officers had no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of
The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest took place under
the crime. They also claimed that they were just "invited" to the police
the terms of Rule 112, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court. The incident
station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure
happened two (2) hours before the police officers actually arrived at the
for preliminary investigation should have been performed pursuant to Rule
crime scene. The police officers could not have undertaken a valid
112 of the Rules of Court.13
warrantless arrest as they had no personal knowledge that the petitioners
were the authors of the crime.
On March 16, 2005, the RTC issued its order denying the petitioners' Urgent
Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.14 The court likewise denied
The petitioners additionally argue that the R TC' s Order denying the Urgent
the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.15
Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation is void because it was not
properly issued.
The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule
65 petition for certiorari. They attributed grave abuse of discretion,
The Court's Ruling
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the R TC for the denial of their
motion for preliminary investigation.16
We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC Order. The
criminal proceedings against the petitioners should now proceed.
The Assailed CA Decision
It is unfortunate that the kind of motion that the petitioners filed has to reach
On January 21, 2008, the CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for
this Court for its resolution. The thought is very tempting that the motion
lack of merit.17 The CA ruled that the word "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest
was employed simply to delay the proceedings and that the use of Rule 65
executed by SP02 Javier carried the meaning of a command. The arresting
petition has been abused.
officer clearly meant to arrest the petitioners to answer for the mauling of
Atty. Generoso. The CA also recognized that the arrest was pursuant to a
But accepting things as they are, this delay can be more than compensated by
valid warrantless arrest so that an inquest proceeding was called for as a
fully examining in this case the legalities surrounding warrantless warrants
consequence. Thus, the R TC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in
and establishing the proper interpretation of the Rules for the guidance of
denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.
the bench and the bar. These Rules have evolved over time, and the present
case presents to us the opportunity to re-trace their origins, development
The CA saw no merit in the petitioners' argument that the order denying the
and the current applicable interpretation.
Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation is void for failure to
clearly state the facts and the law upon which it was based, pursuant to Rule
I. Brief history on warrantless arrests
16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA found that the RTC had
sufficiently explained the grounds for the denial of the motion.
The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the Philippine Bill of 1902,19
and the 1935,20 197321 and 198722 Constitutions all protect the right of the
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in
people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and
its Resolution of April 17, 2008;18 hence, the present petition.
seizures. Arrest falls under the term "seizure. "23
The Issues
This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth Amendment of the
The petitioners cited the following assignment of errors: Constitution of the United States. The Fourth Amendment traces its origins to
the writings of Sir Edward Coke24 and The Great Charter of the Liberties of
I. England (Magna Carta Libertatum), sealed under oath by King John on the
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY ARRESTED
bank of the River Thames near Windsor, England on June 15, 1215.25 The
WITHOUT A WARRANT.
Magna Carta Libertatum limited the King of England's powers and required
II. the Crown to proclaim certain liberties26 under the feudal vassals' threat of
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE LAWFULLY ARRESTED WHEN civil war.27 The declarations in Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta Libertatum
THEY WERE MERELY INVITED TO THE POLICE PRECINCT. later became the foundational component of the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.28 It provides:
III.

No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised29 of his Freehold,
or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise
destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful
Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land, We will sell to no man, we
will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right.30 [Emphasis
supplied]
In United States v. Snyder,31 the United States Supreme Court held that this
constitutional provision does not prohibit arrests, searches and seizures
without judicial warrant, but only those that are unreasonable.32 With
regard to an arrest, it is considered a seizure, which must also satisfy the test
of reasonableness.33
In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have acknowledged the validity
of warrantless arrests. The Court based these rulings on the common law of
America and England that, according to the Court, were not different from the
Spanish laws.34 These court rulings likewise justified warrantless arrests
based on the provisions of separate laws then existing in the Philippines.35
In 1905, the Court held in The United States v. Wilson36 that Section 3737 of
Act No. 183, or the Charter of Manila, defined the arresting officer's power to
arrest without a warrant, at least insofar as the City of Manila was concerned.
In The United States v. Vallejo, et al.,38 the Court held that in the absence of
any provisions under statutes or local ordinances, a police officer who held
similar functions as those of the officers established under the common law
of England and America, also had the power to arrest without a warrant in
the Philippines.
The Court also ruled in The United States v. Santos39 that the rules on
warrantless arrest were based on common sense and reason.40 It further
held that warrantless arrest found support under the then Administrative
Code41 which directed municipal policemen to exercise vigilance in the
prevention of public offenses.
In The United States v. Fortaleza,42 the Court applied Rules 27, 28, 29 and
3043 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code which were
provisions taken from the Spanish Law.
These rules were subsequently established and incorporated in our Rules of
Court and jurisprudence. Presently, the requirements of a warrantless arrest
are now summarized in Rule 113, Section 5 which states that: Section 5.
Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forth with delivered to the nearest police station
or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule
112.
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section
5(a) above has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that
under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.44
For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5(b) – the provision
applicable in the present case. This provision has undergone changes through
the years not just in its phraseology but also in its interpretation in our
jurisprudence.
We shall first trace the evolution of Section 5(b) and examine the applicable
American and Philippine jurisprudence to fully understand its roots and its
appropriate present application.
II. Evolution of Section 5(b), Rule 113
A. Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court
Prior to 1940, the Court based its rulings not just on American and English
common law principle on warrantless arrests but also on laws then existing
in the Philippines. In Fortaleza,45 the Court cited Rule 28 of the Provisional
Law for the Application of the Penal Code which provided that:
Judicial and administrative authorities have power to detain, or to cause to be
detained, persons whom there is reasonable ground to believe guilty of some
offense. It will be the duty of the authorities, as well as of their agents, to
arrest:
First. Such persons as may be arrested under the provisions of rule 27.
Second. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty
greater than that of confinamiento.
Third. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty
less than that of confinamiento, if his antecedents or the circumstances of the
case would warrant the presumption that he would fail to appear when
summoned by the judicial authorities.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply, however, to a
defendant who gives sufficient bond, to the satisfaction of the authority or
agent who may arrest him, and who it may reasonably be presumed will
appear whenever summoned by the judge or court competent to try him.
Fourth. A person coining under the provisions of the preceding paragraph
may be arrested, although no formal complaint has been filed against him,
provided the following circumstances are present:
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
First. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe that an
2
unlawful act, amounting to a crime had been committed.
Second. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe that the
person arrested participated in the commission of such unlawful act or
crime." [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
In the same decision, the Court likewise cited Section 3 7 of the Charter of
Manila, which provided that certain officials, including police officers may,
within the territory defined in the law, pursue and arrest without warrant,
any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances,
reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to
commit any crime or breach of the peace.
In Santos,46 the Court cited Miles v. Weston,47 which ruled that a peace
officer may arrest persons walking in the street at night when there is
reasonable ground to suspect the commission of a crime, although there is no
proof of a felony having been committed.
The Court ruled in Santos that the arresting officer must justify that there
was a probable cause for an arrest without a warrant. The Court defined
probable cause as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable
man in believing that the accused is guilty. Besides reasonable ground of
suspicion, action in good faith is another requirement. Once these conditions
are complied with, the peace officer is not liable even if the arrested person
turned out to be innocent.
Based on these discussions, it appears clear that prior to the 1940 Rules of
Court, it was not necessary for the arresting officer to first have knowledge
that a crime was actually committed. What was necessary was the presence
of reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the
characteristics of a crime; and that the same grounds exist to believe that the
person sought to be detained participated in it. In addition, it was also
established under the old court rulings that the phrase "reasonable
suspicion" was tantamount to probable cause without which, the warrantless
arrest would be invalid and the arresting officer may be held liable for its
breach.48
In The US. v. Hachaw,49 the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest of a
Chinaman because the arresting person did not state in what way the
Chinaman was acting suspiciously or the particular act or circumstance
which aroused the arresting person's curiosity.
It appears, therefore, that prior to the establishment in our Rules of Court of
the rules on warrantless arrests, the gauge for a valid warrantless arrest was
the arresting officer's reasonable suspicion (probable cause) that a crime was
committed and the person sought to be arrested has participated in its
commission. This principle left so much discretion and leeway on the part of
the arresting officer. However, the 1940 Rules of Court has limited this
discretion.
B. The 1940 Rules of Court
(Restricting the arresting officer's determination of probable cause)

Rules 27 and 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code
were substantially incorporated in Section 6, Rule 109 of the 1940 Rules of
Court as follows:50
SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant - When lawful. - A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is about to commit an offense in his presence;
(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another. [Emphasis and underscoring
supplied]
These provisions were adopted in toto in Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964
Rules of Court. Notably, the 1940 and 1964 Rules have deviated from the old
rulings of the Court. Prior to the 1940 Rules, the actual commission of the
offense was not necessary in determining the validity of the warrantless
arrest. Too, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause (or
reasonable suspicion) applied both as to whether a crime has been
committed and whether the person to be arrested has committed it.
However, under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required
that there should be actual commission of an offense, thus, removing the
element of the arresting officer's "reasonable suspicion of the commission of
an offense." Additionally, the determination of probable cause, or reasonable
suspicion, was limited only to the determination of whether the person to be
arrested has committed the offense. In other words, the 1940 and 1964 Rules
of Court restricted the arresting officer's discretion in warrantless arrests
under Section 6(b), Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court.
C. The more restrictive 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again underwent substantial
changes and was re-worded and re-numbered when it became Section 5,
Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when. lawful. - A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under
paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
As amended, Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court retained the
restrictions introduced under the 1964 Rules of Court. More importantly,
however, it added a qualification that the commission of the offense should
not only have been "committed" but should have been "just committed." This
limited the arresting officer's time frame for conducting an investigation for
purposes of gathering information indicating that the person sought to be
arrested has committed the crime.
D. The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further
amended with the incorporation of the word "probable cause" as the basis of
the arresting officer's determination on whether the person to be arrested
has committed the crime.
Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that:
When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it.
From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears
that for purposes of Section S(b ), the following are the notable changes: first,
the contemplated offense was qualified by the word "just," connoting
immediacy; and second, the warrantless arrest of a person sought to be
arrested should be based on probable cause to be determined by the
arresting officer based on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it.
It is clear that the present rules have "objectified" the previously subjective
determination of the arresting officer as to the (1) commission of the crime;
and (2) whether the person sought to be arrested committed the crime.
According to Feria, these changes were adopted to minimize arrests based on
mere suspicion or hearsay.51
As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just been
committed; and second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it.
For purposes of this case, we shall discuss these elements separately below,
starting with the element of probable cause, followed by the elements that
the offense has just been committed, and the arresting officer's personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed the crime.
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
i) First Element of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
3
Procedure: Probable cause
The existence of "probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or the determinant
on how the arresting officer shall proceed on the facts and circumstances,
within his personal knowledge, for purposes of determining whether the
person to be arrested has committed the crime.
i.a) U.S. jurisprudence on probable cause in warrantless arrests
In Payton v. New York,52 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution does not prohibit arrests without a
warrant although such arrests must be reasonable. According to State v.
Quinn,53 the warrantless arrest of a person who was discovered in the act of
violating the law is not a violation of due process.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however indicated in Henry v. United States54 that
the Fourth Amendment limited the circumstances under which warrantless
arrests may be made. The necessary inquiry is not whether there was a
warrant or whether there was time to get one, but whether at the time of the
arrest probable cause existed. The term probable cause is synonymous to
"reasonable cause" and "reasonable grounds."55
In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer should
make a thorough investigation and exercise reasonable judgment. The
standards for evaluating the factual basis supporting a probable cause
assessment are not less stringent in warrantless arrest situation than in a
case where a warrant is sought from a judicial officer. The probable cause
determination of a warrantless arrest is based on information that the
arresting officer possesses at the time of the arrest and not on the
information acquired later.56
In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the determinant
of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. Probable cause involves
probabilities similar to the factual and practical questions of everyday life
upon which reasonable and prudent persons act. It is a pragmatic question to
be determined in each case in light of the particular circumstances and the
particular offense involved.57
In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all the
information in his possession, his fair inferences therefrom, including his
observations. Mere suspicion does not meet the requirements of showing
probable cause to arrest without warrant especially if it is a mere general
suspicion. Probable cause may rest on reasonably trustworthy information as
well as personal knowledge. Thus, the arresting officer may rely on
information supplied by a witness or a victim of a crime; and under the
circumstances, the arresting officer need not verify such information.58
In our jurisdiction, the Court has likewise defined probable cause in the
context of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In Abelita Ill v. Doria et al.,59 the Court held that personal knowledge of facts
must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the
absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person

to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good
faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
i.b) Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, distinguished from probable cause in preliminary
investigations and the judicial proceeding for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime
has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the
accused is guilty of the crime and should be held for triat.60 In Buchanan v.
Viuda de Esteban,61 we defined probable cause as the existence of facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the
facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was
guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence of probable cause as
to the guilt of the respondent was based on the submitted documents of the
complainant, the respondent and his witnesses.62
On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of
a warrant of arrest is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances
that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an
offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.
Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that
based on the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has
been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof.
At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review
in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is
sufficient that he personally evaluates the evidence in determining probable
cause63 to issue a warrant of arrest.
In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on
his personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person sought to
be arrested has committed the crime. These facts or circumstances pertain to
actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making.the
arrest.
The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged,64 or an actual belief
or reasonable ground of suspicion, based on actual facts.65
It is clear therefore that the standard for determining "probable cause" is
invariable for the officer arresting without a warrant, the public prosecutor,
and the judge issuing a warrant of arrest. It is the existence of such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to
believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested or held for trial, as the case may be.
However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all
determine "probable cause," within the spheres of their respective functions,
its existence is influenced heavily by the available facts and circumstance
within their possession. In short, although these officers use the same
standard of a reasonable man, they possess dissimilar quantity of facts or
circumstances, as set by the rules, upon which they must determine probable
cause.
Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer should
base his determination of probable cause on his personal knowledge of facts
and circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the
crime; the public prosecutor and the judge must base their determination on
the evidence submitted by the parties.
In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited
facts, evidence or available information that he must personally gather within
a limited time frame.
Hence, in Santos,66 the Court acknowledged the inherent limitations of
determining probable cause in warrantless arrests due to the urgency of its
determination in these instances. The Court held that one should not expect
too much of an ordinary policeman. He is not presumed to exercise the subtle
reasoning of a judicial officer. Oftentimes, he has no opportunity to make
proper investigation but must act in haste on his own belief to prevent the
escape of the criminal.67
ii) Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113:
The crime has just been committed/personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it
We deem it necessary to combine the discussions of these two elements as
our jurisprudence shows that these were usually taken together in the
Court's determination of the validity of the warrantless arrests that were
made pursuant to Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
In Posadas v. Ombudsman,68 the killing of Dennis Venturina happened on
December 8, 1994. It was only on December 11, 1994 that Chancellor
Posadas requested the NBI's assistance. On the basis of the supposed
identification of two (2) witnesses, the NBI attempted to arrest Francis Carlo
Taparan and Raymundo Narag three (3) days after the commission of the
crime. With this set of facts, it cannot be said that the officers have personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the persons sought to be arrested
committed the crime. Hence, the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest.
Similarly, in People v. Burgos,69 one Cesar Masamlok personally and
voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, stating that Ruben Burgos forcibly
recruited him to become a member of the NPA, with a threat of physical
harm. Upon receipt of this information, a joint team of PC-INP units was
dispatched to arrest Burgos who was then plowing the field. Indeed, the
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
arrest was invalid considering that the only information that the police
4
officers had in effecting the arrest was the information from a third person. It
cannot be also said in this case that there was certainty as regards the
commission of a crime.
In People v. del Rosario,70 the Court held that the requirement that an
offense has just been committed means that there must be a large measure of
immediacy between the time the offense was committed and the time of the
arrest. If there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the
commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured.
The Court held that the arrest of del Rosario did not comply with these
requirements because he was arrested only a day after the commission of the
crime and not immediately thereafter. Additionally, the arresting officers
were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime. Hence, they
had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
had committed the offense. They became aware of del Rosario's identity as
the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation.
In People v. Cendana,71 the accused was arrested one (1) day after the killing
of the victim and only on the basis of information obtained from unnamed
sources. The unlawful arrest was held invalid.
In Rolito Go v. CA,72 the arrest of the accused six ( 6) days after the
commission of the crime was held invalid because the crime had not just
been committed. Moreover, the "arresting" officers had no "personal
knowledge" of facts indicating that the accused was the gunman who had
shot the victim. The information upon which the police acted came from
statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting; one stated that the
accused was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged
gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in the name
of the accused's wife. That information did not constitute "personal
knowledge."
In People v. Tonog, Jr.,73 the warrantless arrest which was done on the same
day was held valid. In this case, the arresting officer had knowledge of facts
which he personally gathered in the course of his investigation, indicating
that the accused was one of the perpetrators.
In People v. Gerente,74 the policemen arrested Gerente only about three (3)
hours after Gerente and his companions had killed the victim. The Court held
that the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of the victim
and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him. The
warrantless arrest was held valid.
In People v. Alvario,75 the warrantless arrest came immediately after the
arresting officers received information from the victim of the crime. The
Court held that the personal knowledge of the arresting officers was derived
from the information supplied by the victim herself who pointed to Alvario as
the man who raped her at the time of his arrest. The Court upheld the
warrantless arrest. In People v. Jayson,76 there was a shooting incident. The
policemen who were summoned to the scene of the crime found the victim.
The informants pointed to the accused as the assailant only moments after
the shooting. The Court held that the arresting officers acted on the basis of

personal knowledge of the death of the victim and of facts indicating that the
accused was the assailant. Thus, the warrantless arrest was held valid.
In People v. Acol,77 a group held up the passengers in a jeepney and the
policemen immediately responded to the report of the crime. One of the
victims saw four persons walking towards Fort Bonifacio, one of whom was
wearing his jacket. The victim pointed them to the policemen. When the
group saw the policemen coming, they ran in different directions. The Court
held that the arrest was valid.
In Cadua v. CA,78 there was an initial report to the police concerning a
robbery. A radio dispatch was then given to the arresting officers, who
proceeded to Alden Street to verify the authenticity of the radio message.
When they reached the place, they met with the complainants who initiated
the report about the robbery. Upon the officers' invitation, the victims joined
them in conducting a search of the nearby area where the accused was
spotted in the vicinity. Based on the reported statements of the complainants,
he was identified as a logical suspect in the offense just committed. Hence,
the arrest was held valid.
In Doria,79 the Court held that Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally
witness the commission of the offense.
In this case, P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call
from a relative of Rosa Sia about a shooting incident. He dispatched a team
headed by SP03 Ramirez to investigate the incident. SP03 Ramirez later
reported that a certain William Sia was wounded while Judge Abelita III, who
was implicated in the incident, and his wife just left the place of the incident.
P/Supt. Doria looked for Abelita III and when he found him, he informed him
of the incident report. P/Supt. Doria requested Abelita III to go with him to
the police headquarters as he had been reported to be involved in the
incident. Abelita III agreed but suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to
his residence where P/Supt. Doria caught him up as he was about to run
towards his house.
The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the
driver's seat as Abelita III opened the door. They also saw a shotgun at the
back of the driver's seat. The police officers confiscated the firearms and
arrested Abelita III. The Court held that the petitioner's act of trying to get
away, coupled with the incident report which they investigated, were enough
to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the
existence of probable cause. Based on these discussions, it appears that the
Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense has just been
committed" and ''personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the
person to be arrested committed it" depended on the particular
circumstances of the case. However, we note that the element of ''personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances" under Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification.
The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the
Black's Law Dictionary,80 "circumstances are attendant or accompanying
facts, events or conditions. " Circumstances may pertain to events or actions
within the actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police
officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not
seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if,
based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the
crime, he could determine the existence of probable cause that the person
sought to be arrested has committed the crime. However, the determination
of probable cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be made
immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the
element of immediacy.
In other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances" is the required element of immediacy within which these
facts or circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts as
a safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or
perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame. This
guarantees that the police officers would have no time to base their probable
cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive
investigation.
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the
commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information
gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to external
factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of
immediacy imposed under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable cause
would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or
circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited period of time.
The same provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of
probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances
before the police officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.
In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on the
matter, we hold that the following must be present for a valid warrantless
arrest: 1) the crime should have been just committed; and 2) the arresting
officer's exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to
be determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal
knowledge. The requirement of the existence of probable cause objectifies
the reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with
the Constitutional mandate against unreasonable arrests.
Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless
arrest of the present petitioners, the question to be resolved is whether the
requirements for a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure were complied with, namely: 1) has
the crime just been committed when they were arrested? 2) did the arresting
officer have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the
petitioners committed the crime? and 3) based on these facts and
circumstances that the arresting officer possessed at the time of the
petitioners' arrest, would a reasonably discreet and prudent person believe
that the attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was committed by the
petitioners? We rule in the affirmative.
III. Application of Section S(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure in the present case: there was a valid warrantless arrest
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
We deem it necessary to review the records of the CA because it has
5
misapprehended the facts in its decision.81 From a review of the records, we
conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances upon which they had properly determined probable cause in
effecting a warrantless arrest against the petitioners. We note, however, that
the determination of the facts in the present case is purely limited to the
resolution of the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrests of the
petitioners.
Based on the police blotter82 entry taken at 4:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005,
the date that the alleged crime was committed, the petitioners were brought
in for investigation at the Batasan Hills Police Station. The police blotter
stated that the alleged crime was committed at 3:15 a.m. on February 20,
2005, along Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City.
The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter at 4:15 a.m., with
Atty. Generoso and the petitioners already inside the police station, would
connote that the arrest took place less than one hour from the time of the
occurrence of the crime. Hence, the CA finding that the arrest took place two
(2) hours after the commission of the crime is unfounded.
The arresting officers' personal observation of Atty. Generoso's bruises when
they arrived at the scene of the crime is corroborated by the petitioners'
admissions that Atty: Generoso indeed suffered blows from petitioner
Macapanas and his brother Joseph Macapanas,83 although they asserted that
they did it in self-defense against Atty. Generoso.
Atty. Generoso's bruises were also corroborated by the Medico-Legal
Certificate84 that was issued by East Avenue Medical Center on the same
date of the alleged mauling. The medical check-up of Atty. Generoso that was
made about 8:10 a.m. on the date of the incident, showed the following
findings: "Contusion Hematoma, Left Frontal Area; Abrasion, T6 area, right
midclavicular line periorbital hematoma, left eye; Abrasion, distal 3rd
posterolateral aspect of right forearm; Abrasion, 4th and fifth digit, right
hand; Abrasion on area of ih rib (L ant. Chest wall), tenderness on L
peripheral area, no visible abrasion. In addition, the attending physician, Dr.
Eva P. Javier, diagnosed Atty. Generoso of contusion hematoma, periorbital L.,
and traumatic conjunctivitis, o.s.
To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the
complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers
responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged
mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso
and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners
as those responsible for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners85 and Atty.
Generoso86 lived almost in the same neighborhood; more importantly, when
the petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny
their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they
narrated a different version of what transpired.87
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and
which they have personally observed less than one hour from the time that
they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the
petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners'

warrantless arrests. These circumstances were well within the police
officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest.
These circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal observation,
which are within their personal knowledge, prompting them to make the
warrantless arrests.
Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson,88 the police officers in the
present case saw Atty. Generoso in his sorry bloodied state. As the victim, he
positively identified the petitioners as the persons who mauled him;
however, instead of fleeing like what happened in Jayson, the petitioners
agreed to go with the police officers.
This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog, Jr.89 where Tonog
did not flee but voluntarily went with the police officers. More than this, the
petitioners in the present case even admitted to have been involved in the
incident with Atty. Generoso, although they had another version of what
transpired.
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent
upon the courts to consider if the police officers have complied with the
requirements set under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, specifically, the requirement of immediacy; the police
officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; and lastly, the
propriety of the determination of probable cause that the person sought to be
arrested committed the crime.
The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPOl
Monsalve immediately dispatched the arresting officer, SP02 Javier, to render
personal assistance to the victim.90 This fact alone negates the petitioners'
argument that the police officers did not have personal knowledge that a
crime had been committed - the police immediately responded and had
personal knowledge that a crime had been committed.1âwphi1
To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms
of the above-cited provision, does not require actual presence at the scene
while a crime was being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent
commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the police officer has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the
crime.
Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the locality where
it took place, its occasion, the personal circumstances of the parties, and the
immediate on-the-spot investigation that took place, the immediate and
warrantless arrests of the perpetrators were proper. Consequently, the
inquest proceeding that the City Prosecutor conducted was appropriate
under the circumstances.
IV. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is construed to
mean as an authoritative command
After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest, the discussion of
the petitioners' second issue is largely academic. Arrest is defined as the
taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for
the commission of an offense. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person
making the arrest.91 Thus, application of actual force, manual touching of the
body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is
enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest
the other and the intent of the other to submit, under the belief and
impression that submission is necessary.92
Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest,93 SP02 Javier
could not but have the intention of arresting the petitioners following Atty.
Generoso' s account. SP02 Javier did not need to apply violent physical
restraint when a simple directive to the petitioners to follow him to the
police station would produce a similar effect. In other words, the application
of actual force would only be an alternative if the petitioners had exhibited
resistance.
To be sure, after a crime had just been committed and the attending
policemen have acquired personal knowledge of the incidents of the crime,
including the alleged perpetrators, the arrest of the petitioners as the
perpetrators pointed to by the victim, was not a mere random act but was in
connection with a particular offense. Furthermore, SP02 Javier had informed
the petitioners, at the time of their arrest, of the charges against them before
taking them to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation.94
V. The Order denying the motion for preliminary
investigation is valid
In their last ditch attempt at avoidance, the petitioners attack the R TC Order
denying the petitioners' urgent motion for regular preliminary investigation
for allegedly having been issued in violation of Article VIII, Section 14 of the
1987 Constitution95 and Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.96
The RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, clearly states that the Court is
not persuaded by the evidentiary nature of the allegations in the said motion
of the accused. Aside from lack of clear and convincing proof, the Court, in the
exercise of its sound discretion on the matter, is legally bound to pursue and
hereby gives preference to the speedy disposition of the case."
We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this
Order. The RTC, in resolving the motion, is not required to state all the facts
found in the record of the case. Detailed evidentiary matters, as the RTC
decreed, is best reserved for the full-blown trial of the case, not in the
preliminary incidents leading up to the trial.
Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the
decision that should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based. In resolving a motion, the court is only required to state
clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. A contrary system would only
prolong the proceedings, which was precisely what happened to this case.
Hence, we uphold the validity of the RTC's order as it correctly stated the
reason for its denial of the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby
DENY the petition, and hereby AFFIRM the decision dated January 21, 2008
and the resolution dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 91541. The City Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to
proceed with the criminal proceedings against the petitioners.
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
6
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 197293 April 21, 2014
ALFREDO C. MENDOZA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND JUNO CARS, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
While the determination of probable cause to charge a person of a crime is
the sole function of the. prosecutor, the trial court may, in the protection of
one's fundamental right to liberty, dismiss the case if, upon a personal
assessment of the evidence, it finds that the evidence does not establish
probable cause.
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Court of Appeals'
decision2 dated January 14, 2011, which reversed the Regional Trial Court's
dismissal of the complaint against petitioner Alfredo C. Mendoza for qualified
theft and estafa.
This case stems from a complaint-affidavit filed by Juno Cars, Inc. through its
representative, Raul C. Evangelista, on January 8, 2008 for qualified theft and
estafa against Alfredo.3
In the complaint-affidavit, Juno Cars alleged that on June 2, 2007, it hired
Alfredo as Trade-In/Used Car Supervisor. On November 19, 2007, its
Dealer/Operator, Rolando Garcia, conducted a partial audit of the used cars
and discovered that five (5) cars had been sold and released by Alfredo
without Rolando’s or the finance manager’s permission.4
The partial audit showed that the buyers of the five cars made payments, but
Alfredo failed to remit the payments totalling ₱886,000.00. It was further
alleged that while there were 20 cars under Alfredo’s custody, only 18 were
accounted for. Further investigation revealed that Alfredo failed to turn over
the files of a 2001 Hyundai Starex and a Honda City 1.5 LXI. Juno Cars alleged
that taking into account the unremitted amounts and the acquisition cost of
the Honda City, Alfredo pilfered a total amount of ₱1,046,000.00 to its
prejudice and damage.5
In his counter-affidavit, Alfredo raised, among others, Juno Cars’ supposed
failure to prove ownership over the five (5) cars or its right to possess them
with the purported unremitted payments. Hence, it could not have suffered
damage.6
On March 4, 2008, Provincial Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado issued a Resolution7
finding probable cause and recommending the filing of an information
against Alfredo for qualified theft and estafa.
Alfredo moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied.8 He then filed
a petition for review with the Department of Justice on May 16, 2008.9

While Alfredo’s motion for reconsideration was still pending before the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong, two informations for qualified theft10
and estafa11 were filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 212,
Mandaluyong City. On March 31, 2008, Alfredo filed a motion for
determination of probable cause12 before the trial court. On April 28, 2008,
he also filed a motion to defer arraignment.
Several clarificatory hearings were scheduled but were not conducted.13 On
February 4, 2009, the parties agreed to submit all pending incidents,
including the clarificatory hearing, for resolution.14
On March 3, 2009, the trial court, through Presiding Judge Rizalina Capco-
Umali, issued an order15 dismissing the complaint, stating that:
After conducting an independent assessment of the evidence on record which
includes the assailed Resolution dated 04 March 2008, the court holds that
the evidence adduced does not support a finding of probable cause for the
offenses of qualified theft and estafa. x x x.16
Juno Cars filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied on
July 3, 2009.17
Juno Cars then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
arguing that the trial court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and
with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the complaint. It argued
that "the determination of probable cause and the decision whether or not to
file a criminal case in court, rightfully belongs to the public prosecutor."18
On January 14, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision,19 reversed
the trial court, and reinstated the case. In its decision, the appellate court
ruled that the trial court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction "in
supplanting the public prosecutor’s findings of probable cause with her own
findings of insufficiency of evidence and lack of probable cause."20
Aggrieved, Alfredo filed a petition for review under Rule 45 before this court.
In essence, he argued that the trial court was correct in finding that there was
no probable cause as shown by the evidence on record. He argued that
"judicial determination of probable cause is broader than [the] executive
determination of probable cause"21 and that "[i]t is not correct to say that
the determination of probable cause is exclusively vested on the prosecutor x
x x."22
In its comment,23 Juno Cars argued that Alfredo presented questions, issues,
and arguments that were a mere rehash of those already considered and
passed upon by the appellate court.
The Office of the Solicitor General, arguing for public respondent, stated in its
comment24 that the appellate court correctly sustained the public
prosecutor in his findings of probable cause against Alfredo. Since there was
no showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of Prosecutor Rey F.
Delgado, the trial court should respect his determination of probable cause.
In his reply,25 Alfredo reiterated that "judicial determination of probable
cause[,] while not a superior faculty[,] covers a broader encompassing
perspective in the disposition of the issue on the existence of probable
cause."26 He argued that the findings of the trial court should be accorded
greater weight than the appellate court’s. It merely reviewed the findings of
the trial court.
The primordial issue is whether the trial court may dismiss an information
filed by the prosecutor on the basis of its own independent finding of lack of
probable cause.
Time and again, this court has been confronted with the issue of the
difference between the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor on
one hand and the determination of probable cause by the judge on the other.
We examine these two concepts again.
Juno Cars filed a complaint against Alfredo for qualified theft27 and estafa
under Article 315, fourth paragraph, no. 3(c)28 of the Revised Penal Code.
Since qualified theft is punishable by reclusion perpetua, a preliminary
investigation must first be conducted "to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held
for trial," in accordance with Rule 112, Section 1 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
At this stage, the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the subsequent
determination of the existence of probable cause lie solely within the
discretion of the public prosecutor.29 If upon evaluation of the evidence, the
prosecutor finds sufficient basis to find probable cause, he or she shall then
cause the filing of the information with the court.
Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then "personally evaluate
the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence"30 to determine
whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. At this stage, a
judicial determination of probable cause exists.
In People v. Castillo and Mejia,31 this court has stated:
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and
judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during
preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public
prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable
cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the
crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated,
such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a
criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been
correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has
made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a
matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass
upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made
by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued
against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the
evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody
in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable
cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.32
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
The difference is clear: The executive determination of probable cause
7
concerns itself with whether there is enough evidence to support an
Information being filed. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the
other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. In
People v. Inting:33
x x x Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry
which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from
the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender
should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in
the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion
about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of
arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper—whether
or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the
offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the
expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial—is the function of the
Prosecutor.34 (Emphasis supplied)
While it is within the trial court’s discretion to make an independent
assessment of the evidence on hand, it is only for the purpose of determining
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. The judge does not act as an
appellate court of the prosecutor and has no capacity to review the
prosecutor’s determination of probable cause; rather, the judge makes a
determination of probable cause independent of the prosecutor’s finding.
People v. Court of Appeals and Jonathan Cerbo35 discussed the rationale. In
that case, Jonathan Cerbo allegedly shot Rosalinda Dy in the presence of his
father, Billy Cerbo. An information for murder was filed against Jonathan
Cerbo. The daughter of Rosalinda Dy, as private complainant, executed a
complaint-affidavit charging Billy Cerbo with conspiracy. The prosecutor
then filed a motion to amend the information, which was granted by the
court. The information was then amended to include Billy Cerbo as one of the
accused, and a warrant of arrest was issued against him.
Billy Cerbo filed a motion to quash the warrant arguing that it was issued
without probable cause. The trial court granted this motion, recalled the
warrant, and dismissed the case against him. The Court of Appeals affirmed
this dismissal. This court, however, reversed the Court of Appeals and
ordered the reinstatement of the amended information against Billy Cerbo,
stating that:
In granting this petition, we are not prejudging the criminal case or the guilt
or innocence of Private Respondent Billy Cerbo. We are simply saying that, as
a general rule, if the information is valid on its face and there is no showing of
manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of the
public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for ‘want of evidence,’ because
evidentiary matters should be presented and heard during the trial. The
functions and duties of both the trial court and the public prosecutor in "the
proper scheme of things" in our criminal justice system should be clearly
understood.
The rights of the people from what could sometimes be an "oppressive"
exercise of government prosecutorial powers do need to be protected when
circumstances so require. But just as we recognize this need, we also
acknowledge that the State must likewise be accorded due process. Thus,

when there is no showing of nefarious irregularity or manifest error in the
performance of a public prosecutor’s duties, courts ought to refrain from
interfering with such lawfully and judicially mandated duties.
In any case, if there was palpable error or grave abuse of discretion in the
public prosecutor’s finding of probable cause, the accused can appeal such
finding to the justice secretary and move for the deferment or suspension of
the proceedings until such appeal is resolved.36 (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the resolution dated March 4, 2008 of Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado
found that the facts and evidence were "sufficient to warrant the indictment
of [petitioner] x x x."37 There was nothing in his resolution which showed
that he issued it beyond the discretion granted to him by law and
jurisprudence.
While the information filed by Prosecutor Delgado was valid, Judge Capco-
Umali still had the discretion to make her own finding of whether probable
cause existed to order the arrest of the accused and proceed with trial.
Jurisdiction over an accused is acquired when the warrant of arrest is served.
Absent this, the court cannot hold the accused for arraignment and trial.
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The Constitution prohibits the issuance of search warrants or warrants of
arrest where the judge has not personally determined the existence of
probable cause. The phrase "upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce" allows a determination of
probable cause by the judge ex parte.
For this reason, Section 6, paragraph (a) of Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure mandates the judge to "immediately dismiss the case if the
evidence on record fails to establish probable cause." Section 6, paragraph (a)
of Rule 112 reads:
Section 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. — (a) By the Regional Trial
Court. — Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information,
the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on
record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he
shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has
already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who
conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or
information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on
the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue
must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
complaint of information.
In People v. Hon. Yadao:38
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options
upon the filing of the criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a
warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as
to the existence of probable cause.
But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not
mandatory.1âwphi1 The court’s first option under the above is for it to
"immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause." That is the situation here: the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause against the respondents.39
(Emphasis supplied)
It is also settled that "once a complaint or information is filed in court, any
disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the
acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court."40
In this case, Judge Capco-Umali made an independent assessment of the
evidence on record and concluded that "the evidence adduced does not
support a finding of probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft and
estafa."41 Specifically, she found that Juno Cars "failed to prove by competent
evidence"42 that the vehicles alleged to have been pilfered by Alfredo were
lawfully possessed or owned by them, or that these vehicles were received by
Alfredo, to be able to substantiate the charge of qualified theft. She also found
that the complaint "[did] not state with particularity the exact value of the
alleged office files or their valuation purportedly have been removed,
concealed or destroyed by the accused,"43 which she found crucial to the
prosecution of the crime of estafa under Article 315, fourth paragraph, no.
3(c) of the Revised Penal Code. She also noted that:
x x x As a matter of fact, this court had even ordered that this case be set for
clarificatory hearing to clear out essential matters pertinent to the offense
charged and even directed the private complainant to bring documents
relative to the same/payment as well as affidavit of witnesses/buyers with
the end view of satisfying itself that indeed probable cause exists to commit
the present case which private complainant failed to do.44
Accordingly, with the present laws and jurisprudence on the matter, Judge
Capco-Umali correctly dismissed the case against Alfredo.
Although jurisprudence and procedural rules allow it, a judge must always
proceed with caution in dismissing cases due to lack of probable cause,
considering the preliminary nature of the evidence before it. It is only when
he or she finds that the evidence on hand absolutely fails to support a finding
of probable cause that he or she can dismiss the case. On the other hand, if a
judge finds probable cause, he or she must not hesitate to proceed with
arraignment and trial in order that justice may be served.
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated January 14, 2011
8
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 110774 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Criminal Case Nos. MC08-11604-05 against Alfredo C. Mendoza are
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1641 July 27, 2006
(formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-1756-MTJ)
NOTAN LUMBOS, complainant, vs. JUDGE MARIE ELLENGRID
S.L.BALIGUAT, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, General Santos
City, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Before us is an administrative complaint[1] dated July 28, 2005 filed by
Notan Lumbos (complainant) against Judge Marie Ellengrid S.L. Baliguat
(respondent), Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, General
Santos City, for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority,
Dereliction of Duty, Grave Misconduct, Oppression and Disbarment (under
Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, October 1, 2002).
Complainant alleges that: he is one of the accused in a complaint for arson
and robbery in Criminal Cases Nos. 46246 and 46247 filed by P/Insp. Richie
Siong Bucol on July 14, 2004 before respondents sala; instead of dismissing
the case for patent lack of jurisdiction, respondent propounded a series of
leading questions on the witnesses i.e., Jose Orlando Acharon (Acharon) and
Edwin Yagat (Yagat) even without prior application for the issuance of
warrant of arrest; with the object of issuing a warrant of arrest against all
accused, respondent propounded a series of suggestive rather than searching
questions on Acharon, who did not actually witness the alleged crime; the
purported eye witness Yagat never categorically named the alleged
malefactors and their specific participation in the alleged crimes; respondent
merely tried to confirm her preconceived presumption of guilt of all accused
via suggestive questions; respondent issued an Order for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest against complainant and his co-accused without giving
them a fair chance to file their respective counter-affidavits; he with his co-
accused, filed two motions dated July 24, 2004 and August 17, 2004,
respectively, for purposes of lifting the warrant of arrest and proper referral
of subject cases to the Office of the City Prosecutor so they can file their
respective counter-affidavits; attached to the motion is an excerpt from the
police blotter certifying that on July 11, 2004 at 8:30 in the evening,
complainant was in Philippine National Police-Camp Lira, which is
approximately 25 kilometers from Bawing, Tambler where the alleged
crimes were committed; his presence in Camp Lira was precipitated by the
suspicious apprehension of some relatives who were detained in the said
camp; on September 1, 2004, the Provincial Office of the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples intervened through a Manifestation
dated August 30, 2004, praying for the dismissal of the subject cases stating
that Acharon, the complainant in the said cases, has no real right or interest
to protect, none of his rights were violated, he (Acharon) is even vulnerable
to criminal prosecution under Republic Act No. 947, and, the filing of the

subject cases in an effort to restrain the legitimate claimants appears to be a
mockery of the judicial process; respondent issued an Order dated October
26, 2004 holding in abeyance the prayer for the lifting of the warrant of
arrest, pending the submission of counter-affidavits within 10 days from
receipt of the Order.
In her Comment[2] dated September 9, 2005, respondent avers that: the
criminal cases subject of this complaint were filed before the MTCC, General
Santos City, for Preliminary Investigation (PI); on July 15, 2004, being the
Executive Judge and by virtue of Sections 84 and 86, Republic Act No.
5412,[3] otherwise known as the City Charter of General Santos City, Acharon
(the complainant in the said cases) and Yagat (the eye witness to the alleged
crimes) were duly examined under oath and through searching questions;
finding probable cause, a warrant of arrest was issued against all the accused;
the accused were directed to file their counter-affidavits but, instead of doing
so, the defense filed a Motion to Correct Caption and to Lift the Warrant of
Arrest issued; the first prayer was granted but the resolution of the second
motion was held in abeyance until the counter-affidavits of all the accused
are submitted; no counter-affidavits were filed so respondent resolved the
cases and forwarded its records to the City Prosecutors Office for the filing of
proper Information.
Respondent claims that: the conduct of the PI and the subsequent issuance of
the warrant of arrest are well within the authority given in the City Charter
which remains valid and enforceable until revoked by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of General Santos City; there was no usurpation of authority of an
RTC Judge when she issued the assailed warrant of arrest as she has
authority to do so under the City Charter; she examined only Acharon and
Yagat because they were the witnesses to the alleged crimes and the
questions propounded were never leading; there was no grave abuse of
discretion when she held in abeyance the resolution of the prayer for the
lifting of the warrant of arrest because the primary reason why it was
withheld was the complainants failure to submit a counter-affidavit; she did
not personally know Acharon as she did not grow up in General Santos City;
there is no conflict that the Rules on Criminal Procedure had undergone
amendments but it would be very safe to say that the General Santos City
Charter is not yet amended, hence, it still stands; and she believes that she
did her duty to her very best in accordance with law and feels strongly
offended and harassed by the filing of the instant case.
For her defense, respondent avers that: in clean conscience she conducted
the PI and thereafter issued the warrant of arrest in good faith and in
accordance with law, jurisprudence and the rules and procedures; as a
government employee since 1979, she had maintained a clean reputation;
she even sacrificed and left her post as Senior Legal Officer of the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR) in 1990 on
the ground that she could not take the corruption around her; she had always
kept her impartiality in making her decisions and never looked into the
persons behind the party litigants; she rose through the ranks asking no
favors from anyone and relied on her own skills, abilities, knowledge of the
Constitution, laws, rules, regulations and jurisprudence and most especially
her unblemished reputation; and with utmost dignity and head held high,
respondent reiterates that she had not violated any of the provisions of the
Constitution, or the Lawyers' and Judges' Oath, or any of the provisions of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, Code of Professional Responsibility, or Canons of
Professional Ethics; and she had observed due process and did not misuse it
to defeat the ends of justice.
In its Memorandum[4] dated November 21, 2005, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) submitted its evaluation and recommendation, to wit:
EVALUATION: After a careful perusal and consideration of the parties
respective positions and arguments, this Office finds no reasonable ground to
hold the respondent administratively liable.
Paragraph (5) Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleadings, practice and [enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading practice and] procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
Under the City Charter of General Santos City, the city court may also conduct
preliminary investigation for any offense without regard to the limits of
punishment and may release or commit and bind over any person charged
with such offense to secure his appearance before the proper court. However,
considering the Honorable Courts power of supervision over all courts, rules
of pleading, practice and procedure in all courts have been promulgated. And
as a matter of policy and procedure, criminal cases covered by the Rule and
initiated by a complaint is being referred to the City Prosecutor for
appropriate action.
In the case of Salcedo vs. Nobles-Banz, 134 SCRA 207, the Supreme Court
ruled that:
There is no question that under the Olongapo City Charter, the Municipal
Trial Court can conduct preliminary investigation of all offenses. That is
substantive law. However, pursuant to our constitutional supervision over all
Courts, as a matter of policy, we direct the Municipal Trial Court in the City of
Olongapo [that] whenever a criminal case covered by the Rule is initiated by
complaint, to refer the same to the City Fiscal for the filing of the
corresponding Information x x x.
xxx
The primary function of courts is to try and decide cases, not to conduct
preliminary investigation. Thus, in Section 9 of the Rule on Summary
Procedure in Special Cases effective August 1, 1983, the Court provided
expressly that in Metro-Manila and chartered cities, (criminal) cases shall be
commenced only by information at the instance of the metropolitan
municipal trial court judges themselves who feared that they would be
swamped with preliminary investigation which they would have to conduct
(instead of cities fiscals) if criminal complaints were to be directly filed with
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
them. The Court has likewise adopted the same rule and policy in the 1985
9
Rules on Criminal Procedure effective January 1, 1985 governing the
institution of all other offenses that in Metropolitan Manila and other
chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.
(Rule 110, sec.1[b]).
Further, it is worthy to state herein that it is the Public Prosecutor who is
given by law direction and control of all criminal actions. It is he who is
primarily responsible for ascertaining through a preliminary inquiry or
proceeding whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has
been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof. Therefore, the
preliminary investigation proper is not a judicial function, but an executive
function, which is part of the prosecutions job. The assignment of this non-
judicial function to judges of inferior courts was dictated by necessity and
practical considerations because there are not enough fiscals and
prosecutors to investigate crimes in all municipalities all over the country. In
the case of Castillo vs. Villaluz, 171 SCRA 39, citing Salta vs. Court
Administrator, 143 SCRA 228, the Honorable Court ruled that:
Whenever there are enough fiscals or prosecutors to conduct preliminary
investigation, courts are counseled to leave this job which is essentially
executive to them.
It appears that the City of General Santos already has sufficient number of
prosecutors who can handle the preliminary investigation of criminal cases.
Hence, the same should be referred to them for appropriate action.
It is worth mentioning here that lately, the Honorable Court in A.M. No. 05-8-
26-SC dated 30 August 2005 has already withdrawn the power to conduct
preliminary investigation from the judges of the first level courts.
Insofar as the issuance of warrant of arrest is concerned, par. (b), Sec. 6, Rule
112 provides:
Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.
xxx
(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. When required pursuant to the second
paragraph of section 1 of this Rule, the preliminary investigation of cases
falling under the original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit
Trial Court may be conducted by either the judge or the prosecutor. x x x.
When the investigation is conducted by the judge himself, he shall follow the
procedure provided in Section 3 of this Rule. If his findings and
recommendations are affirmed by the provincial or city prosecutor, or by the
Ombudsman or his deputy, and the corresponding information is filed, he
shall issue a warrant of arrest. However, without waiting for the conclusion
of the investigation, the judge may issue a warrant of arrest if he finds after
an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his
witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, that a probable
cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under
immediate custody not to frustrate the ends of justice.
Under the above-quoted rule, the power or authority of the investigating
judge to issue a warrant of arrest is limited to those instances where there is
a necessity of placing him in custody in order not to frustrate the ends of

justice. In the case of Mantaring vs. Roman, 254 SCRA 158, the respondent
judge was reprimanded for issuing a warrant without any finding that it was
necessary to place the accused in immediate custody in order to prevent a
frustration of justice. And we quote:
Moreover, we think it was improper for respondent judge to have issued the
warrants of arrest against complainant and his son without any finding that it
was necessary to place them in immediate custody in order to prevent a
frustration of justice. It is now settled that in issuing warrants of arrest in
preliminary investigations, the investigating judge must:
(a) have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his
witnesses by searching questions and answers;
(b) be satisfied that probable cause exists; and
(c) that there is a need to place the respondent under immediate custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
In the instant case, it appears that respondent ordered the issuance of
warrants of arrest against the complainant and his co-accused not only
because of the existence of probable cause, but because of her finding that it
was necessary to place them under immediate custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice. Pertinent portion of the Order of the court
during the preliminary investigation held on 15 July 2004 is hereunder
quoted as follows:
ORDER: For preliminary investigation and request for immediate issuance of
warrant of arrest. After a thorough examination of the complaining witness,
Jose Orlando Acharon together with the eye-witness Edwin Yagat through
searching questions under oath, the undersigned finds that there is reason to
believe that the crimes of arson and robbery and there is a need to place in
custody the named accused herein in order not to frustrate the ends of justice
and also to prevent them from possibly committing the same crime in the
other bunkhouses of the complaining witness, issue warrant of arrest against
all the named accused with bailbond fixed at P200,000.00 each for Robbery
and no bail for Arson. x x x
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration and
approval of the Honorable Court our recommendations as follows:
1. The instant case against Judge Marie Ellengrid S.L. Baliguat of
MTCC, Branch 01 [G]eneral Santos City be DISMISSED for lack of merit; and
2. Judge Baliguat be ADVISED to refer criminal cases filed for
preliminary investigation to the Office of the City Prosecutor, General Santos
City for appropriate action.[5]
Meanwhile, in a Resolution[6] dated February 22, 2006, respondent was
required to inform the Court as to the action taken by her on complainant's
and his co-accused's motions dated July 24, 2004 and August 17, 2004,
respectively, to lift the warrant of arrest and referral of Criminal Cases Nos.
46246 and 46247 to the Office of the City Prosecutor.
In her Compliance[7] dated March 10, 2006, respondent avers that despite
ample time given to the respondents to submit their counter-affidavit, they
failed to do so and attaching thereto the Resolution[8] dated January 14,
2005, denying the Motion to Quash Warrant of Arrest for lack of merit and
forwarded the records of Criminal Cases Nos. 46246 and 46247-I to the
Office of the City Prosecutor for further proceedings.
At issue is whether or not the acts committed by respondent judge constitute
gross ignorance of the law, abuse of authority, dereliction of duty, and
oppression warranting dismissal from judicial service and disbarment.
We adopt the evaluation and recommendation of the OCA.
Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be
held for trial.[9] And prior to the issuance of A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC[10] which
took effect on October 3, 2005, among the officers authorized by Sec. 2, Rule
112[11] of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure to conduct preliminary
investigation are the city prosecutors and judges of the MTC and MCTC.
As provided under Sec. 37 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Judges of
Metropolitan Trial Courts, except those in the National Capital Region, of
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall have
authority to conduct preliminary investigation of crimes alleged to have been
committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions which are
cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts. x x x Provided, however, that, if after
the preliminary investigation the Judge finds a prima facie case, he shall
forward the records of the case to the Provincial/City Fiscal for the filing of
the corresponding information with the proper court. No warrant of arrest
shall be issued by the Judge in connection with any criminal complaint filed
with him for preliminary investigation, unless after an examination in writing
and under oath or affirmation of the complainant and his witnesses, he finds
that a probable cause exists. x x x
The Charter of General Santos City, specifically Sec. 84,[12] authorizes the
city court to conduct preliminary investigations for any offense without
regard to the limits of punishment and may release or commit and bind over
any person charge[d] with such offense to secure his appearance before the
proper court.
Under Sec. 6(b), Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, without
waiting for the conclusion of the investigation, the judge may issue a warrant
of arrest if he finds after an examination in writing and under oath of the
complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and
answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing
the respondent under immediate custody not to frustrate the ends of justice.
And as can be gleaned from the provision of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure,[13] in Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint shall be
filed with the office of the prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their
charters.
Thus, respondent did not commit gross ignorance of the law nor grave abuse
of discretion in conducting the said PI. It is very clear from the
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
aforementioned provision that city judges are authorized to conduct
10
preliminary investigation and examination. The conduct by respondent of the
PI and the subsequent issuance of the warrant of arrest are well within the
authority given under the substantive law as well as the Charter of General
Santos City.
Salcedo v. Nobles-Bans,[14] cited by the complainant, is not on all fours with
the present case. In the said case, respondent judge dismissed the criminal
cases covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, instead of referring the
same to the City Fiscal for the filing of the corresponding Informations. In the
present case, what is being questioned was the PI conducted by the
respondent and the subsequent issuance of the warrant of arrest, which is
neither covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure nor dismissed by the
respondent.
In Ribaya v. Binamira-Parcia,[15] we held that as long as the constitutional
mandate was complied with, that is, the warrant of arrest was issued upon a
finding of probable cause personally by the judge after an examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, the
warrant of arrest was valid. After all, the purpose of issuing the warrant of
arrest was to place the respondents under immediate custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice;[16] and whether it is necessary to place the
accused in custody is left to the judges sound judgment.[17] As aptly found
by the OCA in its evaluation,[18] respondent ordered the issuance of the
warrants of arrest not only because of the existence of probable cause, but
because of her finding that it was necessary to place the accused under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. We find
nothing irregular in the course of action taken by the respondent.
We held in Jamora v. Bersales,[19] that when a preliminary investigation is
conducted by a municipal court trial judge, he is obligated, upon conclusion
of the preliminary investigation, to transmit to the provincial or city fiscal, for
appropriate action, the resolution of the case. In this case, immediately after
the determination of a probable cause, respondent judge forwarded the
records of the criminal cases to the Office of the City Prosecutor for further
proceedings which bespeaks of respondents knowledge of the law, both
substantive and procedural.
However, as adverted to earlier, under A.M. No 05-8-26-SC, which took effect
on October 3, 2005, the officers authorized to conduct preliminary
investigations are the: (a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;
(b) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and (c) other officers as may be
authorized by law. xxx[20] The preliminary investigation of cases falling
under the original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court or Municipal Circuit Trial Court
shall be conducted by the prosecutor. xxx
The above-mentioned administrative matter included the following proviso:
All First Level Courts shall continue with the preliminary investigation of
cases pending with them and terminate them not later than December 31,
2005.

Upon the date of effectivity of these amendments, First Level Courts shall no
longer accept new cases for preliminary investigation, which fall under the
exclusive jurisdiction of courts of other levels.
It must be emphasized that the conduct of respondent in the handling of the
PI and the subsequent issuance of the warrants of arrest is well within the
mandate of the law and not indicative of any grave abuse of discretion on her
part. The criminal cases subject of this complaint were filed on July 15, 2004
and still governed by Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure in
force at the time of the commission of the crime charged; while A.M. No. 05-
8-26-SC which took effect on October 3, 2005, commanded the first level
courts to continue with the preliminary investigation of cases pending with
them and terminate them not later than December 31, 2005.
It is settled that as a matter of policy, the acts of a judge in his judicial
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to
liability civil, criminal or administrative for any of his official acts, no matter
how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith.[21] To hold, otherwise,
would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the
facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be
infallible in his judgment.[22] An inquiry into the administrative liability of a
judge may be resorted to only after the available remedies have been
exhausted and decided with finality.[23] For until there is a final declaration
by the appellate court that the challenged order or judgment is manifestly
erroneous, there will be no basis to conclude whether respondent is
administratively liable.[24]
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the subject
decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official
duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, he
must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption.[25] Good faith
and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations, are
sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can
find refuge.[26] In this case, we are convinced that respondent conducted the
PI and the subsequent issuance of the warrants of arrest in clean conscience,
in good faith and in accordance with law, jurisprudence, rules and
procedures.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the administrative case against Judge
Marie Ellengrid S.L. Baliguat, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1,
General Santos City is DISMISSED. And in line with A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC,
withdrawing the power to conduct preliminary investigation from judges of
first level courts, she is ADVISED to refer criminal cases filed for preliminary
investigation to the Office of the City Prosecutor, General Santos City for
appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176830 February 11, 2014
SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, Petitioner, vs. HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Hilongos,
Leyte, Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in. his capacity as Approving
Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as
Investigating Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Justice, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 185587
RANDALL B. ECHANIS, Petitioner, vs. HON. THELMA BUNYl-MEDINA, in her capacity
as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32, HON. EPHREM S.
ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Hilongos,
Leyte, Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and
Officer-in-Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating Prosecutor,
RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice,
Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 185636
RAFAEL G. BAYLOSIS, Petitioner, vs. HON. THELMA BUNYI-MEDINA, in her capacity
as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32, HON. EPHREM S.
ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Hilongos,
Leyte, Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and
Officer-in-Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating Prosecutor,
RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice,
Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 190005
VICENTE P. LADLAD, Petitioner, vs. HON. THELMA BUNYI-MEDINA, in her capacity
as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32, and the PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by elements of the 43rd
Infantry Brigade of the Philippine Army at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay
Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte.1 The mass grave contained skeletal remains of
individuals believed to be victims of "Operation Venereal Disease" (Operation
VD) launched by members of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New
People’s Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines
(CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their ranks of suspected military informers.
While the doctrine of hierarchy of courts normally precludes a direct
invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction, we take cognizance of these petitions
considering that petitioners have chosen to take recourse directly before us
and that the cases are of significant national interest.
Petitioners have raised several issues, but most are too insubstantial to
require consideration. Accordingly, in the exercise of sound judicial
discretion and economy, this Court will pass primarily upon the following:
1. Whether petitioners were denied due process during preliminary
investigation and in the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
2. Whether the murder charges against petitioners should be dismissed
under the political offense doctrine.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
11
These are petitions for certiorari and prohibition2 seeking the annulment of
the orders and resolutions of public respondents with regard to the
indictment and issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners for the
crime of multiple murder.
Police Chief Inspector George L. Almaden (P C/Insp. Almaden) of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional Office 8 and Staff Judge Advocate
Captain Allan Tiu (Army Captain Tiu) of the 8th Infantry Division of the
Philippine Army sent 12 undated letters to the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte
through Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rosulo U. Vivero (Prosecutor
Vivero).3 The letters requested appropriate legal action on 12 complaint-
affidavits attached therewith accusing 71 named members of the Communist
Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army/National Democratic Front of
the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) of murder, including petitioners herein
along with several other unnamed members.
The letters narrated that on 26 August 2006, elements of the 43rd Infantry
Brigade of the Philippine Army discovered a mass grave site of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte.4
Recovered from the grave site were 67 severely deteriorated skeletal
remains believed to be victims of Operation VD.5
The PNP Scene of the Crime Operation (SOCO) Team based in Regional Office
8 was immediately dispatched to the mass grave site to conduct crime
investigation, and to collect, preserve and analyze the skeletal remains.6 Also,
from 11-17 September 2006, an investigation team composed of intelligence
officers, and medico-legal and DNA experts, conducted forensic crime
analysis and collected from alleged relatives of the victims DNA samples for
matching.7
The Initial Specialist Report8 dated 18 September 2006 issued by the PNP
Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City, was inconclusive with regard
to the identities of the skeletal remains and even the length of time that they
had been buried. The report recommended the conduct of further tests to
confirm the identities of the remains and the time window of death.9
However, in a Special Report10 dated 2 October 2006, the Case Secretariat of
the Regional and National Inter-Agency Legal Action Group (IALAG) came up
with the names of ten (10) possible victims after comparison and
examination based on testimonies of relatives and witnesses.11
The 12 complaint-affidavits were from relatives of the alleged victims of
Operation VD. All of them swore that their relatives had been abducted or
last seen with members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP and were never seen again.
They also expressed belief that their relatives’ remains were among those
discovered at the mass grave site.
Also attached to the letters were the affidavits of Zacarias Piedad,12
Leonardo C. Tanaid, Floro M. Tanaid, Numeriano Beringuel, Glecerio Roluna
and Veronica P. Tabara. They narrated that they were former members of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP.13 According to them, Operation VD was ordered in 1985 by
the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee.14 Allegedly, petitioners Saturnino C.
Ocampo (Ocampo),15 Randall B. Echanis (Echanis),16 Rafael G. Baylosis

(Baylosis),17 and Vicente P. Ladlad (Ladlad)18 were then members of the
Central Committee.
According to these former members, four sub-groups were formed to
implement Operation VD, namely, (1) the Intel Group responsible for
gathering information on suspected military spies and civilians who would
not support the movement; (2) the Arresting Group charged with their
arrests; (3) the Investigation Group which would subject those arrested to
questioning; and (4) the Execution Group or the "cleaners" of those
confirmed to be military spies and civilians who would not support the
movement.19
From 1985 to 1992, at least 100 people had been abducted, hog-tied,
tortured and executed by members of the CPP/NPA/NDF20 pursuant to
Operation VD.21
On the basis of the 12 letters and their attachments, Prosecutor Vivero issued
a subpoena requiring, among others, petitioners to submit their counter-
affidavits and those of their witnesses.22 Petitioner Ocampo submitted his
counter-affidavit.23 Petitioners Echanis24 and Baylosis25 did not file
counter-affidavits because they were allegedly not served the copy of the
complaint and the attached documents or evidence. Counsel of petitioner
Ladlad made a formal entry of appearance on 8 December 2006 during the
preliminary investigation.26 However, petitioner Ladlad did not file a
counter-affidavit because he was allegedly not served a subpoena.27
In a Resolution28 dated 16 February 2007, Prosecutor Vivero recommended
the filing of an Information for 15 counts of multiple murder against 54
named members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP, including petitioners herein, for the
death of the following: 1) Juanita Aviola, 2) Concepcion Aragon, 3) Gregorio
Eras, 4) Teodoro Recones, Jr., 5) Restituto Ejoc, 6) Rolando Vasquez, 7) Junior
Milyapis, 8) Crispin Dalmacio, 9) Zacarias Casil, 10) Pablo Daniel, 11) Romeo
Tayabas, 12) Domingo Napoles, 13) Ciriaco Daniel, 14) Crispin Prado, and 15)
Ereberto Prado.29
Prosecutor Vivero also recommended that Zacarias Piedad, Leonardo Tanaid,
Numeriano Beringuel and Glecerio Roluna be dropped as respondents and
utilized as state witnesses, as their testimonies were vital to the success of
the prosecution.30 The Resolution was silent with regard to Veronica Tabara.
The Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Hilongos,
Leyte, Branch 18 (RTC Hilongos, Leyte) presided by Judge Ephrem S. Abando
(Judge Abando) on 28 February 2007, and docketed as Criminal Case No. H-
1581.31 Petitioner Ocampo filed an Ex Parte Motion to Set Case for
Clarificatory Hearing dated 5 March 2007 prior to receiving a copy of the
Resolution recommending the filing of the Information.32
On 6 March 2007, Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause "in
the commission by all mentioned accused of the crime charged."33 He
ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against them with no
recommended bail for their temporary liberty.34
On 16 March 2007, petitioner Ocampo filed before us this special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and
docketed as G.R. No. 176830 seeking the annulment of the 6 March 2007
Order of Judge Abando and the 16 February 2007 Resolution of Prosecutor
Vivero.35 The petition prayed for the unconditional release of petitioner
Ocampo from PNP custody, as well as the issuance of a temporary restraining
order/ writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the conduct of further
proceedings during the pendency of the petition.36
Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion against him and 44 others
(including petitioners Echanis and Baylosis37 and Ladlad38) docketed as
Criminal Case No. 06-944 was then pending before the RTC Makati, Branch
150 (RTC Makati).39 Putting forward the political offense doctrine, petitioner
Ocampo argues that common crimes, such as murder in this case, are already
absorbed by the crime of rebellion when committed as a necessary means, in
connection with and in furtherance of rebellion.40
We required41 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the
petition and the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/
writ of preliminary injunction, and set42 the case for oral arguments on 30
March 2007. The OSG filed its Comment on 27 March 2007.43
The following were the legal issues discussed by the parties during the oral
arguments:
1. Whether the present petition for certiorari and prohibition is the proper
remedy of petitioner Ocampo;
2. Assuming it is the proper remedy, whether he was denied due process
during preliminary investigation and in the issuance of the warrant of arrest;
3. Whether the murder charges against him are already included in the
rebellion charge against him in the RTC.44
Afterwards, the parties were ordered to submit their memoranda within 10
days.45 On 3 April 2007, the Court ordered the provisional release of
petitioner Ocampo under a ₱100,000 cash bond.46
Acting on the observation of the Court during the oral arguments that the
single Information filed before the RTC Hilongos, Leyte was defective for
charging 15 counts of murder, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit
Amended Information and New Informations on 11 April 2007.47 In an
Order dated 27 July 2007, Judge Abando held in abeyance the resolution
thereof and effectively suspended the proceedings during the pendency of
G.R. No. 176830 before this Court.48
While the proceedings were suspended, petitioner Echanis was arrested on
28 January 2008 by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Abando on
6 March 2007.49 On 1 February 2008, petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed
a Motion for Judicial Reinvestigation/ Determination of Probable Cause with
Prayer to Dismiss the Case Outright and Alternative Prayer to Recall/
Suspend Service of Warrant.50
On 30 April 2008, Judge Abando issued an Order denying the motion.51
Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for Reconsideration52 dated
30 May 2008, but before being able to rule thereon, Judge Abando issued an
Order dated 12 June 2008 transmitting the records of Criminal Case No. H-
1581 to the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC Manila.53 The Order was issued
in compliance with the Resolution dated 23 April 2008 of this Court granting
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
the request of then Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales to transfer the venue of
12
the case.
The case was re-raffled to RTC Manila, Branch 32 (RTC Manila) presided by
Judge Thelma Bunyi-Medina (Judge Medina) and re-docketed as Criminal
Case No. 08-262163.54 Petitioner Echanis was transferred to the PNP
Custodial Center in Camp Crame, Quezon City. On 12 August 2008,
petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed their Supplemental Arguments to
Motion for Reconsideration.55
In an Order56 dated 27 October 2008, Judge Medina suspended the
proceedings of the case pending the resolution of G.R. No. 176830 by this
Court.
On 18 December 2008, petitioner Ladlad filed with the RTC Manila a Motion
to Quash and/or Dismiss.57
On 23 December 2008, petitioner Echanis filed before us a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the
annulment of the 30 April 2008 Order of Judge Abando and the 27 October
2008 Order of Judge Medina.58 The petition, docketed as G.R. No. 185587,
prayed for the unconditional and immediate release of petitioner Echanis, as
well as the issuance of a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain his further incarceration.59
On 5 January 2009, petitioner Baylosis filed before us a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court also seeking
the annulment of the 30 April 2008 Order of Judge Abando and the 27
October 2008 Order of Judge Medina.60 The petition, docketed as G.R. No.
185636, prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the implementation of the warrant of
arrest against petitioner Baylosis.61
The Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 185587 and 185636 on 12 January 2009.62
On 3 March 2009, the Court ordered the further consolidation of these two
cases with G.R. No. 176830.63 We required64 the OSG to comment on the
prayer for petitioner Echanis’s immediate release, to which the OSG did not
interpose any objection on these conditions: that the temporary release shall
only be for the purpose of his attendance and participation in the formal
peace negotiations between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GRP) and the CPP/NPA/NDFP, set to begin in August 2009; and
that his temporary release shall not exceed six (6) months.65 The latter
condition was later modified, such that his temporary liberty shall continue
for the duration of his actual participation in the peace negotiations.66
On 11 August 2009, the Court ordered the provisional release of petitioner
Echanis under a ₱100,000 cash bond, for the purpose of his participation in
the formal peace negotiations.67
Meanwhile, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed its Opposition68 to
petitioner Ladlad’s motion to quash before the RTC Manila. The trial court
conducted a hearing on the motion on 13 February 2009.69

On 6 May 2009, Judge Medina issued an Order70 denying the motion to
quash. The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ladlad was also
denied on 27 August 2009.71
On 9 November 2009, petitioner Ladlad filed before us a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of
the 6 May 2009 and 27 August 2009 Orders of Judge Medina.72 The petition
was docketed as G.R. No. 190005.
On 11 January 2010, we ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 190005 with
G.R. Nos. 176830, 185587 and 185636.73 We also required the OSG to file its
comment thereon. The OSG submitted its Comment74 on 7 May 2010.
On 27 July 2010, we likewise required the OSG to file its Comment in G.R.
Nos. 185636 and 185587.75 These Comments were filed by the OSG on 13
December 201076 and on 21 January 2011,77 respectively. Petitioners
Echanis and Baylosis filed their Consolidated Reply78 on 7 June 2011.
On 2 May 2011, petitioner Ladlad filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bail.79 On 21
July 2011, petitioner Baylosis filed A Motion to Allow Petitioner to Post
Bail.80 The OSG interposed no objection to the grant of a ₱100,000 cash bail
to them considering that they were consultants of the NDFP negotiating
team, which was then holding negotiations with the GRP peace panel for the
signing of a peace accord.81
On 17 January 2012, we granted the motions of petitioners Ladlad and
Baylosis and fixed their bail in the amount of ₱100,000, subject to the
condition that their temporary release shall be limited to the period of their
actual participation in the peace negotiations.82
Petitioner Ladlad filed his Reply83 to the OSG Comment on 18 January 2013.
OUR RULING
Petitioners were accorded due process during preliminary investigation
and in the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
A. Preliminary Investigation
A preliminary investigation is "not a casual affair."84 It is conducted to
protect the innocent from the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a
public trial.85 While the right to have a preliminary investigation before trial
is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a substantive right and a
component of due process in the administration of criminal justice.86
In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law
entails the opportunity to be heard.87 It serves to accord an opportunity for
the presentation of the respondent’s side with regard to the accusation.
Afterwards, the investigating officer shall decide whether the allegations and
defenses lead to a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed, and
that it was the respondent who committed it. Otherwise, the investigating
officer is bound to dismiss the complaint.
"The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit evidence in support of one's defense."88 What is proscribed is lack of
opportunity to be heard.89 Thus, one who has been afforded a chance to
present one’s own side of the story cannot claim denial of due process.90
Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis allege that they did not receive a copy of the
complaint and the attached documents or evidence.91 Petitioner Ladlad
claims that he was not served a subpoena due to the false address indicated
in the 12 undated letters of P C/Insp. Almaden and Army Captain Tiu to
Prosecutor Vivero.92 Furthermore, even though his counsels filed their
formal entry of appearance before the Office of the Prosecutor, petitioner
Ladlad was still not sent a subpoena through his counsels’ addresses.93 Thus,
they were deprived of the right to file counter-affidavits.
Petitioner Ocampo claims that Prosecutor Vivero, in collusion with P C/Insp.
Almaden and Army Captain Tiu, surreptitiously inserted the Supplemental
Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad in the records of the case without furnishing
petitioner Ocampo a copy.94 The original affidavit of Zacarias Piedad dated
14 September 2006 stated that a meeting presided by petitioner Ocampo was
held in 1984, when the launching of Operation VD was agreed upon.95
Petitioner Ocampo refuted this claim in his Counter-affidavit dated 22
December 2006 stating that he was in military custody from October 1976
until his escape in May 1985.96 Thereafter, the Supplemental Affidavit of
Zacarias Piedad dated 12 January 2007 admitted that he made a mistake in
his original affidavit, and that the meeting actually took place in June 1985.97
Petitioner Ocampo argues that he was denied the opportunity to reply to the
Supplemental Affidavit by not being furnished a copy thereof.
Petitioner Ocampo also claims that he was denied the right to file a motion
for reconsideration or to appeal the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero, because
the latter deliberately delayed the service of the Resolution by 19 days,
effectively denying petitioner Ocampo his right to due process.98
As to the claim of petitioners Echanis and Baylosis, we quote the pertinent
portion of Prosecutor Vivero’s Resolution, which states:
In connection with the foregoing and pursuant to the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure[,] the respondents were issued and served with
Subpoena at their last known address for them to submit their counter-
affidavits and that of their witnesses.
Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits because
they could no longer be found in their last known address, per return of the
subpoenas. On the other hand, Saturnino Ocampo @ Satur, Fides Lim,
Maureen Palejaro and Ruben Manatad submitted their Counter-Affidavits.
However, Vicente Ladlad and Jasmin Jerusalem failed to submit the required
Counter Affidavits in spite entry of appearance by their respective
counsels.99
Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to
resolve the complaint based on the evidence before him if a respondent could
not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a respondent were made, and
he was given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the
preliminary investigation remains valid.100 The rule was put in place in
order to foil underhanded attempts of a respondent to delay the prosecution
of offenses.101
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve
13
subpoenas on the named respondents at their last known addresses. This is
sufficient for due process. It was only because a majority of them could no
longer be found at their last known addresses that they were not served
copies of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence.
Petitioner Ladlad claims that his subpoena was sent to the nonexistent
address "53 Sct. Rallos St., QC,"102 which had never been his address at any
time.103 In connection with this claim, we take note of the fact that the
subpoena to Fides Lim, petitioner Ladlad’s wife,104 was sent to the same
address, and that she was among those mentioned in the Resolution as
having timely submitted their counter-affidavits.
Despite supposedly never receiving a subpoena, petitioner Ladlad’s counsel
filed a formal entry of appearance on 8 December 2006.105 Prosecutor
Vivero had a reason to believe that petitioner Ladlad had received the
subpoena and accordingly instructed his counsel to prepare his defense.
Petitioner Ladlad, through his counsel, had every opportunity to secure
copies of the complaint after his counsel’s formal entry of appearance and,
thereafter, to participate fully in the preliminary investigation. Instead, he
refused to participate.
We have previously cautioned that "litigants represented by counsel should
not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of
their case."106 Having opted to remain passive during the preliminary
investigation, petitioner Ladlad and his counsel cannot now claim a denial of
due process, since their failure to file a counter-affidavit was of their own
doing.
Neither do we find any merit in petitioner Ocampo’s allegation of collusion to
surreptitiously insert the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad in the
records. There was nothing surreptitious about the Supplemental Affidavit
since it clearly alludes to an earlier affidavit and admits the mistake
committed regarding the date of the alleged meeting. The date of the
execution of the Supplemental Affidavit was also clearly stated. Thus, it was
clear that it was executed after petitioner Ocampo had submitted his counter-
affidavit. Should the case go to trial, that will provide petitioner Ocampo with
the opportunity to question the execution of Zacarias Piedad’s Supplemental
Affidavit.
Neither can we uphold petitioner Ocampo’s contention that he was denied
the right to be heard. For him to claim that he was denied due process by not
being furnished a copy of the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad
would imply that the entire case of the prosecution rested on the
Supplemental Affidavit. The OSG has asserted that the indictment of
petitioner Ocampo was based on the collective affidavits of several other
witnesses107 attesting to the allegation that he was a member of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee, which had ordered the launch of
Operation VD.
As to his claim that he was denied the right to file a motion for
reconsideration or to appeal the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero due to the
19-day delay in the service of the Resolution, it must be pointed out that the
period for filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal to the Secretary of

Justice is reckoned from the date of receipt of the resolution of the
prosecutor, not from the date of the resolution. This is clear from Section 3 of
the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal:
Sec. 3. Period to appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the resolution, or of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration/ reinvestigation if one has been filed within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the assailed resolution. Only one motion for reconsideration
shall be allowed. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, when petitioner Ocampo received the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero
on 12 March 2007,108 the former had until 27 March 2007 within which to
file either a motion for reconsideration before the latter or an appeal before
the Secretary of Justice. Instead, petitioner Ocampo chose to file the instant
petition for certiorari directly before this Court on 16 March 2007.
B. Issuance of the Warrants of Arrest
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that "no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce."
Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not comply with the
requirements of the Constitution in finding the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners.109
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as
"such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested."110 Although the Constitution provides that probable
cause shall be determined by the judge after an examination under oath or an
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses, we have ruled that a
hearing is not necessary for the determination thereof.111 In fact, the judge’s
personal examination of the complainant and the witnesses is not mandatory
and indispensable for determining the aptness of issuing a warrant of
arrest.112
It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutor’s report and
supporting documents showing the existence of probable cause for the
indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if, on the
basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to disregard the
prosecutor's resolution and require the submission of additional affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in determining its existence.113
Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis claim that, had Judge Abando painstakingly
examined the records submitted by Prosecutor Vivero, the judge would have
inevitably dismissed the charge against them.114 Additionally, petitioner
Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not point out facts and evidence in the
record that were used as bases for his finding of probable cause to issue a
warrant of arrest.115
The determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest
against petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of Judge Abando as
the trial judge.116 Further elucidating on the wide latitude given to trial
judges in the issuance of warrants of arrest, this Court stated in Sarigumba v.
Sandiganbayan117 as follows:
x x x. The trial court's exercise of its judicial discretion should not, as a
general rule, be interfered with in the absence of grave abuse of discretion.
Indeed, certiorari will not lie to cure errors in the trial court's appreciation of
the evidence of the parties, the conclusion of facts it reached based on the
said findings, as well as the conclusions of law. x x x.
Whether or not there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the
arrest of the accused is a question of fact based on the allegations in the
Informations, the Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor, including other
documents and/or evidence appended to the Information.
Here, the allegations of petitioners point to factual matters indicated in the
affidavits of the complainants and witnesses as bases for the contention that
there was no probable cause for petitioners’ indictment for multiple murder
or for the issuance of warrants for their arrest. As stated above, the trial
judge’s appreciation of the evidence and conclusion of facts based thereon
are not interfered with in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. Again, "he
sufficiently complies with the requirement of personal determination if he
reviews the [I]nformation and the documents attached thereto, and on the
basis thereof forms a belief that the accused is probably guilty of the crime
with which he is being charged."118
Judge Abando’s review of the Information and the supporting documents is
shown by the following portion of the judge’s 6 March 2007 Order:
On the evaluation of the Resolution and its Information as submitted and
filed by the Provincial Prosecution of Leyte Province supported by the
following documents: Affidavits of Complainants, Sworn Statements of
Witnesses and other pertinent documents issued by the Regional Crime
Laboratory Office, PNP, Region VIII and Camp Crame, Quezon City, pictures of
the grave site and skeletal remains, this court has the findings [sic] of
probable cause in the commission by all mentioned accused of the crime
charged.119
At bottom, issues involving the finding of probable cause for an indictment
and issuance of a warrant of arrest, as petitioners are doubtless aware, are
primarily questions of fact that are normally not within the purview of a
petition for certiorari,120 such as the petitions filed in the instant
consolidated cases.
The political offense doctrine is not a ground to dismiss the charge
against petitioners prior to a determination by the trial court that the
murders were committed in furtherance of rebellion.
Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes, perpetrated in
furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as "common"
offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they
are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from
the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of
a graver penalty."121
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime
14
of rebellion.122 Thus, when a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion,
the killing is not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the political
complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and
punished as rebellion alone.
However, this is not to say that public prosecutors are obliged to consistently
charge respondents with simple rebellion instead of common crimes. No one
disputes the well-entrenched principle in criminal procedure that the
institution of criminal charges, including whom and what to charge, is
addressed to the sound discretion of the public prosecutor.123
But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial
court, it becomes crucial for the court to determine whether the act of killing
was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the political motive of the
act to be conclusively demonstrated.124
Petitioners aver that the records show that the alleged murders were
committed in furtherance of the CPP/NPA/NDFP rebellion, and that the
political motivation behind the alleged murders can be clearly seen from the
charge against the alleged top leaders of the CPP/NPA/NDFP as co-
conspirators.
We had already ruled that the burden of demonstrating political motivation
must be discharged by the defense, since motive is a state of mind which only
the accused knows.125 The proof showing political motivation is adduced
during trial where the accused is assured an opportunity to present evidence
supporting his defense. It is not for this Court to determine this factual
matter in the instant petitions.
As held in the case of Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del
Norte v. CA,126 if during trial, petitioners are able to show that the alleged
murders were indeed committed in furtherance of rebellion, Section 14, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court provides the remedy, to wit:
SECTION 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may
be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a
formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be
done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the
offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or
information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to
the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in
resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties,
especially the offended party. (n)
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or
information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be
placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail
for their appearance at the trial. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should have
been simple rebellion, the trial court shall dismiss the murder charges upon
the filing of the Information for simple rebellion, as long as petitioners would
not be placed in double jeopardy.
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, states:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused
has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused
had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information.
Based on the above provision, double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a first
jeopardy attached; (2) it has been validly terminated; and (3) a second
jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.127
A first jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or
convicted, or the case has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent, by a competent court in a valid indictment for which the
accused has entered a valid plea during arraignment.128
To recall, on 12 May 2006, an Information for the crime of rebellion, as
defined and penalized under Article 134 in relation to Article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-944 was filed before
the RTC Makati against petitioners and several others.129
However, petitioners were never arraigned in Criminal Case No. 06-
944.1awp++i1 Even before the indictment for rebellion was filed before the
RTC Makati, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad had already filed a
petition before this Court to seek the nullification of the Orders of the DOJ
denying their motion for the inhibition of the members of the prosecution
panel due to lack of impartiality and independence.130 When the indictment
was filed, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad filed supplemental
petitions to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 06-944.131 We
eventually ordered the dismissal of the rebellion case. It is clear then that a
first jeopardy never had a chance to attach.
Petitioner Ocampo shall remain on provisional liberty under the ₱100,000
cash bond posted before the Office of the Clerk of Court. He shall remain on
provisional liberty until the termination of the proceedings before the RTC
Manila.1âwphi1
The OSG has given its conformity to the provisional liberty of petitioners
Echanis, Baylosis and Ladlad in view of the ongoing peace negotiations. Their
provisional release from detention under the cash bond of ₱100,000 each
shall continue under the condition that their temporary release shall be
limited to the period of their actual participation as CPP-NDF consultants in
the peace negotiations with the government or until the termination of the
proceedings before the RTC Manila, whichever is sooner. It shall be the duty
of the government to inform this Court the moment that peace negotiations
are concluded.
WHEREFORE, the instant consolidated petitions are DISMISSED. The RTC of
Manila, Branch 32, is hereby ORDERED to proceed with dispatch with the
hearing of Criminal Case No. 08-262163. Petitioner Saturnino C. Ocampo
shall remain on temporary liberty under the same bail granted by this Court
until the termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila. Petitioners
Randall B. Echanis, Rafael G. Baylosis and Vicente P. Ladlad shall remain on
temporary liberty under the same bail granted by this Court until their actual
participation as CPP-NDF consultants in the peace negotiations with the
government are concluded or terminated, or until the termination of the
proceedings before the RTC Manila, whichever is sooner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 143591 May 5, 2010
TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., CORAZON M. BEJASA, ARTURO E.
MANUEL, JR., ERIC L. LEE, P. SIERVO H. DIZON, BENJAMIN DE LEON,
DELFIN C. GONZALES, JR., and BEN YU LIM, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
MAGDALENO M. PEÑA and HON. MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., as Judge
Designate of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bago City, Respondents.
PEREZ, J.:
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals, in its
Decision[1] dated 20 June 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 49666, is correct when it
dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners Teodoro C.
Borlongan, Jr., Corazon M. Bejasa, Arturo E. Manuel, Jr., Benjamin de Leon, P.
Siervo H. Dizon, Delfin C. Gonzales, Jr., Eric L. Lee and Ben Yu Lim, Jr., and
ruled that the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bago City, did not
gravely abuse its discretion in denying the motion for reinvestigation and
recall of the warrants of arrest in Criminal Case Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685, and
6686.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea (Atty. Pea) instituted a civil case for
recovery of agents compensation and expenses, damages, and attorneys
fees[2] against Urban Bank and herein petitioners, before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bago City. The case was raffled to Branch
62 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 754. Atty. Pea anchored his claim for
compensation on the Contract of Agency[3] allegedly entered into with the
petitioners, wherein the former undertook to perform such acts necessary to
prevent any intruder and squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban Banks
property located along Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City. Petitioners filed a
Motion to Dismiss[4] arguing that they never appointed the respondent as
agent or counsel. Attached to the motion were the following documents: 1) a
Letter[5] dated 19 December 1994 signed by Herman Ponce and Julie Abad
on behalf of Isabela Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI), the original owner of the
subject property; 2) an unsigned Letter[6] dated 7 December 1994 addressed
to Corazon Bejasa from Marilyn G. Ong; 3) a Letter[7] dated 9 December
1994 addressed to Teodoro Borlongan, Jr. and signed by Marilyn G. Ong; and
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
4) a Memorandum[8] dated 20 November 1994 from Enrique Montilla III.
15
Said documents were presented in an attempt to show that the respondent
was appointed as agent by ISCI and not by Urban Bank or by the petitioners.
In view of the introduction of the above-mentioned documents, Atty. Pea filed
his Complaint-Affidavit[9] with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Bago
City.[10] He claimed that said documents were falsified because the alleged
signatories did not actually affix their signatures, and the signatories were
neither stockholders nor officers and employees of ISCI.[11] Worse,
petitioners introduced said documents as evidence before the RTC knowing
that they were falsified.
In a Resolution[12] dated 24 September 1998, the City Prosecutor found
probable cause for the indictment of petitioners for four (4) counts of the
crime of Introducing Falsified Documents, penalized by the second paragraph
of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. The City Prosecutor concluded that
the documents were falsified because the alleged signatories untruthfully
stated that ISCI was the principal of the respondent; that petitioners knew
that the documents were falsified considering that the signatories were mere
dummies; and that the documents formed part of the record of Civil Case No.
754 where they were used by petitioners as evidence in support of their
motion to dismiss, and then adopted in their answer and in their Pre-Trial
Brief.[13] Subsequently, the corresponding Informations[14] were filed with
the MTCC, Bago City. The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 6683,
6684, 6685, and 6686. Thereafter, Judge Primitivo Blanca issued the
warrants[15] for the arrest of the petitioners.
On 1 October 1998, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall
Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation.[16] Petitioners insisted that
they were denied due process because of the non-observance of the proper
procedure on preliminary investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court.
Specifically, they claimed that they were not afforded the right to submit
their counter-affidavit. Then they argued that since no such counter-affidavit
and supporting documents were submitted by the petitioners, the trial judge
merely relied on the complaint-affidavit and attachments of the respondent
in issuing the warrants of arrest, also in contravention with the Rules of
Court. Petitioners further prayed that the information be quashed for lack of
probable cause. Moreover, one of the accused, i.e., Ben Lim, Jr., is not even a
director of Urban Bank, contrary to what complainant stated. Lastly,
petitioners posited that the criminal cases should have been suspended on
the ground that the issue being threshed out in the civil case is a prejudicial
question.
In an Order[17] dated 13 November 1998, the MTCC denied the omnibus
motion primarily on the ground that preliminary investigation was not
available in the instant case which fell within the jurisdiction of the first-level
court. The court, likewise, upheld the validity of the warrant of arrest, saying
that it was issued in accordance with the Rules of Court. Besides, the court
added, petitioners could no longer question the validity of the warrant since
they already posted bail. The court also believed that the issue involved in
the civil case was not a prejudicial question, and, thus, denied the prayer for
suspension of the criminal proceedings. Lastly, the court was convinced that
the Informations contained all the facts necessary to constitute an offense.

Petitioners immediately instituted a special civil action for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) before the Court of Appeals, ascribing grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
MTCC in issuing and not recalling the warrants of arrest, reiterating the
arguments in their omnibus motion.[18] They, likewise, questioned the
courts conclusion that by posting bail, petitioners already waived their right
to assail the validity of the warrants of arrest.
On 20 June 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Thus,
petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, raising the following issues:
A. Where the offense charged in a criminal complaint is not
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and not covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure, is the finding of probable cause required for the filing of
an Information in court?
If the allegations in the complaint-affidavit do not establish probable cause,
should not the investigating prosecutor dismiss the complaint, or at the very
least, require the respondent to submit his counter-affidavit?
B. Can a complaint-affidavit containing matters which are not
within the personal knowledge of the complainant be sufficient basis for the
finding of probable cause?
C. Where there is offense charged in a criminal complaint is not
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and not covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure, and the record of the preliminary investigation does
not show the existence of probable cause, should not the judge refuse to issue
a warrant of arrest and dismiss the criminal case, or at the very least, require
the accused to submit his counter-affidavit in order to aid the judge in
determining the existence of probable cause?
D. Can a criminal prosecution be restrained?
E. Can this Honorable Court itself determine the existence of
probable cause?
On the other hand, respondent contends that the issues raised by the
petitioners had already become moot and academic when the latter posted
bail and were already arraigned.
On 2 August 2000, this Court issued a TRO enjoining the judge of the MTCC
from proceeding in any manner with Criminal Case Nos. 6683 to 6686,
effective during the entire period that the case is pending before, or until
further orders of, this Court.
We will first discuss the issue of mootness.
The issues raised by the petitioners have not been mooted by the fact that
they had posted bail and were already arraigned.
It appears from the records that upon the issuance of the warrant of arrest,
petitioners immediately posted bail as they wanted to avoid embarrassment,
being then the officers of Urban Bank. On the scheduled date for the
arraignment, despite the petitioners refusal to enter a plea, the court a quo
entered a plea of Not Guilty for them.
The erstwhile ruling of this Court was that posting of bail constitutes a
waiver of any irregularity in the issuance of a warrant of arrest, that has
already been superseded by Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rule of
Criminal Procedure. The principle that the accused is precluded from
questioning the legality of the arrest after arraignment is true only if he
voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without previously
invoking his objections thereto.
As held in Okabe v. Hon. Gutierrez:
It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure is a new one, intended to modify previous rulings of this Court
that an application for bail or the admission to bail by the accused shall be
considered as a waiver of his right to assail the warrant issued for his arrest
on the legalities or irregularities thereon. The new rule has reverted to the
ruling of this Court in People v. Red. The new rule is curative in nature
because precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb evils in
procedural rules. Hence, the rules governing curative statutes are applicable.
Curative statutes are by their essence retroactive in application. Besides,
procedural rules as a general rule operate retroactively, even without
express provisions to that effect, to cases pending at the time of their
effectivity, in other words to actions yet undetermined at the time of their
effectivity. Before the appellate court rendered its decision on January 31,
2001, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure was already in effect. It
behoved the appellate court to have applied the same in resolving the
petitioners petition for certiorari and her motion for partial reconsideration.
Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her
personal bail bond, it cannot be argued that she waived her right to question
the finding of probable cause and to assail the warrant of arrest issued
against her by the respondent judge. There must be clear and convincing
proof that the petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish her right to
question the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of intention
rests on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with,
and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the
particular right that no other explanation of his conduct is possible. x x x.
Herein petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of
Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation on the same day that they posted bail.
Their bail bonds likewise expressly contained a stipulation that they were
not waiving their right to question the validity of their arrest. On the date of
their arraignment, petitioners refused to enter their plea due to the fact that
the issue on the legality of their arrest is still pending with the Court. Thus,
when the court a quo entered a plea of not guilty for them, there was no valid
waiver of their right to preclude them from raising the same with the Court of
Appeals or this Court. The posting of bail bond was a matter of imperative
necessity to avert their incarceration; it should not be deemed as a waiver of
their right to assail their arrest. The ruling to which we have returned in
People v. Red[25] stated:
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
x x x The present defendants were arrested towards the end of January, 1929,
16
on the Island and Province of Marinduque by order of the judge of the Court
of First Instance of Lucena, Tayabas, at a time when there were no court
sessions being held in Marinduque. In view of these circumstances and the
number of the accused, it may properly be held that the furnishing of the
bond was prompted by the sheer necessity of not remaining in detention, and
in no way implied their waiver of any right, such as the summary
examination of the case before their detention. That they had no intention of
waiving this right is clear from their motion of January 23, 1929, the same
day on which they furnished a bond, and the fact that they renewed this
petition on February 23, 1929, praying for the stay of their arrest for lack of
the summary examination; the first motion being denied by the court on
January 24, 1929 (G.R. No. 33708, page 8), and the second remaining
undecided, but with an order to have it presented in Boac, Marinduque.
Therefore, the defendants herein cannot be said to have waived the right
granted to them by section 13, General Order No. 58, as amended by Act No.
3042.
The rest of the issues raised by the petitioners may be grouped into two,
which are: (1) the procedural aspect, i.e., whether the prosecution and the
court a quo properly observed the required procedure in the instant case,
and, (2) the substantive aspect, which is whether there was probable cause to
pursue the criminal cases to trial.
THE PROCEDURAL ASPECT:
Petitioners contend that they were denied due process as they were unable
to submit their counter-affidavits and were not accorded the right to a
preliminary investigation. Considering that the complaint of Atty. Pea was
filed in September 1998, the rule then applicable was the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
The provisions of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure relevant to the issue
are Sections 1, 3(a) and 9(a) of Rule 112, to wit:
Section 1. Definition. Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding
for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof,
and should be held for trial.
Sec. 3. Procedure. Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or
information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be
filed without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted in the
following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be
accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as
other supporting documents, in such number of copies as there are
respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The said affidavits shall
be sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official
authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, a notary
public, who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he
is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.

Sec. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts nor covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
(a) Where filed with the fiscal. If the complaint is filed directly with the fiscal
or state prosecutor, the procedure outlined in Section 3(a) of this Rule shall
be observed. The fiscal shall take appropriate action based on the affidavits
and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant.
(underscoring supplied)
The crime to which petitioners were charged was defined and penalized
under second paragraph of Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents.
The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and
a fine of not more than P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications
enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official document or
letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document; and
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause
such damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.
Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial
proceeding or to the damage of another or who, with the intent to cause such
damage, shall use any of the false documents embraced in the next preceding
article or in any of the foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall be punished
by the penalty next lower in degree.
Prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods translates to
imprisonment of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day.[26] The next lower in degree
to prision correccional is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period which translates to 4 months and 1 day
to 2 years and 4 months[27] of imprisonment. Since the crime committed is
not covered by the Rules of Summary Procedure,[28] the case falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the first level courts but applying the ordinary rules.
In such instance, preliminary investigation as defined in Section 1, Rule 112
of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable since such section
covers only crimes cognizable by the RTC. That which is stated in Section
9(a) is the applicable rule.
Under this Rule, while probable cause should first be determined before an
information may be filed in court, the prosecutor is not mandated to require
the respondent to submit his counter-affidavits to oppose the complaint. In
the determination of probable cause, the prosecutor may solely rely on the
complaint, affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the
complainant. If he does not find probable cause, the prosecutor may dismiss
outright the complaint or if he finds probable cause or sufficient reason to
proceed with the case, he shall issue a resolution and file the corresponding
information.
The complaint of respondent, verbatim, is as follows:
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
Isabela Sugar Company 17
COMPLAINT AFFIDAVIT
By:
I, MAGDALENO M. PEA, Filipino, of legal age, with address at Brgy. Ubay,
Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, after having been sworn in accordance with HERMAN PONCE
law hereby depose and state:
JULIE ABAD
1. I am the Plaintiff in Civil Case No. 754 pending with the Regional
Trial Court of Bago City entitled Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea v. Urban Bank, et al
Impleaded therein as defendants of the board of the bank, namely, Teodoro b. Memorandum dated 7 December 1994 supposedly executed by a certain
Marilyn Ong on behalf of ISC, a copy of which is hereto attached as annex F,
Borlongan, Delfin Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin De Leon, P. Siervo Dizon, Eric Lee,
which states:
Ben Lim Jr., Corazon Bejasa and Arturo Manuel.(underlining ours)
December 7, 1994
2. I filed the said case to collect my fees as agent of Urban Bank,
Inc.(hereinafter referred to as the bank) in ridding a certain parcel of land in To: ATTY. CORA BEJASA
Pasay City of squatters and intruders. A certified true copy of the Complaint From: MARILYN G. ONG
in the said case is hereto attached as Annex A.
RE: ISABELA SUGAR CO., INC.
3. In the Motion to Dismiss dated 12 March 1996 (a certified true
copy of which is attached as Annex B), Answer dated 28 October 1996 Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea, who has been assigned by Isabela Sugar
(Annex C), and Pre-Trial Brief dated 28 January 1997 (Annex D) filed by the Company inc. to take charge of inspecting the tenants would like to
bank and the respondent members of the board, the said respondents used as request an authority similar to this from the Bank to new owners. Can
evidence the following documents: you please issue something like this today as he (unreadable) this.
a. Letter dated 19 December 1994 supposedly signed by a certain Herman
Ponce and Julie Abad for Isabela Sugar Company (ISC) (a copy of which is b. Letter dated 9 December 1994 supposedly executed by the same
attached as Annex E), which states: Marilyn Ong, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex G, which states:
December 19, 1994 December 9, 1994
Urban Bank Atty. Ted Borlongan
Urban Avenue, Makati URBAN BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
Metro Manila MAKATI, METRO MANILA
Gentlemen:
Attention: Mr. Ted Borlongan
Dear Mr. Borlongan
This has reference to your property located among Roxas Boulevard,
Pasay City which you purchased from Isabela Sugar Company under a
Deed of Absolute Sale executed on December 1, 1994. I would like to request for an authority from Urban Bank per attached
immediately as the tenants are questioning authority of the people who
In line with our warranties as the Seller of the said property and our are helping us to take possession of the property.
undertaking to deliver to you the full and actual possession and control
of said property, free from tenants, occupants or squatters and from
any obstruction or impediment to the free use and occupancy of the
Marilyn Ong
property and to prevent the former tenants or occupants from entering
or returning to the premises. In view of the transfer of ownership of the
property to Urban Bank, it may be necessary for Urban Bank to appoint
Atty. Pea likewise as its authorized representative for purposes of c. Memorandum dated 20 November 1994, copy of which is attached as
holding/maintaining continued possession of the said property and to annex H, which states:
represent Urban Bank in any court action that may be instituted for the
abovementioned purposes.
MEMORANDUM
It is understood that any attorneys fees, cost of litigation and any other To: Atty. Magadaleno M. Pea
charges or expenses that may be incurred relative to the exercise by Director
Atty. Pea of his abovementioned duties shall be for the account of
Isabela Sugar Company and any loss or damage that may be incurred to From: Enrique C. Montilla III
third parties shall be answerable by Isabela Sugar Company. President
Very truly yours,

Date: 20 November 1994
You are hereby directed to recover and take possession of the property
of the corporation situated at Roxas Boulevard covered by TCT No. 5382
of the Registry of Deeds for Pasay City, immediately upon the expiration
of the contract of lease over the said property on 29 November 1994.
For this purpose, you are authorized to engage the services of security
guards to protect the property against intruders. You may also engage
the services of a lawyer in case there is a need to go to court to protect
the said property of the corporation. In addition, you may take
whatever steps or measures are necessary to ensure our continued
possession of the property.
ENRIQUE C. MONTILLA III
President
4. The respondent member of the board of the bank used and introduced
the aforestated documents as evidence in the civil case knowing that the
same are falsified. They used thae said documents to justify their refusal to
pay my agents fees, to my damage and prejudice.
5. The 19 December 1994 letter (Annex E) is a falsified document, in that
the person who supposedly executed the letter on behalf of ISC, a certain
Herman Ponce and Julie Abad did not actually affix their signatures on the
document. The execution of the letter was merely simulated by making it
appear that Ponce and Abad executed the letter on behalf of ISC when they
did not in fact do so.
6. No persons by the name of Herman Ponce and Julie Abad were ever
stockholders, officers, employees or representatives of ISC. In the letter,
Herman Ponce was represented to be the President of ISC and Julie Abad, the
Corporate Secretary. However, as of 19 December 1994, the real President of
plaintiff was Enrique Montilla, III and Cristina Montilla was the Corporate
Secretary. A copy of the Minutes of the Regular Meeting of ISC for the year
1994, during which Montilla, et al. Were elected is hereto attached as Annex I.
On the otherhand, a list of the stockholders of ISC on or about the time of the
transaction is attached as Annex J.
7. The same holds true with respect to the Memorandum dated 7
December 1994 and athe letter dated 9 December 1994 allegedly written by
a ceratin Marilyn Ong. Nobody by the said name was ever a stockholder of
ISC.
8. Lastly, with respect to the supposed Memorandum issued by Enrique
Montilla, III his signature thereon was merely forged by respondents.
Enrique Montilla III, did not affix his signature on any such document.
9. I am executing this affidavit for the purpose of charging Teodoro C.
Borlongan, Corazon M. Bejasa and Arturo E. Manuel, Delfin C. Gonzales Jr.,
Benjamin L. De Leon, P. Siervo H. Dizon and Eric Lee, with the crime of use of
falsified documents under Artilce 172, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal
Code.(underlining ours)
10. I am likewise executing this affidavit for whatever legal purpose it may
serve.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
Sgd. MAGDALENO M. PEA
It is evident that in the affidavit-complaint, specifically in paragraph 1,
respondent merely introduced and identified the board of the bank, namely,
Teodoro Borlongan, Jr., Delfin Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin De Leon, P. Siervo
Dizon, Eric Lee, Ben Lim, Jr., Corazon Bejasa and Arturo Manuel, Sr. However,
in the accusatory portion of the complaint which is paragraph number 9, Mr.
Ben Lim, Jr. was not included among those charged with the crime of use of
falsified documents under Article 172, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal
Code. The omission indicates that respondent did not intend to criminally
implicate Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., even as he was acknowledged to be a member of
the board. And there was no explanation in the Resolution and Information
by the City Prosecutor why Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was included. Moreover, as can be
gleaned from the body of the complaint and the specific averments therein,
Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was never mentioned.
The City Prosecutor should have cautiously reviewed the complaint to
determine whether there were inconsistencies which ought to have been
brought to the attention of the respondent or, on his own, considered for due
evaluation. It is a big mistake to bring a man to trial for a crime he did not
commit.
Prosecutors are endowed with ample powers in order that they may
properly fulfill their assigned role in the administration of justice. It should
be realized, however, that when a man is hailed to court on a criminal charge,
it brings in its wake problems not only for the accused but for his family as
well. Therefore, it behooves a prosecutor to weigh the evidence carefully and
to deliberate thereon to determine the existence of a prima facie case before
filing the information in court. Anything less would be a dereliction of
duty.[29]
Atty. Pea, in his Second Manifestation[30] dated 16 June 1999, averred that
petitioners, including Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., were already estopped from raising
the fact that Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was not a member of the board of directors of
Urban Bank, as the latter participated and appeared through counsel in Civil
Case No. 754 without raising any opposition. However, this does not detract
from the fact that the City Prosecutor, as previously discussed, did not
carefully scrutinize the complaint of Atty. Pea, which did not charge Mr. Ben
Lim, Jr. of any crime.
What tainted the procedure further was that the Judge issued a warrant for
the arrest of the petitioners, including, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. despite the filing of
the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For
Reinvestigation raising among others the issue that Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., was not
even a member of the board of directors. With the filing of the motion, the
judge is put on alert that an innocent person may have been included in the
complaint. In the Order[31] dated 13 November 1998, in denying the motion
to quash, Judge Primitivo Blanca ruled that:
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
Courts in resolving a motion to quash cannot consider facts contrary to those
18
alleged in the information or which do not appear on the face of the
information because said motion is hypothethical admission of the facts
alleged in the information x x x. (citations omitted.)
We cannot accept as mere oversight the mistake of respondent judge since it
was at the expense of liberty. This cannot be condoned.
In the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the mandate of the Constitution is for
the judge to personally determine the existence of probable cause:
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Corollary thereto, Section 9(b) of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:
Sec. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts nor covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
(a) x x x.
(b) Where filed directly with the Municipal Trial Court. If the complaint or
information is filed directly with the Municipal Trial Court, the procedure
provided for in Section 3(a) of this Rule shall likewise be observed. If the
judge finds no sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial, he shall
dismiss the complaint or information. Otherwise, he shall issue a warrant of
arrest after personally examining in writing and under oath the complainant
and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers.
Enshrined in our Constitution is the rule that [n]o x x x warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing x x x the persons x x x
to be seized.[32] Interpreting the words personal determination, we said in
Soliven v. Makasiar[33] that it does not thereby mean that judges are obliged
to conduct the personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses
themselves. To require thus would be to unduly laden them with preliminary
examinations and investigations of criminal complaints instead of
concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before them. Rather, what
is emphasized merely is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself as to the existence of probable cause. To this
end, he may: (a) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable
cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (b) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, disregard the prosecutor's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
determining its existence. What he is never allowed to do is to follow blindly

the prosecutor's bare certification as to the existence of probable cause.
Much more is required by the constitutional provision. Judges have to go over
the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes if any, and
other documents supporting the prosecutor's certification. Although the
extent of the judge's personal examination depends on the circumstances of
each case, to be sure, he cannot just rely on the bare certification alone but
must go beyond it. This is because the warrant of arrest issues not on the
strength of the certification standing alone but because of the records which
sustain it.[34] He should even call for the complainant and the witnesses to
answer the court's probing questions when the circumstances warrant.[35]
An arrest without a probable cause is an unreasonable seizure of a person,
and violates the privacy of persons which ought not to be intruded by the
State.[36]
Measured against the constitutional mandate and established rulings, there
was here a clear abdication of the judicial function and a clear indication that
the judge blindly followed the certification of a city prosecutor as to the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest with
respect to all of the petitioners. The careless inclusion of Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., in
the warrant of arrest gives flesh to the bone of contention of petitioners that
the instant case is a matter of persecution rather than prosecution.[37] On
this ground, this Court may enjoin the criminal cases against petitioners. As a
general rule, criminal prosecutions cannot be enjoined. However, there are
recognized exceptions which, as summarized in Brocka v. Enrile,[38] are:
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions;
c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
g. Where the court had no jurisdiction over the offense;
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance; and
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion
to quash on that ground has been denied.
THE SUBSTANTIVE ASPECT:
Petitioners were charged with violation of par. 2, Article 172 of the Revised
Penal Code or Introduction of Falsified Document in a judicial proceeding.
The elements of the offense are as follows:
1. That the offender knew that a document was falsified by another
person.
2. That the false document is embraced in Article 171 or in any
subdivisions Nos. 1 or 2 of Article 172.
3. That he introduced said document in evidence in any judicial
proceeding.[49]
The falsity of the document and the defendants knowledge of its falsity are
essential elements of the offense. The Office of the City Prosecutor filed the
Informations against the petitioners on the basis of the Complaint-Affidavit of
respondent Atty. Pea, attached to which were the documents contained in the
Motion to Dismiss filed by the petitioners in Civil Case No. 754. Also included
as attachments to the complaint were the Answers, Pre-Trial Brief, the
alleged falsified documents, copy of the regular meetings of ISCI during the
election of the Board of Directors and the list of ISCI Stockholders.[50] Based
on these documents and the complaint-affidavit of Atty. Pea, the City
Prosecutor concluded that probable cause for the prosecution of the charges
existed. On the strength of the same documents, the trial court issued the
warrants of arrest.
This Court, however, cannot find these documents sufficient to support the
existence of probable cause.
Probable cause is such set of facts and circumstances as would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in
the Information or any offense included therein has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested. In determining probable cause, the average
man weighs the facts and circumstances without restoring to the calibrations
of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on
common sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it
was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than
suspicion; it requires less than evidence that would justify conviction.[51]
As enunciated in Baltazar v. People,[52] the task of the presiding judge when
the Information is filed with the court is first and foremost to determine the
existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused.
The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first determine probable cause
for the arrest of the accused is to insulate from the very start those falsely
charged with crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public
trial.[53]
We do not see how it can be concluded that the documents mentioned by
respondent in his complaint-affidavit were falsified. In his complaint, Atty.
Pea stated that Herman Ponce, Julie Abad and Marilyn Ong, the alleged
signatories of the questioned letters, did not actually affix their signatures
therein; and that they were not actually officers or stockholders of ISCI.[54]
He further claimed that Enrique Montillas signature appearing in another
memorandum addressed to respondent was forged.[55] These averments are
mere assertions which are insufficient to warrant the filing of the complaint
or worse the issuance of warrants of arrest. These averments cannot be
considered as proceeding from the personal knowledge of herein respondent
who failed to, basically, allege that he was present at the time of the execution
of the documents. Neither was there any mention in the complaint-affidavit
that herein respondent was familiar with the signatures of the mentioned
signatories to be able to conclude that they were forged. What Atty. Pea
actually stated were but sweeping assertions that the signatories are mere
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
dummies of ISCI and that they are not in fact officers, stockholders or
19
representatives of the corporation. Again, there is no indication that the
assertion was based on the personal knowledge of the affiant.
The reason for the requirement that affidavits must be based on personal
knowledge is to guard against hearsay evidence. A witness, therefore, may
not testify as what he merely learned from others either because he was told
or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not
be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned.[56] Hearsay is not
limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes
hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements.[57]
The requirement of personal knowledge should have been strictly applied
considering that herein petitioners were not given the opportunity to rebut
the complainants allegation through counter-affidavits.
Quite noticeable is the fact that in the letter dated 19 December 1994 of
Herman Ponce and Julie Abad, neither of the two made the representation
that they were the president or secretary of ISCI. It was only Atty. Pea who
asserted that the two made such representation. He alleged that Marilyn Ong
was never a stockholder of ISCI but he did not present the stock and transfer
book of ISCI. And, there was neither allegation nor proof that Marilyn Ong
was not connected to ISCI in any other way. Moreover, even if Marilyn Ong
was not a stockholder of ISCI, such would not prove that the documents she
signed were falsified.
The Court may not be compelled to pass upon the correctness of the exercise
of the public prosecutors function without any showing of grave abuse of
discretion or manifest error in his findings.[58] Considering, however, that
the prosecution and the court a quo committed manifest errors in their
findings of probable cause, this Court therefore annuls their findings.
Our pronouncement in Jimenez v. Jimenez[59] as reiterated in Baltazar v.
People is apropos:
It is x x x imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to relieve
the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that
the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable
cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. Although
there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable
cause since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining
in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the
finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding
should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear
dictates of reasons. The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the
prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up
during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the
courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the judiciary lives up to
its mission by visualizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has
been before. It should continue to be so.
On the foregoing discussion, we find that the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the findings of the prosecutor as well as the court a quo as to the
existence of probable cause. The criminal complaint against the petitioners
should be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 20 June 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 49666, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Order dated 2 August 2000 is hereby
made permanent. Accordingly, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Negros
Occidental, Bago City, is hereby DIRECTED to DISMISS Criminal Case Nos.
6683, 6684, 6685 and 6686.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 188024 June 5, 2013
RODRIGO RONTOS y DELA TORRE, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision1 dated 28 October 2008 and Resolution2 dated 29 May
2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30412. The CA Decision
affirmed the Decision3 in Criminal Case No. C-69394 of the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City, Branch 123 (RTC) finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic
Act No. (R.A.) 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act).
At 4:00 p.m. on 19 October 2003, PO2 Emil Masi (PO2 Masi) of the Caloocan
North City Police Station dispatched PO1 Joven Pacis (PO1 Pacis) and PO1
Greg Labaclado (PO1 Labaclado) of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Task Force
to conduct surveillance in Sampaloc St., Camarin, Caloocan City because of
reports of illegal drug activity in the said area.4 When they got there around
5:00 p.m., PO1 Pacis and PO1 Labaclado noticed petitioner standing about
five meters away from them, apparently preoccupied with scrutinizing two
plastic sachets in his hand.
Upon coming closer, they saw that the plastic sachets appeared to contain a
white crystalline substance similar to shabu.5 PO1 Pacis approached
petitioner and confiscated the plastic sachets. Thereafter, he introduced
himself as a police officer and informed petitioner of the offense the latter
had committed.6 The two police officers informed petitioner of his
constitutional rights, while he just remained silent.7 PO1 Pacis marked the
plastic sachets with his initials "JCP-1" and JCP-2" and placed them in a
makeshift envelope.8
They then brought petitioner to the station and turned him over to PO2 Masi
together with the plastic sachets.9 PO2 Masi conducted an investigation and
prepared a request for a laboratory examination10 of the contents of the
plastic sachets.11 PO1 Pacis brought the request and the plastic sachets to
the crime laboratory, and forensic chemist Police Inspector Jessie dela Rosa
(P/Insp. dela Rosa) conducted the examination.12 The tests on the contents
of the plastic sachets yielded a positive result for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug more commonly known as shabu.13
A Complaint14 for violation of Section 11 (possession of dangerous drugs),
Article II of R.A. 9165, was drawn up and referred15 to the city prosecutor
for the filing of charges before the court.
On the other hand, petitioner narrated a different version of the incident.
According to him, on the date and time mentioned, he was at home with his
parents, sister, nephews and a visitor named Cassandra Francisco
(Cassandra) when PO1 Pacis and PO1 Labaclado suddenly barged in.16 The
police officers searched the house, claiming that they were looking for
something.17 When the search proved fruitless, they arrested petitioner and
Cassandra and detained them at the Drug Enforcement Unit in Camarin,
Caloocan City.18 Cassandra was later released when her uncle allegedly gave
money to the police officers.19
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision20 dated 23 August
2006, the dispositive portion of which states:
Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding
accused RODRIGO RONTOS Y DELA TORRE guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Violation of Section 11, Article II, RA 9165 and hereby
sentencing him to suffer imprisonment of TWELVE YEARS AND ONE DAY TO
THIRTEEN YEARS, NINE MONTHS AND TEN DAYS and to pay a fine of
₱500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.21
Through the testimonies of PO1 Pacis, PO1 Labaclado and P/Insp. dela Rosa,
the RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to establish the concurrence of
all the elements of possession of dangerous drugs: (a) an item or object
identified to be a dangerous drug was in a person’s possession; (b) the
possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the person freely and
consciously possessed the dangerous drug. The RTC also found no evil
motive on the part of the police officers to testify falsely against petitioner.
Despite the defenses of denial, frame-up and evidence-planting interposed by
petitioner, the RTC held that his guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
On appeal to the CA, petitioner contended that, since his warrantless arrest
was illegal, the allegedly confiscated items were inadmissible in evidence. He
further claimed that the police officers failed to faithfully comply with the
procedure for ensuring the identity and integrity of the plastic sachets
containing shabu.
The CA ruled22 that the question over the legality of the arrest was deemed
waived by petitioner when he voluntarily submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court by entering a plea of "Not Guilty" and participating in
the trial of the case.23 In any case, the CA explained that while the arrest was
without a warrant, it was with probable cause since petitioner was arrested
in flagrante delicto. He committed a crime in plain view of the police officers,
as he was spotted in the act of holding and examining plastic sachets
containing shabu.
While the CA admitted that no photograph or inventory of the confiscated
items was taken or made, it entertained no doubt that the dangerous drugs
presented in court were the same ones confiscated from petitioner.
Furthermore, the failure of the police officers to observe the proper
procedure for handling confiscated dangerous drugs may only result in
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
administrative liability on their part. That failure does not cast doubt on the
20
identity and integrity of the illegal drugs.24
Thus, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC with the modification that the
fine imposed was reduced from ₱500,000 to ₱300,000.25 As the motion for
reconsideration26 of petitioner was denied,27 he now comes before us
raising the same issues presented before the CA.
OUR RULING
We acquit petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt. We cannot uphold
the contention of petitioner that his warrantless arrest was illegal. The CA
correctly ruled that his failure to question the legality of his arrest before
entering his plea during arraignment operated as a waiver of that defense. "It
has been ruled time and again that an accused is estopped from assailing any
irregularity with regard to his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move
for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before his
arraignment."28
In his arraignment before the trial court, petitioner never raised any issue
and instead "freely and voluntarily pleaded Not Guilty to the offense
charged."29 Thus, he was estopped from raising the issue of the legality of his
arrest before the trial court, more so on appeal before the CA or this Court.
However, on the basis of the nonobservance of the rules of procedure for
handling illegal drug items, we resolve to acquit petitioner on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
In illegal drugs cases, the identity and integrity of the drugs seized must be
established with the same unwavering exactitude as that required to arrive at
a finding of guilt.30 The case against the accused hinges on the ability of the
prosecution to prove that the illegal drug presented in court is the same one
that was recovered from the accused upon his arrest.
The procedure set forth in Section 21 of R.A. 9165 is intended precisely to
ensure the identity and integrity of dangerous drugs seized.31 This provision
requires that upon seizure of illegal drug items, the apprehending team
having initial custody of the drugs shall (a) conduct a physical inventory of
the drugs and (b) take photographs thereof (c) in the presence of the person
from whom these items were seized or confiscated and (d) a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice and any elected public official
(e) who shall all be required to sign the inventory and be given copies
thereof.
This Court has emphasized the import of Section 21 as a matter of
substantive law that mandates strict compliance.32 It was laid down by
Congress as a safety precaution against potential abuses by law enforcement
agents who might fail to appreciate the gravity of the penalties faced by those
suspected to be involved in the sale, use or possession of illegal drugs.33
Under the principle that penal laws are strictly construed against the
government, stringent compliance therewith is fully justified.34
Here, the procedure was not observed at all. Where it is clear that Section 21
was not observed, as in this case, such noncompliance brings to the fore the

question of whether the illegal drug items were the same ones that were
allegedly seized from petitioner.
The direct testimony of PO1 Pacis in connection with his identification of the
envelope where he placed the two plastic sachets allegedly confiscated from
petitioner does not really inspire confidence, to wit:
Q: What did you do with the plastic sachet that you have confiscated from the
accused?
A: After confiscating them, I marked them and placed them in an envelope in
order to preserve the evidence, ma‘am.
Q: I am showing toy [sic] you this white envelope, will you please have a look
at it and tell the Honorable Court if this is the same envelope which contained
the two plastic sachets?
A: I am not sure, ma‘am, it is not actually an envelope but an improvised
envelope.35
We cannot, in good conscience, affirm the conviction of petitioner for
possession of illegal drugs if the police officer charged with the preservation
of the evidence cannot even be certain in the identification of the envelope
that was presented in court. As held in Dolera v. People,36 there also exists in
the present case a reasonable likelihood of substitution, in that the two
plastic sachets that tested positive for shabu and were presented in court
were not the items allegedly seized from petitioner.1âwphi1 This possibility
of substitution is fatal for the prosecution,37 for there is then a failure to
prove the identity of the corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt.38
We are not unaware of the rule that justifiable grounds may excuse
noncompliance with the requirements of Section 21 as long as the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.39 The
problem in this case is that the police officers presented no justifiable reason
why they neglected to observe the proper procedure. Considering that PO1
Pacis himself expressed misgivings on the identity of the envelope shown to
him in court, with the envelope that he had placed the confiscated illegal drug
items in, neither can we confirm that the chain of custody had been
sufficiently established.
Corpus delicti is the "actual commission by someone of the particular crime
charged."40 In illegal drug cases, it refers to the illegal drug item itself.41
When courts are given reason to entertain reservations about the identity of
the illegal drug item allegedly seized from the accused, the actual commission
of the crime charged is put into serious question. In those cases, courts have
no alternative but to acquit on the ground of reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 28 October 2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 30412 of
the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. RODRIGO RONTOS y DELA
TORRE is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of Violation of Section 11, Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act) on the
ground of reasonable doubt.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby ORDERED to immediately
RELEASE petitioner from custody, unless he is detained for some other
lawful cause.
RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
G. R. No. 197788 February 29, 2012
SERENO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside
the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18
February 2011[2] and Resolution dated 8 July 2011.
Statement of the Facts and of the Case
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the
version of the prosecution, are as follows:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the
Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on
March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 oclock in the morning, he saw the accused,
who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to
Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this
prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance
which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said
motor vehicle; that he invited the accused to come inside their sub-station
since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the
said sub-station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a
citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the
accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he
was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket
of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused
obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was
a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size,
including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife;
that upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; that
after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and
something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled out
the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4)
plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2)
contained suspected shabu.[3]
Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of
Not guilty to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial was
terminated on 24 September 2003, after which, trial ensued.
During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist
testified for the prosecution. On the other hand, petitioner testified for
himself and raised the defense of planting of evidence and extortion.
In its 19 February 2009 Decision,[4] the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs[5] committed on 10 March 2003. It found the
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested
21
for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid search, which led to the
discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu.
The RTC also found his defense of frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-
serving and unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its Decision held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused RODEL LUZ y
ONG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of violation of Section
11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and
(1) day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of
Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00).
The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency for its proper disposition and destruction in accordance
with law.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.
On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari dated 1 September 2011. In a Resolution dated 12
October 2011, this Court required respondent to file a comment on the
Petition. On 4 January 2012, the latter filed its Comment dated 3 January
2012.
Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:
(i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABU IS
INVALID.
(ii) THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
DUTY OF THE POLICE OFFICER CANNOT BE RELIED UPON IN THIS CASE.
(iii) THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE ALLEGED
SUBJECT SPECIMEN HAS BEEN COMPROMISED.
(iv) THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT PROVEN
BEYOND THE REASONABLE DOUBT (sic).[7]
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there
was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest
was erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with
violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he
claims that he had never consented to the search conducted upon him.
On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully arrested, the RTC
held thus:
It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and apprehended in
this case by Police Officers Alteza and Brillante for violation of City Ordinance
No. 98-012, an ordinance requiring the use of crash helmet by motorcycle
drivers and riders thereon in the City of Naga and prescribing penalties for
violation thereof. The accused himself admitted that he was not wearing a

helmet at the time when he was flagged down by the said police officers,
albeit he had a helmet in his possession. Obviously, there is legal basis on the
part of the apprehending officers to flag down and arrest the accused because
the latter was actually committing a crime in their presence, that is, a
violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012. In other words, the accused, being
caught in flagrante delicto violating the said Ordinance, he could therefore be
lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending officers. x x x.[8]
We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular
reasons alleged. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide
open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though
unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial courts
decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as
errors.[9]
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for
committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this
reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be
bound to answer for the commission of an offense.[10] It is effected by an
actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary
submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the
application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint,
nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an
intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there
be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and
impression that submission is necessary.[11]
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general
procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender,
but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. Law enforcement and peace
officers of other agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in
apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued
pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations not contrary to any
provisions of this Act, confiscate the license of the driver concerned and issue
a receipt prescribed and issued by the Bureau therefor which shall authorize
the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two
hours from the time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in
the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become invalid thereafter. Failure
of the driver to settle his case within fifteen days from the date of
apprehension will be a ground for the suspension and/or revocation of his
license.
Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual[12]
provides the following procedure for flagging down vehicles during the
conduct of checkpoints:
SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While in
Mobile Car. This rule is a general concept and will not apply in hot pursuit
operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake the following, when
applicable: x x x
m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation Ticket
(TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR). Never indulge in prolonged,
unnecessary conversation or argument with the driver or any of the vehicles
occupants;
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket,
petitioner could not be said to have been under arrest. There was no
intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty,
or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during
which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as
waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified
that the only reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner
had been flagged down almost in front of that place. Hence, it was only for the
sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to
take petitioner into custody.
In Berkemer v. McCarty,[13] the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court
discussed at length whether the roadside questioning of a motorist detained
pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered custodial
interrogation. The Court held that, such questioning does not fall under
custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of
the nature of the questioning, the expectations of the motorist and the officer,
and the length of time the procedure is conducted. It ruled as follows:
It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly curtails
the freedom of action of the driver and the passengers, if any, of the detained
vehicle. Under the law of most States, it is a crime either to ignore a
policemans signal to stop ones car or, once having stopped, to drive away
without permission. x x x
However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the Miranda
opinion emphasized by respondent. Fidelity to the doctrine announced in
Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in those types of
situations in which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated.
Thus, we must decide whether a traffic stop exerts upon a detained person
pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against
self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights.
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person
questioned will be induced to speak where he would not otherwise do so
freely, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 467. First, detention of a motorist
pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief. The vast
majority of roadside detentions last only a few minutes. A motorists
expectations, when he sees a policemans light flashing behind him, are that
he will be obliged to spend a short period of time answering questions and
waiting while the officer checks his license and registration, that he may then
be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be allowed to
continue on his way. In this respect, questioning incident to an ordinary
traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse interrogation, which
frequently is prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware that
questioning will continue until he provides his interrogators the answers
they seek. See id., at 451.
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such
that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police. To be sure, the
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
aura of authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and the
22
knowledge that the officer has some discretion in deciding whether to issue a
citation, in combination, exert some pressure on the detainee to respond to
questions. But other aspects of the situation substantially offset these forces.
Perhaps most importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some
degree. x x x
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-
called Terry stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), than to a formal
arrest. x x x The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this
sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops
are subject to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly noncoercive aspect of
ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained
pursuant to such stops are not in custody for the purposes of Miranda.
xxxxxxxxx
We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent will not
come to pass. It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become
applicable as soon as a suspects freedom of action is curtailed to a degree
associated with formal arrest. California v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125
(1983) (per curiam). If a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic
stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him in custody for
practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections
prescribed by Miranda. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977)
(per curiam). (Emphasis supplied.)
The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was
only subjected to modest questions while still at the scene of the traffic stop,
he was not at that moment placed under custody (such that he should have
been apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither can treatment of this sort
be fairly characterized as the functional equivalent of a formal arrest.
Similarly, neither can petitioner here be considered under arrest at the time
that his traffic citation was being made.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was
violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a
motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of
arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense
penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a
warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation.
Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive
the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be
deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officers
issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of
an arrest for the same violation.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed
arrested upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting
the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not
complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of
the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must

show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of
their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement they might make could be used against them.[14] It may also be
noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were complied with
by the police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs.
In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must also
be given to a person apprehended due to a traffic violation:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the
police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the
inherently compelling pressures generated by the custodial setting itself,
which work to undermine the individuals will to resist, and as much as
possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to
determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary.
Those purposes are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons
suspected of misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons suspected
of felonies.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed arrested when he was
flagged down for a traffic violation and while he waiting for his ticket, then
there would have been no need for him to be arrested for a second timeafter
the police officers allegedly discovered the drugsas he was already in their
custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from
it was likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in
plain view; (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless
search; (v) customs search; (vi) a stop and frisk search; and (vii) exigent and
emergency circumstances.[15] None of the above-mentioned instances,
especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be
inadvertently discovered, was not in plain view. It was actually concealed
inside a metal container inside petitioners pocket. Clearly, the evidence was
not immediately apparent.
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not
to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence.[17] It
must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the
consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims that
petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession
does not suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found
that petitioner was merely told to take out the contents of his pocket.[18]
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this
determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent
and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant;
(2) whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether
the defendant objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the
education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive
police procedures; (6) the defendants belief that no incriminating evidence
would be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment
in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable
subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that has the burden of
proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was
obtained, and was freely and voluntarily given.[19] In this case, all that was
alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police station at three in the
morning, accompanied by several police officers. These circumstances weigh
heavily against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.
Neither does the search qualify under the stop and frisk rule. While the rule
normally applies when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual
conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the
stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for
weapons.
In Knowles v. Iowa,[21] the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police
officer stops a person for speeding and correspondingly issues a citation
instead of arresting the latter, this procedure does not authorize the officer to
conduct a full search of the car. The Court therein held that there was no
justification for a full-blown search when the officer does not arrest the
motorist. Instead, police officers may only conduct minimal intrusions, such
as ordering the motorist to alight from the car or doing a patdown:
In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the search
incident to arrest exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to
take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at
trial. x x x But neither of these underlying rationales for the search incident to
arrest exception is sufficient to justify the search in the present case.
We have recognized that the first rationaleofficer safetyis both legitimate and
weighty, x x x The threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation,
however, is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest. In
Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest involves danger to an officer
because of the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into
custody and transporting him to the police station. 414 U. S., at 234-235. We
recognized that [t]he danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the
arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the
grounds for arrest. Id., at 234, n. 5. A routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is
a relatively brief encounter and is more analogous to a so-called Terry stop . .
. than to a formal arrest. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984). See
also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973) (Where there is no formal
arrest . . . a person might well be less hostile to the police and less likely to
take conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy incriminating evidence).
This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a
routine traffic stop. It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at 110; Wilson, supra,
at 413-414. But while the concern for officer safety in this context may justify
the minimal additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of
the car, it does not by itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion
attending a full fieldtype search. Even without the search authority Iowa
urges, officers have other, independent bases to search for weapons and
protect themselves from danger. For example, they may order out of a vehicle
both the driver, Mimms, supra, at 111, and any passengers, Wilson, supra, at
414; perform a patdown of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable
suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
(1968); conduct a Terry patdown of the passenger compartment of a vehicle
23
upon reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain
immediate control of a weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049
(1983); and even conduct a full search of the passenger compartment,
including any containers therein, pursuant to a custodial arrest, New York v.
Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 460 (1981).
Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search
incident to arrestthe need to discover and preserve evidence. Once Knowles
was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to
prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further evidence of excessive
speed was going to be found either on the person of the offender or in the
passenger compartment of the car. (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have
failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a
waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of
the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures.[23] Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search
and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be
exercised and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional
rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance
to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible.[25] The
drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls
for the acquittal of the accused.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 affirming the judgment of
conviction dated 19 February 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial
Region, Naga City, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0087, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is hereby ACQUITTED
and ordered immediately released from detention, unless his continued
confinement is warranted by some other cause or ground.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 200304 January 15, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. DONALD VASQUEZ
y SANDIGAN @ "DON," Accused-Appellant,
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The case before this Court is an appeal from the Decision1 dated May 31,
2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04201. Said decision
affirmed with modification the Joint Decision2 dated August 6 2009 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 41, in Criminal Case Nos. 98-

164174 and 98-164175, which convicted the appellant Donald Vasquez y
Sandigan of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of regulated drugs
under Sections 15 and 16 Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Criminal Case No. 98-164174 stemmed from a charge of violation of Section
15 Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,3 which was allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about April 3, 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver,
transport or distribute any regulated drug, did then and there [willfully],
unlawfully and knowingly sell or offer for sale, dispense, deliver, transport or
distribute 45.46 grams, 44.27 grams, 45.34 grams, 51.45 grams, 41.32 grams
and 20.14 grams or with a total weight of TWO HUNDRED FORTY-SEVEN
POINT NINETY-EIGHT (247.98) grams contained in six (6) transparent
plastic sachets of white crystalline substance known as "Shabu" containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, which is a regulated drug.4
Criminal Case No. 98-164175, on the other hand, arose from an alleged
violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,5
which was said to be committed in this manner:
That on or about April 3, 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused without being authorized by law to possess or use any regulated
drug, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and knowingly have in his
possession and under his custody and control 1.61 grams, 0.58 grams, 0.29
grams, 0.09 [grams], 0.10 grams, 0.17 grams, 0.21 grams, 0.24 grams, 0.12
grams, 0.06 grams, 0.04 grams, [0].51 grams or all with a total weight of four
point zero three grams of white crystalline substance contained in twelve
(12) transparent plastic sachets known as "SHABU" containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the
corresponding license or prescription thereof.6
Initially, Criminal Case No. 98-164175 was raffled to the RTC of Manila,
Branch 23. Upon motion7 of the appellant, however, said case was allowed to
be consolidated with Criminal Case No. 98-164174 in the RTC of Manila,
Branch 41.8 On arraignment, the appellant pleaded not guilty to both
charges.9 The pre-trial conference of the cases was held on July 27, 1998, but
the same was terminated without the parties entering into any stipulation of
facts.10
During the trial of the cases, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the
following witnesses: (1) Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Jean Fajardo,11 (2)
P/Insp. Marilyn Dequito,12 and (3) Police Officer (PO) 2 Christian
Trambulo.13 Thereafter, the defense presented in court the testimonies of:
(1) the appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan,14 (2) Angelina Arejado,15 and
(3) Anatolia Caredo.16
The Prosecution’s Case
The prosecution’s version of the events was primarily drawn from the
testimonies of P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo.
P/Insp. Fajardo testified that in the morning of April 1, 1998, a confidential
informant went to their office and reported that a certain Donald Vasquez
was engaged in illegal drug activity. This alias Don supposedly claimed that
he was an employee of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). According
to the informant, alias Don promised him a good commission if he (the
informant) would present a potential buyer of drugs. P/Insp. Fajardo relayed
the information to Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Pepito Domantay, the
commanding officer of their office. P/Insp. Fajardo was then instructed to
form a team and conduct a possible buy-bust against alias Don. She formed a
team on the same day, which consisted of herself, PO2 Trambulo, PO1
Agravante, PO1 Pedrosa, PO1 Sisteno, and PO1 De la Rosa. P/Insp. Fajardo
was the team leader. With the help of the informant, she was able to set up a
meeting with alias Don. The meeting was to be held at around 9:00 p.m. on
that day at Cindy’s Restaurant located in Welcome Rotonda. She was only
supposed to meet alias Don that night but she decided to bring the team
along for security reasons.17
At about 9:00 p.m. on even date, P/Insp. Fajardo and her team went to the
meeting place with the informant. The members of her team positioned
themselves strategically inside the restaurant. The informant introduced
P/Insp. Fajardo to alias Don as the buyer of shabu. She asked alias Don if he
was indeed an employee of the NBI and he replied in the affirmative. They
agreed to close the deal wherein she would buy 250 grams of shabu for
₱250,000.00. They also agreed to meet the following day at Cindy’s
Restaurant around 10:00 to 11:00 p.m.18
In the evening of April 2, 1998, P/Insp. Fajardo and her team went back to
Cindy’s Restaurant. Alias Don was already waiting for her outside the
establishment when she arrived. He asked for the money and she replied that
she had the money with her. She brought five genuine ₱500.00 bills, which
were inserted on top of five bundles of play money to make it appear that she
had ₱250,000.00 with her. After she showed the money to alias Don, he
suggested that they go to a more secure place. They agreed for the sale to
take place at around 1:30 to 2:00 a.m. on April 3, 1998 in front of alias Don’s
apartment at 765 Valdez St., Sampaloc, Manila. The team proceeded to the
Western Police District (WPD) Station along U.N. Avenue for coordination.
Afterwards, the team held their final briefing before they proceeded to the
target area. They agreed that the pre-arranged signal was for P/Insp. Fajardo
to scratch her hair, which would signify that the deal had been consummated
and the rest of the team would rush up to the scene. The team then travelled
to the address given by alias Don.19
When the team arrived at the target area around 1:15 a.m. on April 3, 1998,
the two vehicles they used were parked along the corner of the street. P/Insp.
Fajardo and the informant walked towards the apartment of alias Don and
stood in front of the apartment gate. Around 1:45 a.m., alias Don came out of
the apartment with a male companion. Alias Don demanded to see the
money, but P/Insp. Fajardo told him that she wanted to see the drugs first.
Alias Don gave her the big brown envelope he was carrying and she checked
the contents thereof. Inside she found a plastic sachet, about 10x8 inches in
size, which contained white crystalline substance. After checking the
contents of the envelope, she assumed that the same was indeed shabu. She
then gave the buy-bust money to alias Don and scratched her hair to signal
the rest of the team to rush to the scene. P/Insp. Fajardo identified herself as
a narcotics agent. The two suspects tried to flee but PO2 Trambulo was able
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
to stop them from doing so. P/Insp. Fajardo took custody of the shabu. When
24
she asked alias Don if the latter had authority to possess or sell shabu, he
replied in the negative. P/Insp. Fajardo put her initials "JSF" on the genuine
₱500.00 bills below the name of Benigno Aquino. After the arrest of the two
suspects, the buy-bust team brought them to the police station. The suspects’
rights were read to them and they were subsequently booked.20
P/Insp. Fajardo said that she found out that alias Don was in fact the
appellant Donald Vasquez. She learned of his name when he brought out his
NBI ID while he was being booked. P/Insp. Fajardo also learned that the
name of the appellant’s companion was Reynaldo Siscar, who was also
arrested and brought to the police station. P/Insp. Fajardo explained that
after she gave the buy-bust money to the appellant, the latter handed the
same to Siscar who was present the entire time the sale was being
consummated. Upon receiving the buy-bust money placed inside a green
plastic bag, Siscar looked at the contents thereof and uttered "okey na to."
P/Insp. Fajardo marked the drug specimen and brought the same to the
Crime Laboratory. She was accompanied there by PO2 Trambulo and PO1
Agravante. She handed over the drug specimen to PO1 Agravante who then
turned it over to P/Insp. Taduran, the forensic chemist on duty. The police
officers previously weighed the drug specimen. Thereafter, the personnel at
the crime laboratory weighed the specimen again. P/Insp. Fajardo and her
team waited for the results of the laboratory examination.21
P/Insp. Fajardo further testified that the six plastic bags of shabu seized
during the buy-bust operation were actually contained in a self-sealing
plastic envelope placed inside a brown envelope. When the brown envelope
was confiscated from the appellant, she put her initials "JSF" therein and
signed it. She noticed that there were markings on the envelope that read
"DD-93-1303 re Antonio Roxas y Sunga" but she did not bother to check out
what they were for or who made them. When she interrogated the appellant
about the brown envelope, she found out that the same was submitted as
evidence to the NBI Crime Laboratory. She also learned that the appellant
worked as a Laboratory Aide at the NBI Crime Laboratory. She identified in
court the six plastic sachets of drugs that her team recovered, which sachets
she also initialed and signed. P/Insp. Fajardo also stated that after the
appellant was arrested, PO2 Trambulo conducted a body search on the two
suspects. The search yielded 12 more plastic sachets of drugs from the
appellant. The 12 sachets were varied in sizes and were contained in a white
envelope. P/Insp. Fajardo placed her initials and signature on the envelope.
As to the 12 sachets, the same were initialed by P/Insp. Fajardo and signed
by PO2 Trambulo.22
The testimony of PO2 Trambulo corroborated that of P/Insp. Fajardo’s. PO2
Trambulo testified that in the morning of April 1, 1998, a confidential
informant reported to them about the illegal drug activities of alias Don.
P/Supt. Domantay then tasked P/Insp. Fajardo to form a buy-bust team.
P/Insp. Fajardo was able to set up a meeting with alias Don at Cindy’s
Restaurant in Welcome Rotonda, Quezon City. At that meeting, PO2 Trambulo
saw P/Insp. Fajardo talk to alias Don. P/Insp. Fajardo later told the members
of the team that she convinced alias Don that she was a good buyer of shabu
and the latter demanded a second meeting to see the money. After the initial
meeting, P/Insp. Fajardo briefed P/Supt. Domantay about what happened.
PO2 Trambulo stated that on April 2, 1998, P/Insp. Fajardo was furnished
with five genuine ₱500.00 bills together with the boodle play money. P/Insp.

Fajardo placed her initials in the genuine bills below the name "Benigno
Aquino, Jr." Afterwards, the team left the office. When they arrived at Cindy’s
Restaurant past 10:00 p.m., alias Don was waiting outside. P/Insp. Fajardo
showed the boodle money to alias Don and after some time, they parted
ways. P/Insp. Fajardo later told the team that alias Don decided that the drug
deal would take place in front of alias Don’s rented apartment on Valdez St.,
Sampaloc, Manila. After an hour, the team went to Valdez St. to familiarize
themselves with the area. They then proceeded to the WPD station to
coordinate their operation. Thereafter, P/Insp. Fajardo conducted a final
briefing wherein PO2 Trambulo was designated as the immediate back-up
arresting officer. The agreed pre-arranged signal was for P/Insp. Fajardo to
scratch her hair to indicate the consummation of the deal. PO2 Trambulo was
to signal the same to the other members of the team.23
The buy-bust team went to the target area at around 1:30 to 2:00 a.m. on
April 3, 1998. P/Insp. Fajardo and the informant walked towards the
direction of alias Don’s apartment, while PO2 Trambulo positioned himself
near a parked jeepney about 15 to 20 meters from the apartment gate. The
rest of the team parked their vehicles at the street perpendicular to Valdez St.
Later, alias Don went out of the gate with another person. PO2 Trambulo saw
alias Don gesturing to P/Insp. Fajardo as if asking for something but P/Insp.
Fajardo gestured that she wanted to see something first. Alias Don handed
P/Insp. Fajardo a big brown envelope, which the latter opened. P/Insp.
Fajardo then handed to alias Don a green plastic bag containing the buy-bust
money and gave the pre-arranged signal. When PO2 Trambulo saw this, he
immediately summoned the rest of the team and rushed to the suspects. He
was able to recover the buy-bust money from alias Don’s male companion.
Upon frisking alias Don, PO2 Trambulo retrieved 12 pieces of plastic sachets
of suspected drugs. The same were placed inside a white envelope that was
tucked inside alias Don’s waist. PO2 Trambulo marked each of the 12 sachets
with his initials "CVT" and the date. The police officers then informed the
suspects of their rights and they proceeded to the police headquarters in Fort
Bonifacio.24
As regards the brown envelope that alias Don handed to P/Insp. Fajardo, the
latter retained possession thereof. The envelope contained six pieces of
plastic bags of white crystalline substance. When they got back to their office,
the team reported the progress of their operation to P/Supt. Domantay. The
arrested suspects were booked and the required documentations were
prepared. Among such documents was the Request for Laboratory
Examination of the drug specimens seized. PO2 Trambulo said that he was
the one who brought the said request to the PNP Crime Laboratory, along
with the drug specimens.25
P/Insp. Marilyn Dequito, the forensic chemist, testified on the results of her
examination of the drug specimens seized in this case. She explained that
P/Insp. Macario Taduran, Jr. initially examined the drug specimens but the
latter was already assigned to another office. The results of the examination
of P/Insp. Taduran were laid down in Physical Science Report No. D-1071-98.
P/Insp. Dequito first studied the data contained in Physical Science Report
No. D-1071-98 and retrieved the same from their office. She entered that fact
in their logbook RD-17-98. She then weighed the drug specimens and
examined the white crystalline substance from each of the plastic sachets.
She examined first the specimens marked as "A-1," "A-2," "A-3," "A-4," "A-5"
and "A-6." P/Insp. Dequito’s examination revealed that the white crystalline
substances were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.26 She also
examined the contents of 12 heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets that also
contained crystalline substances. The 12 plastic sachets were marked "B-1"
to "B-12." The white crystalline powder inside the 12 plastic sachets also
tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. P/Insp. Dequito’s
findings were contained in Physical Science Report No. RD-17-98.27
The prosecution, thereafter, adduced the following object and documentary
evidence: (1) photocopies of the five original ₱500.00 bills28 used as buy-
bust money (Exhibits A-E); (2) Request for Laboratory Examination29 dated
April 3, 1998 (Exhibit F); (3) Initial Laboratory Report30 dated April 3, 1998,
stating that the specimen submitted for examination tested positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride (Exhibit G); (4) Court Order31 dated
September 2, 1998 (Exhibit H); (5) Physical Sciences Report No. D-1071-
9832 dated April 3, 1998 (Exhibit I); (6) Drug specimens A-1 to A-6 (Exhibits
J-O); (7) Big brown envelope (Exhibit P); (8) Small white envelope (Exhibit
Q); (9) Drug specimens B-1 to B-12 (Exhibits R-CC); (10) Physical Sciences
Report No. RD-17-9833 (Exhibit DD); (11) Joint Affidavit of Arrest34 (Exhibit
EE); (12) Play money (Exhibit FF); (13) Booking Sheet and Arrest Report35
(Exhibit GG); (14) Request for Medical Examination36 (Exhibit HH); (15)
Medico Legal Slip37 of Donald Vasquez (Exhibit II); and (16) Medico Legal
Slip38 of Reynaldo Siscar (Exhibit JJ).
The Defense’s Case
As expected, the defense belied the prosecution’s version of events. The
appellant’s brief39 before the Court of Appeals provides a concise summary
of the defense’s counter-statement of facts. According to the defense:
Donald Vasquez was a regular employee of the NBI, working as a Laboratory
Aide II at the NBI Forensics Chemistry Division. His duties at the time
included being a subpoena clerk, receiving chemistry cases as well as
requests from different police agencies to have their specimens examined by
the chemist. He also rendered day and night duties, and during regular office
hours and in the absence of the laboratory technician, he would weigh the
specimens. As subpoena clerk, he would receive subpoenas from the trial
courts. When there is no chemist, he would get a Special Order to testify, or
bring the drug specimens, to the courts.
On 1 April 1998, Donald Vasquez took his examination in Managerial
Statistics between 6:00 to 9:00 o’clock p.m. Thereafter, he took a jeepney and
alighted at Stop and Shop at Quiapo. From there, he took a tricycle to his
house, arriving at 9:45 o’clock that evening, where he saw Reynaldo Siscar
and Sonny San Diego, the latter a confidential informant of the narcotics
agents.
On 3 April 1998, at 1:45 o’clock in the morning, Donald’s household help,
Anatolia Caredo, who had just arrived from Antipolo that time, was eating
while Donald was asleep. She heard a knock on the door. Reynaldo Siscar
opened the door and thereafter two (2) men entered, poking guns at
Reynaldo. They were followed by three (3) others. The door to Donald’s room
was kicked down and they entered his room. Donald, hearing noise, woke up
to see P./Insp. Fajardo pointing a gun at him. He saw that there were six (6)
policemen searching his room, picking up what they could get. One of them
opened a cabinet and got drug specimens in [Donald’s] possession in relation
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
to his work as a laboratory aide. The drugs came from two (2) cases and
25
marked as DD-93-1303 owned by Antonio Roxas, and DD-96-5392 owned by
SPO4 Emiliano Anonas. The drug specimen contained in the envelope marked
as DD-93-1303 was intended for presentation on 3 April 1998. Aside from
the drug specimens, the policemen also took his jewelry, a VHS player, and
his wallet containing ₱2,530.00.
Angelina Arejado, Donald’s neighbor, witnessed the policemen entering the
apartment and apprehending Donald and Reynaldo from the apartment
terrace.40 (Citations omitted.)
The defense then offered the following evidence: (1) NBI Disposition Form41
dated April 3, 1998 (Exhibit 1); (2) Sworn Statement of Idabel Bernabe
Pagulayan42 (Exhibit 2); (3) Photocopy of the buy-bust money43 (Exhibit 3);
(4) List of Hearings44 attended by Donald Vasquez (Exhibit 4); (5)
Authorization Letter45 prepared by Acting Deputy Director Arturo A.
Figueras dated March 27, 1998 (Exhibit 5); and (6) List of Evidence46 taken
by Donald Vasquez from 1996-1998 (Exhibit 6).
The Decision of the RTC
On August 6, 2009, the RTC convicted the appellant of the crimes charged.
The RTC gave more credence to the prosecution’s evidence given that the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty on the part of
the police officers was not overcome. The trial court held that the appellant
did not present any evidence that would show that the police officers in this
case were impelled by an evil motive to charge him of very serious crimes
and falsely testify against him. Also, the trial court noted that the volume of
the shabu involved in this case was considerable, i.e., 247.98 grams and 4.03
grams for illegal sale and illegal possession, respectively. To the mind of the
trial court, such fact helped to dispel the possibility that the drug specimens
seized were merely planted by the police officers. Furthermore, the RTC
ruled that the positive testimonies of the police officers regarding the illegal
drug peddling activities of the appellant prevailed over the latter’s bare
denials.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant was merely framed up
by the police, the trial court pointed out that:
[T]he accused should have reported the said incident to the proper
authorities, or asked help from his Acting Chief [Idabel] Pagulayan from the
NBI to testify and identify in Court the xerox copy of the Disposition Form
which she issued to the accused and the Affidavit dated April 17, 1998 (xerox
copy) executed by her or from Mr. Arturo A. Figueras, Acting Deputy Director,
Technical Services of the NBI to testify and identify the Letter issued by the
said Acting Deputy Director in order to corroborate and strengthen his
testimony that he was indeed authorized to keep in his custody the said
shabu to be presented or turned over to the Court as evidence, and he should
have filed the proper charges against those police officers who were
responsible for such act. But the accused did not even bother to do the same.
Further, the pieces of evidence (Disposition Form, Affidavit of [Idabel]
Pagulayan and Letter dated March 27, 1998 issued by Acting Deputy
Director) presented by the accused in Court could not be given weight and
credence considering that the said persons were not presented in Court to

identify the said documents and that the prosecution has no opportunity to
cross-examine the same, thus, it has no probative value.47
The trial court, thus, decreed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. 98-164174, finding accused, DONALD VASQUEZ y
SANDIGAN @ "DON" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation
of Sec. 15, Art. III in Relation to Sec.
2 (e), (f), (m), (o), Art. I of R.A. No. 6425 and hereby sentences him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of ₱5,000,000.00; and 2. In Crim.
Case No. 98-164175, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused,
DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Violation of Sec. 16, Art. III in Relation to Sec. 2 (e-2) Art. I of R.A.
6425 as Amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 179 and hereby sentences him
to suffer the penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FOUR (4) YEARS
and a fine of FOUR THOUSAND (₱4,000.00) PESOS.
The subject shabu (247.98 grams and 4.03 grams, respectively) are hereby
forfeited in favor of the government and the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby
directed to deliver and/or cause the delivery of the said shabu to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), upon the finality of this
Decision.48
The Judgment of the Court of Appeals
On appeal,49 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the appellant.
The appellate court ruled that the prosecution sufficiently proved the
elements of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu. The
testimony of P/Insp. Fajardo on the conduct of the buy-bust operation was
found to be clear and categorical. As the appellant failed to adduce any
evidence that tended to prove any ill motive on the part of the police officers
to falsely charge the appellant, the Court of Appeals held that the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties on the part of
the police officers had not been controverted in this case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision stated:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The
August 6, 2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41 of the City of
Manila in Criminal Cases No. 98-164174-75, finding appellant Donald
Vasquez y Sandigan guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes of
Violation of Section 15 and Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425 is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 98-164175,
appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, four months and one
day of prision correccional in its medium period, as maximum.50
The Ruling of the Court
The appellant appealed his case to this Court to once again impugn his
conviction on two grounds: (1) the purported illegality of the search and the
ensuing arrest done by the police officers and (2) his supposed authority to
possess the illegal drugs seized from him.51 He argues that the police officers
did not have a search warrant or a warrant of arrest at the time he was
arrested. This occurred despite the fact that the police officers allegedly had
ample time to secure a warrant of arrest against him. Inasmuch as his arrest
was illegal, the appellant avers that the evidence obtained as a result thereof
was inadmissible in court. As the corpus delicti of the crime was rendered
inadmissible, the appellant posits that his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Appellant further insists that he was able to prove that he
was authorized to keep the drug specimens in his custody, given that he was
an employee of the NBI Forensic Chemistry Laboratory who was tasked with
the duty to bring drug specimens in court.
After an assiduous review of the evidence adduced by both parties to this
case, we resolve to deny this appeal.
At the outset, the Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the
validity of his arrest. We reiterated in People v. Tampis52 that "[a]ny
objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the
accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the
quashing of the information against them before their arraignment,
appellants are now estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest.
Any irregularity was cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial
court’s jurisdiction."53 Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that the
appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an
undercover police officer in a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus, falls within
the ambit of Section 5(a), Rule 11354 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure when an arrest made without warrant is deemed lawful. Having
established the validity of the warrantless arrest in this case, the Court holds
that the warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise
valid. We held in People v. Cabugatan55 that:
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not
absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed
permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles,
(2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consented
searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and search incidental to
a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a
rule, an arrest is considered legitimate [if] effected with a valid warrant of
arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1)
arrest in flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of
escaped prisoners. (Citation omitted.)
Thus, the appellant cannot seek exculpation by invoking belatedly the
invalidity of his arrest and the subsequent search upon his person.
We now rule on the substantive matters.
To secure a conviction for the crime of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited
drugs, the following elements should be satisfactorily proven: (1) the identity
of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment therefor.56 As held in People v. Chua Tan
Lee,57 in a prosecution of illegal sale of drugs, "what is material is proof that
the accused peddled illicit drugs, coupled with the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti." On the other hand, the elements of illegal possession of
drugs are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by
26
law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.58
In the case at bar, the testimonies of P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo
established that a buy-bust operation was legitimately carried out in the wee
hours of April 3, 1998 to entrap the appellant. P/Insp. Fajardo, the poseur-
buyer, positively identified the appellant as the one who sold to her six
plastic bags of shabu that were contained in a big brown envelope for the
price of ₱250,000.00. She likewise identified the six plastic bags of shabu,
which contained the markings she placed thereon after the same were seized
from the appellant. When subjected to laboratory examination, the white
crystalline powder contained in the plastic bags tested positive for shabu. We
find that P/Insp. Fajardo’s testimony on the events that transpired during the
conduct of the buy-bust operation was detailed and straightforward. She was
also consistent and unwavering in her narration even in the face of the
opposing counsel’s cross-examination.
Apart from her description of the events that led to the exchange of the drug
specimens seized and the buy-bust money, P/Insp. Fajardo further testified
as to the recovery from the appellant of another 12 pieces of plastic sachets
of shabu. After the latter was arrested, P/Insp. Fajardo stated that PO2
Trambulo conducted a body search on the appellant. This search resulted to
the confiscation of 12 more plastic sachets, the contents of which also tested
positive for shabu. The testimony of P/Insp. Fajardo was amply corroborated
by PO2 Trambulo, whose own account dovetailed the former’s narration of
events. Both police officers also identified in court the twelve plastic sachets
of shabu that were confiscated from the appellant.
In People v. Ting Uy,59 the Court explains that "credence shall be given to the
narration of the incident by prosecution witnesses especially so when they
are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a
regular manner, unless there be evidence to the contrary." In the instant case,
the appellant failed to ascribe, much less satisfactorily prove, any improper
motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses as to why they would falsely
incriminate him. The appellant himself even testified that, not only did he not
have any misunderstanding with P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo prior to
his arrest, he in fact did not know them at all.60 In the absence of evidence of
such ill motive, none is presumed to exist.61
The records of this case are also silent as to any measures undertaken by the
appellant to criminally or administratively charge the police officers herein
for falsely framing him up for selling and possessing illegal drugs. Such a
move would not have been a daunting task for the appellant under the
circumstances. Being a regular employee of the NBI, the appellant could have
easily sought the help of his immediate supervisors and/or the chief of his
office to extricate him from his predicament. Instead, what the appellant
offered in evidence were mere photocopies of documents that supposedly
showed that he was authorized to keep drug specimens in his custody. That
the original documents and the testimonies of the signatories thereof were
not at all presented in court did nothing to help the appellant’s case. To the
mind of the Court, the evidence offered by the appellant failed to persuade
amid the positive and categorical testimonies of the arresting officers that the
appellant was caught red-handed selling and possessing a considerable
amount of prohibited drugs on the night of the buy-bust operation.

It is apropos to reiterate here that where there is no showing that the trial
court overlooked or misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely
abused its discretion, the Court will not disturb the trial court’s assessment of
the facts and the credibility of the witnesses since the RTC was in a better
position to assess and weigh the evidence presented during trial. Settled too
is the rule that the factual findings of the appellate court sustaining those of
the trial court are binding on this Court, unless there is a clear showing that
such findings are tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable
error.62
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the prosecution was
able to establish the guilt of the appellant of the crimes charged.
The Penalties
Anent the proper imposable penalties, Section 15 and Section 16, Article III,
in relation to Section 20(3) of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, state:
SEC. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and
Distribution of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the
victim of the offense is a minor, or should a regulated drug involved in any
offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim
thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed. SEC. 16.
Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million
pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any
regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to
the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds
or Instruments of the Crime. - The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4,
7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act
shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following
quantities:
1. 40 grams or more of opium;
2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
4. 40 grams or more of heroin;
5. 750 grams or more of Indian hemp or marijuana;
6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrocholoride; or
8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond
therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Dangerous
Drugs Board, after public consultations/hearings conducted for the purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the
penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua
depending upon the quantity. (Emphases supplied.)
In Criminal Case No. 98-164174 involving the crime of illegal sale of
regulated drugs, the appellant was found to have sold to the poseur-buyer in
this case a total of 247.98 grams of shabu, which amount is more than the
minimum of 200 grams required by the law for the imposition of either
reclusion perpetua or, if there be aggravating circumstances, the death
penalty.
Pertinently, Article 6363 of the Revised Penal Code mandates that when the
law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties and there are
neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
crime, the lesser penalty shall be applied.1âwphi1 Thus, in this case,
considering that no mitigating or aggravating circumstances attended the
appellant’s violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court’s imposition
of reclusion perpetua. The ₱5,000,000.00 fine imposed by the RTC on the
appellant is also in accord with Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended.
As to the charge of illegal possession of regulated drugs in Criminal Case No.
98-164175, the Court of Appeals properly invoked our ruling in People v.
Tira64 in determining the proper imposable penalty. Indeed, we held in Tira
that:
Under Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, the imposable
penalty of possession of a regulated drug, less than 200 grams, in this case,
shabu, is prision correccional to reclusion perpetua. Based on the quantity of
the regulated drug subject of the offense, the imposable penalty shall be as
follows:
QUANTITY IMPOSABLE PENALTY
Less than one (1) gram to 49.25 grams prision correccional
49.26 grams to 98.50 grams prision mayor
98.51 grams to 147.75 grams reclusion temporal
147.76 grams to 199 grams reclusion perpetua
(Emphases ours.)
Given that the additional 12 plastic sachets of shabu found in the possession
of the appellant amounted to 4.03 grams, the imposable penalty for the crime
is prision correccional. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there
being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance in this case, the imposable
penalty on the appellant should be the indeterminate sentence of six months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four years and two months of prision
correccional, as maximum. The penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals,
thus, falls within the range of the proper imposable penalty. In Criminal Case
No. 98-164175, no fine is imposable considering that in Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, a fine can be imposed as a conjunctive penalty only if the
penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.65
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
27
Incidentally, the Court notes that both parties in this case admitted that the
appellant was a regular employee of the NBI Forensics Chemistry Division.
Such fact, however, cannot be taken into consideration to increase the
penalties in this case to the maximum, in accordance with Section 24 of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.66 Such a special aggravating
circumstance, i.e., one that which arises under special conditions to increase
the penalty for the offense to its maximum period,67 was not alleged and
charged in the informations. Thus, the same was properly disregarded by the
lower courts.
All told, the Court finds no reason to overturn the conviction of the appellant.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 31, 2011 in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 04201 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
G.R. No. 208170, August 20, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PETRUS YAU
A.K.A. “JOHN” AND “RICKY” AND SUSANA YAU Y SUMOGBA A.K.A.
“SUSAN”, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the September 7, 2012 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03446, which affirmed the December 14,
2007 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 214, Mandaluyong City
(RTC), in Criminal Case No. MC-04-7923.
The RTC found accused-appellant Petrus Yau (Petrus) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and
serious illegal detention, as defined and penalized in Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, (R.A. No.
7659), and convicted accused-appellant Susana Yau y Sumogba (Susana) as
an accomplice to the commission of the same crime.
The Facts
Petrus and Susana were charged with the crime of Kidnapping For Ransom in
the Information,3 dated February 13, 2004, the accusatory portion of which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about January 20, 2004, at around 2:00 P.M. in the vicinity of
Shoemart Mega Mall, Mandaluyong City, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with the use of a
sleeping substance, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
kidnap and take away ALASTAIR JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM in the following
manner, to wit: while said ALASTAIR JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM was on board
a white Toyota taxi cab with plate number PVD-115 being driven by the
above-named accused Petrus Yau a.k.a. “John” and “Ricky” and the taxi cab
was travelling along Epifanio Delos Santos (EDSA) Avenue, he suddenly fell
unconscious and upon regaining consciousness he was already handcuffed
and in chains inside a house located at B23, L2, Ponsettia St., Camilla Sorrento

Homes, Panapaan IV, Bacoor, Cavite, where he was kept for twenty two (22)
days, which house is owned by accused Susana Yau y Sumogba and while
therein he was maltreated; that ransom in the amount of SIX HUNDRED
THOUSAND DOLLARS (US$600,000.00) and TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(Php20,000.00) for each day of detention was demanded in exchange for his
safe release until he was finally rescued on February 11, 2004, by PACER
operatives of the Philippine National Police.
CONTRARY TO LAW.chanrobleslaw
Version of the Prosecution
In the Appellee’s Brief,4 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presented
the following narration of the kidnapping:
On January 20, 2004, at around 1:30 in the afternoon, private complainant
Alastair Onglingswam, who is a practicing lawyer and businessman from the
United States, went out of Makati Shangrila Hotel, where he was billeted, and
hailed a white Toyota taxi cab with plate number PVD-115 to take him from
the said hotel to Virra Mall Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila. While
the said taxicab was plying along EDSA, and within the vicinity of SM
Megamall, private complainant received a phone call from his associate Kelly
Wei in Hong Kong. He noted that while he was on the phone conversing with
his associate, appellant Petrus Yau, whom he noted to have short black hair, a
moustache and gold framed eyeglasses, would from time to time turn to him
and talk as if he was also being spoken to. Thereafter, he felt groggy and
decided to hang-up his phone. He no longer knew what transpired except
that when he woke up lying down, his head was already covered with a
plastic bag and he was handcuffed and chained.
When private complainant complained that the handcuffs were too tight, a
man who was wearing a red mask and introduced himself as “John”
approached him and removed the plastic bag from his head and loosened his
handcuff. John informed him that he was being kidnapped for ransom and
that he will be allowed to make phone calls to his family and friends. Hours
later, John returned with telephony equipment, tape recorder, phone and a
special antennae cap for the cellphone. With these equipment, private
complainant was allowed to call his girlfriend and father and asked them for
the PIN of his ATM cards and for money, however, with instructions not to
inform them that he was kidnapped. A day after, he was told by his captor to
call his girlfriend and father to tell them that he was still alive as well as to
reveal to them that he was kidnapped for ransom and his kidnappers were
demanding Six Hundred Thousand Dollars (US$600,000.00) as ransom and
Twenty Thousand Pesos (Php20,000.00) a day as room and board fee.
The private complainant’s family, girlfriend (Iris Chau) and friends received a
text message purportedly from the former informing them that he was
kidnapped and ransom for his liberty was demanded.
On January 21, 2004, the family of the victim informed the United States
Embassy in Manila about the situation and a meeting with the
representatives of the Philippine National Police was arranged.
Subsequently, Chau received an email from the purported kidnapper
demanding US$2,000.00. Chau then wired US$1,000.00, upon instructions, to
Ong Kwai Ping thru Metro Bank and Trust Company. Likewise, private
complainant’s brother Aaron Onglingswam made eight (8) deposits to Ong
Kwai Ping’s account in Metro Bank, amounting to Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (Php200,000.00), to ensure his brother’s safety and eventual release.
During private complainant’s twenty-two (22) days of captivity, while he was
allowed to communicate with his family almost daily to prove that he was
still alive and was served with meals almost five times a day either by John or
the other accused Susan Yau, he was also maltreated i.e. beaten with sticks,
made to lay-down biting a piece of wood which was made as target for a rifle.
On February 10, 2004, the PACER received information that a taxi with plate
number PVD 115 plying along Bacoor was victimizing passengers. Upon
instructions of P/Supt. Isagani Nerez, members of the Police Anti-Crime and
Emergency Response Task Force (PACER) were ordered to proceed to
Bacoor, Cavite to look for Toyota Corolla White Taxicab with Plate No. PVD
115.
On February 11, 2004, at around 4:00 o’clock in the morning, the PACER
group proceeded to Bacoor and positioned themselves along Aguinaldo
Highway under the overpass fronting SM Bacoor. Not having caught sight of
the taxi, after three hours, the group moved to a different location along the
Aguinaldo Highway where they were able to chance upon the said vehicle.
Thus, they followed it, then flagged it down and approached the driver. The
driver was asked to scroll down his window and was told that the vehicle
was being used to victimize foreign nationals. Appellant did not offer to make
any comment. Hence, this prompted the officers to ask for his name and since
he answered that he was Petrus Yau, a British national, they asked him for his
driver’s license and car registration but appellant was not able to produce
any. Since he could not produce any driver’s license and car registration, they
were supposed to bring him to the police station for investigation, however,
when shown a picture of private complainant and asked if he knew him, he
answered that the man is being kept in his house. He was immediately
informed that he was being placed under arrest for kidnapping private
complainant Alastair Onglingswam after being informed of his constitutional
rights. Thereafter, appellant’s cellphones, a QTEK Palmtop and Sony Erickson
were confiscated. Upon instructions of P/Supt. Nerez, [appellant] was
brought to the parking lot of SM City Bacoor for a possible rescue operations
of the victim.
Appellant led the team to his house and after opening the gate of his
residence, he was led back to the police car. The rest of the members of
PACER proceeded inside the house and found a man sitting on the floor
chained and handcuffed. The man later identified himself as Alastair
Onglingswam.
During the trial of the case, private complainant positively identified Petrus
Yau as his captor and the taxi driver. Test conducted by the United States
Federal Bureau of Investigation reveals that the DNA found in the mask used
by private complainant’s captor matched that of appellant Petrus Yau.5
Version of the Defense
Petrus and Susana denied the accusation, and stated the following in their
Brief6 to substantiate their claim of innocence:
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
Accused Petrus Yau denied having committed the crime. He averred that the
28
supposed kidnap victim coordinated with the police to set up the subject case
against him and his family. He is a British national. He had been in the
Philippines for many times since he was 14 years old. He came to the country
in July 2001 for a vacation and had not left since then. On September 2001, he
got married to Susana Yau. Prior thereto, he was in Singapore running some
businesses.
On January 20, 2004, at around 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon (the date and
time the victim was kidnapped), Petrus Yau was at home sleeping.
On February 11, 2004 (the date the victim was allegedly rescued) at around
8:30 – 9:00 o’clock in the morning, he went to his wife Susana in her shop
and got money to be deposited to the Asia Trust Bank. He parked his car
outside the bank. After he alighted from his car, three (3) men bigger than
him held his hands: one (1) of them held his neck. They pushed him inside
their van. They tied his hands with packing tape, covered his eyes with the
same tape, and his head with a plastic bag. They kicked and beat him until he
became unconscious.
When he regained consciousness, he was inside an air-conditioned room. His
hands were handcuffed and he felt very cold because his body was wet. His
head was still being covered. He shouted asking where he was. People came
in and he heard them talking in Tagalog. They kicked him for about twenty
(20) seconds. Later, he was made to sit, as he was lying on the floor. He said
that he could not see anything, thus, someone removed the cover of his head.
They accused him of being a kidnapper, to which he replied that he was not.
He pleaded to them to allow him to make a call to the British Embassy, his
friends and his wife, but to no avail.
When he was taken into custody, he had his wedding ring, watch and a waist
bag containing his British passport, alien certificate, driver’s license, Asia
Trust bankbook in the name of Susana Yau, ATM Cards (in his name) of
Metrobank, PCI Equitable Bank and Banco de Oro, VISA Card, and some cash
given to him by his wife . He lost those personal properties.
After four (4) to five (5) hours, he was transferred to another room without a
window. The following day, he was brought to and detained at the PACER
Custodial Center.
Petrus Yau can speak English but he is better in the Chinese language, both
Mandarin and Cantonese. He bought the taxi he was driving in August 2003
for Eighty Five Thousand Pesos (Php85,000.00) for personal use and/or for
resale. It had a defective engine (usually overheats), without an aircon and
cannot travel for long journey. He does not drive a taxi to earn a living. He
had police friends who told him that he cannot drive a taxi as an occupation
since his driver’s license is non-professional.
Sometime on June 2003, he and his wife Susana had a heated argument over
his womanizing. Hence, she decided to live separately from him (though she
was pregnant at that time) and moved to another house (Block 5, Lot 4, Tulip
Street, Andrea Village, Bacoor, Cavite). Sometimes, she would visit him.
Petrus claimed that his house does not have a basement, contrary to the
victim’s testimony that he was placed in the basement. He was not in his

house when the police officers allegedly rescued the kidnapped victim. He
left his house in good condition in the morning before his arrest. The white
Toyota Corolla taxi he was driving had markings of faded grey, not black, as
claimed by Alastair.
During the inquest proceedings, Petrus Yau was not assisted by a counsel and
was not informed of his constitutional rights.
Susana Sumogba Yau denied the accusation that she was in the company of
the kidnapper every time the latter served Alastair’s food (lunch and dinner).
She is legally married to Petrus Yau. They have two (2) children named
Charlie and Vivian. On February 11, 2004, she lived at Block 5, Lot 4, Tulips
Street, Andrea Village, Bacoor, Cavite, while Petrus Yau lived at Block 23, Lot
2, Ponsettia Street, Sorrento Town Homes, Bacoor, Cavite, with his girlfriend.
Susana and Petrus were separated since June 2003.
On February 11, 2004, she called him to pick up the amount of Php7,000.00
(earnings of her sari-sari store) and to deposit it in her account at Asia Trust
Bank. She would request Petrus to do such errand for her as she does not
trust her househelp. Petrus came to her at around 7:00 o’clock in the
morning. At around 11:00 o’clock a.m. of the same day, four (4) to five (5)
policemen arrived at her residence and told her to come with them to the
hospital where Petrus was brought because he met a vehicular accident along
Aguinaldo Highway.
Susana, together with her children and helpers, went with them, and rode in
their van. They, however, were not brought to the hospital but to an office.
Thereat, Susana saw her husband (almost dead) inside a small room with a
one-way mirror. She was not able to talk to him. She, together with her
children and helpers, were detained for three (3) days inside a small room.
After three (3) days, her children and helpers were released and they went
home. At that time, she was not provided with the assistance of a counsel.
Susana stated that her husband’s name is Petrus Yau. He is not known either
as John or Ong Kwai Ping. He is engaged in the business of buying cars for
resale. They owned three (3) houses and lots, all registered in her name. At
the time she was taken into custody by the police, she had with her Five
Thousand Pesos cash, Allied Bank passbook and ATM Cards (Allied Bank and
Asia Trust Bank), VISA card, passport, wedding ring, necklace and cellphone,
which were taken away by persons whom she does not know.7
The Ruling of the RTC
In its judgment, dated December 14, 2007, the RTC convicted Petrus Yau, as
principal, of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention,
and Susana Yau, as an accomplice to the commission thereof. The RTC found
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible and sufficient, with
their versions of the incident dovetailing with each other even on minor
details. It observed that Petrus failed to rebut his positive identification by
the victim, Alastair and his brother Aaron John Onglingswam (Aaron John),
with whom he talked for several times over the phone. It stated that the
circumstantial evidence proffered by the prosecution had adequately
reinforced its theory that Petrus was the perpetrator of the heinous act.
With respect to Susana, the RTC wrote that she was positively identified by
Alastair as the Filipino woman who fed him or accompanied Petrus in
bringing him food during his 22 days of captivity and, for said reason, should
be held liable as an accomplice.
The RTC rejected the twin defenses of alibi and frame-up submitted by Petrus
and Susana because the same were unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence. The dispositive portion of the said decision
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, this court renders judgment finding the accused Petrus Yau
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as principal of the crime of
kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention and pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9346, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the prison term of
RECLUSION PERPETUA. The court also finds the accused Susana Yau GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as accomplice to the commission of the crime
of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention and applying to her
the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law wherein her minimum penalty
shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree of the imposable penalty
of RECLUSION TEMPORAL which is prision mayor, she is hereby therefore
sentenced to suffer the prison term of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
PRISION MAYOR MINIMUM AS MINIMUM to TWELVE (12) YEARS and TEN
(10) MONTHS of RECLUSION TEMPORAL MINIMUM AS MAXIMUM. Accused
are credited in full of the preventive imprisonment they have already served
in confinement.
Further, both accused are sentenced to pay, jointly and severally, the victim
ALASTAIR JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM actual damages of Two Hundred Seventy
Three Thousand and One Hundred Thirty Two Pesos (P273, 132.00) plus
interest from the filing of the information until full payment, moral damages
of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), and exemplary damages of Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
Unfazed, Petrus and Susana appealed the RTC judgment of conviction before
the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA affirmed the conviction of Petrus and Susana. 9 The appellate court
likewise lent credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, who
were able to establish with certitude the commission of the crime and the
identities of the culprits thereof.
Hence, this appeal.
ASSIGNED ERRORS:
I been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT WAS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED AND AS SUCH, THE PIECES OF
OBJECT EVIDENCE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED ARE INADMISSIBLE.
II
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS
POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS THE ALLEGED 29
KIDNAPPER.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
Susana insisted that the trial court erred: 1] in not giving credence to her
claim that she was living separately with her husband, Petrus Yau; 2] in not
considering that she was not mentioned in the sworn statement executed by
Alastair, dated February 12, 2004, even when said victim was asked if there
was another person assisting Petrus in the perpetration of the crime; 3] in
not considering the Resolution of the Department of Justice, dated February
13, 2004, finding probable cause against her because she is the registered
owner of the house where Alastair was held captive and not because she
served food on the victim; and 4] in convicting her as an
accomplice.11cralawred
On September 11, 2013, the Court issued a resolution12 notifying the parties
that they could file their respective supplemental briefs if they so desire. The
People of the Philippines, represented by the OSG, opted not to file any
supplemental brief, maintaining its positions and arguments in its brief
earlier filed in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03446.13 Petrus filed his Supplemental
Brief14 on December 27, 2013 in amplification of his arguments raised in his
brief filed before the CA.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Encapsulated, the issues herein focus on: (a) the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses; (b) the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to
prove the commission of kidnapping for ransom and the identity of the
culprits thereof; and (c) the degree of responsibility of each accused-
appellant for the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
Worth reiterating on the issue of the credibility of the witnesses is the ruling
of the Court in People v. Maxion15 that:
The issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of witness,
which is best addressed by the trial court, it being in a better position to
decide such question, having heard the witness and observed his demeanor,
conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These are the most
significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing
the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. Through its
observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to
determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and which
witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters will not
be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have
affect the disposition of the case.16
It has been an established rule in appellate review that the trial court’s
factual findings, such as its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the
probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions drawn from the

factual findings, are accorded great respect and have even conclusive effect.
Such factual findings and conclusions assume even greater weight when they
are affirmed by the CA.17cralawred
In the case at bench, the RTC gave more weight and credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses compared to those of the accused-
appellants. After a judicious review of the evidence on record, the Court finds
no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings of the RTC and the CA,
and their respective assessment and calibration of the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses.
In every criminal case, the task of the prosecution is always two-fold, that is,
(1) to prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged;
and (2) to establish with the same quantum of proof the identity of the
person or persons responsible therefor, because, even if the commission of
the crime is a given, there can be no conviction without the identity of the
malefactor being likewise clearly ascertained.18 Here, the prosecution was
able to satisfactorily discharge this burden.
Victim Alastair positively identified Petrus as the driver of the white Toyota
Corolla taxicab with Plate No. PVD 115 which he boarded before he lost
consciousness on the afternoon of January 20, 2004. He claimed that while he
was conversing with his business associate Kelly Wei over his phone inside
the taxicab, Petrus would turn his face towards him, from time to time, and
would talk as if he was being spoken to. Alastair claimed that he had a good
look and an ample opportunity to remember the facial features of the driver
as to be able to recognize and identify him in court. It is the most natural
reaction for victims of crimes to strive to remember the faces of their
accosters and the manner in which the craven acts are
committed.19cralawred
Alastair also recognized the voice behind the red mask used by his kidnapper
as belonging to Petrus. It was established that from the first to the twentieth
day of Alastair’s captivity, his kidnapper would meet him five times a day and
would talk to him for an hour, thus, enabling him to remember the culprit’s
voice which had a unique tone and noticeable Chinese accent. Alastair
declared with certainty that it was the voice of Petrus. Witness Aaron John
insisted that the person who introduced himself as Ong Kwai Ping and with
whom he had talked over the phone for three weeks, demanding necessity
money and ransom for the release of his brother Alastair, was Petrus because
of the distinct tone of his voice with Chinese accent. There was no showing
that Alastair and Aaron John had any ill motive to falsely testify against
Petrus. As a rule, absent any evidence showing any reason or motive for
prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no such
improper motive exists, and their testimonies are, thus, worthy of full faith
and credit.20cralawred
Further, the prosecution presented credible and sufficient pieces of
circumstantial evidence that led to the inescapable and reasonable
conclusion that Petrus committed the crime charged. The settled rule is that a
judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only
if the following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance;
(2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.21 The corollary rule is that the circumstances proven
must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person.22cralawred
The combination of the following established facts and circumstances affirm
the findings of guilt by the RTC and the CA:
1] The victim was rescued by the police inside the house owned by Petrus
and Susana, located at Block 23, Lot 2, Ponsettia St., Camella Sorrento Homes,
Bacoor, Cavite;
2] The Toyota Corolla white taxicab bearing Plate No. PVD 115, which the
victim recalled boarding in going to Virra Mall Greenhills Shopping Center on
the afternoon of January 20, 2004 and where he lost consciousness, was
found in the possession of the accused-appellant Petrus on February 11,
2004;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
3] The driver’s license of Petrus and an ATM card in the name of Ong Kwai
Ping were recovered inside the Toyota Corolla taxicab of Petrus
Yau;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
4] In the house where the victim was rescued, the following evidence were
found: one (1) chain with padlock; handcuffs; short broken chain; checkered
pajama; black blazer; one (1) Onesimus black coat; two (2) video camera
cartridges, one showing the victim in lying down position and family
footages, and the other one labeled “sex scandal”; eight (8) pieces of
cellphones; notebook; two (2) Talk n Tex SIM cards; Globe SIM card; two (2)
Transfer Certificates of Title for two pieces of land in Bacoor, Cavite, under
the name of Susana Sumogba; original copy of the Official Receipts and
Certificate of Registration of a Suzuki 1993 motorcycle bearing Plate No.
2M9748; business license and mayor’s permit issued to Susana Yau; marriage
contract of Petrus Yau and Susana Yau; birth certificate of Susana Sumogba;
birth certificates of their children; ACR of Petrus Yau; Meralco bills; Asia
Trust deposit slips; five ATM deposit slips; and PLDT
bills;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
5] Two (2) cellphones, a QTEK Palmtop and a Sony Erickson were found in
the possession of Petrus. Incidentally, it was reported that the owner of the
QTEK Palmtop cellphone was a certain Jasper Beltran, also a kidnapped
victim whose whereabouts had not been known yet;
andChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
6] The DNA examination on the red mask worn by the kidnapper that was
recovered inside the house and on the buccal swab taken from Petrus
showed that both DNA profiles matched.23
The Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and the CA that the foregoing
pieces of circumstantial evidence, when analyzed and taken together,
definitely lead to no other conclusion than that Petrus was the author of the
kidnapping for ransom. When viewed as a whole, the prosecution evidence
effectively established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The elements of Kidnapping For Ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659, are as follows: (a) intent on the part of the
accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of the accused, which is extorting ransom
30
for the release of the victim.24cralawred
All of the foregoing elements were duly established by the testimonial and
documentary evidences for the prosecution in the case at bench. First, Petrus
is a private individual. Second, Petrus kidnapped Alastair by using sleeping
substance which rendered the latter unconscious while inside a taxicab
driven by the said accused-appellant. Third, Petrus took and detained
Alastair inside the house owned by him and Susana Yau in Bacoor, Cavite,
where said victim was handcuffed and chained, and hence, deprived of his
liberty. Fourth, Alastair was taken against his will. And fifth, Petrus made
demands for the delivery of a ransom in the amount of US$600,000.00 for the
release of the victim.
Anent the criminal liability of each accused-appellant, there is no doubt that
Petrus is liable as principal of the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Susana, on
the other hand, is liable only as an accomplice to the crime as correctly found
by the lower courts. It must be emphasized that there was no evidence
indubitably proving that Susana participated in the decision to commit the
criminal act. The only evidence the prosecution had against her was the
testimony of Alastair to the effect that he remembered her as the woman who
gave food to him or who accompanied his kidnapper whenever he would
bring food to him every breakfast, lunch and dinner.
Jurisprudence25 is instructive of the elements required, in accordance with
Article 18 of the RPC, in order that a person may be considered an
accomplice, namely, (1) that there be a community of design; that is, knowing
the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with
the latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the execution by previous
or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in
the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a
relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the
person charged as accomplice.
In the case at bench, Susana knew of the criminal design of her husband,
Petrus, but she kept quiet and never reported the incident to the police
authorities. Instead, she stayed with Petrus inside the house and gave food to
the victim or accompanied her husband when he brought food to the victim.
Susana not only countenanced Petrus’ illegal act, but also supplied him with
material and moral aid. It has been held that being present and giving moral
support when a crime is being committed make a person responsible as an
accomplice in the crime committed.26 As keenly observed by the RTC, the act
of giving food by Susana to the victim was not essential and indispensable for
the perpetration of the crime of kidnapping for ransom but merely an
expression of sympathy or feeling of support to her husband.27 Moreover,
this Court is guided by the ruling in People v. De Vera,28 where it was
stressed that in case of doubt, the participation of the offender will be
considered as that of an accomplice rather than that of a principal.
Alastair’s positive identification of Susana is not in any bit prejudiced by his
failure to mention her name in his sworn statement, dated February 12,
2004. It is well-settled that affidavits, being ex parte, are almost always
incomplete and often inaccurate, but do not really detract from the credibility
of witnesses.29 Oftentimes, the allegations contained in affidavits involved
mere passive mention of details anchored entirely on the investigator’s

questions. The discrepancies between a sworn statement and a testimony in
court do not outrightly justify the acquittal of an accused, as testimonial
evidence carries more weight than an affidavit.30 Testimonies given during
the trial are more exact and elaborate. Besides, sworn statements are often
executed when an affiant’s mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford
the affiant a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which
transpired.31cralawred
Given the overwhelming picture of their complicity in the crime, this Court
cannot accept the defenses of alibi and frame-up interposed by the accused-
appellants. Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and
difficult to prove. Alibi must be proven by the accused with clear and
convincing evidence; otherwise it cannot prevail over the positive
testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. 32 The
defense of frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by this Court with
disfavor, for it can easily be concocted but is difficult to prove. In order to
prosper, the defense of frame-up must be proven by the accused with clear
and convincing evidence.33 Apart from their bare allegations, no competent
and independent evidence was adduced by the accused-appellants to
substantiate their twin defenses of alibi and frame-up and, thus, remain self-
serving and do not merit any evidentiary value. More importantly, nowhere
in the records does it show of any dubious reasons or improper motive that
could have impelled the prosecution witnesses, particularly victim Alastair
Onglingswam, to falsely testify and fabricate documentary or object evidence
just to implicate accused-appellants in such a heinous crime as kidnapping
for ransom. Their only motive was to see to it that the kidnapper be brought
to justice and sentenced with the appropriate penalty.
As a last-ditch effort to exculpate themselves from any criminal culpability,
the accused-appellants questioned the legality of their warrantless arrests.
This too must fail.
Any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a
court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be opportunely
raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived.34 The accused-appellants never objected to or questioned the
legality of their warrantless arrests or the acquisition of jurisdiction by the
RTC over their persons before they entered their respective pleas to the
kidnapping for ransom charge. Considering this lapse and coupled with their
full and active participation in the trial of the case, accused-appellants were
deemed to have waived any objection to their warrantless arrests. The
accused-appellants voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC
thereby curing whatever defects that might have attended their arrest. It
bears stressing that the legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of
the court over their persons.35 Their warrantless arrests cannot, by
themselves, be the bases of their acquittal.
Even assuming arguendo that the accused-appellants made a timely objection
to their warrantless arrests, jurisprudence is replete with rulings that
support the view that their conviction was proper despite being illegally
arrested without a warrant. In People v. Manlulu,36 the Court ruled that the
illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to
prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability.
Indeed, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting
aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free
from error.37cralawred
With respect to the penalty, the Court finds that the RTC was correct in
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole
against Petrus as principal in the charge of kidnapping for ransom in view of
R.A. No. 9346, prohibiting the death penalty. Also, the Court finds that the
penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
twelve (12) years and ten (10) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
meted out against Susana, an accomplice, to be proper.
The Court also sustains the RTC in awarding actual damages in the amount of
P273,132.00 plus interest committed from the filing of the information until
fully paid. As regards the moral damages against the accused-appellants, the
Court finds the award of P1,000,000.00 to be exorbitant. Hence, the same is
being reduced to P200,000.00, as the reasonable compensation for the
ignominy and sufferings that Alastair and his family endured because of the
accused-appellants’ inhumane acts of detaining him in handcuffs and chains,
and mentally torturing him and his family to raise the ransom money. The
fact that they suffered the trauma from mental, physical and psychological
ordeal which constitutes the basis for moral damages under Article 2219 of
the Civil Code is too obvious to still require its recital at the trial through the
superfluity of a testimonial charade. The Court also finds the award of
exemplary damages to be in order in view of the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of demand for ransom, and to serve as an example and
deterrence for the public good. The Court, however, reduces the amount from
P200,000.00 to P100,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
The RTC, however, erred in ruling that Susana was solidarily liable with
Petrus for the payment of damages. This is an erroneous apportionment of
the damages awarded because it does not take into account the difference in
the nature and degree of participation between the principal, Petrus, and the
accomplice, Susana. The ruling of this Court in People v. Montesclaros39 is
instructive on the apportionment of civil liabilities among all the accused-
appellants. The entire amount of the civil liabilities should be apportioned
among all those who cooperated in the commission of the crime according to
the degrees of their liability, respective responsibilities and actual
participation. Accordingly, Petrus should shoulder a greater share in the total
amount of damages than Susana who was adjudged only as an accomplice.
In fine, the accused-appellants are ordered to pay the victim, Alastair
Onglingswam actual damages in the amount of P273,132.00; moral damages
in the amount of P200,000.00; and exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.00, or a total amount of P573,132.00. Taking into consideration the
degree of their participation, the principal, Petrus, should be liable for two-
thirds (2/3) of the total amount of the damages (P573,132.00 x 2/3) or
P382,088.00; and the accomplice, Susana, should be ordered to pay the
remaining one-third (1/3) or P191,044.00. Specifically, Petrus shall be liable
for actual damages in the amount of P182,088.00; moral damages in the
amount of P133,333.33; and exemplary damages in the amount of
P66,666.67; and Susana for the amount of P91,044.00 as actual damages;
P66,666.67 as moral damages; and P33,333.33 as exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the September 7, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03446 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
appellants Petrus Yau and Susana Yau y Sumogba are ordered to pay the
31
victim Alastair Joseph Onglingswam moral damages in the amount of
P200,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00. The
award of actual damages in the amount of P273,132.00 is maintained. The
civil liabilities of the accused-appellants shall be apportioned as follows:
1] Petrus Yau is directed to pay actual damages in the amount of
P182,088.00; moral damages in the amount of P133,333.33; and exemplary
damages in the amount of P66,666.67; and
2] Susana Yau y Sumogba is directed to pay actual damages in the amount of
P91,044.00, moral damages in the amount of ?66,666.67 and exemplary
damages in the amount of P33,333.33.
G.R. No. 199042 November 17, 2014
DANILO VILLANUEVA y ALCARAZ, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
We resolve the Petition1 filed by Danilo Villanueva y Alcaraz from the
Decision2 dated 4 May 2011 and Resolution3 dated 18 October 2011 issued
by the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. C.R. No.
32582.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
Petitioner Danilo Villanueva was charged with violation of Section 11, Article
II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002. The Information4 reads:
That on or about the 15th day of June 2004 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu) weighing 0.63 gram
knowing the same to [be a] dangerous drug under the provisions of the
above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On 15 July 2004, the accused, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not
guilty to the offense charged.5
PROSECUTION’S VERSION
Four witnesses testified for the prosecution: (1) Police Senior Inspector (PSI)
Albert Arturo, (2) Police Officer (PO) 3 Jonathan Coralde, (3) PO2 Reynante
Mananghaya, and (4) Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Antonio Asiones.6 Their
testimonies reveal that a Complaint was filed by Brian Resco against Danilo
Villanueva for allegedly shooting the former along C-3 Road, Navotas City.
After recording the incident in the police blotter, PO3 Jonathan Coralde, SPO3
Enrique de Jesus, SPO2 Henry Martin and SPO1 Anthony Asiones, together

with Resco, proceeded to the house of Villanueva. They informed Villanueva
about the Complaint lodged against him. They invited him to the police
station. There, he was subjected to a body search and, in the process, a plastic
sachet of shabu was recovered from the left pocket of his pants. PO3 Coralde
marked the sachet with the initial "DAV 06-15-04", and PO2 Reynante
Mananghaya brought it to the National Police District Scene of the Crime
Operatives (NPD-SOCO) for examination.7 DEFENSE’S VERSION
The accused testified that at the time of the incident, he was at home
watching TV when PO3 Coralde, along with three others, invited him to go
with them to the police station. Informed that he had been identified as
responsible for shooting Resco, the accused was then frisked and detained at
the police station.8
RULING OF THE RTC
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 127 of Caloocan City, in its Decision9
dated 6 April 2009, convicted petitioner of the offense charged. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
accused DANILO VILLANUEVA y ALCARAZ, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT of the offense of Violation of Section 11, Article II,R.A. 9165.
Henceforth, this Court hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day as the minimum to seventeen (17) years
and eight (8) months as the maximum and to pay the fine of Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00).
The drugs subject matter of this case is ordered confiscated and forfeited in
favor of the government to be dealt with in accordance with the law.
SO ORDERED.10
The CA reviewed the appeal, which hinged on one issue, viz:
THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING AS ILLEGAL THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S WARRANTLESS ARREST AND SEARCH.11
RULING OF THE CA
On 4 May 2011, the CA affirmed the ruling of the lower court:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated April 6, 2009 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 127, Caloocan City in Criminal Case No. 70854 finding the
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.12
On 27 May 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,13 which the
CA denied in a Resolution14 dated 18 October 2011.
Hence, the instant Petition, which revolves around the following lone issue:
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE PETITIONER’S CONVICTION FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 11 OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 DESPITE THE ILLEGALITY OF THE ARREST AND
THE LAPSES ON THE PART OF THE POLICE OFFICERS IN THE HANDLING OF
THE CONFISCATED DRUG.15
Petitioner claims that his arrest does not fall within the purview of valid
warrantless arrests, since it took place on the day of the alleged shooting
incident. Hence, to "invite" him to the precinct without any warrant of arrest
was illegal. The evidence obtained is, consequently, inadmissible. The Office
of the Solicitor General filed its Comment16 stating that the shabu
confiscated from petitioner was admissible in evidence against him; that the
search conducted on him was valid; and that he cannot raise the issue
regarding the apprehending officers’ non-compliance with Section 21, Article
II of R.A. 9165 for the first time on appeal.
OUR RULING
We find the instant appeal meritorious.
Accused-appellant is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest.
Accused-appellant was arrested without a warrant. Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, lays down the basic rules on lawful
warrantless arrests either by a peace officer or a private person, as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
The circumstances that transpired between accused-appellant and the
arresting officer show none of the above that would make the warrantless
arrest lawful. Nevertheless, records reveal that accused-appellant never
objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. He pleaded
not guilty upon arraignment. He actively participated in the trial of the case.
Thus, he is considered as one who had properly and voluntarily submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court and waived his right to question
the validity of his arrest.17
The warrantless search conducted is not among those allowed by law.
A waiver of an illegal arrest, however, is not a waiver of an illegal search.18
Records have established that both the arrest and the search were made
without a warrant. While the accused has already waived his right to contest
the legality of his arrest, he is not deemed to have equally waived his right to
contest the legality of the search.
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
32
Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements on when a warrantless search
can be conducted.1âwphi1 These searches include: (1) search of a moving
vehicle; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs search; (4) waiver or
consented search; (5) stop-and-frisk situation; (6) search incidental to a
lawful arrest and (7) exigent and emergency circumstance.19
The search made was not among the enumerated instances. Certainly, it was
not of a moving vehicle, a customs search, or a search incidental to a lawful
arrest. There could not have been a seizure in plain view as the seized item
was allegedly found inside the left pocket of accused-appellant’s pants.
Neither was it a stop-and-frisk situation. While thistype may seemingly fall
under the consented search exception, we reiterate that "[c]onsent to a
search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing
evidence."20
Consent must also be voluntary inorder to validate an otherwise illegal
search; that is, the consent mustbe unequivocal, specific, intelligently given,
and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.21 In this case, petitioner was
merely "ordered" to take out the contents of his pocket. The testimony of the
police officer on the matter is clear:
Q: And what did you do when you frisked a small plastic sachet?
A: When I felt something inside his pocket, I ordered him to bring out the
thing which I felt.
Q. : And what did Danilo Villanueva do when you instructed him to bring out
the contents of his pocket?
A: He took out the contents of his pocket and I saw the plastic containing
shabu.22
The evidence obtained is not admissible.
Having been obtained through an unlawful search, the seized item is thus
inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant. Obviously, this is an
instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree." Hence, the confiscated
item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the
1987 Constitution: "Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding."23 Without the seized item, therefore, the conviction of accused
appellant cannot be sustained. This being the case, we see no more reason to
discuss the alleged lapses of the officers in the handling of the confiscated
drug.
As a final word, we reiterate that "[ w ]hile this Court appreciates and
encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the
peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with ·
deliberate care and within the parameters set by the Constitution and the
law. Truly, the end never justifies the means."24
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 4 May 2011
and Resolution dated 18 October 2011 issued by the Fourteenth Division of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 32582 are SET ASIDE. Petitioner is
hereby ACQUITTED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus -
ROLANDO S. DELOS REYES, alias Botong, and RAYMUNDO G. REYES, alias
Mac-Mac, Accused-Appellants.
G.R. No. 174774 August 31, 2011
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
On appeal is the Decision[1] dated July 12, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01733, which affirmed with modification the Decision[2]
dated September 23, 2003 of Branch 214 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Mandaluyong City in Criminal Case No. MC-00-2375-D. The Court of Appeals
found accused-appellants Rolando S. delos Reyes and Raymundo G. Reyes
(Reyes) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 21 of Article
IV, in relation to Section 16 of Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and imposing upon them the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The following antecedent facts are culled from the records:
On February 17, 2000, accused-appellants Rolando S. delos Reyes and
Raymundo G. Reyes, Emmanuel de Claro, and Mary Jane Lantion-Tom
(Lantion-Tom) were all arrested for illegal possession, sale, delivery,
distribution, and/or transportation of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a
regulated drug commonly known as shabu. The Office of the City Prosecutor
of Mandaluyong City, in its Resolution dated March 3, 2000, found probable
cause to indict accused-appellants, together with Emmanuel de Claro, for
violation of Republic Act No. 6425, and resolved to continue the preliminary
investigation in so far as Lantion-Tom was concerned. The criminal
information against accused-appellants and Emmanuel de Claro, filed with
the RTC, reads:
The undersigned 2nd Asst. City Prosecutor accuses ROLANDO DELOS REYES
y SANTOS @ BOTONG, RAYMUNDO REYES y GUINZON @ MAC-MAC and
EMMANUEL DE CLARO y ENRIQUEZ @ COCOY of the crime of VIOLATION OF
SEC. 21 ART. IV IN REL. TO SEC. 16 ART. III OF R.A. 6425 AS AMENDED,
committed in the manner herein narrated as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of February, 2000, in the City of Mandaluyong,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess any regulated drug,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one
another, commit to sell, deliver, distribute and/or transport a carton of ten
(10) heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline
substance with the following grams, to wit: 99.2, 94.9, 99.6, 93.5, 98.3, 99.5,
99.6, 99.5, 98.4 and 98.4 grams or a total of 980.9 grams, which substance
when submitted for drug examination, were found positive to the test for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, a regulated
drug, without the corresponding license and prescription.[3]
On March 7, 2000, accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes, Emmanuel de
Claro, and Lantion-Tom, insisting on their innocence, moved for a
reinvestigation of their case before the RTC, which said trial court granted in
an Order[4] dated March 15, 2000.
After the reinvestigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution
dated April 3, 2000, recommending that the RTC proceed with the indictment
of accused-appellant Reyes and Emmanuel de Claro, and dismiss the charges
against accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes and Lantion-Tom. The Office
of the City Prosecutor considered the different versions of events presented
by the parties during the preliminary investigation and reinvestigation
(except accused-appellant Reyes who did not participate in the proceedings),
which it summarized as follows:
In their Joint Affidavit of Arrest, the arresting officers, members of the
Intelligence and Investigation of the Regional Mobile Group (RMG) of the
National Capital Region Police Office (NCRPO) claims that on 17 February
2000 a confidential informant called up relative to a narcotics drug deal to
commence at the vicinity of the parking area of Shangrila Plaza Hotel,
Mandaluyong City; that they were dispatched to verify the reports and
conduct police operations; that about 2:00 p.m. after meeting with the
confidential agent, they strategically positioned themselves at the vicinity
parking area of said hotel; that about 10:00 p.m., accused/respondent Reyes
a.k.a. Mac-Mac, on board a white Toyota Corolla, and accused/respondent
[Rolando] delos Reyes, a.k.a. Botong, on board a red Toyota Corolla, arrived
with accused/respondent Reyes subsequently proceeding inside Whistletop
Bar and Restaurant, and accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes calling
accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro through his cellular phone; that
accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes and [Emmanuel] de Claro then
proceeded to the latters parked Mazda car where respondent Lantion-Tom
was waiting; from the parked car, a box in transparent plastic bag was taken,
which accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro handed-over to
accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes; accused/respondent [Rolando]
delos Reyes in turn handed the box in a plastic bag to accused/respondent
Reyes; that the arresting officers accosted the accused/respondents who
according to the arresting officers admitted having in their possession illegal
drugs; that the recovered items containing ten (10) pcs. of heat sealed
transparent plastic bags of white crystalline substance with a total weight of
980.9 grams turned positive to the test for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.
In his Sinumpaang Kontra-Salaysay, accused/respondent [Rolando] delos
Reyes claims that on 17 February 2000, he went to Buenas Market,
Manggahan, Pasig City, together with a neighbor, one Marlon David, to talk to
Raymundo Reyes who was to pay his indebtedness; that while looking for a
parking space, several men with firearms suddenly appeared, with one
shouting, buksan mo ang pintuan ng sasakyan at kung hindi babasagin ko ito;
that he and Marlon David were forced out of their vehicle with one of the
armed men bringing out a plastic shopping bag of Shoe Mart, asking where
the said bag allegedly containing shabu came from; that accused/respondent
[Rolando] delos Reyes answered hindi ko alam, that he and Marlon David
were blindfolded when forcibly taken to the groups vehicle and continuously
asked who the source of the shabu was, with respondent/accused [Rolando]
delos Reyes replying, hindi ko alam at wala akong kinalaman diyan; that
Marlon David was separated from accused/respondent [Rolando] delos
Reyes and later released on 18 February 2000; that when
accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes blindfold was removed, he found
himself at Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila.
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
xxxx
33
To confirm respondent/accused [Rolando] delos Reyes claim, that he was
arrested in Brgy. Manggahan, Pasig City, and not in the vicinity of Whistletop
Bar and Restaurant in Mandaluyong City, respondent/accused [Emmanuel]
de Claros spouse submitted a certified true xerox copy of barangay blotter of
Barangay Manggahan, Pasig City, reflecting the entry on 19 February 2000
made by Mrs. Delos Reyes, on the incident reported to by Marlon David thus:
BLOTTER
Dumulog po rito sa himpilan ng Punong Barangay si Gng. Virginia Delos
Reyes, upang ipagbigay alam ang pagkawala ng kanyang asawa na si Mr.
Rolando delos Reyes, nuong petsa 17 ng Pebrero taong dalawang libo (2000)
na ayon sa batang pamangkin na si Marlon David, ay hinuli ng mga hindi
kilalang lalaki sa Buenas Market, Manggahan, Pasig City nais niyang alamin
kung ang nasabing insidente ay coordinated dito sa himpilan o tanggapan ng
Barangay.
(Sgd) Virginia delos Reyes
Nagpapahayag
The blotter was apparently made after Marlon David informed Mrs. [Virginia]
Delos Reyes of the incident upon his release on 18 February 2000. Another
witness, one Joel Navarro, claims having seen the actual incident confirming
the events as narrated to by accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes and
Marlon David.
Accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro and his common law wife,
respondent Lantion-Tom, submitted their separate Counter-Affidavits jointly
denying the charges and claiming that they were at the Whistlestop Bar and
Restaurant to talk to respondent Lantion-Toms accountant Ms. Daisy Milan
regarding the Mayors Permit, Business Location Clearance issued by the
Office of the Barangay Captain, insurance documents, BIR Certificate of
Registration of her business; that they were with accused/respondent
[Emmanuel] de Claros brother, Roberto and a friend, James, with the two
remaining outside the restaurant; that respondent Lantion-Tom went to
accompany Ms. Milan, while accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro was
left inside; that after Ms. Milan left, respondent Lantion-Tom was suddenly
surrounded by men who introduced themselves as police officers and were
arresting them for being the source of shabu in a drug deal; that all of them,
accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro, Roberto and James were likewise
arrested and continuously questioned on their complicity in the drug deal;
that they were taken to Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro Manila and
subjected to further investigation; that Roberto and James were released the
following day. Both respondents maintain that the allegations of the arresting
officers as to the circumstances on the alleged drug deal leading to their
arrest are unfounded and purely fabricated.
During the preliminary investigation proceedings on 21 March 2000, the
arresting officers manifested that they are going to submit reply-affidavit on
29 March 2000. However, no such reply-affidavit was submitted.[5]
The Office of the City Prosecutor pointed out that the arresting police officers
failed to refute accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes counter-allegation
that he was not arrested at Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City, but he was

illegally arrested without warrant at Buenas Market in Cainta, Rizal, as
corroborated by Marlon David and Joel Navarro (Navarro) in their respective
sworn statements (Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated March 14, 2000. The Office
of the City Prosecutor also observed that Lantion-Tom was merely in the
company of the other respondents without performing any overt act showing
her to be part of the illicit transaction and her drug test revealed negative
results. On the other hand, it considered the conflicting claims of Emmanuel
de Claro (i.e., that he was illegally arrested and that the drug deal was a mere
fabrication) and the arresting officers (i.e., that Emmanuel de Claro was the
seller/pusher in the drug deal and the shabu was seized from his vehicle)
would be best ventilated during the trial on the merits.
In accordance with the foregoing resolution, the prosecution filed with the
RTC a motion with leave of court to admit amended information.
In its Order[6] dated April 4, 2000, the RTC denied the prosecutions motion.
Contrary to the finding of the Office of the City Prosecutor, the RTC adjudged
that probable cause exists not only against accused-appellant Reyes and
Emmanuel de Claro, but accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes as well.
Accused-appellants were arraigned on May 23, 2000,[7] while Emmanuel de
Claro was arraigned on July 12, 2000.[8] All three pleaded not guilty. After
the pre-trial conference, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented in evidence the testimonies of Police Officer (PO)
3 Virgilio Santiago,[9] Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Eraldo Lectura,[10] PO3
Angel Yumul,[11] and SPO1 Benjamin David,[12] members of the Regional
Mobile Group (RMG) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) National Capital
Regional Police Office (NCRPO) who apprehended and/or investigated the
case against accused-appellants, Emmanuel de Claro, and Lantion-Tom; and
P/Insp. Benjamin Cruto, Jr.[13] (Cruto), the forensic chemist of the PNP
Crime Laboratory.
PO3 Santiago was one of the police officers who arrested Emmanuel de Claro
and Lantion-Tom on February 17. 2000. He testified that at around 10:30
a.m., their operation chief, Major Arnold Aguilar, received information from a
confidential informant regarding an illegal drug deal that would take place
between Botong and Mac-Mac at the parking lot of Shangri-La Plaza in
Madaluyong City. Botong and Mac-Mac were identified during the
investigation as accused-appellants Rolando delos Reyes and Reyes,
respectively.
As narrated by PO3 Santiago, a team to bust the illegal drug deal was
organized by Major Aguilar, composed of PO3 Santiago himself, SPO1
Lectura, and PO3 Yumul, along with PO3 Elmer Corbe, PO3 Marcelo Arcancia,
Jr., PO3 Randy Fuentes, PO3 Dennis Padpad, and PO3 Edwin dela Cruz. At
around 1:00 p.m. of the same day, the police team was dispatched, using four
vehicles, to the location of the drug deal and upon arrival, they waited for the
confidential informant to arrive. When the confidential informant arrived at
around 3:30 p.m., he told the police team that the drug deal would possibly
take place between 6:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m., and that the suspects would
utilize a red Toyota Corolla with plate number TRP-868 and a white Toyota
Corolla with plate number ULF-706. The police team then positioned their
cars strategically in such a way that they could see the vehicles coming from
St. Francis Street and EDSA.
PO3 Santiago further recounted that at around 10:00 p.m., the suspected
vehicles arrived, both stopping along the driveway of Shangri-La Plaza. The
drivers of the vehicles alighted and talked to each other. The confidential
informant recognized the driver of the white Toyota car as Mac-Mac and the
driver of the red Toyota car as Botong. After a few minutes, Botong made a
call on his cellular phone and then proceeded inside Whistle Stop Restaurant,
leaving Mac-Mac behind. Inside the restaurant, Botong talked to another
person, who was identified during the investigation as Emmanuel de Claro
alias Cocoy. PO3 Santiago was about three to five meters away. Thereafter,
Botong and Cocoy went out of the restaurant and approached a car parked
right outside. The person at the back seat of the car, later on identified as
Lantion-Tom, handed to Cocoy a white plastic bag containing a box. Cocoy
gave the bag to Botong, who, in turn, handed the same bag to Mac-Mac. In the
meantime, Cocoy went back inside the restaurant.
PO3 Santiago related that their team leader sensed that the drug deal had
already been consummated, so the police team immediately effected the
arrest of the suspected drug dealers. PO3 Santiago and PO3 Yumul arrested
Cocoy and Lantion-Tom, while SPO1 Lectura and the remaining police team
members arrested Botong and Mac-Mac. The plastic bag containing the box
was seized from Mac-Mac. The arrested suspects were brought to the police
office for investigation. The plastic bag, the box, and the 10 heat-sealed
sachets of white crystalline substance inside the box, were marked for
identification and physical examination at the police office.
According to PO3 Santiago, the physical examination of the contents of each
of the 10 heat-sealed sachets yielded positive test results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. PO3 Santiago then signed a Joint
Affidavit of Arrest dated February 18, 2000 together with the other arresting
police officers, namely, SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Corbe, PO3 Arcancia, PO3 Fuentes,
and PO3 Nelson Gene Javier.
On cross-examination, PO3 Santiago admitted that he did not actually see
what was inside the plastic bag and that he did not even see Botong hand
over such plastic bag to Mac-Mac. From PO3 Santiagos position, he could not
conclude that the suspects were committing an illegal drug deal as he had no
prior knowledge of the contents of the plastic bag, and that he and the other
arresting officers just relied on the information relayed by the confidential
informant. Also, the police team did not recover any money from the arrested
suspects. The confidential informant merely informed the police the
following morning that the money for the illegal drugs was already deposited
in the bank. The police, however, failed to make further queries from the
confidential informant about the bank.
SPO1 Lectura related that their office received a telephone call from a
confidential informant about an illegal drug deal involving Cocoy, Botong,
and Mac-Mac in the vicinity of Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City on
February 17, 2000. SPO1 Lectura was designated as the leader of the team
that will bust said illegal drug deal. After the briefing, SPO1 Lecturas team
proceeded to the subject location.
The confidential informant arrived and met SPO1 Lecturas team at around
3:30 p.m. SPO1 Lectura conducted a short briefing then positioned his team
strategically within the vicinity. The confidential informant told the police
team that the drug deal would take place between 6:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m.
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
At around 10:00 p.m., the confidential informant identified the suspected
34
drug dealers Botong and Mac-Mac, who were arriving in two cars. After
conversing for a moment with Mac-Mac, Botong went inside Whistle Stop
Restaurant to talk to Cocoy. Botong and Cocoy then went outside the
restaurant and approached another car. Cocoy took a white plastic bag from
the car, which he handed to Botong. Thereafter, Cocoy went back inside the
restaurant, while [Botong] proceeded to his car near [Mac-Mac]. SPO1
Lectura was positioned at the other lane of the road, approximately 10 to 15
meters away from the suspects. At that moment, SPO1 Lectura sensed that
the drug deal had been consummated, so he decided to already arrest the
suspects. SPO1 Lectura arrested Mac-Mac, from whom he seized the white
plastic bag. PO3 Yumul and PO3 Padpad arrested Botong; and PO3 Santiago
apprehended Cocoy. The police team brought the arrested suspects to the
police office for investigation.
SPO1 Lectura submitted to SPO1 David the white plastic bag containing a box
with 10 heat-sealed plastic sachets inside. In front of SPO1 Lectura, SPO1
David marked the said articles with his initials. After physical and chemical
examinations revealed that the contents of the sachets were shabu, SPO1
Lectura signed the Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated February 18, 2000.
During cross-examination, SPO1 Lectura initially denied that Marlon David
was with Botong when the latter was arrested, but he later admitted that the
police also arrested Marlon David. Marlon David was brought to Camp
Bagong Diwa, Taguig, together with the other arrested suspects, for
verification, and was released the following day. SPO1 Lectura also admitted
that during the preliminary investigation, he and PO3 Corbe, PO3 Arcancia,
and PO3 Javier, answered that it was PO3 Santiago who seized the shabu
from Mac-Mac; but SPO1 Lectura explained that what the investigating
prosecutor actually asked during preliminary investigation was who saw
where the shabu came from and that he signed the minutes of the
preliminary investigation without reading the same. SPO1 Lectura
maintained that it was he who recovered the shabu from Mac-Mac. Lastly,
SPO1 Lectura acknowledged that his team heavily relied on the information
given by the confidential informant in identifying the suspects in the illegal
drug deal, who were eventually arrested.
PO3 Yumul substantially narrated the same version of events as that of PO3
Santiago and SPO1 Lectura. On February 17, 2000, he was assigned at the
Intelligence Investigation Division of the RMG based in Camp Bagong Diwa,
Bicutan, Taguig. He was with SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, PO3 Fuentes, PO3
Padpad, and several other police officers at the vicinity of Shangri-La Plaza in
Mandaluyong City, conducting surveillance operation regarding the tipped-
off illegal drug deal. He was with SPO1 Lectura and PO3 Padpad in the car
parked in front of Shangri-La Plaza, while PO3 Fuentes, PO3 Dela Cruz, and
their confidential informant were in another car also parked along the
driveway of Shangri-La Plaza. PO3 Santiago, PO3 Arcancia, and PO3 Corbe
were in the car stationed in front of Whistle Stop Restaurant. PO3 Yumul
could not recall where the other members of the team were located.
At around 10:00 p.m., the suspects Botong and Mac-Mac arrived in separate
cars, stopping in front of Shangri-La Plaza. Botong and Mac-Mac alighted
from their cars and talked to each other. At that time, PO3 Yumul was about
five meters away from the two suspects. Moments later, Botong called
someone on his cellular phone, and then went inside Whistle Stop

Restaurant, leaving Mac-Mac behind. PO3 Yumul followed Botong inside the
restaurant and saw the latter talking to Cocoy. PO3 Yumul though did not
hear the conversation between Botong and Cocoy. Afterwards, Botong and
Cocoy went out of the restaurant and approached a parked car. From his
position about three meters away, PO3 Yumul saw the passenger at the back
seat of the car, Lantion-Tom, opening the window and handing over a white
plastic bag with carton inside to Cocoy, who, in turn, gave the plastic bag to
Botong. Cocoy then returned inside the restaurant and [Botong] went back to
[Mac-Mac]. PO3 Yumul followed Cocoy inside the restaurant. A few minutes
later, PO3 Santiago also went inside the restaurant informing PO3 Yumul that
they would be arresting Cocoy, and that Botong and Mac-Mac were already
arrested outside the restaurant. PO3 Santiago, assisted by PO3 Yumul,
approached Cocoy and arrested him. The police team proceeded to the police
office with all the arrested suspects for further investigation. PO3 Yumul,
however, failed to join the other arresting officers in signing the Joint
Affidavit of Arrest dated February 18, 2000.
SPO1 David was an investigator at the Intelligence and Investigation Section
of the RMG at Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig, assigned to the instant
case following the arrests of accused-appellants, Emmanuel de Claro and
Lantion-Tom. He also referred the case for inquest to the Office of the City
Prosecutor.
SPO1 David testified that on February 17, 2000, he received from SPO1
Lectura a plastic bag containing a box with 10 heat-sealed sachets of
suspected shabu inside. SPO1 Lectura told SPO1 David that the articles were
seized from the suspected drug dealers. SPO1 David marked his initials BSD
on the confiscated articles, then prepared a request to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination of the specimens. SPO1 David disclosed that he
prepared the Affidavit of Arrest of the arresting officers.
The last witness for the prosecution was P/Insp. Cruto of the PNP Crime
Laboratory. P/Insp. Cruto was the forensic chemist who conducted the
physical, chemical, and confirmatory examinations of the contents of the 10
heat-sealed plastic sachets submitted by the RMG-NCRPO on February 18,
2000.
P/Insp. Cruto conducted the physical examination by weighing the contents
of each sachet, revealing that two sachets weighed 99.6 grams each; two
sachets, 99.5 grams each; one sachet, 99.2 grams; two sachets, 98.4 grams
each; one sachet, 98.3 grams; one sachet, 94.9 grams; and one sachet, 93.5
grams. P/Insp. Cruto then took a representative sample from each plastic
sachet and proceeded with his chemical and confirmatory examinations. The
contents of the 10 heat-sealed plastic sachets all tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu. P/Insp. Cruto
recorded the result of the examinations in his Physical Sciences Report No. D-
097-2000.[14]
The prosecution submitted the following object and documentary evidence:
the Joint Affidavit of Arrest[15] dated February 18, 2000 signed by SPO1
Lectura, PO3 Santiago, PO3 Corbe, PO3 Arcancia, PO3 Dela Cruz and PO3
Javier; the Sketch prepared in open court by SPO1 Lectura;[16] the 10 heat-
sealed plastic sachets recovered from the possession of accused-
appellants;[17] the PNP-RMG Request for Laboratory Examination of the
contents of the 10 heat-sealed plastic sachets;[18] the PNP Crime Laboratory
Physical Sciences Report No. D-097-2000 dated February 18, 2000 which
revealed that the contents of the 10 heat-sealed plastic sachets positively
tested for methamphetamine hydrochloride;[19] and the Letter (Referral of
the case to the Office of the City Prosecutor)[20] dated February 18, 2000.
The RTC admitted all the aforementioned evidence for the prosecution in its
Order[21] dated March 1, 2001.
The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of Marlon
David,[22] accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes,[23] Emmanuel de
Claro,[24] Roberto de Claro,[25] and Mary Jane Lantion-Tom.[26] Accused-
appellant Reyes did not testify.
Marlon David was 17 years old and a fourth year high school student of Rizal
High School in Pasig City. He recalled that on February 17, 2000, at about
1:00 p.m., he accompanied accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes, whom he
referred to as Kuya Botong, to the Buenas Market in Cainta, Rizal, to collect
some money.
While accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes and Marlon David were inside
their car at the parking area of said market, another car suddenly arrived,
from which an armed male passenger alighted and approached them. Four
other armed men followed and poked their guns at accused-appellant
Rolando delos Reyes and Marlon David. The armed men, in civilian attire,
were carrying an SM plastic shopping bag and questioned accused-appellant
Rolando delos Reyes if he knew the owner of said plastic bag. Accused-
appellant Rolando delos Reyes denied any knowledge about the plastic bag.
Marlon David was also asked and he answered that he knew nothing about
the plastic bag.
Thereafter, the armed men, who later introduced themselves as police
officers, pulled accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes from the driver seat
of the latters car, transferred him and Marlon David to the back seat of said
car, and blindfolded both of them. Two of the armed men sat in the front
seats of the car, while one of them sat at the back, beside accused-appellant
Rolando delos Reyes and Marlon David. The armed men drove the car around
(paikot-ikot). The armed men then separated accused-appellant Rolando
delos Reyes from Marlon David. They ordered Marlon David to alight from
the car and transfer to another vehicle. While in the other car, the armed men
boxed and mauled Marlon David to force him to admit to be the source of the
plastic bag. Each question was accompanied with one punch. Marlon David
remained blindfolded until they arrived at the police camp in Bicutan, Taguig,
where he again saw accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes. Marlon David
was released the following morning, leaving accused-appellant Rolando delos
Reyes behind at the police camp. Marlon David went home and told Virginia
delos Reyes, the wife of accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes, about the
incident.
Marlon David, during his cross examination, denied knowing any person with
the name Mac-Mac. Marlon David additionally relayed that he was told by
accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes that the latter was likewise mauled
by the armed men.
Accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes or Botong gave a similar account of
the incident that took place at 1:00 p.m. on February 17, 2000, while he and
Marlon David were at the Buenas Market in Cainta, Rizal. Their car was
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
surrounded by four armed men. The armed men poked their guns at him and
35
Marlon David, shouting at them to open the car doors. He lowered the car
window and the armed men opened the car door. The armed men forced him
and Marlon David to get down from the front seats of the car and to transfer
to the back seat, blindfolded them, and asked them who were the owners of
the SM plastic bag. After they left Buenas Market, he noticed that they were
just driving around. The car stopped only when Marlon David was taken out
and transferred to another car. It was already late in the evening when the
car finally stopped. He then realized, after his blindfold had been removed,
that he was at Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan, Taguig.
Accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes denied the accusation of the police
that he was selling or delivering shabu to anyone. He asserted that he was not
arrested at Whistle Stop restaurant in Mandaluyong City, rather, he was
illegally arrested at Buenas Market in Cainta, Rizal. Accused-appellant Reyes
or Mac-Mac was his friend who owed him money. He and accused-appellant
Reyes agreed to meet at Buenas Market for the settlement of the latters loan,
but the meeting did not take place because the armed men arrived. He
further claimed that he only met Emmanuel de Claro at Camp Bagong Diwa in
Bicutan, Taguig. He never knew Emmanuel de Claro before that time, and he
found out the latters name only when they were already detained at the
Mandaluyong City Jail.
Emmanuel de Claro or Cocoy testified that on February 17, 2000 at around
10:00 a.m., he was at the Department of Trade and Industry in Buendia,
Makati City, with his common-law wife Mary Jane Lantion-Tom to follow up
their application for business permit. At around 1:00 p.m., they had lunch at
Glorietta. Emmanuel de Claro was no longer feeling well so he and Lantion-
Tom passed by the house of his brother Roberto de Claro to request the latter
to drive for them. James, Roberto de Claros friend, also went with them.
The vehicle driven by Emmanuel de Claro was a rented car because his own
car was in the auto shop. Emmanuel de Claro, Lantion-Tom, Roberto de Claro,
and James first went to Las Pias City to check on Emmanuel de Claros car at
the auto shop. From there, they proceeded to Libertad in Pasay City and ate
dinner at the Duty Free Philippines. Afterwards, the group made their way to
Mandaluyong City where Lantion-Tom had a scheduled appointment with
Daisy Milan (Milan), her accountant. Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-Tom
met Milan at Whistle Stop Restaurant located at Shangri-La Plaza in
Mandaluyong City. Milan and Lantion-Tom discussed matters pertaining to
the business permit. Emmanuel de Claro stepped outside the restaurant for a
moment to smoke a cigarette, then, returned inside to wait for the meeting
between Lantion-Tom and Milan to finish. After their meeting, Lantion-Tom
walked Milan outside the restaurant, while Emmanuel de Claro waited for
Lantion-Tom inside.
Three male persons suddenly approached Emmanuel de Claro and
introduced themselves as police officers. They warned Emmanuel de Claro
not to make a scene and just go with them peacefully. Emmanuel de Claro
obeyed. He was brought outside the restaurant and was forced to get into a
waiting car. For about three hours inside the car, he was punched,
handcuffed, blindfolded, and told to bow down his head. He was likewise
being forced to admit something about the shabu, but he denied knowing
anything about it. He heard from the radio inside the car that the police
officers were waiting for another car. After three hours of traveling, the car

finally stopped and when his blindfold was removed, he learned that they
were already at Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan, Taguig.
Emmanuel de Claro was placed in one room where he stayed for almost an
hour, until he was called into another room where he met his co-accused for
the first time. He later saw Lantion-Tom at the office of one of the police
officers. They were interrogated by the police and being forced to admit that
the drugs being shown to them belonged to them. They asked for a lawyer
but their plea was ignored. The police told Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-
Tom that somebody should be held responsible for the shabu so they were
made to choose whether both of them or only one of them would be charged.
Emmanuel de Claro was compelled to choose the latter option.
Roberto de Claro corroborated Emmanuel de Claros testimony. On February
17, 2000, Roberto de Claro was at home playing video games when his
brother Emmanuel de Claro and the latters wife, Lantion-Tom, arrived and
requested him to drive their car because Emmanuel was not feeling well.
James, Roberto de Claros friend, rode with them. They first went to Las Pias
City to check on Emmanuel de Claros car at the auto shop, then they
proceeded to Libertad, Pasay City, where they had dinner at Duty Free
Philippines. They next drove to Whistle Stop Restaurant at Shangri-La Plaza
in Mandaluyong City to meet Ms. Milan. Only Emmanuel de Claro and
Lantion-Tom went inside the restaurant. Roberto de Claro and James stayed
in the car.
Two hours later, Roberto de Claro saw Lantion-Tom and Ms. Milan walking
towards them. As the two women were approaching, armed men suddenly
appeared, surrounded their car, and pointed guns at them. Roberto de Claro
got terrified. It was as if an armed robbery (hold-up) was taking place. The
armed men knocked at the car window. Out of fear, Roberto de Claro opened
the window, then the door of the car. Roberto de Claro, James, and Lantion-
Tom were made to sit at the back seat of the car. Two of the armed men sat
on the front seats of the car, while one sat at the back with Roberto de Claro,
James, and Lantion-Tom. The armed men introduced themselves as police
officers.
Inside the car, the police officers mauled (siniko, sinuntok sa ulo) Roberto de
Claro, James, and Lantion-Tom, all the while ordering them to keep their
heads bowed down. The police officers drove the car for two hours, stopping
at a gas station for about five minutes. At this moment, Roberto de Claro was
able to raise his head but was immediately told to bow down his head again.
Roberto de Claro also heard from the police officers radio that they were still
waiting for somebody. They travelled again for quite a long time and stopped
in a dark place. The police officers took Roberto de Claros wallet containing
P7,000.00 cash. Early in the following morning, they arrived at the police
station where Roberto de Claro saw his brother Emmanuel de Claro once
more. They stayed in one room until Roberto de Claro and James were
released by the police the next day.
When Lantion-Tom was called to testify, the prosecution and the defense
agreed to consider her Counter Affidavit dated March 23, 2000 and
Supplemental Affidavit dated March 29, 2000 as her direct examination.
On cross-examination, Lantion-Tom confirmed that she was among those
arrested on February 17, 2000 at the vicinity of Shangri-La Plaza in
Mandaluyong City for her alleged involvement in an illegal drug deal. At the
time of the arrest, she was with Emmanuel de Claro, Roberto de Claro, and
James. She was also brought to Camp Bagong Diwa in Taguig where she was
interrogated without a lawyer. She was shown a box containing shabu which
she had never seen before. Lantion-Tom insisted that she was in
Mandaluyong City to meet her accountant, Milan, regarding her application
for a business permit. Lantion-Tom pointed out that the charge against her
was eventually dismissed.
The documentary evidence for the defense consisted of Emmanuel de Claros
Counter Affidavit dated March 23, 2000,[27] Lantion-Toms Counter Affidavit
dated March 23, 2000,[28] Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-Toms
Supplemental Affidavit dated March 29, 2000,[29] Roberto de Claros Witness
Affidavit dated March 29, 2000,[30] Marlon Davids Sinumpaang Salaysay
dated March 14, 2000,[31] Virginia delos Reyes Sinumpaang Salaysay dated
March 14, 2000,[32] Navarros Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March 14,
2000,[33] accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes Sinumpaang Kontra
Salaysay dated March 14, 2000,[34] and a Barangay Blotter dated February
19, 2000 by Virginia delos Reyes.[35] The RTC admitted all these
documentary evidence for the defense in its Order[36] dated September 13,
2002.
In its Decision dated September 23, 2003, the RTC found accused-appellants
and Emmanuel de Claro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, and decreed:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having successfully proved the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt for unlawfully possessing/selling,
delivering, transporting and distributing methamphetamine hydrochloride
otherwise known as shabu, a regulated drug, without lawful authority in
violation of Sections 15 and 16 of Article III in relation to Section 21 of Article
IV of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 each and the
costs of suit.
Further, all the methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) taken and seized
from the accused during the aforesaid operation are forfeited and confiscated
in favor of the government shall be turned over to the PDEA pursuant to law
for proper disposal without delay.[37]
Emmanuel de Claro filed his notice of appeal[38] on October 23, 2003.
Accused-appellants Roberto delos Reyes and Reyes each filed his notice of
appeal[39] on October 29, 2003 and December 30, 2003, respectively.
Emmanuel de Claro, however, subsequently moved to withdraw his notice of
appeal,[40] instead, filing before the RTC an Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and to Re-Open Proceedings Pursuant [to] Section 24, Rule
119 of the Rules of Court[41] on October 30, 2003, and a Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration[42] on November 3, 2003. Emmanuel de Claro
asked the RTC to review its judgment of conviction based on the following
grounds:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
ACCUSED DEFENSE OF FRAME-UP IS A MERE ALIBI AND HAS THUS ERRED
IN ADOPTING THE THEORY OF THE PROSECUTION THAT ALL THE THREE
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
(3) ACCUSED WERE PICKED-UP AT THE VICINITY OF EDSA SHANGRI-LA
36
PLAZA HOTEL.
II. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE WARRANTLESS ARREST WAS LAWFUL SINCE THE ACCUSED
WERE CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THERE WAS CONSPIRACY AMONG THE THREE (3) ACCUSED IN THE
ALLEGED COMMISSION OF THE CRIME OF UNLAWFUL SALE, DELIVERY AND
TRANSPORTATION OF THE PROHIBITED DRUG.
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING BOTH
ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED
IN THE INFORMATION ON THE BASIS MAINLY OF A DISPUTABLE
PRESUMPTION OF LACK OF IMPROPER MOTIVE ON THE PART OF THE
POLICE OFFICERS.
V. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS FAILURE
TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT ACCUSED EMMANUEL DE CLARO WAS NOT
AFFORDED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS DURING CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION.[43]
Emmanuel de Claro principally contended that the accusation that he was
engaging in an illegal drug deal, levied against him by prosecution witnesses
SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul was suspicious, if not incredible.
Emmanuel de Claro pointed out that although these police officers testified
that Lantion-Tom, from the car, handed to him the plastic bag containing the
box with sachets of shabu, the prosecution still dropped the criminal charges
against Lantion-Tom. Emmanuel de Claro also strongly argued that the
prosecution failed to contradict his well-supported alibi that he, his wife, and
his brother went to Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City to meet his wifes
accountant, so they could attend to several documents pertaining to a
business permit. Emmanuel de Claro further insisted that the RTC should
have highly regarded accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes testimony
which directly contradicted the police officers statements.
In its Order[44] dated November 11, 2003, the RTC granted Emmanuel de
Claros motion to withdraw his notice of appeal and required the prosecution
to comment to his motions for reconsideration.
The prosecution filed its Comment/Opposition[45] on December 19, 2003,
objecting to Emmanuel de Claros motions for reconsideration and
maintaining that its police-witnesses categorical, consistent, and straight-
forward testimonies were sufficient to convict Emmanuel de Claro.
In a complete turnabout from its previous findings and conclusion, the RTC,
in its Order[46] dated January 12, 2004, acquitted Emmanuel de Claro of the
crime charged. The RTC explicitly admitted that it erred in giving full faith
and credit to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses SPO1 Lectura, PO3
Santiago, and PO3 Yumul, and in entirely rejecting the alibi of the defense.
Thus, the RTC disposed:

WHEREFORE, the motion of accused-movant Emmanuel De Claro is hereby
GRANTED and a new one entered, ACQUITTING him of the crime charged.
Consequently, his immediate release from detention is hereby ordered unless
he is detained for other cause or causes.[47]
Nevertheless, in view of the pending notices of appeal of accused-appellants,
the RTC forwarded the complete records of the case to us on March 29, 2004,
and we gave due course to the said appeals in our Resolution[48] dated June
21, 2004.
Accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes filed his Appellants Brief[49] on
September 15, 2004, while accused-appellant Reyes filed his Appellants
Brief[50] on November 26, 2004. Pursuant to our pronouncement in People
v. Mateo,[51] we transferred the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
action and disposition.[52] Accordingly, the plaintiff-appellee, represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed before the appellate court its
Consolidated Brief[53] on January 21, 2005.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated July 12, 2006, sustained the
conviction of accused-appellants, and merely modified the penalty imposed
upon them, from life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua. According to the
appellate court, the police officers testimonies deserve credence than
accused-appellants defenses of denial and alibi, there being no evidence to
rebut the presumption that the police officers regularly performed their
official duties.
The case was then elevated to us for final review. In our Resolution[54] dated
January 31, 2007, we required the parties to submit their supplemental
briefs. Plaintiff-appellee and accused-appellants Rolando delos Reyes and
Reyes filed their manifestations[55] on March 14, 2007, April 10, 2007, and
April 13, 2007, respectively, opting to stand by the briefs they had already
filed before the Court of Appeals.
In his Appellants Brief, accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes assigned the
following errors of the RTC:
I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FAILING TO RESOLVE THE
CONTRADICTORY TESTIMONY AS TO THE PLACE OF THE ARREST IN FAVOR
OF THE ACCUSED.
II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING [THE] TESTIMONIES OF
PO3 VIRGILIO SANTIAGO CREDIBLE.
III. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE
PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE WHICH WAS PREVIOUSLY CATEGORIZE[D] AS
WEAK WHEN THE COURT A QUO GRANTED BAIL TO THE ACCUSED.[56]
Accused-appellant Reyes cited these errors in his Appellants Brief:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE WARRANTLESS
ARREST OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT RAYMUNDO REYES AS UNLAWFUL.
II. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE WARRANTLESS ARREST WAS
VALID, ACCUSED-APPELLANT RAYMUNDO REYES CANNOT BE CONVICTED
FOR VIOLATION OF R.A. 6425.[57]
Accused-appellants essentially assert that the charge of illegal drug deal
lodged against them by the police is a complete fabrication and frame-up.
Accused-appellants called attention to the material inconsistencies in the
prosecutions evidence. PO3 Santiago testified during direct examination that
accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes handed the plastic bag with box
inside to accused-appellant Reyes, but he admitted during cross-examination
that he did not see such transfer. The prosecution was unable to present any
evidence to prove the source of the plastic bag containing the box with
sachets of shabu, and the money paid as consideration for the illegal drugs.
The prosecution likewise failed to rebut accused-appellant Rolando delos
Reyes straightforward, coherent, and truthful narration, corroborated by
Marlon David, that he was illegally arrested at Buenas Market in Cainta, Rizal,
and not at Shangri-la Plaza in Mandaluyong City.
Accused-appellants additionally argued that even the prosecutions version of
the arrests of the suspects and seizure of the shabu shows that the same were
effected in violation of accused-appellants fundamental rights. The arrests
were executed without any warrant or any of the exceptional circumstances
to justify a warrantless arrest. The suspects, including accused-appellants,
were arrested without warrants based on a mere tip from a confidential
informant and not because of any apparent criminal activity. A tip does not
constitute probable cause for a warrantless arrest or search and seizure
incidental thereto. Thus, the shabu allegedly seized from accused-appellants
is inadmissible in evidence.
Plaintiff-appellee, on the other hand, stand by the convictions of accused-
appellants, maintaining that:
I. THE POSITIVE AND CREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES HAVE ESTABLISHED THE GUILT OF
APPELLANTS BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II. THE WARRANTLESS ARREST CONDUCTED BY THE POLICE IS
VALID SINCE IT FALLS SQUARELY UNDER RULE 113, SECTION 5(A) OF THE
REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
III. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION MORE THAN
SUFFICE TO CONVICT APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
IV. CONSPIRACY ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE.
V. MERE DENIAL AND HULIDAP, WITHOUT MORE, CANNOT
EXCULPATE APPELLANTS FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY.
VI. THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
OFFICIAL DUTY UNDER SECTION 3(M) OF RULE 131 OF THE REVISED
RULES OF COURT HAD NOT BEEN OVERCOME BY DEFENSE EVIDENCE.
VII. CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE REGARDING THE CREDIBILITY
OF WITNESSES COMMANDS GREAT RESPECT AND CONSIDERATION.[58]
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
37
Plaintiff-appellee avers that the inconsistencies in the police officers
statements, as pointed out by accused-appellants, are trivial and do not affect
the weight of their testimonies; while accused-appellants defenses of denial
and frame-up could be easily concocted and, thus, should be looked upon
with disfavor. Moreover, there is no need for proof of consideration for the
illegal drug deal, since consideration is not an element of the crime charged.
Plaintiff-appellee avows that accused-appellants were caught while in the
commission of a crime or in flagrante delicto, which justifies their
warrantless arrests under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
Accused-appellants were arrested while in possession and in the act of
distributing, without legal authority, a total of 980.9 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, on the night of February 17,
2000 at the parking area of Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City. In
addition, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, the warrantless
arrests executed by the police officers enjoy the presumption that official
duty has been regularly performed.
We grant the appeal and reverse the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals.
At the outset, we observe that the prosecutors and the RTC both displayed
uncertainty as to the facts surrounding accused-appellants arrest on the
night of February 17, 2000.
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, after preliminary
investigation and reinvestigation, recommended that the RTC drop accused-
appellant Rolando delos Reyes and Lantion-Tom from the criminal charge.
The RTC only partially adopted the recommendations of the Office of the City
Prosecutor: dropping the criminal charge against Lantion-Tom, but still
finding probable cause against accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes.[59]
Even after trial, the RTC wavered in its findings and conclusion. In its
Decision[60] dated September 23, 2003, the RTC initially convicted accused-
appellants and Emmanuel de Claro, but acting on Emmanuel de Claros
motions for reconsideration, said trial court, in its Order[61] dated January
12, 2004, totally reversed itself and acquitted Emmanuel de Claro. This time,
the RTC gave more weight to the evidence presented by the defense.
The Court of Appeals, on appeal, refused to consider the subsequent acquittal
of Emmanuel de Claro by the RTC. Instead, the appellate court upheld the
earlier ruling of the RTC giving absolute credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses and convicted accused-appellants of the crime
charged. Despite the varying judgments of the RTC, the Court of Appeals
speciously ratiocinated in its assailed decision that when the issue involves
the credibility of a witness, the trial courts assessment is entitled to great
weight.
Guided by the settled rule that where the inculpatory facts admit of several
interpretations, one consistent with accused's innocence and another with
his guilt, the evidence thus adduced fail[ed] to meet the test of moral
certainty,[63] we find that the findings and conclusion of the RTC in its
subsequent Order[64] dated January 12, 2004 (in which it acquitted
Emmanuel de Claro) is more in keeping with the evidence on record in this
case. It bears to stress that the very same evidence were presented against

Emmanuel de Claro and accused-appellants; if the evidence is insufficient to
convict the former, then it is also insufficient to convict the latter.
Indeed, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses SPO1 Lectura, PO3
Santiago, and PO3 Yumul are unreliable and suspiciously fabricated. In its
Order dated January 12, 2004, the RTC correctly observed that:
Viewed vis--vis the peculiar factual milieu of this case, not to say the
insistence by the accused-movant [Emmanuel de Claro] that a reevaluation or
reassessment of the evidence by the prosecution be considered, this court
has decided to revisit the evidence put forward by the prosecution through
the crucible of a severe testing by taking a more than casual consideration of
every circumstance of the case.
It is noted that the testimony given by the witnesses for the prosecution and
that of the defense are diametrically opposed to each other. While this court
had already made its conclusion that the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses PO3 Santiago, SPO1 Lectura and PO3 Yumul are given full faith and
credit and reject the frame-up and alibi story of the accused-movant
[Emmanuel de Claro], nonetheless, upon reassessment of the same it appears
that the court erred.
In sum, the conveniently dovetailing accounts of the prosecution
eyewitnesses, all of them police officers, with regard to the material facts of
how the crime was allegedly committed engenders doubt as to their
credibility. Firstly, the court noted that these police officers gave identical
testimonies of the events that happened from the moment they arrived at 2
oclock in the afternoon until the arrest of the accused at 10:30 oclock in the
evening at the EDSA Shangri-La premises. This uniform account given by
these witnesses cannot but generate the suspicion that the material
circumstances testified to by them were integral parts of a well thought-out
and prefabricated story. Because of the close camaraderie of these witnesses
who belong to the same police force it is not difficult for them to make the
same story. Furthermore, their testimonies are so general which shows only
too clearly that they testified uniformly only as to material facts but have not
given the particulars and the details having relation with the principal facts.
While they testified that they were at Shangri-La from 2 in the afternoon to
10 in the evening, they were not able to tell the court how their group
positioned strategically at the premises without being noticed by their target.
They could not also gave (sic) an explanation how their confidential
informant was able to obtain information regarding the drug deal that was
supposed to take place on that date involving several personalities. Except
for their bare allegation that they have that information regarding the drug
deal they were not able to present any proof of such report, say, entry in their
logbook of such confidential report and a spot report. Even their operation is
not recorded as no documentary evidence was presented. Worth
remembering in this regard is People v. Alviar, 59 SCRA 136, where it is said
that: . . . [i]t often happens with fabricated stories that minute particulars
have not been thought of. It has also been said that an honest witness, who
has sufficient memory to state one fact, and that fact a material one, cannot
be safely relied upon as such weakness of memory not only leaves the case
incomplete, but throws doubt upon the accuracy of the statements made.
Such a witness may be honest, but his testimony is not reliable.[65]
(Emphasis supplied.)
There are also material inconsistencies between the police-witnesses sworn
statements following accused-appellants arrest and their testimonies before
the RTC. The police officers attested in their Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated
February 18, 2000 that upon sensing suspicious transactions being
undertaken thereat, team leader thru hand signaled immediately accosted
the suspects and introduced themselves as Police Officers and after that,
subject persons deliberately admitted that they have in their possession
illegal drugs and thereafter showed the same to the herein undersigned
arresting officers thus they were placed under arrest.[66] Yet, during trial
before the RTC, the police officers uniformly testified that they brought
accused-appellants, Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-Tom to the police office
after arresting the four suspects in flagrante delicto, without mention at all of
the suspects purported admission.
We also consider the fact that Lantion-Tom was never charged with any
criminal involvement even when, according to the prosecutions version of
events, she was the first person to deliver the shabu. This seriously dents the
prosecutions sequence of events on the night of February 17, 2000.
In contrast, accused-appellants presented clear and convincing evidence in
support of their defenses, which the prosecution failed to rebut. Specifically,
accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes testified that he was illegally arrested
without warrant at Buenas Market, Cainta, Rizal, not at Shangri-La Plaza in
Mandaluyong City; and that he and Marlon David were coerced to incriminate
themselves for possession of shabu. His claims were corroborated by Marlon
Davids testimony and Navarros Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March 14, 2000.
Also, Emmanuel de Claro, Lantion-Tom, and Roberto de Claro consistently
testified that they were at Shangri-La Plaza to meet Milan, Lantion-Toms
accountant, regarding documents for a business permit (photocopies of the
said documents were presented during trial); and that they were illegally
arrested without warrant and forced to admit criminal liability for
possession of shabu. These pieces of evidence are overwhelmingly adequate
to overthrow the presumption of regularity in the performance by the
arresting police officers of their official duties and raise reasonable doubt in
accused-appellants favor.
Furthermore, even assuming that the prosecutions version of the events that
took place on the night of February 17, 2000 were true, it still failed to
establish probable cause to justify the in flagrante delicto arrests of accused-
appellants and search of accused-appellants persons, incidental to their
arrests, resulting in the seizure of the shabu in accused-appellants
possession.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
Complementary to the above provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined in
38
Section 3, paragraph 2 of Article III of the Constitution, which solidifies the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, thus:
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or
order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. (Emphases supplied.)
The foregoing constitutional proscription is not without exceptions. Search
and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained
therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident
to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in
violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the
accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures;
and (6) stop and frisk situations.[67]
The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid
warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless
arrest which must precede the search. In this instance, the law requires that
there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made the process cannot
be reversed. As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a
valid warrant of arrest. The Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible
warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without
warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
(arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed and
he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest
effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving
final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another (arrest of
escaped prisoners).[68]
In People v. Molina,[69] we cited several cases involving in flagrante delicto
arrests preceding the search and seizure that were held illegal, to wit:
In People v. Chua Ho San, the Court held that in cases of in flagrante delicto
arrests, a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The arresting
officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge of such fact or, as recent
case law adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. As discussed in
People v. Doria, probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable grounds
of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of
actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts,
i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create
the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good
faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.

As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable
information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise
in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, are not sufficient
to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
Thus, in People v. Aminnudin, it was held that "the accused-appellant was
not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he
was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward
indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the
other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when
the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly
became suspect and so subject to apprehension."
Likewise, in People v. Mengote, the Court did not consider "eyes . . . darting
from side to side . . . [while] holding . . . [one's] abdomen," in a crowded street
at 11:30 in the morning, as overt acts and circumstances sufficient to arouse
suspicion and indicative of probable cause. According to the Court, "[b]y no
stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an
offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at
least being attempted in [the arresting officers'] presence." So also, in People
v. Encinada, the Court ruled that no probable cause is gleanable from the act
of riding a motorela while holding two plastic baby chairs.
Then, too, in Malacat v. Court of Appeals, the trial court concluded that
petitioner was attempting to commit a crime as he was "'standing at the
corner of Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard' with his eyes 'moving very
fast' and 'looking at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to them."' In
declaring the warrantless arrest therein illegal, the Court said:
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto ... arrest preceding
the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the
arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating
that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to
be committed.
It went on to state that
Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could
have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were
"moving very fast" an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and
his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m.,
thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing
at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble . . .
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that
petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he
admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of
petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and
petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a
grenade, could not have been visible to Yu.
Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of xxxx
Q: Did you see that something that was taken inside that car? 39
the arresting officer.[70] (Emphases supplied.)
A: White plastic bag, sir.
Similar to the above-cited cases in Molina, there is a dearth of evidence in this
Q: What happened after that?
case to justify the in flagrante delicto arrests of accused-appellants and A: Cocoy went inside the Whistle Stop, sir.
search of their persons incidental to the arrests.
Q: With the bag?
A close examination of the testimonies of SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and A: No, it was left with Botong, sir.
PO3 Yumul reveal that they simply relied on the information provided by
their confidential informant that an illegal drug deal was to take place on the Q: What happened next after that?
A: Botong proceeded to his car near Mac-Mac, sir.
night of February 17, 2000 at Shangri-la Plaza in Mandaluyong City. Without
any other independent information, and by simply seeing the suspects pass Q: What happened next after that?
from one to another a white plastic bag with a box or carton inside, the police A: We already sensed that drug deal has transpired, sir. We accosted him.
team was already able to conclude that the box contained shabu and sensed
that an illegal drug deal took place. xxxx
Q: What did you do?
SPO1 Lectura testified on direct examination as follows: A: I arrested Mac-Mac, sir.
Q: What was the information gathered by your informant?
A: That there will be a drug deal between 6 to 11 in the evening, sir. xxxx
Q: Who of your companion apprehended Botong or Rolando delos Reyes?
A: Botong was arrested by Yumul and Padpad, sir.
Q: You were there as early as 2:00 p.m.?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How about De Claro?
Q: What did you do after briefing? A: Arrested by Santiago, sir.
A: We positioned ourselves strategically, we waited for the arrival of the
subject, sir. xxxx
Q: Then what did you do after apprehending these people?
A: We brought them to our office for investigation, sir.[71] (Emphases
xxxx
supplied.)
Q: When you are already positioned in your respective area at the vicinity of
Shangri-La Plaza, what happened next, if any?
A: At around 10:00 p.m. two (2) cars arrived and they were identified by the
informant that they were the personalities involved. PO3 Santiagos testimony also did not offer much justification for the
warrantless arrest of accused-appellants and search of their persons:
xxxx Q: When these two (2) persons went out of the restaurant and went to the
place where blue Mazda car was parked, what happened next?
Q: When this two (2) cars arrive what happened next?
A: They talked for a while after few minutes Botong entered, sir. A: The person inside the Mazda car, from the backseat, handed a white plastic
bag with a box inside to Emmanuel de Claro [Cocoy], sir. Then, Emmanuel de
xxxx Claro [Cocoy] gave it to Rolando Delos Reyes [Botong], sir.
Q: Do you know this Botong prior this incident?
A: No, sir. Q: You mentioned about somebody handling box to De Claro [Cocoy] from
inside that Mazda car?
Q: How did you come to know that he is Botong? A: Yes, sir.
A: Through our informant, sir.
Q: Who was this somebody handling that box?
Q: When Botong went to the Whistle Stop, what happened next? A: It was Mary Jane Lantion, sir.
A: According to my other companion he talked to another person then after
that they went out, sir. xxxx
Q: When you see De Claro [Cocoy] handling the box to Botong, what
xxxx happened after that?
A: Botong proceeded to the place of Mac-Mac and Emmanuel De Claro
Q: How long did Botong stay in Whistle Stop Restaurant?
A: One (1) minute, sir. [Cocoy] returned back inside the said restaurant, sir.
xxxx Q: Where was Mac-Mac then at that time?
Q: When you say they who is the companion? A: Near their car, sir. He was waiting for Botong.
A: Cocoy, sir.
Q: After that what happened next?
xxxx A: When Botong returned to Mac-Mac, he gave white plastic bag with box
inside to Mac-Mac, sir.
Q: What happened next after they went out to the car?
A: They went to another car and Cocoy got something from his car and
Q: What happened after that?
handed to Botong, sir.

A: Our team leader, sensing that the drug deal have been consummated, we
apprehended them, sir.
Q: How did you come to know that there was a drug deal at that particular
place and time?
A: Because of the information given to us by the informant, sir.
Q: Are you aware of the contents of that box at that time?
A: No, sir.
Q: How did you come to know that there was a consummation of a drug deal?
A: Because of the information given to us by the informant that there will be a
drug-deal, sir.
xxxx
Q: Then what did you do?
A: We brought them to our office for proper investigation, sir.
Q: At your office, what else did you do?
A: We confiscated the evidence, marked them and a request for laboratory
examination was made and other pertaining papers regarding the arrest of
the accused.
Q: You mentioned about the confiscated evidence. What is that confiscated
evidence that you are saying?
A: Ten (10) pieces of white plastic transparent plastic bag with white
crystalline substance suspected to be methamphetamine hydrochloride, sir.
Q: How were these evidences confiscated by your group?
A: They were confiscated from Mac-Mac, sir.
Q: In what condition were they at that time that they were confiscated from
Mac-Mac?
A: They were placed inside the box, sir.[72] (Emphases supplied.)
PO3 Yumuls narration of events was not any different from those of SPO1
Lectura and PO3 Santiago:
Q: When did you meet the confidential informant?
A: At the vicinity of EDSA Shangri-La Plaza, sir.
Q: And what was the information that was relayed to you by the confidential
informant?
A: The identities of the persons, sir.
Q: What did he particularly tells you in that particular time you meet the
confidential informant at the vicinity of EDSA Shangri-La Plaza?
A: That there will be a drug-deal and the people involved will arrived
together with their car, sir.
xxxx
Q: And what happened after the confidential informant relayed to you the
information?
A: After we were brief by the confidential informant, we strategically
positioned ourselves in the place where the drug-deal will occur, sir.
xxxx
Q: So what did you do after positioning yourselves in that place of EDSA
Shangri-La Plaza and Whistle Stop restaurant, what happened next after that?
A: At around 10:00, one car arrived, a white Toyota corolla . . .
Q: 10:00 what? In the morning or in the evening?
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
A: In the evening, sir, of February 17, 2000, sir.
xxxx 40
Q: And you stated that two vehicles arrived? Q: Were you able to know the person inside that car and who handed to
A: Yes, sir. Cocoy the white plastic bag?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: So what happened when this vehicle arrived? Q: Who was that person?
A: The red Toyota corolla follows, sir. A: Mary Jane Lantion, sir.
xxxx xxxx
Q: Then what happened? What did you do, if any? Q: And when this white plastic bag with carton placed inside handed to
A: Our confidential informant told us that, that is our subject, sir. Cocoy, what did you do?
A: It was first handed by Cocoy to Botong, the plastic bag and then they
xxxx walked in different direction, Cocoy went back inside the Whistle Stop and
Q: What happened next, if any, were they alighted from the car? then Botong went back to Mac-Mac, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
xxxx Q: And then what happened next after that?
Q: Then, what happened next, if any? A: I followed Cocoy inside the Whistle Stop, sir.
A: They talked after they alighted from their car, sir.
xxxx
Q: When you say nag-usap sila to whom are you referring? Q: So what did you do then?
A: To Mac-Mac and Botong, sir. A: I observed him inside but after a few minutes PO3 Virgilio Santiago went
inside and told me that we will going to get them, sir.
xxxx
Q: What happened next after you see them talking to each other? Q: Why are you going to get them?
A: When they talk Mac-Mac called through cellphone, sir. A: Because the two were already arrested outside the Whistle Stop, Mac-Mac
and Botong, sir.
Q: By the way, did you hear the conversation of this two?
A: No, sir. xxxx
Q: So what did you do when PO3 Santiago told you that?
xxxx A: PO3 Santiago approached Cocoy and I am just assisting him, PO3 Santiago
Q: How about the one calling over the cellphone, did you hear also what was to avoid commotion, sir.
the subject of their conversation?
A: No, sir. Q: Then what did you do next after that?
A: We were able to get Cocoy and we went outside, sir.
Q: So what happened next after seeing them having a conversation with each
other? Q: And then what did you do, if any?
A: Botong immediately walked and proceeding to the Whistle Stop, sir. A: After arresting them we boarded to the car and we went to the office,
sir.[73] (Emphases supplied.)
xxxx
Q: Then what happened when Botong went to Whistle Stop? Evident from the foregoing excerpts that the police officers arrested accused-
A: He talked to somebody inside, sir. appellants and searched the latters persons without a warrant after seeing
Rolando delos Reyes and Emmanuel de Claro momentarily conversing in the
xxxx
restaurant, and witnessing the white plastic bag with a box or carton inside
Q: And did you hear what was the subject of their conversation?
A: No, sir. being passed from Lantion-Tom to Emmanuel de Claro, to accused-appellant
Rolando delos Reyes, and finally, to accused-appellant Reyes. These
Q: Then what happened next when Botong talked to somebody inside the circumstances, however, hardly constitute overt acts indicative of a felonious
Whistle Stop? enterprise. SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul had no prior
A: The companion stood up and they went outside and both of them went to knowledge of the suspects identities, and they completely relied on their
the side of Whistle Stop in front of the blue car, sir. confidential informant to actually identify the suspects. None of the police
officers actually saw what was inside that box. There is also no evidence that
xxxx
Q: What did you do then? the confidential informant himself knew that the box contained shabu. No
A: Somebody opened the window in back of the blue car, sir. effort at all was taken to confirm that the arrested suspects actually knew
that the box or carton inside the white plastic bag, seized from their
Q: And then what happened next, if any? possession, contained shabu. The police officers were unable to establish a
A: A white plastic bag was handed to him with carton inside, sir. cogent fact or circumstance that would have reasonably invited their
attention, as officers of the law, to suspect that accused-appellants,
xxxx
Emmanuel de Claro, and Lantion-Tom has just committed, is actually
Q: And who received that item or article from the car?
A: Cocoy, sir.

committing, or is attempting to commit a crime, particularly, an illegal drug
deal.
Finally, from their own account of the events, the police officers had
compromised the integrity of the shabu purportedly seized from accused-
appellants.
In People v. Sy Chua,[74] we questioned whether the shabu seized from the
accused was the same one presented at the trial because of the failure of the
police to mark the drugs at the place where it was taken, to wit:
Furthermore, we entertain doubts whether the items allegedly seized from
accused-appellant were the very same items presented at the trial of this
case. The record shows that the initial field test where the items seized were
identified as shabu, was only conducted at the PNP headquarters of Angeles
City. The items were therefore not marked at the place where they were
taken. In People v. Casimiro, we struck down with disbelief the reliability of
the identity of the confiscated items since they were not marked at the place
where they were seized, thus:
The narcotics field test, which initially identified the seized item as
marijuana, was likewise not conducted at the scene of the crime, but only at
the narcotics office. There is thus reasonable doubt as to whether the item
allegedly seized from accused-appellant is the same brick of marijuana
marked by the policemen in their headquarters and given by them to the
crime laboratory.[75] (Emphases supplied.)
In the instant case, SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul uniformly
testified before the RTC that they brought the arrested suspects to the police
office for investigation. SPO1 Lectura and PO3 Santiago were vague as to how
they ascertained as shabu the contents of the box inside the white plastic bag,
immediately after seizing the same from accused-appellant Reyes and before
proceeding to the police office; while PO3 Yumul explicitly testified on cross-
examination[76] that he saw the shabu for the first time at the police office.
At any rate, all three police officers recounted that the shabu was marked by
SPO1 Benjamin David only at the police office.
Without valid justification for the in flagrante delicto arrests of accused-
appellants, the search of accused-appellants persons incidental to said
arrests, and the eventual seizure of the shabu from accused-appellants
possession, are also considered unlawful and, thus, the seized shabu is
excluded in evidence as fruit of a poisonous tree. Without the corpus delicti
for the crime charged, then the acquittal of accused-appellants is inevitable.
As we aptly held in People v. Sy Chua[77]:
All told, the absence of ill-motive on the part of the arresting team cannot
simply validate, much more cure, the illegality of the arrest and consequent
warrantless search of accused-appellant. Neither can the presumption of
regularity of performance of function be invoked by an officer in aid of the
process when he undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by
the Constitution. In People v. Nubla, we clearly stated that:
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be
used as basis for affirming accused-appellant's conviction because, first, the
presumption is precisely just that a mere presumption. Once challenged by
evidence, as in this case, . . . [it] cannot be regarded as binding truth. Second,
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot
preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not
overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
xxxx
The government's drive against illegal drugs needs the support of every
citizen. But it should not undermine the fundamental rights of every citizen
as enshrined in the Constitution. The constitutional guarantee against
warrantless arrests and unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be so
carelessly disregarded as overzealous police officers are sometimes wont to
do. Fealty to the constitution and the rights it guarantees should be
paramount in their minds, otherwise their good intentions will remain as
such simply because they have blundered. The criminal goes free, if he must,
but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more
quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the
charter of its own existence.[78]
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 12, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01733 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-
appellants Rolando delos Reyes and Raymundo Reyes are ACQUITTED on the
ground of reasonable doubt and they are ORDERED forthwith released from
custody, unless they are being lawfully held for another crime.
G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014
RIZALDY SANCHEZ Y CAJILI, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to reverse and set aside
the July 25, 2012 Decision1 and the November 20, 2012 Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 31742 filed by petitioner Rizaldy
Sanchez y Cajili (Sanchez), affirming the April 21, 2005 Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20 (RTC), which convicted him
for Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165. The
dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered convicting accused
Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili of Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165 and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment from twelve (12)
to fifteen (15) years and to pay a fine of Php300,000.00.
SO ORDERED.4
Sanchez was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, in the
Information,5 dated March 20, 2003, filed before the RTC and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 10745-03. The accusatory portion of the Information
indicting Sanchez reads:
That on or about the 19th day of March 2003, in the Municipality of Imus,
Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and
41
custody, 0.1017 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly
known as “shabu,” a dangerous drug, in violation of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
When arraigned, Sanchez pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. During
the pre-trial, the prosecution and the defense stipulated on the existence and
due execution of the following pieces of evidence: 1] the request for
laboratory examination; 2] certification issued by the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI); 3] Dangerous Drugs Report; and 4] transparent plastic
sachet containing small transparent plastic sachet of white crystalline
substance.6 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution’s version of the events as summarized by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) in its Comment7 on the petition is as follows:
Around 2:50 pm of March 19, 2003, acting on the information that Jacinta
Marciano, aka “Intang,” was selling drugs to tricycle drivers, SPO1 Elmer
Amposta, together with CSU Edmundo Hernandez, CSU Jose Tagle, Jr., and
CSU Samuel Monzon, was dispatched to Barangay Alapan 1-B, Imus, Cavite to
conduct an operation.
While at the place, the group waited for a tricycle going to, and coming from,
the house of Jacinta. After a few minutes, they spotted a tricycle carrying
Rizaldy Sanchez coming out of the house. The group chased the tricycle. After
catching up with it, they requested Rizaldy to alight. It was then that they
noticed Rizaldy holding a match box.
SPO1 Amposta asked Rizaldy if he could see the contents of the match box.
Rizaldy agreed. While examining it, SPO1 Amposta found a small transparent
plastic sachet which contained a white crystalline substance. Suspecting that
the substance was a regulated drug, the group accosted Rizaldy and the
tricycle driver. The group brought the two to the police station.
On March 20, 2003, Salud M. Rosales, a forensic chemist from the NBI,
submitted a Certification which reads:
This certifies that on the above date at 9:25 a.m. one PO1 Edgardo Nario of
Imus, Mun. PS, PNP, Imus, Cavite submitted to this office for laboratory
examinations the following specimen/s to wit:
White crystalline substance contained in a small plastic sachet, marked
“RSC,” placed in a plastic pack, marked “Mar. 19, 2003.” (net wt. = 0.1017
gm)…
Examinations conducted on the above-mentioned specimen/s gave POSITIVE
RESULTS for METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE.
Said specimen/s were allegedly confiscated from RIZALDY SANCHEZ y CAJILI
and DARWIN REYES y VILLARENTE.
Official report follows:

This certification was issued upon request for purpose of filing the case.
Version of the Defense
In the present petition,9 Sanchez denied the accusation against him and
presented a different version of the events that transpired in the afternoon of
March 19, 2003, to substantiate his claim of innocence:
On 24 February 2005, the accused Rizaldy Sanchez took the witness stand.
He testified that on the date and time in question, he, together with a certain
Darwin Reyes, were on their way home from Brgy. Alapan, Imus, Cavite,
where they transported a passenger, when their way was blocked by four (4)
armed men riding an owner-type jeepney. Without a word, the four men
frisked him and Darwin. He protested and asked what offense did they
commit. The arresting officers told him that they had just bought drugs from
Alapan. He reasoned out that he merely transported a passenger there but
the policemen still accosted him and he was brought to the Imus Police
Station where he was further investigated. The police officer, however, let
Darwin Reyes go. On cross-examination, the accused admitted that it was the
first time that he saw the police officers at the time he was arrested. He also
disclosed that he was previously charged with the same offense before
Branch 90 of this court which was already dismissed, and that the police
officers who testified in the said case are not the same as those involved in
this case.10
The Ruling of the RTC
On April 21, 2005, the RTC rendered its decision11 finding that Sanchez was
caught in flagrante delicto , in actual possession of shabu. It stated that the
police operatives had reasonable ground to believe that Sanchez was in
possession of the said dangerous drug and such suspicion was confirmed
when the match box Sanchez was carrying was found to contain shabu. The
RTC lent credence to the testimony of prosecution witness, SPO1 Elmer
Amposta (SPO1 Amposta) because there was no showing that he had been
impelled by any ill motive to falsely testify against Sanchez. The dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered convicting accused
Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili of Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165 and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment from twelve (12)
to fifteen (15) years and to pay a fine of Php300,000.00.
SO ORDERED.12
Unfazed, Sanchez appealed the RTC judgment of conviction before the CA. He
faulted the RTC for giving undue weight on the testimony of SPO1 Amposta
anchored merely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty
of the said arresting officer. He insisted that the prosecution evidence was
insufficient to establish his guilt.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA found no cogent reason to reverse or modify the findings of facts and
conclusions reached by the RTC and, thus, upheld the conviction of the
accused for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. According to
the CA, there was probable cause for the police officers to believe that
Sanchez was then and there committing a crime considering that he was seen
leaving the residence of a notorious drug dealer where, according to a tip
they received, illegal drug activities were being perpetrated. It concluded that
the confiscation by the police operative of the subject narcotic from Sanchez
was pursuant to a valid search. The CA then went on to write that non-
compliance by the police officers on the requirements of Section 21,
paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, particularly on the conduct of
inventory and photograph of the seized drug, was not fatal to the
prosecution’s cause since its integrity and evidentiary value had been duly
preserved. The fallo of the decision reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Imus,
Cavite dated April 21, 2005 and Order dated October 1, 2007 in Criminal Case
No. 10745-03 finding accused-appellant Rizaldy C. Sanchez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.13
Sanchez filed a motion for reconsideration of the July 25, 2012 Decision, but
it was denied by the CA in its November 20, 2012 Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
Bewailing his conviction, Sanchez filed the present petition for “certiorari”
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and anchored on the following
GROUNDS:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT,
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT HELD THAT ACCUSED WAS CAUGHT IN
FLAGRANTE DELICTO, HENCE, A SEARCH WARRANT WAS NO LONGER
NECESSARY; AND
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT HELD THAT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 21,
PARAGRAPH 1, ARTICLE II OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 DOES NOT
AUTOMATICALLY RENDER THE SEIZED ITEMS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
Sanchez insists on his acquittal. He argues that the warrantless arrest and
search on him were invalid due to the absence of probable cause on the part
of the police officers to effect an in flagrante delicto arrest under Section 15,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. He also contends that the failure of the police
operatives to comply with Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
renders the seized item inadmissible in evidence and creates reasonable
doubt on his guilt.
By way of Comment15 to the petition, the OSG prays for the affirmance of the
challenged July 25, 2012 decision of the CA. The OSG submits that the
warrantless search and seizure of the subject narcotic were justified under
the plain view doctrine where a police officer is not searching for evidence
against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object.
The Court’s Ruling
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
42
Preliminarily, the Court notes that this petition suffers from procedural
infirmity. Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the proper remedy
to question the CA judgment, final order or resolution, as in the present case,
is a petition for review on certiorari, which would be but a continuation of
the appellate process over the original case.16 By filing a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65, Sanchez therefore clearly availed himself of the
wrong remedy.
Be that as it may, the Court, in several cases before, had treated a petition for
certiorari as a petition for review under Rule 45, in accordance with the
liberal spirit and in the interest of substantial justice, particularly (1) if the
petition was filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition for
review; (2) errors of judgment are averred; and (3) there is sufficient reason
to justify the relaxation of the rules.17 The case at bench satisfies all the
above requisites and, hence, there is ample justification to treat this petition
for certiorari as a petition for review. Besides, it is axiomatic that the nature
of an action is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition and
the character of the relief sought.18 Here, stripped of allegations of “grave
abuse of discretion,” the petition actually avers errors of judgment rather
than of jurisdiction, which are the appropriate subjects of a petition for
review on certiorari.
Going now into the substance of the petition, the Court finds the same to be
impressed with merit.
Although it is true that the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect and not to be
disturbed on appeal, this rule, however, is not a hard and fast one. It is a time-
honored rule that the assessment of the trial court with regard to the
credibility of witnesses deserves the utmost respect, if not finality, for the
reason that the trial judge has the prerogative, denied to appellate judges, of
observing the demeanor of the declarants in the course of their testimonies.
But an exception exists if there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that would have affected the case.19 After going over the records
of the case at bench, the Court finds some facts of weight and substance that
have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court
which cast doubt on the guilt of Sanchez.
In sustaining the conviction of Sanchez, the CA ratiocinated that this was a
clear case of an in flagrante delicto arrest under paragraph (a) Section 5, Rule
113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. In this regard, the CA
wrote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the case at Bar, the acquisition of the regulated drug by the police officers
qualifies as a valid search following a lawful operation by the police officers.
The law enforcers acted on the directive of their superior based on an
information that the owner of the residence where Sanchez came from was a
notorious drug dealer. As Sanchez was seen leaving the said residence, the
law enforcers had probable cause to stop Sanchez on the road since there
was already a tip that illegal drug-related activities were perpetrated in the
place where he came from and seeing a match box held on one hand, the
police officers’ action were justified to inspect the same. The search
therefore, is a sound basis for the lawful seizure of the confiscated drug,
arrest and conviction of Sanchez.
 Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST

The case of People vs. Valdez (G.R. No. 127801, March 3, 1999) is instructive.
In that case, the police officers, by virtue of an information that a person
having been previously described by the informant, accosted Valdez and
upon inspection of the bag he was carrying, the police officers found the
information given to them to be true as it yielded marijuana leaves hidden in
the water jug and lunch box inside Valdez’s bag. The Supreme Court in
affirming the trial court’s ruling convicting Valdez declared that:
In this case, appellant was caught in flagrante since he was carrying
marijuana at the time of his arrest. A crime was actually being committed by
the appellant, thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely
under paragraph (a) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a
warrantless search incident to lawful arrest. While it is true that SPO1
Mariano was not armed with a search warrant when the search was
conducted over the personal effects of appellant, nevertheless, under the
circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said police
officer to believe that appellant was then and there committing a crime.
The cited case is akin to the circumstances in the instant appeal as in this
case, Sanchez, coming from the house of the identified drug dealer,
previously tipped by a concerned citizen, walked to a parked tricycle and
sped towards the direction of Kawit, Cavite. The search that gave way to the
seizure of the match box containing shabu was a reasonable course of event
that led to the valid warrantless arrest since there was sufficient probable
cause for chasing the tricycle he was in. (Underscoring supplied)
A judicious examination of the evidence on record belies the findings and
conclusions of the RTC and the CA.
At the outset, it is observed that the CA confused the search incidental to a
lawful arrest with the stop-and-frisk principle, a well-recognized exception to
the warrant requirement. Albeit it did not expressly state so, the CA labored
under the confused view that one and the other were indistinct and identical.
That confused view guided the CA to wrongly affirm the petitioner's
conviction. The Court must clear this confusion and correct the error.
It is necessary to remind the RTC and the CA that the Terry20 stop- and-frisk
search is entirely different from and should not be confused with the search
incidental to a lawful arrest envisioned under Section 13, Rule 126 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure. The distinctions have been made clear in
Malacat v. Court of Appeals21:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines
the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in
a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a
pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there
first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made -- the process cannot be
reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search
the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for
a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found
which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or
that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with
the means of escaping or committing violence.
xxxx
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a “stop-and-
frisk” as a "limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid
down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct
which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing
may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating
this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable
inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to
dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited
search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment x x x x.
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to
conduct a “stop-and-frisk,” it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a
hunch will not validate a “stop-and-frisk.” A genuine reason must exist, in
light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant
the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally,
a “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of
effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition
that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more
pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police
officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is
not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against the police officer.
In the case at bench, neither the in flagrante delicto arrest nor the stop- and-
frisk principle was applicable to justify the warrantless search and seizure
made by the police operatives on Sanchez. An assiduous scrutiny of the
factual backdrop of this case shows that the search and seizure on Sanchez
was unlawful. A portion of SPO1 Amposta’s testimony on direct examination
is revelatory, viz:
Pros. Villarin:
Q:
On March 19, 2003 at around 2:50 p.m., can you recall where were you?
A:
Yes, Mam.
Q:
Where were you?
A:
We were in Brgy. Alapan 1-B, Imus, Cavite.
Q:
What were you doing at Alapan 1-B, Imus, Cavite?
A:
We were conducting an operation against illegal drugs.
Q:
Who were with you?
A:
CSU Edmundo Hernandez, CSU Jose Tagle, Jr. and CSU Samuel Monzon.
Q:
Was the operation upon the instruction of your Superior?
A:
Our superior gave us the information that there were tricycle drivers buying
drugs from “Intang” or Jacinta Marciano. 43
Q:
What did you do after that?
A:
We waited for a tricycle who will go to the house of Jacinta Marciano.
Q:
After that what did you do?
A:
A tricycle with a passenger went to the house of “Intang” and when the
passenger boarded the tricycle, we chase[d] them.
Q:
After that, what happened next?
A:
When we were able to catch the tricycle, the tricycle driver and the passenger
alighted from the tricycle.
Q:
What did you do after they alighted from the tricycle?
A:
I saw the passenger holding a match box.
Q:
What did you do after you saw the passenger holding a match box?
A:
I asked him if I can see the contents of the match box.
Q:
Did he allow you?
A:
Yes, mam. He handed to me voluntarily the match box.
Court:
Q:
Who, the driver or the passenger?
A:
The passenger, sir.
Pros. Villarin:
Q:
After that what did you find out?
A:
I opened the match box and I found out that it contained a small transparent
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance.23
A search as an incident to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of
Court.24 It bears emphasis that the law requires that the search be incidental
to a lawful arrest. Therefore it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must
precede the search of a person and his belongings; the process cannot be
reversed.
Here, the search preceded the arrest of Sanchez. There was no arrest prior to
the conduct of the search. Arrest is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court as the taking of a person into custody that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense. Under Section 2, of the same rule,
an arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by
his voluntary submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.26
Even casting aside the petitioner’s version and basing the resolution of this
case on the general thrust of the prosecution evidence, no arrest was effected
by the police operatives upon the person of Sanchez before conducting the
search on him. It appears from the above quoted testimony of SPO1 Amposta
that after they caught up with the tricycle, its driver and the passenger,
Sanchez, alighted from it; that he noticed Sanchez holding a match box; and
that he requested Sanchez if he could see the contentsof the match box, to
which the petitioner acceded and handed it over to him. The arrest of
Sanchez was made only after the discovery by SPO1 Amposta of the shabu

inside the match box. Evidently, what happened in this case was that a search
was first undertaken and then later an arrest was effected based on the
evidence produced by the search.
Even granting arguendo that Sanchez was arrested before the search, still the
warrantless search and seizure must be struck down as illegal because the
warrantless arrest was unlawful. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure lays down the basic rules on lawful warrantless arrests, either by
a peace officer or a private person, as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a)
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actuallly
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b)
When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c)
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
xxx
For warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 (in flagrante delicto
arrest) to operate, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.27 On the
other hand, paragraph (b) of Section 5 (arrest effected in hot pursuit)
requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense has in fact
just been committed and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be apprehended has committed it. These
elements would be lacking in the case at bench.
The evidence on record reveals that no overt physical act could be properly
attributed to Sanchez as to rouse suspicion in the minds of the police
operatives that he had just committed, was committing, or was about to
commit a crime. Sanchez was merely seen by the police operatives leaving
the residence of a known drug peddler, and boarding a tricycle that
proceeded towards the direction of Kawit, Cavite. Such acts cannot in any
way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if Sanchez had exhibited
unusual or strange acts, or at the very least appeared suspicious, the same
would not have been considered overt acts in order for the police officers to
effect a lawful warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113.
It has not been established either that the rigorous conditions set forth in
paragraph (b) of Section 5 have been complied with in this warrantless
arrest. When the police officers chased the tricycle, they had no personal
knowledge to believe that Sanchez bought shabu from the notorious drug
dealer and actually possessed the illegal drug when he boarded the tricycle.
Probable cause has been held to signify a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged.28 The police officers in this case had no inkling
whatsoever as to what Sanchez did inside the house of the known drug
dealer. Besides, nowhere in the prosecution evidence does it show that the
drug dealer was conducting her nefarious drug activities inside her house so
as to warrant the police officers to draw a reasonable suspicion that Sanchez
must have gotten shabu from her and possessed the illegal drug when he
came out of the house. In other words, there was no overt manifestation on
the part of Sanchez that he had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or
was attempting to engage in the criminal activity of illegal possession of
shabu. Verily, probable cause in this case was more imagined than real.
In the same vein, there could be no valid “stop-and-frisk” search in the case at
bench. Elucidating on what constitutes “stop-and-frisk” operation and how it
is to be carried out, the Court in People v. Chua29 wrote:
A stop and frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on
the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. The
police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries,
approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious
conduct, in order to check the latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed
weapons. The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in
accordance with the police officer’s experience and the surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons (or
contraband) concealed about him. It should therefore be emphasized that a
search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.30
In this jurisdiction, what may be regarded as a genuine reason or a
reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop-and-frisk search had been
sufficiently illustrated in two cases. In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and
People,31 a policeman chanced upon Manalili in front of the cemetery who
appeared to be “high” on drugs as he was observed to have reddish eyes and
to be walking in a swaying manner. Moreover, he appeared to be trying to
avoid the policemen and when approached and asked what he was holding in
his hands, he tried to resist. When he showed his wallet, it contained
marijuana. The Court held that the policeman had sufficient reason to accost
Manalili to determine if he was actually “high” on drugs due to his suspicious
actuations, coupled with the fact that the area was a haven for drug addicts.
In People v. Solayao,32 the Court also found justifiable reason for the police
to stop and frisk the accused after considering the following circumstances:
the drunken actuations of the accused and his companions; the fact that his
companions fled when they saw the policemen; and the fact that the peace
officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that
armed persons where roaming the vicinity. Seemingly, the common thread of
these examples is the presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity,
which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity.
It was not so in the case at bench.
The Court does not find the totality of the circumstances described by SPO1
Amposta as sufficient to incite a reasonable suspicion that would justify a
stop-and-frisk search on Sanchez. Coming out from the house of a drug
pusher and boarding a tricycle, without more, were innocuous movements,
and by themselves alone could not give rise in the mind of an experienced
and prudent police officer of any belief that he had shabu in his possession, or
that he was probably committing a crime in the presence of the officer. There
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
was even no allegation that Sanchez left the house of the drug dealer in haste
44
or that he acted in any other suspicious manner. There was no showing
either that he tried to evade or outmaneuver his pursuers or that he
attempted to flee when the police officers approached him. Truly, his acts and
the surrounding circumstances could not have engendered any reasonable
suspicion on the part of the police officers that a criminal activity had taken
place or was afoot.
In the recent case of People v. Cogaed,33 where not a single suspicious
circumstance preceded the search on the accused, the Court ruled that the
questioned act of the police officer did not constitute a valid stop-and-frisk
operation. Cogaed was a mere passenger carrying a blue bag and a sack and
travelling aboard a jeepney. He did not exhibit any unusual or suspicious
behavior sufficient to justify the law enforcer in believing that he was
engaged in a criminal activity. Worse, the assessment of suspicion was made
not by the police officer but by the jeepney driver, who signaled to the police
officer that Cogaed was “suspicious.” In view of the illegality of the search and
seizure, the 12,337.6 grams of marijuana confiscated from the accused was
held as inadmissible.
The OSG characterizes the seizure of the subject shabu from Sanchez as
seizure of evidence in plain view. The Court disagrees.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer
who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure
and may be presented as evidence.34 The plain view doctrine applies when
the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in search of
the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from
which he can view a particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the
item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure.35
Measured against the foregoing standards, it is readily apparent that the
seizure of the subject shabu does not fall within the plain view exception.
First, there was no valid intrusion. As already discussed, Sanchez was illegally
arrested. Second, subject shabu was not inadvertently discovered, and third,
it was not plainly exposed to sight. Here, the subject shabu was allegedly
inside a match box being then held by Sanchez and was not readily apparent
or transparent to the police officers. In fact, SPO1 Amposta had to demand
from Sanchez the possession of the match box in order for him to open it and
examine its content. The shabu was not in plain view and its seizure without
the requisite search warrant is in violation of the law and the Constitution.
In the light of the foregoing, there being no lawful warrantless arrest and
warrantless search and seizure, the shabu purportedly seized from Sanchez
is inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous
tree. As the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged,
the accused must be acquitted and exonerated from the criminal charge of
violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
Furthermore, the Court entertains doubts whether the shabu allegedly seized
from Sanchez was the very same item presented during the trial of this case.
The Court notes that there were several lapses in the law enforcers’ handling

of the seized item which, when taken collectively, render the standards of
chain of custody seriously breached.
Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and
custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction.36 The function of the chain of custody
requirement is to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as to the identity of
the evidence are removed.37 Thus, the chain of custody requirement has a
two-fold purpose: (1) the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items, and (2) the removal of unnecessary doubts as to the
identity of the evidence.38
In this case, the prosecution failed to account for each and every link in the
chain of custody of the shabu, from the moment it was allegedly confiscated
up to the time it was presented before the court as proof of the corpus delicti.
The testimony of SPO1 Amposta was limited to the fact that he placed the
marking “RSC” on the seized drug; and that he and the three other police
officers brought Sanchez and the subject shabu to their station and turned
them over to their investigator. The prosecution evidence did not disclose
where the marking of the confiscated shabu took place and who witnessed it.
The evidence does not show who was in possession of the seized shabu from
the crime scene to the police station. A reading of the Certification, dated
March 20, 2003, issued by Forensic Chemist Salud Rosales shows that a
certain PO1 Edgardo Nario submitted the specimen to the NBI for laboratory
examination, but this piece of evidence does not establish the identity of the
police investigator to whom SPO1 Amposta and his group turned over the
seized shabu. The identities of the person who received the specimen at the
NBI laboratory and the person who had the custody and safekeeping of the
seized marijuana after it was chemically analyzed pending its presentation in
court were also not disclosed.
Given the procedural lapses pointed out above, a serious uncertainty hangs
over the identity of the seized shabu that the prosecution introduced in
evidence. The prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody,
resulting in rendering the seizure and confiscation of the shabu open to
doubt and suspicion. Hence, the incriminatory evidence cannot pass judicial
scrutiny.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed July 25, 2012 Decision
and the November 20, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 31742 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili
is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court orders the
immediate release of the petitioner, unless the latter is being lawfully held for
another cause; and to inform the Court of the date of his release, or reason for
his continued confinement, within ten (10) days from receipt of notice.
G.R. No. 128587 March 16, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S.
LAGUIO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Manila,
and LAWRENCE WANG Y CHEN, Respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
On pure questions of law, petitioner People of the Philippines has directly
come to this Court via this petition for review on certiorari to nullify and set
aside the Resolution1 dated 13 March 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 18, in Criminal Case Nos. 96-149990 to 96-149992, entitled
People of the Philippines v. Lawrence Wang y Chen, granting private
respondent Lawrence C. Wang’s Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of
the three (3) charges filed against him, namely: (1) Criminal Case No. 96-
149990 for Violation of Section 16, Article III in relation to Section 2(e)(2),
Article I of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act); (2) Criminal
Case No. 96-149991 for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms); and (3) Criminal Case No. 96-149992 for Violation
of Comelec Resolution No. 2828 in relation to R.A. No. 7166 (COMELEC Gun
Ban).
The three (3) separate Informations filed against Lawrence C. Wang in the
court of origin respectively read:
Criminal Case No. 96-149990 (Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act):
That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have
in his possession and under his custody and control a bulk of white and
yellowish crystalline substance known as SHABU contained in thirty-two
(32) transparent plastic bags weighing approximately 29.2941 kilograms,
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the
corresponding license or prescription therefor.
Contrary to law.2
Criminal Case No. 96-149991 (Illegal Possession of Firearms):
That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have
in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) DAEWOO Cal.
9mm, automatic pistol with one loaded magazine and one AMT Cal. .380
9mm automatic backup pistol with magazine loaded with ammunitions
without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from
the proper authorities.
Contrary to law. 3
Criminal Case No. 96-149992 (Violation of Comelec Gun Ban):
That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have
in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) DAEWOO Cal.
9mm automatic pistol with one loaded magazine and one (1) AMT Cal. 380
9mm automatic backup pistol with magazine loaded with ammunitions,
carrying the same along Maria Orosa St., Ermita, Manila, which is a public
place, on the date which is covered by an election period, without first
securing the written permission or authority from the Commission on
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
Elections, as provided by the COMELEC Resolution 2828 in relation to
45
Republic Act 7166.
Contrary to law. 4
During his arraignment, accused Wang refused to enter a plea to all the
Informations and instead interposed a continuing objection to the
admissibility of the evidence obtained by the police operatives. Thus, the trial
court ordered that a plea of "Not Guilty" be entered for him.5 Thereafter,
joint trial of the three (3) consolidated cases followed.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On 16 May 1996, at about 7:00 p.m., police operatives of the Public
Assistance and Reaction Against Crime of the Department of Interior and
Local Government, namely, Captain Margallo, Police Inspector Cielito Coronel
and SPO3 Reynaldo Cristobal, arrested SPO2 Vergel de Dios, Rogelio Anoble
and a certain Arellano, for unlawful possession of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug popularly known as shabu. In the course of
the investigation of the three arrested persons, Redentor Teck, alias Frank,
and Joseph Junio were identified as the source of the drug. An entrapment
operation was then set after the three were prevailed upon to call their
source and pretend to order another supply of shabu.
At around 11:00 p.m. that same date, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were
arrested while they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to SPO2
De Dios and company. Questioned, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio informed
the police operatives that they were working as talent manager and gymnast
instructor, respectively, of Glamour Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence
Wang. Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio did not disclose their source of shabu
but admitted that they were working for Wang.6 They also disclosed that
they knew of a scheduled delivery of shabu early the following morning of 17
May 1996, and that their employer (Wang) could be found at the Maria Orosa
Apartment in Malate, Manila. The police operatives decided to look for Wang
to shed light on the illegal drug activities of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio.
Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and his men then proceeded to Maria Orosa
Apartment and placed the same under surveillance.
Prosecution witness Police Inspector Cielito Coronel testified that at about
2:10 a.m. of 17 May 1996, Wang, who was described to the operatives by
Teck, came out of the apartment and walked towards a parked BMW car. On
nearing the car, he (witness) together with Captain Margallo and two other
police officers approached Wang, introduced themselves to him as police
officers, asked his name and, upon hearing that he was Lawrence Wang,
immediately frisked him and asked him to open the back compartment of the
BMW car.7 When frisked, there was found inside the front right pocket of
Wang and confiscated from him an unlicensed AMT Cal. 380 9mm automatic
Back-up Pistol loaded with ammunitions. At the same time, the other
members of the operatives searched the BMW car and found inside it were
the following items: (a) 32 transparent plastic bags containing white
crystalline substance with a total weight of 29.2941 kilograms, which
substance was later analyzed as positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug locally known as shabu; (b) cash in the
amount of ₱650,000.00; (c) one electronic and one mechanical scales; and (d)

an unlicensed Daewoo 9mm Pistol with magazine. Then and there, Wang
resisted the warrantless arrest and search.8
On 6 December 1996, the prosecution rested its case and upon motion,
accused Wang was granted 25 days from said date within which to file his
intended Demurrer to Evidence.9 On 19 December 1996, the prosecution
filed a Manifestation10 to the effect that it had rested its case only in so far as
the charge for Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act in Criminal Case No. 96-
149990 is concerned, and not as regards the two cases for Illegal Possession
of Firearms (Crim. Case No. 96-149991) and Violation of the Comelec Gun
Ban (Crim. Case No. 96-149992). Accordingly, trial continued.
On 9 January 1997, Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence,11 praying
for his acquittal and the dismissal of the three (3) cases against him for lack
of a valid arrest and search warrants and the inadmissibility of the
prosecution’s evidence against him. Considering that the prosecution has not
yet filed its Opposition to the demurrer, Wang filed an Amplification12 to his
Demurrer of Evidence on 20 January 1997. On 12 February 1997, the
prosecution filed its Opposition13 alleging that the warrantless search was
legal as an incident to the lawful arrest and that it has proven its case, so it is
now time for the defense to present its evidence.
On 13 March 1997, the respondent judge, the Hon. Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr.,
issued the herein assailed Resolution14 granting Wang’s Demurrer to
Evidence and acquitting him of all charges for lack of evidence, thus:
WHEREFORE, the accused's undated Demurrer to Evidence is hereby
granted; the accused is acquitted of the charges against him for the crimes of
Violation of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act, Illegal
Possession of Firearms, and Violation of Comelec Gun Ban, for lack of
evidence; the 32 bags of shabu with a total weight of 29.2941 kilograms and
the two unlicensed pistols, one AMT Cal. .380 9mm and one Daewoo Cal.
9mm. are ordered confiscated in favor of the government and the branch
clerk is directed to turn over the 32 bags of shabu to the Dangerous Drugs
Board in Intramuros, Manila, and the two firearms to the Firearms and
Explosive Units, PNP, Camp Crame, Quezon City, for proper disposition, and
the officer-in-charge of PARAC, Department of Interior and Local
Government, is ordered to return the confiscated amount of P650,000.00 to
the accused, and the confiscated BMW car to its registered owner, David Lee.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition15 for review on certiorari by the People, submitting that
the trial court erred -
I pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due process of law and
XXX IN HOLDING THAT THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES DID
NOT CONSTITUTE PROBABLE CAUSE WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF
SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION, AND IN HOLDING THAT
SUCH FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES NEITHER JUSTIFIED THE
WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF ACCUSED'S VEHICLE AND THE SEIZURE OF THE
CONTRABAND THEREIN.
ll
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
XXX IN HOLDING, IN EFFECT, THAT A WARRANTLESS SEARCH IS An order granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence is a resolution of the
CONSTITUTIONALLY ALLOWABLE AND CAN ONLY BE VALID AS AN 46
case on the merits, and it amounts to an acquittal. Generally, any further
INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST. prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy. To this general rule, however, the Court has
lII
XXX IN DECLARING THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE ACCUSED AND previously made some exceptions.
THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF HIS HANDGUNS UNLAWFUL.
The celebrated case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan22 presents one exception to
IV the rule on double jeopardy, which is, when the prosecution is denied due
XXX IN NOT DECLARING THE ACCUSED AS HAVING WAIVED, AS A RESULT process of law:
OF HIS SUBMISSION AND FAILURE TO PROTEST THE SEARCH AND HIS
ARREST, HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH
No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions" from
AND SEIZURE AND HIS OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSION OF THE EVIDENCE
SEIZED. the very President who by an amendatory decree (disclosed only at the
hearing of oral arguments on November 8, 1984 on a petition challenging the
V referral of the Aquino-Galman murder cases to the Tanodbayan and
XXX IN NOT ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE EVIDENCE SEIZED AND Sandiganbayan instead of to a court martial, as mandatorily required by the
OFFERED BY THE PROSECUTION AND IN NOT DENYING ACCUSED'S known P.D. 1850 at the time providing for exclusive jurisdiction of courts
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE. martial over criminal offenses committed by military men) made it possible
to refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial court, which is
In its Resolution16 of 9 July 1997, the Court, without giving due course to the
the very essence of due process of law. As the writer then wrote, "jurisdiction
petition, required the public and private respondents to comment thereon
over cases should be determined by law, and not by preselection of the
within ten days from notice. Private respondent Wang filed his
Executive, which could be much too easily transformed into a means of
comment17on 18 August 1997.
predetermining the outcome of individual cases." This criminal collusion as
to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the
On 10 September 1997, the Court required the People to file a reply,18 which
secret Malacañang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by
the Office of the Solicitor General did on 5 December 1997, after several
Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan
extensions.19
and voided ab initio its verdict. This renders moot and irrelevant for now the
extensive arguments of respondents accused, particularly Generals Ver and
On 20 October 2004, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and
Olivas and those categorized as accessories, that there has been no evidence
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda,20 which they
or witness suppressed against them, that the erroneous conclusions of Olivas
did.
as police investigator do not make him an accessory of the crimes he
investigated and the appraisal and evaluation of the testimonies of the
The case presents two main issues: (a) whether the prosecution may appeal
witnesses presented and suppressed. There will be time and opportunity to
the trial court’s resolution granting Wang’s demurrer to evidence and
present all these arguments and considerations at the remand and retrial of
acquitting him of all the charges against him without violating the
the cases herein ordered before a neutral and impartial court.
constitutional proscription against double jeopardy; and (b) whether there
was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police operatives in this case
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty
despite the absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a search warrant.
of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are
courts of law and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if
First off, it must be emphasized that the present case is an appeal filed
they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and
directly with this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial
in relation to Rule 41, Section 2, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court raising
power whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to
only pure questions of law, ordinary appeal by mere filing of a notice of
all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention
appeal not being allowed as a mode of appeal directly to this Court. Then, too,
or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures
it bears stressing that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part
of politics and prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the
of due process, it being merely a statutory privilege which may be exercised
world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system
only in the manner provided for by law (Velasco v. Court of Appeals21).
is at stake. In life, as an accused before the military tribunal Ninoy had
Although Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that
any party may appeal, the right of the People to appeal is, in the very same
trial in the regular civil courts before an impartial court with an unbiased
provision, expressly made subject to the prohibition against putting the
prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim of the "treacherous and vicious
accused in double jeopardy. It also basic that appeal in criminal cases throws
assassination" and the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved
the whole records of the case wide open for review by the appellate court,
parties plead once more for due process of law and a retrial before an
that is why any appeal from a judgment of acquittal necessarily puts the
impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. The Court is constrained to
accused in double jeopardy. In effect, the very same Section 2 of Rule 122 of
declare the sham trial a mock trial — the non-trial of the century — and that
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, disallows appeal by the People from
the predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.
judgments of acquittal.

1. No double jeopardy. — It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot
be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of
dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign
people in criminal cases is denied due process. As the Court stressed in the
1985 case of People vs. Bocar,
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and
prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional
rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's
right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue (Gumabon vs.
Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971])
which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the
fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in
disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction (Aducayen vs. Flores, L-
30370 [May 25, 19731, 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA
416 Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding
such violation may be regarded as a "lawless thing, which can be treated as
an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head"
(Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).
Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for
lack of jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of
double jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa, supra).
xxx xxx xxx
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a
competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered;
and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court was
not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of
the prosecution to due process.
In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the
criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts
amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose
the accused to a second jeopardy.
Another exception is when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence.
In point is the fairly recent case of People v. Uy,23 which involved the trial
court’s decision which granted the two separate demurrers to evidence filed
by the two accused therein, both with leave of court, resulting in their
acquittal of their respective charges of murder due to insufficiency of
evidence. In resolving the petition for certiorari filed directly with this Court,
we had the occasion to explain:
The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a judgment of acquittal is final and
unappealable. People v. Court of Appeals explains the rationale of this rule:
In our jurisdiction, the finality-of-acquittal doctrine as a safeguard against
double jeopardy faithfully adheres to the principle first enunciated in Kepner
v. United States. In this case, verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as
absolutely final and irreviewable. The cases of United States v. Yam Tung
Way, People v. Bringas, Gandicela v. Lutero, People v. Cabarles, People v. Bao,
to name a few, are illustrative cases. The fundamental philosophy behind the
constitutional proscription against double jeopardy is to afford the
defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from
government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes. As
succinctly observed in Green v. United States "(t)he underlying idea, one that
is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is
that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to
live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the
possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty." (Underscoring
supplied)
The same rule applies in criminal cases where a demurrer to evidence is
granted. As held in the case of People v. Sandiganbayan:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed
after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it
calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its
sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a
dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the
accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to
evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in
double-jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.
(Italics in the original)
Like any other rule, however, the above-said rule is not absolute. By way of
exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon a clear
showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused,
committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due
process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Sanvicente v. People,24 the Court allowed the review of a decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed the accused’s acquittal upon demurrer
to evidence filed by the accused with leave of court, the CA ruling that the
trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in preventing the prosecution
from establishing the due execution and authenticity of certain letter marked
therein as Exhibit "LL," which supposedly "positively identified therein
petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime charged." The Court, in a petition
for certiorari, sustained the CA’s power to review the order granting the
demurrer to evidence, explaining thus:
Under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, the trial court may dismiss the action on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused
with or without leave of court. In resolving accused’s demurrer to evidence,
the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or
sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or support a verdict of guilt.
The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion
of the trial court and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the
absence of a grave abuse of discretion. Significantly, once the court grants the
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
demurrer, such order amounts to an acquittal and any further prosecution of
47
the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.
This constitutes an exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case
made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a
plea of double jeopardy. The finality-of-acquittal rule was stressed thus in
People v. Velasco:
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the
trial court cuts deep into the "humanity of the laws and in jealous
watchfulness over the rights of the citizens, when brought in unequal contest
with the State xxx. Thus Green expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying
idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of
jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well
as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found
guilty."
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted
defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the
finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the
absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal
justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful
conviction." The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively
to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose", a
desire to know the exact extent of one’s liability. With this right of repose, the
criminal justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent,
even those whose innocence rests upon a jury’s leniency, will not be found
guilty in a subsequent proceeding.
Given the far-reaching scope of an accused’s right against double jeopardy,
even an appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence will not lie.
The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to
present its case or where the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari may
be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an
extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court
blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very
power to dispense justice. (Emphasis supplied.)
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders
of trial courts granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence. This may be done
via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such
dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy.
Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate
court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused
against double jeopardy is not violated.
Unfortunately, what petitioner People of the Philippines, through then
Secretary of Justice Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. and then Solicitor General
Silvestre H. Bello, III, filed with the Court in the present case is an appeal by
way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 raising a pure

question of law, which is different from a petition for certiorari under Rule
65.
In Madrigal Transport Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation,25 we have
enumerated the distinction between the two remedies/actions, to wit:
Appeal and Certiorari Distinguished
Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial
distinctions which shall be explained below.
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors
of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC,
we explained the simple reason for the rule in this light:
"When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged
does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is
committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its
jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This
cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a
rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble through the original civil action
of certiorari."
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of
certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic
correctness of a judgment of the lower court -- on the basis either of the law
or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision.
Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction
over the case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari.
Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact -- a
mistake of judgment -- appeal is the remedy.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate
jurisdiction and power of review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its
original jurisdiction in accordance with its power of control and supervision
over the proceedings of lower courts. An appeal is thus a continuation of the
original suit, while a petition for certiorari is an original and independent
action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the
judgment or order complained of. The parties to an appeal are the original
parties to the action. In contrast, the parties to a petition for certiorari are the
aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the lower
court or quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the public and the
private respondents, respectively).
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the
Rules of Court so declared are appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an
original action for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order
of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy.
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days
from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on
appeal is required, the appellant must file a notice of appeal and a record on
appeal within thirty days from the said notice of judgment or final order. A
petition for review should be filed and served within fifteen days from the
notice of denial of the decision, or of the petitioner’s timely filed motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the
petition should be filed also within fifteen days from the notice of judgment
or final order, or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty
days from the notice of judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration was timely filed, the period shall be
counted from the denial of the motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for
reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a petition for
certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged
errors. Note also that this motion is a plain and adequate remedy expressly
available under the law. Such motion is not required before appealing a
judgment or final order.
Also in Madrigal, we stressed that the special civil action of certiorari and
appeal are two different remedies mutually exclusive; they are neither
alternative nor successive. Where appeal is available, certiorari will not
prosper. In the dismissal of a criminal case upon demurrer to evidence,
appeal is not available as such an appeal will put the accused in double
jeopardy. Certiorari, however, is allowed.
For being the wrong remedy taken by petitioner People of the Philippines in
this case, this petition is outrightly dismissible. The Court cannot reverse the
assailed dismissal order of the trial court by appeal without violating private
respondent’s right against double jeopardy.
Even assuming that the Court may treat an "appeal" as a special civil action of
certiorari, which definitely this Court has the power to do, when there is a
clear showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the lower court, the
instant petition will nevertheless fail on the merits as the succeeding
discussion will show.
There are actually two (2) acts involved in this case, namely, the warrantless
arrest and the warrantless search. There is no question that warrantless
search may be conducted as an incident to a valid warrantless arrest. The law
requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the
process cannot be reversed.26 However, if there are valid reasons to conduct
lawful search and seizure which thereafter shows that the accused is
currently committing a crime, the accused may be lawfully arrested in
flagrante delicto27 without need for a warrant of arrest.
Finding that the warrantless arrest preceded the warrantless search in the
case at bar, the trial court granted private respondent's demurrer to evidence
and acquitted him of all the three charges for lack of evidence, because the
unlawful arrest resulted in the inadmissibility of the evidence gathered from
an invalid warrantless search. The trial court’s ratiocination is quoted as
follows:
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
The threshold issue raised by the accused in his Demurrer to Evidence is
48
whether his warrantless arrest and search were lawful as argued by the
prosecution, or unlawful as asserted by the defense.
Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, a peace officer may
arrest a person without a warrant: (a) when in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense; (b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it, and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while being transferred from one
confinement to another. None of these circumstances were present when the
accused was arrested. The accused was merely walking from the Maria Orosa
Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police
officers arrested and frisked him and searched his car. The accused was not
committing any visible offense at the time of his arrest. Neither was there an
indication that he was about to commit a crime or that he had just committed
an offense. The unlicensed AMT Cal.380 9mm Automatic Back-up Pistol that
the accused had in his possession was concealed inside the right front pocket
of his pants. And the handgun was bantam and slim in size that it would not
give an outward indication of a concealed gun if placed inside the pant's side
pocket as was done by the accused. The arresting officers had no information
and knowledge that the accused was carrying an unlicensed handgun, nor did
they see him in possession thereof immediately prior to his arrest.
Ditto on the 32 bags of shabu and the other unlicensed Daewoo Cal. 9mm
Pistol with magazine that were found and seized from the car. The
contraband items in the car were not in plain view. The 32 bags of shabu
were in the trunk compartment, and the Daewoo handgun was underneath
the driver’s seat of the car. The police officers had no information, or
knowledge that the banned articles were inside the car, or that the accused
had placed them there. The police officers searched the car on mere suspicion
that there was shabu therein.
On this matter, pertinent portions of the testimonies of Police Inspector
Cielito Coronel and SP03 Reynaldo are hereunder quoted:
POLICE INSPECTOR CIELITO CORONEL’S TESTIMONY
"PROSECUTOR TO WITNESS: Direct-Examination
Q. Mr. Witness, what was your role or participation in this case?
A. I am one of those responsible for the arrest of the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Where did you make that arrest, Mr. Witness?
A. The apprehension was made in front of an apartment along Maria Orosa
Street, Ermita, Manila.
Q. What date was that when you arrested the accused?
A. It was on May 17, 1996, at about 2:10 a.m.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. What was the reason why you together with other policemen effected the
arrest of the accused?

A. We arrested him because of the information relayed to us by one of those
whom we have previously apprehended in connection with the delivery of
shabu somewhere also in Ermita, Manila.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. When you established that he was somewhere at Maria Orosa, what did
you do?
A. We waited for him.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. You yourself, Mr. Witness, where did you position yourself during that
time?
A. I was inside a vehicle waiting for the accused to appear.
Q. What about your other companions where were they?
A. They were position in strategic places within the area.
Q. What happened when you and your companions were positioned in that
place?
A. That was when the accused arrived.
Q. How many of your approached him.
A. Inspector Margallo, myself and two other operatives.
Q. What happened when you approached the accused, Mr. Witness?
A. We introduced ourselves as police officers and we frisked him and we
asked him to open the back compartment of his car.
Q. You said you frisked him, what was the result of that?
A. He was found in possession of one back-up pistol with one loaded
magazine and likewise when the compartment was opened several plastic
bags containing white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu (were
found).
Q. What did you do when you found out Mr. Witness?
A. When the car was further search we later found another firearm, a Daewoo
Pistol at the place under the seat of the driver.
Q. Then what happened?
A. He was brought to our headquarters at Mandaluyong for further
investigation.
Q. What about the suspected shabu that you recovered, what did you do with
that?
A. The suspected shabu that we recovered were forwarded to the NBI for
laboratory examination.
Q. Did you come to know the results?
A. It was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. (TSN, pp. 3-8,
November 15, 1996).
ATTY. LOZANO TO WITNESS: CROSS
Q. You arrested Joseph Junio and Redentor Teck for alleged transporting of
shabu on May 16, 1996, at 11:00 p.m., is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. You asked Redentor Teck where he is employed, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Redentor Teck told you that he is a talent manager at the Glenmore
Modeling Agency, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
.Q. The Glenmore Modeling Agency is owned by Lawrence Wang, is it not?
A. I supposed, Sir.
Q. And that is why immediately after Redentor Teck told you that he is an
employee of the Glenmore Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang,
naturally, you and your companions look for Lawrence Wang to shed light on
the transporting of shabu by Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Thereafter, you spotted a person previously described by Redentor Teck
as Lawrence Wang, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. While you were arresting Lawrence Wang, your companions at the same
time searched the BMW car described in your affidavit of arrest, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Lawrence Wang was not inside the BMW car while the same was searched,
is it not?
A. He was outside, Sir.
Q. The driver of the car was inside the car when the arrest and search were
made, is it not?
A. He was likewise outside, Sir.
Q. Lawrence Wang did resist arrest and search is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. When you effected the arrest, there was no warrant of arrest, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. When the search was made on the BMW car, there was no search warrant,
is it not?
A. Yes, none, Sir. (TSN, pp. 3-12, November 15, 1996)
SPO3 REYNALDO CRISTOBAL’S TESTIMONY
PROSECUTOR TO WITNESS: DIRECT EXAMINATION
Q. What is you role or participation in this case?
A. I was one of the arresting officers and investigator, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. What kind of specific offense did the accused allegedly do so that you
arrested him, Mr. Witness?
A. He was arrested on the basis of the recovered drugs in his possession
placed inside his car.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Mr. witness, you said that you recovered drug from the car of the accused,
please tell us the antecedent circumstances which led you to recover or
confiscate these items?
A. Earlier in the evening about 11:00 p.m. of May 16, we arrested one
Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio.
COURT: Where did you arrest these people?
A :They were arrested in Metro Manila also.
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
COURT: The same date? 49
A. May 16, about 11:00 p.m. They were arrested and when they were
investigated, Teck mentioned the name of Lawrence Wang as his employer.
COURT: Why were these people, arrested?
A. For violation of R.A. 6425.
COURT: How were they arrested?
A. They were arrested while in the act of transporting shabu or handling
shabu to another previously arrested person. It was a series of arrest.
COURT: So, this involved a series of operation?
A. Yes, Your Honor. About 11:00 p.m. of May 16, we arrested three (3)
persons, SPO2 Vergel de Dios, a certain Arellano and a certain Rogelio Noble.
When they were arrested they divulged the name of the source.
COURT: They were arrested for what, for possession?
A. Yes, Your Honor. For unlawful possession of shabu . Then they divulged to
us the name of the person from whom they get shabu.
COURT: Whose name did they mention:
A. One Alias Frank, who turned out to be Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio. We
let them call Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio thru the cellphone and pretend
and to order another supply of shabu.
COURT: So there was an entrapment?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
COURT: So, these two (2) were arrested?
A. While they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to Noble and
company.
COURT: And these two reveals (revealed) some information to you as to the
source of the shabu?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
COURT: What was the information?
A. Teck told us that he is an employee of Lawrence Wang.
COURT: What did you do when you were told about that?
A. They also told us that there was an ongoing delivery of shabu on that
morning.
COURT: When?
A. Of that date early morning of May 17, 1996.
COURT: At what place?
A. We asked them where we could find Lawrence Wang and Teck lead us to
Maria Orosa Apartment where we conducted a stake out which lasted up to
2:00 a.m.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT: What happened during the stake out?
A. When the person of the accused was identified to us, we saw him opening
his car together with his driver.
COURT: So, he was about to leave when you saw him?
A. Probably, Sir.
COURT: What did you do?
A. We saw him opened his car and we have a suspicion that there was a
shabu inside the compartment of the car.

xxx xxx xxx
COURT: All right, when you saw the accused opened his car, what did you do?
A. We approached him.
COURT: What happened when you approached him?
A. We suspected the shabu inside the compartment of his car.
COURT: And this shabu that you saw inside the compartment of the car, what
did you do with that?
A. Well, he was first arrested by Captain Margallo and Lt. Coronel while I was
the one who inspected and opened the compartment of the car and saw the
shabu. (TSN, pp. 15-24, December 16, 1996).
CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONING OF SPO3 CRISTOBAL BY THE COURT
COURT: From your testimony and that of Police Inspector Cielito Coronel,
this Court has gathered that prior to the arrest of the accused there were
three (3) men that your team arrested. One of whom is a police officer.
A: Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT: And on the occasion of the arrest of these three men shabu were
confiscated from them?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And in the course of the investigation of these three men, you were able to
discover that Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were the source of the
regulated drug that were confiscated from the three men that you have
arrested?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Now, thru entrapment base[d] on your testimony you were able to
apprehend also these two men, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio?
A: Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: These two men, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio they were also
investigated by your team?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: You were present while they were investigated?
A: I was the one whom investigated them.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did you ask Redentor and Joseph the source of shabu that you confiscated
from them at the time of the (their) arrest?
A: Yes, Sir. They refuse to say the source, however, they told me that they
were working for the accused.
Q: You also testified that Redentor informed you that there was another
delivery of shabu scheduled that morning of (stop) was it May 16 or 17? The
other delivery that is scheduled on?
A: On the 17th.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did he tell you who was to make the delivery?
A: No, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: At that time when you decided to look for the accused to ask him to shed
light on the matter concerning the arrest of these two employees in
possession of shabu. Did you and did your team suspect the accused as being
involved in the transaction that lead (led) to the arrest of Redentor and
Joseph?
A: Yes, Sir. We suspected that he was the source of the shabu.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When you saw the accused walking towards his car, did you know whether
he was carrying a gun?
A: No, Sir. It cannot be seen.
Q: It was concealed?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: So, the only time that you and your team learned that he was in possession
of the gun is when he was bodily search?
A: Yes, Sir. That is the only time that I came to know about when Capt.
Margallo handed to me the gun.
Q: Other than walking towards his car, the accused was not doing anything
else?
A: None, Sir.
Q: That would invite your suspicion or give indication that he was intending
to do something unlawful or illegal?
A: No, Sir.
Q: When you searched the car, did the accused protest or try to prevent your
team from searching his car?
A: No, Sir." (TSN pp. 3-16, Feb. 26, 1997)
Clearly therefore, the warrantless arrest of the accused and the search of his
person and the car were without probable cause and could not be licit. The
arrest of the accused did not fall under any of the exception to the
requirements of warrantless arrests, (Sec. 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court) and is
therefore, unlawful and derogatory of his constitutional right of liberty. x x x
The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the arrest
preceded the search, and finding no basis to rule in favor of a lawful arrest, it
ruled that the incidental search is likewise unlawful. Any and all pieces of
evidence acquired as a consequence thereof are inadmissible in evidence.
Thus, the trial court dismissed the case for lack of evidence.
Contrary to its position at the trial court, the People, however, now posits
that "inasmuch as it has been shown in the present case that the seizure
without warrant of the regulated drugs and unlicensed firearms in the
accused’s possession had been validly made upon probable cause and under
exigent circumstances, then the warrantless arrest of the accused must
necessarily have to be regarded as having been made on the occasion of the
commission of the crime in flagrante delicto, and therefore constitutionally
and statutorily permissible and lawful."28 In effect, the People now contends
that the warrantless search preceded the warrantless arrest. Since the case
falls under an exception to the general rule requiring search warrant prior to
a valid search and seizure, the police officers were justified in requiring the
private respondent to open his BMW car’s trunk to see if he was carrying
illegal drugs.
The conflicting versions as to whether the arrest preceded the search or vice
versa, is a matter of credibility of evidence. It entails appreciation of
evidence, which may be done in an appeal of a criminal case because the
entire case is thrown open for review, but not in the case of a petition for
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
certiorari where the factual findings of the trial court are binding upon the
50
Court. Since a dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not
subject to appeal and reviewable only by certiorari, the factual finding that
the arrest preceded the search is conclusive upon this Court. The only legal
basis for this Court to possibly reverse and set aside the dismissal order of
the trial court upon demurrer to evidence would be if the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in excess of jurisdiction when it ruled
that there was no legal basis to lawfully effect a warrantless arrest.
The pertinent provisions of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on
warrantless arrest provide:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
Section 5, above, provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may
be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a
suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is
probable cause that said suspect was the author of a crime which had just
been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending.
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under
paragraph (a) of Section 5 to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.291awphi1.nét
The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not manifest
any suspicious behavior on the part of private respondent Lawrence Wang
that would reasonably invite the attention of the police. He was merely
walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked
BMW car when the police operatives arrested him, frisked and searched his
person and commanded him to open the compartment of the car, which was
later on found to be owned by his friend, David Lee. He was not committing
any visible offense then. Therefore, there can be no valid warrantless arrest
in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that
"reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious
enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not
sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante
delicto arrest.30

Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of
Section 5. What is clearly established from the testimonies of the arresting
officers is that Wang was arrested mainly on the information that he was the
employer of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio who were previously arrested
and charged for illegal transport of shabu. Teck and Junio did not even
categorically identify Wang to be their source of the shabu they were caught
with in flagrante delicto. Upon the duo’s declaration that there will be a
delivery of shabu on the early morning of the following day, May 17, which is
only a few hours thereafter, and that Wang may be found in Maria Orosa
Apartment along Maria Orosa Street, the arresting officers conducted
"surveillance" operation in front of said apartment, hoping to find a person
which will match the description of one Lawrence Wang, the employer of
Teck and Junio. These circumstances do not sufficiently establish the
existence of probable cause based on personal knowledge as required in
paragraph (b) of Section 5.
And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under paragraph (c) of
Section 5.
The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that the
warrantless arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to
the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful.
In People v. Aminnudin,31 the Court declared as inadmissible in evidence the
marijuana found in appellant’s possession during a search without a warrant,
because it had been illegally seized, in disregard of the Bill of Rights:
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest,
committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he
had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the
M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest.
To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him
as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became a suspect and so
subject to apprehension. It was the fugitive finger that triggered his arrest.
The identification of the informer was the probable cause as determined by
the officer (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin
and immediately arrest him.
The People’s contention that Wang waived his right against unreasonable
search and seizure has no factual basis. While we agree in principle that
consent will validate an otherwise illegal search, however, based on the
evidence on record, Wang resisted his arrest and the search on his person
and belongings.32 The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any,
could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at
all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.33 Moreover, the
continuing objection to the validity of the warrantless arrest made of record
during the arraignment bolsters Wang’s claim that he resisted the
warrantless arrest and search.
We cannot close this ponencia without a word of caution: those who are
supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of
liberty. As Justice Holmes once said, "I think it is less evil that some criminals
should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is
simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another,
especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.34
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.
G.R. No. 184658 March 6, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE RAFAEL R.
LAGOS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 79, JONATHAN DY y RUBIC, CASTEL
VINCI ESTACIO y TOLENTINO, AND CARLO CASTRO y CANDO,
Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
Before this Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking
to reverse the following Orders in Criminal Case No. Q-07-146628 issued by
public respondent Judge Rafael R. Lagos (Judge Lagos), presiding judge of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 79:
1. The Order issued on 23 April 2008, granting respondents' Petition for Bail
and Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence;1
2. The Order issued on 24 June 2008 granting the demurrer to evidence filed
by respondents and acquitting them of the crime of illegal sale of drugs
punishable under Section 5, Article II, Republic Act 9165;2
3. The Order issued on 24 July 2008, which: a) denied petitioner's Motion for
Inhibition, b) denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the 24 July
2008 Order; and c) granted respondents’ Motion to withdraw their cash
bonds.3
On 30 March 2007, at 11:00 a.m., a confidential informant (CI) appeared
before the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force (AIDSOTF) of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) in Camp Crame, Quezon City. The CI relayed
to Police Senior Inspector Fidel Fortaleza, Jr. (P S/Insp. Fortaleza) that an
individual using the alias "Brian" was engaged in the illegal sale of the
prohibited drug "ecstasy" in BF Homes, Parañaque City.4 The CI further
reported that "Brian," who was later identified as herein private respondent
Castel Vinci Estacio y Tolentino (Estacio), promised a commission from any
transaction the former would help arrange. P S/Insp. Fortaleza, as team
leader of the AIDSOTF, assembled and briefed the team that would conduct
the buy-bust operation. Police Officer (PO) 2 Marlo V. Frando (PO2 Frando)
was assigned to act as the poseur-buyer and PO2 Ruel P. Cubian (PO2
Cubian) as back-up, while the rest of the team members were to serve as
perimeter security. P S/Insp. Fortaleza and PO2 Leonard So prepared and
dusted two ₱500 bills for use as buy-bust money. The CI then called
respondent Estacio, informing him that a prospective buyer wished to
purchase thirty (30) tablets of ecstasy with a total value of ₱50,000.5 That
afternoon, respondent Estacio instructed them to proceed to Tandang Sora
Avenue, Quezon City, where the transaction was to take place.6
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
At 11:00 p.m. of the same day, Estacio alighted from a Toyota Vios car at the
51
Jollibee branch located at the corner of Commonwealth Avenue and Tandang
Sora. PO2 Frando, accompanied by the CI, approached Estacio. After PO2
Frando was introduced to Estacio as the prospective buyer, the latter
demanded to see the payment. However, PO2 Frando asked him to first show
the ecstasy pills.7 Estacio then opened the doors of the vehicle and
introduced his two companions, Carlo and Jonathan (later identified as
herein respondents Jonathan Dy and Carlo Castro), to PO2 Frando and the CI.
Respondent Castro handed PO2 Frando one sealed plastic sachet containing
several pink pills. The latter gave the "boodle" money to respondent Dy and
immediately removed his baseball cap. The removal of the cap was the
prearranged signal to the rest of the buy-bust team that the transaction was
complete.8
PO2 Frando introduced himself as a police officer and informed respondents
of their constitutional rights.9 PO2 Cubian frisked respondent Dy and was
able to recover the buy-bust money.10 Respondents were then escorted to
the AIDSOTF office in Camp Crame, where they identified themselves as
Castel Vinci Estacio y Tolentino, Carlo Castro y Cando, and Jonathan Dy y
Rubic. As officer in charge of the inventory of the evidence seized, PO2
Cubian turned over the plastic sachet to PO3 Jose Rey Serrona, who was in
charge of the investigation.11 On 31 March 2007, forensic chemist and Police
Senior Inspector Yelah C. Manaog (P S/Insp. Manaog) conducted a laboratory
examination of the contents of the sachet, which was completed at 10:50 a.m.
that same day.12 The 30 pink pills were found positive for
methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) hydrochloride, commonly
known as ecstasy, a dangerous drug.13
An Information dated 3 April 2007 was filed against respondents for the sale
of dangerous drugs, in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
(R.A.) 9165. The case was raffled to the sala of Judge Fernando Sagum, Jr. of
the Quezon City RTC. Upon arraignment, respondents pleaded not guilty to
the charges. Trial ensued, and the prosecution presented its evidence,
including the testimonies of four witnesses: PO2 Marlo V. Frando, PO2 Ruel P.
Cubian, Police Senior Inspector Yelah C. Manaog, and PO3 Jose Rey Serrona.
After the prosecution submitted its Formal Offer of Evidence on 17
November 2007, respondents filed a Motion for leave of court to file their
demurrer, as well as a Motion to resolve their Petition for Bail. On 2 January
2008, Judge Sagum issued a Resolution denying both the Petition for Bail and
the Motion for leave of court to file a demurrer. Respondent Estacio then
sought the inhibition of Judge Sagum, a move subsequently adopted by
respondents Dy and Castro. On 15 January 2008, Presiding Judge Sagum
inhibited himself from the case. On 31 January 2008, the case was re-raffled
to public respondent Judge Lagos.
Judge Lagos issued the first assailed Order on 23 April 2008 granting
respondents’ Petition for Bail and allowing them to file their demurrer. On 24
June 2008, he issued the second assailed Order, acquitting all the accused. On
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the People, he issued the third assailed
Order denying the above motion and granting the Motion to Withdraw Cash
Bonds filed by the accused.
Before this Court, the prosecution argues that Judge Lagos committed grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting
the demurrer despite clear proof of the elements of the illegal sale, the

existence of the corpus delicti, and the arrest in flagrante delicto.14 Private
respondents counter that the Petition is dismissible on the ground of double
jeopardy and is violative of the principle of hierarchy of courts.
We grant the petition.
Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the
demurrer.
It has long been settled that the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an
acquittal. An acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct
consequence of the finality of his acquittal.15 This rule, however, is not
without exception. The rule on double jeopardy is subject to the exercise of
judicial review by way of the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court is endowed with the power to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.16 Here, the party asking for the review
must show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a patent and gross abuse of discretion
amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of power
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a
blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the
court of its very power to dispense justice.17 In such an event, the accused
cannot be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy.18
The trial court declared that the testimonies of PO2 Frando, PO2 Cubian, P
S/Insp. Manaog, and AIDSOTF Chief Leonardo R. Suan were insufficient to
prove the culmination of the illegal sale, or to show their personal knowledge
of the offer to sell and the acceptance thereof. In granting the demurrer filed
by the accused, respondent judge surmised that it was the CI who had
initiated the negotiation of the sale and should have thus been presented at
trial.
Accused were caught in flagrante delicto; AIDSOTF police officers witnessed
the actual sale.
The trial court’s assessment that the witnesses had no personal knowledge of
the illegal sale starkly contrasts with the facts borne out by the records. PO2
Frando was present during the negotiation and the actual buy-bust
operation. PO2 Frando himself acted as the poseur-buyer and testified in
open court. PO2 Cubian frisked the accused and recovered the buy-bust
money; he also testified in court. P S/Insp. Manaog testified as to the corpus
delicti of the crime; and the 30 pills of ecstasy were duly marked, identified,
and presented in court. The validity of buy-bust transactions as an effective
way of apprehending drug dealers in the act of committing an offense is well-
settled.19
The only elements necessary to consummate the crime of illegal sale of drugs
is proof that the illicit transaction took place, coupled with the presentation
in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.20 In buy-bust
operations, the delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the
seller’s receipt of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust
transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused. Unless there is
clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were
inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty,
their testimonies on the operation deserve faith and credit. 21
The Court has held that when police officers have no motive to testify falsely
against the accused, courts are inclined to uphold the presumption of
regularity accorded to them in the performance of their official duties.22 In
the present case, there is no contention that the members of AIDSOTF who
conducted the buy-bust operation were motivated by ill will or malice.
Neither was there evidence adduced to show that they neglected to perform
their duties properly. Hence, their testimonies as to the conduct of the buy-
bust operation deserves full faith and credence.
Respondent judge harps on the fact that it was the CI who had personal
knowledge of the identity of the seller, the initial offer to purchase the
ecstasy pills, and the subsequent acceptance of the offer. It is clear from the
testimonies of PO2 Frando and the other arresting officers that they
conducted the buy-bust operation based on the information from the CI.
However, the arrest was made, not on the basis of that information, but of the
actual buy-bust operation, in which respondents were caught in flagrante
delicto engaged in the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Due to the investigative
work of the AIDSOTF members, the illegal sale was consummated in their
presence, and the elements of the sale – the identity of the sellers, the
delivery of the drugs, and the payment therefor – were confirmed. That the CI
initially provided this information or "tip" does not negate the subsequent
consummation of the illegal sale.
In the Court’s Resolution on People v. Utoh, the accused was caught in
flagrante delicto selling ₱36,000 worth of shabu in a buy-bust operation
conducted by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). The accused
argued that mere reliable information from the CI was an insufficient ground
for his warrantless arrest. The Court stated:
Utoh was arrested not, as he asserts, on the basis of "reliable information"
received by the arresting officers from a confidential informant. His arrest
came as a result of a valid buy-bust operation, a form of entrapment in which
the violator is caught in flagrante delicto. The police officers conducting a
buy-bust operation are not only authorized but also duty-bound to
apprehend the violators and to search them for anything that may have been
part of or used in the commission of the crime.
The testimonies of arresting officers IOI Apiit and IOI Mosing were
straightforward, positive, and categorical. From the time they were tipped off
by the confidential informant at around 9:00 a.m. of November 22, 2008 or
up to the time until the informant confirmed Utoh’s impending arrival at a
very late hour that night, and the latter's eventual arrest, the intelligence
officers credibly accounted for the briefings held, the preparations, and
actions taken by them.23
It is well-settled that the testimony of the CI in the sale of illegal drugs is not
indispensable.
Given the foregoing, respondent Judge Lagos erred in requiring the testimony
of the CI.1âwphi1 Respondent judge based his ruling on a 2004 case, People
v. Ong, the facts of which purportedly "mirror" those of the present case.
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
However, there is no basis for this conclusion, as Ong involved a conviction
52
based on the lone testimony of one apprehending officer, Senior Police
Officer (SPO1) Gonzales. The Court found that SPO1 Gonzales was merely the
deliveryman, while the CI was the one who acted as the poseur-buyer. In this
case, one of the witnesses, PO2 Frando, was a buy-bust team member who
also acted as the poseur-buyer. He participated in the actual sale transaction.
His testimony was a firsthand account of what transpired during the buy-
bust and thus stemmed from his personal knowledge of the arrest in
flagrante delicto.
Requiring the CI to testify is an added imposition that runs contrary to
jurisprudential doctrine, since the Court has long established that the
presentation of an informant is not a requisite for the prosecution of drug
cases. The testimony of the CI is not indispensable, since it would be merely
corroborative of and cumulative with that of the poseur-buyer who was
presented in court, and who testified on the facts and circumstances of the
sale and delivery of the prohibited drug.24
Informants are usually not presented in court because of the need to hide
their identities and preserve their invaluable services to the police. Except
when the accused vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are
material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers, or there
are reasons to believe that the officers had motives to falsely testify against
the accused, or that it was the informant who acted as the poseur-buyer, the
informant's testimony may be dispensed with, as it will merely be
corroborative of the apprehending officers' eyewitness accounts.25 In People
v. Lopez, the Court ruled that the "informant's testimony, then, would have
been merely corroborative and cumulative because the fact of sale of the
prohibited drug was already established by the direct testimony of SP04
Jamisolamin who actively took part in the transaction. If the prosecution has
several eyewitnesses, as in the instant case, it need not present all of them
but only as many as may be needed to meet the quantum of proof necessary
to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt."26
Similarly, in the present case, the fact of the illegal sale has already been
established by testimonies of the members of the buy-bust team. Judge Lagos
need not have characterized the Cl's testimony as indispensable to the
prosecution's case. We find and so hold that the grant of the demurrer for
this reason alone was not supported by prevailing jurisprudence and
constituted grave abuse of discretion. The prosecution's evidence was, prima
facie, sufficient to prove the criminal charges filed against respondents,
subject to the defenses they may present in the course of a full-blown trial.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Orders of the Regional Trial
Court dated 23 April 2008, 24 June 2008, and 24 July 2008 are ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. The RTC is ORDERED to reinstate Criminal Case No. Q-07-
146628 to the court's docket and proceed with trial.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1658 July 3, 2007
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 01-1014-MTJ]

MIGUEL E. COLORADO, complainant, vs. JUDGE RICARDO M.
AGAPITO Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Laur, Nueva Ecija, respondent.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Before us is a sworn letter-complaint[1] dated January 31, 2001 of Miguel E.
Colorado (complainant) charging Judge Ricardo M. Agapito (respondent),
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Laur, Nueva Ecija, with Gross
Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Authority relative to Criminal Case
Nos. 3461-G and 3462-G, entitled People v. Miguel Colorado, with Grave
Slander and Grave Threats.
Complainant alleges: He is the accused in the aforementioned criminal cases.
The cases were directly filed with the court without first passing the Office of
the Barangay Chairman, although he and private complainants are
permanent residents of Barangay Bagong Sikat, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija.
Respondent ignored the glaring deficiency in private complainants filing of
the cases without attaching the requisite certifications to file action from the
barangay. On the date the two cases were filed, respondent immediately
issued two warrants for his arrest. He was arrested on a Friday and
languished in the municipal jail for two days and two nights. He posted bail
and filed a motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the case, but the same
was not acted upon. He received an envelope from the court with nothing
inside and found out later that the same was supposed to be a notice of
hearing; thus, he was ordered arrested in view of his non-appearance in
court.
On February 22, 2001, respondent compulsorily retired from the judiciary.
In a 1st Indorsement dated June 8, 2001, respondent was directed to file his
comment on the complaint. A 1st Tracer dated October 17, 2001 was sent to
respondent giving him a non-extendible period of five days to file his
comment. However, the said tracer was returned unserved due to
respondents retirement from the judiciary. Another Tracer dated July 30,
2002 was sent to respondent in his residential address giving him a chance to
file his comment, but none was filed.
Acting on the complaint, the Court, in its Resolution of March 24, 2003,
required respondent to manifest whether he was willing to submit the
administrative matter against him for resolution without his comment.
Respondent failed to comply with the Court Resolution. Thus, in the
Resolution of January 26, 2005, the Court ordered respondent to show cause
why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure
to manifest and to comply with the Resolution of March 24, 2003. Still,
respondent failed to comply with the Resolution of January 26, 2005. In the
Resolution of August 24, 2005, the Court imposed upon respondent a fine of
P1,000.00 and deemed respondent to have waived the filing of a comment on
the complaint.
In the Agenda Report[2] dated October 12, 2005, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) found respondent guilty as charged and recommended
that he be fined in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be
deducted from his retirement benefits.
On November 8, 2005, respondent paid the fine of P1,000.00 imposed on him
in the Resolution of August 24, 2005 and submitted his Comment on the
complaint.
In his Comment[3] dated October 31, 2005, respondent denied the
allegations contained in the complaint reasoning that he acted in good faith
and within the scope of his duties. He further contends: Based on
Administrative Circular No. 140-93, the crimes committed by the accused are
not within the Katarungan Pambarangay Law because the imposable penalty
exceeds one year. Both cases are within the original jurisdiction of the court
and, finding a probable cause against the accused, the court issued the
warrant of arrest. There is no law or circular issued by this Court that a court
cannot issue a warrant of arrest on Friday. If the accused was not able to post
bail on time, it is not his fault or of the court. The motion for inhibition filed
by complainant must be set for hearing. But in spite of several settings to
hear the motion, complainant failed to appear. In the hearing of both cases,
complainant failed to appear in court; thus, the assistant provincial
prosecutor moved for the arrest of the complainant. At the hearing of
November 17, 2000 and January 5, 2001, complainant failed to appear in
court, and orders of arrest were issued against him, but said orders were
reconsidered by the court. In spite of all the orders of the court for the arrest
of complainant, none of the orders were implemented. Neither was the
accused arrested and detained in jail. And if the complainant received an
envelope from the MCTC of Laur without content, complainant should have
immediately informed the court of the said circumstance so that proper
action may be done on the employee in charge of the mailing of notices.
In the Resolution of March 29, 2006, the Court referred back the instant
administrative matter to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
In a letter[4] dated November 21, 2005, respondent requested the Court that
his retirement benefits be released subject to the withholding of P20,000.00
pending resolution of the present complaint.
In the Resolution[5] of June 28, 2006, the Court granted the partial release of
respondent's compulsory retirement benefits and withheld therefrom the
amount of P20,000.00 to answer for whatever liability respondent may incur
in the present administrative case.
In the Agenda Report dated August 30, 2006, the OCA submitted its
evaluation and recommendation, to wit:
The charges against respondent judge are summarized as follows:
1. Gross Ignorance of the law for his failure to remand or dismiss the case
in view of the absence of the requisite certificate to file action issued by the
Barangay as a mandatory requirement of the Katarungan Pambarangay Law
and the Local Government Code.
2. Grave abuse of authority for the issuance of a warrant of arrest on a
Friday to ensure complainants incarceration for two days.
3. Grave abuse of authority and bias in continuing the hearing of the cases
and for failure to act on the motion for inhibition.
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
4. An intention on the part of respondent to prevent complainants
53
appearance in court by sending an envelope, with a supposed notice of
hearing but with nothing inside.
xxxx
Respondent judge argued that under Administrative Circular No. 14-93 dated
August 3, 1993 issued by this Court as Guidelines for the Implementation of
the Barangay Conciliation Procedure, based on the Local Government Code of
1991, R.A. 7160, which took effect on January 1, 1992, one of the exceptions
to the coverage of the circular is Offense[s] for which the law prescribes a
maximum penalty of imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine over five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00). Considering that the offenses for which accused
was charged have corresponding penalties of more than one year there is no
need for a certification to file action from the Barangay.
There was likewise no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of warrant of
arrest. The subject criminal cases were within the original jurisdiction of the
MTC and after finding probable cause against the accused, respondent issued
the questioned warrant of arrest. Respondent pointed out that there is no law
or circular issued by the Honorable Court prohibiting the issuance of a
warrant of arrest on Friday.
With regard to the charge of grave abuse of discretion relative to the motion
for inhibition, respondent submitted that there should be a hearing on the
motion before it could be acted upon. But in spite of the several settings of
said motion the complainant as accused failed to appear.
Respondent contended that if it were true that complainant received an
envelope from the MCTC of Laur, Nueva Ecija, without any contents, he
should have immediately informed the court about it so that the proper
action could have been done.
Lastly, respondent invited the Courts attention to the fact that complainant
was also accused of Grave Slander by Darlito Urbano and Violeta Urbano
which case were docketed as Criminal Case No. 3648-G and 3649-G, MCTC
Laur-Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija. It is argued that this shows the character of
Miguel Colorado.
After careful evaluation of the record of the case, the undersigned finds merit
in the neglect of respondent judge to resolve the pending issue of the motion
for inhibition which was not acted upon up to the time of his compulsory
retirement from the service.
It should be noted that respondent never gave any valid justification for the
delay in the filing of his comment. It seems that he believed that the mere
payment of the fine obliterated the charge of contumacious refusal to obey
the order of this Court. Respondent's conduct cannot be left unnoticed by the
Court. Judges are the visible representations of law and justice, from whom
the people draw the will and inclination to obey the law (Moroo v. Lomeda,
316 Phil. 103, July 14, 1995) How can the respondent judge expect others to
respect the law when he himself cannot obey orders as simple as the show-
cause resolution? {Longboan v. Hon. Polig (A.M. No. R-704-RTJ, June 14, 1990,
186 SCRA 557) cited in the case of Bonifacio Guintu v. Judge Aunario L.
Lucero, A.M. No. MTJ-93-794, August 23, 1996}.

In a catena of cases this Court has unhesitatingly imposed the penalty of
dismissal on those who have persistently failed to comply with orders
requiring them either to file comment or to show cause and comply.
Respondent's belated filing of his comment cannot cure or obliterate[d] his
shortcomings with this Court. The fact remains that he ignored the lawful
directive of the Court and in fact offered no valid justification or excuse for it.
This Court could have imposed the penalty of dismissal and forfeiture of all of
respondent's retirement benefit had it not been for this Courts compassion in
allowing him to retire with the mere retention of P20,000.00. Respondents
comment should not have been received in the first place as the same was
already considered waived pursuant to the Resolution of the Honorable
Court dated 24 August 2005.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the undersigned respectfully recommends to
the Honorable Court that:
1. Judge Ricardo M. Agapito, former judge of MCTC, Laur, Nueva Ecija be
found guilty of gross neglect for failure to act on the motion for inhibition
filed by accused-complainant and for his failure to promptly comply with the
lawful order of Court and not offering a valid excuse therefor and should be
FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000); and
2. The withheld amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000) shall be
considered the payment of the fine.[6]
We agree in toto with the findings and recommendations of the OCA.
First of all, we deem it necessary to determine the applicability of A.M. No.
03-10-01-SC, a Resolution Prescribing Measures to Protect Members of the
Judiciary from Baseless and Unfounded Administrative Complaints, which
took effect on November 3, 2003.
Recognizing the proliferation of unfounded or malicious administrative or
criminal cases against members of the judiciary for purposes of harassment,
we issued said Resolution, which provides:
2. If the complaint is (a) filed within six months before the compulsory
retirement of a Justice or Judge; (b) for an alleged cause of action that
occurred at least a year before such filing; and (c) shown prima facie that it is
intended to harass the respondent, it must forthwith be recommended for
dismissal. If such is not the case, the Office of the Court Administrator must
require the respondent to file a comment within ten (10) days from receipt of
the complaint, and submit to the Court a report and recommendation not
later than thirty (30) days from receipt of the comment. The Court shall act
on the recommendation before the date of compulsory retirement of the
respondent, or if it is not possible to do so, within six (6) months from such
date without prejudice to the release of the retirement benefits less such
amount as the Court may order to be withheld, taking into account the
gravity of the cause of action alleged in the complaint.
Thus, in order for an administrative complaint against a retiring judge or
justice to be dismissed outright, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
complaint must have been filed within six months from the compulsory
retirement of the judge or justice; (2) the cause of action must have occurred
at least a year before such filing; and (3) it is shown that the complaint was
intended to harass the respondent.
In the present case, the first two requisites are present. The sworn letter-
complaint was received by the Office of the Court Administrator on January
31, 2001. The respondent retired compulsorily from the service barely three
weeks after or on February 22, 2001; and the ground for disciplinary action
alleged to have been committed by the respondent occurred five months
before the respondents separation from the service.
As to the third requirement, although the first and second charges against
respondent are outrightly without merit as aptly found by the OCA, the
complaint that respondent failed to act on his motion for inhibition and
intentionally prevented complainant from appearing in a scheduled hearing
was not prima facie shown to be without merit; nor was the filing thereof
shown to be intended merely to harass the respondent. Thus, the OCA
correctly proceeded with the administrative case against respondent.
Moreover, the fact that a judge has retired or has otherwise been separated
from the service does not necessarily divest the Court of its jurisdiction to
determine the veracity of the allegations of the complaint, pursuant to its
disciplinary authority over members of the bench. As we held in Gallo v.
Cordero,[8] citing Zarate v. Judge Romanillos:
The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the administrative
complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent had ceased in
office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains jurisdiction either to
pronounce the respondent public official innocent of the charges or declare
him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and
pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications... If innocent, respondent
public official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the
government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to
receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable
under the situation.
We now go to the four charges against respondent.
1. Gross Ignorance of the law for his failure to remand or dismiss the case in
view of the absence of the requisite certificate to file action issued by the
barangay as a mandatory requirement of the Katarungan Pambarangay Law
and the Local Government Code.
As we earlier stated, the Court finds that the OCA is correct in not finding
respondent administratively liable therefor. Complainant is charged with
grave slander, the maximum penalty for which is 2 years and 4 months under
Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, respondent is not guilty of gross
ignorance of the law in taking jurisdiction over said criminal case,
considering that prior recourse to barangay conciliation is not required
where the law provides a maximum penalty of imprisonment exceeding one
year.
2. Grave abuse of authority for the issuance of a warrant of arrest on a Friday
to ensure complainants incarceration for two days.
Complainant faults respondent for having been arrested on a Friday, causing
him to languish in jail for two days and two nights. Respondent cannot be
held administratively liable for this particular matter.
Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST
54
Section 6, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that
an arrest may be made on any day and at any time of the day or night.
It is of no moment that the warrant of arrest was issued by respondent on a
Friday, because it is clear from the foregoing that an arrest may be made on
any day regardless of what day the warrant of arrest was issued. Nowhere in
the Rules or in our jurisprudence can we find that a warrant of arrest issued
on a Friday is prohibited.
Granting that complainant was arrested on a Friday, he was not without
recourse, as he could have posted bail for his temporary liberty in view of
Supreme Court Circular No. 95-96[10] dated December 5, 1996, providing for
a skeletal force on a Saturday from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. primarily to act on
petitions for bail and other urgent matters. And on Saturday afternoons,
Sundays and non-working holidays, any judge may act on bailable offenses.
Thus, we agree with the OCA that respondent did not commit grave abuse of
authority for issuing the warrant of arrest on a Friday, the same not being
prohibited by law.
3. Grave abuse of authority and bias in continuing the hearing of the cases
and for failure to act on the motion for inhibition.
While there is no evidence in support of the claim that respondent committed
grave abuse of authority and bias in continuing the hearing of cases, we find
respondent liable for failure to act upon complainants motion for inhibition.
As borne by the records, complainant filed his motion for respondent's
inhibition sometime in September 2000 but up to the time of respondents
compulsory retirement from the judiciary on February 22, 2001, the same
remained unacted upon. Verily, the undue delay of respondent by five
months in resolving the pending incident before his court erodes the peoples
faith in the judiciary and the same is tantamount to gross inefficiency.
Respondents explanation that despite the fact that the motion was set for
hearing several times, complainant repeatedly failed to appear thereat, is
untenable. Respondent must know that he may act motu proprio on the
motion for inhibition without requiring the attendance of complainant. A
judge, in the exercise of his sound discretion, may disqualify himself from
sitting on a case for just or valid reasons.[11]
Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary,[12] mandates judges to perform all judicial duties, including the
delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable
promptness. Similarly, Supreme Court Circular No. 13 dated July 1, 1987
directs judges to observe unscrupulously the periods prescribed by the
Constitution in the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters
submitted to their court.
In Visbal v. Buban,[13] the Court held that failure to decide cases and other
matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and
warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against the erring
magistrate.[14] Delay in resolving motions and incidents pending before a
judge within the reglementary period of ninety (90) days fixed by the
Constitution and the law is not excusable and constitutes gross
inefficiency.[15] Further, such delay constitutes a violation of Rule 3.05,
 Additional cases on Rule 113 – ARREST

Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which mandates that a judge should
55
dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required
periods. As a trial judge, respondent is a frontline official of the judiciary and
should at all times act with efficiency and with probity.[16] Undue delay in
the disposition of cases and motions erodes the faith and confidence of the
people in the judiciary and unnecessarily blemishes its stature.

4. An intention on the part of respondent to prevent complainants

appearance in court by sending an envelope, with a supposed notice of
hearing but with nothing inside.

Suffice it to be stated that in the absence of evidence to show that the sending
of an empty envelope to complainant was malicious on the part of
respondent, he cannot be held liable therefor.

Section 9 (1) and 11 (B), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 01-8-10-SC, classifies gross neglect or undue delay in rendering a
decision or order as a less serious charge which carries any of the following
sanctions: suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not
less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months or a fine of more than
P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. We adopt the recommendation of
the OCA that respondent should be imposed a fine in the amount of
P20,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Ricardo M. Agapito guilty of

gross neglect and is FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00). The withheld amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.0)
from respondents retirement benefits is considered as payment of the fine.

SO ORDERED.