CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES – CHAPTER 1 -3
Jann Claudine M. Amago 3 – B
Constitutional Construction
1. Perfecto vs. Meer
In April 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice
Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salary as member of the
Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount, he instituted an
action in Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment
was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of
taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution. It provides
in its Article VIII, Section 9 that the members of the Supreme Court and
all judges of inferior courts “shall receive such compensation as may be
fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in
office.
ISSUE
Whether or not the imposition of an income tax upon this salary in 1946
amount to a diminution.
HELD
Yes, the imposition of the income tax upon the salary of Justice Perfecto
amount to a diminution thereof. The prohibition is general, contains
no excepting words, and appears to be directed against all
diminution, whether for one purpose or another. The fathers of
the Constitution intended to prohibit diminution by taxation as well as
otherwise, that they regarded the independence of the judges as of far
greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their
salaries. Thus, taxing the salary of a judge as a part of his income is a
violation of the Constitution.
1.Constitutional Law; Taxation; Tax On Income Of
Constitutional Officers.—The imposition of income tax upon the
salary of judges is a diminution thereof, and violates the Constitution.
2.Id.; Id.; Id.; Right Not Waivable.—The undiminishable character
of judicial salaries is not a mere privilege of judges—personal and
therefore waivable—but a basic limitation upon legislative or executive
action imposed in the public interest.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.—On income other than judicial salary, tax assessments
may be levied for men on the Bench. It is only when the tax is charged
directly on their salary and the effect of the tax is to diminish their official
stipend when taxation becomes an infringement of the fundamental
charter.
4.ID.; ID.—Perhaps the Legislature may validly provide by a law that
salaries of judges appointed after its passage shall be subject to income
tax. Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil. 552, No. L-2348 February 27, 1950
2. Endencia vs. David
Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the
taxing of Justice Pastor Endencia’s and Justice Fernando Jugo’s (and
other judges’) salary pursuant to Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 590 which
provides that
No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the
Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment
of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation
fixed by the Constitution or by law.
The judges however argued that under the case of Perfecto vs Meer,
judges are exempt from taxation – this is also in observance of the
doctrine of separation of powers, i.e., the executive, to which the
Internal Revenue reports, is separate from the judiciary; that under the
Constitution, the judiciary is independent and the salaries of judges may
not be diminished by the other branches of government; that taxing
their salaries is already a diminution of their benefits/salaries (see
Section 9, Art. VIII, Constitution).
The Solicitor General, arguing in behalf of the CIR, states that the
decision in Perfecto vs Meer was rendered ineffective when Congress
enacted Republic Act No. 590.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.
HELD: No. The said provision is a violation of the separation of powers.
Only courts have the power to interpret laws. Congress makes laws but
courts interpret them. In Sec. 13, R.A. 590, Congress is already
encroaching upon the functions of the courts when it inserted the
phrase: “payment of which [tax] is hereby declared not to be a
diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.”
Here, Congress is already saying that imposing taxes upon judges is not
a diminution of their salary. This is a clear example of interpretation or
ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase “which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office,” found in Section 9, Article
VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This
act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature
is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and
jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
“The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any
declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its
passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative
definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning
as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a
judicial function in defining a term.
The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is
within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department,
and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide
therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a
Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their
task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the interpretation
sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous
interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land.
*In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case
of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the collection of income
tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so
violates the Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation and
application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive
province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and that in enacting
a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be
interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional
prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later
interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation sought and
provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already
given in a case by the highest court of the land.
Constitutional Law ; Taxation; Interpretation of Laws, a
Judicial Finction.—The Legislature cannot lawfully declare the
collection of income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a
judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has
found and decided otherwise. "Defining and interpreting the law is a
judicial function and the legis lative branch may not limit or restrict the
power granted to the courts by the Constitution." (Bandy vs. Mickelson
et al., 44 N.W., 2nd, 341, 342; see also 11 Am. Jur., 714-715 and 905.)
The act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the
Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province
and jurisdiction of the Judiciary, .
Id.; Separation of Powers—Under our system of constitutional
government, the Legislative department is assigned the power to make
and enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution
or carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and
application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department.
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And this au-thority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the
Con-stitution. Before the courts can determine whether a law is
constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning
not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution
in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because
if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared
invalid and unconstitutional.
3.Taxation; Income Tax, Taxing Salaries of Judicial Officers a
Diminution Of Their Compensation as Fixed by Law—The doctrine
laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer (85 Phil., 552) to the effect
that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a
diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution, is reiterated.
Endencia and Jugo vs. David, etc, 93 Phil., 696, Nos. L-6355-56 August
31, 1953
3. Nitafan vs. CIR
FACTS:
Nitafan and some others, duly qualified and appointed judges of the
RTC, NCR, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually
enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer
of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes
from their salaries.
They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or
compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of
their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution mandating that during their continuance in office,
their salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal
of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."
ISSUE: Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from
income taxes.
HELD:
No. The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general
income tax applied to all taxpayers. Although such intent was somehow
and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the 1987
Constitution, the deliberations of the1986 Constitutional Commission
negate the contention that the intent of the framers is to revert to the
original concept of non-diminution´ of salaries of judicial officers.
Justices and judges are not only the citizens whose income has been
reduced in accepting service in government and yet subject to income
tax. Such is true also of Cabinet members and all other employees.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1
Constitutional Law; Salaries of Justices and Judges subject to
income taxation; Ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs.
David, discarded.—lt may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had
dealt with the matter administratively in response to representations
that the Court direct its Finance Officer to discontinue the withholding
of taxes from salaries of members of the Bench. Thus, on June 4, 1987,
the Court en banc had re-affirmed the Chief Justice's directive as follows:
"RE: Question of exemption from income taxation.—The Court
REAFFIRMED the Chief Justice's previous and standing directive to the
Fiscal Management and Budget Office of this Court to continue with the
deduction of the withholding taxes from the salaries of the Justices of
the Supreme Court as well as from the salaries of all other members of
the judiciary." That should have resolved the question. However, with
the filing of this petition, the Court has deemed it best to settle the legal
issue raised through this judicial pronouncement. As will be shown
hereinafter, the clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to
delete the proposed express grant of exemption from payment of
income tax to members of the Judiciary, so as to "give substance to
equality among the three branches of Government" in the words of
Commissioner Rigos. In the course of the deliberations, it was further
expressly made clear, specially with regard to Commissioner Joaquin F.
Bernas' accepted amendment to the amendment of Commissioner
Rigos, that the salaries of members of the Judiciary would be subject to
the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. This intent was
somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the
Constitution as approved and ratified in February, 1987 (infra, pp. 7-8).
Although the intent may have been obscured by the failure to include in
the General Provisions a proscription against exemption of any public
officer or employee, including constitutional officers, from payment of
income tax, the Court since then has authorized the continuation of the
deduction of the withholding tax from the salaries of the members of
the Supreme Court, as well as from the salaries of all other members of
the Judiciary. The Court hereby makes of record that it had then
discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David, infra,
that declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from
payment of the income tax and considered such payment as a
diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office. The Court
hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly
subject to a general income tax law applicable to all income earners and
that the payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not
fall within the constitutional protection against decrease of their salaries
during their continuance in office.
Statutory Construction; Intent of the framers of the organic law
and of the people adopting it should be given effect.—The
debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the
constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved by the
Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the
Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with
the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent
of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should
be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to
ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the
framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may
also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were
guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. Besides,
construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, which, for
clarity, is again reproduced hereunder: "The salary of the Chief Justice
and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of
lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office,
their salary shall not be decreased." (Italics supplied). It is plain that the
Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of
compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than
that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it
would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would
be a strained construction to read into the provision an exemption from
taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission.
Nitafan vs. Commissioner of lnternal Revenue, 152 SCRA 284, No. L-
78780 July 23, 1987
Declaration of Martial Law
1. Aquino vs. Enrile
1973 Constitution
1. Javellana vs. Executive Secretary
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may
call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in
writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at
least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may
revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be
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set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the
invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following
such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules
without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by
any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative
assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military
courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function,
nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply
only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in,
or directly connected with, invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any
person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three
days, otherwise he shall be released.
Aquino vs Enrile [59 SCRA183]
FACTS: The events which form the background of these nine petitions
are related, either briefly or in great detail, in the separate opinions filed
by the individual Justices. The petitioners were arrested and held
pursuant to General Order No. 2 of the President (September 22, 1972),
“for being participants or for having given aid and comfort in the
conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take
over the Government by force …”
General Order No. 2 was issued by the President in the exercise of the
powers he assumed by virtue of Proclamation No. 1081 (September 21,
1972) placing the entire country under martial law.
ISSUE: The first major issue raised by the parties is whether this Court
may inquire into the validity of Proclamation No. 1081. Stated more
concretely, is the existence of conditions claimed to justify the exercise
of the power to declare martial law subject to judicial inquiry? Is the
question political or justiciable in character?
RULING: Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez and Aquino
hold that the question is political and therefore its determination is
beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. The reasons are given at length in
the separate opinions they have respectively signed. Justice Fernandez
adds that as a member of the Convention that drafted the 1973
Constitution he believes that “the Convention put an imprimatur on the
proposition that the validity of a martial law proclamation and its
continuation is political and non-justiciable in character.”
Justice Barredo, on the other hand, believes that political questions are
not per se beyond the Court’s jurisdiction, the judicial power vested in
it by the Constitution being plenary and all-embracing, but that as a
matter of policy implicit in the Constitution itself the Court should abstain
from interfering with the Executive’s Proclamation, dealing as it does
with national security, for which the responsibility is vested by the
charter in him alone. But the Court should act, Justice Barredo opines,
when its abstention from acting would result in manifest and palpable
transgression of the Constitution proven by facts of judicial notice, no
reception of evidence being contemplated for purposes of such judicial
action.
It may be noted that the postulate of non-justiciability as discussed in
those opinions involves disparate methods of approach. Justice Esguerra
maintains that the findings of the President on the existence of the
grounds for the declaration of martial law are final and conclusive upon
the Courts. He disagrees vehemently with the ruling in Lansang vs.
Garcia, 42 SCRA 448, December 11, 1971, and advocates a return
to Barcelon vs. Baker, 5 Phil. 87 (1905), and Montenegro vs. Castañeda,
91 Phil. 882 (1952). Justice Barredo, for his part, holds that Lansang
need not be overturned, indeed does not control in these cases. He
draws a distinction between the power of the President to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which was the issue in Lansang,
and his power to proclaim martial law, calling attention to the fact that
while the Bill of Rights prohibits suspension of the privilege except in the
instances specified therein, it places no such prohibition or qualification
with respect to the declaration of martial law.
Justice Antonio, with whom Justices Makasiar, Fernandez and Aquino
concur, finds that there is no dispute as to the existence of a state of
rebellion in the country, and on that premise emphasizes the factor
of necessity for the exercise by the President of his power under the
Constitution to declare martial law, holding that the decision as to
whether or not there is such necessity is wholly confided to him and
therefore is not subject to judicial inquiry, his responsibility being directly
to the people.
Arrayed on the side of justiciability are Justices Castro, Fernando,
Teehankee and Muñoz Palma. They hold that the constitutional
sufficiency of the proclamation may be inquired into by the Court, and
would thus apply the principle laid down in Lansang although that case
refers to the power of the President to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. The recognition of justiciability accorded to the
question in Lansang, it should be emphasized, is there expressly
distinguished from the power of judicial review in ordinary civil or
criminal cases, and is limited to ascertaining “merely whether he (the
President) has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction,
not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of
his act.” The test is not whether the President’s decision is correct but
whether, in suspending the writ, he did or did not act arbitrarily.
Applying this test, the finding by the Justices just mentioned is that there
was no arbitrariness in the President’s proclamation of martial law
pursuant to the 1935 Constitution; and I concur with them in that
finding. The factual bases for the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, particularly in regard to the existence of a state of
rebellion in the country, had not disappeared, indeed had been
exacerbated, as events shortly before said proclamation clearly
demonstrated. On this Point the Court is practically unanimous; Justice
Teehankee merely refrained from discussing it.
Insofar as my own opinion is concerned the cleavage in the Court on
the issue of justiciability is of not much more than academic interest for
purposes of arriving at a judgment. I am not unduly exercised by
Americas decisions on the subject written in another age and political
clime, or by theories of foreign authors in political science. The present
state of martial law in the Philippines is peculiarly Filipino and fits into
no traditional patterns or judicial precedents.
In the first place I am convinced (as are the other Justices), without
need of receiving evidence as in an ordinary adversary court proceeding,
that a state of rebellion existed in the country when Proclamation No.
1081 was issued. It was a matter of contemporary history within the
cognizance not only of the courts but of all observant people residing
here at the time. Many of the facts and events recited in detail in the
different “Whereases” of the proclamation are of common knowledge.
The state of rebellion continues up to the present. The argument that
while armed hostilities go on in several provinces in Mindanao there are
none in other regions except in isolated pockets in Luzon, and that
therefore there is no need to maintain martial law all over the country,
ignores the sophisticated nature and ramifications of rebellion in a
modern setting. It does not consist simply of armed clashes between
organized and identifiable groups on fields of their own choosing. It
includes subversion of the most subtle kind, necessarily clandestine and
operating precisely where there is no actual fighting. Underground
propaganda, through printed news sheets or rumors disseminated in
whispers; recruitment of armed and ideological adherents, raising of
funds, procurement of arms and material, fifth-column activities
including sabotage and intelligence — all these are part of the rebellion
which by their nature are usually conducted far from the battle fronts.
They cannot be counteracted effectively unless recognized and dealt
with in that context.
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Secondly, my view, which coincides with that of other members of the
Court as stated in their opinions, is that the question of validity of
Proclamation No. 1081 has been foreclosed by the transitory provision
of the 1973 Constitution [Art. XVII, Sec. 3(2)] that “all proclamations,
orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by
the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land and shall
remain valid, legal, binding and effective even after … the ratification of
this Constitution …” To be sure, there is an attempt in these cases to
resuscitate the issue of the effectivity of the new Constitution. All that,
however, is behind us now. The question has been laid to rest by our
decision in Javellana vs. Executive Secretary (L-36142, 50 SCRA 30,
March 31, 1973), and of course by the existing political realities both in
the conduct of national affairs and in our relations with other countries.
On the effect of the transitory provision Justice Muñoz Palma withholds
her assent to any sweeping statement that the same in effect validated,
in the constitutional sense, all “such proclamations, decrees,
instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent
President.” All that she concedes is that the transitory provision merely
gives them “the imprimatur of a law but not of a constitutional
mandate,” and as such therefore “are subject to judicial review when
proper under the Constitution.
Finally, the political-or-justiciable question controversy indeed, any
inquiry by this Court in the present cases into the constitutional
sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of martial law —
has become moot and purposeless as a consequence of the general
referendum of July 27-28, 1973. The question propounded to the voters
was: “Under the (1973) Constitution, the President, if he so desires, can
continue in office beyond 1973. Do you want President Marcos to
continue beyond 1973 and finish the reforms he initiated under Martial
Law?” The overwhelming majority of those who cast their ballots,
including citizens between 15 and 18 years, voted affirmatively on the
proposal. The question was thereby removed from the area of
presidential power under the Constitution and transferred to the seat of
sovereignty itself. Whatever may be the nature of the exercise of that
power by the President in the beginning — whether or not purely
political and therefore non-justiciable — this Court is precluded from
applying its judicial yardstick to the act of the sovereign.
Snap presidential election
1. Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883
which calls for special national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap
elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of the
Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the
President to continue holding office after the calling of the special
election.
Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter of conditional
“resignation” did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9,
Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a
special election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular
elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that the President
is: “irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when
the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as
President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation.”
The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the
cited constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually
resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang
Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any
suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the
scheduled election. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate
his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest.
ISSUE:
Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop
and prohibit the holding of the elections
HELD:
The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the
issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from holding the
election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less than the
required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.
The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not
issue any restraining order, have turned the issue into a political
question (from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned
constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the
President’s office) which can be truly decided only by the people in their
sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no issue
more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the way of
letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the
incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new president.
People Power Revolt
1. Lawyers League vs. Aquino
2. In re: Bermudez
In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, petitioner,
as a lawyer, quotes the first paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7 as
erroneously stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution,
which provides in full as follows:
Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President
elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of
synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under
this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
Claiming that the said provision "is not clear" as to whom it refers, he
then asks the Court "to declare and answer the question of the
construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent
President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel and the
elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President Arturo M.
Tolentino being referred to under the said Section 7 (sic) of ARTICLE
XVIII of the TRANSITORY PROVISIONS of the proposed 1986
Constitution refers to, . ...
The petition is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction and for lack for
cause of action.
Jurisdiction; Actions; Declaratory Relief; The Supreme Court
assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. A
petition directed in effect againstPresident Corazon C. Aquino
cannot be entertained the President being immune from suit
during her incumbency.—Prescinding from petitioner’s lack of
personality to sue or to bring this action (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA
677), it is elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over
petitions for declaratory relief. More importantly, the petition amounts
in effect to a suit against the incumbent President of the Republic,
President Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally elementary that
incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to
court during the period of their incumbency and tenure.
Same: Same; Same; Constitutional Law; A petition questioning
the clarity ofaprovision in the proposed 1986 Constitution
states no cause of action it being of common knowledge that
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the officials referred to in the 1st par. of Sec. 5, Art XVIII there
of are incumbent Pres. Aquino and Vice-Pres. Laurel.—The
petition furthermore states no cause of action. Petitioner’s allegation of
ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted provision is manifestly
gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public
knowledge that tha Constitutional Commission refers therein to
incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H.
Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their
term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of
elections. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section provides for
the holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular
elections for the President and Vice-President under said 1986
Constitution. In previous cases, the legitimacy of the government of
President Corazon C. Aquino was iikewise sought to be questioned with
the claim that it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
The said cases were dismissed outright by this Court. In Re: Saturnino
V. Bermudez, 145 SCRA 160, No. L-76180 October 24, 1986
1987 Constitution
1. In re: Letter of Reynato Puno
Effectivity of the 1987 Constitution
1. De Leon vs. Esguerra
Action; Prohibition; Local Government; Security of tenure of barangay
officials. It is a policy of the State to guarantee and promote the
autonomy of the barangays to ensure their fullest development as self-
reliant communities.—Petitioners must now be held to have acquired
security of tenure specially considering that the Barangay Election Act
of 1982 declares it "a policy of the State to guarantee and promote the
autonomy of the barangays to ensure their fullest development as self-
reliant communities." Similarly, the 1987 Constitution ensures the
autonomy of local governments and of political subdivisions of which the
barangays form a part, and limits the President's power to "general
supervision" over local governments.
Same; Same; Same; Term of office of local elective officials. Sec. 8 Art.
X of 1987 Constitution provides that the term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years.—Until the term of office of barangay officials has
been determined by law, therefore, the term of office of six (6) years
provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.

Facts: Same; Same; Same; There is no inconsistency between the term of six
- The petitioner, Reynato S. Puno, was first appointed as Associate (6) years for elective Barangay officials and the 1987 Constitution.—
Justice of the Court of Appeals on 1980. Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent
- On 1983, the Court of Appeals was reorganized and became the between the term of six (6) years for elective Barangay officials and the
Intermediate Appellate Court pursuant to BP Blg. 129. 1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be considered as still
- On 1984, petitioner was appointed to be Deputy Minister of Justice in operative, pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.
the Ministry of Justice. Thus, he ceased to be a member of the Judiciary. De Leon vs. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602, No. L-78059 August 31, 1987
- After February 1986 EDSA Revolution, there was a reorganization of
the entire government, including the Judiciary. Defensor Santiago vs. COMELEC
- A Screening Committee for the reorganization of the Intermediate
Appelate Court and lower courts recommended the return of petitioner
as Associate Justice of the new court of Appeals and assigned him the
rank of number 11 in the roster of appellate court justices.
- When the appointments were signed by Pres. Aquino, petitioner's
seniority ranking changes from number 11 to 26.
- Then, petitioner alleged that the change in seniority ranking was due
to "inadvertence" of the President, otherwise, it would run counter to
the provisions of Section 2 of E.O. No. 33.
- Petitioner Justice Reynato S. Puno wrote a letter to the Court seeking
the correction of his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals.
- The Court en banc granted Justice Puno's request.
- A motion for reconsideration was later filed by Associate Justices
Campos Jr. and Javellana who are affected by the ordered correction.
- They alleged that petitioner could not claim reappointment because
the courts where he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at
the date of his last appointment.

Issue: WON the present Court of Appeals is merely a continuation of

the old Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing
before the promulgation of E.O. No. 33.

Held:

The Court held that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate
Court existing prior to E.O. No. 33 phased out as part of the legal system
abolished by the 1987 Revolution. The Court of Appeals that was
established under E.O. No. 33 is considered as an entirely new court.

The present Court of Appeals is a new entity, different and distinct from
the courts existing before E.O. No. 33. It was created in the wake of the
massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of
Corazon Aquino in the aftermath of the people power in 1986.

Revolution is defined as "the complete overthrow of the established

government in any country or state by those who were previously
subject to it." or "as sudden. radical and fundamental change in the
government or political system, usually effected with violence or at least
some acts of violence."