suit, they countered, was intended merely to harass, preempt and forestall Dalion's threat to sue
for these unpaid commissions.
G.R. No. 78903 February 28, 1990
SPS. SEGUNDO DALION AND EPIFANIA SABESAJE-DALION, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND RUPERTO SABESAJE, JR., respondents.
Francisco A. Puray, Sr. for petitioners.
Gabriel N. Duazo for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals rendered on May
26, 1987, upholding the validity of the sale of a parcel of land by petitioner Segundo Dalion
(hereafter, "Dalion") in favor of private respondent Ruperto Sabesaje, Jr. (hereafter, "Sabesaje"),
described thus:
A parcel of land located at Panyawan, Sogod, Southern Leyte, declared in the name of Segundo
Dalion, under Tax Declaration No. 11148, with an area of 8947 hectares, assessed at P 180.00,
and bounded on the North, by Sergio Destriza and Titon Veloso, East, by Feliciano Destriza, by
Barbara Bonesa (sic); and West, by Catalino Espina. (pp. 36-37, Rollo)
The decision affirms in toto the ruling of the trial court 1 issued on January 17, 1984, the
dispositive portion of which provides as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby renders judgment.
(a) Ordering the defendants to deliver to the plaintiff the parcel of land subject of this
case, declared in the name of Segundo Dalion previously under Tax Declaration No. 11148 and
lately under Tax Declaration No. 2297 (1974) and to execute the corresponding formal deed of
conveyance in a public document in favor of the plaintiff of the said property subject of this case,
otherwise, should defendants for any reason fail to do so, the deed shall be executed in their
behalf by the Provincial Sheriff or his Deputy;
(b) Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the amount of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees
and P 500.00 as litigation expenses, and to pay the costs; and
(c) Dismissing the counter-claim. (p. 38, Rollo)
The facts of the case are as follows:
On May 28, 1973, Sabesaje sued to recover ownership of a parcel of land, based on a private
document of absolute sale, dated July 1, 1965 (Exhibit "A"), allegedly executed by Dalion, who,
however denied the fact of sale, contending that the document sued upon is fictitious, his
signature thereon, a forgery, and that subject land is conjugal property, which he and his wife
acquired in 1960 from Saturnina Sabesaje as evidenced by the "Escritura de Venta Absoluta"
(Exhibit "B"). The spouses denied claims of Sabesaje that after executing a deed of sale over
the parcel of land, they had pleaded with Sabesaje, their relative, to be allowed to administer the
land because Dalion did not have any means of livelihood. They admitted, however,
administering since 1958, five (5) parcels of land in Sogod, Southern Leyte, which belonged to
Leonardo Sabesaje, grandfather of Sabesaje, who died in 1956. They never received their
agreed 10% and 15% commission on the sales of copra and abaca, respectively. Sabesaje's
From the adverse decision of the trial court, Dalion appealed, assigning errors some of which,
however, were disregarded by the appellate court, not having been raised in the court below.
While the Court of Appeals duly recognizes Our authority to review matters even if not assigned
as errors in the appeal, We are not inclined to do so since a review of the case at bar reveals
that the lower court has judicially decided the case on its merits.
As to the controversy regarding the identity of the land, We have no reason to dispute the Court
of Appeals' findings as follows:
To be sure, the parcel of land described in Exhibit "A" is the same property deeded out in Exhibit
"B". The boundaries delineating it from adjacent lots are identical. Both documents detail out the
following boundaries, to wit:
On the North-property of Sergio Destriza and Titon Veloso;
On the East-property of Feliciano Destriza;
On the South-property of Barbara Boniza and
On the West-Catalino Espina.
(pp. 41-42, Rollo)
The issues in this case may thus be limited to: a) the validity of the contract of sale of a parcel of
land and b) the necessity of a public document for transfer of ownership thereto.
The appellate court upheld the validity of the sale on the basis of Secs. 21 and 23 of Rule 132 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
SEC. 21. Private writing, its execution and authenticity, how proved.-Before any private writing
may be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the writing executed;
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or
(c) By a subscribing witness
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 23. Handwriting, how proved. — The handwriting of a person may be proved by any
witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person, and has seen the person write, or
has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and
has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the
handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to
be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (Rule 132, Revised Rules of Court)
And on the basis of the findings of fact of the trial court as follows:
Here, people who witnessed the execution of subject deed positively testified on the authenticity
thereof. They categorically stated that it had been executed and signed by the signatories
thereto. In fact, one of such witnesses, Gerardo M. Ogsoc, declared on the witness stand that he
was the one who prepared said deed of sale and had copied parts thereof from the "Escritura De
Venta Absoluta" (Exhibit B) by which one Saturnina Sabesaje sold the same parcel of land to
appellant Segundo Dalion. Ogsoc copied the bounderies thereof and the name of appellant
Segundo Dalion's wife, erroneously written as "Esmenia" in Exhibit "A" and "Esmenia" in Exhibit
"B". (p. 41, Rollo)
xxx xxx xxx
Against defendant's mere denial that he signed the document, the positive testimonies of the
instrumental Witnesses Ogsoc and Espina, aside from the testimony of the plaintiff, must prevail.
Defendant has affirmatively alleged forgery, but he never presented any witness or evidence to
prove his claim of forgery. Each party must prove his own affirmative allegations (Section 1, Rule
131, Rules of Court). Furthermore, it is presumed that a person is innocent of a crime or wrong
(Section 5 (a), Idem), and defense should have come forward with clear and convincing
evidence to show that plaintiff committed forgery or caused said forgery to be committed, to
overcome the presumption of innocence. Mere denial of having signed, does not suffice to show
forgery.
In addition, a comparison of the questioned signatories or specimens (Exhs. A-2 and A-3) with
the admitted signatures or specimens (Exhs. X and Y or 3-C) convinces the court that Exhs. A-2
or Z and A-3 were written by defendant Segundo Dalion who admitted that Exhs. X and Y or 3-C
are his signatures. The questioned signatures and the specimens are very similar to each other
and appear to be written by one person.
Further comparison of the questioned signatures and the specimens with the signatures
Segundo D. Dalion appeared at the back of the summons (p. 9, Record); on the return card (p.
25, Ibid.); back of the Court Orders dated December 17, 1973 and July 30, 1974 and for October
7, 1974 (p. 54 & p. 56, respectively, Ibid.), and on the open court notice of April 13, 1983 (p. 235,
Ibid.) readily reveal that the questioned signatures are the signatures of defendant Segundo
Dalion.
It may be noted that two signatures of Segundo D. Dalion appear on the face of the questioned
document (Exh. A), one at the right corner bottom of the document (Exh. A-2) and the other at
the left hand margin thereof (Exh. A-3). The second signature is already a surplusage. A forger
would not attempt to forge another signature, an unnecessary one, for fear he may commit a
revealing error or an erroneous stroke. (Decision, p. 10) (pp. 42-43, Rollo)
We see no reason for deviating from the appellate court's ruling (p. 44, Rollo) as we reiterate
that
Appellate courts have consistently subscribed to the principle that conclusions and findings of
fact by the trial courts are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless
for strong and cogent reasons, since it is undeniable that the trial court is in a more
advantageous position to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses while testifying in the case (Chase v. Buencamino, Sr., G.R. No. L-20395, May 13,
1985, 136 SCRA 365; Pring v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41605, August 19, 1985, 138 SCRA
185)
Assuming authenticity of his signature and the genuineness of the document, Dalion
nonetheless still impugns the validity of the sale on the ground that the same is embodied in a
private document, and did not thus convey title or right to the lot in question since "acts and
contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinction of real
rights over immovable property must appear in a public instrument" (Art. 1358, par 1, NCC).
This argument is misplaced. The provision of Art. 1358 on the necessity of a public document is
only for convenience, not for validity or enforceability. It is not a requirement for the validity of a
contract of sale of a parcel of land that this be embodied in a public instrument.
A contract of sale is a consensual contract, which means that the sale is perfected by mere
consent. No particular form is required for its validity. Upon perfection of the contract, the parties
may reciprocally demand performance (Art. 1475, NCC), i.e., the vendee may compel transfer of
ownership of the object of the sale, and the vendor may require the vendee to pay the thing sold
(Art. 1458, NCC).
The trial court thus rightly and legally ordered Dalion to deliver to Sabesaje the parcel of land
and to execute corresponding formal deed of conveyance in a public document. Under Art.
1498, NCC, when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof is
equivalent to the delivery of the thing. Delivery may either be actual (real) or constructive. Thus
delivery of a parcel of land may be done by placing the vendee in control and possession of the
land (real) or by embodying the sale in a public instrument (constructive).
As regards petitioners' contention that the proper action should have been one for specific
performance, We believe that the suit for recovery of ownership is proper. As earlier stated, Art.
1475 of the Civil Code gives the parties to a perfected contract of sale the right to reciprocally
demand performance, and to observe a particular form, if warranted, (Art. 1357). The trial court,
aptly observed that Sabesaje's complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action to compel Dalion
to execute a formal deed of sale, and the suit for recovery of ownership, which is premised on
the binding effect and validity inter partes of the contract of sale, merely seeks consummation of
said contract.
... . A sale of a real property may be in a private instrument but that contract is valid and binding
between the parties upon its perfection. And a party may compel the other party to execute a
public instrument embodying their contract affecting real rights once the contract appearing in a
private instrument hag been perfected (See Art. 1357).
... . (p. 12, Decision, p. 272, Records)
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals upholding the
ruling of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 115402 July 15, 1998
LEONCIO LEE TEK SHENG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, and LEE TEKSHENG, respondents.
MARTINEZ, J.:
After his mother's death, petitioner 1 filed a complaint against his father, herein private
respondent, to partition the conjugal properties of his parents. 2 In his answer with counterclaim,
private respondent alleged that four (4) parcels of land registered solely in petitioner's name
under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) 8278 are conjugal properties. Private respondent
contends that the lots are owned by the conjugal regime but was registered in petitioner's name
only as a trustee considering that at that time, the latter was then the only Filipino citizen in the
family. Accordingly, private respondent prayed for the dismissal of the partition case and for the
reconveyance of the lots to its rightful owner — the conjugal regime.
Meantime, to protect the interest of the conjugal regime during the pendency of the case, private
respondent caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT 8278. Petitioner moved for
the cancellation of said annotation which was denied by the trial court ruling that (a) the notice
was not for the purpose of molesting or harassing petitioner and (b) also to keep the property
within the power of the court pending litigation. 3 Petitioner assailed the denial of his motion to
cancel the notice of lis pendens via petition for certiorari and prohibition to the Court of Appeals
(CA), but to no avail. 4
Resorting to this Court, petitioner primarily contends that in the resolution of an incidental motion
for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens (a) it was improper to thresh out the issue of
ownership of the disputed lots since ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case,
otherwise, (b) it would amount to a collateral attack of his title obtained more than 28 years ago.
He argues that his sole ownership as shown in the TCT would be improperly assailed in a
partition case and should be done through a separate suit. On the contrary, private respondent
posits that evidence of ownership is admissible in a partition case as this is not a probate or land
registration proceedings where the court's jurisdiction is limited.
Though the postulates respectively proffered by both parties are not at point, luckily for private
respondent, petitioner's claim is not legally tenable. There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate
of title cannot be collaterally attacked 5 but that rule is not material to this case. The annotation
of a notice of lis pendens does not in any case amount nor can it be considered as equivalent to
a collateral attack of the certificate of title for a parcel of land. The concept of no collateral attack
of title is based on Section 48 of P.D. 1529 which states that:
Certificate not Subject to Collateral attack. — A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law. 6 (Emphasis Supplied).
What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title. The certificate
referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to ownership which is represented by that document.
Petitioner apparently confuses certificate with title. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of
the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership
is different from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of
land. 7 Besides, the certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of
ownership. 8 Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not
foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not
named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may
have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. To repeat,
registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof. Title as a concept
of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership
although both are interchangeably used. In this case, contrary to petitioner's fears, his certificate
of title is not being assailed by private respondent. 9 What the latter disputes is the former's
claim of sole ownership. Thus, although petitioner's certificate of title may have become
incontrovertible one year after issuance, 10 yet contrary to his argument, it does not bar private
respondent from questioning his ownership. 11
It should be noted that what is being challenged in this case is the denial of the motion to cancel
the notice of lis pendens. But whether as a matter of procedure 12 or substance, 13 a notice of
lis pendens may be cancelled only on two grounds, which are: (1) if the annotation was for the
purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party, or, (2) when the annotation is not necessary
to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded. Neither ground for cancellation of
the notice was convincingly shown to concur in this case. It would not even be fair to justify the
cancellation of the notice on the legally untenable grounds that such annotation amounts to a
collateral attack of petitioner's certificate of title or that ownership cannot be adjudicated in a
partition case. It must be emphasized that the annotation of a notice of lis pendens is only for the
purpose of announcing "to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, serving
as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that
he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property." 14 Here, the parties are still locked
in a legal battle to settle their respective claims of ownership. The lower court allowed the
annotation pending litigation only for the purpose of giving information to the public that parcel of
land is involved in a suit and that those who deal with the property is forewarned of such fact.
On the contention that ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case, suffice it to say that
until and unless ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect partition of the
property. 15 For purposes of annotating a notice of lis pendens, there is nothing in the rules
which requires the party seeking annotation to prove that the land belongs to him. 16 Besides,
an action for partition is one case where the annotation of a notice of lis pendens is proper. 17
Further, contrary to petitioner's argument, one of the issues agreed upon by the parties at pre-
trial is to determine what are the properties acquired by the spouses during their marriage. 18 In
addition, private respondent in his answer with counterclaim prayed for the reconveyance of the
disputed lots. Accordingly, the issue of ownership has been put in issue and each claimant must
present their respective evidence to substantiate their respective allegations. 19 Considering
that this is a partition case, the court is required to inquire into the "nature and extent of title" of
the supposed claimant. 20 The title referred to by the rule is the purported ownership of the
claimants and not the certificate of title mentioned in Section 48 of P.D. 1529, although the latter
may be considered in the determination of the former.
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Melo, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Petitioner is one of the legitimate children of private respondent. The latter has
illegitimate children with another woman.
2 The listed properties are lumber business, rents, four buildings and a warehouse.
(Complaint, ANNEX "D" of Petition, pp. 2-3; Rollo, p. 47-48).
3 Order of RTC dated November 24, 1992; Rollo, p. 72.
4 Court of Appeals Decision promulgated February 8, 1994; Rollo, pp. 35-41.
5 Halili v. NLRC, 257 SCRA 174.
6 Property Registration Decree.
7 Halili v. NLRC, 257 SCRA 174 (1996).
8 Heirs of Gonzaga v. CA, 261 SCRA 327; Republic v. CA, 258 SCRA 712; In ejectment
cases, a certificate of title is conclusive evidence of ownership and it does not matter if the title is [G.R. No. 147072. May 7, 2002]
questionable (Dizon v. CA, 264 SCRA 391).
FRANCISCO H. LU, petitioner, vs. Spouses ORLANDO and ROSITA MANIPON, respondents.
9 Private Respondent's Memorandum, p. 6; Rollo, p. 196.
DECISION
10 Sec. 32, P.D. 1529.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
11 Petition, p. 10; Rollo, p. 16.
The registration of a sale of real estate will not protect a buyer in bad faith, for the law cannot be
12 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 13, Section 14 (formerly Section 24). used as a shield for fraud. On the other hand, the preferential right of a first registrant in a double
sale is always qualified by good faith.
Notice of lis pendens. — xxx xxx xxx
The Case
The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon order or the court,
after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the October 25, 2000 Decision and
not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded. (Emphasis the February 9, 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals[1] (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55149. The
supplied). assailed Decision disposed as follows:

13 Sec. 77 of P.D. 1529 provides. "Cancellation of lis pendens. — Before final judgment,
a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled, upon order of the court, after proper showing that the
notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the
rights of the party who caused it to be registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register of
Deeds upon the verified petition of the party who caused the registration thereof. (Emphasis
supplied).
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in the sense that [petitioner] is directed to convey Lot 5582-B-7-D covered by
TCT No. 171497 to [respondent] Rosita C. Manipon without being entitled to any payment from
the latter."[2]
The assailed Resolution denied the Motion for Reconsideration.[3]

14 Sajonas v. CA, 258 SCRA 79; Garbin v. CA, 253 SCRA 187; Tanchoco v. Aquino, 154 The Facts
SCRA 1; J.P. Pellicer & Co., Inc. v. Philippine Realty Corp., 87 Phil. 302.
The facts of the case are summarized in the assailed Decision as follows:
15 Catapusan v. CA, 264 SCRA 534.
On May 9, 1981, Juan Peralta executed a [D]eed of [S]ale by installment in favor of spouses
16 Villanueva v. CA, G.R. No. 117108, November 5, 1997. Orlando and Rosita Manipon [herein respondents]. Therein, Juan Peralta agreed to sell by
installment to the said spouses 350 square meters of the 2,078 square-meter lot he owned,
17 The other instances where the notice of lis pendens is proper are: a) an action to covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 137911 and located at Barrio Dilan, Urdaneta,
recover possession of real estate, b) an action to quiet title thereto, c) an action remove clouds Pangasinan. The said [D]eed was not registered with the Registry of Deeds.
thereon, d) any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title to the land or the
use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon. See Magdalena Homeowners Association, On June 10, 1981, Juan Peralta mortgaged the aforesaid lot to Thrift Savings and Loan
Inc. v. CA, 184 SCRA 325 (1990) cited in Villanueva v. CA, G.R. No. 117108, November 5, Association, Inc. (TSLAI). He however failed to pay the loan he obtained for which the mortgage
1997; See also Section 14, Rule 13 (formerly Section 24, Rule 14), 1997 Rules or Civil was constituted and so the same was judicially foreclosed and sold to TSLAI for P62,789.18
Procedure and Section 76 of P. D. 1529. which was the highest bidder. The latter in turn sold the same on July 15, 1988 in the amount of
P80,000.00 to the [petitioner]. Thereafter, on August 30, 1989, [petitioner] caused the
18 Annex "H" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 61. subdivision of the said lot into five (5) lots, one of which is Lot 5582-B-7-D, with an area of 339
square meters covering the lot which was earlier sold by installment to [respondents]. The said
19 Sec. 1, Rule 131. lot is now covered by TCT No. 171497. In the interim, or on July 30, 1983, Juan Peralta
executed a [D]eed of [S]ale in favor of [respondents] after the couple paid a total amount of
20 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1, Rule 69. "Complaint in action for partition of P8,000.00 for the subject lot. The aforesaid [D]eed was however also not registered.
real estate. — A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as
provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an On January 22, 1990, [petitioner] through counsel wrote the [respondents] regarding the
adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants presence of the latters house, which was also being occupied by them, on the lot in question.
all other persons interested in the property. (Emphasis supplied). Efforts were apparently made by both parties to settle the brewing dispute but to [no] avail.
Hence, on February 26, 1990, [petitioner] filed the present action alleging therein that he is the
owner of the lot in question including that which was being occupied by [respondents. Petitioner]
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation further claims that his ownership was confirmed by the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, Branch 49, in Civil Case No. U-4399. He also averred that for reasons unknown to
THIRD DIVISION
him, [respondents] were claiming ownership of Lot 5582-B-7-D and have constructed a house
thereon on January 22, 1990.
In the Answer filed by [respondents], they claim that [petitioner] is a buyer in bad faith because
even before he bought the 2,078 square-meter lot, he knew for a fact that they already bought
Lot 5582-B-7-D from the original owner of the said lot and have been residing therein since
1981. [Respondents] also asserted that [petitioner] had knowledge of their claim over the said
property because when the whole lot was foreclosed they shared the same problem as
[petitioner] also bought a lot with the 2,078 square-meter lot of Juan Peralta.
Trial ensued and thereafter, the trial court rendered the questioned judgment. x x x.[4] (Citations
omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that petitioner was not a buyer in good faith despite the fact that he was able
to register his ownership of the disputed lot. He admitted knowing that respondents had
constructed a house on the disputed lot in 1984, even before he purchased the property from
the loan association in 1990. Indeed, he waited more than ten (10) years before contesting
respondents occupation and possession of the land. The RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment as follows:
1). The [petitioner] is hereby ordered to convey to the herein [respondent] Rosita Manipon,
(defendant Orlando Manipon is already dead) the lot consisting of 339 square meters
denominated as Lot 5582-B-7-D and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 171497 after
paying the sum of P13,051.50 plus legal interest to the herein [petitioner] anytime after the
finality of this decision.
2). The third-party defendant, Juan Peralta, is ordered to refund to the defendants Manipons the
amount of P18,000.00 paid by the latter to him;
3). x x x no pronouncement as to damages in favor [of] or against either of the parties.[5]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the Decision of the trial court with the modification that respondents would no
longer be required to pay petitioner the value of the disputed portion in a forced sale. The
appellate court said that petitioner knew that Lot 5582-B-7-D had already been sold by Juan
Peralta to respondents before the mother lot was mortgaged, foreclosed and eventually
purchased. He bought the entire property from the foreclosing bank, because he feared that he
might lose what he had earlier bought in 1981 -- a 350 square meter lot which also formed part
of the mother lot.
Hence, this Petition.[6]
The Issues
In his Memorandum,[7] petitioner raises the following issues:
1. Who between petitioner and respondents have a better right of ownership over the lot in
question, Lot 5582-B-7-D, with an area of 339 square meters?
2. Whether respondents claim over the lot can rise [above that of] their predecessor in interest
Juan Peralta[.]
3. Whether respondents are under estoppel to question petitioners ownership over the lot in
question[.]
4. Whether petitioner was in bad faith in the acquisition of the lot in question[.]
5. And even assuming without admitting that petitioner is under obligation to convey the lot in
question in favor of respondents, whether the consideration of the lot be paid by respondent is
P2,000.00 per square meter[.][8]
These issues can be summed up into three questions: (1) who has a better right to the disputed
property? (2) was petitioner a purchaser in bad faith? and (3) what should be the purchase price
of the disputed lot?
This Courts Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Better Right to the Disputed Lot
Petitioner claims to have a better right to the disputed portion of the real property. First, although
respondents had bought it first, he was the first to register his purchase of the mother lot.
Second, respondents ownership follows that of their vendor who mortgaged to the bank his title
to the mother lot and failed to redeem it.
Petitioner avers that, although respondents purchased the disputed lot by installment on May 9,
1981 and fully paid for it on May 30, 1983, they failed to register their sale with the Registry of
Deeds. In the meantime, on June 18, 1981, Juan Peralta mortgaged the mother lot -- including
the disputed portion -- to the Thrift Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (TSLAI). The mortgage
was foreclosed and the property sold on July 10, 1988. Petitioner, on the other hand, bought the
whole lot from the bank for P80,000 on July 15, 1988 and registered it in his name on
September 23, 1988.
Third, petitioner claims that from the time respondents fully paid for the lot until they received a
Notice to Vacate, they did not do anything to perfect their title thereto; hence, they are now
estopped from questioning his ownership of it.
We are not convinced. In estoppel, a person who by deed or conduct induces another to act in a
particular manner is barred from adopting an inconsistent position, attitude or course of conduct
that thereby causes loss or injury to another.[9] This equitable principle will not apply to
respondents, because they exercised dominion over the property by occupying and building their
house on it. On the other hand, it was petitioner who, despite having knowledge of the existence
of respondents house on the disputed portion, bought the whole lot. Before acquiring the mother
lot from the bank, he knew of respondents claim of ownership and occupation. He cannot now
pretend to be an innocent buyer in good faith.
Registration is not the equivalent of title.[10] Under the Torrens system, registration only gives
validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land.[11] It was not established as a means of
acquiring title to private land because it merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership.[12]
Moreover, the RTC and the CA have correctly ruled that the preferential right of the first
registrant of a real property in a case of double sale is always qualified by good faith under
Article 1544[13] of the Civil Code.[14] A holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to
the protection of the law, for the law cannot be used as a shield for fraud.[15]

When the registration of a sale is not made in good faith, a party cannot base his preference of
title thereon, because the law will not protect anything done in bad faith. Bad faith renders the
registration futile. Thus, if a vendee registers the sale in his favor after he has acquired
knowledge that there was a previous sale of the same property to a third party, or that another
person claims said property under a previous sale, or that the property is in the possession of
one who is not a vendor, or that there were flaws and defects in the vendors title, or that this was
in dispute, the registration will constitute x x x bad faith, and will not confer upon him any
preferential right. The situation will be the same as if there had been no registration, and the
vendee who first took possession of the real property in good faith shall be preferred.[16]
Equally important, under Section 44 of the Property Registration Decree (Presidential Decree
No. 1529), every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of
registration and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking such certificate for value
and in good faith shall hold the same free from all encumbrances, except those noted on the
certificate and enumerated therein. Petitioner is evidently not a subsequent purchaser in good
faith. Therefore, between the parties, respondents have a better right to the property based on
the concurring factual findings of both the trial and the appellate courts. We quote with approval
the following ruling of the CA:
x x x We are persuaded that [petitioner] knew of the fact that Lot 5582-B-7-D was sold by Juan
Peralta to [respondents] before Lot 5582-B-7, the mother lot of Lot 5582-B-7-D, was mortgaged,
foreclosed, sold and [its ownership] transferred x x x to him. In fact, [w]e are convinced that the
main reason why [petitioner] bought the entire lot from the TSLAI was his fear of losing the 350
square meter-lot he bought sometime in 1981 which also forms part of Lot 5582-B-7. Having
been aware of the defects in the title of TSLAI as far as Lot 5582-B-7-D is concerned, he cannot
now claim to be a purchaser in good faith and for value even if he traces his ownership [to]
TSLAI which [w]e believe was a purchaser in good faith - the latter not being aware of the sale
that transpired between the [respondents] and Juan Peralta before Lot 5582-B-7 was sold to it in
a public auction.
One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot
claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith as against the true owner of the land or an
interest therein. Thus, even assuming arguendo that [petitioner] was not aware of the sale
between Juan Peralta and the [respondents], still he cannot be considered as a purchaser in
good faith because he had personal knowledge of [respondents] occupation of the lot in
question. This fact alone should have put him on guard before buying the land. But as he
admitted during the trial, he was not interested in the [respondents] reason for occupying the
said lot[;] all that he was interested in was to buy the entire lot. This devil-may-care attitude of
[petitioner] has placed him where he is now. Consequently, he cannot be entitled to the relief he
is seeking before this [c]ourt.
True, the purchaser of a registered land is not required to go behind the title to determine the
condition of the property. However, a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put
a reasonable man upon his guard and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that
there was no defect in the title of the vendor. His mere refusal to believe that such defect exists,
or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendors title,
will not make him an innocent purchaser for value, if it afterwards develops that the title was in
fact defective, and it appears that he had such notice of the defect as would have led to its
discovery had he acted with that measure of precaution which may reasonably be required of a
prudent man in a like situation.[17]
All told, the right of a buyer to rely upon the face of the title certificate and to dispense with the
need of inquiring further is upheld only when the party concerned had no actual knowledge of
facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to conduct further
inquiry.[18]
Second Issue:
Bad Faith
Petitioner denies being a purchaser in bad faith. He alleges that the only reason he spoke to the
respondents before he bought the foreclosed land was to invite them to share in the purchase
price, but they turned him down. This, he argues, was not an indication of bad faith.
Petitioners contention is untenable. He might have had good intentions at heart, but it is not the
intention that makes one an innocent buyer. A purchaser in good faith or an innocent purchaser
for value is one who buys property and pays a full and fair price for it, at the time of the purchase
or before any notice of some other persons claim on or interest in it.[19] One cannot close ones
eyes to facts that should put a reasonable person on guard and still claim to have acted in good
faith. As aptly explained by Vitug:
The governing principle is prius tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge
by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyers rights except when the second
buyer first registers in good faith the second sale (Olivares vs. Gonzales, 159 SCRA 33.)
Conversely, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he
is first to register, since such knowledge taints his registration with bad faith (see also Astorga
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 58530, 26 December 1984). In Cruz vs. Cabana (G.R. No.
56232, 22 June 1984; 129 SCRA 656), it was held that it is essential, to merit the protection of
Art. 1544, second paragraph, that the second realty buyer must act in good faith in registering
his deed of sale (citing Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 99, Crisostomo vs. CA, G.R.
95843, 02 September 1992).
The registration contemplated under Art. 1544 has been held to refer to registration under Act
496 Land Registration Act (now PD 1529) which considers the act of registration as the
operative act that binds the land (see Mediante vs. Rosabal, 1 O.G. [12] 900, Garcia vs.
Rosabal, 73 Phil 694). On lands covered by the Torrens System, the purchaser acquires such
rights and interest as they appear in the certificate of title, unaffected by any prior lien or
encumbrance not noted therein. The purchaser is not required to explore farther than what the
Torrens title, upon its face, indicates. The only exception is where the purchaser has actual
knowledge of a flaw or defect in the title of the seller or of such liens or encumbrances which, as
to him, is equivalent to registration (see Sec. 39, Act 496; Bernales vs. IAC, G.R. 75336, 18
October 1988; Hernandez vs. Sales, 69 Phil 744; Tajonera vs. Court of Appeals, L-26677, 27
March 1981).[20]
By his own allegations, petitioner admits he was not a purchaser in good faith. A buyer of real
property which is in the possession of another must be wary and investigate the rights of the
latter. Otherwise, without such inquiry, the buyer cannot be said to be in good faith.[21]
Basic is the rule that the factual findings of the appellate court are given great weight, even
finality, when they affirm those of the trial court,[22] unless they fall under the exceptions
enumerated in Fuentes v. Court of Appeals.[23] Petitioner has not shown that this case falls
under any of those exceptions; hence, we find no cogent reason to depart from this general rule.
Third Issue:
Proper Purchase Price
Petitioner protests respondents exemption from paying him P13,051.50 with legal interest for the
conveyance of the disputed portion. Instead, he pleads that this Court modify the price to P2,000
per square meter.
We are not persuaded. While neither party appealed the issue of the purchase price, petitioner
did question the conveyance of Lot 5582-B-7-D to respondents upon payment of the said price.
Hence, the payment was also effectively put in issue. It is well-settled that appellate courts have
ample authority to rule on matters not specifically assigned as errors in an appeal, if these are
indispensable or necessary to the just resolution of the pleaded issues.[24]
However, the CA modification exempting respondents from paying petitioner is flawed, because
the RTC had ordered Juan Peralta to refund the P18,000 paid to him by petitioner as the
purchase price of the disputed lot. Thus, the trial court correctly ordered (1) respondents to pay
petitioner P13,051.50[25] plus legal interest for Lot 5582-B-7-D and (2) the third-party defendant
Peralta to refund to respondents the P18,000 they had paid for the lot. The CA ruling would
unjustly enrich respondents, who would receive double compensation. In short, the RTC ruling
should have been affirmed in its entirety.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution are
AFFIRMED without the MODIFICATION ordered by the CA. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
[1] Seventeenth Division. Penned by Justice Martin S. Villarama Jr. with the concurrence of
Justices Romeo J. Callejo Sr. (Division chairman) and Juan Q. Enriquez Jr. (member).
[2] Assailed Decision, pp. 5-6; rollo, pp. 66-67.
[3] Rollo, p. 71.
[4] CA Decision, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp. 63-64.
[5] RTC Decision, pp. 15-16; rollo, pp. 46-47; penned by Judge Joven F. Costales.
[6] The case was deemed submitted for decision on November 19, 2001 upon the submission of
the Memorandum for petitioner.
[7] Signed by Atty. Simplicio M. Sevilleja; Atty. Ruben G. Ticse Sr. signed the Memorandum for
respondents, but did not indicate his IBP number and PTF fees. He is advised to do so next
time; otherwise, he would be sanctioned.
[8] Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 5; rollo, p. 121.
[9] Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 293 SCRA 239, July 27, 1998.
[10] Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, 292 SCRA 544, 548, July 15, 1998.
[11] Sajonas v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 79 & 91, July 5, 1996.
[12] Republic v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 366, 384, January 21, 1999; Heirs of Teodoro Dela
Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 172, October 21, 1998; Strait Times, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 294 SCRA 714, August 28, 1998; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 712, 722,
July 12, 1996.
[13] "Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership
shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it
should be movable property.
"Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in
good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
"Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was
first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title,
provided there is good faith."
[14] Baricuatro Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 137, 148-149, February 9, 2000; Uraca v.
Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 702, 712, September 5, 1997.
[15] Baricuatro Jr. v. CA, supra, p. 155.
[16] Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. V, 1992 ed., p. 100; citations omitted.
[17] CA Decision, pp. 4-5; rollo, pp. 65-66.
[18] Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 380.
[19] David v. Malay, 318 SCRA 711, 722, November 19, 1999; Republic v. CA, supra, p. 381; Co
v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 705, May 6, 1991.
[20] Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 rev. ed., p. 604.
[21] David v. Malay, supra, p. 724.
[22] Borromeo v. Sun, 317 SCRA 176, 182, October 22, 1999; Compaia Maritima, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, 318 SCRA 169, 177, November 16, 1999.
[23] 268 SCRA 703, 708-709, February 26, 1997; Baricuatro Jr. v. CA, supra, p. 145.
[24] Logronio v. Taleseo, 312 SCRA 52, 60, August 6, 1999.
[25] The price was computed as follows: petitioner bought the whole 2.078 sq. m. lot from the
bank for P80,000, of P38.50 per sq. m.; therefore, the trial court fixed the value of Lot 5582-B-7-
D at 339 sq. m. multiplied by P38.50 or P13,051.50 plus legal interest.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129760. December 29, 1998]
RICARDO CHENG, petitioner, vs. RAMON B. GENATO and ERNESTO R. DA JOSE &
SOCORRO B. DA JOSE, respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA)[1] dated July 7, 1997 in CA-G.R. No. CV No. 44706 entitled Ricardo Cheng,
plaintiff-appellee vs. Ramon B. Genato, defendant-appellant, Ernesto R. Da Jose & Socorro B.
Da Jose, Intervenors-Appellants which reversed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96
of Quezon City dated January 18, 1994. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and judgment is rendered ordering;
1. The dismissal of the complaint;
2. The cancellation of the annotations of the defendant-appellants Affidavit to Annul Contract to
Sell and plaintiff-appellees Notice of Adverse Claim in the subject TCTs, namely, TCT No. T-
76.196 (M) and TCT No. T-76.197 (M);
3. Payment by the intervenors-appellants of the remaining balance of the purchase price
pursuant to their agreement with the defendant-appellant to suspend encashment of the three
post-dated checks issued since 1989.
4. Ordering the execution by the defendant-appellant Genato of the Deed of Absolute Sale over
the subject two lots covered by TCT No. T-76.196 (M) and TCT No. T-76.197 (M) in favor of
intervenors-appellants Spouses Da Jose;
5. The return by defendant-appellant Genato of P50,000.00 paid to him by the plaintiff-appellee
Cheng, and
6. Payment by plaintiff-appellee Cheng of moral damages to herein intervenors-appellants Da
Jose of P100,000.00, exemplary damages of P50,000.00, attorneys fees of P50,000.00, and
costs of suit; and to defendant-appellant, of P100,000.00 in exemplary damages, P50,000.00 in
attorneys fees. The amounts payable to the defendant-appellant may be compensated by
plaintiff-appellee with the amount ordered under the immediately foregoing paragraph which
defendant-appellant has to pay the plaintiff-appellee.
SO ORDERED.[2]
The antecedents of the case are as follows:
Respondent Ramon B. Genato(Genato) is the owner of two parcels of land located at Paradise
Farms, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan covered by TCT No. T-76.196 (M)[3] and TCT No. T-
76.197 (M)[4] with an aggregate area of 35,821 square meters, more or less.
On September 6, 1989, respondent Genato entered into an agreement with respondent-spouses
Ernesto R. Da Jose and Socorro B. Da Jose (Da Jose spouses) over the above-mentioned two
parcels of land. The agreement culminated in the execution of a contract to sell for which the
purchase price was P80.00 per square meter. The contract was in a public instrument and was
duly annotated at the back of the two certificates of title on the same day. Clauses 1 and 3
thereof provide:
'1. That the purchase price shall be EIGHTY (P80.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency per square
meter, of which the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) Pesos shall be paid by the
VENDEE to the VENDOR as partial down payment at the time of execution of this Contract to
Sell.
xxx xxx xxx
'3. That the VENDEE, thirty (30) DAYS after the execution of this contract, and only after having
satisfactorily verified and confirmed the truth and authenticity of documents, and that no
restrictions, limitations, and developments imposed on and/or affecting the property subject of
this contract shall be detrimental to his interest, the VENDEE shall pay to the VENDOR, NINE
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P950,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, representing the
full payment of the agreed Down Payment, after which complete possession of the property shall
be given to the VENDEE to enable him to prepare the premises and any development therein.[5]
On October 4, 1989, the Da Jose spouses, not having finished verifying the titles mentioned in
clause 3 as aforequoted, asked for and was granted by respondent Genato an extension of
another 30 days or until November 5, 1989. However, according to Genato, the extension was
granted on condition that a new set of documents is made seven (7) days from October 4,
1989.[6] This was denied by the Da Jose spouses.
Pending the effectivity of the aforesaid extension period, and without due notice to the Da Jose
spouses, Genato executed an Affidavit to Annul the Contract to Sell,[7] on October 13, 1989.
Moreover, no annotation of the said affidavit at the back of his titles was made right away. The
affidavit contained, inter alia, the following paragraphs;
xxx xxx xxx
That it was agreed between the parties that the agreed downpayment of P950,000.00 shall be
paid thirty (30) days after the execution of the Contract, that is on or before October 6, 1989;
The supposed VENDEES failed to pay the said full downpayment even up to this writing, a
breach of contract.
That this affidavit is being executed to Annul the aforesaid Contract to Sell for the vendee having
committed a breach of contract for not having complied with the obligation as provided in the
Contract to Sell;[8]
On October 24, 1989, herein petitioner Ricardo Cheng (Cheng) went to Genatos residence and
expressed interest in buying the subject properties. On that occasion, Genato showed to Ricardo
Cheng copies of his transfer certificates of title and the annotations at the back thereof of his
contract to sell with the Da Jose spouses. Genato also showed him the aforementioned Affidavit
to Annul the Contract to Sell which has not been annotated at the back of the titles.
Despite these, Cheng went ahead and issued a check for P50,000.00 upon the assurance by
Genato that the previous contract with the Da Jose spouses will be annulled for which Genato
issued a handwritten receipt (Exh. D), written in this wise.
10/24/89
Received from Ricardo Cheng
the Sum of Fifty Thousand Only (P50,000 -)
as partial for T-76196 (M)
T-76197 (M) area 35,821 Sq.m.
Paradise Farm, Gaya-Gaya, San Jose Del Monte
P70/m2 Bulacan
Plus C.G.T. etc
(SGD) Ramon B. Genato
Check # 470393
10/24/89[9]
On October 25, 1989, Genato deposited Chengs check. On the same day, Cheng called up
Genato reminding him to register the affidavit to annul the contract to sell.[10]
The following day, or on October 26, 1989, acting on Chengs request, Genato caused the
registration of the Affidavit to Annul the Contract to Sell in the Registry of Deeds, Meycauayan,
Bulacan as primary entry No. 262702.[11]
While the Da Jose spouses were at the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Meycauaya, Bulacan
on October 27, 1989, they met Genato by coincidence. It was only then that the Da Jose
spouses discovered about the affidavit to annul their contract. The latter were shocked at the
disclosure and protested against the rescission of their contract. After being reminded that he
(Genato) had given them (Da Jose spouses) an additional 30-day period to finish their
verification of his titles, that the period was still in effect, and that they were willing and able to
pay the balance of the agreed down payment, later on in the day, Genato decided to continue
the Contract he had with them. The agreement to continue with their contract was formalized in
a conforme letter dated October 27, 1989.
Thereafter, Ramon Genato advised Ricardo Cheng of his decision to continue his contract with
the Da Jose spouses and the return of Chengs P50,000.00 check. Consequently, on October
30, 1989, Chengs lawyer sent a letter[12] to Genato demanding compliance with their
agreement to sell the property to him stating that the contract to sell between him and Genato
was already perfected and threatening legal action.
On November 2, 1989, Genato sent a letter[13] to Cheng (Exh. 6) enclosing a BPI Cashiers
Check for P50,000.00 and expressed regret for his inability to consummate his transaction with
him. After having received the letter of Genato on November 4, 1989, Cheng, however, returned
the said check to the former via RCPI telegram[14] dated November 6, 1989, reiterating that our
contract to sell your property had already been perfected.
Meanwhile, also on November 2, 1989, Cheng executed an affidavit of adverse claim[15] and
had it annotated on the subject TCTs.
On the same day, consistent with the decision of Genato and the Da Jose spouses to continue
with their Contract to Sell of September 6, 1989, the Da Jose spouses paid Genato the complete
down payment of P950,000.00 and delivered to him three (3) postdated checks (all dated May 6,
1990, the stipulated due date) in the total amount of P1,865,680.00 to cover full payment of the
balance of the agreed purchase price. However, due to the filing of the pendency of this case,
the three (3) postdated checks have not been encashed.
On December 8, 1989, Cheng instituted a complaint[16] for specific performance to compel
Genato to execute a deed of sale to him of the subject properties plus damages and prayer for
preliminary attachment. In his complaint, Cheng averred that the P50,000.00 check he gave was
a partial payment to the total agreed purchase price of the subject properties and considered as
an earnest money for which Genato acceded. Thus, their contract was already perfected.
In Answer[17] thereto, Genato alleged that the agreement was only a simple receipt of an
option-bid deposit, and never stated that it was a partial payment, nor is it an earnest money and
that it was subject to the condition that the prior contract with the Da Jose spouses be first
cancelled.
The Da Jose spouses, in their Answer in Intervention,[18] asserted that they have a superior
right to the property as first buyers. They alleged that the unilateral cancellation of the Contract
to Sell was without effect and void. They also cited Chengs bad faith as a buyer being duly
informed by Genato of the existing annotated Contract to Sell on the titles.
After trial on the merits, the lower court ruled that the receipt issued by Genato to Cheng
unerringly meant a sale and not just a priority or an option to buy. It cannot be true that the
transaction was subjected to some condition or reservation, like the priority in favor of the Da
Jose spouses as first buyer because, if it were otherwise, the receipt would have provided such
material condition or reservation, especially as it was Genato himself who had made the receipt
in his own hand. It also opined that there was a valid rescission of the Contract to Sell by virtue
of the Affidavit to Annul the Contract to Sell. Time was of the essence in the execution of the
agreement between Genato and Cheng, under this circumstance demand, extrajudicial or
judicial, is not necessary. It falls under the exception to the rule provided in Article 1169[19] of
the Civil Code. The right of Genato to unilaterally rescind the contract is said to be under Article
1191[20] of the Civil Code. Additionally, after reference was made to the substance of the
agreement between Genato and the Da Jose spouses, the lower court also concluded that
Cheng should be preferred over the intervenors-Da Jose spouses in the purchase of the subject
properties. Thus, on January 18, 1994 the trial court rendered its decision the decretal portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the contract to sell dated September 6, 1989 executed between defendant Ramon
Genato, as vendor, and intervenors Spouses Ernesto and Socorro Da Jose, as vendees,
resolved and rescinded in accordance with Art. 1191, Civil Code, by virtue of defendants affidavit
to annul contract to sell dated October 13, 1989 and as the consequence of intervenors failure to
execute within seven (7) days from October 4, 1989 another contract to sell pursuant to their
mutual agreement with the defendant;
2. Ordering defendant to return to the intervenors the sum of P1,000,000.00, plus interest at the
legal rate from November 2, 1989 until full payment;
3. Directing defendant to return to the intervenors the three (3) postdated checks immediately
upon finality of this judgment;
4. Commanding defendant to execute with and in favor of the plaintiff Ricardo Cheng, as
vendee, a deed of conveyance and sale of the real properties described and covered in Transfer
Certificates of Title No. T-76-196 (M) and T-76.197 (M) of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan,
Meycauyan Branch, at the rate of P70.00/sqaure meter, less the amount of P50,000.00 already
paid to defendant, which is considered as part of the purchase price, with the plaintiff being liable
for payment of the capital gains taxes and other expenses of the transfer pursuant to the
agreement to sell dated October 24, 1989; and
5. Ordering defendant to pay the plaintiff and the intervenors as follows:
a/ P50,000.00, as nominal damages, to plaintiff;
b/ P50,000.00, as nominal damages, to intervenors;
c/ P20,000.00, as and for attorneys fees, to plaintiff;
d/ P20,000.00, as and for attorneys fees, to intervenors; and
e/ Cost of the suit.
xxx xxx xxx
Not satisfied with the aforesaid decision, herein respondents Ramon Genato and Da Jose
spouses appealed to the court a quo which reversed such judgment and ruled that the prior
contract to sell in favor of the Da Jose spouses was not validly rescinded, that the subsequent
contract to sell between Genato and Cheng, embodied in the handwritten receipt, was without
force and effect due to the failure to rescind the prior contract; and that Cheng should pay
damages to the respondents herein being found to be in bad faith.
Hence this petition.[21]
This petition for review, assails the Court of Appeals Decision on the following grounds: (1) that
the Da Jose spouses Contract to Sell has been validly rescinded or resolved; (2) that Ricardo
Chengs own contract with Genato was not just a contract to sell but one of conditional contract
of sale which gave him better rights, thus precluding the application of the rule on double sales
under Article 1544, Civil Code; and (3) that, in any case, it was error to hold him liable for
damages.
The petition must be denied for failure to show that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error which would warrant a contrary ruling.
No reversible error can be ascribed to the ruling of the Court of Appeals that there was no valid
and effective rescission of resolution of the Da Jose spouses Contract to Sell, contrary to
petitioners contentions and the trial courts erroneous ruling.
In a Contract to Sell, the payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition, the
failure of which is not a breach, casual or serious, but a situation that prevents the obligation of
the vendor to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force.[22] It is one where the happening of
the event gives rise to an obligation. Thus, for its non-fulfillment there will be no contract to
speak of, the obligor having failed to perform the suspensive condition which enforces a juridical
relation. In fact with this circumstance, there can be no rescission of an obligation that is still
non-existent, the suspensive condition not having occurred as yet.[23] Emphasis should be
made that the breach contemplated in Article 1191 of the New Civil Code is the obligors failure
to comply with an obligation already extant, not a failure of a condition to render binding that
obligation.[24]
Obviously, the foregoing jurisprudence cannot be made to apply to the situation in the instant
case because no default can be ascribed to the Da Jose spouses since the 30-day extension
period has not yet expired. The Da Jose spouses contention that no further condition was
agreed when they were granted the 30-days extension period from October 7, 1989 in
connection with clause 3 of their contract to sell dated September 6, 1989 should be upheld for
the following reason, to wit; firstly, If this were not true, Genato could not have been persuaded
to continue his contract with them and later on agree to accept the full settlement of the
purchase price knowing fully well that he himself imposed such sine qua non condition in order
for the extension to be valid; secondly, Genato could have immediately annotated his affidavit to
annul the contract to sell on his title when it was executed on October 13, 1989 and not only on
October 26, 1989 after Cheng reminded him of the annotation; thirdly, Genato could have sent at
least a notice of such fact, there being no stipulation authorizing him for automatic rescission, so
as to finally clear the encumbrance of his titles and make it available to other would be buyers. It
likewise settles the holding of the trial court that Genato needed money urgently.
Even assuming in gratia argumenti that the Da Jose spouses defaulted, as claimed by Genato,
in their Contract to Sell, the execution by Genato of the affidavit to annul the contract is not even
called for. For with or without the aforesaid affidavit their non-payment to complete the full
downpayment of the purchase price ipso facto avoids their contract to sell, it being subjected to
a suspensive condition. When a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth or
effectivity can take place only if and when the event which constitutes the condition happens or
is fulfilled.[25] If the suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the
conditional obligation had never existed.[26]
Nevertheless, this being so Genato is not relieved from the giving of a notice, verbal or written,
to the Da Jose spouses for decision to rescind their contract. In many cases,[27] even though
we upheld the validity of a stipulation in a contract to sell authorizing automatic rescission for a
violation of its terms and conditions, at least a written notice must be sent to the defaulter
informing him of the same. The act of a party in treating a contract as cancelled should be made
known to the other.[28] For such act is always provisional. It is always subject to scrutiny and
review by the courts in case the alleged defaulter brings the matter to the proper courts. In
University of the Philippines vs. De Los Angeles,[29] this Court stressed and we quote:
In other words, the party who deems the contract violated may consider it resolved or rescinded,
and act accordingly, without previous court action, but it proceeds at its own risk. For it is only
the final judgment of the corresponding court that will conclusively and finally settle whether the
action taken was or was not correct in law. But the law definitely does not require that the
contracting party who believes itself injured must first file suit and wait for a judgment before
taking extajudicial steps to protect its interest. Otherwise, the party injured by the others breach
will have to passively sit and watch its damages accumulate during the pendency of the suit until
the final judgment of rescission is rendered when the law itself requires that he should exercise
due diligence to minimize its own damages (Civil Code, Article 2203).
This rule validates, both in equity and justice, contracts such as the one at bat, in order to avoid
and prevent the defaulting party from assuming the offer as still in effect due to the obligees
tolerance for such non-fulfillment. Resultantly, litigations of this sort shall be prevented and the
relations among would-be parties may be preserved. Thus, Ricardo Chengs contention that the
Contract to Sell between Genato and the Da Jose spouses was rescinded or resolved due to
Genatos unilateral rescission finds no support in this case.
Anent the issue on the nature of the agreement between Cheng and Genato, the records of this
case are replete with admissions[30] that Cheng believed it to be one of a Contract to Sell and
not one of Conditionl Contract of Sale which he, in a transparent turn-around, now pleads in this
Petition. This ambivalent stance of Cheng is even noted by the appellate court, thus:
At the outset, this Court notes that plaintiff-appellee was inconsistent in characterizing the
contract he allegedly entered into. In his complaint,[31] Cheng alleged that the P50,000.00 down
payment was earnest money. And next, his testimony[32] was offered to prove that the
transaction between him and Genato on October 24, 1989 was actually a perfected contract to
sell.[33]
Settled is the rule that an issue which was not raised during the trial in the court below cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal.[34] Issues of fact and arguments not adequately brought to
the attention of the trial court need not be and ordinarily will not be considered by a reviewing
court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[35] In fact, both courts below correctly
held that the receipt which was the result of their agreement, is a contract to sell. This was, in
fact Chengs contention in his pleadings before said courts. This patent twist only operates
against Chengs posture which is indicative of the weakness of his claim.
But even if we are to assume that the receipt, Exh. D, is to be treated as a conditional contract of
sale, it did not acquire any obligatory force since it was subject to suspensive condition that the
earlier contract to sell between Genato and the Da Jose spouses should first be cancelled or
rescinded a condition never met, as Genato, to his credit, upon realizing his error, redeemed
himself by respecting and maintaining his earlier contract with the Da Jose spouses. In fact a
careful reading of the receipt, Exh. D, alone would not even show that a conditional contract of
sale has been entered by Genato and Cheng. When the requisites of a valid contract of sale are
lacking in said receipt, therefore the sale is neither valid or enforceable.[36]
To support his now new theory that the transaction was a conditional contract of sale, petitioner
invokes the case of Coronel vs. Court of Appeals[37] as the law that should govern their Petition.
We do not agree. Apparently, the factual milieu in Coronel is not on all fours with those in the
case at bar.
In Coronel, this Court found that the petitioners therein clearly intended to transfer title to the
buyer which petitioner themselves admitted in their pleading. The agreement of the parties
therein was definitively outline in the Receipt of Down Payment both as to property, the
purchase price, the delivery of the seller of the property and the manner of the transfer of title
subject to the specific condition that upon the transfer in their names of the subject property the
Coronels will execute the deed of absolute sale.
Whereas, in the instant case, even by a careful perusal of the receipt, Exh. D, alone such kind of
circumstances cannot be ascertained without however resorting to the exceptions of the Rule on
Parol Evidence.
To our mind, the trial court and the appellate court correctly held that the agreement between
Genato and Cheng is a contract to sell, which was, in fact, petitioner connection in his pleadings
before the said courts. Consequently, both to mind, which read:
Article 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall
be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it
should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in
good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was
first in possession; and in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title,
provided there is good faith
However, a meticulous reading of the aforequoted provision shows that said law is not apropos
to the instant case. This provision connotes that the following circumstances must concur:
(a) The two (or more) sales transactions in the issue must pertain to exactly the same subject
matter, and must be valid sales transactions.
(b) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter must each
represent conflicting interests; and
(c) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter must each
have bought from the very same seller.
These situations obviously are lacking in a contract to sell for neither a transfer of ownership nor
a sales transaction has been consummated. The contract to be binding upon the obligee or the
vendor depends upon the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of an event.
Notwithstanding this contrary finding with the appellate court, we are of the view that the
governing principle of Article 1544, Civil Code, should apply in this situation. Jurisprudence[38]
teaches us that the governing principle is PRIMUS TEMPORE, PORTIOR JURE (first in time,
stronger in right). For not only was the contract between herein respondents first in time; it was
also registered long before petitioners intrusion as a second buyer. This principle only applies
when the special rules provided in the aforcited article of Civil Code do not apply or fit the
specific circumstances mandated under said law or by jurisprudence interpreting the article.
The rule exacted by Article 1544 of the Civil Code for the second buyer to be able to displace the
first buyer are:
(1) that the second buyer must show that he acted in good faith (i.e. in ignorance of the first sale
and of the first buyers rights) from the time of acquisition until title is transferred to him by
registration or failing registration, by delivery of possession;[39]
(2) the second buyer must show continuing good faith and innocence or lack of knowledge of the
first sale until his contract ripens into full ownership through prior registration as provided by
law.[40]
Thus, in the case at bar, the knowledge gained by the Da Jose spouses, as first buyers, of the
new agreement between Cheng and Genato will not defeat their rights as first buyers except
where Cheng, as second buyer, registers or annotates his transaction or agreement on the title
of the subject properties in good faith ahead of the Da Jose spouses. Moreover, although the Da
Jose spouses, as first buyers, knew of the second transaction it will not bar them from availing of
their rights granted by law, among them, to register first their agreement as against the second
buyer.
In contrast, knowledge gained by Cheng of the first transaction between the Da Jose spouses
and Genato defeats his rights even if he is first to register the second transaction, since such
knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith.
Registration, as defined by Soler and Castillo, means any entry made in the books of the
registry, including both registration in its ordinary and strict sense and cancellation, annotation,
and even marginal notes.[41] In its strict acceptation, it is the entry made in the registry which
records solemnly and permanently the right of ownership and other real rights.[42] We have
ruled[43] before that when a Deed of Sale is inscribed in the registry of property on the original
document itself, what was done with respect to said entries or annotations and marginal notes
amounted to a registration of the sale. In this light, we see no reason why we should not give
priority in right the annotation made by the Da Jose spouses with respect to their Contract to Sell
dated September 6, 1989.
Moreover, registration alone in such cases without good faith is not sufficient. Good faith must
concur with registration for such prior right to be enforceable. In the instant case, the annotation
made by the Da Jose spouses on the titles of Genato of their Contract to Sell more than satisfies
this requirement. Whereas in the case of Genatos agreement with Cheng such is unavailing. For
even before the receipt, Exh. D, was issued to Cheng information of such pre-existing
agreement has been brought to his knowledge which did not deter him from pursuing his
agreement with Genato. We give credence to the factual finding of the appellate court that
Cheng himself admitted that it was he who sought Genato in order to inquire about the property
and offered to buy the same.[44] And since Cheng was fully aware, or could have been if he had
chosen to inquire, of the rights of the Da Jose spouses under the Contract to Sell duly annotated
on the transfer certificates of titles of Genato, it now becomes unnecessary to further elaborate
in detail the fact that he is indeed in bad faith in entering into such agreement. As we have held
in Leung Yee vs. F.L. Strong Machinery Co.:[45]
One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect x x x of title in his vendor cannot [7] Annex D, Petition; Rollo, p. 110.
claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith as against x x x x an interest therein; and the
same rule must be applied to one who has knowledge of facts which should have put him upon [8] Ibid.
such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title
of his vendor. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man [9] Annex C, Petition; Rollo, p. 109.
upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no
defect in the title of the vendor. His mere refusal to believe that such defect exists, or his willful [10] Annex I, Petition p. 7; Rollo, p. 145
closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendors title, will not make
him an innocent purchaser for value, if it afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective, [11] Annex B, Petition; Rollo, pp. 106 & 108.
and it appears that he had such notice of the defect as would have led to its discovery had he
acted with that measure of precaution which may reasonably be required of a prudent man in a [12] Annex E, Petition; Rollo, p. 111
like situation. Good faith, or lack of it, is in its last analysis a question of intention; but in
ascertaining the intention by which one is actuated on a given occasion, we are necessarily [13] Rollo, p. 115.
controlled by the evidence as to the conduct and outward acts by which alone the inward motive
may, with safety, be determined. So it is that the honesty of intention, the honest lawful intent, [14] Rollo, p. 120.
which constitutes good faith implies a freedom from knowledge and circumstances which ought
to put a person on inquiry, and so it is that proof of such knowledge overcomes the presumption [15] Rollo, pp. 106 & 108.
of good faith in which the courts always indulge in the absence of the proof to the contrary. Good
faith, or the want of it, is not a visible, tangible fact that can be seen or touched, but rather a [16]Rollo, pp. 99-104.
state or condition of mind which can only be judge of by actual or fancied tokens or signs.
(Wilder vs. Gilman, 55 Vt. 504, 505; Cf. Cardenas vs. Miller, 108 Cal., 250; Breaux-Renoudet, [17] Rollo, pp. 112-114.
Cypress Lumber Co. vs. Shadel, 52 La. Ann., 2094-2098; Pinkerton Bros. Co. vs. Bromely, 119
Mich., 8, 10, 17.) Emphasis ours [18] Rollo, pp. 124-132.

Damages were awarded by the appellate court on the basis of its finding that petitioner was in
bad faith when he filed the suit for specific performance knowing fully well that his agreement
with Genato did not push through.[46] Such bad faith, coupled with his wrongful interference with
the contractual relations between Genato and the Da Jose spouses, which culminated in his
filing of the present suit and thereby creating what the counsel for the respondents describes as
a prolonged and economically unhealthy gridlock[47] on both the land itself and the respondents
rights provides ample basis for the damages awarded. Based on these overwhelming evidence
of bad faith on the part of herein petitioner Ricardo Cheng, we find that the award of damages
made by the appellate court is in order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED and the assailed
decision is hereby AFFIRMED EN TOTO.
[19] Article 1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in delay from the time the
obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation.
However, the demand by the creditor shall not be necessary in order that delay may exist:
(1) xxx; or
(2) When from the nature and the circumstances of the obligation it appears that the designation
of the time when the thing is to be delivered or the service is to be rendered was a controlling
motive for the establishment of the contract; or
(3) xxx.

SO ORDERED. [20] Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of
the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with
the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen
[1] Thirteenth Division. fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.

[2] Penned by Justice Demetrio G. Demetria and concurred by Justices Jainal Rasul and The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of
Godardo A. Jacinto. a period.

[3] Annex A, Petition; Rollo, pp. 105-106. This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the
thing in accordance with articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law. (1124)
[4] Annex B, Petition; Rollo, pp. 107-108.
[21] Filed on September 4, 1997.
[5] Annex 1, Petition; Rollo, pp. 142-143.
[22] Odyssey Park, Inc. vs. CA, 280 SCRA 253.
[6] TSN, June 26, 1992, p. 16; Rollo, p. 77.
[23] Rillo vs. CA, 274 SCRA 461.
[46] Annex A, Petition; Rollo, p. 95.
[24] Odyssey Park, Inc. vs. CA, supra.
[47] Comment of Da Jose spouses, p. 3; Rollo, p. 315.
[25] Javier vs. CA, 183 SCRA 171 citing Article 1181, Civil Code and Araneta vs. Rural Progress
Administration, 92 Phil. 98.

[26] Javier vs. CA, supra, also citing Gaite vs. Fonacier, et al., 2 SCRA 830. Today is Saturday, June 23, 2018

[27] Palay, Inc. vs. Clave, 124 SCRA 638 citing Torralba vs. De los Angeles, 96 SCRA 69; Custom Search
Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Building Co., 43 SCRA 93 and 86 SCRA 305; Lopez vs.
Commissioner of Customs, 37 SCRA 327; U.P. vs. De los Angeles, 35 SCRA 102; Ponce Enrile
vs. CA, 29 SCRA 504; Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., 12 SCRA 276; Taylor vs. Uy Tieng Republic of the Philippines
Piao, 43 Phil. 873. SUPREME COURT
Manila
[28] Palay, Inc. vs. Clave, supra.
EN BANC
[29] 35 SCRA 102.
G.R. No. L-22486 March 20, 1968
[30] Rollo, p. 111; Annex D at pp. 1 & 2, Petition, Rollo, pp. 116 & 117; RCPI Telegram dated
November 06, 1989, Rollo, p. 120; CA Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at p. 6, Rollo, p. 257. TEODORO ALMIROL, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
[31] Annex A at par. 5, p. 15, Petition; Rollo, p. 87. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN, respondent-appellee.

[32] Ibid. Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for petitioner-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.
[33] CA Decision at par. 5, p. 15, Annex A, Petition; Rollo, p. 87.
CASTRO, J.:
[34] Pangilinan vs. CA, 279 SCRA 590 citing Reparations Commission vs. Visayan Packing
Corporation, 193 SCRA 531. On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land situated
in the municipality of Esperanza, province of Agusan, and covered by original certificate of title
[35] Pangilinan vs. CA, supra, citing Berin vs. CA, 194 SCRA 508. P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962
Almirol went to the office of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed
[36] Jovan Land, Inc. vs. CA, 268 SCRA 160. of sale and to secure in his name a transfer certificate of title. Registration was refused by the
Register of Deeds upon the following grounds, inter alia, stated in his letter of May 21, 1962:
[37] 263 SCRA 15.
1. That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the name of Arcenio Abalo,
[38] Uraca vs. CA, 278 SCRA 702; Cruz vs. Cabana, 129 SCRA 656; Carbonell vs. CA, 69 married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal presumption, is considered conjugal property;
SCRA 99, concurring Separate Opinion of then Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee, later to be
the Chief Justice. 2. That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the effectivity of the New Civil Code it is
necessary that both spouses sign the document; but
[39] See Uraca vs. CA, supra.
3. Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the sale was made, the surviving
[40] Ibid. husband can not dispose of the whole property without violating the existing law (LRC Consulta
No. 46 dated June 10, 1958).
[41] Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. V, 1992, pp.
97-98. To effect the registration of the aforesaid deed of absolute Sale, it is necessary that the
property be first liquidated and transferred in the name of the surviving spouse and the heirs of
[42] Ibid. the deceased wife by means of extrajudicial settlement or partition and that the consent of such
other heir or heirs must be procured by means of another document ratifying this sale executed
[43] Veguillas vs. Jaucian, 25 Phil. 315. by their father.

[44] Annex A, Petition; Rollo, par. 2, p. 95. In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan on a petition
for mandamus (sp. civ. case 151), to compel the Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale
[45] 37 Phil. 644. and to issue to him the corresponding transfer certificate of title, and to recover P5,000 in moral
damages and P1,000 attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. It is Almirol's assertion that it is
but a ministerial duty of the respondent to perform the acts required of him, and that he (Almirol)
has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In his answer with counterclaim for P10,000 damages, the respondent reiterated the
grounds stated in his letter of May 21, 1962, averred that the petitioner has "other legal, plain,
speedy and adequate remedy at law by appealing the decision of the respondent to the
Honorable Commissioner of Land Registration," and prayed for dismissal of the petition.
In its resolution of October 16, 1963 the lower court, declaring that "mandamus does not
lie . . . because the adequate remedy is that provided by Section 4 of Rep. Act 1151", dismissed
the petition, with costs against the petitioner.
Hence the present appeal by Almirol.
The only question of law tendered for resolution is whether mandamus will lie to compel
the respondent to register the deed of sale in question.
Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent evince a sincere desire on his part to
maintain inviolate the law on succession and transmission of rights over real properties, these do
not constitute legal grounds for his refusal to register the deed. Whether a document is valid or
not, is not for the register of deeds to determine; this function belongs properly to a court of
competent jurisdiction.1
Whether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the duty of a
Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction. (Gabriel vs. Register of Deeds
of Rizal, et al., L-17956, Sept. 30, 1953).
. . . the supposed invalidity of the contracts of lease is no valid objection to their
registration, because invalidity is no proof of their non-existence or a valid excuse for denying
their registration. The law on registration does not require that only valid instruments shall be
registered. How can parties affected thereby be supposed to know their invalidity before they
become aware, actually or constructively, of their existence or of their provisions? If the purpose
of registration is merely to give notice, then questions regarding the effect or invalidity of
instruments are expected to be decided after, not before, registration. It must follow as a
necessary consequence that registration must first be allowed, and validity or effect litigated
afterwards. (Gurbax Singh Pablo & Co. vs. Reyes and Tantoco, 92 Phil. 182-183).
Indeed, a register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from
exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confronted with the problem of whether to
register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For under the said section, when he
is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with respect to any deed or other instrument
presented to him for registration, all that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify the
question to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an
order prescribing the step to be taken on the doubtful question. Section 4 of R.A. 1151 reads as
follows:
Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. — When the
Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to be
made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented to him for registration,
or where any party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds with reference to any
such matter, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration either
upon the certification of the Register of Deeds, stating the question upon which he is in doubt, or
upon the suggestion in writing by the party in interest; and thereupon the Commissioner, after
consideration of the matter shown by the records certified to him, and in case of registered
lands, after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be
taken or memorandum to be made. His decision in such cases shall be conclusive and binding
upon all Registers of Deeds: Provided, further, That when a party in interest disagrees with the
ruling or resolution of the Commissioner and the issue involves a question of law, said decision
may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty days from and after receipt of the notice
thereof.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the court a quo correctly dismissed the petition for
mandamus. Section 4 abovequoted provides that "where any party in interest does not agree
with the Register of Deeds . . . the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land
Registration," who thereafter shall "enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or
memorandum to be made," which shall be "conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds."
This administrative remedy must be resorted to by the petitioner before he can have recourse to
the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of the lower court of October 16, 1969, is affirmed, at
petitioner's cost.1äwphï1.ñët
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.
Sanchez, J., concurs in the result.
Footnotes
1In re Consulta filed by Francisco on behalf of Cabantog, 67 Phil. 222, 228; Smith Bell & Co.,
Ltd. vs. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 61; Register of Deeds, Pasig, Rizal vs. heirs of
Hi Caiji, et al., 99 Phil. 25, 29-31; Mendoza vs. Abrera, et al., L-10519, April 30, 1959;
Agricultural Credit Cooperative Association of Hinibiran vs. Yulo Yusay, et al., L-13313, April 28,
1960; Dulay, et al., vs. Herrera, L-17084, August 30, 1962.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
Today is Saturday, June 23, 2018
Custom Search
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-60413 October 31, 1990
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SOFRONIO G. SAYO, Judge, Br. I, C I, Nueva Vizcaya, HEIRS OF CASIANO
SANDOVAL, HEIRS OF LIBERATO BAYAUA, JOSE C. REYES, and PHILIPPINE CACAO AND
FARM PRODUCTS, INC., respondents.
Celso D. Gangan respondent Heirs of Liberato Bayaua.

Acosta & Associates fox Phil. Cacao and Farm Products, Inc.
Jose Reyes & Associates for Heirs of Casiano Sandoval, et al.
NARVASA, J.:
Sought to be annulled and set aside in this special civil action of certiorari is the decision of
respondent Judge Sofronio G. Sayo rendered on March 5, 1981 in Land Registration Case No.
N-109, LRC Record No. 20850, confirming, by virtue of a compromise agreement, the title of the
private respondents over a tract of land.
The spouses, Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez, filed an original application for registration of
a tract of land identified as Lot No. 7454 of the Cadastral Survey of Santiago, BL Cad. 211 (July
17, 1961) and having an area of 33,950 hectares. The land was formerly part of the Municipality
of Santiago, Province of Isabela, but had been transferred to Nueva Vizcaya in virtue of Republic
Act No. 236.
Oppositions were filed by the Government, through the Director of Lands and the Director of
Forestry, and some others, including the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua.1 In due course, an order of
general default was thereafter entered on December 11, 1961 against the whole world except
the oppositors.
The case dragged on for about twenty (20) years until March 3, 1981 when a compromise
agreement was entered into by and among all the parties, assisted by their respective counsel,
namely: the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (who had since died), the Bureau of Lands, the Bureau
of Forest Development, the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, and the Philippine Cacao and Farm
Products, Inc. Under the compromise agreement, the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (as applicants)
renounced their claims and ceded —
1) in favor of the Bureau of Lands, an area of 4,109 hectares;
2) in favor of the Bureau of Forest Development, 12,341 hectares;
3) in favor of the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, 4,000 hectares; and
4) in favor of Philippine Cacao & Farm Products, Inc., 8,000 hectares.
The remaining area of 5,500 hectares was, under the compromise agreement, adjudicated to
and acknowledged as owned by the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval, but out of this area, 1,500
hectares were assigned by the Casiano Heirs to their counsel, Jose C. Reyes, in payment of his
attorney's fees. In consideration of the areas respectively allocated to them, all the parties also
mutually waived and renounced all their prior claims to and over Lot No. 7454 of the Santiago
Cadastre.
In a decision rendered on March 5, 1981, the respondent Judge approved the compromise
agreement and confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in accordance with its terms.
The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, has taken the present
recourse in a bid to have that decision of March 5, 1981 annulled as being patently void and
rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The Solicitor General
contends that —
1) no evidence whatever was adduced by the parties in support of their petitions for
registration;
2) neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of Forest Development had legal
authority to enter into the compromise agreement;
3) as counsel of the Republic, he should have been but was not given notice of the
compromise agreement or otherwise accorded an opportunity to take part therein;
4) that he was not even served with notice of the decision approving the compromise; it
was the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Quirino Province that drew his attention to the "patently
erroneous decision" and requested him to take immediate remedial measures to bring about its
annulment.
The respondents maintain, on the other hand, that the Solicitor General's arguments are
premised on the proposition that Lot 7454 is public land, but it is not. According to them, as
pointed out in the application for registration, the private character of the land is demonstrated by
the following circumstances, to wit:
1) the possessory information title of the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest;
2) the fact that Lot 7454 was never claimed to be public land by the Director of Lands in
the proper cadastral proceedings;
3) the pre-war certification of the National Library dated August 16, 1932 to the effect that
the (Estadistica de Propiedades) of Isabela issued in 1896 and appearing in the Bureau of
Archives, the property in question was registered under the 'Spanish system of land registration
as private property owned by Don Liberato Bayaua, applicants' predecessors-in-interest;
4) the proceeding for registration, brought under Act 496 (the Torrens Act) presupposes
that there is already a title to be confirmed by the court, distinguishing it from proceedings under
the Public Land Act where the presumption is always that the land involved belongs to the State.
Under the Regalian Doctrine 2 all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence it is that all applicants in land registration
proceedings have the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land thus sought to be
registered forms part of the public domain. 3 Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by clear
and convincing evidence that the property involved was acquired by him or his ancestors either
by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title, or any
other means for the proper acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be part of the
public domain . 4 The applicant must present competent and persuasive proof to substantiate
his claim; he may not rely on general statements, or mere conclusions of law other than factual
evidence of possession and title. 5
In the proceeding at bar, it appears that the principal document relied upon and presented by the
applicants for registration, to prove the private character of the large tract of land subject of their
application, was a photocopy of a certification of the National Library dated August 16, 1932
(already above mentioned) to the effect that according to the Government's (Estadistica de
Propiedades) of Isabela issued in 1896, the property in question was registered under the
Spanish system of land registration as private property of Don Liberato Bayaua. But, as this
Court has already had occasion to rule, that Spanish document, the (Estadistica de
Propiedades,) cannot be considered a title to property, it not being one of the grants made
during the Spanish regime, and obviously not constituting primary evidence of ownership. 6 It is
an inefficacious document on which to base any finding of the private character of the land in
question.
And, of course, to argue that the initiation of an application for registration of land under the
Torrens Act is proof that the land is of private ownership, not pertaining to the public domain, is
to beg the question. It is precisely the character of the land as private which the applicant has
the obligation of establishing. For there can be no doubt of the intendment of the Land
Registration Act, Act 496, that every applicant show a proper title for registration; indeed, even in
the absence of any adverse claim, the applicant is not assured of a favorable decree by the
Land Registration Court, if he fails to establish a proper title for official recognition.
It thus appears that the decision of the Registration Court a quo is based solely on the
compromise agreement of the parties. But that compromise agreement included private persons
who had not adduced any competent evidence of their ownership over the land subject of the
registration proceeding. Portions of the land in controversy were assigned to persons or entities
who had presented nothing whatever to prove their ownership of any part of the land. What was
done was to consider the compromise agreement as proof of title of the parties taking part
therein, a totally unacceptable proposition. The result has been the adjudication of lands of no
little extension to persons who had not submitted any substantiation at all of their pretensions to
ownership, founded on nothing but the agreement among themselves that they had rights and
interests over the land.
The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development to the compromise agreement did
not and could not supply the absence of evidence of title required of the private respondents.
As to the informacion posesoria invoked by the private respondents, it should be pointed out that
under the Spanish Mortgage Law, it was considered a mode of acquiring title to public lands,
subject to two (2) conditions: first, the inscription thereof in the Registry of Property, and second,
actual, public, adverse, and uninterrupted possession of the land for twenty (20) years (later
reduced to ten [10] years); but where, as here, proof of fulfillment of these conditions is absent,
the informacion posesoria cannot be considered as anything more than prima facie evidence of
possession. 7
Finally, it was error to disregard the Solicitor General in the execution of the compromise
agreement and its submission to the Court for approval. It is, after all, the Solicitor General, who
is the principal counsel of the Government; this is the reason for our holding that "Court orders
and decisions sent to the fiscal, acting as agent of the Solicitor General in land registration
cases, are not binding until they are actually received by the Solicitor General." 8
It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the judgment approving it must be, as they
are hereby, declared null and void, and set aside. Considerations of fairness however indicate
the remand of the case to the Registration Court so that the private parties may be afforded an
opportunity to establish by competent evidence their respective claims to the property.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Judge complained of is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Land Registration Case No. N-109 subject of the petition is REMANDED to the court of
origin which shall conduct further appropriate proceedings therein, receiving the evidence of the
parties and thereafter rendering judgment as such evidence and the law may warrant. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 See Municipality of Santiago, Isabela v. CA et al., 120 SCRA 734, infra, involving
parties surnamed Bayaua, claimants to Lots No. 49760A and No. 8000-A of the Santiago
cadastre, Province of Isabela, which lots were declared to belong to the Municipality of Santiago.
2 Embodied "in Section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution of 1935 . . declaring that 'al
agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public d•main ... and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State..."(Pinero, Jr. v. Director of Lands, 57 SCRA 386) (See Secs. 2
and 3, ART. XII, 1987 Constitution).
3 National Power Corporation v. C.A., 114 SCRA 318 [1982]; Armagui v. Director of
Forestry, 126 SCRA 69 [1983].
4 Director of Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 2177 [1971].
5 Republic v. C.A 167 SCRA 150 [1988).
6 Municipality of Santiago v. C.A. 120 SCRA 734, 743 [1983].
7 Republic v. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424 [1987].
8 Republic v. C.A., 148 SCRA 480 [1987]; Republic v. C.A., 135 SCRA 157 [1985];
Republic v. Mendoza, 125 SCRA 539 [1983].
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
Today is Saturday, June 23, 2018
EN BANC
G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI
MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO
CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI
KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-
ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU
EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY,
TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG
MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY
DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU
MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY,
LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA
GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES,
LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING
DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO,
CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR,
MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER
N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA,
ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE
SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES,
FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY
UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID,
NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO
MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON,
SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA,
SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M.
GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS
MARICEL MALID, represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA,
represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father
TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA,
EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S
ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN
VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION
OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No.
8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and
its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment.1 In
compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its
provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the
constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed
through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that
the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources
to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the
authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
and the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their
Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and
praying for the dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to
Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of
the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee
the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it
prays that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the
Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a
motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and
Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for
prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their
respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings
and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its
Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b)
which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including
inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral
domains are private but community property of the indigenous peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting,
extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas
claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous
peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not
exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop,
protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be
necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas,
forest cover or reforestation."2
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral
domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas,
Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of
the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral
domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause
of the Constitution.4
These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral
domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and
ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an
ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of
Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said
officials over said area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples
shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession
and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof
shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes
involving indigenous peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving
rights of the indigenous peoples."5
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative
Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to
the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes
of policy and program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the President’s
power of control over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.6
Petitioners pray for the following:
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the
NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its
Implementing Rules;
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to
cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions
of R.A. 8371; and
"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control
and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural
resources."7
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice
and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged
provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged
provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative
Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57
of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation
of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the
ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to
question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a
separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of
Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases
by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate
opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional.
Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of
Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case
was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same.
Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is
DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-
Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion
Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 114.
2 Petition, Rollo, pp. 16-23.
3 Id. at 23-25.
4 Section 1, Article III of the Constitution states: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws."
5 Rollo, pp. 25-27.
6 Id. at 27-28.
7 Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the hearing held on April 13, 1999, pp. 5-6.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO, J.:

PRECIS
A classic essay on the utility of history was written in 1874 by Friedrich Nietzsche entitled "On
the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life." Expounding on Nietzsche's essay, Judge
Richard Posner1 wrote:2
"Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most backward-looking, the most 'past-
dependent,' of the professions. It venerates tradition, precedent, pedigree, ritual, custom, ancient
practices, ancient texts, archaic terminology, maturity, wisdom, seniority, gerontocracy, and
interpretation conceived of as a method of recovering history. It is suspicious of innovation,
discontinuities, 'paradigm shifts,' and the energy and brashness of youth. These ingrained
attitudes are obstacles to anyone who wants to re-orient law in a more pragmatic direction. But,
by the same token, pragmatic jurisprudence must come to terms with history."
When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it introduced radical
concepts into the Philippine legal system which appear to collide with settled constitutional and
jural precepts on state ownership of land and other natural resources. The sense and subtleties
of this law cannot be appreciated without considering its distinct sociology and the labyrinths of
its history. This Opinion attempts to interpret IPRA by discovering its soul shrouded by the mist
of our history. After all, the IPRA was enacted by Congress not only to fulfill the constitutional
mandate of protecting the indigenous cultural communities' right to their ancestral land but more
importantly, to correct a grave historical injustice to our indigenous people.
This Opinion discusses the following:
I. The Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System.
A. The Laws of the Indies
B. Valenton v. Murciano
C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System
D. The Philippine Constitutions
II. The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).
A. Indigenous Peoples
1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History
2. Their Concept of Land
III. The IPRA is a Novel Piece of Legislation.
A. Legislative History
IV. The Provisions of the IPRA Do Not Contravene the Constitution.
A. Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private property of indigenous peoples and do
not constitute part of the land of the public domain.
1. The right to ancestral domains and ancestral lands: how acquired
2. The concept of native title
(a) Cariño v. Insular Government
(b) Indian Title to land
(c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique
3. The option of securing a torrens title to the ancestral land
B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is a limited
form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
1. The indigenous concept of ownership and customary law
C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the Regalian Doctrine enshrined in
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
1. The rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains and lands
2. The right of ICCs/IPs to develop lands and natural resources within the ancestral domains
does not deprive the State of ownership over the natural resources, control and supervision in
their development and exploitation.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond the parameters of Section
7(a) of the law on ownership of ancestral domains and is ultra vires.
(b) The small-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 7 (b) of the IPRA is allowed under
Paragraph 3, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Consitution.
(c) The large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57 of the IPRA may be harmonized
with Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
V. The IPRA is a Recognition of Our Active Participation in the International Indigenous
Movement.
DISCUSSION
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE IN THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL
SYSTEM.
A. The Laws of the Indies
The capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the state's power of dominium.3 This was
the foundation for the early Spanish decrees embracing the feudal theory of jura regalia. The
"Regalian Doctrine" or jura regalia is a Western legal concept that was first introduced by the
Spaniards into the country through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas. The Laws of
the Indies, i.e., more specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de
Leyes de las Indias, set the policy of the Spanish Crown with respect to the Philippine Islands in
the following manner:
"We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and possessions
not heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to
the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held without proper and true
deeds of grant be restored to us as they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what
to us or to our viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public squares,
ways, pastures, and commons in those places which are peopled, taking into consideration not
only their present condition, but also their future and their probable increase, and after
distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in
what they now have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain
free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish.
We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretorial courts designate at
such time as shall to them seem most expedient, a suitable period within which all possessors of
tracts, farms, plantations, and estates shall exhibit to them and to the court officers appointed by
them for this purpose, their title deeds thereto. And those who are in possession by virtue of
proper deeds and receipts, or by virtue of just prescriptive right shall be protected, and all the
rest shall be restored to us to be disposed of at our will."4
The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of "discovery" and conquest. Consequently, all lands
became the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. The Spanish Government
took charge of distributing the lands by issuing royal grants and concessions to Spaniards, both
military and civilian.5 Private land titles could only be acquired from the government either by
purchase or by the various modes of land grant from the Crown.6
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria, or the Mortgage Law of 1893.7
The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as
possessory claims. The law sought to register and tax lands pursuant to the Royal Decree of
1880. The Royal Decree of 1894, or the "Maura Law," was partly an amendment of the
Mortgage Law as well as the Laws of the Indies, as already amended by previous orders and
decrees.8 This was the last Spanish land law promulgated in the Philippines. It required the
"adjustment" or registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands shall revert to the state.
Four years later, by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, Spain ceded to the government
of the United States all rights, interests and claims over the national territory of the Philippine
Islands. In 1903, the United States colonial government, through the Philippine Commission,
passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act.
B. Valenton v. Murciano
In 1904, under the American regime, this Court decided the case of Valenton v. Murciano.9
Valenton resolved the question of which is the better basis for ownership of land: long-time
occupation or paper title. Plaintiffs had entered into peaceful occupation of the subject land in
1860. Defendant's predecessor-in-interest, on the other hand, purchased the land from the
provincial treasurer of Tarlac in 1892. The lower court ruled against the plaintiffs on the ground
that they had lost all rights to the land by not objecting to the administrative sale. Plaintiffs
appealed the judgment, asserting that their 30-year adverse possession, as an extraordinary
period of prescription in the Partidas and the Civil Code, had given them title to the land as
against everyone, including the State; and that the State, not owning the land, could not validly
transmit it.
The Court, speaking through Justice Willard, decided the case on the basis of "those special
laws which from earliest time have regulated the disposition of the public lands in the
colonies."10 The question posed by the Court was: "Did these special laws recognize any right
of prescription as against the State as to these lands; and if so, to what extent was it
recognized?"
Prior to 1880, the Court said, there were no laws specifically providing for the disposition of land
in the Philippines. However, it was understood that in the absence of any special law to govern a
specific colony, the Laws of the Indies would be followed. Indeed, in the Royal Order of July 5,
1862, it was decreed that until regulations on the subject could be prepared, the authorities of
the Philippine Islands should follow strictly the Laws of the Indies, the Ordenanza of the
Intendentes of 1786, and the Royal Cedula of 1754.11
Quoting the preamble of Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, the
court interpreted it as follows:
"In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement that all those lands belong
to the Crown which have not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the kings who
preceded him. This statement excludes the idea that there might be lands not so granted, that
did not belong to the king. It excludes the idea that the king was not still the owner of all
ungranted lands, because some private person had been in the adverse occupation of them. By
the mandatory part of the law all the occupants of the public lands are required to produce
before the authorities named, and within a time to be fixed by them, their title papers. And those
who had good title or showed prescription were to be protected in their holdings. It is apparent
that it was not the intention of the law that mere possession for a length of time should make the
possessors the owners of the land possessed by them without any action on the part of the
authorities."12
The preamble stated that all those lands which had not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or
by the kings who preceded him, belonged to the Crown.13 For those lands granted by the king,
the decree provided for a system of assignment of such lands. It also ordered that all possessors
of agricultural land should exhibit their title deed, otherwise, the land would be restored to the
Crown.14
The Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 reinforced the Recopilacion when it ordered the Crown's
principal subdelegate to issue a general order directing the publication of the Crown's
instructions:
"x x x to the end that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the date of the
promulgation and publication of said order, shall have occupied royal lands, whether or not x x x
cultivated or tenanted, may x x x appear and exhibit to said subdelegates the titles and patents
by virtue of which said lands are occupied. x x x. Said subdelegates will at the same time warn
the parties interested that in case of their failure to present their title deeds within the term
designated, without a just and valid reason therefor, they will be deprived of and evicted from
their lands, and they will be granted to others."15
On June 25, 1880, the Crown adopted regulations for the adjustment of lands "wrongfully
occupied" by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. Valenton construed these regulations
together with contemporaneous legislative and executive interpretations of the law, and
concluded that plaintiffs' case fared no better under the 1880 decree and other laws which
followed it, than it did under the earlier ones. Thus as a general doctrine, the Court stated:
"While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a
possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof
before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did that the
State remained the absolute owner."16
In conclusion, the Court ruled: "We hold that from 1860 to 1892 there was no law in force in
these Islands by which the plaintiffs could obtain the ownership of these lands by prescription,
without any action by the State."17 Valenton had no rights other than those which accrued to
mere possession. Murciano, on the other hand, was deemed to be the owner of the land by
virtue of the grant by the provincial secretary. In effect, Valenton upheld the Spanish concept of
state ownership of public land.
As a fitting observation, the Court added that "[t]he policy pursued by the Spanish Government
from earliest times, requiring settlers on the public lands to obtain title deeds therefor from the
State, has been continued by the American Government in Act No. 926."18
C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the the
Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It
prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling, and leasing of portions of the
public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable
persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of
patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale
of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of
Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the
assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government;19 and
that the government's title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent
treaties between Spain and the United States.20 The term "public land" referred to all lands of
the public domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement,21 and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and
the friar lands.22
Act No. 926 was superseded in 1919 by Act 2874, the second Public Land Act. This new law
was passed under the Jones Law. It was more comprehensive in scope but limited the
exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which
gave Filipinos the same privileges.23 After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, Act 2874 was
amended in 1936 by Commonwealth Act No. 141. Commonwealth Act No. 141 remains the
present Public Land Law and it is essentially the same as Act 2874. The main difference
between the two relates to the transitory provisions on the rights of American citizens and
corporations during the Commonwealth period at par with Filipino citizens and corporations.24
Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens system under Act 496, or
the Land Registration Law of 1903. Enacted by the Philippine Commission, Act 496 placed all
public and private lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system. The law is said to be
almost a verbatim copy of the Massachussetts Land Registration Act of 1898,25 which, in turn,
followed the principles and procedure of the Torrens system of registration formulated by Sir
Robert Torrens who patterned it after the Merchant Shipping Acts in South Australia. The
Torrens system requires that the government issue an official certificate of title attesting to the
fact that the person named is the owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens
and encumbrances as thereon noted or the law warrants or reserves.26 The certificate of title is
indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are quieted upon issuance of
said certificate. This system highly facilitates land conveyance and negotiation.27
D. The Philippine Constitutions
The Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935 Constitution. One of the fixed and dominating
objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the
natural resources of the country.28 There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in
favor of the principle of state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian
doctrine.29 State ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point to
secure recognition of the state's power to control their disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization.30 The delegates to the Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of
State ownership of land and natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they
were not certain whether it was continued and applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts,
the Convention approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine.31
Thus, the 1935 Constitution, in Section 1 of Article XIII on "Conservation and Utilization of
Natural Resources," reads as follows:
"Sec. 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of
the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization
shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,
lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be
alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of
any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, except as
to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of
the grant."
The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV on the "National
Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation," to wit:
"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils,
all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines
belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and
resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the
natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be
the measure and the limit of the grant."
The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII on "National
Economy and Patrimony," to wit:
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils,
all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and
conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be
the measure and limit of the grant.
x x x."
Simply stated, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources enumerated therein,
whether on public or private land, belong to the State. It is this concept of State ownership that
petitioners claim is being violated by the IPRA.
II. THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT.
Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of
Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and
for Other Purposes." It is simply known as "The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997" or the
IPRA.
The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous
peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership
and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these
lands and domains. The ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under
customary law which traces its origin to native title.
Other rights are also granted the ICCs/IPs, and these are:
- the right to develop lands and natural resources;
- the right to stay in the territories;
- the right in case of displacement;
- the right to safe and clean air and water;
- the right to claim parts of reservations;
- the right to resolve conflict;32
- the right to ancestral lands which include
a. the right to transfer land/property to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to
customary laws and traditions of the community concerned;
b. the right to redemption for a period not exceeding 15 years from date of transfer, if the transfer
is to a non-member of the ICC/IP and is tainted by vitiated consent of the ICC/IP, or if the
transfer is for an unconscionable consideration.33
Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the ICCs/IPs are given the right to self-
governance and empowerment,34 social justice and human rights,35 the right to preserve and
protect their culture, traditions, institutions and community intellectual rights, and the right to
develop their own sciences and technologies.36
To carry out the policies of the Act, the law created the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP). The NCIP is an independent agency under the Office of the President and is
composed of seven (7) Commissioners belonging to ICCs/IPs from each of the ethnographic
areas- Region I and the Cordilleras; Region II; the rest of Luzon; Island groups including
Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, Panay and the rest of the Visayas; Northern and Western
Mindanao; Southern and Eastern Mindanao; and Central Mindanao.37 The NCIP took over the
functions of the Office for Northern Cultural Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural
Communities created by former President Corazon Aquino which were merged under a
revitalized structure.38
Disputes involving ICCs/IPs are to be resolved under customary laws and practices. When still
unresolved, the matter may be brought to the NCIP, which is granted quasi-judicial powers.39
The NCIP's decisions may be appealed to the Court of Appeals by a petition for review.
Any person who violates any of the provisions of the Act such as, but not limited to, unauthorized
and/or unlawful intrusion upon ancestral lands and domains shall be punished in accordance
with customary laws or imprisoned from 9 months to 12 years and/or fined from ₱100,000.00 to
₱500,000.00 and obliged to pay damages.40
A. Indigenous Peoples
The IPRA is a law dealing with a specific group of people, i.e., the Indigenous Cultural
Communities (ICCs) or the Indigenous Peoples (IPs). The term "ICCs" is used in the 1987
Constitution while that of "IPs" is the contemporary international language in the International
Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 16941 and the United Nations (UN) Draft Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.42
ICCs/IPs are defined by the IPRA as:
"Sec. 3 [h]. Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples- refer to a group of people or
homogeneous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have
continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined territory, and
who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized
such territories, sharing common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive
cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of
colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the
majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise include peoples who are regarded as indigenous on
account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, at the time of
conquest or colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures, or
the establishment of present state boundaries, who retain some or all of their own social,
economic, cultural and political institutions, but who may have been displaced from their
traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains."
Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people or
homogeneous societies who have continuously lived as an organized community on communally
bounded and defined territory. These groups of people have actually occupied, possessed and
utilized their territories under claim of ownership since time immemorial. They share common
bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their
resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and
cultures, became historically differentiated from the Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also include
descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the country at the time of conquest or colonization, who
retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions but who may
have been displaced from their traditional territories or who may have resettled outside their
ancestral domains.
1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History
Presently, Philippine indigenous peoples inhabit the interiors and mountains of Luzon,
Mindanao, Mindoro, Negros, Samar, Leyte, and the Palawan and Sulu group of islands. They
are composed of 110 tribes and are as follows:
1. In the Cordillera Autonomous Region- Kankaney, Ibaloi, Bontoc, Tinggian or Itneg, Ifugao,
Kalinga, Yapayao, Aeta or Agta or Pugot, and Bago of Ilocos Norte and Pangasinan; Ibanag of
Isabela, Cagayan; Ilongot of Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya; Gaddang of Quirino, Nueva Vizcaya,
Itawis of Cagayan; Ivatan of Batanes, Aeta of Cagayan, Quirino and Isabela.
2. In Region III- Aetas.
3. In Region IV- Dumagats of Aurora, Rizal; Remontado of Aurora, Rizal, Quezon; Alangan or
Mangyan, Batangan, Buid or Buhid, Hanunuo and Iraya of Oriental and Occidental Mindoro;
Tadyawan of Occidental Mindoro; Cuyonon, Palawanon, Tagbanua and Tao't bato of Palawan.
4. In Region V- Aeta of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur; Aeta-Abiyan, Isarog, and Kabihug
of Camarines Norte; Agta, and Mayon of Camarines Sur; Itom of Albay, Cimaron of Sorsogon;
and the Pullon of Masbate and Camarines Sur.
5. In Region VI- Ati of Negros Occidental, Iloilo and Antique, Capiz; the Magahat of Negros
Occidental; the Corolano and Sulod.
6. In Region VII- Magahat of Negros Oriental and Eskaya of Bohol.
7. In Region IX- the Badjao numbering about 192,000 in Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur; the
Kalibugan of Basilan, the Samal, Subanon and Yakat.
8. Region X- Numbering 1.6 million in Region X alone, the IPs are: the Banwaon, Bukidnon,
Matigsalog, Talaanding of Bukidnon; the Camiguin of Camiguin Island; the Higa-unon of Agusan
del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Bukidnon and Misamis Occidental; the Tigwahanon of Agusan del
Sur, Misamis Oriental and and Misamis Occidental, the Manobo of the Agusan provinces, and
the Umayamnon of Agusan and Bukidnon.
9. In Region XI- There are about 1,774,065 IPs in Region XI. They are tribes of the Dibabaon,
Mansaka of Davao del Norte; B'laan, Kalagan, Langilad, T'boli and Talaingod of Davao del Sur;
Mamamanua of Surigao del Sur; Mandaya of the Surigao provinces and Davao Oriental;
Manobo Blit of South Cotabato; the Mangguangon of Davao and South Cotabato; Matigsalog of
Davao del Norte and Del Sur; Tagakaolo, Tasaday and Ubo of South Cotabato; and Bagobo of
Davao del sur and South Cotabato.
10. In Region XII- Ilianen, Tiruray, Maguindanao, Maranao, Tausug, Yakan/Samal, and
Iranon.43
How these indigenous peoples came to live in the Philippines goes back to as early as 25,000 to
30,000 B.C.
Before the time of Western contact, the Philippine archipelago was peopled largely by the
Negritos, Indonesians and Malays.44 The strains from these groups eventually gave rise to
common cultural features which became the dominant influence in ethnic reformulation in the
archipelago. Influences from the Chinese and Indian civilizations in the third or fourth millenium
B.C. augmented these ethnic strains. Chinese economic and socio-cultural influences came by
way of Chinese porcelain, silk and traders. Indian influence found their way into the religious-
cultural aspect of pre-colonial society.45
The ancient Filipinos settled beside bodies of water. Hunting and food gathering became
supplementary activities as reliance on them was reduced by fishing and the cultivation of the
soil.46 From the hinterland, coastal, and riverine communities, our ancestors evolved an
essentially homogeneous culture, a basically common way of life where nature was a primary
factor. Community life throughout the archipelago was influenced by, and responded to,
common ecology. The generally benign tropical climate and the largely uniform flora and fauna
favored similarities, not differences.47 Life was essentially subsistence but not harsh.48
The early Filipinos had a culture that was basically Malayan in structure and form. They had
languages that traced their origin to the Austronesian parent-stock and used them not only as
media of daily communication but also as vehicles for the expression of their literary moods.49
They fashioned concepts and beliefs about the world that they could not see, but which they
sensed to be part of their lives.50 They had their own religion and religious beliefs. They
believed in the immortality of the soul and life after death. Their rituals were based on beliefs in a
ranking deity whom they called Bathalang Maykapal, and a host of other deities, in the
environmental spirits and in soul spirits. The early Filipinos adored the sun, the moon, the
animals and birds, for they seemed to consider the objects of Nature as something to be
respected. They venerated almost any object that was close to their daily life, indicating the
importance of the relationship between man and the object of nature.51
The unit of government was the "barangay," a term that derived its meaning from the Malay
word "balangay," meaning, a boat, which transported them to these shores.52 The barangay
was basically a family-based community and consisted of thirty to one hundred families. Each
barangay was different and ruled by a chieftain called a "dato." It was the chieftain's duty to rule
and govern his subjects and promote their welfare and interests. A chieftain had wide powers for
he exercised all the functions of government. He was the executive, legislator and judge and
was the supreme commander in time of war.53
Laws were either customary or written. Customary laws were handed down orally from
generation to generation and constituted the bulk of the laws of the barangay. They were
preserved in songs and chants and in the memory of the elder persons in the community.54 The
written laws were those that the chieftain and his elders promulgated from time to time as the
necessity arose.55 The oldest known written body of laws was the Maragtas Code by Datu
Sumakwel at about 1250 A.D. Other old codes are the Muslim Code of Luwaran and the
Principal Code of Sulu.56 Whether customary or written, the laws dealt with various subjects,
such as inheritance, divorce, usury, loans, partnership, crime and punishment, property rights,
family relations and adoption. Whenever disputes arose, these were decided peacefully through
a court composed by the chieftain as "judge" and the barangay elders as "jury." Conflicts arising
between subjects of different barangays were resolved by arbitration in which a board composed
of elders from neutral barangays acted as arbiters.57
Baranganic society had a distinguishing feature: the absence of private property in land. The
chiefs merely administered the lands in the name of the barangay. The social order was an
extension of the family with chiefs embodying the higher unity of the community. Each individual,
therefore, participated in the community ownership of the soil and the instruments of production
as a member of the barangay.58 This ancient communalism was practiced in accordance with
the concept of mutual sharing of resources so that no individual, regardless of status, was
without sustenance. Ownership of land was non-existent or unimportant and the right of usufruct
was what regulated the development of lands.59 Marine resources and fishing grounds were
likewise free to all. Coastal communities depended for their economic welfare on the kind of
fishing sharing concept similar to those in land communities.60 Recognized leaders, such as the
chieftains and elders, by virtue of their positions of importance, enjoyed some economic
privileges and benefits. But their rights, related to either land and sea, were subject to their
responsibility to protect the communities from danger and to provide them with the leadership
and means of survival.61
Sometime in the 13th century, Islam was introduced to the archipelago in Maguindanao. The
Sultanate of Sulu was established and claimed jurisdiction over territorial areas represented
today by Tawi-tawi, Sulu, Palawan, Basilan and Zamboanga. Four ethnic groups were within this
jurisdiction: Sama, Tausug, Yakan and Subanon.62 The Sultanate of Maguindanao spread out
from Cotabato toward Maranao territory, now Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur.63
The Muslim societies evolved an Asiatic form of feudalism where land was still held in common
but was private in use. This is clearly indicated in the Muslim Code of Luwaran. The Code
contains a provision on the lease of cultivated lands. It, however, has no provision for the
acquisition, transfer, cession or sale of land.64
The societies encountered by Magellan and Legaspi therefore were primitive economies where
most production was geared to the use of the producers and to the fulfillment of kinship
obligations. They were not economies geared to exchange and profit.65 Moreover, the family
basis of barangay membership as well as of leadership and governance worked to splinter the
population of the islands into numerous small and separate communities.66
When the Spaniards settled permanently in the Philippines in 1565, they found the Filipinos
living in barangay settlements scattered along water routes and river banks. One of the first
tasks imposed on the missionaries and the encomenderos was to collect all scattered Filipinos
together in a reduccion.67 As early as 1551, the Spanish government assumed an unvarying
solicitous attitude towards the natives.68 The Spaniards regarded it a sacred "duty to
conscience and humanity to civilize these less fortunate people living in the obscurity of
ignorance" and to accord them the "moral and material advantages" of community life and the
"protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws."69
The Spanish missionaries were ordered to establish pueblos where the church and convent
would be constructed. All the new Christian converts were required to construct their houses
around the church and the unbaptized were invited to do the same.70 With the reduccion, the
Spaniards attempted to "tame" the reluctant Filipinos through Christian indoctrination using the
convento/casa real/plaza complex as focal point. The reduccion, to the Spaniards, was a
"civilizing" device to make the Filipinos law-abiding citizens of the Spanish Crown, and in the
long run, to make them ultimately adopt Hispanic culture and civilization.71
All lands lost by the old barangays in the process of pueblo organization as well as all lands not
assigned to them and the pueblos, were now declared to be crown lands or realengas,
belonging to the Spanish king. It was from the realengas that land grants were made to non-
Filipinos.72
The abrogation of the Filipinos' ancestral rights in land and the introduction of the concept of
public domain were the most immediate fundamental results of Spanish colonial theory and
law.73 The concept that the Spanish king was the owner of everything of value in the Indies or
colonies was imposed on the natives, and the natives were stripped of their ancestral rights to
land.74
Increasing their foothold in the Philippines, the Spanish colonialists, civil and religious, classified
the Filipinos according to their religious practices and beliefs, and divided them into three types .
First were the Indios, the Christianized Filipinos, who generally came from the lowland
populations. Second, were the Moros or the Muslim communities, and third, were the infieles or
the indigenous communities.75
The Indio was a product of the advent of Spanish culture. This class was favored by the
Spaniards and was allowed certain status although below the Spaniards. The Moros and infieles
were regarded as the lowest classes.76
The Moros and infieles resisted Spanish rule and Christianity. The Moros were driven from
Manila and the Visayas to Mindanao; while the infieles, to the hinterlands. The Spaniards did not
pursue them into the deep interior. The upland societies were naturally outside the immediate
concern of Spanish interest, and the cliffs and forests of the hinterlands were difficult and
inaccessible, allowing the infieles, in effect, relative security.77 Thus, the infieles, which were
peripheral to colonial administration, were not only able to preserve their own culture but also
thwarted the Christianization process, separating themselves from the newly evolved Christian
community.78 Their own political, economic and social systems were kept constantly alive and
vibrant.
The pro-Christian or pro-Indio attitude of colonialism brought about a generally mutual feeling of
suspicion, fear, and hostility between the Christians on the one hand and the non-Christians on
the other. Colonialism tended to divide and rule an otherwise culturally and historically related
populace through a colonial system that exploited both the virtues and vices of the Filipinos.79
President McKinley, in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900, addressed
the existence of the infieles:
"In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same
course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain
their tribal organization and government, and under which many of those tribes are now living in
peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to
conform. Such tribal government should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and,
without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent
barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs."80
Placed in an alternative of either letting the natives alone or guiding them in the path of
civilization, the American government chose "to adopt the latter measure as one more in accord
with humanity and with the national conscience."81
The Americans classified the Filipinos into two: the Christian Filipinos and the non-Christian
Filipinos. The term "non-Christian" referred not to religious belief, but to a geographical area,
and more directly, "to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living
in tribal relationship apart from settled communities."82
Like the Spaniards, the Americans pursued a policy of assimilation. In 1903, they passed Act
No. 253 creating the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes (BNCT). Under the Department of the
Interior, the BNCT's primary task was to conduct ethnographic research among unhispanized
Filipinos, including those in Muslim Mindanao, with a "special view to determining the most
practicable means for bringing about their advancement in civilization and prosperity." The
BNCT was modeled after the bureau dealing with American Indians. The agency took a keen
anthropological interest in Philippine cultural minorities and produced a wealth of valuable
materials about them.83
The 1935 Constitution did not carry any policy on the non-Christian Filipinos. The raging issue
then was the conservation of the national patrimony for the Filipinos.
In 1957, the Philippine Congress passed R.A. No. 1888, an "Act to effectuate in a more rapid
and complete manner the economic, social, moral and political advancement of the non-
Christian Filipinos or national cultural minorities and to render real, complete, and permanent the
integration of all said national cultural minorities into the body politic, creating the Commission
on National Integration charged with said functions." The law called for a policy of integration of
indigenous peoples into the Philippine mainstream and for this purpose created the Commission
on National Integration (CNI).84 The CNI was given, more or less, the same task as the BNCT
during the American regime. The post-independence policy of integration was like the colonial
policy of assimilation understood in the context of a guardian-ward relationship.85
The policy of assimilation and integration did not yield the desired result. Like the Spaniards and
Americans, government attempts at integration met with fierce resistance. Since World War II, a
tidal wave of Christian settlers from the lowlands of Luzon and the Visayas swamped the
highlands and wide open spaces in Mindanao.86 Knowledge by the settlers of the Public Land
Acts and the Torrens system resulted in the titling of several ancestral lands in the settlers'
names. With government initiative and participation, this titling displaced several indigenous
peoples from their lands. Worse, these peoples were also displaced by projects undertaken by
the national government in the name of national development.87

It was in the 1973 Constitution that the State adopted the following provision:
"The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests of national cultural
communities in the formulation and implementation of State policies."88
For the first time in Philippine history, the "non-Christian tribes" or the "cultural minorities" were
addressed by the highest law of the Republic, and they were referred to as "cultural
communities." More importantly this time, their "uncivilized" culture was given some recognition
and their "customs, traditions, beliefs and interests" were to be considered by the State in the
formulation and implementation of State policies. President Marcos abolished the CNI and
transferred its functions to the Presidential Adviser on National Minorities (PANAMIN). The
PANAMIN was tasked to integrate the ethnic groups that sought full integration into the larger
community, and at the same time "protect the rights of those who wish to preserve their original
lifeways beside the larger community."89 In short, while still adopting the integration policy, the
decree recognized the right of tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life.90
In 1974, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 410, otherwise known as the Ancestral Lands
Decree. The decree provided for the issuance of land occupancy certificates to members of the
national cultural communities who were given up to 1984 to register their claims.91 In 1979, the
Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems was created under E.O. No. 561 which
provided a mechanism for the expeditious resolution of land problems involving small settlers,
landowners, and tribal Filipinos.92
Despite the promulgation of these laws, from 1974 to the early 1980's, some 100,000 Kalingas
and Bontoks of the Cordillera region were displaced by the Chico River dam project of the
National Power Corporation (NPC). The Manobos of Bukidnon saw their land bulldozed by the
Bukidnon Sugar Industries Company (BUSCO). In Agusan del Sur, the National Development
Company was authorized by law in 1979 to take approximately 40,550 hectares of land that later
became the NDC-Guthrie plantation in Agusan del Sur. Most of the land was possessed by the
Agusan natives.93 Timber concessions, water projects, plantations, mining, and cattle ranching
and other projects of the national government led not only to the eviction of the indigenous
peoples from their land but also to the reduction and destruction of their natural environment.94
The Aquino government signified a total shift from the policy of integration to one of
preservation. Invoking her powers under the Freedom Constitution, President Aquino created
the Office of Muslim Affairs, Office for Northern Cultural Communities and the Office for
Southern Cultural Communities all under the Office of the President.95
The 1987 Constitution carries at least six (6) provisions which insure the right of tribal Filipinos to
preserve their way of life.96 This Constitution goes further than the 1973 Constitution by
expressly guaranteeing the rights of tribal Filipinos to their ancestral domains and ancestral
lands. By recognizing their right to their ancestral lands and domains, the State has effectively
upheld their right to live in a culture distinctly their own.
2. Their Concept of Land
Indigenous peoples share distinctive traits that set them apart from the Filipino mainstream.
They are non-Christians. They live in less accessible, marginal, mostly upland areas. They have
a system of self-government not dependent upon the laws of the central administration of the
Republic of the Philippines. They follow ways of life and customs that are perceived as different
from those of the rest of the population.97 The kind of response the indigenous peoples chose
to deal with colonial threat worked well to their advantage by making it difficult for Western
concepts and religion to erode their customs and traditions. The "infieles societies" which had
become peripheral to colonial administration, represented, from a cultural perspective, a much
older base of archipelagic culture. The political systems were still structured on the patriarchal
and kinship oriented arrangement of power and authority. The economic activities were
governed by the concepts of an ancient communalism and mutual help. The social structure
which emphasized division of labor and distinction of functions, not status, was maintained. The
cultural styles and forms of life portraying the varieties of social courtesies and ecological
adjustments were kept constantly vibrant.98
Land is the central element of the indigenous peoples' existence. There is no traditional concept
of permanent, individual, land ownership. Among the Igorots, ownership of land more accurately
applies to the tribal right to use the land or to territorial control. The people are the secondary
owners or stewards of the land and that if a member of the tribe ceases to work, he loses his
claim of ownership, and the land reverts to the beings of the spirit world who are its true and
primary owners. Under the concept of "trusteeship," the right to possess the land does not only
belong to the present generation but the future ones as well.99
Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no one owns the land except the gods
and spirits, and that those who work the land are its mere stewards.100 Customary law has a
strong preference for communal ownership, which could either be ownership by a group of
individuals or families who are related by blood or by marriage,101 or ownership by residents of
the same locality who may not be related by blood or marriage. The system of communal
ownership under customary laws draws its meaning from the subsistence and highly
collectivized mode of economic production. The Kalingas, for instance, who are engaged in team
occupation like hunting, foraging for forest products, and swidden farming found it natural that
forest areas, swidden farms, orchards, pasture and burial grounds should be communally-
owned.102 For the Kalingas, everybody has a common right to a common economic base.
Thus, as a rule, rights and obligations to the land are shared in common.
Although highly bent on communal ownership, customary law on land also sanctions individual
ownership. The residential lots and terrace rice farms are governed by a limited system of
individual ownership. It is limited because while the individual owner has the right to use and
dispose of the property, he does not possess all the rights of an exclusive and full owner as
defined under our Civil Code.103 Under Kalinga customary law, the alienation of individually-
owned land is strongly discouraged except in marriage and succession and except to meet
sudden financial needs due to sickness, death in the family, or loss of crops.104 Moreover, and
to be alienated should first be offered to a clan-member before any village-member can
purchase it, and in no case may land be sold to a non-member of the ili.105
Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples' economic and social system. The concept of
individual land ownership under the civil law is alien to them. Inherently colonial in origin, our
national land laws and governmental policies frown upon indigenous claims to ancestral lands.
Communal ownership is looked upon as inferior, if not inexistent.106
III. THE IPRA IS A NOVEL PIECE OF LEGISLATION.
A. The Legislative History of the IPRA
It was to address the centuries-old neglect of the Philippine indigenous peoples that the Tenth
Congress of the Philippines, by their joint efforts, passed and approved R.A. No. 8371, the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997. The law was a consolidation of two Bills- Senate
Bill No. 1728 and House Bill No. 9125.
Principally sponsored by Senator Juan M. Flavier,107 Senate Bill No. 1728 was a consolidation
of four proposed measures referred to the Committees on Cultural Communities, Environment
and Natural Resources, Ways and Means, as well as Finance. It adopted almost en toto the
comprehensive version of Senate Bill Nos. 1476 and 1486 which was a result of six regional
consultations and one national consultation with indigenous peoples nationwide.108 At the
Second Regular Session of the Tenth Congress, Senator Flavier, in his sponsorship speech,
gave a background on the situation of indigenous peoples in the Philippines, to wit:
"The Indigenous Cultural Communities, including the Bangsa Moro, have long suffered from the
dominance and neglect of government controlled by the majority. Massive migration of their
Christian brothers to their homeland shrunk their territory and many of the tribal Filipinos were
pushed to the hinterlands. Resisting the intrusion, dispossessed of their ancestral land and with
the massive exploitation of their natural resources by the elite among the migrant population,
they became marginalized. And the government has been an indispensable party to this
insidious conspiracy against the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs). It organized and
supported the resettlement of people to their ancestral land, which was massive during the
Commonwealth and early years of the Philippine Republic. Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine
first introduced to our system by Spain through the Royal Decree of 13 February 1894 or the
Maura Law, the government passed laws to legitimize the wholesale landgrabbing and provide
for easy titling or grant of lands to migrant homesteaders within the traditional areas of the
ICCs."109
Senator Flavier further declared:
"The IPs are the offsprings and heirs of the peoples who have first inhabited and cared for the
land long before any central government was established. Their ancestors had territories over
which they ruled themselves and related with other tribes. These territories- the land- include
people, their dwelling, the mountains, the water, the air, plants, forest and the animals. This is
their environment in its totality. Their existence as indigenous peoples is manifested in their own
lives through political, economic, socio-cultural and spiritual practices. The IPs culture is the
living and irrefutable proof to this.
Their survival depends on securing or acquiring land rights; asserting their rights to it; and
depending on it. Otherwise, IPs shall cease to exist as distinct peoples."110
To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator Flavier proposed a bill
based on two postulates: (1) the concept of native title; and (2) the principle of parens patriae.
According to Senator Flavier, "[w]hile our legal tradition subscribes to the Regalian Doctrine
reinstated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution," our "decisional laws" and
jurisprudence passed by the State have "made exception to the doctrine." This exception was
first laid down in the case of Cariño v. Insular Government where:
"x x x the court has recognized long occupancy of land by an indigenous member of the cultural
communities as one of private ownership, which, in legal concept, is termed "native title." This
ruling has not been overturned. In fact, it was affirmed in subsequent cases."111
Following Cariño, the State passed Act No. 926, Act No. 2874, C.A. No. 141, P.D. 705, P.D.
410, P.D. 1529, R.A. 6734 (the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao).
These laws, explicitly or implicitly, and liberally or restrictively, recognized "native title" or "private
right" and the existence of ancestral lands and domains. Despite the passage of these laws,
however, Senator Flavier continued:
"x x x the executive department of government since the American occupation has not
implemented the policy. In fact, it was more honored in its breach than in its observance, its
wanton disregard shown during the period unto the Commonwealth and the early years of the
Philippine Republic when government organized and supported massive resettlement of the
people to the land of the ICCs."
Senate Bill No. 1728 seeks to genuinely recognize the IPs right to own and possess their
ancestral land. The bill was prepared also under the principle of parens patriae inherent in the
supreme power of the State and deeply embedded in Philippine legal tradition. This principle
mandates that persons suffering from serious disadvantage or handicap, which places them in a
position of actual inequality in their relation or transaction with others, are entitled to the
protection of the State.
Senate Bill No. 1728 was passed on Third Reading by twenty-one (21) Senators voting in favor
and none against, with no abstention.112
House Bill No. 9125 was sponsored by Rep. Zapata, Chairman of the Committee on Cultural
Communities. It was originally authored and subsequently presented and defended on the floor
by Rep. Gregorio Andolana of North Cotabato.113
Rep. Andolana's sponsorhip speech reads as follows:
"This Representation, as early as in the 8th Congress, filed a bill of similar implications that
would promote, recognize the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of
national unity and development.
Apart from this, Mr. Speaker, is our obligation, the government's obligation to assure and
ascertain that these rights shall be well-preserved and the cultural traditions as well as the
indigenous laws that remained long before this Republic was established shall be preserved and
promoted. There is a need, Mr. Speaker, to look into these matters seriously and early approval
of the substitute bill shall bring into reality the aspirations, the hope and the dreams of more than
12 million Filipinos that they be considered in the mainstream of the Philippine society as we
fashion for the year 2000." 114
Rep. Andolana stressed that H.B. No. 9125 is based on the policy of preservation as mandated
in the Constitution. He also emphasized that the rights of IPs to their land was enunciated in
Cariño v. Insular Government which recognized the fact that they had vested rights prior to the
establishment of the Spanish and American regimes.115
After exhaustive interpellation, House Bill No. 9125, and its corresponding amendments, was
approved on Second Reading with no objections.
IV. THE PROVISIONS OF THE IPRA DO NOT CONTRAVENE THE CONSTITUTION.
A. Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands are the Private Property of Indigenous Peoples and
Do Not Constitute Part of the Land of the Public Domain.
The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral domains and ancestral
lands. Ancestral lands are not the same as ancestral domains. These are defined in Section 3
[a] and [b] of the Indigenous Peoples Right Act, viz:
"Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally
belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources
therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or
through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the
present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth
or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by
government and private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their
economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture,
residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or
otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other
natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from
which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly
the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;
b) Ancestral Lands.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and
utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time
immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual
or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present except when interrupted by war,
force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government
projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies,
private forests, swidden farms and tree lots."
Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of ownership,
occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or
individually since time immemorial, continuously until the present, except when interrupted by
war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government
projects or any other voluntary dealings with government and/or private individuals or
corporations. Ancestral domains comprise lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural
resources therein and includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and
other lands individually owned whether alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds,
worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources. They also include lands
which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had
access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs
who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.116
Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as ancestral domains
except that these are limited to lands and that these lands are not merely occupied and
possessed but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs under claims of individual or traditional group
ownership. These lands include but are not limited to residential lots, rice terraces or paddies,
private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.117
The procedures for claiming ancestral domains and lands are similar to the procedures
embodied in Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 2, series of 1993, signed by then
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Angel Alcala.118
DAO No. 2 allowed the delineation of ancestral domains by special task forces and ensured the
issuance of Certificates of Ancestral Land Claims (CALC's) and Certificates of Ancestral Domain
Claims (CADC's) to IPs.
The identification and delineation of these ancestral domains and lands is a power conferred by
the IPRA on the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).119 The guiding principle
in identification and delineation is self-delineation.120 This means that the ICCs/IPs have a
decisive role in determining the boundaries of their domains and in all the activities pertinent
thereto.121
The procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains is set forth in Sections
51 and 52 of the IPRA. The identification, delineation and certification of ancestral lands is in
Section 53 of said law.
Upon due application and compliance with the procedure provided under the law and upon
finding by the NCIP that the application is meritorious, the NCIP shall issue a Certificate of
Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) in the name of the community concerned.122 The allocation of
lands within the ancestral domain to any individual or indigenous corporate (family or clan)
claimants is left to the ICCs/IPs concerned to decide in accordance with customs and
traditions.123 With respect to ancestral lands outside the ancestral domain, the NCIP issues a
Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT).124
CADT's and CALT's issued under the IPRA shall be registered by the NCIP before the Register
of Deeds in the place where the property is situated.125
(1) Right to Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands: How Acquired
The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in two
modes: (1) by native title over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by torrens title under the
Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only.
(2) The Concept of Native Title
Native title is defined as:
"Sec. 3 [l]. Native Title- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as
memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never
been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before
the Spanish Conquest."126
Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of
private ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been
public lands and are indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the
Spanish Conquest. The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains (which also include
ancestral lands) by virtue of native title shall be recognized and respected.127 Formal
recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate of
Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over
the territories identified and delineated.128
Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by native title. Native title,
however, is a right of private ownership peculiarly granted to ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands
and domains. The IPRA categorically declares ancestral lands and domains held by native title
as never to have been public land. Domains and lands held under native title are, therefore,
indisputably presumed to have never been public lands and are private.
(a) Cariño v. Insular Government129
The concept of native title in the IPRA was taken from the 1909 case of Cariño v. Insular
Government.130 Cariño firmly established a concept of private land title that existed irrespective
of any royal grant from the State.
In 1903, Don Mateo Cariño, an Ibaloi, sought to register with the land registration court 146
hectares of land in Baguio Municipality, Benguet Province. He claimed that this land had been
possessed and occupied by his ancestors since time immemorial; that his grandfather built
fences around the property for the holding of cattle and that his father cultivated some parts of
the land. Cariño inherited the land in accordance with Igorot custom. He tried to have the land
adjusted under the Spanish land laws, but no document issued from the Spanish Crown.131 In
1901, Cariño obtained a possessory title to the land under the Spanish Mortgage Law.132 The
North American colonial government, however, ignored his possessory title and built a public
road on the land prompting him to seek a Torrens title to his property in the land registration
court. While his petition was pending, a U.S. military reservation133 was proclaimed over his
land and, shortly thereafter, a military detachment was detailed on the property with orders to
keep cattle and trespassers, including Cariño, off the land.134
In 1904, the land registration court granted Cariño's application for absolute ownership to the
land. Both the Government of the Philippine Islands and the U.S. Government appealed to the
C.F.I. of Benguet which reversed the land registration court and dismissed Cariño's application.
The Philippine Supreme Court135 affirmed the C.F.I. by applying the Valenton ruling. Cariño
took the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.136 On one hand, the Philippine government invoked
the Regalian doctrine and contended that Cariño failed to comply with the provisions of the
Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, which required registration of land claims within a limited period
of time. Cariño, on the other, asserted that he was the absolute owner of the land jure gentium,
and that the land never formed part of the public domain.
In a unanimous decision written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the U.S. Supreme Court
held:
"It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands
were held from the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of conquering nations toward
people not recognized as entitled to the treatment accorded to those in the same zone of
civilization with themselves. It is true, also, that in legal theory, sovereignty is absolute, and that,
as against foreign nations, the United States may assert, as Spain asserted, absolute power. But
it does not follow that, as against the inhabitants of the Philippines, the United States asserts
that Spain had such power. When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a question of
strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign shall insist upon the theoretical
relation of the subjects to the head in the past, and how far it shall recognize actual facts, are
matters for it to decide."137
The U.S. Supreme Court noted that it need not accept Spanish doctrines. The choice was with
the new colonizer. Ultimately, the matter had to be decided under U.S. law.
The Cariño decision largely rested on the North American constitutionalist's concept of "due
process" as well as the pronounced policy "to do justice to the natives."138 It was based on the
strong mandate extended to the Islands via the Philippine Bill of 1902 that "No law shall be
enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." The court
declared:
"The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race in the United
States. Whatever consideration may have been shown to the North American Indians, the
dominant purpose of the whites in America was to occupy land. It is obvious that, however
stated, the reason for our taking over the Philippines was different. No one, we suppose, would
deny that, so far as consistent with paramount necessities, our first object in the internal
administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives, not to exploit their country for private
gain. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, chapter 1369, section 12 (32 Statutes at Large, 691),
all the property and rights acquired there by the United States are to be administered 'for the
benefit of the inhabitants thereof.' It is reasonable to suppose that the attitude thus assumed by
the United States with regard to what was unquestionably its own is also its attitude in deciding
what it will claim for its own. The same statute made a bill of rights, embodying the safeguards of
the Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It provides that 'no
law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws.' In the
light of the declaration that we have quoted from section 12, it is hard to believe that the United
States was ready to declare in the next breath that "any person" did not embrace the inhabitants
of Benguet, or that it meant by "property" only that which had become such by ceremonies of
which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had heard, and that it proposed to treat
as public land what they, by native custom and by long association,- of the profoundest factors in
human thought,- regarded as their own."139
The Court went further:
"Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the present. It
might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory
goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be
presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to
have been public land. Certainly in a case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish
law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt."140
The court thus laid down the presumption of a certain title held (1) as far back as testimony or
memory went, and (2) under a claim of private ownership. Land held by this title is presumed to
"never have been public land."
Against this presumption, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the Spanish decrees upheld in the
1904 decision of Valenton v. Murciano. The U.S. Supreme Court found no proof that the Spanish
decrees did not honor native title. On the contrary, the decrees discussed in Valenton appeared
to recognize that the natives owned some land, irrespective of any royal grant. The Regalian
doctrine declared in the preamble of the Recopilacion was all "theory and discourse" and it was
observed that titles were admitted to exist beyond the powers of the Crown, viz:
"If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such clear proof that
it was bad by that law as to satisfy us that he does not own the land. To begin with, the older
decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty clearly that
the natives were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. In other
words, Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into
trespassers or even into tenants at will. For instance, Book 4, title 12, Law 14 of the the
Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary conclusion in Valenton v. Murciano, 3
Philippine 537, while it commands viceroys and others, when it seems proper, to call for the
exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm those who hold by good grants or justa prescripcion.
It is true that it begins by the characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship and the origin of all
titles in the King or his predecessors. That was theory and discourse. The fact was that titles
were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain beyond this recognition in their
books." (Emphasis supplied).141
The court further stated that the Spanish "adjustment" proceedings never held sway over
unconquered territories. The wording of the Spanish laws were not framed in a manner as to
convey to the natives that failure to register what to them has always been their own would
mean loss of such land. The registration requirement was "not to confer title, but simply to
establish it;" it was "not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient
family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it."
By recognizing this kind of title, the court clearly repudiated the doctrine of Valenton. It was frank
enough, however, to admit the possibility that the applicant might have been deprived of his land
under Spanish law because of the inherent ambiguity of the decrees and concomitantly, the
various interpretations which may be given them. But precisely because of the ambiguity and of
the strong "due process mandate" of the Constitution, the court validated this kind of title.142
This title was sufficient, even without government administrative action, and entitled the holder to
a Torrens certificate. Justice Holmes explained:
"It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present a problem not
without difficulties for courts of a legal tradition. We have deemed it proper on that account to
notice the possible effect of the change of sovereignty and the act of Congress establishing the
fundamental principles now to be observed. Upon a consideration of the whole case we are of
the opinion that law and justice require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks, and
should not be deprived of what, by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was
his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain."143
Thus, the court ruled in favor of Cariño and ordered the registration of the 148 hectares in
Baguio Municipality in his name.144
Examining Cariño closer, the U.S. Supreme Court did not categorically refer to the title it upheld
as "native title." It simply said:
"The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor-General, in his argument,
characterized as a savage tribe that never was brought under the civil or military government of
the Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if not certain, that the Spanish officials would not have
granted to anyone in that province the registration to which formerly the plaintiff was entitled by
the Spanish Laws, and which would have made his title beyond question good. Whatever may
have been the technical position of Spain it does not follow that, in the view of the United States,
he had lost all rights and was a mere trespasser when the present government seized his land.
The argument to that effect seems to amount to a denial of native titles through an important part
of the Island of Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would not have
permitted and had not the power to enforce."145
This is the only instance when Justice Holmes used the term "native title" in the entire length of
the Cariño decision. It is observed that the widespread use of the term "native title" may be
traced to Professor Owen James Lynch, Jr., a Visiting Professor at the University of the
Philippines College of Law from the Yale University Law School. In 1982, Prof. Lynch published
an article in the Philippine Law Journal entitled Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land
Law.146 This article was made after Professor Lynch visited over thirty tribal communities
throughout the country and studied the origin and development of Philippine land laws.147 He
discussed Cariño extensively and used the term "native title" to refer to Cariño's title as
discussed and upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in said case.
(b) Indian Title
In a footnote in the same article, Professor Lynch stated that the concept of "native title" as
defined by Justice Holmes in Cariño "is conceptually similar to "aboriginal title" of the American
Indians.148 This is not surprising, according to Prof. Lynch, considering that during the
American regime, government policy towards ICCs/IPs was consistently made in reference to
native Americans.149 This was clearly demonstrated in the case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of
Mindoro.150
In Rubi, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a Resolution authorizing the provincial
governor to remove the Mangyans from their domains and place them in a permanent
reservation in Sitio Tigbao, Lake Naujan. Any Mangyan who refused to comply was to be
imprisoned. Rubi and some Mangyans, including one who was imprisoned for trying to escape
from the reservation, filed for habeas corpus claiming deprivation of liberty under the Board
Resolution. This Court denied the petition on the ground of police power. It upheld government
policy promoting the idea that a permanent settlement was the only successful method for
educating the Mangyans, introducing civilized customs, improving their health and morals, and
protecting the public forests in which they roamed.151 Speaking through Justice Malcolm, the
court said:
"Reference was made in the President's instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by
the United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the
Philippine Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to
be practically identical with that followed by the United States Government in its dealings with
the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the
American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in
a state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and
the Indians may be described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine
when and how the guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the
plenary authority of the United States.152
x x x.
As to the second point, the facts in the Standing Bear case and the Rubi case are not exactly
identical. But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do
exist in the United States, that Indians have been taken from different parts of the country and
placed on these reservations, without any previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that,
when once so located, they have been made to remain on the reservation for their own good
and for the general good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn from the Indian policy of the
United States, it is that the determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive
branches of the government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should not
interfere to upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as many forceful
reasons exist for the segregation of the Manguianes in Mindoro as existed for the segregation of
the different Indian tribes in the United States."153
Rubi applied the concept of Indian land grants or reservations in the Philippines. An Indian
reservation is a part of the public domain set apart by proper authority for the use and
occupation of a tribe or tribes of Indians.154 It may be set apart by an act of Congress, by treaty,
or by executive order, but it cannot be established by custom and prescription.155
Indian title to land, however, is not limited to land grants or reservations. It also covers the
"aboriginal right of possession or occupancy."156 The aboriginal right of possession depends on
the actual occupancy of the lands in question by the tribe or nation as their ancestral home, in
the sense that such lands constitute definable territory occupied exclusively by the particular
tribe or nation.157 It is a right which exists apart from any treaty, statute, or other governmental
action, although in numerous instances treaties have been negotiated with Indian tribes,
recognizing their aboriginal possession and delimiting their occupancy rights or settling and
adjusting their boundaries.158
American jurisprudence recognizes the Indians' or native Americans' rights to land they have
held and occupied before the "discovery" of the Americas by the Europeans. The earliest
definitive statement by the U.S. Supreme Court on the nature of aboriginal title was made in
1823 in Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh.159
In Johnson, the plaintiffs claimed the land in question under two (2) grants made by the chiefs of
two (2) Indian tribes. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to recognize this conveyance, the
plaintiffs being private persons. The only conveyance that was recognized was that made by the
Indians to the government of the European discoverer. Speaking for the court, Chief Justice
Marshall pointed out that the potentates of the old world believed that they had made ample
compensation to the inhabitants of the new world by bestowing civilization and Christianity upon
them; but in addition, said the court, they found it necessary, in order to avoid conflicting
settlements and consequent war, to establish the principle that discovery gives title to the
government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, the discovery was made, against all other
European governments, which title might be consummated by possession.160 The exclusion of
all other Europeans gave to the nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil
from the natives and establishing settlements upon it. As regards the natives, the court further
stated that:

"Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives were to be
regulated by themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other power could
interpose between them.
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no instance,
entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired. They were
admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain
possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion; but their rights to complete
sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of
the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the fundamental principle
that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.
While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives as occupants, they
asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a
consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in possession of the
natives. These grants have been understood by all to convey a title to the grantees, subject only
to the Indian right of occupancy."161
Thus, the discoverer of new territory was deemed to have obtained the exclusive right to acquire
Indian land and extinguish Indian titles. Only to the discoverer- whether to England, France,
Spain or Holland- did this right belong and not to any other nation or private person. The mere
acquisition of the right nonetheless did not extinguish Indian claims to land. Rather, until the
discoverer, by purchase or conquest, exercised its right, the concerned Indians were recognized
as the "rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it."
Grants made by the discoverer to her subjects of lands occupied by the Indians were held to
convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy. Once the discoverer
purchased the land from the Indians or conquered them, it was only then that the discoverer
gained an absolute title unrestricted by Indian rights.
The court concluded, in essence, that a grant of Indian lands by Indians could not convey a title
paramount to the title of the United States itself to other parties, saying:
"It has never been contended that the Indian title amounted to nothing. Their right of possession
has never been questioned. The claim of government extends to the complete ultimate title,
charged with this right of possession, and to the exclusive power of acquiring that right."162
It has been said that the history of America, from its discovery to the present day, proves the
universal recognition of this principle.163
The Johnson doctrine was a compromise. It protected Indian rights and their native lands without
having to invalidate conveyances made by the government to many U.S. citizens.164
Johnson was reiterated in the case of Worcester v. Georgia.165 In this case, the State of
Georgia enacted a law requiring all white persons residing within the Cherokee nation to obtain a
license or permit from the Governor of Georgia; and any violation of the law was deemed a high
misdemeanor. The plaintiffs, who were white missionaries, did not obtain said license and were
thus charged with a violation of the Act.
The U.S. Supreme Court declared the Act as unconstitutional for interfering with the treaties
established between the United States and the Cherokee nation as well as the Acts of Congress
regulating intercourse with them. It characterized the relationship between the United States
government and the Indians as:
"The Indian nations were, from their situation, necessarily dependent on some foreign potentate
for the supply of their essential wants, and for their protection from lawless and injurious
intrusions into their country. That power was naturally termed their protector. They had been
arranged under the protection of Great Britain; but the extinguishment of the British power in
their neighborhood, and the establishment of that of the United States in its place, led naturally
to the declaration, on the part of the Cherokees, that they were under the protection of the
United States, and of no other power. They assumed the relation with the United States which
had before subsisted with Great Britain.
This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more powerful, not
that of individuals abandoning their national character, and submitting as subjects to the laws of
a master."166
It was the policy of the U.S. government to treat the Indians as nations with distinct territorial
boundaries and recognize their right of occupancy over all the lands within their domains. Thus:
"From the commencement of our government Congress has passed acts to regulate trade and
intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations, respect their rights, and manifest a firm
purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate. All these acts, and especially that of
1802, which is still in force, manifestly consider the several Indian nations as distinct political
communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a
right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guaranteed by
the United States.
x x x.
"The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political communities,
retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil from time
immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them
from intercourse with any other European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the
particular region claimed: and this was a restriction which those European potentates imposed
on themselves, as well as on the Indians. The very term "nation," so generally applied to them,
means "a people distinct from others." x x x.167
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries
accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of
Georgia have no right to enter but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves or in conformity
with treaties and with the acts of Congress. The whole intercourse between the United States
and this nation is, by our Constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United
States."168
The discovery of the American continent gave title to the government of the discoverer as
against all other European governments. Designated as the naked fee,169 this title was to be
consummated by possession and was subject to the Indian title of occupancy. The discoverer
acknowledged the Indians' legal and just claim to retain possession of the land, the Indians
being the original inhabitants of the land. The discoverer nonetheless asserted the exclusive
right to acquire the Indians' land- either by purchase, "defensive" conquest, or cession- and in so
doing, extinguish the Indian title. Only the discoverer could extinguish Indian title because it
alone asserted ultimate dominion in itself. Thus, while the different nations of Europe respected
the rights of the natives as occupants, they all asserted the ultimate dominion and title to be in
themselves.170
As early as the 19th century, it became accepted doctrine that although fee title to the lands
occupied by the Indians when the colonists arrived became vested in the sovereign- first the
discovering European nation and later the original 13 States and the United States- a right of
occupancy in the Indian tribes was nevertheless recognized. The Federal Government continued
the policy of respecting the Indian right of occupancy, sometimes called Indian title, which it
accorded the protection of complete ownership.171 But this aboriginal Indian interest simply
constitutes "permission" from the whites to occupy the land, and means mere possession not
specifically recognized as ownership by Congress.172 It is clear that this right of occupancy
based upon aboriginal possession is not a property right.173 It is vulnerable to affirmative action
by the federal government who, as sovereign, possessed exclusive power to extinguish the right
of occupancy at will.174 Thus, aboriginal title is not the same as legal title. Aboriginal title rests
on actual, exclusive and continuous use and occupancy for a long time.175 It entails that land
owned by Indian title must be used within the tribe, subject to its laws and customs, and cannot
be sold to another sovereign government nor to any citizen.176 Such title as Indians have to
possess and occupy land is in the tribe, and not in the individual Indian; the right of individual
Indians to share in the tribal property usually depends upon tribal membership, the property of
the tribe generally being held in communal ownership.177
As a rule, Indian lands are not included in the term "public lands," which is ordinarily used to
designate such lands as are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws.178 Indian land
which has been abandoned is deemed to fall into the public domain.179 On the other hand, an
Indian reservation is a part of the public domain set apart for the use and occupation of a tribe of
Indians.180 Once set apart by proper authority, the reservation ceases to be public land, and
until the Indian title is extinguished, no one but Congress can initiate any preferential right on, or
restrict the nation's power to dispose of, them.181
The American judiciary struggled for more than 200 years with the ancestral land claims of
indigenous Americans.182 And two things are clear. First, aboriginal title is recognized. Second,
indigenous property systems are also recognized. From a legal point of view, certain benefits
can be drawn from a comparison of Philippine IPs to native Americans.183 Despite the
similarities between native title and aboriginal title, however, there are at present some
misgivings on whether jurisprudence on American Indians may be cited authoritatively in the
Philippines. The U.S. recognizes the possessory rights of the Indians over their land; title to the
land, however, is deemed to have passed to the U.S. as successor of the discoverer. The
aboriginal title of ownership is not specifically recognized as ownership by action authorized by
Congress.184 The protection of aboriginal title merely guards against encroachment by persons
other than the Federal Government.185 Although there are criticisms against the refusal to
recognize the native Americans' ownership of these lands,186 the power of the State to
extinguish these titles has remained firmly entrenched.187
Under the IPRA, the Philippine State is not barred form asserting sovereignty over the ancestral
domains and ancestral lands.188 The IPRA, however, is still in its infancy and any similarities
between its application in the Philippines vis-à-vis American Jurisprudence on aboriginal title will
depend on the peculiar facts of each case.
(c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique
In the Philippines, the concept of native title first upheld in Cariño and enshrined in the IPRA
grants ownership, albeit in limited form, of the land to the ICCs/IPs. Native title presumes that
the land is private and was never public. Cariño is the only case that specifically and
categorically recognizes native title. The long line of cases citing Cariño did not touch on native
title and the private character of ancestral domains and lands. Cariño was cited by the
succeeding cases to support the concept of acquisitive prescription under the Public Land Act
which is a different matter altogether. Under the Public Land Act, land sought to be registered
must be public agricultural land. When the conditions specified in Section 48 [b] of the Public
Land Act are complied with, the possessor of the land is deemed to have acquired, by operation
of law, a right to a grant of the land.189 The land ceases to be part of the public domain,190 ipso
jure,191 and is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the prescribed
statutory period.
It was only in the case of Oh Cho v. Director of Lands192 that the court declared that the rule
that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or grant, belong to
the public domain has an exception. This exception would be any land that should have been in
the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial. It is
this kind of possession that would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of
the public domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest.193 Oh
Cho, however, was decided under the provisions of the Public Land Act and Cariño was cited to
support the applicant's claim of acquisitive prescription under the said Act.
All these years, Cariño had been quoted out of context simply to justify long, continuous, open
and adverse possession in the concept of owner of public agricultural land. It is this long,
continuous, open and adverse possession in the concept of owner of thirty years both for
ordinary citizens194 and members of the national cultural minorities
Today is Saturday, June 23, 2018
Custom Search
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 2869 March 25, 1907
MATEO CARIÑO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellee.
Coudert Brothers for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
Mateo Cariño, the appellant herein, on the 23d of February, 1904, filed his petition in the Court
of Land Registration praying that there be granted to him title to a parcel of land consisting of 40
hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, and situated in the town of Baguio, Province of Benguet,
together with a house erected thereon and constructed of wood and roofed with rimo, and
bounded as follows: On the north, in lines running 1,048 metes and 20 decimeters with the lands
of Sepa Cariño, H. Phelps Whitmarsh, and Calsi; on the east, in lines running 991 meters and 50
decimeters with the land of Kuidno, Esteban Gonzales, and of the Civil Government; on the
south, in lines of 115 meters and 60 decimeters, with the lands of Talaca; and on the west, in
lines running 982 meters and 20 decimeters, with the lands of Sisco Cariño and Mayengmeng.
By order of the court the hearing of this petition, No. 561, and that of Antonio Rebollo and
Vicente Valpiedad filed under No. 834, were heard together for the reason that the latter petition
claimed a small portion of land included in the parcel set out in the former petition.
The Insular Government opposed the granting of these petitions, alleging that the whole parcel
of land is public property of the Government and that the same was never acquired in any
manner or through any title of egresion from the State.
After trial, and the hearing of documentary and oral proof, the court of Land Registration
rendered its judgment in these terms:
Therefore the court finds that Cariño and his predecessors have not possessed exclusively and
adversely any part of the said property prior to the date on which Cariño constructed the house
now there — that is to say, for the years 1897 and 1898, and Cariño held possession for some
years afterwards of but a part of the property to which he claims title. Both petitions are
dismissed and the property in question is adjudged to be public land. (Bill of exceptions, p. 15.)
The conclusions arrived at the set forth in definite terms in the decision of the court below are
the following:
From the testimony given by Cariño as well as from that of several of the witnesses for the
Government it is deduced, that in or about the year 1884 Cariño erected and utilized as a
domicile a house on the property situated to the north of that property now in question, property
which, according to the plan attached to expediente No. 561, appears to be property belonging
to Donaldson Sim; that during the year 1893 Cariño sold said house to one Cristobal Ramos,
who in turn sold the same to Donaldson Sim, moving to and living on the adjoining property,
which appears on the plan aforesaid to be the property of H. Phelps Whitmarsh, a place where
the father and the grandfather of his wife, that is to say, Ortega and Minse, had lived . . ..
In or about the years 1898 Cariño abandoned the property of Whitmarsh and located on the
property described in the plan attached to expediente No. 561, having constructed a house
thereon in which he now lives, and which house is situated in the center of the property, as is
indicated on the plan; and since which time he has undoubtedly occupied some portion of the
property now claimed by him. (Bill of exceptions, pp. 11 and 12.)
1. Therefore it is evident that this court can not decree the registration of all of the
superficial extension of the land described in the petition and as appears on the plan filed herein,
such extension containing 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, inasmuch as the documentary
evidence accompanying the petition is conclusive proof against the petitioners; this documentary
proof consists of a possessory information under date of March 7, 1901, and registered on the
11th day of the same month and year; and, according to such possessory information, the land
therein described contains an extension of only 28 hectares limited by "the country road to the
barrio of Pias," a road appearing on the plan now presented and cutting the land, as might be
said, in half, or running through its center from north to south, a considerable extension of land
remaining on the other side of the said road, the west side, and which could not have been
included in the possessory information mentioned.
2. As has been shown during the trial of this case, this land, of which mention is made in
said possessory information, and upon which is situated the house now actually occupied by the
petitioner, all of which is set forth as argument as to the possession in the judgment, is "used for
pasture and sowing," and belongs to the class called public lands.
3. Under the express provisions of law, a parcel of land, being of common origin,
presumptively belonged to the State during its sovereignty, and, in order to perfect the legitimate
acquisition of such land by private persons, it was necessary that the possession of the same
pass from the State. And there is no evidence or proof of title of egresion of this land from the
domain of the Spanish Government, nor is there any possessory information equivalent to title
by composicion or under agreement. 4, The possessory information filed herein is not the title to
property authorized in substitution for that of adjustment by the royal decree of February 13,
1894, this being the last law or legal disposition of the former sovereignty applicable to the
present subject-matter of common lands: First, for the reason that the land referred to herein is
not covered nor does it come within any one of the three conditions required by article 19 of the
said royal decree, to wit, that the land has been in an uninterrupted state of cultivation during a
period of six years last past; or that the same has been possessed without interruption during a
period of twelve years and has been in a state of cultivation up to the date of the information and
during the three years immediately preceding such information; or that such land had been
possessed openly without interruption during a period of thirty or more years, notwithstanding
the land had not been cultivated; nor is it necessary to refer to the testimony given by the two
witnesses to the possessory information for the following reason: Second, because the
possessory information authorized by said royal decree or last legal disposition of the Spanish
Government, as title or for the purpose of acquiring actual proprietary right, equivalent to that of
adjustment with the Spanish Government and required and necessary at all times until the
publication of said royal decree was limited in time to one year, in accordance with article 21,
which is as follows: " A period of one year, not to be extended, is allowed to verify the
possessory informations which are referred to in articles 19 and 20. After the expiration of this
period of the right of the cultivators and persons in possession to obtain gratuitous title thereto
lapses and the land together with full possession reverts to the state, or, as the case may be, to
the community, and the said possessors and cultivators or their assigns would simply have
rights under universal or general title of average in the event that the land is sold within a period
of five years immediately following the cancellation. The possessors not included under this
chapter can only acquire by time the ownership and title to unappropriated or royal lands in
accordance with common law."
5. In accordance with the preceding provisions, the right that remained to Cariño, if it be
certain that he was the true possessor of the land in question, was the right of average in case
the Government or State could have sold the same within the period of five years immediately
following for example, if the denouncement of purchase had been carried out by Felipe Zafra or
any other person, as appears from the record of the trial of the case. Aside from this right, in
such event, his possession as attested in the possessory information herein could not, in
accordance with common law, go to show any right of ownership until after the expiration of
twenty years from the expiration of twenty years from the verification and registry of the same in
conformity with the provisions of article 393 of the Mortgage Law and other conditions prescribe
by this law.
6. The right of possession in accordance with common law — that is to say, civil law —
remains at all times subordinate to the Spanish administrative law, inasmuch as it could only be
of force when pertaining to royal transferable or alienable lands, which condition and the
determination thereof is reversed to the government, which classified and designated the royal
alienable lands for the purpose of distinguishing them from those lands strictly public, and from
forestry lands which could at no time pass to private ownership nor be acquired through time
even after the said royal decree of February 13, 1894.
7. The advent of the new sovereignty necessarily brought a new method of dealing with
lands and particularly as to the classification and manner of transfer and acquisition of royal or
common lands then appropriated, which were thenceforth merely called public lands, the
alienation of which was reserved to the Government, in accordance with section 12 and 13 of
the act of Congress of July 1, 1902,1 and in conformity with other laws enacted under this act of
Congress by the Philippine Commission prescribing rules for the execution thereof, one of which
is Act No. 648,2 herein mentioned by the petitioner, in connection with Act No. 627,3 which
appears to be the law upon which the petition herein is founded.
8. Section 6 of Act No. 627 admits prescription, in accordance with the provisions
contained in Act No. 190, as a basis for obtaining the right of ownership. "The petitioners claims
title under the period of prescription of ten years established by that act, as well as by reason of
his occupancy and use thereof from time immemorial." (Allegation 1.) But said act admits such FIRST DIVISION
prescription for the purpose of obtaining title and ownership to lands "not exceeding more that
sixteen hectares in extent." (Sec. 6 of said act.) The land claimed by Cariño is 40 hectares in G.R. No. 130174 July 14, 2000
extent, if we take into consideration his petition, or an extension of 28 hectares, according to the
possessory information, the only thing that can be considered. Therefore, it follows that the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
judgment denying the petition herein and now appealed from was strictly in accordance with the vs.
law invoked herein. COURT OF APPEALS AND TABANGAO REALTY, INC., represented by Rodolfo Perez,
respondents.
9. And of the 28 hectares of land as set out in the possessory information, one part of
same, according to the testimony of Cariño, belongs to Vicente Valpiedad, the extent of which is DECISION
not determined. From all of which it follows that the precise extent has not been determined in
the trial of this case on which judgment might be based in the event that the judgment and title PARDO, J.:
be declared in favor of the petitioner, Mateo Cariño. And we should not lose sight of the fact that,
considering the intention of Congress in granting ownership and title to 16 hectares, that Mateo The case is an appeal1 via certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals2 affirming that of
Cariño and his children have already exceeded such amount in various acquirements of lands, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 07, Batangas City decreeing the registration under the Property
all of which is shown in different cases decided by the said Court of Land Registration, donations Registration Decree, P. D. No. 1529, of three (3) parcels of land situated in Tabangao, Batangas
or gifts of land that could only have been made efficacious as to the conveyance thereof with the City in favor of respondent corporation.3
assistance of these new laws.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
By reason of the findings set forth it is clearly seen that the court below did not err:
"On January 8, 1991, Tabangao Realty, Inc. filed an application for Original Registration of Title
1. In finding that Mateo Cariño and those from whom he claims his right had not over three parcels of land, more particularly described as follows:
possessed and claimed as owners the lands in question since time immemorial;
"Lot 9895 – Plan Ap-4A-001136, containing an area of 4,596 square meters, situated in the
2. In finding that the land in question did not belong to the petitioner, but that, on the Barrio of Tabangao, City of Batangas;
contrary, it was the property of the Government. (Allegation 21.)
"Lot 10155 – Plan Ap-4A-001221, containing an area of 4, 031 square meters, situated in the
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the costs of this instance against the Barrio of Libjo, City of Batangas;
appellant. After the expiration of twenty days from the notification of this decision let judgment be
entered in accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter let the case be remanded to the court "Lot 10171 – Plan Ap-4A-001157, containing an area of 8,224 square meters, situated in the
from whence it came for proper action. So ordered. Barrio of Tabangao, City of Batangas.

Torres, Mapa, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur. "Applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. alleged in its application that it acquired the above-mentioned
Johnson, J., reserves his vote. lots by purchase from its previous owners as evidenced by the corresponding Deeds of Sale;
that it is the owner of all adjoining lots; that it had been in actual possession of the lots since the
time it acquired the same from the previous owners up to the present; and that its possession
Footnotes and occupation as owners including that of its predecessor-in-interest has been open, peaceful,
continuous, adverse to the whole world and in the concept of an owner.
1 Pub. Laws, 1056.
"The applicant further alleged that the plant of the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Company is
2 II Pub. Laws, 311. partly erected on the subject lots which improvements are owned by it (applicant). It also claims
that the subject lots are not subject of any lien or encumbrance; that no adverse interests exist
3 II Pub Laws, 288. with respect to the subject lots; and that there are no military or forest reservation or any pending
litigation affecting said subject lots.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation "Should the property registration decree invoked not be allowed, the applicant in the alternative
applied for the benefits under CA No. 141 as amended and thus alleged that together with its
predecessors-in-interest it had been in open, continuous, public, peaceful and adverse
possession of the subject lots for more than 30 years. It also declared that the lots are not
Today is Saturday, June 23, 2018 tenanted nor subject of an agricultural leasehold relationship.

Custom Search "Applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. attached to its application its Articles of Incorporation, the
tracing cloth plan of the lots, blue print copies of said plan, technical descriptions of the lots,
Deeds of Sale, Assessment Certificate, Tax Declarations for the three lots and Tax Clearances.
"On August 12, 1991, the application was ordered archived by the Regional Trial Court for the
applicant’s failure to comply with the requirements called for in the Report dated February 22,
1994 by the Office of the Land Registration Authority. On June 2, 1994, the applicant filed a
motion to revive the application and to set the case for initial hearing. The motion was granted by
the Regional Trial Court on June 7, 1994 and initial hearing was set on September 1994.
"At the hearing, only the Assistant City Prosecutor appeared to oppose the application on behalf
of the Republic of the Philippines. Counsel for the applicant thereupon presented all the
necessary evidence to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements. Thereafter, upon motion of the
application, the Regional Trial Court issued an order of special default against the whole world
with the exception of the government. The court also issued an order designating and
authorizing Mr. Rodolfo G. Serrano, Legal Researcher of Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, to
receive evidence.
"At the reception of evidence, the applicant presented Romeo Geron, the Consultant and Project
Controller of applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. Geron testified that he is a resident of Tabangao
and was a member of the Task Force responsible for negotiating with the numerous landowners
and the subsequent acquisition by sale of the properties of Tabangao Realty, Inc. in Tabangao
and Libjo, Batangas. He testified that the applicant-corporation was duly organized and
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is authorized to acquire land by
purchase and develop, subdivide, sell, mortgage, exchange, lease and hold for investment or
otherwise, real estate of all kinds.
"He also testified that Lot 9895 was acquired by the applicant-corporation on March 31, 1980 by
virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed in its favor by the previous owners; the spouses
Santiago and Cristina Dimaano (Exh. "L"); that Lot 10155 was acquired by applicant-corporation
by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed on April 25, 1980 in its favor by the former owner Mr.
Perpetuo Almario married to Felisa Magpantay who owned the lot since 1945 (Exh. "L-1"); and
that Lot 10171 was purchased by applicant-corporation on March 31, 1980 from Anita Clear de
Jesus who had been the owner of said lot since 1945 (Exh. "L-2").
"The witness presented the tax declarations for the three parcels of land and tax receipts
showing full payment of all taxes due. (Exh. "P, P-1, P-2" and "Q") He testified that there is no
pending litigation involving the subject properties or any adverse claims filed against the
applicants; that they are free from any liens or encumbrances; that there are no tenants or
agricultural leasehold contracts involving the subject properties; and that there are no mineral
deposits in said lots.
"Geron also testified that the properties are presently under Lease Contract with Shell Gas
Philippines for 25 years from 1981 up to 2006 as evidenced by a Lease Contract executed on
May 18, 1991 (Exh. "M").
"The applicants also presented Crecencio Marasigan. He is an employee at the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Batangas since June 1971. He testified that he has been a resident of
Barangay Malitan, Batangas City even before 1937 up to the present and that he knew the
applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. and the areas surrounding the lots subject of the application. He
mentioned that he was the Chairman of the Task Force that was responsible for the negotiations
that were done with the previous owners of the subject lots, and was therefore personally aware
of the specific dealing regarding the lots subject of the application. He said that he knew the
previous owners since he started residing in Batangas; and that their possessions had been
open, public, peaceful, continuous, adverse and in the concept of owners.
"Marasigan corroborated the testimony of Romeo Geron with regard to the ownership,
possession and the status of the lots subject of the application.
"In opposition, the City Prosecutor of Batangas offered the testimonies of Rodolfo Fernandez of
the Bureau of Lands and Loida Maglinao of the Bureau of Forest Development.
"Rodolfo Fernandez testified that the three parcels of land subject of the application are not
covered by any kind of public land application or patent; that they are not within the reservation
area nor within the forest zone; that they are not reserved for any government purposes; and
that the entire areas are within the Alienable and Disposable Zone as Classified under Project
No. 13, Map No. 718 and certified on March 26, 1928. Fernandez presented the Investigation
Report made by the Bureau of Lands dated April 24, 1991 (Exh. "1" to "1-b").
"Loida Maglinao testified that the subject properties are within the alienable and disposable area
of the public domain and no forestry interest is adversely interposed by the Bureau of Forest
Development.
"On the basis of all the evidence presented, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision on
March 31, 1995 granting the application for registration. It held:
"From the credible testimony and documentary evidence adduced establishing applicant-
corporation that the latter and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public, continuous,
peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse possessions of the parcels of land applied for up to the
present, for the requisite period of time, under bona fide claim of ownership, and considering,
that no evidence has been presented by the government in support of its Opposition, and even
presented the favorable testimonies of Mr. Rodolfo Fernandez, of the Bureau of Lands and Miss
Loida Y. Maglinao, of the Bureau of Forest Development, both CENRO, Batangas City Branch,
Batangas City, supported by their respective official Reports, the Court is convinced that the
applicant-corporation Tabangao Realty Incorporated had sufficiently established its rights to the
grant of title over the three (3) parcels of land subject of this case."
In due time, petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals.4
On July 30, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming the appealed
decision.5
Hence, this appeal.6
The issue raised is whether respondent Tabangao Realty, Inc. has registerable title over three
(3) parcels of land situated in Tabangao, Batangas City applied for.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. is entitled to registration of
title over the three (3) parcels of land applied for. The ruling is erroneous.
An applicant seeking to establish ownership over land must conclusively show that he is the
owner thereof in fee simple,7 for the standing presumption is that all lands belong to the public
domain of the State, unless acquired from the Government either by purchase or by grant,
except lands possessed by an occupant and his predecessors since time immemorial, for such
possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain
or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest.8
The land in question is admittedly public. The applicant has no title at all.1âwphi1 Its claim of
acquisition of ownership is solely based on possession. In fact, the parcels of land applied for
were declared public land by decision of the Cadastral Court.9 Such being the case, the
application for voluntary registration under P. D. No. 152910 is barred by the prior judgment of
the Cadastral Court. The land having been subjected to compulsory registration under the
Cadastral Act and declared public land can no longer be the subject of registration by voluntary
application under Presidential Decree No. 1529. The second application is barred by res-
judicata.11 As previously held, "[W]here the applicant possesses no title or ownership over the
parcel of land, he cannot acquire one under the Torrens System of registration."12
Nonetheless, applicant anchors its application for registration of title on the provisions of P. D.
No. 1529 or in the alternative Com. Act No. 141, Section 48 (b), as amended by Rep. Act No.
1942, which allows "those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application" to apply for judicial confirmation and
registration of title.13
However, the evidence is inconclusive that applicant and its predecessors in interest had been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land in question, en concepto de
dueño, or a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years immediately
preceding the filing of the application,14 or since June 12, 1945,15 or earlier,16 or since time
immemorial.17
Analyzing the evidence submitted, we note that the applicant failed to prove the fact of
possession by itself and its predecessors in interest for at least thirty (30) years before the filing
of the application.
Witness Romeo Geron, a consultant of applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. testified that in the year
1945, he knew that the land designated as Lot 9895, with an area of 4,596 square meters was
owned by Santiago Dimaano, who sold the lot to applicant corporation on March 31, 1980 and
that the parcel of land designated as Lot 10155 with an area of 4,031 square meters was owned
by Perpetuo Almario way back in 1945, and that he possessed the lot up to the time he sold the
same to applicant corporation on April 25, 1980 because he was in charge of negotiation with
the numerous landowners for acquisition of their property by Tabangao Realty, Inc.18 However,
in 1945, witness Geron was only seven (7) years old, and obviously could not competently testify
on the ownership and possession of the subject land.
Applicant failed to prove specific acts showing the nature of its possession and that of its
predecessors in interest.19 "The applicant must present specific acts of ownership to
substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of
law than factual evidence of possession."20 "Actual possession of land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise
over his own property."21
The bare assertion of witnesses that the applicant of land had been in the open, adverse and
continuous possession of the property for over thirty (30) years is hardly "the well-nigh
incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this nature.22 In other words, facts constituting
possession must be duly established by competent evidence.
Consequently, the lower court gravely erred in granting the application.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals, DENIES the
application for registration of title filed by applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. and declares the
subject parcels of land to be public land belonging to the public domain.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Petition for Review, filed on September 29, 1997, Rollo, pp. 9-22.
2 Petition, Annex "C", Rollo, pp. 42-50.
3 In CA-G. R. CV No. 50012, promulgated on July 30, 1997, Montoya, J., ponente, Labitoria and
Amin, JJ., concurring, Rollo, pp. 42-50.
4 Docketed as CA-G. R. CV No. 50012.
5 Petition, Annex "C", Rollo, pp. 42-50.
6 Filed on September 29, 1997, Rollo, pp. 9-23. On December 01, 1999, we gave due course to
the petition (Rollo, pp. 86-87).
7 De Ralla v. Director of Lands, 83 Phil. 491, 501 [1949], citing Director of Lands v. Peñales, 63
Phil. 1065 [1936]; Republic v. Lee, 197 SCRA 13, 19 [1991].
8 Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, 892 [1946], citing Cariño v. Insular Government,
212 U. S. 449; Director of Lands v. Reyes; Alinsunurin v. Director of Lands, 68 SCRA 177, 195
[1975]; Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 219 SCRA 339, 346-347 [1993];
Gordula v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 617, 631 [1998].
9 Report, dated March 14, 1995, Land Registration Authority, Original RTC Record pp. 193-194,
quoted in RTC Decision, Petition, Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 31-41.
10 Formerly Act No. 496.
11 Cf. Duran v. Oliva, 3 SCRA 154 [1961]; Aquino v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 850 [1919];
Republic v. Aquino, 120 SCRA 186 [1983].
12 Republic v. Reyes, 71 SCRA 450, 458 [1976].
13 By P. D. No. 1073, enacted on January 25, 1977, the thirty-year period prescribed in Com.
Act No. 141, Sec. 48 (b), as amended by R. A. 1942, was further amended to "since June 12,
1945". See Republic v. Doldol, 295 SCRA 359, 364 [1998].
14 Com. Act No. 141, Section 48 [b], as amended by R. A. No. 1942.
15 P. D. No. 1073, Sec. 4; Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78, 100 [1992]; Director of
Lands v. Court of Appeals, 308 SCRA 317, 323 [1999].
16 Republic v. Doldol, supra.
17 Republic v. Doldol, supra, citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 567 [1994]; Director
of Lands v. Buyco, supra.
18 RTC Decision, Rollo, pp. 34-35.
19 Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 214 SCRA 604, 611 [1992].
20 Republic v. Court of Appeals, 167 SCRA 150, 156 [1988].
21 Ramos v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175 [1918]. PERALTA,

22 Republic v. Lee, supra, Note 7. ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila Promulgated:

SECOND DIVISION
November 15, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

DECISION
Petitioner,

PERALTA, J.:

-versus-
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to set aside the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R.
CV No. 84206, which affirmed the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City,
Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514, granting respondents application for registration and
confirmation of title over a parcel of land located in Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro
Manila.

AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, ARSENIO R. DELA PAZ, JOSE R. DELA PAZ, and GLICERIO R. The factual milieu of this case is as follows:
DELA PAZ, represented by JOSE R. DELA PAZ,

Respondents.
On November 13, 2003, respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela
G.R. No. 171631 Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, represented by Jose R. dela Paz (Jose), filed with the RTC of
Pasig City an application for registration of land[3] under Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD
1529) otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. The application covered a parcel of
land with an area of 25,825 square meters, situated at Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila,
Present: described under survey Plan Ccn-00-000084, (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212
and 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping). Together with their application for
registration, respondents submitted the following documents: (1) Special power of attorney
showing that the respondents authorized Jose dela Paz to file the application; (2) Conversion
CARPIO, J., Chairperson, Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping (Ccn-
00-000084) with the annotation that the survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B
CARPIO-MORALES,* classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development, Quezon City on
January 03, 1968; (3) Technical Descriptions of Ccn-00-000084; (4) Geodetic Engineer's
Certificate; (5) Tax Declaration No. FL-018-01466; (6) Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob dated June 18,
1987; (7) Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pagaari ng Namatay dated March
10, 1979; (8) Certification that the subject lots are not covered by any land patent or any public
land appilcation; and (9) Certification by the Office of the Treasurer, Municipality of Taguig,
Metro Manila, that the tax on the real property for the year 2003 has been paid.
Respondents alleged that they acquired the subject property, which is an agricultural land, by
virtue of Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob[4] dated June 18, 1987, executed by their parents Zosimo
dela Paz and Ester dela Paz (Zosimo and Ester), who earlier acquired the said property from
their deceased parent Alejandro dela Paz (Alejandro) by virtue of a Sinumpaang Pahayag sa
Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pag-aari ng Namatay[5] dated March 10, 1979. In their application,
respondents claimed that they are co-owners of the subject parcel of land and they have been in
continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse possession of the same, in the concept of
owner since they acquired it in 1987. Respondents further averred that by way of tacking of
possession, they, through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public, adverse,
continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the same, in the concept of an owner even before
June 12, 1945, or for a period of more than fifty (50) years since the filing of the application of
registration with the trial court. They maintained that the subject property is classified as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The case was set for initial hearing on April 30, 2004. On said date, respondents presented
documentary evidence to prove compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the law.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), opposed the application for registration on the following grounds, among others: (1) that
neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for a period of not
less than thirty (30) years; (2) that the muniments of title, and/or the tax declarations and tax
payments receipts of applicants, if any, attached to or alleged in the application, do not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the land applied for; and
(3) that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of public domain belonging to the Republic not
subject to private appropriation. Except for the Republic, there was no other oppositor to the
application.
On May 5, 2004, the trial court issued an Order of General Default[6] against the whole world
except as against the Republic. Thereafter, respondents presented their evidence in support of
their application.
In its Decision dated November 17, 2004, the RTC granted respondents' application for
registration of the subject property. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, affirming the order of general default hereto entered, judgment is hereby
rendered AFFIRMING and CONFIRMING the title of AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, Arsenio R. dela
Paz, Jose R. dela Paz and Glicerio R. dela Paz, all married and residents of and with postal
address at No. 65 Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, over a parcel of land described and
bounded under Plan Ccn-00-000084 (consolidation of Lots No. 3212 and 3234, Mcadm-590-D,
Taguig, Cadastral Mapping, containing Twenty-Five Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty-Five
(25,825) Square Meters, more or less, situated at Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro
Manila, under the operation of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.
After the decision shall have been become final and executory and, upon payment of all taxes
and other charges due on the land, the order for the issuance of a decree of registration shall be
accordingly undertaken.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal.[8] The CA, in its Decision dated
February 15, 2006, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled
that respondents were able to show that they have been in continuous, open, exclusive and
notorious possession of the subject property through themselves and their predecessors-in-
interest. The CA found that respondents acquired the subject land from their predecessors-in-
interest, who have been in actual, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession in
the concept of an owner since time immemorial. The CA, likewise, held that respondents were
able to present sufficient evidence to establish that the subject property is part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain. Hence, the instant petition raising the following
grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER GRANTING
RESPONDENTS' APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LOT
CONSIDERING THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT
RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS
POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT LOT IN THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT
LOT IN RESPONDENTS' NAME CONSIDERING THAT NO EVIDENCE WAS FORMALLY
OFFERED TO PROVE THAT THE SAME IS WITHIN THE ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE
AREA OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.[9]
In its Memorandum, petitioner claims that the CA's findings that respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, uninterrupted, public, and adverse possession in
the concept of owners, for more than fifty years or even before June 12, 1945, was
unsubstantiated. Respondents failed to show actual or constructive possession and occupation
over the subject land in the concept of an owner. Respondents also failed to establish that the
subject property is within the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. The subject
property remained to be owned by the State under the Regalian Doctrine.
In their Memorandum, respondents alleged that they were able to present evidence of specific
acts of ownership showing open, notorious, continuous and adverse possession and occupation
in the concept of an owner of the subject land. To prove their continuous and uninterrupted
possession of the subject land, they presented several tax declarations, dated 1949, 1966,
1974, 1979, 1980, 1985, 1991, 1994 and 2000, issued in the name of their predecessors-in-
interest. In addition, respondents presented a tax clearance issued by the Treasurer's Office of
the City of Taguig to show that they are up to date in their payment of real property taxes.
Respondents maintain that the annotations appearing on the survey plan of the subject land
serves as sufficient proof that the land is within the alienable and disposable portion of the public
domain. Finally, respondents assert that the issues raised by the petitioner are questions of fact
which the Court should not consider in a petition for review under Rule 45.
The petition is meritorious.
In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court is
limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are
devoid of support by the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts.[10] It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all
over again, unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of
support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error or grave abuse of
discretion.[11]
In the present case, the records do not support the findings made by the CA that the subject
land is part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.
Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
From the foregoing, respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier.[12]
These the respondents must prove by no less than clear, positive and convincing evidence.[13]
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land.
All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of the inalienable
public domain.[14] The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the
lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who
must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.[15]
To support its contention that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable,
respondents presented survey Plan Ccn-00-000084[16] (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot
Nos. 3212 & 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping) prepared by Geodetic Engineer
Arnaldo C. Torres with the following annotation:
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B clasified as alienable/disposable by the
Bureau of Forest Development, Quezon City on Jan. 03, 1968.
Respondents' reliance on the afore-mentioned annotation is misplaced.
In Republic v. Sarmiento,[17] the Court ruled that the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer
on the blue print copy of the conversion and subdivision plan approved by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Center, that this survey is inside the alienable and
disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the
Bureau of Forestry, is insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome
the presumption that the land remains part of the inalienable public domain.
Further, in Republic v. Tri-plus Corporation,[18] the Court held that:
In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required by
law is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are
alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove that
the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators,
and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, while the
Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands Management Services of the
DENR, the certification refers only to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said
plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property surveyed.
Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to prove that the
lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable.
Furthermore, in Republic of the Philippines v. Rosila Roche,[19] the Court held that the applicant
bears the burden of proving the status of the land. In this connection, the Court has held that he
must present a certificate of land classification status issued by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO), or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
(PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land as alienable and disposable, and that it is within the
approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant
must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified
as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established by
the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Clearly, the surveyor's annotation presented by respondents is not the kind of proof required by
law to prove that the subject land falls within the alienable and disposable zone. Respondents
failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to establish that the subject
land are part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. In the absence of
incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property is already classified as alienable and
disposable, we must consider the same as still inalienable public domain.[20]
Anent respondents possession and occupation of the subject property, a reading of the records
failed to show that the respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
possessed and occupied the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The evidence submitted by respondents to prove their possession and occupation over the
subject property consists of the testimonies of Jose and Amado Geronimo (Amado), the tenant
of the adjacent lot. However, their testimonies failed to establish respondents predecessors-in-
interest' possession and occupation of subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Jose,
who was born on March 19, 1939,[21] testified that since he attained the age of reason he
already knew that the land subject of this case belonged to them.[22] Amado testified that he
was a tenant of the land adjacent to the subject property since 1950,[23] and on about the same
year, he knew that the respondents were occupying the subject land.[24]
Jose and Amado's testimonies consist merely of general statements with no specific details as
to when respondents' predecessors-in-interest began actual occupancy of the land subject of
this case. While Jose testified that the subject land was previously owned by their parents
Zosimo and Ester, who earlier inherited the property from their parent Alejandro, no clear
evidence was presented to show Alejandro's mode of acquisition of ownership and that he had
been in possession of the same on or before June 12, 1945, the period of possession required
by law. It is a rule that general statements that are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof
of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice.[25] An applicant in a land registration case
cannot just harp on mere conclusions of law to embellish the application but must impress
thereto the facts and circumstances evidencing the alleged ownership and possession of the
land.[26]
Respondents earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration issued in the name of
their predecessors-in-interest only in the year 1949. At best, respondents can only prove
possession since said date. What is required is open, exclusive, continuous and notorious
possession by respondents and their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of
ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[27] Respondents failed to explain why, despite their
claim that their predecessors-in interest have possessed the subject properties in the concept of
an owner even before June 12, 1945, it was only in 1949 that their predecessors-in-interest
started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. Well settled is the rule that tax declarations
and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when not
supported by any other evidence. The fact that the disputed property may have been declared
for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration or of their predecessors-in-
interest does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of
ownership.[28]
The foregoing pieces of evidence, taken together, failed to paint a clear picture that respondents
by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive,
continuous and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land, under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Evidently, since respondents failed to prove that (1) the subject property was classified as part of
the disposable and alienable land of the public domain; and (2) they and their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
thereof under a bonafide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, their application for
confirmation and registration of the subject property under PD 1529 should be denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February
15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application
for registration and confirmation of title filed by respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela
Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, as represented by Jose R. dela Paz, over a
parcel of land, with a total area of twenty-five thousand eight hundred twenty-five (25,825)
square meters situated at Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
 I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
Associate Justice case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

WE CONCUR: Associate Justice

Second Division, Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice CERTIFICATION

Chairperson

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES ROBERTO A. ABAD
* Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura,
Associate Justice Associate Justice per raffle dated May 13, 2009.

[1] Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, with Associate Justices Remedios A.
Salazar-Fernando and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, concurring; rollo, pp. 53-60.

[2] Rollo, pp. 61-64.

[3] Records, pp. 1-6.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA [4] Id. at 11-12.

Associate Justice [5] Id. at 13-14.

[6] Id. at 55

[7] Rollo, pp. 63-64.

ATTESTATION [8] Records, pp. 100-101.

[9] Rollo, pp. 32-33.

[10] Raquel-Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 174986, 175071, 181415, July 7, 2009, 592 Petitioner,
SCRA 169, 195, 196; Fangonil-Herrera v. Fangonil, G.R. No. 169356, August 28, 2007, 531
SCRA 486, 505.

[11] FGU Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 494 Phil. 342, 356 (2005).

[12] Mistica v. Republic, G.R. No. 165141, September 11, 2009, 599 SCRA 401, 408, citing In - versus -
Re: Application for Land Registration of Title, Fieldman Agricultural Trading Corporation v.
Republic, 550 SCRA 92, 103 (2008).

[13] Mistica v. Republic, supra, at 408-409.

[14] Republic v. Tri-Plus Corporation, G.R. No. 150000, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 91,101-
102.
TEOFILO VICTOR TANJUATCO, JR., and VICENTE CUEVAS,*
[15] Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v.Yap, G.R. Nos.
167707 and 173775, October 8, 2008, 568 SCRA 164, 192. Respondents.

[16] Exhibit N-3, records, p. 7. G.R. No. 168800

[17] G.R. No. 169397, March 13, 2007, 518 SCRA 250, 259, citing Menguito v. Republic, 401
Phil. 274 (2000). Present:

[18] Supra note 14, at 102.

[19] G.R. No. 175846, July 6, 2010, citing Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 555 SCRA 477, QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
488-489 (2008).
CARPIO MORALES,
[20] Arbias v. Republic, G.R. No. 173808, September 17, 2008, 565 SCRA 582, 596.
TINGA,
[21] Id. at 39.
VELASCO, JR., and
[22] Id. at 8.
BRION, JJ.
[23] Id. at 10.

[24] Id. at 16.

[25] Mistica v. Republic, supra note 12, at 410-411.

Promulgated:
[26] Lim v. Republic, G.R. Nos. 158630 and 162047, September 4, 2009, 598 SCRA 247, 262.
April 16, 2009
[27] Republic v. Bibonia, G.R. No. 157466, June 21, 2007, 525 SCRA 268, 276-277.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
[28] Arbias v. Republic, supra note 20, at 593-594.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

Petitioner through counsel prays for the reversal of the Orders dated February 12, 2005[1] and
July 1, 2005[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba City, Branch 37, in Civil Case No.
SECOND DIVISION 2662-98-C. The RTC had granted the demurrer to evidence filed by respondent Tanjuatco, and
then denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

NEW REGENT SOURCES, INC., The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Petitioner New Regent Sources, Inc. (NRSI) filed a Complaint[3] for Rescission/Declaration of
Nullity of Contract, Reconveyance and Damages against respondent Tanjuatco and the Register
of Deeds of Calamba before the RTC of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 37. NRSI alleged that in
1994, it authorized Vicente P. Cuevas III, its Chairman and President, to apply on its behalf, for
the acquisition of two parcels of land by virtue of its right of accretion. Cuevas purportedly
applied for the lots in his name by paying P82,400.38 to the Bureau of Lands. On January 2,
1995, Cuevas and his wife executed a Voting Trust Agreement[4] over their shares of stock in
the corporation. Then, pending approval of the application with the Bureau of Lands, Cuevas
assigned his right to Tanjuatco for the sum of P85,000.[5] On March 12, 1996, the Director of
Lands released an Order,[6] which approved the transfer of rights from Cuevas to Tanjuatco.
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-369406[7] and T-369407[8] were then issued in the name of
Tanjuatco.
In his Answer with Counterclaim,[9] Tanjuatco advanced the affirmative defense that the
complaint stated no cause of action against him. According to Tanjuatco, it was Cuevas who
was alleged to have defrauded the corporation. He averred further that the complaint did not
charge him with knowledge of the agreement between Cuevas and NRSI.
Upon Tanjuatcos motion, the trial court conducted a preliminary hearing on the affirmative
defense, but denied the motion to dismiss, and ordered petitioner to amend its complaint and
implead Cuevas as a defendant.[10]
Summons was served on respondent Cuevas through publication,[11] but he was later declared
in default for failure to file an answer.[12]
After NRSI completed presenting evidence, Tanjuatco filed a Demurrer to Evidence,[13] which
the RTC granted in an Order dated February 12, 2005. In dismissing NRSIs complaint,[14] the
RTC cited the Order of the Director of Lands and certain insufficiencies in the allegations in the
complaint. The trial court further held that Tanjuatco is an innocent purchaser for value.
NRSI moved for reconsideration, but it was denied by the trial court in an Order dated July 1,
2005, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the plaintiff on May 3, 2005 is DENIED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Hence, NRSI filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED INSUFFICIENCY OF THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE
COMPLAINT MAY BE USED AS A BASIS TO DISMISS THE SAME BY WAY OF A
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT A COMPLAINT MAY BE DISMISSED ON DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
BASED ON A DOCUMENT NOT PROPERLY IDENTIFIED, MARKED AND OFFERED IN
EVIDENCE.[16]
In a nutshell, the issue for our determination is whether the trial court erred in dismissing the
case on demurrer to evidence.
NRSI argues that the supposed insufficiency of allegations in the complaint did not justify its
dismissal on demurrer to evidence. It contends that a dismissal on demurrer to evidence should
be grounded on insufficiency of evidence presented at trial. NRSI contends that the sufficiency
of its allegations was affirmed when the trial court denied the motion to dismiss. It likewise
asserts that the RTC erred in declaring Tanjuatco a buyer in good faith. It stressed that the
Order of the Director of Lands, as the basis for such finding, was not formally offered in
evidence. Hence, it should not have been considered by the trial court in accordance with
Section 34,[17] Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Tanjuatco, for his part, maintains that NRSI failed to make a case for reconveyance against him.
He insists that the complaint stated no cause of action, and the evidence presented established,
rather than refuted, that he was an innocent purchaser. Tanjuatco adds that the RTCs denial of
the motion to dismiss, and admission of evidence negated NRSIs claim that it relied on the
complaint alone to decide the case. Lastly, Tanjuatco argues that the Order of the Director of
Lands was a matter of judicial notice. Thus, under Section 1,[18] Rule 129 of the Rules of Court,
there was no need to identify, mark, and offer it in evidence.
After serious consideration, we find the instant petition utterly without merit.
In its petition, NRSI questions the trial courts dismissal of its complaint upon a demurrer to
evidence and invites a calibration of the evidence on record to determine the sufficiency of the
factual basis for the trial courts order. This factual analysis, however, would involve questions of
fact which are improper in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is well
established that in an appeal by certiorari, only questions of law may be reviewed.[19] A
question of law exists when there is doubt or difference as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts. A question of fact exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.[20]
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value
of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns
the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter.[21] Otherwise, there is a question
of fact. Since it raises essentially questions of fact, the instant petition must be denied.
In any event, we find that based on the examination of the evidence at hand, we are in
agreement that the trial court correctly dismissed NRSIs complaint on demurrer to evidence.
Petitioner filed a complaint for rescission/declaration of nullity of contract, reconveyance and
damages against respondents. An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer
property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner.[22] In an action for
reconveyance, the certificate of title is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is
the transfer of the property, specifically the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another persons name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with a
better right.[23]
To warrant a reconveyance of the land, the following requisites must concur: (1) the action must
be brought in the name of a person claiming ownership or dominical right over the land
registered in the name of the defendant; (2) the registration of the land in the name of the
defendant was procured through fraud[24] or other illegal means;[25] (3) the property has not yet
passed to an innocent purchaser for value;[26] and (4) the action is filed after the certificate of
title had already become final and incontrovertible[27] but within four years from the discovery of
the fraud,[28] or not later than 10 years in the case of an implied trust.[29] Petitioner failed to
show the presence of these requisites.
Primarily, NRSI anchors its claim over the lands subjects of this case on the right of accretion. It
submitted in evidence, titles[30] to four parcels of land, which allegedly adjoin the lots in the
name of Tanjuatco.
But it must be stressed that accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457[31] of
the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil
or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of
the river; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.[32]
Thus, it is not enough to be a riparian owner in order to enjoy the benefits of accretion. One who
claims the right of accretion must show by preponderant evidence that he has met all the
conditions provided by law. Petitioner has notably failed in this regard as it did not offer any
evidence to prove that it has satisfied the foregoing requisites.
Further, it is undisputed that Tanjuatco derived his title to the lands from Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 245 registered in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Said parcels of
land formed part of the Dried San Juan River Bed,[33] which under Article 502 (1)[34] of the Civil
Code rightly pertains to the public dominion. The Certification[35] issued by Forester III Emiliano
S. Leviste confirms that said lands were verified to be within the Alienable and Disposable
Project No. 11-B of Calamba, Laguna per BFD LC Map No. 3004, certified and declared as such
on September 28, 1981. Clearly, the Republic is the entity which had every right to transfer
ownership thereof to respondent.
Next, petitioner sought to establish fraudulent registration of the land in the name of Tanjuatco.
NRSI presented before the trial court a copy of the Voting Trust Agreement which the spouses
Cuevas executed in favor of Pauline Co. However, nothing in said agreement indicates that
NRSI empowered Cuevas to apply for the registration of the subject lots on its behalf.
property of another, without notice that some other person has a right or interest in such property
and pays the full price for the same, at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the
claims or interest of some other person in the property.[40]
As regards the consideration which Tanjuatco paid Cuevas for the assignment of rights to the
lands, suffice it to state that the assignment merely vested upon Tanjuatco all of Cuevass
intangible claims, rights and interests over the properties and not the properties themselves. At
the time of the assignment, the lots were still the subjects of a pending sales application before
the Bureau of Lands. For, it was not until May 24, 1996, that titles were issued in Tanjuatcos
name. The assignment not being a sale of real property, it was not surprising that Cuevas
demanded from Tanjuatco only P85,000 for the transfer of rights.
From all the foregoing, it is plain and apparent that NRSI failed to substantiate its claim of
entitlement to ownership of the lands in Tanjuatcos name. The trial court, therefore, correctly
dismissed petitioners complaint for reconveyance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Orders dated February 12, 2005 and July 1, 2005 of
the Regional Trial Court of Calamba City, Branch 37, in Civil Case No. 2662-98-C are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Neither did petitioner adduce evidence to prove that Cuevas was its President and Chairman.
Even assuming that Cuevas was the president of NRSI, his powers are confined only to those
vested upon him by the board of directors or fixed in the by-laws.[36] In truth, petitioner could
have easily presented its by-laws or a corporate resolution[37] to show Cuevass authority to buy
the lands on its behalf. But it did not.

Petitioner disagrees with the trial courts finding that Tanjuatco was a buyer in good faith. It
contends that the March 12, 1996 Order of the Director of Lands which declared that the lots LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
covered by TCT Nos. T-369406 and T-369407 were free from claims and conflicts when Cuevas
assigned his rights thereon to Tanjuatco. But petitioners claim is untenable because Associate Justice
respondents did not formally offer said order in evidence. Lastly, petitioner makes an issue
regarding the below-fair market value consideration which Tanjuatco paid Cuevas for the Chairperson
assignment of his rights to the lots. But it draws unconvincing conclusions therefrom that do not
serve to persuade us of its claims.

We note that Tanjuatco filed a demurrer to evidence before the RTC. By its nature, a demurrer WE CONCUR:
to evidence is filed after the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence but before
the defendant offers evidence in his defense. Thus, the Rules provide that if the defendants
motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. However, if the defendants motion
is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed, he shall be deemed to have waived
the right to present evidence.[38] It is understandable, therefore, why the respondent was unable
to formally offer in evidence the Order of the Director of Lands, or any evidence for that matter.

More importantly, petitioner introduced in evidence TCT Nos. T-369406 and T-369407 in the
name of respondent Tanjuatco. These titles bear a certification that Tanjuatcos titles were
derived from OCT No. 245 in the name of no less than the Republic of the Philippines. Hence,
we cannot validly and fairly rule that in relying upon said title, Tanjuatco acted in bad faith. A
person dealing with registered land may safely rely upon the correctness of the certificate of title
issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the
condition of the property.[39] This applies even more particularly when the seller happens to be CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
the Republic, against which, no improper motive can be ascribed. The law, no doubt, considers
Tanjuatco an innocent purchaser for value. An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

* Also known as Vicente P. Cuevas III.

ATTESTATION
[1] Rollo, pp. 26-27. Penned by Judge Antonio T. Manzano.

[2] Id. at 28.

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. [3] Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-5.

[4] Rollo, pp. 31-33.

[5] Id. at 34-37.

[6] Records, Vol. I, p. 41.

[7] Id. at 6.

[8] Id. at 7.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING [9] Id. at 27-34.

Associate Justice [10] Id. at 101-102.

Chairperson [11] Id. at 209-211.

[12] Id. at 221-222.

[13] Id. at 318-332.

CERTIFICATION [14] Rollo, p. 27.

The dispositive portion reads:

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, WHEREFORE, the Motion To Dismiss by way of Demurrer To Evidence filed by defendant
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the Tanjuatco is granted. The complaint for Rescission/Declaration of Nullity of Contract,
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. Reconveyance, and Damages filed by plaintiff New Regent Sources, Inc. is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 [34] Art. 502. The following are of public dominion:
[15] Id. at 28.
(1) Rivers and their natural beds;
[16] Id. at 16.
xxxx
[17] SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. − The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. [35] Records, Vol. I, p. 35.

[18] SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. − A court shall take judicial notice, without
the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history,
forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime
courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the
official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of
nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (Emphasis supplied.)
[19] Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v. Santamaria, G.R. No. 139885, January 13, 2003, 395 SCRA
84, 92.
[20] Morales v. Skills International Company, G.R. No. 149285, August 30, 2006, 500 SCRA
186, 194, citing Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., G.R. No. 140946, 438 SCRA 224, 230-
231.
[36] H. DE LEON, THE LAW ON PARTNERSHIPS AND PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 281 (2001
ed.).
[37] BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1311 (6th ed.).
Corporation resolution. − Formal documentation of action taken by board of directors of
corporation.
[38] SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his
evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present
evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.

[21] Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111324, July 5, 1996, [39] Dela Cruz v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 146222, January 15, 2004, 419 SCRA 648, 657.
258 SCRA 186, 199.
[40] Id.
[22] Heirs of Maximo Sanjorjo v. Heirs of Manuel Y. Quijano, G.R. No. 140457, January 19,
2005, 449 SCRA 15, 27.

[23] Walstrom v. Mapa, Jr., G.R. No. 38387, January 29, 1990, 181 SCRA 431, 442. Today is Saturday, June 23, 2018

[24] Id. at 440. Custom Search

[25] Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala v. Heirs of Honorio Dacut, G.R. No. 147379, February 27, 2002,
378 SCRA 206, 217. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
[26] Walstrom v. Mapa, Jr., supra at 440. Manila

[27] A. NOBLEJAS AND E. NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 247 EN BANC
(2007 Revised ed.).
G.R. No. L-55289 June 29, 1982
[28] Balbin v. Medalla, No. L-46410, October 30, 1981, 108 SCRA 666, 677.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director of Lands, petitioner-appellant,
[29] Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala v. Heirs of Honorio Dacut, supra at 219. vs.
JUDGE CANDIDO P. VILLANUEVA, of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Malolos Branch
[30] Records, Vol. I, pp. 298-305. TCT No. T-312462, TCT No. T-312463, TCT No. T-312464, VII, and IGLESIA NI CRISTO, as a corporation sole, represented by ERAÑO G. MANALO, as
TCT No. T-312465. Executive Minister, respondents-appellees.

[31] Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which
they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. AQUINO, J.:

[32] Meneses v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 82220, 82251 and 83059, July 14, 1995, 246 Like L-49623, Manila Electric Company vs. Judge Castro-Bartolome, this case involves the
SCRA 162, 172. prohibition in section 11, Article XIV of the Constitution that "no private corporation or
association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one
[33] Rollo, pp. 29-30. thousand hectares in area".
Lots Nos. 568 and 569, located at Barrio Dampol, Plaridel, Bulacan, with an area of 313 square
meters and an assessed value of P1,350 were acquired by the Iglesia Ni Cristo on January 9,
1953 from Andres Perez in exchange for a lot with an area of 247 square meters owned by the
said church (Exh. D).
The said lots were already possessed by Perez in 1933. They are not included in any military
reservation. They are inside an area which was certified as alienable or disposable by the
Bureau of Forestry in 1927. The lots are planted to santol and mango trees and banana plants.
A chapel exists on the said land. The land had been declared for realty tax purposes. Realty
taxes had been paid therefor (Exh. N).
On September 13, 1977, the Iglesia Ni Cristo, a corporation sole, duly existing under Philippine
laws, filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan an application for the registration of the two
lots. It alleged that it and its predecessors-in-interest had possessed the land for more than thirty
years. It invoked section 48(b) of the Public Land Law, which provides:
Chapter VIII.—Judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefore, under
the Land Register Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented
by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter." (As amended by Republic Act No. 1942, approved on June 22,
1957.)
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Direct/r of Lands, opposed the application on the
grounds that applicant, as a private corporation, is disqualified to hold alienable lands of the
public domain, that the land applied for is public land not susceptible of private appropriation and
that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have not been in the open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the land since June 12, 1945.
After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the two lots, as described in Plan Ap-04-
001344 (Exh. E), in the name of the Iglesia Ni Cristo, a corporation sole, represented by
Executive Minister Eraño G. Manalo, with office at the corner of Central and Don Mariano
Marcos Avenues, Quezon City, From that decision, the Republic of the Philippines appealed to
this Court under Republic Act No. 5440. The appeal should be sustained.
As correctly contended by the Solicitor General, the Iglesia Ni Cristo, as a corporation sole or a
juridical person, is disqualified to acquire or hold alienable lands of the public domain, like the
two lots in question, because of the constitutional prohibition already mentioned and because
the said church is not entitled to avail itself of the benefits of section 48(b) which applies only to
Filipino citizens or natural persons. A corporation sole (an "unhappy freak of English law") has
no nationality (Roman Catholic Apostolic Adm. of Davao, Inc. vs. Land Registration Commission,
102 Phil. 596. See Register of Deeds vs. Ung Siu Si Temple, 97 Phil. 58 and sec. 49 of the
Public Land Law).
The contention in the comments of the Iglesia Ni Cristo (its lawyer did not file any brief) that the
two lots are private lands, following the rule laid down in Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands,
48 Phil. 424, is not correct. What was considered private land in the Susi case was a parcel of
land possessed by a Filipino citizen since time immemorial, as in Cariño vs. Insular Government,
212 U.S. 449, 53 L. ed. 594, 41 Phil. 935 and 7 Phil. 132. The lots sought to be registered in this
case do not fall within that category. They are still public lands. A land registration proceeding
under section 48(b) "presupposes that the land is public" (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-
19535, July 10, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
As held in Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, "all lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the
rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private
property even before the Spanish conquest. "
In Uy Un vs. Perez, 71 Phil. 508, it was noted that the right of an occupant of public agricultural
land to obtain a confirmation of his title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Law is a "derecho
dominical incoativo"and that before the issuance of the certificate of title the occupant is not in
the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.
The lower court's judgment is reversed and set aside. The application for registration of the
Iglesia Ni Cristo is dismissed with costs against said applicant.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Makasiar, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Plana, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
In the result for the same reasons I have already given in Manila Electric Co. vs. Judge
Floreliana Castro-Bartolome, G.R. No. L-49623.
DE CASTRO, J., dissenting:
Justice Teehankee cites in his dissenting opinion the case of Herico vs. Dar, 1 the decision in
which I am the ponente, as reiterating a supposedly well-established doctrine that lands of the
public domain which, by reason of possession and cultivation for such a length of time, a grant
by the State to the occupant is presumed, and the land thereby ceases to form part of the public
domain, but is segregated therefrom as to be no longer subject to the authority of the Director of
Lands to dispose under the public land laws or statutes. He would thus consider said land as no
longer public land but "private" lands and therefore, not within the prohibition of the New
Constitution against corporations from acquiring public lands which provides that "no private
corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to
exceed one thousand hectares." 2
I cannot subscribe to the view that the land as above described has become private land, even
before title thereto, which is, as of this stage, said to be still "an incomplete or imperfect title,"
has been fully vested on the occupant, through the prescribed procedure known as judicial
confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title. 3 This is the only legal method by which full and
absolute title to the land may be granted, to convert the land into a truly private land. To secure
such judicial title, only the courts can be resorted to. The Director of Lands has lost authority
over the land, insofar as its disposition is concerned. His authority is limited to another form of
disposition of public land, referred to as administrative legalization, resulting in the issuance of
free patents, also based on possession, in which case, as in the issuance of homestead and
sales patents, the land involved in undoubtedly public land. The possessor of a piece of public
land would have the option to acquire title thereto through judicial confirmation or administrative
legalization. The difference is that in the latter case, the area disposable to a citizen-applicant by
the Director of Lands is limited to 24 hectares. There is no limit to the area subject to judicial
confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title, except possibly the limit fixed for a State grant
under old Spanish laws and decrees, which certainly is much larger than that set for free
patents.
It is because of the divestiture of authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of the land subject
to judicial confirmation of incomplete and imperfect title that some statements are found in many
cases, such as those cited by Justice Teehankee, to the effect that such land has ceased to be
public land. What these statements, however, really mean is that the land referred to no longer
forms part of the mass of public domain still disposable by the Director of Lands, under the
authority granted him by the public land statutes. It, however, would not follow that the land
covered by Section 48 of the Public Land Act has itself become private land. The fact that its
disposition is provided for in the aforecited Act which deals with "public land" gives rise to the
very strong implication, if not a positive conclusion, that the land referred to is still public land.
Only when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant for confirmation of title would the land
become privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may declare it public land,
depending on the evidence.
The discussion of the question of whether the land involved is still public or already private land
is, however, entirely pointless, or an Idle exercise, if We consider the provision of Section 14,
Article XIV of the Constitution which appears to have been lost sight of, which provides that
"save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain. " As previously stated, by express provision of the Constitution, no corporation or
association may hold alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease, not to exceed 1,000
hectares in area. 4 Hence, even if the land involved in the present case is considered private
land, the cited section prohibits its acquisition by the Meralco or Iglesia which admittedly are
"corporations or association" within the meaning of the aforecited provision of the New
Constitution. This observation should end all arguments on the issue of whether the land in
question is public or private land. Although it may further be observed that supposing a
corporation has been in possession of a piece of public land from the very beginning, may it
apply for judicial confirmation of the land in question to acquire title to it as owner after
possessing the land for the requisite length of time? The answer is believed obvious-it may not.
If its possession is not from the beginning but has commenced only upon the transfer to it by the
prior possessor, may the corporation apply? The answer is just as obvious with more reason, it
may not.
This separate opinion should have had no need to be written because the majority opinion
written by Justice Aquino is already well-reasoned out and supported by applicable authorities. I
•as impelled to write it only because in the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee, the case of
Herico vs. Dar (supra) which is my ponencia was cited in support of his position. This separate
opinion then is more to show and explain that whatever has been stated by me in the Dar case
should be interpreted in the light of what I have said in his separate opinion, which I believe,
does not strengthen Justice Teehankee's position a bit.
FERNANDO, C.J., dissenting:
It is with regret that unlike in the case of Meralco v. Judge Castro-Bartolome, 1 where I had a
brief concurrence and dissent, I am constrained to dissent in the ably-written opinion of Justice
Aquino. I join him in according the utmost respect and deference to this provision in the
Constitution: "No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; ... ." 2 If the matter before
us be viewed solely from the standpoint of respondent appellee Iglesia ni Cristo being a
corporation sole, then I would have no hesitancy in sustaining the conclusion that if the land be
considered public, its registration would have to be denied. For me, that is not the decisive
consideration. It is my view that the Bill of Rights provision on religious freedom which bans the
enactment of any law prohibiting its free exercise, the "enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, [being] forever ... allowed." 3 This is not the first
time the Court has occasion to recognize the high estate that freedom of religion occupies in our
hierarchy of values. Even as against the fundamental objectives, constitutionally enshrined, of
social justice and protection to labor, the claim of such free exercise and enjoyment was
recognized in the leading case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union. 4 Here the Iglesia
ni Cristo, as a corporation sole, seeks the registration. The area involved in the two parcels of
land in question is 313 square meters. As admitted in the opinion of the Court, a chapel is
therein located. It is that basic consideration that leads me to conclude that the balancing
process, which finds application in constitutional law adjudication, equally requires that when two
provisions in the Constitution may be relevant to a certain factual situation calls for the
affirmance of the decision of respondent Judge allowing the registration. 5 There is for me
another obstacle to a partial concurrence. The right of the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Administrator of Davao to register land purchased from a Filipino citizen was recognized in The
Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao v. Land Registration. 6As I view it, therefore,
the decision of respondent Judge is equally entitled to affirmance on equal protection grounds. 7
Hence this brief dissent.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., dissenting:
Involved in these two cases are the applications of petitioner Meralco, a nationalized domestic
corporation, in the first case and respondent Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious corporation sole, in the
second case (both admittedly Filipino corporations qualified to hold and own private lands), for
judicial confirmation of their titles to small parcels of land, residential in character as
distinguished from strictly agricultural land, acquired by them by purchase or exchange from
private persons publicly recognized as the private owners (who have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands under a bona fide
claim of ownership for at least thirty [30] years immediately preceding the filing of the
applications).
This dissent is based on the failure of the majority to adhere to established doctrine since the
1909 case of Cariño and the 1925 case of Susi down to the 1980 case of Herico, infra, pursuant
to the Public Land Act, as amended, that where a possessor has held the open, exclusive and
unchallenged possession of alienable public land for the statutory period provided by law (30
years now under amendatory Rep. Act No. 1942 approved on June 22, 1957), the law itself
mandates that the possessor "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title" and" by
legal fiction [the land] has already ceased to be of the public domain and has become private
property." Accordingly, the prohibition of the 1973 Constitution and of the Public Land Act
against private corporations holding lands of the public domain has no applicability in the present
cases. What Meralco and Iglesia have acquired from their predecessors-in-interest had already
ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property at the time of the sale to
them and therefore their applications for confirmation of title by virtue of their predecessors-in-
interest' vested right and title may be duly granted.
The land covered by the Meralco application of November 26, 1976 consists of two (2) small lots
with a total area of 165 square meters located at Tanay, Rizal with an assessed value of
P3,270.00. This land was possessed by Olimpia Ramos before World War II which broke out in
the Pacific in 1941. Olimpia Ramos sold the land on July 3, 1947 to the spouses Rafael Piguing
and Minerva Inocencio who constructed a house thereon. But because the Meralco had installed
the "anchor guy" of its steel posts on the land, the Piguing spouses sold the land to the Meralco
on August 13, 1976. The land had been declared for realty tax purposes since 1945 and realty
taxes were regularly paid thereon. It is residential in character as distinguished from strictly
agricultural land. It is likewise established that it is not included in any military reservation and
that since 1927 it had been certified as part of the alienable or disposable portion of the public
domain.
The Land covered by the Iglesia application of September 3, 1977 likewise consists of two (2)
small lots located in Barrio Dampol, Plaridel, Bulacan with a total area of 313 square meters and
with an assessed value of P1,350.00. The land was acquired by the Iglesia on January 9, 1953
from Andres Perez in exchange for a lot owned by the Iglesia with an area of 247 square meters.
The land was already possessed by Perez in 1933. Admittedly also it is not included in any
military reservation and is inside an area which was certified since 1927 as part of the alienable
or disposable portion of the public domain. A chapel of the Iglesia stands on the said land. It had
been duly declared for realty tax purposes in the name of the Iglesia and realty taxes were
regularly paid thereon.
Respondent judge in the Meralco case sustained the Republic's opposition and dismissed the
application, holding that under both the provisions of the new Constitution and the Public Land
Act, Meralco, being a corporation and not a natural person, is not qualified to apply for the
registration of title over the public land.
On the other hand, in the Iglesia case, the Republic presented no evidence in support of its
opposition but expressly "submitted the case for decision on the basis of the evidence submitted
by the applicant." Respondent judge in the case accordingly granted the application for
registration of the land in the name of the Iglesia, holding that it had been "satisfactorily
established that applicant [Iglesia] and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, public and adverse possession of the land ... under a bona fide claim of ownership
for more than thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the application" and is therefore entitled to the
registration applied for under the Public Land Act, as amended.
Both decisions are now with the Court for review. I hold that both applications for registration
should be granted by virtue of the prevailing principle as enunciated since the 1925 case of Susi
vs. Razon and Director of Lands 1 and reaffirmed in a long line of cases down to the 1980 case
of Herico vs. Dar 2 that the lands in question ceased, ipso jure, or by operation of law, to be
lands of the public domain upon completion of the statutory period of open, continuous,
exclusive, notorious and unchallenged possession thereof by the applicants' predecessors-in-
interest who were qualified natural persons and entitled to registration by right of acquisitive
prescription under the provisions of the Public Land Act, and that accordingly the judgment in the
Meralco case should be reversed and a new judgment entered granting Meralco's application,
while the judgment in the Iglesia case should stand affirmed. The principal issue at bar may thus
be stated:
It is expressly provided in section 48, par. (b) of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, approved on June 22, 1957) that citizens of the
Philippines who are natural persons who have occupied lands of the public domain but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed may apply to the corresponding court of first
instance for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of the certificate of title therefor under
the Land Registration Act in cases where they "by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for
at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter." 3 In such cases, is the land ipso jure or by operation
of law converted into private land upon completion of the 30th year of continuous and
unchallenged occupation of the land such that thereafter as such private land, it may be duly
transferred to and owned by private corporations or does such land, as held by respondent
judge in the Meralco case, remain part of the public domain and does not become private land
until after actual judicial confirmation proceedings and the formal court order for the issuance of
the certificate of title?
1. This issue has been squarely resolved by this Court since the 1925 case of Susi vs.
Razon (and a long line of cases, infra). It is established doctrine as first held therein that an
open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period
provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under
the old law) by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective
title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes
private property.
(At that time in 1925 in the Susi case, such possession was required "from July 26, 1894" as
then provided for in section 45 (b) of the old Public Land Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926;
whereas at present as provided for in the corresponding section 48, par. (b) of the later and
subsisting Public Land Act, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942
approved on June 22, 1957, in force since 1957, the period of open and unchallenged
possession was reduced to "at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription. This is
admitted in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Aquino, wherein it is stated that "(I)n the Susi case,
this Court applied section 45 (b) of Act No. 2874 which corresponds to what is now section
48(b). It was held that the long possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership
since July 26, 1894 gave rise to the conclusive presumption that the occupant had complied with
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and was thus entitled to a certificate of title." 4
The text of the corresponding section 48(b), as amended by Rep. Act 1942 referred to is
reproduced verbatim in Mr. Justice Aquino's opinion 5 and quotes the reduced statutory period
of open and unchallenged possession of "at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the application. ")
Accordingly, the Court held that Susi, as the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory
period, acquired the same by operation of law as a grant from the Government, "not only a right
to a grant," and the land thereby "already ceased to be of the public domain and had become
private property at least by presumption" as expressly provided in the Act. Therefore, any
supposed sale by the Director of Lands of the same land to another person was void and of no
effect and Susi as the rightful possessor could recover the land as his private property from the
supposed vendee who did not acquire any right thereto since it had ceased to be land of the
public domain. The Court thus specifically held therein, as applied to the specific facts of the
case, that:
... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure, established in
paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and
physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the
public domain, openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to
a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when
Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by
operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary
that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts,
an application therefor is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a
legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had
already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in
selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which
he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and
Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6
2. The above-quoted ruling in Susi has been affirmed and reaffirmed by this Court in a
long unbroken line of cases, as follows:
In Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 7 the Court held that "(I)n the case of Susi vs. Razon, et al., 48
Phil. 424, it was observed that where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the
Government are complied with through actual physical possession openly, continuously, and
publicly, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of Act
No. 2874, amending Act No. 926 (carried over as Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141),
the possessor is deemed to have already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant,
but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order
that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts — an application therefor being sufficient under
the provisions of Section 47 of Act No. 2874 (reproduced as Section 50, Commonwealth Act No.
141)," and "(C)onsidering that this case was dismissed by the trial court merely on a motion to
dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's action is already barred by the statute of limitations, which
apparently is predicated on the theory that a decree of registration can no longer be impugned
on the ground of fraud one year after the issuance and entry of the decree, which theory does
not apply here because the property involved is allegedly private in nature and has ceased to be
part of the public domain, we are of the opinion that the trial court erred in dismissing the case
outright without giving plaintiff a chance to prove his claim."
In Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 8 the Court stressed that by force of possession, the land in
question became private property on the strength of the Susi doctrine.
In Manarpaac us. Cabanatan, 9 the Court quoted with favor the text of the above-quoted ruling
of Susi, and its ratio decidendi thus:
The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain, the plaintiff-
appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession thereof.
If, as above stated, that land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become, by
operation of law, private property, there is lacking only the judicial sanction of his title Valentin
Susi has the right to bring an action to recover the possession thereof and hold it.
In Miguel us. Court of Appeals, 10 the Court again held that where possession has been
continuous, uninterrupted, open, adverse and in the concept of an owner, there is a presumption
juris et de jure that all necessary condition for a grant by the State have been complied with and
he would have been by force of law entitled to the registration of his title to the land (citing
Pamintuan vs. Insular Government, 8 Phil. 485 and Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424).
In the latest 1980 case of Herico vs. Dar, 11 " the Court once more reiterated the Susi doctrine
that "(A)nother obvious error of the respondent Court is in holding that after one year from the
issuance of the Torrens Title, the same can no longer be reopened to be declared null and void,
and has become absolute and indefeasible. ... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 1942, which the respondent court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the
latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by
his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner as to segregate the land
from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as
by free patent. This is as provided in Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June 22, 1957,
amending Section 48-b of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which provides: ... As interpreted in
several cases when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the
possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government
grant without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be
of the public domain, and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The
application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal
sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued
upon the strength of said patent."
3. In fine, since under the Court's settled doctrine, the acquisitive prescription of
alienable or disposable public lands provided for now in section 48, par. (b) of the Public Land
Act takes place by operation of law and the public land is converted to and becomes private
property upon as showing of open and unchallenged possession under bona fide claim of
ownership by the applicants' predecessors-in-interest for the statutory period of thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application and "it is not necessary that a certificate of title
should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the court" which right is
expressly backed up by the conclusive presumption or presumption juris et de jure of the statute
that the possessor has "performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant," the
applicant Meralco cannot be said to be barred as a corporation from filing the application for
registration of the private property duly acquired by it.
4. It should be noted that respondent judge's decision in the Meralco case expressly
finds as established facts that the Meralco's predecessors-in- interest had possessed and
occupied as owners the land in question for at least over 35 years; Olimpia Ramos having
possessed the same since the last world war in 1941 and then having sold the same on July 3,
1947 to the Piguing spouses who built a house thereon and continuously possessed the same
until they sold the same in turn to the Meralco on August 13, 1976, 12 Meralco's predecessors-
in-interest had therefore acquired by operation of the Public Land Act a Government grant to the
property, as well as acquired ownership thereof by right of acquisitive prescription over the land
which thereby became private property. The very definition of prescription as a mode of
acquiring ownership as set forth in Art. 1106 of the Civil Code provides that "By prescription one
acquires ownership and other real rights through lapse of time in the manner and under the
conditions laid down by law." The law does I not provide that one acquires ownership of a land
by prescription only after his title thereto is judicially confirmed. To this same effect is the ruling
in Cariño vs. Insular Government, 13 wherein the U.S. Supreme Court speaking through Justice
Holmes held that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession
for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in
registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have recommended an
application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind
of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every
word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions,
might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that
registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership
actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but
simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law.
To the same effect is the Court's ruling in Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, that "an
owner does not obtain title by virtue of certificate but rather obtains his certificate by virtue of the
fact that he has a fee simple title."
5. Since the public land became private property upon completion of the 30th year of
continuous, exclusive, and unchallenged possession of the applicant Meralco's predecessors-in-
interest, particularly the Piguing spouses who sold the private land to the Meralco, there is no
justification for denying the Meralco's application for registration of its duly acquired title to the
land. Meralco's predecessors-in-interest had acquired ownership of the land by acquisitive
prescription as provided by the Public Land Act and by the Civil Code. The land became private
property and Meralco duly acquired it by right of purchase. To deny Meralco's application to
register the property because it is not a natural person is unjustified because neither the new
constitutional ban under the 1973 Constitution against private corporations owning lands of the
public domain or the Public Land Act's limitation on the right of application for confirmation of
imperfect title to lands of the public domain can be invoked any longer as the land had long
ceased to be public land but had become private property. Meralco's application in effect seeks
confirmation of the acquisition of ownership of the land which had become private property of its
predecessors-in-interest, the Piguing spouses who thru their open and unchallenged possession
of the land for over thirty years acquired title thereto by acquisitive prescription and by
conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act itself. There is no legal nor constitutional obstacle
to such title being transferred to the Meralco by right of purchase and traditio — for it is not
claimed that there is any legal prohibition against the Piguing spouses transferring the ownership
of the land to others (whether natural persons or corporations) such as the applicant Meralco,
even before the formal issuance of the certificate of title to them.
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that
the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for
confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court
actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having filed the application for
registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is
conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and
neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the
name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their
application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of
law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to
go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and
adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it
here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao 14 )
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for
confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original
persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that
they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who
thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly
qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to
the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.
7. All that has been said here applies of course with equal force to the Iglesia case, save
that as already stated at the beginning hereof, the Iglesia application was granted because the
Republic presented no evidence in support of its opposition and respondent judge held in effect
that the property had ceased to be land of the public domain and had become private property,
the title to which could be duly issued in the name of the Iglesia as the transferee of its
predecessors-in-interest.
8. It should bear emphasis that what are involved here are small parcels of land, of 165
square meters in the Meralco case used for installation of an "anchor guy" for its steel posts in
connection with its tasks as a nationalized domestic corporation to furnish electrical service to
the consumer public, and of 313 square meters in the Iglesia case used as the site of its church
built thereon to minister to the religious needs of its members. In no way, may the letter, intent
and spirit of the prohibition of the 1973 Constitution against corporations "holding alienable lands
of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area" (which is
beamed against the undue control and exploitation of our public lands and natural resources by
corporations, Filipino and foreign-controlled) be deemed violated or disregarded by the granting
of the applications at bar. The two corporations in truth and in fact do not hold the small parcels
of land at bar for their own use or benefit but for the sole use and benefit of the public.
9. With reference to the separate concurring opinion of Mr. Justice De Castro wherein he
would blunt the "supposedly (sic) well-established doctrine" (at page 1) from the 1909 case of
Cariño and the 1925 case of Susi down to the 1980 case of Herico (supra, at pages 5 to 11) and
support the contrary pronouncement in Mr. Justice Aquino's main opinion that "as between the
State and the Meralco, the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only
upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b)
[of the Public Land Act]" (at page 5), suffice it to cite his own pronouncement in Herico
(reiterating the well-established and prevailing doctrine which this Court has not overturned, as it
cannot overturn the mandate of the statute that the unchallenged possessor for at least 30 years
is "conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant")
wherein Mr. Justice De Castro categorically reiterated for the Court that "As interpreted in
several cases .....the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a
grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land,
therefore, ceases to be of the public domain, and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands
to dispose of. The application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not
affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title
to be issued upon the strength of said patent. "
It only remains to point out, in order to avoid misapprehension or confusion, that Mr. Justice De
Castro's seemingly querulous statement that "the discussion of the question of whether the land
involved is still public or already private land, is however, entirely pointless or an Idle exercise, if
We consider the provision of Section 14, Article XIV of the Constitution which appears to have
been lost sight of, which provides that 'save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands
shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the domain'" (at page 2) that "hence, even if the land involved in the
present case is considered private land, the cited section prohibits its acquisition by the Meralco
or Iglesia which admittedly are 'corporations' or associations within the meaning of the aforecited
provision of the New Constitution. The observation should end all arguments on the issue of
whether the land in question is public or private land" (idem) might mislead one to the wrong
conclusion that corporations with 60% Filipino ownership may not own private lands when the
express provisions of Art. XIV, section 9 15 and section 14 as quoted by himself as well as the
counterpart provisions of the 1935 Constitution have always expressly permitted Filipino-owned
corporations to own private lands, and the only change effected in the 1973 Constitution is
section 11 which now prohibits even such Filipino corporations to own or hold lands of the public
domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares in area.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote for reversal of respondent court's judgment in the Meralco case and for
the entry of a new judgment granting Meralco's application and for affirmance of judgment in the
second case granting the Iglesia application.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
In the result for the same reasons I have already given in Manila Electric Co. vs. Judge
Floreliana Castro-Bartolome, G.R. No. L-49623.
DE CASTRO, J., dissenting:
Justice Teehankee cites in his dissenting opinion the case of Herico vs. Dar, 1 the decision in
which I am the ponente, as reiterating a supposedly well-established doctrine that lands of the
public domain which, by reason of possession and cultivation for such a length of time, a grant
by the State to the occupant is presumed, and the land thereby ceases to form part of the public
domain, but is segregated therefrom as to be no longer subject to the authority of the Director of
Lands to dispose under the public land laws or statutes. He would thus consider said land as no
longer public land but "private" lands and therefore, not within the prohibition of the New
Constitution against corporations from acquiring public lands which provides that "no private
corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to
exceed one thousand hectares." 2
I cannot subscribe to the view that the land as above described has become private land, even
before title thereto, which is, as of this stage, said to be still "an incomplete or imperfect title,"
has been fully vested on the occupant, through the prescribed procedure known as judicial
confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title. 3 This is the only legal method by which full and
absolute title to the land may be granted, to convert the land into a truly private land. To secure
such judicial title, only the courts can be resorted to. The Director of Lands has lost authority
over the land, insofar as its disposition is concerned. His authority is limited to another form of
disposition of public land, referred to as administrative legalization, resulting in the issuance of
free patents, also based on possession, in which case, as in the issuance of homestead and
sales patents, the land involved in undoubtedly public land. The possessor of a piece of public
land would have the option to acquire title thereto through judicial confirmation or administrative
legalization. The difference is that in the latter case, the area disposable to a citizen-applicant by
the Director of Lands is limited to 24 hectares. There is no limit to the area subject to judicial
confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title, except possibly the limit fixed for a State grant
under old Spanish laws and decrees, which certainly is much larger than that set for free
patents.
It is because of the divestiture of authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of the land subject
to judicial confirmation of incomplete and imperfect title that some statements are found in many
cases, such as those cited by Justice Teehankee, to the effect that such land has ceased to be
public land. What these statements, however, really mean is that the land referred to no longer
forms part of the mass of public domain still disposable by the Director of Lands, under the
authority granted him by the public land statutes. It, however, would not follow that the land
covered by Section 48 of the Public Land Act has itself become private land. The fact that its
disposition is provided for in the aforecited Act which deals with "public land" gives rise to the
very strong implication, if not a positive conclusion, that the land referred to is still public land.
Only when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant for confirmation of title would the land
become privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may declare it public land,
depending on the evidence.
The discussion of the question of whether the land involved is still public or already private land
is, however, entirely pointless, or an Idle exercise, if We consider the provision of Section 14,
Article XIV of the Constitution which appears to have been lost sight of, which provides that
"save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain. " As previously stated, by express provision of the Constitution, no corporation or
association may hold alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease, not to exceed 1,000
hectares in area. 4 Hence, even if the land involved in the present case is considered private
land, the cited section prohibits its acquisition by the Meralco or Iglesia which admittedly are
"corporations or association" within the meaning of the aforecited provision of the New
Constitution. This observation should end all arguments on the issue of whether the land in
question is public or private land. Although it may further be observed that supposing a
corporation has been in possession of a piece of public land from the very beginning, may it
apply for judicial confirmation of the land in question to acquire title to it as owner after
possessing the land for the requisite length of time? The answer is believed obvious-it may not.
If its possession is not from the beginning but has commenced only upon the transfer to it by the
prior possessor, may the corporation apply? The answer is just as obvious with more reason, it
may not.
This separate opinion should have had no need to be written because the majority opinion
written by Justice Aquino is already well-reasoned out and supported by applicable authorities. I
was impelled to write it only because in the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee, the case of
Herico vs. Dar (supra) which is my ponencia was cited in support of his position. This separate
opinion then is more to show and explain that whatever has been stated by me in the Dar case
should be interpreted in the light of what I have said in his separate opinion, which I believe,
does not strengthen Justice Teehankee's position a bit.
FERNANDO, C.J., dissenting:
It is with regret that unlike in the case of Meralco v. Judge Castro-Bartolome, 1 where I had a
brief concurrence and dissent, I am constrained to dissent in the ably-written opinion of Justice
Aquino. I join him in according the utmost respect and deference to this provision in the
Constitution: "No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; ... ." 2 If the matter before
us be viewed solely from the standpoint of respondent appellee Iglesia ni Cristo being a
corporation sole, then I would have no hesitancy in sustaining the conclusion that if the land be
considered public, its registration would have to be denied. For me, that is not the decisive
consideration. It is my view that the Bill of Rights provision on religious freedom which bans the
enactment of any law prohibiting its free exercise, the "enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, [being] forever ... allowed." 3 This is not the first
time the Court has occasion to recognize the high estate that freedom of religion occupies in our
hierarchy of values. Even as against the fundamental objectives, constitutionally enshrined, of
social justice and protection to labor, the claim of such free exercise and enjoyment was
recognized in the leading case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union. 4 Here the Iglesia
ni Cristo, as a corporation sole, seeks the registration. The area involved in the two parcels of
land in question is 313 square meters. As admitted in the opinion of the Court, a chapel is
therein located. It is that basic consideration that leads me to conclude that the balancing
process, which finds application in constitutional law adjudication, equally requires that when two
provisions in the Constitution may be relevant to a certain factual situation calls for the
affirmance of the decision of respondent Judge allowing the registration. 5 There is for me
another obstacle to a partial concurrence. The right of the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Administrator of Davao to register land purchased from a Filipino citizen was recognized in The
Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao v. Land Registration. 6As I view it, therefore,
the decision of respondent Judge is equally entitled to affirmance on equal protection grounds. 7
Hence this brief dissent.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., dissenting:
Involved in these two cases are the applications of petitioner Meralco, a nationalized domestic
corporation, in the first case and respondent Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious corporation sole, in the
second case (both admittedly Filipino corporations qualified to hold and own private lands), for
judicial confirmation of their titles to small parcels of land, residential in character as
distinguished from strictly agricultural land, acquired by them by purchase or exchange from
private persons publicly recognized as the private owners (who have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands under a bona fide
claim of ownership for at least thirty [30] years immediately preceding the filing of the
applications).
This dissent is based on the failure of the majority to adhere to established doctrine since the
1909 case of Cariño and the 1925 case of Susi down to the 1980 case of Herico, infra, pursuant
to the Public Land Act, as amended, that where a possessor has held the open, exclusive and
unchallenged possession of alienable public land for the statutory period provided by law (30
years now under amendatory Rep. Act No. 1942 approved on June 22, 1957), the law itself
mandates that the possessor "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title" and" by
legal fiction [the land] has already ceased to be of the public domain and has become private
property." Accordingly, the prohibition of the 1973 Constitution and of the Public Land Act
against private corporations holding lands of the public domain has no applicability in the present
cases. What Meralco and Iglesia have acquired from their predecessors-in-interest had already
ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property at the time of the sale to
them and therefore their applications for confirmation of title by virtue of their predecessors-in-
interest' vested right and title may be duly granted.
The land covered by the Meralco application of November 26, 1976 consists of two (2) small lots
with a total area of 165 square meters located at Tanay, Rizal with an assessed value of
P3,270.00. This land was possessed by Olimpia Ramos before World War II which broke out in
the Pacific in 1941. Olimpia Ramos sold the land on July 3, 1947 to the spouses Rafael Piguing
and Minerva Inocencio who constructed a house thereon. But because the Meralco had installed
the "anchor guy" of its steel posts on the land, the Piguing spouses sold the land to the Meralco
on August 13, 1976. The land had been declared for realty tax purposes since 1945 and realty
taxes were regularly paid thereon. It is residential in character as distinguished from strictly
agricultural land. It is likewise established that it is not included in any military reservation and
that since 1927 it had been certified as part of the alienable or disposable portion of the public
domain.
The Land covered by the Iglesia application of September 3, 1977 likewise consists of two (2)
small lots located in Barrio Dampol, Plaridel, Bulacan with a total area of 313 square meters and
with an assessed value of P1,350.00. The land was acquired by the Iglesia on January 9, 1953
from Andres Perez in exchange for a lot owned by the Iglesia with an area of 247 square meters.
The land was already possessed by Perez in 1933. Admittedly also it is not included in any
military reservation and is inside an area which was certified since 1927 as part of the alienable
or disposable portion of the public domain. A chapel of the Iglesia stands on the said land. It had
been duly declared for realty tax purposes in the name of the Iglesia and realty taxes were
regularly paid thereon.
Respondent judge in the Meralco case sustained the Republic's opposition and dismissed the
application, holding that under both the provisions of the new Constitution and the Public Land
Act, Meralco, being a corporation and not a natural person, is not qualified to apply for the
registration of title over the public land.
On the other hand, in the Iglesia case, the Republic presented no evidence in support of its
opposition but expressly "submitted the case for decision on the basis of the evidence submitted
by the applicant." Respondent judge in the case accordingly granted the application for
registration of the land in the name of the Iglesia, holding that it had been "satisfactorily
established that applicant [Iglesia] and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, public and adverse possession of the land ... under a bona fide claim of ownership
for more than thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the application" and is therefore entitled to the
registration applied for under the Public Land Act, as amended.
Both decisions are now with the Court for review. I hold that both applications for registration
should be granted by virtue of the prevailing principle as enunciated since the 1925 case of Susi
vs. Razon and Director of Lands 1 and reaffirmed in a long line of cases down to the 1980 case
of Herico vs. Dar 2 that the lands in question ceased, ipso jure, or by operation of law, to be
lands of the public domain upon completion of the statutory period of open, continuous,
exclusive, notorious and unchallenged possession thereof by the applicants' predecessors-in-
interest who were qualified natural persons and entitled to registration by right of acquisitive
prescription under the provisions of the Public Land Act, and that accordingly the judgment in the
Meralco case should be reversed and a new judgment entered granting Meralco's application,
while the judgment in the Iglesia case should stand affirmed. The principal issue at bar may thus
be stated:
It is expressly provided in section 48, par. (b) of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, approved on June 22, 1957) that citizens of the
Philippines who are natural persons who have occupied lands of the public domain but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed may apply to the corresponding court of first
instance for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of the certificate of title therefor under
the Land Registration Act in cases where they "by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for
at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter." 3 In such cases, is the land ipso jure or by operation
of law converted into private land upon completion of the 30th year of continuous and
unchallenged occupation of the land such that thereafter as such private land, it may be duly
transferred to and owned by private corporations or does such land, as held by respondent
judge in the Meralco case, remain part of the public domain and does not become private land
until after actual judicial confirmation proceedings and the formal court order for the issuance of
the certificate of title?
1. This issue has been squarely resolved by this Court since the 1925 case of Susi vs.
Razon (and a long line of cases, infra). It is established doctrine as first held therein that an
open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period
provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under
the old law) by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective
title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes
private property.
(At that time in 1925 in the Susi case, such possession was required "from July 26, 1894" as
then provided for in section 45 (b) of the old Public Land Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926;
whereas at present as provided for in the corresponding section 48, par. (b) of the later and
subsisting Public Land Act, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942
approved on June 22, 1957, in force since 1957, the period of open and unchallenged
possession was reduced to "at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription. This is
admitted in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Aquino, wherein it is stated that "(I)n the Susi case,
this Court applied section 45 (b) of Act No. 2874 which corresponds to what is now section
48(b). It was held that the long possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership
since July 26, 1894 gave rise to the conclusive presumption that the occupant had complied with
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and was thus entitled to a certificate of title." 4
The text of the corresponding section 48(b), as amended by Rep. Act 1942 referred to is
reproduced verbatim in Mr. Justice Aquino's opinion 5 and quotes the reduced statutory period
of open and unchallenged possession of "at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the application. ")
Accordingly, the Court held that Susi, as the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory
period, acquired the same by operation of law as a grant from the Government, "not only a right
to a grant," and the land thereby "already ceased to be of the public domain and had become
private property at least by presumption" as expressly provided in the Act. Therefore, any
supposed sale by the Director of Lands of the same land to another person was void and of no
effect and Susi as the rightful possessor could recover the land as his private property from the
supposed vendee who did not acquire any right thereto since it had ceased to be land of the
public domain. The Court thus specifically held therein, as applied to the specific facts of the
case, that:
... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure, established in
paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and
physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the
public domain, openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to
a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when
Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by
operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary
that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts,
an application therefor is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a
legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had
already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in
selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which
he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and
Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6
2. The above-quoted ruling in Susi has been affirmed and reaffirmed by this Court in a
long unbroken line of cases, as follows:
In Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 7 the Court held that "(I)n the case of Susi vs. Razon, et al., 48
Phil. 424, it was observed that where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the
Government are complied with through actual physical possession openly, continuously, and
publicly, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of Act
No. 2874, amending Act No. 926 (carried over as Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141),
the possessor is deemed to have already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant,
but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order
that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts — an application therefor being sufficient under
the provisions of Section 47 of Act No. 2874 (reproduced as Section 50, Commonwealth Act No.
141)," and "(C)onsidering that this case was dismissed by the trial court merely on a motion to
dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's action is already barred by the statute of limitations, which
apparently is predicated on the theory that a decree of registration can no longer be impugned
on the ground of fraud one year after the issuance and entry of the decree, which theory does
not apply here because the property involved is allegedly private in nature and has ceased to be
part of the public domain, we are of the opinion that the trial court erred in dismissing the case
outright without giving plaintiff a chance to prove his claim."
In Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 8 the Court stressed that by force of possession, the land in
question became private property on the strength of the Susi doctrine.
In Manarpaac us. Cabanatan, 9 the Court quoted with favor the text of the above-quoted ruling
of Susi, and its ratio decidendi thus:
The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain, the plaintiff-
appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession thereof.
If, as above stated, that land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become, by
operation of law, private property, there is lacking only the judicial sanction of his title Valentin
Susi has the right to bring an action to recover the possession thereof and hold it.
In Miguel us. Court of Appeals, 10 the Court again held that where possession has been
continuous, uninterrupted, open, adverse and in the concept of an owner, there is a presumption
juris et de jure that all necessary condition for a grant by the State have been complied with and
he would have been by force of law entitled to the registration of his title to the land (citing
Pamintuan vs. Insular Government, 8 Phil. 485 and Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424).
In the latest 1980 case of Herico vs. Dar, 11 " the Court once more reiterated the Susi doctrine
that "(A)nother obvious error of the respondent Court is in holding that after one year from the
issuance of the Torrens Title, the same can no longer be reopened to be declared null and void,
and has become absolute and indefeasible. ... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 1942, which the respondent court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the
latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by
his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner as to segregate the land
from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as
by free patent. This is as provided in Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June 22, 1957,
amending Section 48-b of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which provides: ... As interpreted in
several cases when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the
possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government
grant without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be
of the public domain, and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The
application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal
sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued
upon the strength of said patent."
3. In fine, since under the Court's settled doctrine, the acquisitive prescription of
alienable or disposable public lands provided for now in section 48, par. (b) of the Public Land
Act takes place by operation of law and the public land is converted to and becomes private
property upon as showing of open and unchallenged possession under bona fide claim of
ownership by the applicants' predecessors-in-interest for the statutory period of thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application and "it is not necessary that a certificate of title
should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the court" which right is
expressly backed up by the conclusive presumption or presumption juris et de jure of the statute
that the possessor has "performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant," the
applicant Meralco cannot be said to be barred as a corporation from filing the application for
registration of the private property duly acquired by it.
4. It should be noted that respondent judge's decision in the Meralco case expressly
finds as established facts that the Meralco's predecessors-in- interest had possessed and
occupied as owners the land in question for at least over 35 years; Olimpia Ramos having
possessed the same since the last world war in 1941 and then having sold the same on July 3,
1947 to the Piguing spouses who built a house thereon and continuously possessed the same
until they sold the same in turn to the Meralco on August 13, 1976, 12 Meralco's predecessors-
in-interest had therefore acquired by operation of the Public Land Act a Government grant to the
property, as well as acquired ownership thereof by right of acquisitive prescription over the land
which thereby became private property. The very definition of prescription as a mode of
acquiring ownership as set forth in Art. 1106 of the Civil Code provides that "By prescription one
acquires ownership and other real rights through lapse of time in the manner and under the
conditions laid down by law." The law does I not provide that one acquires ownership of a land
by prescription only after his title thereto is judicially confirmed. To this same effect is the ruling
in Cariño vs. Insular Government, 13 wherein the U.S. Supreme Court speaking through Justice
Holmes held that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession
for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in
registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have recommended an
application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind
of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every
word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions,
might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that
registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership
actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but
simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law.
To the same effect is the Court's ruling in Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, that "an
owner does not obtain title by virtue of certificate but rather obtains his certificate by virtue of the
fact that he has a fee simple title."
5. Since the public land became private property upon completion of the 30th year of
continuous, exclusive, and unchallenged possession of the applicant Meralco's predecessors-in-
interest, particularly the Piguing spouses who sold the private land to the Meralco, there is no
justification for denying the Meralco's application for registration of its duly acquired title to the
land. Meralco's predecessors-in-interest had acquired ownership of the land by acquisitive
prescription as provided by the Public Land Act and by the Civil Code. The land became private
property and Meralco duly acquired it by right of purchase. To deny Meralco's application to
register the property because it is not a natural person is unjustified because neither the new
constitutional ban under the 1973 Constitution against private corporations owning lands of the
public domain or the Public Land Act's limitation on the right of application for confirmation of
imperfect title to lands of the public domain can be invoked any longer as the land had long
ceased to be public land but had become private property. Meralco's application in effect seeks
confirmation of the acquisition of ownership of the land which had become private property of its
predecessors-in-interest, the Piguing spouses who thru their open and unchallenged possession
of the land for over thirty years acquired title thereto by acquisitive prescription and by
conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act itself. There is no legal nor constitutional obstacle
to such title being transferred to the Meralco by right of purchase and traditio — for it is not
claimed that there is any legal prohibition against the Piguing spouses transferring the ownership
of the land to others (whether natural persons or corporations) such as the applicant Meralco,
even before the formal issuance of the certificate of title to them.
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that
the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for
confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court
actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having filed the application for
registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is
conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and
neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the
name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their
application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of
law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to
go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and
adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it
here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao 14 )
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for
confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original
persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that
they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who
thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly
qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to
the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.
7. All that has been said here applies of course with equal force to the Iglesia case, save
that as already stated at the beginning hereof, the Iglesia application was granted because the
Republic presented no evidence in support of its opposition and respondent judge held in effect
that the property had ceased to be land of the public domain and had become private property,
the title to which could be duly issued in the name of the Iglesia as the transferee of its
predecessors-in-interest.
8. It should bear emphasis that what are involved here are small parcels of land, of 165
square meters in the Meralco case used for installation of an "anchor guy" for its steel posts in
connection with its tasks as a nationalized domestic corporation to furnish electrical service to
the consumer public, and of 313 square meters in the Iglesia case used as the site of its church
built thereon to minister to the religious needs of its members. In no way, may the letter, intent
and spirit of the prohibition of the 1973 Constitution against corporations "holding alienable lands
of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area" (which is
beamed against the undue control and exploitation of our public lands and natural resources by
corporations, Filipino and foreign-controlled) be deemed violated or disregarded by the granting
of the applications at bar. The two corporations in truth and in fact do not hold the small parcels
of land at bar for their own use or benefit but for the sole use and benefit of the public.
9. With reference to the separate concurring opinion of Mr. Justice De Castro wherein he
would blunt the "supposedly (sic) well-established doctrine" (at page 1) from the 1909 case of
Cariño and the 1925 case of Susi down to the 1980 case of Herico (supra, at pages 5 to 11) and
support the contrary pronouncement in Mr. Justice Aquino's main opinion that "as between the
State and the Meralco, the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only
upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b)
[of the Public Land Act]" (at page 5), suffice it to cite his own pronouncement in Herico
(reiterating the well-established and prevailing doctrine which this Court has not overturned, as it
cannot overturn the mandate of the statute that the unchallenged possessor for at least 30 years
is "conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant")
wherein Mr. Justice De Castro categorically reiterated for the Court that "As interpreted in
several cases .....the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a
grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land,
therefore, ceases to be of the public domain, and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands
to dispose of. The application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not
affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title
to be issued upon the strength of said patent. "
It only remains to point out, in order to avoid misapprehension or confusion, that Mr. Justice De 1 48 Phil. 424.
Castro's seemingly querulous statement that "the discussion of the question of whether the land
involved is still public or already private land, is however, entirely pointless or an Idle exercise, if 2 95 SCRA 437 (Jan. 22, 1980), citing Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424; Mesina vs. Vda. de
We consider the provision of Section 14, Article XIV of the Constitution which appears to have Sonza, 108 Phil. 251 (1960).
been lost sight of, which provides that 'save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands
shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to 3 Emphasis supplied.
acquire or hold lands of the domain'" (at page 2) that "hence, even if the land involved in the
present case is considered private land, the cited section prohibits its acquisition by the Meralco 4 At page 6; emphasis supplied.
or Iglesia which admittedly are 'corporations' or associations within the meaning of the aforecited
provision of the New Constitution. The observation should end all arguments on the issue of 5 At pages 4 and 5 thereof.
whether the land in question is public or private land" (idem) might mislead one to the wrong
conclusion that corporations with 60% Filipino ownership may not own private lands when the 6 Emphasis supplied.
express provisions of Art. XIV, section 9 15 and section 14 as quoted by himself as well as the
counterpart provisions of the 1935 Constitution have always expressly permitted Filipino-owned 7 108 Phil. 251, 253 & 255 (1960).
corporations to own private lands, and the only change effected in the 1973 Constitution is
section 11 which now prohibits even such Filipino corporations to own or hold lands of the public 8 63 Phil. 654, 655 (1936), citing Delos Reyes us. Razon 38 Phil. 480: Susi vs. Razon, supra,
domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares in area. and PNB vs. Luis, 53 Phil. 649. See also Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498, 503 (928).

ACCORDINGLY, I vote for reversal of respondent court's judgment in the Meralco case and for 9 21 SCRA 743, 747-748 (1967).
the entry of a new judgment granting Meralco's application and for affirmance of judgment in the
second case granting the Iglesia application. 10 29 SCRA 760, 779 (1969).

Footnotes 11 95 SCRA 437, 443-444, per De Castro, J.

1 45 SCRA 437. 12 Record p. 22.

2 Section 11, Article XIV, Constitution. 13 41 Phil. 935 (1909), 212 U.S. 449, 53 Lawyer's Ed. 594; emphasis supplied.

3 See Section 48 of the Public Land Act. 14 12 SCRA 628,634. Page 898

4 Section 1 1, Article XIV, Constitution. 15 "Sec. 9. The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the
natural resources of the Philippines shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
FERNANDO, C.J., dissenting Footnotes: corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens." (Art. XIV, 1973 Constitution).
1 G.R. No. L-49623.

2 Article XIV, Section 11 of the Constitution. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

3 According to Article IV, Section 8 of the Constitution: "No law shall be made respecting an Lawphil Main Menu
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and ♦ Constitution
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever ♦ Statutes
be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights." ♦ Jurisprudence
♦ Judicial Issuances
4 L-25246, September 12, 1974, 59 SCRA 54. ♦ Executive Issuances
♦ Treatise
5 Cf. De la Llana v. Alba, G. R. No. 57883, March 12,1982. ♦ Legal Link

6 102 PhiL 596 (1957).

7 According to Article IV, Section I of the Constitution: "No person shall be deprived of Today is Saturday, June 23, 2018
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws. " Custom Search

TEEHANKEE, C.J., dissenting Footnotes:

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-49623 June 29, 1982
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
JUDGE FLORENLIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati
Branch XV, and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent-appellees.
AQUINO, J.:p
This case involves the prohibition in section 11, Article XIV of the Constitution that "no private
coporation or associaiton may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to
exceed on ethousand hectares in area". * That prohibition is not found in the 1935 Constitution.
The Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation organized under Philippine laws, more
than sixty percent of whose capital stock is owned by Filipino citizens, in its application filed on
December 1, 1976 in the Makati branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, prayed for the
confirmation of its title to two lots with a total area of one hundred sixty-five square meters,
located at Tanay, Rizal with an assessed value of P3,270 (LRC Case No. N-9485, LRC No. N-
50801).
The Republic of the Philippines opposed theh application on the grounds that the applicant, as a
private corporation,is disqualified to hold alienable public lands and that the applicant and its
prredecessors-in-interest have not been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the application (pp. 65-66, Rollo).
After the trial had commenced, the Province of rizal and the Municipality of Tanay filed a joint
opposition to the application on the ground that one of the lots, Lot No. 1165 of the Tanay
cadastre, would be needed for the widening and improvement of Jose Abad Santos and
E.Quirino Streetsin the town of Tanay.
The land was possessed by Olimpia ramos before the Pacific war which broke out in 1941. On
July 3, 1947, Ramos sold the land to the spouses Rafael Piguing and MInerva Inocencio (Exh.
K). The Piguing sapouses constructed a house therereon. Because the Meralco had installed
the "anchor guy" of its steel post on the land, the Piguing spouses sold the lot to the Meralco on
August 13, 1976.
The said land was included in the1968 cadastral survey made in Tanacy by the Bureau of
Lands, Plan AP-04-000902 (Exh. F and H) and was divided into two lots, Lots Nos. 1164 and
1165, so as to segregate Lot No. 1165 which would be used to widen the two street serving as
the land's eastern and southern boundaries.
The land was declared for realty tax purposes since 1945 and taxes had been paid thereon up
to 1977. It is residential in character as distinguished from a strictly agricultural land. It is not
included in any military reservation. Since 1927, it has formed part of the alienable portion of the
public domain.
After trial, the lowre court rendered a decision dismissing the application because in its opinion
the Meralco is not qualified to apply for the registration of the said land since under section 48(b)
of the Public Land Law only Filipino citizens or natural persons can apply for judicial
confirmationof their imperfect titles to public land. The Meralco is a juridical person. The trial
court assumed that the land which it seeks to register is public land.
From that decision, the Meralco appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440.
In contends that the said land, after having been possessed in the concept of owner by Olimpia
Ramos and the Piguing spouses for more than thirty years, had become private land in the
hands of the latter, and, therefore, the constitutional prohibition, banning a private corporation
from acquiring alienable public land, is not applicable to the said land.
The Meralco further contends that it has invoke section 48(b) of the Public Land Law, not for
itself, but for the Piguing spouses who, as Filipino citizens, could secure a judicial confirmation of
their imperfect title to the land.
In reply to these contentions, the Solicitor General counters that the said land is not private land
because the Meralco and its predecessors-in-interest have no composition title from the Spanish
government nor possessory information title or any other means for the acquisition of public
lands such as grants or patents (Republic vs. Court of Appeals and De Jesus, L-40912,
September 30, 1976, 73 SCRA 146, 157; Director of Lands vs. Reyes, L-27594, November 28,
1975, and Alinsunurin vs. Director of Lands, L-28144, November 28, 1975; 68 SCRA 177; 195;
Lee Hong Hok vs. David, L-30389, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 372, 378-9; Director of Lands
vs. Court of Appeals and Raymundo, L-29575, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 634, 639; Padilla vs.
Reyes and Director of Lands, 60 Phil. 967, 969; Heirs of Datu Pendatun vs. Director of Lands,
59 Phil. 600, 603).
The Public Land Law provides:
CHAPTER VIII. — Judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented
by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (As amended by Republic Act No. 1942, approved on June 22, 1957.)
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 49. No person claiming title to lands of the public domain not in possession of the
qualifications specified in the last preceding section may apply for the benefits of this chapter.

We hold that, as between the State and the Meralco, the said land is still public land. It would
cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen
claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical
person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application
cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.
This conclusion is supported by the rule announced in Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil.
890, 892, which rule is a compendious or quintessential precis of a pervasive principle of public
land law and land registration law, that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be
any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-
interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land
had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the
Spanish conquest." (Cariño vs. Insular Government, 212 U. S. 449, 53 L. ed. 594, 41 Phil. 935
and 7 Phil. 132).
The Meralco relies on the ruling in Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 424, that "an
open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain from time
immemorial by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective
title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be public" and becomes private property.
That ruling is based on the Cariño case which is about the possession of land by an Igorot and
his ancestors since time immemorial or even before the Spanish conquest. The land involved in
the Susi case was possessed before 1880 or since a period of time "beyond the reach of
memory". That is not the situation in this case. The Meralco does not pretend that the Piguing
spouses and their predecessor had been in possession of the land since time immemorial.
In the Susi case, this Court applied section 45(b) of Act No. 2874 which corresponds to what is
now section 48(b). It was held that the long possession of the land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since July 26, 1894 gave rise to the conclusive presumption that the occupant had
complied with all the conditions essential to a Government grant and was thus entitled to a
certificate of title.
On the other hand, in Uy Un vs. Perez, 71 Phil. 508, 510-11, it was held that while occupants of
public land, who have applied for the confirmation of their title, "teian asimismo a su favor la
presuncion juris et de jure de que habian cumplido con todas las condiciones necesarias para la
concesion del titulo; pero hasta que el titulo se expida no tenian el concepto juridico de ser los
verdaderos dueños del terreno in este dejo de pertenecer a los terrenos publico del Estado
susceptibles de enajenacion."
That means that until the certificate of title is issued, a pice of land, over which an imperfect title
is sought to be confirmed, remains public land. For that reason in the Uy Un case, it was held
that if that land was attached by a judgment creditor of the applicant, while his application for
confirmation of his imperfect title was pending in the Bureau of Lands, the levy and execution
sald of the land were void.
For that same reason, lands over which an imperfect title is sought to be confirmed are governed
by the Public Land Law. Such lands would not be covered by the Public Land Law if they were
already private lands. The occupants' right to the said lands is characterized in the Uy Un case,
not as ownership in fee simple, but as derecho dominical incoativo.
The Meralco in its concluding argument contends that if the Piguing spouses could ask for the
confirmation of their imperfect title to the said lands, then why should the Meralco, as their
transferee, be denied the same right to register the said land in its name, there being no legal
prohibition for the Piguing spouses from selling the land to the Meralco? This Court is disposing
of that same contention in the Oh Cho case said:
The benefits provided in the Public Land Act (meaning the confirmation of an imperfect title
under section 48[b]) for applicant's immediate predecessors-in-interest are or constitute a grant
or concession by the State; and before they could acquire any right under such benefits, the
applicant's immediate predecessors-in-interest should comply with the condition precedent for
the grant of such benefits.
The condition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of which they had been in
possession at least since July 26, 1894. This the applicant's immediate predecessors-in-interest
(meaning the Piguing spouses in the instant case) failed to do.
They did not have any vested right in the lot amounting to title which was transmissible to the
applicant. The only right, if it may thus be called, is their possession of the lot which, tacked to
that of their predecessors-in-interest, may be availed of by a qualified person to apply for its
registration but not by a person as the applicant who is disqualified. (75 Phil. 890, 893.)
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on
one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and
(on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has an
imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or
qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be
secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b) "presupposes that the land is
public" (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
The lower court;s judgment dismissing Meralco's application is affirmed. Costs against the
petitioner-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Makasiar, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J.: concurring:
I concur in the result. I am of the opinion that the lots which are sought to be registered have
ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they were acquired by the petitioner
corporation. They are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the
predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly,
the constitutional provision that no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of
the public domain is inapplicable. However, the petitioner is relying on Sec. 48 of the Public
Land Act for the confirmation of its title and Mr. Justice Aquino is correct in holding that said
provision cannot be availed by juridical entities.
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the ruling of the Court that Meralco "as a juridical person" is disqualified to apply for
its registration under Section 48(b).. 1 I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court would
characterize such jurisdictional defect, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an
insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy, although the facts could
be distinguished, the approach followed by us in Francisco v. City of Davao, 2 where the legal
question raised, instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved.
By legal fiction 3 and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic
solutionwould be to decide the matter as if the application under Section 48(b) were filed by the
Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from no such disability.
DE CASTRO, J., dissenting:
Justice Teehankee cites in his dissenting opinion the case of herico vs. Dar, 1 the decision in
which I am the ponente, as reiterating a supposedly well-established doctrine that lands of the
public domain which, by reason of possession and cultivation for such a length of time, a grant
by the State to the occupant is presumed, and the land thereby ceases to form part of the public
domain, but is segregated therefrom as to be no longer subject to the authority of the Director of
Lands to dispose under the public lands laws or statutes. He would thus consider said land as
no longer public land but "private" lands and therefore, not within the prohibition of the New
Constitution against corporations from acquiring public lands which provides that "no private
corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to
exceed one thousand hectares." 2
I cannot subscribe to the view that the land as above described has become private land, even
before title thereto, which is, as of this stage, said to be still "an incomplete or imperfect title,"
has been fully vested on the occupant, through the prescribed procedure known as judicial
confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title. 3 This is the only legal method by which full and
absolute title to the land may be granted, to convert the land into a truly private land. To secure
such judicial title, only the courts can be resorted to. The Director of Lands has lost authority
over the land, insofar as its disposition is concerned. His authority is limited to another form of
disposition of public land, referred to as administrative legalization, resulting in the issuance of
free patents, also based on possession, in which case, as in the issuance of homestead and
sales patents, the land involved is undoubtedly public land. The possessor of a piece of public
land would have the option to acquire title thereto through judicial confirmation or administrative
legalization. The difference is that in the latter case, the area disposable to a citizen-applicant by
the Director of Lands is limited to 24 hectares. There is no limit to the area subject to judicial
confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title, except possibly the limit fixed for a State grant
under old Spanish laws and decrees, which certainly is much larger than that set for free
patents.
It is because of the divestiture of authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of the land subject
to judicial confirmation of incomplete and imperfect title that some statements are found in many
cases, such as those cited by Justice Teehankee, to the effect that such land has ceased to be a
public land. What these statements, however, really mean is that the land referred to no longer
forms part of the mass of public domain still disposable by the Director of Lands, under the
authority granted him by the public land statutes. It, however, would not follow that the land
covered by Section 48 of the Public Land Act has itself become private land. The fact that its
disposition is provided for in the aforecited Act which deals with "public land" gives rise to the
very strong implication, if not a positive conclusion, that the land referred to is still public land.
Only when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant for confirmation of title would the land
become privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may declare it public land,
depending on the evidence.
The discussion of the question of whether the land involved is still public or already private land
is, however, entirely pointless, or an idle exercise, if We consider the provision of Section 14,
Article XIV of the Constitution which appears to have been lost sight of, which provides that
'save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain." As previously stated, by express provisions of the Constitution, no corporation or
association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, not to exceed, 1,000
hectares in area. 4 Hence, even if the land involved in the present case is considered private
land, the cited section prohibits its acquisition by the Meralco or Iglesia which admittedly are
"corporations or association" within the meaning of the aforecited provision of the New
Constitution. This observation should end all arguments on the issue of whether the land in
question is public or private land. Although it may further be observed that supposing a
corporation has been in possession of a piece of public land from the very beginning, may it
apply for judicial confirmation of the land in question to acquire title to its owner after possessing
the land for the requisite length of time? The answer is believed obvious — it may not. If its
possession is not from the beginning but has commenced only upon the transfer to it by the prior
possessor, may the corporation apply? The answer is just as obvious — with more reason, it
may not.
This separate opinion should have had no need to be written because the majority opinion
written by Justice Aquino is already well-reasoned out and supported by applicable authorities. I
was impelled to write it only because in the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee, the case of
Herico vs. Dar (supra) which is my ponencia was cited in support of his position. This separate
opinion then is more to show and explain that whatever has been stated by me in the Dar case
should be interpreted in the light of what I have said in this separate opinion, which I believe,
does not strengthen Justice Teehankee's position a bit.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
Involved in these two cases are the applications of petitioner Meralco, a nationalized domestic
corporation, in the first case and respondent Iglesia in Cristo, a religious corporation sole, in the
second case (both admittedly Filipino corporations qualified to hold and own private lands), for
judicial confirmation of their titles to small parcels of land, residential in character as
distinguished from strictly agricultural land, acquired by them by purchase or exchange from
private persons publicly recognized as the private owners (who have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands under a bona fide
claim of ownership for at least thirty [30] years immediately preceding the filing of the
applications).
This dissent is based on the failure of the majority to adhere to established doctrine since the
1909 case of Cariño and the 1925 case of Susi down to the 1980 case of Herico, infra, pursuant
to the Public Land Act, as amended, that where a possessor has held the open, exclusive and
unchallenged possession of alienable public land for the statutory period provided by law (30
years now under amendatory Rep. Act No. 1942 approved on June 22, 1957), the law itself
mandates that the possessor "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title" and "by
legal fiction [the land] has already ceased to be of the public domain and has become private
property." Accordingly, the prohibition of the 1973 Constitution and of the Public Land Act
against private corporation holding lands of the public domain has no applicability in the present
cases. What Meralco and Iglesia have acquired from their predecessors-in-interest had already
ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property at the time of the sale to
them and therefore their applicatins for confirmation of title by virtue of their predecessors-in-
interest' vested right and title may be duly granted.
The land covered by the Meralco application of November 26, 1976 consists of two (1) small lots
with a total area of 165 square meters located at Tanay, Rizal with an assessed value of
P3,270.00. This land was possessed by Olimpia Ramos before World Warr II which broke out in
the Pacific in 1941. Olimpia Ramos sold the land on July 3, 1947 to the spouses Rafael Piguing
and Minerva Inocencio who constructed a house thereon. But because the Meralco had
instealled the "anchor guy" of its stell posts on the land, the Piguing spouses sold the land to the
Meralco on August 13, 1976. The land had been declared for realty tax purposes since 1945
and realty taxes were regularly paid thereon. It is residential in character as distinguished from
strictly agricultural land. It is likewise established that it is not included in any military reservation
and that since 1927 it had been certified as part of the alienable or disposable portion of the
public domain.
The land covered by the Iglesia application of September 3, 1977 likewise consists of two (2)
small lots located in Barrio Dampol, Plaridel, Bulacan with a total area of 313 square meters and
with an assessed value of P1,350.00. The land was acquired by the Iglesia on January 9, 1953
from Andres Perez in exchange for a lot owned by the Iglesia with an area of 247 square meters.
The land was already possessed by Perez in 1933. Admittedly also it is not included in any
military reservation and is inside an area which was certified since 1927 as part of the alienable
or disposable portion of the public domain. A chapel of the Iglesia stands on the said land. It had
been duly declared for realty tax purposes in the name of the Iglesia and realty taxes were
regularly paid thereon.
Respondent judge in the Meralco case sustained the Republic's opposition and dismissed the
application, holding that under both the provisions of the new Constitution and the Public Land
Act, Meralco, being a corporation and not a natural person, is not qualified to apply for the
registration of title over the public land.
On the other hand, in the Iglesia case, the Republic presented no evidence in support of its
opposition but expressly "submitted the case for decision on the basis of the evidence submitted
by the applicant." Respondent judge in the case accordingly granted the application for
registration of the land in the name of the Iglesia, holding that it had been "satisfactorily
established that applicant ]Iglesia] and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, public and adverse possession of the land . . . under a bona fide claim of ownership
for more than thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the application" and is therefore entitled to the
registration applied for under the Public Land Act, as amended.
Both decisions are now with the Court for review. I hold that both applications for registration
should be granted by virtue of the prevailing principle as enunciated since the 1925 case of Susi
vs. Razon and Director of Lands 1 and reaffirmed in a long line of cases down to the 1980 case
of Herico vs. Dar 2 that the lands in question ceased, ipso jure, or by operation of law, to be
lands of the public domain upon completion of the statutory period of open, continuous,
exclusive, notorious and unchallenged possession thereof by the applicants' predecessors-in-
interest who were qualified natural persons and entitled to registration by right of acquisitive
prescription under the provisions of the Public Land Act, and that accordingly the judgment in the
Meralco case should be reversed and a new judgment entered granting Meralco's application,
while the judgment in the Iglesia case should stand affirmed.
The principal issue at bar may thus be stated:
It is expressly provided in section 48, par. (b) of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, approved on June 22, 1957) that citizens of the
Philippines who are natural persons who have occupied lands of the public domain but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed may apply to the corresponding court of first
instance for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of the certificate of title therefor under
the Land Registration Act in cases where they "by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for
at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter." 3 In such cases, is the land ipso jure or by operation
of law converted into private land upon completion of the 30th year of continuous and
unchallenged occupation of the land such that thereafter as such private land, it may be duly
transferred to and owned by private corporations or does such land, as held by respondent
judge in the Meralco case, remain part of the public domain and does not become private land
until after actual judicial confirmation proceedings and the formal court order for the issuance of
the certificate of title?
1. This issue has been squarely resolved by this Court since the 1925 case of Susi vs.
Razon (and a long line of cases, infra). It is established doctrine as first held therein that an
open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period
provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under
the old law) by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective
title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes
private property.
(At that time in 1925 in the Susi case, such possession was required "from July 26, 1894" as
then provided for in section 45(b) of the old Public Land Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926;
whereas at present, as provided for in the corresponding section 48, par.(b) of the later and
subsisting Public Land Act, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942
approved on June 22, 1957, in force since 1957, the period of open and unchallenged
possession was reduced to "at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription. This is
admitted in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Aquino, wherein it is stated that "(I)n the Susi case,
this Court applied section 45 (b) of Act No. 2874 which corresponds to what is now section
48(b). It was held that the long possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership
since July 26, 1894 gave rise to the conclusive presumption that the occupant had complied with
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and was thus entitled to a certificate of title." 4
The text of the corresponding section 48(b), as amended by Rep. Act 1942 referred to is
reproduced verbatim in Mr. Justice Aquino's opinion 5 and quotes the reduced statutory period
of open and unchallenged possession of "at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the application.")
Accordingly, the Court held that Susi, as the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory
period, acquired the same by operation of law as a grant from the Government, "not only a right
to a grant," and the land thereby "already ceased to be of the public domain and had become
private property at least by presumption" as expressly provided in the Act. Therefore, any
supposed sale by the Director of Lands of the same land to another person was void and of no
effect and Susi as the rightful possessor could recover the land as his private property from the
supposed vendee who did not acquire any right thereto since it had ceased to be land of the
public domain. The Court thus specifically held therein, as applied to the specific facts of the
case, that:
. . . In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure, established in
paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with for he has been in actual and
physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the
public domain, openly continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a
certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when
Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by
operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary
that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts,
an application therefor is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a
legal function, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had
already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in
selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which
he had no longer any title or control, and the sake thus made was void and of no effect, and
Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right." 6
2. The above-quoted ruling in Susi has been affirmed and reaffirmed by this Court in a
long unbroken line of cases, as follows:
In Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 7 the Court held that "(I)n the case of Susi vs. Razon, et al., 48
Phil. 424, it was observed that where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the
Government are complied with through actual physical possession openly, continuously, and
publicly, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of Act
No. 2874, amending Act No. 926 (carried over as Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141),
the possessor is deemed to have already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant,
but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order
that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts — an application therefor being sufficient under
the provisions of Section 47 of Act No. 2874 (reproduced as Section 50, Commonwealth Act No.
141)." and "(C)onsidering that this case was dismissed by the trial court merely on a motion to
dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's action is already barred by the statute of limitations, which
apparently is predicated on the theory that a decree of registration can no longer be impugned
on the ground of fraud one year after the issuance and entry of the decree, which theory does
not apply here because the property involved is allegedly private in natural and has ceased to be
part of the public domain, we are of the opinion that the trial court erred in dismissing the case
outright without giving plaintiff a chance to prove his claim."
In Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 8 the Court stressed that by force of possession, the land in
question became private property on the strength of the Susi doctrine.
In Manarpaac vs. Cabanatan, 9 the Court quoted with favor the text of the above-quoted ruling
of Susi, and its ratio decidendi thus:
The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain, the plaintiff-
appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession thereof.
If, as above stated, that land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become,
operation of law, private property, there is lacking only the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin
Susi has the right to bring an action to recover the possession thereof and hold it.
In Miguel vs. Court of Appeals, 10 the Court again held that where possession has been
continuous, uninterrupted, open, adverse and in the concept of an owner, there is a presumption
juris et de jure that all necessary conditions for a grant by the State have been complied with
and he would have been by force of law entitled to the registration of his title to the land (citing
Pamintuan vs. Insular Government, 8 Phil. 485 and Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424).
In the latest 1980 case of Herico vs. Dar, 11 the Court once more reiterated the Susi doctrine
that "(A)nother obvious error of the respondent Court is in holding that after one year from the
issuance of the Torrens Title, the same can no longer be reopened to be declared and void, and
has become absolute and indefeasible. . . . Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No.
1942, which the respondent court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's
proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his
predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner as to segregate the land
from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as
by free patent. This is as provided in Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June 22, 1957,
amending Section 48-b of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which provides: . . . As interpreted in
several cases when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the
possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government
grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be
of the public domain, and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The
application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal
sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued
upon the strength of said patent."
3. In fine, since under the Court's settled doctrine, the acquisitive prescription of
alienable or disposable public lands provided for now in section 48, par. (b) of the Public Land
Act takes place by operation of law and the public land is converted to and becomes private
property upon a showing of open and unchallenged possession under bona fide claim of
ownership by the applicants' predecessors-in-interest for the statutory period of thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application and "it is not necessary that a certificate of title
should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the court" which right is
expressly backed up by the conclusive presumption or presumption juris et de jure of the statute
that the possessor has "performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant," the
applicant Meralco cannot be said to be barred as a corporation from filing the application for
registration of the private property duly acquired by it.
4. It should be noted that respondent judge's decision in the Meralco case expressly
finds as established facts that the Meralco's predecessors-in-interest had possessed and
occupied as owners the land in question for at least over 35 years; Olimpia Ramos having
possessed the same since the last world war in 1941 and then having sold the same on July 3,
1947 to the Piguing spouses who built a house thereon and continuously possessed the same
until they sold the same in turn to the Meralco on August 13, 1976, 12 Meralco's predecessors-
in-interest had therefore acquired by operation of the Public Land Act a Government grant to the
property, as well as acquired ownership thereof by right of acquisitive prescription over the land
which thereby became private property. The very definition of prescription as a mode of
acquiring ownership as set forth in Art. 1106 of the Civil Code provides that "By prescription one
acquires ownership and other real rights through lapse of time in the manner and under the
conditions laid down by law." The law does not provide that one acquires ownership of a land by
prescription only after his title thereto is judicially confirmed. To this same effect is the ruling in
Cariño vs. Insular Government 13, wherein the U.S. Supreme Court speaking through Justice
Holmes held that
It is true that the language of Articles 4 and 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession
for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in
registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have recommended an
application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind
of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every
word of it. The words "may prove" (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions,
might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that
registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership
actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but
simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law.
To the same effect is the Court's ruling in Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, that "an
owner does not obtain title by virtue of certificate but rather obtains his certificate by virtue of the
fact that he has a fee simple title."
5. Since the public land because private property upon completion of the 30th year of
continuous, exclusive, and unchallenged possession of the applicant Meralco's predecessors-in-
interest, particularly the Piguing spouses who sold the private land to the Meralco, there is no
justification for denying the Meralco's application for registration of its duly acquired title to the
land. Meralco's predecessors-in-interest had acquired ownership of the land by acquisitive
prescription as provided by the Public Land Act and by the Civil Code. The land became private
property and Meralco duly acquired it by right of purchase. To deny Meralco's application to
register the property because it is not a natural person is unjustified because neither the new
constitutional ban under the 1973 Constitution against private corporations owning lands of the
public domain or the Public Land Act's limitation on the right of application for confirmation of
imperfect title to lands of the public domain can be invoked any longer as the land had long
ceased to be public land but had become private property. Meralco's application in effect seeks
confirmation of the acquisition of ownership of the land which had become private property of its
predecessors-in-interest, the Piguing spouses who thru their open and unchallenged possession
of the land for over thirty years acquired title thereto by acquisitive prescription and by
conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act itself. There is no legal nor constitutional obstacle
to such title being transferred to the Meralco by right of purchase and traditio — for it is not
claimed that there is any legal prohibition against the Piguing spouses transferring the ownership
of the land to others (whether natural persons or corporations) such as the applicant Meralco,
even before the formal issuance of the certificate of title to them.
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that
the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for
confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court
actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having filed the application for
registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is
conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and
neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the
name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their
application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of
law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to
go through all the rituals as the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and
adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it
here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao 14)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for
confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original
persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that
they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who
thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly
qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the application for confirmation of title to
the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.
7. All that has been said here applies of course with equal force to the Iglesia case, save
that as already stated at the beginning hereof, the Iglesia application was granted because the
Republic presented no evidence in support of its opposition and respondent judge held in effect
that the property had ceased to be land of the public domain and had become private property,
the title to which could be duly issued in the name of the Iglesia as the transferee of its
predecessors-in-interest.
8. It should bear emphasis that what are involved here are small parcels of land, of 165
square meters in the Meralco case used for installation of an "anchor guy" for its steel posts in
connection with its tasks as a nationalized domestic corporation to furnish electrical service to
the consumer public, and of 313 square meters in the Iglesia case used as the site of its church
built thereon to minister to the religious needs of its members. In no way, may the letter, intent
and spirit of the prohibition of the 1973 Constitution against corporations "holding alienable lands
of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area" (which is
beamed against the undue control and exploitation of our public lands and natural resources by
corporations, Filipino and foreign-controlled) be deemed violated or disregarded by the granting
of the applications at bar. The two corporations in truth and in fact do not hold the small parcels
of land at bar for their own use or benefit but for the sole use and benefit of the public.
9. With reference to the separate concurring opinion of Mr. Justice De Castro wherein he
would blunt the "supposedly (sic) well-established doctrine" (at page 1) from the 1909 case of
Cariño and the 1925 case of Susi down to the 1980 case of Herico (supra, at pages 5 to 11) and
support the contrary pronouncement in Mr. Justice Aquino's main opinion that "as between the
State and the Meralco, the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only
upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b)
[of the Public Land Act]" (at page 5), suffice it to cite his own pronouncement in Herico
(reiterating the well-established and prevailing doctrine which this Court has not overturned, as it
cannot overturn the mandate of the statute that the unchallenged possessor for at least 30 years
is "conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant")
wherein Mr. Justice De Castro categorically reiterated for the Court that "As interpretated in
several cases . . . the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a
grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The and,
therefore, ceases to be of the public domain, and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands
to dispose of. The application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not
affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title
to be issued upon the strength of said patent."
In only remains to point out, in order to avoid misapprehension or confusion, that Mr. Justice De
Castro's seemingly querulous statement that "the discussion of the question of whether the land
involved is still public or already private land, is, however, entirely pointless or an idle exercise, if
We consider the provision of Section 14, Article XIV of the Constitution which appears to have
been lost sight of, which provides that 'save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands
shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain'" (at page 2) that "hence, even if the land involved in
the present case is considered private land, the cited section prohibits its acquisition by the
Meralco or Iglesia which admittedly are 'corporations or associations' within the meaning of the
aforecited provisions of the New Constitution. This observation should end all arguments of the
issue of whether the land in question is public or private land" (idem) might mislead one to the
wrong conclusion that corporations with 60% Filipino ownership may not own private lands when
the express provisions of Art. XIV, section 9 15 and section 14 as quoted by himself as well as
the counterpart provisions of the 1935 Constitution have always expressly permitted Filipino-
owned corporations to own private lands, and the only change effected in the 1973 Constitution
is section 11 which now prohibits even such Filipino corporations to own or hold lands of the
public domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares in area.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote for reversal of respondent court's judgment in the Meralco case and for
the entry of a new judgment granting Meralco's application and for affirmance of judgment in the
second case granting the Iglesia application.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J.: concurring:
I concur in the result. I am of the opinion that the lots which are sought to be registered have
ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they were acquired by the petitioner
corporation. They are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the
predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly,
the constitutional provision that no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of
the public domain is inapplicable. However, the petitioner is relying on Sec. 48 of the Public
Land Act for the confirmation of its title and Mr. Justice Aquino is correct in holding that said
provision cannot be availed by juridical entities.
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the ruling of the Court that Meralco "as a juridical person" is disqualified to apply for
its registration under Section 48(b).. 1 I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court would
characterize such jurisdictional defect, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an
insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy, although the facts could
be distinguished, the approach followed by us in Francisco v. City of Davao, 2 where the legal
question raised, instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved.
By legal fiction 3 and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic
solutionwould be to decide the matter as if the application under Section 48(b) were filed by the
Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from no such disability.
DE CASTRO, J., dissenting:
Justice Teehankee cites in his dissenting opinion the case of herico vs. Dar, 1 the decision in
which I am the ponente, as reiterating a supposedly well-established doctrine that lands of the
public domain which, by reason of possession and cultivation for such a length of time, a grant
by the State to the occupant is presumed, and the land thereby ceases to form part of the public
domain, but is segregated therefrom as to be no longer subject to the authority of the Director of
Lands to dispose under the public lands laws or statutes. He would thus consider said land as
no longer public land but "private" lands and therefore, not within the prohibition of the New
Constitution against corporations from acquiring public lands which provides that "no private
corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to
exceed one thousand hectares." 2
I cannot subscribe to the view that the land as above described has become private land, even
before title thereto, which is, as of this stage, said to be still "an incomplete or imperfect title,"
has been fully vested on the occupant, through the prescribed procedure known as judicial
confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title. 3 This is the only legal method by which full and
absolute title to the land may be granted, to convert the land into a truly private land. To secure
such judicial title, only the courts can be resorted to. The Director of Lands has lost authority
over the land, insofar as its disposition is concerned. His authority is limited to another form of
disposition of public land, referred to as administrative legalization, resulting in the issuance of
free patents, also based on possession, in which case, as in the issuance of homestead and
sales patents, the land involved is undoubtedly public land. The possessor of a piece of public
land would have the option to acquire title thereto through judicial confirmation or administrative
legalization. The difference is that in the latter case, the area disposable to a citizen-applicant by
the Director of Lands is limited to 24 hectares. There is no limit to the area subject to judicial
confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title, except possibly the limit fixed for a State grant
under old Spanish laws and decrees, which certainly is much larger than that set for free
patents.
It is because of the divestiture of authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of the land subject
to judicial confirmation of incomplete and imperfect title that some statements are found in many
cases, such as those cited by Justice Teehankee, to the effect that such land has ceased to be a
public land. What these statements, however, really mean is that the land referred to no longer
forms part of the mass of public domain still disposable by the Director of Lands, under the
authority granted him by the public land statutes. It, however, would not follow that the land
covered by Section 48 of the Public Land Act has itself become private land. The fact that its
disposition is provided for in the aforecited Act which deals with "public land" gives rise to the
very strong implication, if not a positive conclusion, that the land referred to is still public land.
Only when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant for confirmation of title would the land
become privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may declare it public land,
depending on the evidence.
The discussion of the question of whether the land involved is still public or already private land
is, however, entirely pointless, or an idle exercise, if We consider the provision of Section 14,
Article XIV of the Constitution which appears to have been lost sight of, which provides that
'save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain." As previously stated, by express provisions of the Constitution, no corporation or
association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, not to exceed, 1,000
hectares in area. 4 Hence, even if the land involved in the present case is considered private
land, the cited section prohibits its acquisition by the Meralco or Iglesia which admittedly are
"corporations or association" within the meaning of the aforecited provision of the New
Constitution. This observation should end all arguments on the issue of whether the land in
question is public or private land. Although it may further be observed that supposing a
corporation has been in possession of a piece of public land from the very beginning, may it
apply for judicial confirmation of the land in question to acquire title to its owner after possessing
the land for the requisite length of time? The answer is believed obvious — it may not. If its
possession is not from the beginning but has commenced only upon the transfer to it by the prior
possessor, may the corporation apply? The answer is just as obvious — with more reason, it
may not.
This separate opinion should have had no need to be written because the majority opinion
written by Justice Aquino is already well-reasoned out and supported by applicable authorities. I
was impelled to write it only because in the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee, the case of
Herico vs. Dar (supra) which is my ponencia was cited in support of his position. This separate
opinion then is more to show and explain that whatever has been stated by me in the Dar case
should be interpreted in the light of what I have said in this separate opinion, which I believe,
does not strengthen Justice Teehankee's position a bit.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
Involved in these two cases are the applications of petitioner Meralco, a nationalized domestic
corporation, in the first case and respondent Iglesia in Cristo, a religious corporation sole, in the
second case (both admittedly Filipino corporations qualified to hold and own private lands), for
judicial confirmation of their titles to small parcels of land, residential in character as
distinguished from strictly agricultural land, acquired by them by purchase or exchange from
private persons publicly recognized as the private owners (who have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands under a bona fide
claim of ownership for at least thirty [30] years immediately preceding the filing of the
applications).
This dissent is based on the failure of the majority to adhere to established doctrine since the
1909 case of Cariño and the 1925 case of Susi down to the 1980 case of Herico, infra, pursuant
to the Public Land Act, as amended, that where a possessor has held the open, exclusive and
unchallenged possession of alienable public land for the statutory period provided by law (30
years now under amendatory Rep. Act No. 1942 approved on June 22, 1957), the law itself
mandates that the possessor "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title" and "by
legal fiction [the land] has already ceased to be of the public domain and has become private
property." Accordingly, the prohibition of the 1973 Constitution and of the Public Land Act
against private corporation holding lands of the public domain has no applicability in the present
cases. What Meralco and Iglesia have acquired from their predecessors-in-interest had already
ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property at the time of the sale to
them and therefore their applicatins for confirmation of title by virtue of their predecessors-in-
interest' vested right and title may be duly granted.
The land covered by the Meralco application of November 26, 1976 consists of two (1) small lots
with a total area of 165 square meters located at Tanay, Rizal with an assessed value of
P3,270.00. This land was possessed by Olimpia Ramos before World Warr II which broke out in
the Pacific in 1941. Olimpia Ramos sold the land on July 3, 1947 to the spouses Rafael Piguing
and Minerva Inocencio who constructed a house thereon. But because the Meralco had
instealled the "anchor guy" of its stell posts on the land, the Piguing spouses sold the land to the
Meralco on August 13, 1976. The land had been declared for realty tax purposes since 1945
and realty taxes were regularly paid thereon. It is residential in character as distinguished from
strictly agricultural land. It is likewise established that it is not included in any military reservation
and that since 1927 it had been certified as part of the alienable or disposable portion of the
public domain.
The land covered by the Iglesia application of September 3, 1977 likewise consists of two (2)
small lots located in Barrio Dampol, Plaridel, Bulacan with a total area of 313 square meters and
with an assessed value of P1,350.00. The land was acquired by the Iglesia on January 9, 1953
from Andres Perez in exchange for a lot owned by the Iglesia with an area of 247 square meters.
The land was already possessed by Perez in 1933. Admittedly also it is not included in any
military reservation and is inside an area which was certified since 1927 as part of the alienable
or disposable portion of the public domain. A chapel of the Iglesia stands on the said land. It had
been duly declared for realty tax purposes in the name of the Iglesia and realty taxes were
regularly paid thereon.
Respondent judge in the Meralco case sustained the Republic's opposition and dismissed the
application, holding that under both the provisions of the new Constitution and the Public Land
Act, Meralco, being a corporation and not a natural person, is not qualified to apply for the
registration of title over the public land.
On the other hand, in the Iglesia case, the Republic presented no evidence in support of its
opposition but expressly "submitted the case for decision on the basis of the evidence submitted
by the applicant." Respondent judge in the case accordingly granted the application for
registration of the land in the name of the Iglesia, holding that it had been "satisfactorily
established that applicant ]Iglesia] and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, public and adverse possession of the land . . . under a bona fide claim of ownership
for more than thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the application" and is therefore entitled to the
registration applied for under the Public Land Act, as amended.
Both decisions are now with the Court for review. I hold that both applications for registration
should be granted by virtue of the prevailing principle as enunciated since the 1925 case of Susi
vs. Razon and Director of Lands 1 and reaffirmed in a long line of cases down to the 1980 case
of Herico vs. Dar 2 that the lands in question ceased, ipso jure, or by operation of law, to be
lands of the public domain upon completion of the statutory period of open, continuous,
exclusive, notorious and unchallenged possession thereof by the applicants' predecessors-in-
interest who were qualified natural persons and entitled to registration by right of acquisitive
prescription under the provisions of the Public Land Act, and that accordingly the judgment in the
Meralco case should be reversed and a new judgment entered granting Meralco's application,
while the judgment in the Iglesia case should stand affirmed.
The principal issue at bar may thus be stated:
It is expressly provided in section 48, par. (b) of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, approved on June 22, 1957) that citizens of the
Philippines who are natural persons who have occupied lands of the public domain but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed may apply to the corresponding court of first
instance for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of the certificate of title therefor under
the Land Registration Act in cases where they "by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for
at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter." 3 In such cases, is the land ipso jure or by operation
of law converted into private land upon completion of the 30th year of continuous and
unchallenged occupation of the land such that thereafter as such private land, it may be duly
transferred to and owned by private corporations or does such land, as held by respondent
judge in the Meralco case, remain part of the public domain and does not become private land
until after actual judicial confirmation proceedings and the formal court order for the issuance of
the certificate of title?
1. This issue has been squarely resolved by this Court since the 1925 case of Susi vs.
Razon (and a long line of cases, infra). It is established doctrine as first held therein that an
open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period
provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under
the old law) by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective
title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes
private property.
(At that time in 1925 in the Susi case, such possession was required "from July 26, 1894" as
then provided for in section 45(b) of the old Public Land Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926;
whereas at present, as provided for in the corresponding section 48, par.(b) of the later and
subsisting Public Land Act, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942
approved on June 22, 1957, in force since 1957, the period of open and unchallenged
possession was reduced to "at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription. This is
admitted in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Aquino, wherein it is stated that "(I)n the Susi case,
this Court applied section 45 (b) of Act No. 2874 which corresponds to what is now section
48(b). It was held that the long possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership
since July 26, 1894 gave rise to the conclusive presumption that the occupant had complied with
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and was thus entitled to a certificate of title." 4
The text of the corresponding section 48(b), as amended by Rep. Act 1942 referred to is
reproduced verbatim in Mr. Justice Aquino's opinion 5 and quotes the reduced statutory period
of open and unchallenged possession of "at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the application.")
Accordingly, the Court held that Susi, as the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory
period, acquired the same by operation of law as a grant from the Government, "not only a right
to a grant," and the land thereby "already ceased to be of the public domain and had become
private property at least by presumption" as expressly provided in the Act. Therefore, any
supposed sale by the Director of Lands of the same land to another person was void and of no
effect and Susi as the rightful possessor could recover the land as his private property from the
supposed vendee who did not acquire any right thereto since it had ceased to be land of the
public domain. The Court thus specifically held therein, as applied to the specific facts of the
case, that:
. . . In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure, established in
paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with for he has been in actual and
physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the
public domain, openly continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a
certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when
Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by
operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary
that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts,
an application therefor is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a
legal function, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had
already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in
selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which
he had no longer any title or control, and the sake thus made was void and of no effect, and
Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right." 6
2. The above-quoted ruling in Susi has been affirmed and reaffirmed by this Court in a
long unbroken line of cases, as follows:
In Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 7 the Court held that "(I)n the case of Susi vs. Razon, et al., 48
Phil. 424, it was observed that where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the
Government are complied with through actual physical possession openly, continuously, and
publicly, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of Act
No. 2874, amending Act No. 926 (carried over as Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141),
the possessor is deemed to have already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant,
but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order
that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts — an application therefor being sufficient under
the provisions of Section 47 of Act No. 2874 (reproduced as Section 50, Commonwealth Act No.
141)." and "(C)onsidering that this case was dismissed by the trial court merely on a motion to
dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's action is already barred by the statute of limitations, which
apparently is predicated on the theory that a decree of registration can no longer be impugned
on the ground of fraud one year after the issuance and entry of the decree, which theory does
not apply here because the property involved is allegedly private in natural and has ceased to be
part of the public domain, we are of the opinion that the trial court erred in dismissing the case
outright without giving plaintiff a chance to prove his claim."
In Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 8 the Court stressed that by force of possession, the land in
question became private property on the strength of the Susi doctrine.
In Manarpaac vs. Cabanatan, 9 the Court quoted with favor the text of the above-quoted ruling
of Susi, and its ratio decidendi thus:
The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain, the plaintiff-
appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession thereof.
If, as above stated, that land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become,
operation of law, private property, there is lacking only the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin
Susi has the right to bring an action to recover the possession thereof and hold it.
In Miguel vs. Court of Appeals, 10 the Court again held that where possession has been
continuous, uninterrupted, open, adverse and in the concept of an owner, there is a presumption
juris et de jure that all necessary conditions for a grant by the State have been complied with
and he would have been by force of law entitled to the registration of his title to the land (citing
Pamintuan vs. Insular Government, 8 Phil. 485 and Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424).
In the latest 1980 case of Herico vs. Dar, 11 the Court once more reiterated the Susi doctrine
that "(A)nother obvious error of the respondent Court is in holding that after one year from the
issuance of the Torrens Title, the same can no longer be reopened to be declared and void, and
has become absolute and indefeasible. . . . Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No.
1942, which the respondent court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's
proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his
predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner as to segregate the land
from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as
by free patent. This is as provided in Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June 22, 1957,
amending Section 48-b of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which provides: . . . As interpreted in
several cases when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the
possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government
grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be
of the public domain, and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The
application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal
sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued
upon the strength of said patent."
3. In fine, since under the Court's settled doctrine, the acquisitive prescription of
alienable or disposable public lands provided for now in section 48, par. (b) of the Public Land
Act takes place by operation of law and the public land is converted to and becomes private
property upon a showing of open and unchallenged possession under bona fide claim of
ownership by the applicants' predecessors-in-interest for the statutory period of thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application and "it is not necessary that a certificate of title
should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the court" which right is
expressly backed up by the conclusive presumption or presumption juris et de jure of the statute
that the possessor has "performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant," the
applicant Meralco cannot be said to be barred as a corporation from filing the application for
registration of the private property duly acquired by it.
4. It should be noted that respondent judge's decision in the Meralco case expressly
finds as established facts that the Meralco's predecessors-in-interest had possessed and
occupied as owners the land in question for at least over 35 years; Olimpia Ramos having
possessed the same since the last world war in 1941 and then having sold the same on July 3,
1947 to the Piguing spouses who built a house thereon and continuously possessed the same
until they sold the same in turn to the Meralco on August 13, 1976, 12 Meralco's predecessors-
in-interest had therefore acquired by operation of the Public Land Act a Government grant to the
property, as well as acquired ownership thereof by right of acquisitive prescription over the land
which thereby became private property. The very definition of prescription as a mode of
acquiring ownership as set forth in Art. 1106 of the Civil Code provides that "By prescription one
acquires ownership and other real rights through lapse of time in the manner and under the
conditions laid down by law." The law does not provide that one acquires ownership of a land by
prescription only after his title thereto is judicially confirmed. To this same effect is the ruling in
Cariño vs. Insular Government 13, wherein the U.S. Supreme Court speaking through Justice
Holmes held that
It is true that the language of Articles 4 and 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession
for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in
registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have recommended an
application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind
of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every
word of it. The words "may prove" (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions,
might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that
registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership
actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but
simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law.
To the same effect is the Court's ruling in Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, that "an
owner does not obtain title by virtue of certificate but rather obtains his certificate by virtue of the
fact that he has a fee simple title."
5. Since the public land because private property upon completion of the 30th year of
continuous, exclusive, and unchallenged possession of the applicant Meralco's predecessors-in-
interest, particularly the Piguing spouses who sold the private land to the Meralco, there is no
justification for denying the Meralco's application for registration of its duly acquired title to the
land. Meralco's predecessors-in-interest had acquired ownership of the land by acquisitive
prescription as provided by the Public Land Act and by the Civil Code. The land became private
property and Meralco duly acquired it by right of purchase. To deny Meralco's application to
register the property because it is not a natural person is unjustified because neither the new
constitutional ban under the 1973 Constitution against private corporations owning lands of the
public domain or the Public Land Act's limitation on the right of application for confirmation of
imperfect title to lands of the public domain can be invoked any longer as the land had long
ceased to be public land but had become private property. Meralco's application in effect seeks
confirmation of the acquisition of ownership of the land which had become private property of its
predecessors-in-interest, the Piguing spouses who thru their open and unchallenged possession
of the land for over thirty years acquired title thereto by acquisitive prescription and by
conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act itself. There is no legal nor constitutional obstacle
to such title being transferred to the Meralco by right of purchase and traditio — for it is not
claimed that there is any legal prohibition against the Piguing spouses transferring the ownership
of the land to others (whether natural persons or corporations) such as the applicant Meralco,
even before the formal issuance of the certificate of title to them.
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that
the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for
confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court
actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having filed the application for
registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is
conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and
neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the
name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their
application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of
law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to
go through all the rituals as the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and
adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it
here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao 14)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for
confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original
persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that
they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who
thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly
qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the application for confirmation of title to
the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.
7. All that has been said here applies of course with equal force to the Iglesia case, save
that as already stated at the beginning hereof, the Iglesia application was granted because the
Republic presented no evidence in support of its opposition and respondent judge held in effect
that the property had ceased to be land of the public domain and had become private property,
the title to which could be duly issued in the name of the Iglesia as the transferee of its
predecessors-in-interest.
8. It should bear emphasis that what are involved here are small parcels of land, of 165
square meters in the Meralco case used for installation of an "anchor guy" for its steel posts in
connection with its tasks as a nationalized domestic corporation to furnish electrical service to
the consumer public, and of 313 square meters in the Iglesia case used as the site of its church
built thereon to minister to the religious needs of its members. In no way, may the letter, intent
and spirit of the prohibition of the 1973 Constitution against corporations "holding alienable lands
of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area" (which is
beamed against the undue control and exploitation of our public lands and natural resources by
corporations, Filipino and foreign-controlled) be deemed violated or disregarded by the granting
of the applications at bar. The two corporations in truth and in fact do not hold the small parcels
of land at bar for their own use or benefit but for the sole use and benefit of the public.
9. With reference to the separate concurring opinion of Mr. Justice De Castro wherein he
would blunt the "supposedly (sic) well-established doctrine" (at page 1) from the 1909 case of
Cariño and the 1925 case of Susi down to the 1980 case of Herico (supra, at pages 5 to 11) and
support the contrary pronouncement in Mr. Justice Aquino's main opinion that "as between the
State and the Meralco, the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only
upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b)
[of the Public Land Act]" (at page 5), suffice it to cite his own pronouncement in Herico
(reiterating the well-established and prevailing doctrine which this Court has not overturned, as it
cannot overturn the mandate of the statute that the unchallenged possessor for at least 30 years
is "conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant")
wherein Mr. Justice De Castro categorically reiterated for the Court that "As interpretated in
several cases . . . the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a
grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The and,
therefore, ceases to be of the public domain, and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands
to dispose of. The application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not
affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title
to be issued upon the strength of said patent."
In only remains to point out, in order to avoid misapprehension or confusion, that Mr. Justice De
Castro's seemingly querulous statement that "the discussion of the question of whether the land
involved is still public or already private land, is, however, entirely pointless or an idle exercise, if
We consider the provision of Section 14, Article XIV of the Constitution which appears to have
been lost sight of, which provides that 'save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands
shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain'" (at page 2) that "hence, even if the land involved in
the present case is considered private land, the cited section prohibits its acquisition by the
Meralco or Iglesia which admittedly are 'corporations or associations' within the meaning of the
aforecited provisions of the New Constitution. This observation should end all arguments of the
issue of whether the land in question is public or private land" (idem) might mislead one to the
wrong conclusion that corporations with 60% Filipino ownership may not own private lands when
the express provisions of Art. XIV, section 9 15 and section 14 as quoted by himself as well as
the counterpart provisions of the 1935 Constitution have always expressly permitted Filipino-
owned corporations to own private lands, and the only change effected in the 1973 Constitution
is section 11 which now prohibits even such Filipino corporations to own or hold lands of the
public domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares in area.
 8 63 Phil. 654 655 (1963), citing De Los Reyes vs. Razon, 38 Phil. 480; Susi vs. Razon,
ACCORDINGLY, I vote for reversal of respondent court's judgment in the Meralco case and for supra, and PNB vs. Luis, 53 Phil. 649. See also Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498, 503 (1928).
the entry of a new judgment granting Meralco's application and for affirmance of judgment in the
second case granting the Iglesia application. 9 21 SCRA 743, 747-748 (1967).

Footnotes 10 29 SCRA 760, 779 (1969)

* The same issue is involved in the following fourteen pending cases. (1) G.R. No. 11 95 SCRA 437, 443-444, per De Castro, J.
51756, Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Director of Lands, et al.; (2) G.R. No 54045, Director of Lands vs.
Dynamarine Corporation, et al.; (3) G.R. No. 54276, Director of Lands vs. Iglesia ni Cristo, et al.; 12 Record, p. 22
(4) G.R. No. 54952, Director of Lands vs. Hon. Gabriel Valley, Jr., et al.; (5) G.R. No. 55171,
Director of Lands vs. Hon. Job B. Madayag, et al.; (6) G.R. No. 55289. Director of Lands vs. 13 41 Phil. 935 (1909), 212 U.S. 449, 53 Lawyers ed. 594; 10 emphasis supplied.
Hon. Candido Villanueva, et al.,; (7) G.R. No. 56025. Republic vs. Hon. Arsenio Gonong, et al.;
(8) G.R. No. 56613, Director of Lands vs. Iglesia ni Cristo, et al.; (9) G.R. No. 57272, Director of 14 12 SCRA 628, 634.
Lands vs. Valenzuela Tannery Corporation, et al.; (1) G.R. No. 57461, Director of Lands vs.
Manila Electric Company, et al.; (11) G.R. No. 58077, Director of Lands vs. Hermanos y 15 "Sec. 9. The disposition, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural
Hermanas de Sta. Cruz de Mayo, Inc., et al.; (12) G.R. No. 58089, Director of Lands vs. resources of the Philippines shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
Continental Leaf Tobacco (Phil.), et al.; (13) G.R. No. 58117, Director of Lands vs. Hon. associations at least sixty per centum, of the capital of which is owned by such citizens." (Art.
Emmanuel Cleto, et al., and (14) G.R. No. 58906, Director of Lands vs. United Church of Christ XIV, 1973 Constitution).
in the Phil., et al.

1 Decision, 6. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

2 120 Phil. 1417 (1964) (per Concepcion, J.)

Today is Saturday, June 23, 2018
3 Cf. Fuller, Legal Fictions (1967).
Custom Search
SEPARATE OPINION

1 45 SCRA 437. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
2 Section 11, Article XIV, Constitution. Manila

3 See Section 48 of the Public Land Act. EN BANC

4 Section 11, Article XIV, Constitution G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986

TEEHANKEE THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.
1 48 Phil. 424. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC.,
respondents.
2 95 SCRA 437 (Jan. 22, 1980), citing Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424; Mesina vs. Vda. de
Sonza, 108 Phil. 251 (1960). D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.

3 Emphasis supplied.
NARVASA, J.:
4 At page 6; emphasis supplied.
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate
5 At pages 4 and 5 thereof. Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered
registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481,
6 Emphasis supplied. 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the
Dumagat tribe.
7 108 Phil. 251, 253 & 255 (1960).
The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the appealed judgment sums up the
findings of the trial court in said proceedings in this wise:
1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a
corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on December 23, 1959;
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can
acquire real properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation particularly on
the provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both
members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the
sale took place on October 29, 1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood
& Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the
ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from generation to generation
until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous,
adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who were
granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession
is already considered from time immemorial.
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on
land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public
land or within the public domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five
Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said improvements were seen by the
Court during its ocular investigation of the land sought to be registered on September 18, 1982;
9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the
applicant was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon,
Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc.,
and this negotiation came to reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer
Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite
of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by
the Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special session on
November 22, 1979.
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability of
the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration
proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution
had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article
XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public
domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935
Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from the
Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b)
and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented
by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not,
under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted
in subsection (b) hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the trial court
which were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert
before this Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased the lands in
question on October 29, 1962, are members of the national cultural minorities who had, by
themselves and through their progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands since time
immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period and were, by reason thereof, entitled
to exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially
confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is
disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said lands under any provisions of the 1973
Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the Infiels had
transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by
it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the prohibition therein
against private corporations holding lands of the public domain except in lease not exceeding
1,000 hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of
the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be
answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands, the
constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations
obviously does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et al,
1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic
corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in
1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed by the
vendors and, before them, by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the
outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that
the lots were public land, dismissed the application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical
person, was not qualified to apply for registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
which allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this Court upheld the
dismissal. It was held that:
..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the
certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still public
land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under
section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on
the one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title
and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has on
imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or
qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be
secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is
public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning with
Carino in 1909 2 thru Susi in 1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed and
reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land
for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of
the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be
public land and becomes private property. That said dissent expressed what is the better — and,
indeed, the correct, view-becomes evident from a consideration of some of the principal rulings
cited therein,
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of
June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the
Philippine Islands. It was ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove'
possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this means may
prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have
recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to
convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger,
if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or better, in view of the
other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are
indications that registration was expected from all but none sufficient to show that, for want of it,
ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to
confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical
language, in Susi:
.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in
paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and
physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the
public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a
certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when
Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by
operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary
that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the
courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If
by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had
already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in
selling the land in question of Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which
he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and
Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director of Lands,
7 Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of Appeals 10 and
Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in
jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11
.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to
be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for
more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the
land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land.
Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. ....
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are
complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant,
a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land,
therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to
dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect
the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be
issued upon the strength of said patent. 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public
land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express
grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that the possessor(s) "... shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive
presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most
limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of
time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already
vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but
only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the
required period of possession became complete. As was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are
indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it,
ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to
confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a
legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said
owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there
being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution
which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial
possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in
appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes
right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that
might be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land
to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title.
The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public
agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that
confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids
corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before
that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court
has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application to the sales
application of Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right to the
land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. Section
2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural
lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is
barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.
xxx xxx xxx
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not impair vested
rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal
ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the
police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right
of the corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and established and was
no longer open to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the
effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a
patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without due process
(Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919).<äre||anº•1àw> 15
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name
must be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more
than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership
sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the
land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the
1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only
a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful
successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling in
Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule,
as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a
possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and
exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as
amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso
jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal
was already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby
acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's
holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to
apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical,
rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that
the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for
confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court
actions. Assuming that there was a technical error not having filed the application for registration
in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that
there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there
any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the
original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application
being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the
conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go through
all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the
overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now.
(See Francisco vs. City of Davao)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for
confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original
persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that
they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who
thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly
qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to
the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter
from themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in
their names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty
charades, whereas the same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no
prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of the rule on amendment to conform to the
evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a real
sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were, doctrines the
soundness of which has passed the test of searching examination and inquiry in many past
cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of
Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition
that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying for confirmation of an
imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973
Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the
main opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short,
decided no constitutional question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate
Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the June, 1982
Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld, "expressed what is the better. . . .
and indeed the correct view." My dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909 case of Carino 2
through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited therein to the latest 1980 case
of Herico 4 that "it is established doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse and public
possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act
provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old law [this period was
reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title' by amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the period of
acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally and through his predecessors
confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public
domain and becomes private property." I hereby reproduce the same by reference for brevity's
sake. But since we are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents and
discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed therefrom in the recent past, I
feel constrained to write this concurrence in amplification of my views and ratio decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. "
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in the Act, the
rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory period "already acquired, by operation of
law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that
certificate of title should be issued an order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in
question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had
become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the
Director of Lands [and beyond his authority to sell to any other person]. " 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes for
the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have been
deprived of ancestral family lands by the dismissal of his application for registration) which
reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by the Supreme Court) and adopted
the liberal view that under the decree and regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove'
(acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when
called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from
all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The
effect of the proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases subsequent
thereto which failed to adhere to the aforecited established doctrine dating back to 1909 and
was consistently applied up to June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision was promulgated). We
reaffirm the established doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes
place ipso jure or by operation of law without the necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of
title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of the public domain and becomes private property, which
may be lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified corporations such as respondent corporation.
(As stressed in Herico supra, "the application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of
which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so expressly stated therein.
By virtue of such conversion into private property, qualified corporations may lawfully acquire
them and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's prohibition against
corporations holding or acquiring title to lands of the public domain, as claimed in the dissenting
opinion, for the simple reason that no public lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on October
16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which contained no prohibition against
corporations holding public lands (except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later 1973
Constitution which imposed an absolute prohibition. Even on the erroneous assumption that the
land remained public land despite the Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from time
immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P
45million investments redounding presumably to the welfare and progress of the community,
particularly the municipality of Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the
townsite created a vested right which could not be impaired by the prohibition adopted eleven
years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso jure converted into
private land and they had a legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by the conclusive
presumption of the Public Land Act (which needed only to be established in confirmation of title
proceedings for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and
validly transferred to respondent corporation.
In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such applications
for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable public
lands expressly reiterate that it has always been the "policy of the State to hasten the
settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such] unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize that
such lands publicly and notoriously occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition
or ownership have ipso jure been converted into private property and grant the possessors the
opportunity to establish and record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application
which would have originally expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively extended to
December 31, 1941, then extended to December 31, 1957, then to December 31, 1968, further
extended to December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7
The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for confirmation of title
is in effect a technicality of procedure and not of substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis
mutandis, is properly applicable: "The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by
considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed
in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal
confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the
Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino
corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for
confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed, then
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented along the same line from the majority
ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court would characterize such
jurisdictional defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical person rather than the natural
persons-transferors, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an insurmountable
obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy, although the facts could be distinguished,
the approach followed by us in Francisco v. City of Davao, where the legal question raised,
instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction
and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solution would be to
decide the matter as if the application under Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses,
who I assume suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while
concurring in the procedural result, likewise, in effect dissented from the therein majority ruling
on the question of substance, and stated his opinion that "the lots which are sought to be
registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they were acquired by the
petitioner corporation. They are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the
predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly,
the constitutional provision that no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of
the public domain is inapplicable. " 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural citizens who
may prove their undisputed and open possession of public lands for the required statutory thirty-
year period, tacking on their predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only natural persons, to
the exclusion of juridical persons such as corporations, can actually, physically and in reality
possess public lands for the required statutory 30-year period. That juridical persons or
corporations cannot do so is obvious. But when the natural persons have fulfilled the required
statutory period of possession, the Act confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable title.
It is preferable to follow the letter of the law that they file the applications for confirmation of their
title, although they have lawfully transferred their title to the land. But such procedural failure
cannot and should not defeat the substance of the law, as stressed in the above-cited opinions,
that the lands are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the corporation's
predecessors and the realistic solution would be to consider the application for confirmation as
filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance with the evidence, confirm their title
to the private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully transferred by them to the
corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the validity of the transfer and sale of the private land
to the corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have the
corporation reassign its rights to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was done
after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on
paper with the technicality of having natural persons file the application for confirmation of title to
the private land.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) ...
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented
by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed are the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
(c) ...
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:
SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such
lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares ....
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a
corporation from directly applying to the Courts for the issuance of Original Certificates of Title to
lands of the public domain (Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799;
Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; Iglesia
ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion that the literalism should be
adhered to in this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the land
involved in the case.
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to directly
apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the circuituous "literal" requirement
that the INFIELS should first apply to the courts for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title to
ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila Electric
Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982]).
To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public
Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation
of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions.
Assuming that there was a technical error in not having filed the application for registration in the
name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant
Meralco
and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in
the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of
their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by
operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such
applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can
after all these years dispose of it here and now." (Paragraphing supplied)
The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only citizens
(natural persons) can apply for certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which prohibits corporations from
acquiring title to lands of the public domain. That interpretation or construction adopted by the
majority cannot be justified. "A construction adopted should not be such as to nullify, destroy or
defeat the intention of the legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino [UST
37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352;
cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).
It has also been said that:
In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature intended
to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in
the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general principle that the courts should, if reasonably
possible to do so interpret the statute, or the provision being construed, so as to give it efficient
operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided, under which
the statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified,
destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless,
inoperative, or nugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which will
give effect to the act, while the other will defeat it, the former construction is preferred. One part
of a statute may not be construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no effect.
Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule against the enlargement of extension of a statute by
construction, the meaning of a statute may be extended beyond the precise words used in the
law, and words or phrases may be altered or supplied, where this is necessary to prevent a law
from becoming a nullity. Wherever the provision of a statute is general everything which is
necessary to make such provision effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor
Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)
The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. The proper
course for the Court to take is to promote in the fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to
avoid a construction which would alter or defeat that policy.
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-Bartolome,
114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the June, 1982
Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld, "expressed what is the better. . . .
and indeed the correct view." My dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909 case of Carino 2
through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited therein to the latest 1980 case
of Herico 4 that "it is established doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse and public
possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act
provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old law [this period was
reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title' by amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the period of
acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally and through his predecessors
confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public
domain and becomes private property." I hereby reproduce the same by reference for brevity's
sake. But since we are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents and
discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed therefrom in the recent past, I
feel constrained to write this concurrence in amplification of my views and ratio decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. "
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in the Act, the
rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory period "already acquired, by operation of
law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that
certificate of title should be issued an order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in
question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had
become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the
Director of Lands [and beyond his authority to sell to any other person]. " 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes for
the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have been
deprived of ancestral family lands by the dismissal of his application for registration) which
reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by the Supreme Court) and adopted
the liberal view that under the decree and regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove'
(acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when
called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from
all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The
effect of the proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases subsequent
thereto which failed to adhere to the aforecited established doctrine dating back to 1909 and
was consistently applied up to June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision was
promulgated).<äre||anº•1àw> We reaffirm the established doctrine that such acquisitive
prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by operation of law without the
necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of the public
domain and becomes private property, which may be lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified
corporations such as respondent corporation. (As stressed in Herico supra, "the application for
confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the
title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so expressly stated therein.
By virtue of such conversion into private property, qualified corporations may lawfully acquire
them and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's prohibition against
corporations holding or acquiring title to lands of the public domain, as claimed in the dissenting
opinion, for the simple reason that no public lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on October
16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which contained no prohibition against
corporations holding public lands (except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later 1973
Constitution which imposed an absolute prohibition. Even on the erroneous assumption that the
land remained public land despite the Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from time
immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P
45million investments redounding presumably to the welfare and progress of the community,
particularly the municipality of Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the
townsite created a vested right which could not be impaired by the prohibition adopted eleven
years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso jure converted into
private land and they had a legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by the conclusive
presumption of the Public Land Act (which needed only to be established in confirmation of title
proceedings for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and
validly transferred to respondent corporation.
In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such applications
for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable public
lands expressly reiterate that it has always been the "policy of the State to hasten the
settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such] unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize that
such lands publicly and notoriously occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition
or ownership have ipso jure been converted into private property and grant the possessors the
opportunity to establish and record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application
which would have originally expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively extended to
December 31, 1941, then extended to December 31, 1957, then to December 31, 1968, further
extended to December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7
The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for confirmation of title
is in effect a technicality of procedure and not of substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis
mutandis, is properly applicable: "The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by
considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed
in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal
confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the
Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino
corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for
confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed, then
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented along the same line from the majority
ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court would characterize such
jurisdictional defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical person rather than the natural
persons-transferors, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an insurmountable
obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy, although the facts could be distinguished,
the approach followed by us in Francisco v. City of Davao, where the legal question raised,
instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction
and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solution would be to
decide the matter as if the application under Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses,
who I assume suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while
concurring in the procedural result, likewise, in effect dissented from the therein majority ruling
on the question of substance, and stated his opinion that "the lots which are sought to be
registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they were acquired by the
petitioner corporation. They are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the
predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly,
the constitutional provision that no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of
the public domain is inapplicable. " 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural citizens who
may prove their undisputed and open possession of public lands for the required statutory thirty-
year period, tacking on their predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only natural persons, to
the exclusion of juridical persons such as corporations, can actually, physically and in reality
possess public lands for the required statutory 30-year period. That juridical persons or
corporations cannot do so is obvious. But when the natural persons have fulfilled the required
statutory period of possession, the Act confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable title.
It is preferable to follow the letter of the law that they file the applications for confirmation of their
title, although they have lawfully transferred their title to the land. But such procedural failure
cannot and should not defeat the substance of the law, as stressed in the above-cited opinions,
that the lands are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the corporation's
predecessors and the realistic solution would be to consider the application for confirmation as
filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance with the evidence, confirm their title
to the private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully transferred by them to the
corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the validity of the transfer and sale of the private land
to the corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have the
corporation reassign its rights to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was done
after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on
paper with the technicality of having natural persons file the application for confirmation of title to
the private land.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) ...
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented
by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed are the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
(c) ...
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:
SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such
lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares ....
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a
corporation from directly applying to the Courts for the issuance of Original Certificates of Title to
lands of the public domain (Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799;
Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; Iglesia
ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion that the literalism should be
adhered to in this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the land
involved in the case.
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to directly
apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the circuituous "literal" requirement
that the INFIELS should first apply to the courts for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title to
ACME. In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-Bartolome,
114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila Electric
Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982]). Footnotes

To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public 1 114 SCRA 799.
Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation
of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. 2 Carino vs. Insular Government, 41 Phil. 935, 944.
Assuming that there was a technical error in not having filed the application for registration in the
name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, 3 Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424.

still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant 4 Herico vs. Dar 95 SCRA 437.
Meralco
5 Of said Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880.
and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in
the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of 6 emphasis supplied.
their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by
operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. 7 63 Phil. 654.

It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such 8 Phil. 251.
applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can
after all these years dispose of it here and now." (Emphasis supplied) 9 21 SCRA 743.

The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only citizens 10 29 SCRA 760.
(natural persons) can apply for certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which prohibits corporations from 11 There was withal a later attempt by the ponente in Herico (Castro, J.) to somewhat
acquiring title to lands of the public domain. That interpretation or construction adopted by the soften the import of the doctrine, in his concurrence in Meralco (114 SCRA 799, 810-813)
majority cannot be justified. "A construction adopted should not be such as to nullify, destroy or
defeat the intention of the legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino [UST 12 Emphasis supplied; the provision referred to is Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141. "
37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352;
cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351). 13 Sec. 48(b).

It has also been said that: 14 Referring, precisely, to Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution.

In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature intended 15 Ayog vs. Cusi, Jr., 118 SCRA 492.
to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in
the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general principle that the courts should, if reasonably Teehankee, C.J.,
possible to do so interpret the statute, or the provision being construed, so as to give it efficient
operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided, under which 1 Meralco vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799, and Republic vs. Villanueva and
the statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, Iglesia ni Cristo, 114 SCRA 875, respectively.
destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless,
inoperative, or nugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which will 2 Carino vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449, 53 L. ed. 594, 41 Phil. 935 and 7 Phil.
give effect to the act, while the other will defeat it, the former construction is preferred. One part 132.
of a statute may not be construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no effect.
Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule against the enlargement of extension of a statute by 3 Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424.
construction, the meaning of a statute may be extended beyond the precise words used in the
law, and words or phrases may be altered or supplied, where this is necessary to prevent a law 4 Herico vs. Dar 95 SCRA 437.
from becoming a nullity. Wherever the provision of a statute is general everything which is
necessary to make such provision effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor 5 For the text of the Act, as amended, see page 3 of the opinion.
Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)
6 Emphasis supplied.
The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. The proper
course for the Court to take is to promote in the fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to
avoid a construction which would alter or defeat that policy.
7 Under CA 292 approved June 9, 1938; R.A. 107, approved June 2, 1947; R. A 2061, comprehended in the cadastral proceeding: Lot No. 1272, measuring 256 square meters, and
approved June 13, 1958; R.A. 6236, approved June 19, 1971; and P.D. 1073 issued January Lot 1273 a road lot, measuring 21 square meters; and that as owner, she had been in
25, 1977. possession of both lots for fifteen (15) years, and her predecessors-in-interest, for sixty (60)
years. 4 Title to the same parcels of land was however claimed by the Religious of the Virgin
8 114 SCRA at pp. 823-824. Mary. 5 In its answer, it averred that it had bought the lots from Victoria Ong de Ocsio and had
been in possession as owner thereof for over four years, and its possession and that of its
9 Idem, at pp. 809-810. predecessors was immemorial.

10 Idem, at p. 810. Evidence was received on these conflicting assertions after which the Cadastral Court rendered
judgment, declaring that the evidence satisfactorily established that Victoria Ong de Ocsio had in
truth sold Lot No. 1272 to the Religious of the Virgin Mary in virtue of a deed of sale dated April
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation 12, 1956 (Exhibit 1), and Lot No. 1273 was a road right of way granted to the City of Iligan. The
judgment contained the following dispositive portion, viz: 6

WHEREFORE, the court renders judgment adjudicating Cadastral Lot 1272, Iligan Cadastre, to
Today is Saturday, June 23, 2018 the Religious of the Virgin Mary, a duly registered domestic religious corporation, the members
of which are all Filipino citizens, with main office in the City of Manila, but the building existing
Custom Search thereon is hereby declared to be the property of claimant Victoria Ong de Ocsio who is hereby
ordered to remove Said building out of the premises within 90 days from date hereof. The claim
of Victoria Ong de Ocsio with respect to said cadastral lot is dismiss. No pronouncement is
Republic of the Philippines made as to costs.
SUPREME COURT
Manila Let the corresponding decree issue 30 days after this decision shall have become final.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-44237 February 28, 1989
VICTORIA ONG DE OCSIO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and the RELIGIOUS OF THE VIRGIN MARY, represented by M.O.
Leoncia Pacquing, R.V.M., respondents.
Elpedio N. Cabasan for petitioner.
Padilla Law Office for private respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
From the adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals, 1 affirming in toto that of the Trial Court, 2
the petitioner has come to this Court on an appeal by certiorari to plead for reversal of (1) the
factual determination that she had sold the lot in controversy to private respondent, and (2) the
legal conclusion that neither the 1973 nor the 1987 Constitution disqualifies the corporation
known as the Religious of the Virgin Mary, from acquiring the land in question and registering it
in its name. In light of the time-honored rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
generally final, and the doctrine lately laid down by this Court on the precise legal issue now
raised by petitioner, her appeal must fail.
The controversy at bar arose in connection with cadastral proceedings initiated by the Director of
Lands, in behalf of the Republic, for the settlement and adjudication of title to a large tract of land
measuring 261.5791 hectares, divided into 1,419 lots, situated in the City of Iligan. 3
Victoria Ong de Ocsio (herein petitioner) seasonably presented an answer to the petition. She
alleged that she was the owner, by purchase, of two (2) parcels of land with specific boundaries
As aforestated, the Court of Appeals affirmed the cadastral court's decision in toto. So, too, will
this Court.
Both the cadastral Court and the Court of Appeals came to the conclusion, after analysing and
weighing the testimonial and documentary evidence adduced by the parties, that Virginia Ong de
Ocsio's version of the facts was not true-that it was another property, not Lot No. 1272, that she
had conveyed to the religious corporation but that it was indeed Lot No. 1272 that was subject of
the sale and had indeed been transferred to the latter. Now, findings of fact of this sort,
contained in a decision of the Court of Appeals are by long and uniformly observed rule
conclusive on the parties and on the Supreme Court, as well; 7 subject only to a few specified
exceptions, 8 none of which obtains here, said findings may not be reviewed on appeal.
As regards the issue of law raised by her, petitioner fares no better. Citing Manila Electric Co. v.
Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 (1982) and Republic v. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875 (1982), in
relation to Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, she asserts that as the private
respondent is a religious corporation, it is disqualified to obtain judicial confirmation of an
imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which grants that right only to natural
persons. The cited rulings no longer control. Current doctrine, first announced by the Court en
banc in Director of Lands v. I.A.C. 146 SCRA 509 (1986), is that open, continuous and exclusive
possession of alienable public land for at least thirty (30) years in accordance with the Public
Land Act ipso jure converts the land to private property, and a juridical person who thereafter
acquires the same may have title thereto confirmed in its name. Virtually the same state of facts
obtained in said case that now obtain here. A private corporation had purchased the land
originally of the public domain from parties who had, by themselves and through their
predecessors-in-interest, possessed and occupied it since time immemorial. It had thereafter
instituted proceedings for confirmation of title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. In
upholding its right to do so, the court held that the fact that the proceedings had been instituted
by said purchaser in its own name and not in the name of the transferors was "xx simply xx (an)
accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise
affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed." The ruling
was reaffirmed in two later cases, Director of Lands v. Manila Electric Co., 153 SCRA 686
(September 11, 1987), and Republic v. C.A., 156 SCRA 344 (October 30, 1987) where the same
question of law was raised. In the latter it was expressly held that the prohibitions in the 1973
and 1987 Constitutions against acquisition or registration of lands by or in behalf of private
corporations do not apply to public lands already converted to private ownership by natural
persons under the provisions of the Public Land Act. In the present case, Virginia Ong de Ocsio
and her predecessors-in-interest having possessed Lot No. 1272 for the period and under the
conditions prescribed by law for acquisition of ownership of disposable public land prior to the
sale of the property to the Religious of the Virgin Mary, confirmation of title thereto in the latter's
name is, under the precedents referred to, entirely in order.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals subject of the petition for review on
certiorari is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioner.
Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rendered on May 17,1976 in CA-G.R. No. 43661-R: L.B. Reyes, J, ponente, with
whom concurred de Castro and Ericta, JJ.
2 Rendered on August 31, 1968 in Cadastral Case No. N- 11-1, LRC Rec. No. 146 of the CFI of
Lanao del Norte, Hon. F. Pineda, presiding.
3 The petition was filed on July 20, 1956 and was docketed, as aforestated, as CAD
Case No. N-11-1 LRC Rec. No. N-146 and assigned to the sala of Judge Pineda. The petition
was filed pursuant to Sec. 1955 of the Revised Administrative Code in relation to Sec. 53 of the
Public Land Act, Rollo, p. 30, Rec. on App., pp. 1-5.
4 Rec. on App., pp. 9-106.
5 The Court allowed it to file its answers albeit tardily, upon its motion to reopen the proceedings
and upon a showing of excusable negligence in failing to file the same on time. Rec. on App.,
pp. 20-22, 36.
6 Rec. on App., pp. 48-49.
7 SEE e.g., Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. C.A., G.R. No. 57493, Jan. 7, 1987.
8 SEE e.g., Manlapaz v. CA- G.R. No. 56989, Jan. 12, 1987; Vallarta v. I.A.C. G.R No.
74957, June 30, 1987.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
Lawphil Main Menu
♦ Constitution
♦ Statutes
♦ Jurisprudence
♦ Judicial Issuances
♦ Executive Issuances
♦ Treatise
♦ Legal Link
Today is Saturday, June 23, 2018
Custom Search
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 169599 March 16, 2011
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JUANITO MANIMTIM, JULIO UMALI, represented by AURORA U. JUMARANG, SPOUSES
EDILBERTO BAÑANOLA and SOFIA BAÑANOLA, ZENAIDA MALABANAN, MARCELINO
MENDOZA, DEMETRIO BARRIENTOS, FLORITA CUADRA, and FRANCISCA MANIMTIM,
Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Assailed in this petition is the September 5, 2005 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 74720, which reversed and set aside the February 15, 2000 Amended Judgment2
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City (RTC), and reinstated the March 31, 1997
Judgment3 granting the respondents’ application for registration of Lot 3857 but deferring the
approval of the application for Lot 3858.
The Facts
Records show that on December 3, 1991, Juanito Manimtim, Julio Umali, Spouses Edilberto
Bañanola and Sofia Bañanola, Zenaida Malabanan, Marcelino Mendoza, Demetrio Barrientos,
Florita Cuadra, and Francisca Manimtim (respondents) filed with the RTC two applications for
registration and confirmation of their title over two (2) parcels of land, designated as Lot 3857
(Ap-04-006225) with an area of 38,213 square meters and Lot 3858 (Ap-04-006227) with an
area of 9,520 square meters, located in Barangay Sungay, Tagaytay City.
Julio Umali died while the case was pending and he was substituted by his heirs namely:
Guillermo, Jose, Gerardo, Meynardo, Jacinto, and Ernesto, all surnamed Umali, and Aurora
Umali-Jumarang.
The respondents alleged that they are the owners pro indiviso and in fee simple of the subject
parcels of land; that they have acquired the subject parcels of land by purchase or assignment of
rights; and that they have been in actual, open, public, and continuous possession of the subject
land under claim of title exclusive of any other rights and adverse to all other claimants by
themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial.
In support of their applications, the respondents submitted blueprint plans of Lot 3857 and Lot
3858, technical descriptions, certifications in lieu of lost geodetic engineer’s certificates,
declarations of real property tax, official receipts of payment of taxes, real property tax
certifications, and deeds of absolute sale.

The RTC set the initial hearing of the case on May 20, 1992 after compliance with all the
requirements of the law regarding publication, mailing and posting.
On February 19, 1992, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), opposed the respondents’ twin application on the following grounds:
1] Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945
or prior thereto;
2] The muniments of title, that is, tax declaration and tax receipts, attached to or alleged in the
application, do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the
land applied for registration;
3] This is a claim of ownership on the basis of a Spanish title or grant, which has been barred as
a mode of proving acquisition; and
4] The land is part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, which is not
subject to private appropriation.4
On May 15, 1992, the Land Registration Authority (LRA) transmitted to the RTC a report dated
April 29, 1992 stating that there were discrepancies in Plans Ap-04-006225 (Lot 3857) and Ap-
04-006227 (Lot 3858) and referred the matter to the Land Management Sector (LMS), now
called the Land Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), for verification and correction.
On May 20, 1992, Moldex Realty, Inc. (MOLDEX) opposed the applications on the ground that it
is the registered owner of a parcel of land designated as Lot 4, Psu-108624 and technically
described in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-20118 and that the metes and bounds of
Lot 3857 and Lot 3858 overlapped its lot by about 14,088 square meters. MOLDEX, therefore,
prayed that the overlapping portion be excluded from the applications.
On June 30, 1993, the respondents and MOLDEX filed a joint motion requesting the RTC to
appoint a team of commissioners composed of a government representative from the Survey
Division, LMS, DENR; Engr. Vivencio L. Valerio, representing the respondents; and Engr.
Romeo Durante, representing MOLDEX, to conduct an actual ground verification and relocation
survey to assist the RTC in resolving the controversy on the location and position of the subject
lots. On that same day, the RTC granted the joint motion and directed the team of
commissioners to submit its findings within 15 days after the termination of the ground
verification and relocation survey.
On January 19, 1995, Robert C. Pangyarihan, the Chief of Survey Division, LMS, DENR,
transmitted to the RTC the report of Engr. Alexander L. Jacob (Engr. Jacob), based on the
verification and relocation survey he conducted in the presence of the respondents and
MOLDEX, which found an encroachment or overlapping on Lot 4, Psu-108624. The report stated
the following findings and recommendations:
3.5. Lot 4, Psu-108624 is an older approved survey previously decreed and, therefore, it is the
survey which was encroached upon or overlapped by Lot 1, Psu-176181;Lot 1, Psu-176182; and
Lot 1 & 2 Psu-176184.
4. RECOMMENDATIONS
4.1 In view of the foregoing findings of encroachment on decreed survey, the portions labeled as
"A" "B" "C" and "D" should be segregated from Lot 1, Psu-176181; Lot 1 & 2, 176184; and Lot 1
& 2 Psu-176182; respectively, which process involves the amendment of said plans to be
submitted for approval by the Regional Office.
4.2 It is further recommended that the point of reference or "tie point" of Lot 1, Psu-176181, Lot
1, Psu-176182, Lot 1, Psu-176182 and Lot 3, Psu-176181 be changed to BLLM No. 5, Tagaytay
Cadastre, the said amendment being warranted by the findings of this verification survey thru
direct traverse connection of the corner boundaries of said lots from BLLM No. 5 which is
relatively near to subject lots.5
On March 31, 1997, the RTC handed down its Judgment granting the respondents’ application
for registration of Lot 3857 of Plan Ap-04-006227 but deferred the approval of registration of Lot
3858 pending the segregation of 4,243 square meter portion thereof which was found to belong
to MOLDEX.
On April 29, 1997, the respondents filed a motion for partial new trial on the following grounds:
1] Newly discovered evidence explaining that when they were in the process of amending plan
Ap-04-006227 of Lot 3858, they found out that the sketch plan that was furnished to them by the
LRA, upon their request, showed no overlapping between their property and that of MOLDEX;
and
2] Insufficiency of evidence because the plan prepared by Engr. Jacob, which was the basis of
his report, was not signed by the respondents or their representatives and the LRA was not
informed of these developments.
On October 27, 1997, Director Felino M. Cortez (Director Cortez) of the LRA Department of
Registration transmitted a supplementary report to the RTC dated October 1, 1997, which found
that Lot 3858 did not encroach on MOLDEX’s property. Likewise, the supplementary report
made the following recommendations:
1. To approve the correction made by the Lands Management Sector on the boundaries of Lot
3858, Cad. 355 along lines 2-3 and 9-1 which is Lot 4-B, Psu-105624 Amd. as mentioned in
paragraph 2 hereof; and
2. The judgment dated March 31, 1997 with respect to Lot 3858, Cad. 355 item #2 of the
dispositive portion be amended accordingly.6
On January 29, 1998, MOLDEX filed an opposition to the respondents’ motion for partial new
trial for lack of a supporting affidavit of the witness by whom such evidence would be given or a
duly authenticated document which was supposed to be introduced in evidence as required by
Section 2, Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court.
On September 3, 1998, the RTC granted the respondents’ motion for partial new trial.
On February 15, 2000, the RTC, after due hearing and pleadings submitted by the parties,
rendered an Amended Judgment by also approving the application for the confirmation and
registration of Lot 3858 of Plan Ap-04-006227, Cad. 355, Tagaytay Cadastre, Barangay Sungay,
Tagaytay City.
The OSG and MOLDEX filed their respective appeals with the CA based on the following
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
For MOLDEX:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPROVING THE APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION OF LOT 3858 DESPITE FINDINGS OF ENCROACHMENT BASED ON
ACTUAL GROUND VERIFICATION SURVEY CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO ITS OWN
ORDER.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE SUPPLEMENTARY
REPORT DATED 1 OCTOBER 1997 ISSUED BY THE LRA THRU DIRECTOR FELINO
CORTEZ.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE THE REPORT ON THE ACTUAL
GROUND VERIFICATION SURVEY PREPARED BY ENGR. ALEXANDER JACOB DESPITE
COMPLETE ABSENCE OF ANY EVIDENCE TO CONTRADICT ITS VERACITY AND
CORRECTNESS.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT DENIAL OF THE REGISTRATION
FOR LOT 3858 WILL VIOLATE SECTION 19, PARAGRAPH 2 OF P.D. 1529.
For the OSG:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF
ORIGINAL TITLE FOR FAILURE OF THE APPELLEES TO SUBMIT IN EVIDENCE THE
ORIGINAL TRACING CLOTH PLAN OR SEPIA OF THE LAND APPLIED FOR.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLEES, BY THEMSELVES AND
THROUGH THEIR PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST, HAVE BEEN IN POSSESSION OF THE
DISPUTED LANDS IN THE CONCEPT OF OWNER, OPENLY AND ADVERSELY FOR THE
PERIOD REQUIRED BY LAW.
On September 5, 2005, the CA reversed and set aside the February 15, 2000 Amended
Judgment of the RTC and reinstated its earlier March 31, 1997 Judgment. The dispositive
portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the February 15, 2000 Amended Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Tagaytay City, Branch 18 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in its stead, the earlier
March 31, 1997 Judgment is hereby REINSTATED whereby registration as to LOT 3857 is
hereby APPROVED while registration as to LOT 3858 is hereby DENIED until such time that the
encroachment on the land of MOLDEX REALTY, INC. is separated and removed.
The CA held, among others, that the January 19, 1995 Report made by Engr. Jacob of the LMS,
DENR was more reliable than the supplementary report dated October 1, 1997 of Director
Cortez of the Department of Registration, LRA. The CA reasoned out that the January 19, 1995
Report which found that Lot 3858 encroached on the property of MOLDEX was based on an
actual field verification and actual relocation survey ordered by the RTC upon joint motion of the
parties. On the other hand, the supplementary report dated October 1, 1997 which found no
encroachment was only based on an unreliable "table survey" of existing data and plans which
were actually not verified in the field.
The CA likewise ruled that although the respondents failed to submit in evidence the original
tracing cloth plan or sepia of the subject lots (Lots 3857 and 3858), these were sufficiently
identified with the presentation of the blueprint copy of Plans Ap-04-006225 and Ap-04-006227
and the technical descriptions duly certified by the Land Management Bureau.
Hence, the OSG filed this petition.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REINSTATING THE MARCH 31,
1997 DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WHICH APPROVED THE APPLICATION
FOR REGISTRATION OF LOT 3857 BUT DEFERRED THE APPROVAL OF REGISTRATION
OF LOT 3858.
The OSG argues that the respondents have not shown a registrable right over Lot 3857.
According to the OSG, respondents’ evidence is insufficient to establish their alleged possession
over Lot 3857 to warrant its registration in their names. Despite their claim that their
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of Lot 3857 for over 40 years at the time of
their application for registration in December 1991, it appears that their possession only started
in 1951 which falls short of the legal date requirement of possession, that is, since June 12,
1945 or earlier. The respondents simply made a general statement that their possession and
that of their predecessors-in-interest have been adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and
in the concept of an owner for the required number of years. Their general statements simply
lack supporting evidence.
The OSG further contends that the respondents’ claim over the subject lots suffer from the
following infirmities, to wit:
1] The alleged deed of absolute sale upon which Juanito Manimtim (Juanito) anchors his claim
over the lot is a mere xerox copy and mentions only an area of 6,225 square meters and not 11,
577.44 square meters as claimed by him.
2] The signature appearing in the deed of sale as allegedly belonging to Julio Umali as vendor is
actually that of his daughter, Aurora, who, as far as Juanito knows, was not authorized to sign
for and in behalf of her father.
3] Likewise, in the case of Edilberto Bañanola, the alleged deed of absolute sale upon which he
banks his claim on the subject land is a mere xerox copy.
4] Jacinto and Isabelo Umali, claiming that they inherited the land they seek to be registered in
their names, have not adduced any evidence to substantiate this claim.
5) As to Eliseo Granuelas, representing Zenaida Malabanan, he failed to present any instrument
to substantiate her claim that her parents bought the claimed property from Julio Umali.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petition violates Section 2, Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court because the CA decision dated September 5, 2005 is not yet final in view of the
unresolved issues raised in their motion for reconsideration dated September 27, 2005. The
respondents likewise claim that the RTC decision dated February 15, 2000 refers only to Lot
3858, Plan Ap-04006227 and that it was promulgated in accordance with the fundamental
requirements in the land registration of Commonwealth Act No. 141 and Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1529.
They further argue that the OSG, represented by the City Prosecutor of Tagaytay, did not raise
the issues, currently put forward by the OSG, in all the hearings before the RTC. Neither did the
OSG contest the respondents’ possession of Lot 3858 and 3857. In fact, Lot 3858, Plan Ap-04-
006227, together with the other adjoining lots, is originally listed in the original copy of the tracing
cloth of Tagaytay Cadastre Map as those belonging to the respondents’ grandmother, Agapito
Magsumbol, and/or Julio Umali.
Finally, the respondents aver that insofar as Lot No. 3857 is concerned, Original Certificate of
Title No. 0-741 was issued in their names pursuant to the decision dated March 31, 1997 and
that the derivative transfer certificates of title were already registered in their names in
compliance with the order for the issuance of the decree dated December 14, 1998 issued by
the Land Registration Court in LRC No. TG-399.
In reply, the OSG asserts that the issue raised by the respondents has been rendered moot with
the denial by the CA of their motion for reconsideration in its resolution dated March 13, 2006.
The OSG further claims that under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of whatever classification
belong to the state. Hence, the respondents have the burden to show, even in the absence of an
opposition, that they are the absolute owners of the subject lots or that they have continuously
possessed the same under claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.
The Court’s Ruling
In its September 5, 2005 Decision, the CA ruled in favor of the respondents by approving their
application for registration of Lot 3857 but denying their application for registration of Lot 3858
until such time that the encroachment on the land of MOLDEX would have been separated and
removed. The CA, however, did not rule on the second and more important issue of whether the
respondents were qualified for registration of title.
After going over the records, the Court agrees with the OSG that the respondents indeed failed
to sufficiently prove that they are entitled to the registration of the subject lands.
Sec. 14(1) of P.D. No. 15297 in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as
amended by Section 4 of P.D. No. 1073,8 provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply.—The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
[now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.1avvphi1
Xxx
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
Xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter. [Emphasis supplied]
Based on these legal parameters, applicants for registration of title under Section 14(1) must
sufficiently establish: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of
the public domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that it is
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.9 These the respondents
must prove by no less than clear, positive and convincing evidence.10
In the case at bench, the respondents failed to establish that the subject lots were disposable
and alienable lands.
Although respondents attached a photocopy of a certification11 dated August 16, 1988 from the
District Land Officer, LMS, DENR, attesting that the subject lots were not covered by any public
land applications or patents, and another certification12 dated August 23, 1988 from the Office
of the District Forester, Forest Management Bureau, DENR, attesting that the subject lots have
been verified, certified and declared to be within the alienable or disposable land of Tagaytay
City on April 5, 1978, they were not able to present the originals of the attached certifications as
evidence during the trial. Neither were they able to present the officers who issued the
certifications to authenticate them.
A careful scrutiny of the respondents’ Offer of Evidence13 would show that only the following
were offered as evidence:
1) blue print plans of AP-04-006225 and AP-04-006227
2) technical descriptions of Lot 3857 and 3858
3) surveyor’s certificates for Lot 3857 and 3858
4) photo-copy of the deed of sale dated September 17, 1971
5) jurisdictional requirements of posting and publication
6) tax declarations
7) tax receipts
Hence, there is no proof that the subject lots are disposable and alienable lands.
Moreover, the records failed to show that the respondents by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive, continuous, and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject lands, under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945
or earlier.
The respondents presented the testimonies of Juanito Manimtim (Juanito), Edilberto Bañanola,
Jacinto Umali, Eliseo Ganuelas, Isabelo Umali, and Engr. Vivencio Valerio and tax declarations
to prove possession and occupation over the subject lots. These declarations and documents,
however, do not suffice to prove their qualifications and compliance with the requirements.
Juanito testified, among others, that he is a co-owner of the subject lots14 and that his
ownership covers about 11,577.14 square meters of the subject lots;15 that he acquired his
possession through a deed of absolute sale16 dated September 17, 1971 from Julio Umali
(Julio);17 that the 11,577.14 square meter property has been covered by three (3) tax
declarations;18 and that his great grandparents were in possession of the subject lots for a
period of 40 years.19
Juanito, however, could not show a duplicate original copy of the deed of sale dated September agencies is of no controlling significance because the State cannot be estopped by the omission,
17, 1991. Moreover, a closer look at the deed of absolute sale dated September 17, 1991 would mistake or error of its officials or agents.33
show that, for and in consideration of the amount of ₱10,000.00, the sale covered only an area
of 6,225 square meters of Lot 1, Plan Psu-176181 (Lot 3858) and not 11,577.44 square meters WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the September 5, 2005 Decision of the
as claimed. Juanito explained that only the 6,225 square meter portion (Tax Declaration No. Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74720 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another
018-0928)20 was covered by the subject deed of absolute sale while the two (2) other portions judgment entered denying the application for land registration of the subject properties.
(Tax Declaration No. 018-0673 and Tax Declaration No. 018-0748 covering 2,676.40 square
meters each)21 were not covered by any deed of sale because Julio knew that these other SO ORDERED.
portions were already owned by him (Juanito).22 So, no deed of sale was executed between the
two of them after he paid Julio the price for the portions covered by Tax Declaration No. 018- JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
0673 and Tax Declaration No. 018-0748.23 He was not able to show, however, any other Associate Justice
document that would support his claim over the portions beyond 6,225 square meters.
WE CONCUR:
In any event, Juanito failed to substantiate his general statement that his great grandparents
were in possession of the subject lots for a period of over 40 years. He failed to give specific ANTONIO T. CARPIO
details on the actual occupancy by his predecessors-in-interest of the subject lots or mode of Associate Justice
acquisition of ownership for the period of possession required by law. It is a rule that general Chairperson
statements that are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing
and cannot suffice. An applicant in a land registration case cannot just harp on mere conclusions PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.*
of law to embellish the application but must impress thereto the facts and circumstances Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
evidencing the alleged ownership and possession of the land.24 Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Like Juanito, the testimonies of Edilberto Bañanola, Jacinto Umali, Eliseo Ganuelas, and Isabelo Associate Justice
Umali were all unsubstantiated general statements.
ATTESTATION
Edilberto Bañanola (Edilberto) claims that he owns a portion of Lot 3857 based on Tax
Declaration No. GR-018-1058-R25 covering 5,025 square meters and Tax Declaration No. GR- I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
018-1059-R26 covering 6,225 square meters.27 According to him, he bought the subject case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
property from Hilarion Maglabe and Juanito Remulla through a deed of absolute sale28 dated
February 6, 1978.29 To prove the same, he presented several tax declarations30 in the names ANTONIO T. CARPIO
of Hilarion Maglabe and Juanito Remulla. He further asserts that he has been in actual, Associate Justice
continuous and uninterrupted possession of the subject property since he purchased it in Chairperson, Second Division
1978.31
CERTIFICATION
Like Juanito, however, Edilberto failed to present a duplicate original copy of the deed of sale
dated February 6, 1978 and validate his claim that he himself and his predecessors-in-interest Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation,
have been in open, exclusive, continuous, and notorious possession and occupation of the I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
subject land, under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

As for Jacinto Umali and Eliseo Ganuelas, they likewise failed to authenticate their claim of RENATO C. CORONA
acquisition through inheritance and acquisition through purchase, respectively. Chief Justice

Apparently, the respondents’ best evidence to prove possession and ownership over the subject
property were the tax declarations issued in their names. Unfortunately, these tax declarations Footnotes
together with their unsubstantiated general statements and mere xerox copies of deeds of sale
are not enough to prove their rightful claim. Well settled is the rule that tax declarations and * Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, per
receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when not Special Order No. 933 dated January 24, 2011.
supported by any other evidence. The fact that the disputed property may have been declared
for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration or of their predecessors-in- 1Rollo, pp. 29-50. Penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas with Associate Justice Portia
interest does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of Aliño-Hormachuelos and Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., concurring.
ownership.32
2 CA rollo, pp. 81-92.
Finally, the fact that the public prosecutor of Tagaytay City did not contest the respondents’
possession of the subject property is of no moment. The absence of opposition from government 3 Id. at 75-80.
4 Rollo, p. 32. 30 Records, pp. 124-132.

5 Id. at 33-34. 31 TSN, November 11, 1992, p. 11.

6 Id. at 38. 32 Republic of the Philippines v. Dela Paz, supra note 10.

7 Amending and Codifying the Laws Relative to Registration of Property and for other Purposes. 33 Republic of the Philippines v. Lao, 453 Phil. 189 (2003).

8 Extending the Period of Filing Applications for Administrative Legalization (Free Patent) and
Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect and Incomplete Titles to Alienable and Disposable Lands in The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
the Public Domain under Chapter VII and Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, for eleven (11) years commencing on January 1, 1977.

9 Republic of the Philippines v. Ching, G.R. No. 186166, October 20, 2010.

10 Republic of the Philippines v. Dela Paz, G.R. No. 171631, November 15, 2010. SECOND DIVISION

11 Records, p. 62.

12 Id. at 63.
NATIVIDAD STA. ANA VICTORIA, G.R. No. 179673
13 Id. at 105-112.
Petitioner,
14 TSN, October 16, 1992, pp. 4-5.
Present:
15 TSN, October 16, 1992, p. 8.

16 Exh. "J," Records, p. 113. CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

17 TSN, October 16, 1992, p. 11. - versus - PERALTA,

18 TSN, October 16, 1992, pp. 8-10. ABAD,

19 TSN, October 16, 1992, p. 11. PEREZ,* and

20 Records, p. 10. MENDOZA, JJ.

21 Id. at 22-23. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

22 TSN, November 6, 1992, p. 7. Respondent. Promulgated:

23 TSN, November 6, 1992, p. 21.

24 Republic of the Philippines v. Dela Paz, supra note 10. June 8, 2011

25 Records, p. 117. x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

26 Id. at 118.

27 TSN, November 11, 1992, pp. 3-4. DECISION

28 Records, pp. 119-121.

ABAD, J.:
29 TSN, November 11, 1992, p. 5.
This case is about the need for an applicant for registration of title to land to prove that the same
has been officially declared alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The Facts and the Case
On November 2, 2004 petitioner Natividad Sta. Ana Victoria applied for registration under the
law[1] of a 1,729-square meter lot in Bambang, City of Taguig, before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of that city. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the
respondent Republic of the Philippines, opposed the application in the usual form.
Victoria testified and offered documentary evidence to show that the subject lot, known as Lot
5176-D, Mcadm-590-D of the Taguig Cadastral Mapping is a portion of a parcel of land with an
area of 17,507 sq m originally owned by Victorias father Genaro Sta. Ana and previously
declared in his name for tax purposes. Upon Genaros death, Victoria and her siblings inherited
the land and divided it among themselves via a deed of partition.
The Conversion/Subdivision Plan Victoria presented in evidence showed that the land is inside
the alienable and disposable area under Project 27-B as per L.C. Map 2623, as certified by the
Bureau of Forest Development on January 3, 1968. Victoria testified that she and her
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property continuously, uninterruptedly,
openly, publicly, adversely and in the concept of owners since the early 1940s or for more than
30 years and have been declared as owners for taxation purposes for the last 30 years. The
Republic did not present any evidence in support of its opposition.
On January 25, 2006 the MeTC rendered a decision,[2] granting the application for registration
and finding that Victoria sufficiently established her claim and right under the land registration
law to have the subject property registered in her name.
The Republic appealed the MeTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), pointing out in its brief
that Victoria failed to present evidence that the subject property is alienable and disposable land
of the public domain and that she failed to establish the kind of possession required for
registration.
In her brief, Victoria replied that the Conversion/Subdivision Plan she submitted carried a
notation that the subject property is within alienable and disposable area. Further, she attached
to her brief a Certification[3] dated November 6, 2006 issued by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), verifying the subject property as within the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
On June 19, 2007 the CA rendered judgment, reversing and setting aside the MeTC decision
because Victoria failed to prove that the subject lot is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. She could not, said the CA, rely on the notation in the Conversion/Subdivision Plan she
submitted before the MeTC, although it carried a notation that the land is alienable and
disposable as certified by the Chief of Survey of the Land Management Services of the DENR
on January 3, 1968, because such notation was made only in connection with the approval of
the plan.
On the other hand, the CA could not take cognizance of the DENR Certification of November 6,
2006 that she submitted together with her appellees brief even if it were to the same effect since
she did not offer it in evidence during the hearing before the trial court. The CA found it
unnecessary to pass upon the evidence of Victorias possession and occupation of the subject
property. It denied Victorias motion for reconsideration on September 11, 2007.
Issues Presented
The issues in this case are:
1. Whether or not Victoria amply proved that the subject lot is alienable and disposable land of
the public domain; and
2. Whether or not she has amply proved her claim of ownership of the property.
Courts Ruling
Section 14(1)[4] of the Property Registration Decree has three requisites for registration of title:
(a) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (b) that
the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and (c) that such possession is
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[5]
A similar right is granted under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act.[6] There are no material
differences between Sec. 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree and Sec. 48(b) of the Public
Land Act.[7] Sec. 14(1) operationalizes the registration of such lands of the public domain.[8]

Here, the only reason the CA gave in reversing the decision of the MeTC is that Victoria failed to
submit the November 6, 2006 Certification issued by the DENR, verifying the subject property as
within the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, during the hearing before the
MeTC. She belatedly submitted it on appeal.
To prove that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation
or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or statute.[9] The applicant may secure a certification from the
government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable, but the certification must
show that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the
pubic domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO.[10] The applicant must also present a copy of the original classification of the land into
alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the
President.[11]
The DENR Certification submitted by Victoria reads:
This is to certify that the tract of land as shown and described at the reverse side of this
Conversion/Subdivision Plan of Lot 5176 MCadm 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping, Csd-00-
000648, containing an area of 17,507 square meters, situated at Bambang, Taguig City, Metro
Manila, as surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Justa M. de las Alas for Marissa S. Estopalla, et al.,
was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable Land, under Project No. 27-B, Taguig City,
Metro Manila as per LC Map 2623, approved on January 3, 1968.[12]
On July 28, 2010 the Court issued a resolution requiring the OSG to verify from the DENR
whether the Senior Forest Management Specialist of its National Capital Region, Office of the
Regional Technical Director for Forest Management Services, who issued the Certification in this
case, is authorized to issue certifications on the status of public lands as alienable and
disposable, and to submit a copy of the administrative order or proclamation that declares as
alienable and disposable the area where the property involved in this case is located, if any
there be.[13]
In compliance, the OSG submitted a certification from the DENR stating that Senior Forest
Management Specialist Corazon D. Calamno, who signed Victorias DENR Certification, is
authorized to issue certifications regarding status of public land as alienable and disposable
land.[14] The OSG also submitted a certified true copy of Forestry Administrative Order 4-1141
dated January 3, 1968,[15] signed by then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
Arturo R. Tanco, Jr., which declared portions of the public domain covered by Bureau of Forestry
Map LC-2623, approved on January 3, 1968, as alienable and disposable.
Since the OSG does not contest the authenticity of the DENR Certification, it seems too hasty
for the CA to altogether disregard the same simply because it was not formally offered in
evidence before the court below. More so when even the OSG failed to present any evidence in
support of its opposition to the application for registration during trial at the MeTC. The attack on
Victorias proof to establish the nature of the subject property was made explicit only when the
case was at the appeal stage in the Republics appellants brief. Only then did Victoria find it
necessary to present the DENR Certification, since she had believed that the notation in the
Conversion/Subdivision Plan of the property was sufficient.
In Llanes v. Republic,[16] this Court allowed consideration of a CENRO Certification though it
was only presented during appeal to the CA to avoid a patent unfairness. The rules of procedure
being mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, the Court is empowered to
suspend their application to a particular case when its rigid application tends to frustrate rather
than promote the ends of justice.[17] Denying the application for registration now on the ground
of failure to present proof of the status of the land before the trial court and allowing Victoria to
re-file her application would merely unnecessarily duplicate the entire process, cause additional
expense and add to the number of cases that courts must resolve. It would be more prudent to
recognize the DENR Certification and resolve the matter now.
Besides, the record shows that the subject property was covered by a cadastral survey of
Taguig conducted by the government at its expense. Such surveys are carried out precisely to
encourage landowners and help them get titles to the lands covered by such survey. It does not
make sense to raise an objection after such a survey that the lands covered by it are inalienable
land of the public domain, like a public forest. This is the City of Taguig in the middle of the
metropolis.
The CA also erred in not affirming the decision of the MeTC especially since Victoria has,
contrary to the Solicitor Generals allegation, proved that she and her predecessors-in-interest
had been in possession of the subject lot continuously, uninterruptedly, openly, publicly,
adversely and in the concept of owners since the early 1940s. In fact, she has submitted tax
declarations covering the land way back in 1948 that appeared in her fathers name.
We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of the trial court that Victoria amply established her
right to have the subject property registered in her name, given that she has met all the
requisites for registration of title under the Property Registration Decree.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the June 19,
2007 decision and the September 11, 2007 resolution of the Court of Appeals, and
REINSTATES the January 25, 2006 decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 74 of the
City of Taguig.
SO ORDERED.
ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
ROBERTO A. ABAD case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Second Division

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, per
raffle dated June 6, 2011.
[1] Act 496, now Presidential Decree 1529 or the Property Registration Decree.
[2] Rollo, pp. 84-89. Penned by Judge Maria Paz R. Reyes-Yson.
[3] CA rollo, pp. 42-43.
[4] The provision reads: Sec. 14. Who may apply.The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. x x x
[5] Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 489 Phil. 405, 413 (2005).
[6] The provision reads: The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have
not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act [now Property Registration Decree], to wit: x x x (b)
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945 or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except
when prevented by war or force majeur. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter.
[7] Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, supra note 5, at 417.
[8] Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009,
587 SCRA 172, 189.
[9] Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 440 Phil. 697, 710-711 (2002).
[10] Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio, G.R. No. 159589, December 23, 2008, 575 SCRA 51, 77.
[11] Id.
[12] CA rollo, p. 49.
[13] Rollo, p. 203.
[14] Id. at 229. Certification of such authority issued on November 23, 2010 by Rolando G.
Malamug, Chief, Forest Utilization and Law Enforcement Division, and Ibarra G. Calderon, In-
Charge, Office of the Regional Technical Director, Forest Management Service, of the DENR.
[15] Id. at 220. The subject of the order reads: Land Classification. Declaring Certain Portions of
the Public Domain Situated in the Municipalities of Taytay, Las Pias, Muntinglupa, Paraaque,
Taguig, and Pateros, Province of Rizal and in the Municipalities of Bacoor and Imus, Province of
Cavite, Under Project Nos. 5-B, 13-A, 22, 25, 27-B, 29, 6 and 12-A Respectively, as Alienable or
Disposable.
[16] G.R. No. 177947, November 27, 2008, 572 SCRA 258, 268-269.
[17] Id. at 269.
Today is Saturday, June 23, 2018
Custom Search
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-59731 January 11, 1990
ALFREDO CHING, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS & PEDRO ASEDILLO, respondents.
Joaquin E. Chipeco & Lorenzo D. Fuggan for petitioners.
Edgardo Salandanan for private respondent.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent Court
of Appeals (penned by Hon. Rodolfo A. Nocon with the concurrence of Hon. Crisolito Pascual
and Juan A. Sison) in CA-G.R. No. 12358-SP entitled Alfredo Ching v. Hon. M. V. Romillo, et al.
which in effect affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, now Regional Trial
Court (penned by Judge Manuel V. Romillo, Jr. then District Judge, Branch XXVII Pasay City)
granting ex-parte the cancellation of title registered in the name of Ching Leng in favor of Pedro
Asedillo in Civil Case No. 6888-P entitled Pedro Asedillo v. Ching Leng and/or Estate of Ching
Leng.
The facts as culled from the records disclose that:
In May 1960, Decree No. N-78716 was issued to spouses Maximo Nofuente and Dominga
Lumandan in Land Registration Case No. N-2579 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and
Original Certificate of Title No. 2433 correspondingly given by the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Rizal covering a parcel of land situated at Sitio of Kay-Biga Barrio of San Dionisio,
Municipality of Paranaque, Province of Rizal, with an area of 51,852 square meters (Exhibit "7",
p. 80, CA, Rollo).
In August 1960, 5/6 portion of the property was reconveyed by said spouses to Francisco,
Regina, Perfects, Constancio and Matilde all surnamed Nofuente and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 78633 was issued on August 10, 1960 accordingly (Exhibit "8", pp. 81 and 82, Ibid.).
By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng with postal address at No. 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 91137 was issued on September 18, 1961 and T.C.T. No. 78633
was deemed cancelled. (Exhibit "5-2", pp. 76-77 and 83, Ibid.).
On October 19, 1965, Ching Leng died in Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America. His
legitimate son Alfredo Ching filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now RTC) Branch III,
Pasay City a petition for administration of the estate of deceased Ching Leng docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. 1956-P. Notice of hearing on the petition was duly published in the "Daily Mirror", a
newspaper of general circulation on November 23 and 30 and December 7, 1965. No oppositors
appeared at the hearing on December 16, 1965, consequently after presentation of evidence
petitioner Alfredo Ching was appointed administrator of Ching Leng's estate on December 28,
1965 and letters of administration issued on January 3, 1966 (pp. 51-53, Rollo). The land
covered by T.C.T. No. 91137 was among those included in the inventory submitted to the court
(p. 75, Ibid.).
Thirteen (13) years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was commenced on December
27, 1978 by private respondent Pedro Asedillo with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now
RTC), Branch XXVII, Pasay City docketed as Civil Case No. 6888-P for reconveyance of the
abovesaid property and cancellation of T.C.T. No. 91137 in his favor based on possession (p.
33, Ibid.). Ching Leng's last known address is No. 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City which appears
on the face of T.C.T. No. 91137 (not No. 441 Libertad Street, Pasay City, as alleged in private
respondent's complaint). (Order dated May 29, 1980, p. 55, Ibid.). An amended complaint was
filed by private respondent against Ching Leng and/or Estate of Ching Leng on January 30,
1979 alleging "That on account of the fact that the defendant has been residing abroad up to the
present, and it is not known whether the defendant is still alive or dead, he or his estate may be
served by summons and other processes only by publication;" (p. 38, Ibid.). Summons by
publication to Ching Leng and/or his estate was directed by the trial court in its order dated
February 7, 1979. The summons and the complaint were published in the "Economic Monitor", a
newspaper of general circulation in the province of Rizal including Pasay City on March 5, 12
and 19, 1979. Despite the lapse of the sixty (60) day period within which to answer defendant
failed to file a responsive pleading and on motion of counsel for the private respondent, the court
a quo in its order dated May 25, 1979, allowed the presentation of evidence ex-parte. A
judgment by default was rendered on June 15, 1979, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding plaintiffs causes of action in the complaint to be duly substantiated by the
evidence, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant
declaring the former (Pedro Asedillo) to be the true and absolute owner of the property covered
by T.C.T. No. 91137; ordering the defendant to reconvey the said property in favor of the
plaintiff; sentencing the defendant Ching Leng and/or the administrator of his estate to surrender
to the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal the owner's copy of T.C.T. No. 91137 so that
the same may be cancelled failing in which the said T.C.T. No. 91137 is hereby cancelled and
the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal is hereby ordered to issue, in lieu thereof, a new
transfer certificate of title over the said property in the name of the plaintiff Pedro Asedillo of
legal age, and a resident of Estrella Street, Makati, Metro Manila, upon payment of the fees that
may be required therefor, including the realty taxes due the Government.
IT IS SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-44, Ibid.)
Said decision was likewise served by publication on July 2, 9 and 16, 1979 pursuant to Section 7
of Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court (CA Decision, pp. 83-84, Ibid.). The title over the
property in the name of Ching Leng was cancelled and a new Transfer Certificate of Title was
issued in favor of Pedro Asedillo (p. 77, CA Rollo) who subsequently sold the property to Villa
Esperanza Development, Inc. on September 3, 1979 (pp. 125-126, Ibid.).
On October 29, 1979 petitioner Alfredo Ching learned of the abovestated decision. He filed a
verified petition on November 10, 1979 to set it aside as null and void for lack of jurisdiction
which was granted by the court on May 29, 1980 (penned by Hon. Florentino de la Pena,
Vacation Judge, pp. 54-59, Rollo).
On motion of counsel for private respondent the said order of May 29, 1980 was reconsidered
and set aside, the decision dated June 15, 1979 aforequoted reinstated in the order dated
September 2, 1980. (pp. 60-63, Ibid.)
On October 30, 1980, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said latter order but the
same was denied by the trial court on April 12, 1981 (pp. 77-79, Ibid.)
Petitioner filed an original petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals but the same was
dismissed on September 30, 1981. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on
February 10, 1982 (pp. 81-90, Ibid.)
Private respondent Pedro Asedillo died on June 7, 1981 at Makati, Metro Manila during the
pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals (p. 106, CA Rollo).
Hence, the instant petition.
Private respondent's comment was filed on June 1, 1982 (p. 117, Ibid.) in compliance with the
resolution dated April 26, 1982 (p. 109, Ibid.) Petitioner filed a reply to comment on June 18,
1982 (p. 159, Ibid ), and the Court gave due course to the petition in the resolution of June 28,
1982 (p. 191, Ibid.)
Petitioner raised the following:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I
WHETHER OR NOT A DEAD MAN CHING LENG AND/OR HIS ESTATE MAY BE VALIDLY
SERVED WITH SUMMONS AND DECISION BY PUBLICATION.
II
WHETHER OR NOT AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE OF PROPERTY AND
CANCELLATION OF TITLE IS IN PERSONAM, AND IF SO, WOULD A DEAD MAN AND/OR
HIS ESTATE BE BOUND BY SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND DECISION BY PUBLICATION.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE PROCEEDINGS FOR RECONVEYANCE AND CANCELLATION OF
TITLE CAN BE HELD EX-PARTE.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT
MATTER AND THE PARTIES.
V connection with, or as a mere incident in Civil Case No. 6888-P (Estanislao v. Honrado, 114
WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS GUILTY OF LACHES IN INSTITUTING THE
ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE AFTER THE LAPSE OF 19 YEARS FROM THE TIME THE
DECREE OF REGISTRATION WAS ISSUED.
Petitioner's appeal hinges on whether or not the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
substance in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the
Supreme Court.
Petitioner avers that an action for reconveyance and cancellation of title is in personam and the
court a quo never acquired jurisdiction over the deceased Ching Leng and/or his estate by
means of service of summons by publication in accordance with the ruling laid down in Ang Lam
v. Rosillosa et al., 86 Phil. 448 [1950].
On the other hand, private respondent argues that an action for cancellation of title is quasi in
rem, for while the judgment that may be rendered therein is not strictly a judgment in in rem, it
fixes and settles the title to the property in controversy and to that extent partakes of the nature
of the judgment in rem, hence, service of summons by publication may be allowed unto Ching
Leng who on the face of the complaint was a non-resident of the Philippines in line with the
doctrine enunciated in Perkins v. Dizon, 69 Phil. 186 [1939].
The petition is impressed with merit.
An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is not an action in rem
or an action against the whole world, like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a will; it
is an action in personam, so much so that a judgment therein is binding only upon the parties
properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. Actions in personam and
actions in rem differ in that the former are directed against specific persons and seek personal
judgments, while the latter are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and
seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world. An action to recover a parcel of
land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only
although it concerns the right to a tangible thing (Ang Lam v. Rosillosa, supra).
Private respondent's action for reconveyance and cancellation of title being in personam, the
judgment in question is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased
defendant Ching Leng. Verily, the action was commenced thirteen (13) years after the latter's
death. As ruled by this Court in Dumlao v. Quality Plastic Products, Inc. (70 SCRA 475 [1976])
the decision of the lower court insofar as the deceased is concerned, is void for lack of
jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been validly served with
summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical personality, that is fitness to be subject
of legal relations, was lost through death (Arts. 37 and 42 Civil Code).
The same conclusion would still inevitably be reached notwithstanding joinder of Ching Leng's
estate as co-defendant. it is a well-settled rule that an estate can sue or be sued through an
executor or administrator in his representative capacity (21 Am. Jr. 872). Contrary to private
respondent's claims, deceased Ching Leng is a resident of 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City as
shown in his death certificate and T. C. T. No. 91137 and there is an on-going intestate
proceedings in the same court, Branch III commenced in 1965, and notice of hearing thereof
duly published in the same year. Such misleading and misstatement of facts demonstrate lack of
candor on the part of private respondent and his counsel, which is censurable.
The complaint for cancellation of Ching Leng's Torrens Title must be filed in the original land
registration case, RTC, Pasig, Rizal, sitting as a land registration court in accordance with
Section 112 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, as amended) not in CFI Pasay City in
SCRA 748 [1982]).
Section 112 of the same law requires "notice to all parties in interest." Since Ching Leng was
already in the other world when the summons was published he could not have been notified at
all and the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over his person. The ex-parte proceedings for
cancellation of title could not have been held (Estanislao v. Honrado, supra).
The cited case of Perkins v. Dizon, supra is inapplicable to the case at bar since petitioner
Perkins was a non-resident defendant sued in Philippine courts and sought to be excluded from
whatever interest she has in 52,874 shares of stocks with Benguet Consolidated Mining
Company. The action being a quasi in rem summons by publication satisfied the constitutional
requirement of due process.
The petition to set aside the judgment for lack of jurisdiction should have been granted and the
amended complaint of private respondent based on possession and filed only in 1978 dismissed
outrightly. Ching Leng is an innocent purchaser for value as shown by the evidence adduced in
his behalf by petitioner herein, tracing back the roots of his title since 1960, from the time the
decree of registration was issued.
The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another's name—after one year from the date of the decree—is not to set aside the
decree, but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an
ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for damages if the property has passed unto the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value (Sy, Sr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
66742; Teoville Development Corporation v. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 75011, June 16, 1988).
Failure to take steps to assert any rights over a disputed land for 19 years from the date of
registration of title is fatal to the private respondent's cause of action on the ground of laches.
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which by exercising
due diligence could or should have been done, earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it (Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78178,
April 15, 1988; Villamor v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 41508, June 27, 1988).
The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question
as to its legality. Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the "mirador su casa," to avoid the possibility of
losing his land (National Grains Authority v. IAC, 157 SCRA 388 [1988]).
A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein
(Section 49, Act 496). A strong presumption exists that Torrens titles are regularly issued and
that they are valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible against any "information possessoria" or title
existing prior to the issuance thereof not annotated on the title (Salamat Vda. de Medina v. Cruz,
G.R. No. 39272, May 4, 1988).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, (1) the instant petition is hereby GRANTED; (2) the appealed
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; (3) the trial court's
decision dated June 15, 1979 and the Order dated September 2, 1980 reinstating the same are
hereby declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction and (4) the complaint in Civil Case No.
6888-P is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
1) Reimburse complainant the sum of P3,187,500.00, representing the purchase price paid by
Melencio-Herrera, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur. the complainants to P.R. Builders, plus interest thereon at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annum from the time complaint was filed;
Padilla, J., took no part.
2) Pay complainant the sum of P297,000.00 as actual damages;

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation 3) Pay complainant the sum of P100,000.00 by way of moral damages;

Unchecked Article 4) Pay complainant the sum of P150,000.00 as exemplary damages;

5) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and for other litigation expenses; and

Today is Saturday, June 23, 2018 6) Cost of suit.

Custom Search SO ORDERED.3

Meanwhile, spouses Hulst divorced. Ida assigned her rights over the purchased property to
Republic of the Philippines petitioner.4 From then on, petitioner alone pursued the case.
SUPREME COURT
Manila On August 21, 1997, the HLURB Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution addressed to the Ex-Officio
Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas directing the latter to execute its
THIRD DIVISION judgment.5

G.R. No. 156364 September 3, 2007 On April 13, 1998, the Ex-Officio Sheriff proceeded to implement the Writ of Execution.
However, upon complaint of respondent with the CA on a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
JACOBUS BERNHARD HULST, petitioner, the levy made by the Sheriff was set aside, requiring the Sheriff to levy first on respondent's
vs. personal properties.6 Sheriff Jaime B. Ozaeta (Sheriff) tried to implement the writ as directed but
PR BUILDERS, INC., respondent. the writ was returned unsatisfied.7

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court assailing the Decision1 dated October 30, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 60981.
The facts:
Jacobus Bernhard Hulst (petitioner) and his spouse Ida Johanna Hulst-Van Ijzeren (Ida), Dutch
nationals, entered into a Contract to Sell with PR Builders, Inc. (respondent), for the purchase of
a 210-sq m residential unit in respondent's townhouse project in Barangay Niyugan, Laurel,
Batangas.
On January 26, 1999, upon petitioner's motion, the HLURB Arbiter issued an Alias Writ of
Execution.8
On March 23, 1999, the Sheriff levied on respondent's 15 parcels of land covered by 13 Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT)9 in Barangay Niyugan, Laurel, Batangas.10
In a Notice of Sale dated March 27, 2000, the Sheriff set the public auction of the levied
properties on April 28, 2000 at 10:00 a.m..11
Two days before the scheduled public auction or on April 26, 2000, respondent filed an Urgent
Motion to Quash Writ of Levy with the HLURB on the ground that the Sheriff made an overlevy
since the aggregate appraised value of the levied properties at P6,500.00 per sq m is
P83,616,000.00, based on the Appraisal Report12 of Henry Hunter Bayne Co., Inc. dated
December 11, 1996, which is over and above the judgment award.13

When respondent failed to comply with its verbal promise to complete the project by June 1995,
the spouses Hulst filed before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) a
complaint for rescission of contract with interest, damages and attorney's fees, docketed as
HLRB Case No. IV6-071196-0618.
On April 22, 1997, HLURB Arbiter Ma. Perpetua Y. Aquino (HLURB Arbiter) rendered a
Decision2 in favor of spouses Hulst, the dispositive portion of which reads:
At 10:15 a.m. of the scheduled auction date of April 28, 2000, respondent's counsel objected to
the conduct of the public auction on the ground that respondent's Urgent Motion to Quash Writ
of Levy was pending resolution. Absent any restraining order from the HLURB, the Sheriff
proceeded to sell the 15 parcels of land. Holly Properties Realty Corporation was the winning
bidder for all 15 parcels of land for the total amount of P5,450,653.33. The sum of
P5,313,040.00 was turned over to the petitioner in satisfaction of the judgment award after
deducting the legal fees.14

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the complainant, At 4:15 p.m. of the same day, while the Sheriff was at the HLURB office to remit the legal fees
rescinding the Contract to Sell and ordering respondent to: relative to the auction sale and to submit the Certificates of Sale15 for the signature of HLURB
Director Belen G. Ceniza (HLURB Director), he received the Order dated April 28, 2000 issued
by the HLURB Arbiter to suspend the proceedings on the matter.16
Four months later, or on August 28, 2000, the HLURB Arbiter and HLURB Director issued an
Order setting aside the sheriff's levy on respondent's real properties,17 reasoning as follows:
While we are not making a ruling that the fair market value of the levied properties is
PhP6,500.00 per square meter (or an aggregate value of PhP83,616,000.00) as indicated in the
Hunter Baynes Appraisal Report, we definitely cannot agree with the position of the
Complainants and the Sheriff that the aggregate value of the 12,864.00-square meter levied
properties is only around PhP6,000,000.00. The disparity between the two valuations are [sic] so
egregious that the Sheriff should have looked into the matter first before proceeding with the
execution sale of the said properties, especially when the auction sale proceedings was
seasonably objected by Respondent's counsel, Atty. Noel Mingoa. However, instead of resolving
first the objection timely posed by Atty. Mingoa, Sheriff Ozaete totally disregarded the objection
raised and, posthaste, issued the corresponding Certificate of Sale even prior to the payment of
the legal fees (pars. 7 & 8, Sheriff's Return).
While we agree with the Complainants that what is material in an execution sale proceeding is
the amount for which the properties were bidded and sold during the public auction and that,
mere inadequacy of the price is not a sufficient ground to annul the sale, the court is justified to
intervene where the inadequacy of the price shocks the conscience (Barrozo vs. Macaraeg, 83
Phil. 378). The difference between PhP83,616,000.00 and Php6,000,000.00 is
PhP77,616,000.00 and it definitely invites our attention to look into the proceedings had
especially so when there was only one bidder, the HOLLY PROPERTIES REALTY
CORPORATION represented by Ma, Chandra Cacho (par. 7, Sheriff's Return) and the auction
sale proceedings was timely objected by Respondent's counsel (par. 6, Sheriff's Return) due to
the pendency of the Urgent Motion to Quash the Writ of Levy which was filed prior to the
execution sale.
Besides, what is at issue is not the value of the subject properties as determined during the
auction sale, but the determination of the value of the properties levied upon by the Sheriff taking
into consideration Section 9(b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure x x x.
xxxx
It is very clear from the foregoing that, even during levy, the Sheriff has to consider the fair
market value of the properties levied upon to determine whether they are sufficient to satisfy the
judgment, and any levy in excess of the judgment award is void (Buan v. Court of Appeals, 235
SCRA 424).
x x x x18 (Emphasis supplied).
The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, the levy on the subject properties made by the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC of
Tanauan, Batangas, is hereby SET ASIDE and the said Sheriff is hereby directed to levy instead
Respondent's real properties that are reasonably sufficient to enforce its final and executory
judgment, this time, taking into consideration not only the value of the properties as indicated in
their respective tax declarations, but also all the other determinants at arriving at a fair market
value, namely: the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its actual or potential
uses, and in the particular case of lands, their size, shape or location, and the tax declarations
thereon.
SO ORDERED.19
A motion for reconsideration being a prohibited pleading under Section 1(h), Rule IV of the 1996
HLURB Rules and Procedure, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA
on September 27, 2000.
On October 30, 2002, the CA rendered herein assailed Decision20 dismissing the petition. The
CA held that petitioner's insistence that Barrozo v. Macaraeg21 does not apply since said case
stated that "when there is a right to redeem inadequacy of price should not be material" holds no
water as what is obtaining in this case is not "mere inadequacy," but an inadequacy that shocks
the senses; that Buan v. Court of Appeals22 properly applies since the questioned levy covered
15 parcels of land posited to have an aggregate value of P83,616,000.00 which shockingly
exceeded the judgment debt of only around P6,000,000.00.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration,23 petitioner took the present recourse on the sole
ground that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE ARBITER'S
ORDER SETTING ASIDE THE LEVY MADE BY THE SHERIFF ON THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES.24
Before resolving the question whether the CA erred in affirming the Order of the HLURB setting
aside the levy made by the sheriff, it behooves this Court to address a matter of public and
national importance which completely escaped the attention of the HLURB Arbiter and the CA:
petitioner and his wife are foreign nationals who are disqualified under the Constitution from
owning real property in their names.
Section 7 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain. (Emphasis supplied).
The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain. Private land may be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or
entities "qualified to acquire lands of the public domain." The 1987 Constitution reserved the
right to participate in the disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of lands of the
public domain for Filipino citizens25 or corporations at least 60 percent of the capital of which is
owned by Filipinos.26 Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from
acquiring public lands; hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands.27
Since petitioner and his wife, being Dutch nationals, are proscribed under the Constitution from
acquiring and owning real property, it is unequivocal that the Contract to Sell entered into by
petitioner together with his wife and respondent is void. Under Article 1409 (1) and (7) of the
Civil Code, all contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law or public policy and
those expressly prohibited or declared void by law are inexistent and void from the beginning.
Article 1410 of the same Code provides that the action or defense for the declaration of the
inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. A void contract is equivalent to nothing; it produces
no civil effect.28 It does not create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation.29
Generally, parties to a void agreement cannot expect the aid of the law; the courts leave them as
they are, because they are deemed in pari delicto or "in equal fault."30 In pari delicto is "a
universal doctrine which holds that no action arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal contract;
no suit can be maintained for its specific performance, or to recover the property agreed to be
sold or delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or damages for its violation; and where the
parties are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will be given to one against the
other."31
This rule, however, is subject to exceptions32 that permit the return of that which may have been
given under a void contract to: (a) the innocent party (Arts. 1411-1412, Civil Code);33 (b) the
debtor who pays usurious interest (Art. 1413, Civil Code);34 (c) the party repudiating the void
contract before the illegal purpose is accomplished or before damage is caused to a third person
and if public interest is subserved by allowing recovery (Art. 1414, Civil Code);35 (d) the
incapacitated party if the interest of justice so demands (Art. 1415, Civil Code);36 (e) the party
for whose protection the prohibition by law is intended if the agreement is not illegal per se but
merely prohibited and if public policy would be enhanced by permitting recovery (Art. 1416, Civil
Code);37 and (f) the party for whose benefit the law has been intended such as in price ceiling
laws (Art. 1417, Civil Code)38 and labor laws (Arts. 1418-1419, Civil Code).39
It is significant to note that the agreement executed by the parties in this case is a Contract to
Sell and not a contract of sale. A distinction between the two is material in the determination of
when ownership is deemed to have been transferred to the buyer or vendee and, ultimately, the
resolution of the question on whether the constitutional proscription has been breached.
In a contract of sale, the title passes to the buyer upon the delivery of the thing sold. The vendor
has lost and cannot recover the ownership of the property until and unless the contract of sale is
itself resolved and set aside.40 On the other hand, a contract to sell is akin to a conditional sale
where the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor's obligation to transfer title is subordinated to
the happening of a future and uncertain event, so that if the suspensive condition does not take
place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed.41 In other
words, in a contract to sell, the prospective seller agrees to transfer ownership of the property to
the buyer upon the happening of an event, which normally is the full payment of the purchase
price. But even upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition, ownership does not
automatically transfer to the buyer. The prospective seller still has to convey title to the
prospective buyer by executing a contract of absolute sale.42
Since the contract involved here is a Contract to Sell, ownership has not yet transferred to the
petitioner when he filed the suit for rescission. While the intent to circumvent the constitutional
proscription on aliens owning real property was evident by virtue of the execution of the Contract
to Sell, such violation of the law did not materialize because petitioner caused the rescission of
the contract before the execution of the final deed transferring ownership.
Thus, exception (c) finds application in this case. Under Article 1414, one who repudiates the
agreement and demands his money before the illegal act has taken place is entitled to recover.
Petitioner is therefore entitled to recover what he has paid, although the basis of his claim for
rescission, which was granted by the HLURB, was not the fact that he is not allowed to acquire
private land under the Philippine Constitution. But petitioner is entitled to the recovery only of the
amount of P3,187,500.00, representing the purchase price paid to respondent. No damages
may be recovered on the basis of a void contract; being nonexistent, the agreement produces no
juridical tie between the parties involved.43 Further, petitioner is not entitled to actual as well as
interests thereon,44 moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
The Court takes into consideration the fact that the HLURB Decision dated April 22, 1997 has
long been final and executory. Nothing is more settled in the law than that a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any
respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and
whether it was made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.45 The only
recognized exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc
pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable.46 None of the exceptions is present in this case. The HLURB decision cannot be
considered a void judgment, as it was rendered by a tribunal with jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the complaint.47
Ineluctably, the HLURB Decision resulted in the unjust enrichment of petitioner at the expense of
respondent. Petitioner received more than what he is entitled to recover under the
circumstances.
Article 22 of the Civil Code which embodies the maxim, nemo ex alterius incommode debet
lecupletari (no man ought to be made rich out of another's injury), states:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him.
The above-quoted article is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, the
provisions of which were formulated as basic principles to be observed for the rightful
relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order; designed to indicate
certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience; guides for human conduct that
should run as golden threads through society to the end that law may approach its supreme
ideal which is the sway and dominance of justice.48 There is unjust enrichment when a person
unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of
another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.49
A sense of justice and fairness demands that petitioner should not be allowed to benefit from his
act of entering into a contract to sell that violates the constitutional proscription.
This is not a case of equity overruling or supplanting a positive provision of law or judicial rule.
Rather, equity is exercised in this case "as the complement of legal jurisdiction [that] seeks to
reach and to complete justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want
of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do
so."50
The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction in this case is to prevent unjust enrichment and
to ensure restitution. Equity jurisdiction aims to do complete justice in cases where a court of law
is unable to adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of the
inflexibility of its statutory or legal jurisdiction.51
The sheriff delivered to petitioner the amount of P5,313,040.00 representing the net proceeds
(bidded amount is P5,450,653.33) of the auction sale after deducting the legal fees in the
amount of P137,613.33.52 Petitioner is only entitled to P3,187,500.00, the amount of the
purchase price of the real property paid by petitioner to respondent under the Contract to Sell.
Thus, the Court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may validly order petitioner to return the
excess amount of P2,125,540.00.
The Court shall now proceed to resolve the single issue raised in the present petition: whether
the CA seriously erred in affirming the HLURB Order setting aside the levy made by the Sheriff
on the subject properties.
Petitioner avers that the HLURB Arbiter and Director had no factual basis for pegging the fair
market value of the levied properties at P6,500.00 per sq m or P83,616,000.00; that reliance on
the appraisal report was misplaced since the appraisal was based on the value of land in
neighboring developed subdivisions and on the assumption that the residential unit appraised
had already been built; that the Sheriff need not determine the fair market value of the subject
properties before levying on the same since what is material is the amount for which the
properties were bidded and sold during the public auction; that the pendency of any motion is
not a valid ground for the Sheriff to suspend the execution proceedings and, by itself, does not
have the effect of restraining the Sheriff from proceeding with the execution.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that while it is true that the HLURB Arbiter and
Director did not categorically state the exact value of the levied properties, said properties
cannot just amount to P6,000,000.00; that the HLURB Arbiter and Director correctly held that the
value indicated in the tax declaration is not the sole determinant of the value of the property.
The petition is impressed with merit.
If the judgment is for money, the sheriff or other authorized officer must execute the same
pursuant to the provisions of Section 9, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, viz:
Sec. 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced. –
(a) Immediate payment on demand. - The officer shall enforce an execution of a judgment for
money by demanding from the judgment obligor the immediate payment of the full amount
stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees. x x x
(b) Satisfaction by levy. - If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash,
certified bank check or other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer
shall levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which
may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution, giving the latter the
option to immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to
satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option, the officer shall first
levy on the personal properties, if any, and then on the real properties if the personal properties
are insufficient to answer for the judgment.
The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the personal or real property of the judgment
obligor which has been levied upon.
When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment
and lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the personal or real property as is sufficient to
satisfy the judgment and lawful fees.
Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any interest in
either real or personal property, may be levied upon in like manner and with like effect as under
a writ of attachment (Emphasis supplied).53
Thus, under Rule 39, in executing a money judgment against the property of the judgment
debtor, the sheriff shall levy on all property belonging to the judgment debtor as is amply
sufficient to satisfy the judgment and costs, and sell the same paying to the judgment creditor so
much of the proceeds as will satisfy the amount of the judgment debt and costs. Any excess in
the proceeds shall be delivered to the judgment debtor unless otherwise directed by the
judgment or order of the court.54
Clearly, there are two stages in the execution of money judgments. First, the levy and then the
execution sale.
Levy has been defined as the act or acts by which an officer sets apart or appropriates a part or
the whole of a judgment debtor's property for the purpose of satisfying the command of the writ
of execution.55 The object of a levy is to take property into the custody of the law, and thereby
render it liable to the lien of the execution, and put it out of the power of the judgment debtor to
divert it to any other use or purpose.56
On the other hand, an execution sale is a sale by a sheriff or other ministerial officer under the
authority of a writ of execution of the levied property of the debtor.57
In the present case, the HLURB Arbiter and Director gravely abused their discretion in setting
aside the levy conducted by the Sheriff for the reason that the auction sale conducted by the
sheriff rendered moot and academic the motion to quash the levy. The HLURB Arbiter lost
jurisdiction to act on the motion to quash the levy by virtue of the consummation of the auction
sale. Absent any order from the HLURB suspending the auction sale, the sheriff rightfully
proceeded with the auction sale. The winning bidder had already paid the winning bid. The legal
fees had already been remitted to the HLURB. The judgment award had already been turned
over to the judgment creditor. What was left to be done was only the issuance of the
corresponding certificates of sale to the winning bidder. In fact, only the signature of the HLURB
Director for that purpose was needed58 – a purely ministerial act.
A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of
facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard
for or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the
law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty
shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only
when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor
judgment.59 In the present case, all the requirements of auction sale under the Rules have been
fully complied with to warrant the issuance of the corresponding certificates of sale.
And even if the Court should go into the merits of the assailed Order, the petition is meritorious
on the following grounds:
Firstly, the reliance of the HLURB Arbiter and Director, as well as the CA, on Barrozo v.
Macaraeg60 and Buan v. Court of Appeals61 is misplaced.
The HLURB and the CA misconstrued the Court's pronouncements in Barrozo. Barrozo involved
a judgment debtor who wanted to repurchase properties sold at execution beyond the one-year
redemption period. The statement of the Court in Barrozo, that "only where such inadequacy
shocks the conscience the courts will intervene," is at best a mere obiter dictum. This declaration
should be taken in the context of the other declarations of the Court in Barrozo, to wit:
Another point raised by appellant is that the price paid at the auction sale was so inadequate as
to shock the conscience of the court. Supposing that this issue is open even after the one-year
period has expired and after the properties have passed into the hands of third persons who
may have paid a price higher than the auction sale money, the first thing to consider is that the
stipulation contains no statement of the reasonable value of the properties; and although
defendant' answer avers that the assessed value was P3,960 it also avers that their real market
value was P2,000 only. Anyway, mere inadequacy of price – which was the complaint' allegation
– is not sufficient ground to annul the sale. It is only where such inadequacy shocks the
conscience that the courts will intervene. x x x Another consideration is that the assessed value
being P3,960 and the purchase price being in effect P1,864 (P464 sale price plus P1,400
mortgage lien which had to be discharged) the conscience is not shocked upon examining the
prices paid in the sales in National Bank v. Gonzales, 45 Phil., 693 and Guerrero v. Guerrero, 57
Phil., 445, sales which were left undisturbed by this Court.
Furthermore, where there is the right to redeem – as in this case – inadequacy of price should
not be material because the judgment debtor may re-acquire the property or else sell his right to
redeem and thus recover any loss he claims to have suffered by reason of the price obtained at
the execution sale.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied).62
In other words, gross inadequacy of price does not nullify an execution sale. In an ordinary sale,
for reason of equity, a transaction may be invalidated on the ground of inadequacy of price, or
when such inadequacy shocks one's conscience as to justify the courts to interfere; such does
not follow when the law gives the owner the right to redeem as when a sale is made at public
auction,63 upon the theory that the lesser the price, the easier it is for the owner to effect
redemption.64 When there is a right to redeem, inadequacy of price should not be material
because the judgment debtor may re-acquire the property or else sell his right to redeem and
thus recover any loss he claims to have suffered by reason of the price obtained at the execution
sale.65 Thus, respondent stood to gain rather than be harmed by the low sale value of the
auctioned properties because it possesses the right of redemption. More importantly, the subject
matter in Barrozo is the auction sale, not the levy made by the Sheriff.
The Court does not sanction the piecemeal interpretation of a decision. To get the true intent
and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be isolated and resorted to, but the
decision must be considered in its entirety.66
As regards Buan, it is cast under an entirely different factual milieu. It involved the levy on two
parcels of land owned by the judgment debtor; and the sale at public auction of one was
sufficient to fully satisfy the judgment, such that the levy and attempted execution of the second
parcel of land was declared void for being in excess of and beyond the original judgment award
granted in favor of the judgment creditor.
In the present case, the Sheriff complied with the mandate of Section 9, Rule 39 of the Revised
Rules of Court, to "sell only a sufficient portion" of the levied properties "as is sufficient to satisfy
the judgment and the lawful fees." Each of the 15 levied properties was successively bidded
upon and sold, one after the other until the judgment debt and the lawful fees were fully satisfied.
Holly Properties Realty Corporation successively bidded upon and bought each of the levied
properties for the total amount of P5,450,653.33 in full satisfaction of the judgment award and
legal fees.67
Secondly, the Rules of Court do not require that the value of the property levied be exactly the
same as the judgment debt; it can be less or more than the amount of debt. This is the
contingency addressed by Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In the levy of property, the
Sheriff does not determine the exact valuation of the levied property. Under Section 9, Rule 39,
in conjunction with Section 7, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, the sheriff is required to do only two
specific things to effect a levy upon a realty: (a) file with the register of deeds a copy of the order
of execution, together with the description of the levied property and notice of execution; and (b)
leave with the occupant of the property copy of the same order, description and notice.68
Records do not show that respondent alleged non-compliance by the Sheriff of said requisites.
Thirdly, in determining what amount of property is sufficient out of which to secure satisfaction of
the execution, the Sheriff is left to his own judgment. He may exercise a reasonable discretion,
and must exercise the care which a reasonably prudent person would exercise under like
conditions and circumstances, endeavoring on the one hand to obtain sufficient property to
satisfy the purposes of the writ, and on the other hand not to make an unreasonable and
unnecessary levy.69 Because it is impossible to know the precise quantity of land or other
property necessary to satisfy an execution, the Sheriff should be allowed a reasonable margin
between the value of the property levied upon and the amount of the execution; the fact that the
Sheriff levies upon a little more than is necessary to satisfy the execution does not render his
actions improper.70 Section 9, Rule 39, provides adequate safeguards against excessive
levying. The Sheriff is mandated to sell so much only of such real property as is sufficient to
satisfy the judgment and lawful fees.
In the absence of a restraining order, no error, much less abuse of discretion, can be imputed to
the Sheriff in proceeding with the auction sale despite the pending motion to quash the levy filed
by the respondents with the HLURB. It is elementary that sheriffs, as officers charged with the
delicate task of the enforcement and/or implementation of judgments, must, in the absence of a
restraining order, act with considerable dispatch so as not to unduly delay the administration of
justice; otherwise, the decisions, orders, or other processes of the courts of justice and the like
would be futile.71 It is not within the jurisdiction of the Sheriff to consider, much less resolve,
respondent's objection to the continuation of the conduct of the auction sale. The Sheriff has no
authority, on his own, to suspend the auction sale. His duty being ministerial, he has no
discretion to postpone the conduct of the auction sale.
Finally, one who attacks a levy on the ground of excessiveness carries the burden of sustaining
that contention.72 In the determination of whether a levy of execution is excessive, it is proper to
take into consideration encumbrances upon the property, as well as the fact that a forced sale
usually results in a sacrifice; that is, the price demanded for the property upon a private sale is
not the standard for determining the excessiveness of the levy.73
Here, the HLURB Arbiter and Director had no sufficient factual basis to determine the value of
the levied property. Respondent only submitted an Appraisal Report, based merely on surmises.
The Report was based on the projected value of the townhouse project after it shall have been
fully developed, that is, on the assumption that the residential units appraised had already been
built. The Appraiser in fact made this qualification in its Appraisal Report: "[t]he property subject
of this appraisal has not been constructed. The basis of the appraiser is on the existing model
units."74 Since it is undisputed that the townhouse project did not push through, the projected
value did not become a reality. Thus, the appraisal value cannot be equated with the fair market
value. The Appraisal Report is not the best proof to accurately show the value of the levied
properties as it is clearly self-serving.
Therefore, the Order dated August 28, 2000 of HLURB Arbiter Aquino and Director Ceniza in
HLRB Case No. IV6-071196-0618 which set aside the sheriff's levy on respondent's real
properties, was clearly issued with grave abuse of discretion. The CA erred in affirming said
Order.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 30, 2002 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60981 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated
August 28, 2000 of HLURB Arbiter Ma. Perpetua Y. Aquino and Director Belen G. Ceniza in
HLRB Case No. IV6-071196-0618 is declared NULL and VOID. HLURB Arbiter Aquino and
Director Ceniza are directed to issue the corresponding certificates of sale in favor of the winning
bidder, Holly Properties Realty Corporation. Petitioner is ordered to return to respondent the
amount of P2,125,540.00, without interest, in excess of the proceeds of the auction sale
delivered to petitioner. After the finality of herein judgment, the amount of P2,125,540.00 shall
earn 6% interest until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and concurred in by Associate
Justices Eliezer R. de Los Santos (now deceased) and Amelita G. Tolentino, CA rollo, p. 443.
2 Id. at 48.
3 Id. at 50. Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve
hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.
4 Id. at 46.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied).
5 Id. at 51.
26 Id. at Section 2.
6 Id. at 66.
Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils,
7 Id. at 75. all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
8 Id. at 76. natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly
9 Id. at 78-129. undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
10 Id. at 81, 85, 89, 93, 97, 101, 105, 109, 113, 117, 121, 125 and 129. whose capital is owned by such citizens. x x x (Emphasis supplied).

11 Id. at 130. 27 Muller v. Muller, G.R. No. 149615, August 29, 2006, 500 SCRA 65, 71; Frenzel v. Catito,
G.R. No. 143958, July 11, 2003, 406 SCRA 55, 69; Ong Ching Po v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
12 Id. at 140 and 151. 113472-73, December 20, 1994, 239 SCRA 341, 346.

13 Id. at 136. 28 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines (1991), Vol. IV, p. 629; Tongoy v. Court of Appeals,
208 Phil. 95, 113 (1983).
14 Id. at 210.
29 Id. at 632; Tongoy v. Court of Appeals, id.
15 Id. at 191-207.
30 Sodhi, Latin Words and Phrases for Lawyers (1980), p. 115.
16 Supra note 14.
31 Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary (1988), p. 451, citing Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun, 93 Phil.
17 Id. at 38. 827, 831, (1953).

18 Id. at 42-43. 32 Vitug, Civil Law Annotated, Vol. III (2003), pp. 159-160.

19 Id. at 44. 33 Art. 1411. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract,
and the act constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no
20 Supra note 1. action against each other, and both shall be prosecuted. Moreover, the provisions of the Penal
Code relative to the disposal of effects or instruments of a crime shall be applicable to the things
21 83 Phil. 378 (1949). or the price of the contract.

22 G.R. No. 101614, August 17, 1994, 235 SCRA 424.
23 Applying by analogy the ruling in Commissioner on Higher Education v. Mercado, G.R. No.
157877, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 424, 432, a party may elevate a decision of the Court of
Appeals before the Supreme Court by way of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, without the benefit of a prior motion for reconsideration.
24 Rollo, p. 19.
This rule shall be applicable when only one of the parties is guilty; but the innocent one may
claim what he has given, and shall not be bound to comply with his promise.
Art.1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a
criminal offense, the following rule shall be observed:
(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has
given by virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the other's undertaking;

25 Constitution, (1987), Article XII, Section 3.
Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands,
and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be classified by law according to
the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the
public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the
(2) When only one of the contracting parties is at fault, he cannot recover what he has given by
reason of the contract, or ask for the fulfillment of what has been promised him. The other who is
not at fault, may demand the return of what he has given without any obligation to comply with
his promise.
34 Art. 1413. Interest paid in excess of the interest allowed by the usury laws may be recovered
by the debtor, with interest thereon from the date of the payment.
35 Art. 1414. When money is paid or property delivered for an illegal purpose, the contract may
be repudiated by one of the parties before the purpose has been accomplished, or before any
damage has been caused to a third person. In such case, the courts may, if the public interest
will thus be subserved, allow the party repudiating the contract to recover the money or property.
36 Art. 1415. Where one of the parties to an illegal contract is incapable of giving consent, the
courts may, if the interest of justice so demands, allow recovery of money or property delivered
by the incapacitated person.
37 Art. 1416. When the agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the
prohibition by the law is designed for the protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is
thereby enhanced, recover what he has paid or delivered.
38 Art. 1417. When the price of any article or commodity is determined by statute, or by authority
of law, any person paying any amount in excess of the maximum price allowed may recover
such excess.
39 Art. 1418. When the law fixes, or authorizes the fixing of the maximum number of hours of
labor, and a contract is entered into whereby a laborer undertakes to work longer than the
maximum thus fixed, he may demand additional compensation for service rendered beyond the
time limit.
Art. 1419. When the law sets, or authorizes the setting of a minimum wage for laborers, and a
contract is agreed upon by which a laborer accepts a lower wage, he shall be entitled to recover
the deficiency.
40 Ayala Life Assurance, Inc. v. Ray Burton Development Corporation, G.R. No. 163075,
January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 462, 468-469; Dijamco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113665,
October 7, 2004, 440 SCRA 190, 197.
41 Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 330 Phil. 1048, 1067 (1996); Rose Packing Co.,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-33084, November 14, 1988, 167 SCRA 309, 318; Lim v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85733, February 23, 1990, 182 SCRA 564, 570.
42 Sacobia Hills Development Corporation v. Ty, G.R. No. 165889, September 20, 2005, 470
SCRA 395, 404; Coronel v. Court of Appeals, 331 Phil. 294, 309 (1996).
43 Menchavez v. Teves, Jr., G.R. No. 153201, January 26, 2005, 449 SCRA 380, 393.
44 Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994, 234 SCRA
78, 95.
45 Peña v. Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), G.R No. 159520, September 19,
2006, 502 SCRA 383, 404; Siy v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 158971,
August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 154, 161-162; Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128967, May
20, 2004, 428 SCRA 586, 599.
46 Peña v. Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), supra note 45; Siy v. National Labor
Relations Commission, supra note 45, at 162; Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals, supra note 45.
47 Pilapil v. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones, G.R. No. 150175, February 5, 2007, citing Gomez v.
Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717, 722-723 (1925).
48 Security Bank & Trust Company v. Court of Appeals, 319 Phil. 312, 317 (1995).
49 66 Am Jur 2d Restitution and Implied Contracts § 3.
50 Tamio v. Ticson, G.R. No. 154895, November 18, 2004, 443 SCRA 44, 55.
51 Agcaoili v. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No. L-30056, August 30, 1988, 165
SCRA 1, 9; Air Manila, Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-39742, June 9, 1978, 83
SCRA 579, 589.
52 Sheriff's Return dated May 3, 2000, CA rollo, pp. 208-210.
53 Rules of Court, Rule 57, Section 7:
Sec. 7. Attachment of real and personal property; recording thereof. - Real and personal
property shall be attached by the sheriff executing the writ in the following manner:
(a) Real property, or growing crops thereon, standing upon the record of the registry of deeds of
the province in the name of the party against whom attachment is issued, or not appearing at all
upon such records, or belonging to the party against whom attachment is issued and held by any
other person, or standing on the records of the registry of deeds in the name of any other
person, by filing with the registry of deeds a copy of the order, together with a description of the
property attached, and a notice that it is attached, or that such real property and any interest
therein held by or standing in the name of such other person are attached, and by leaving a copy
of such order, description, and notice with the occupant of the property, if any, or with such other
person or his agent if found within the province. Where the property has been brought under the
operation of either the Land Registration Act or the Property Registration Decree, the notice
shall contain a reference to the number of the certificate of title, the volume and page in the
registration book where the certificate is registered, and the registered owner or owners thereof.
The registrar must index attachments filed under this paragraph in the names both of the
applicant, the adverse party, or the person by whom the property is held or in whose name it
stands in the records. x x x.
xxxx
54 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. II, p. 297 (1980).
55 Caja v. Nanquil, A.M. No. P-04-1885, September 13, 2004, 438 SCRA 174, 191; Cagayan de
Oro Coliseum, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 498, 523 (1999); Fiestan v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 81552, May 28, 1990, 185 SCRA 751, 757; Del Rosario v. Hon. Yatco, 125 Phil. 396,
399 (1966); Llenares v. Valdeavella, 46 Phil. 358, 360 (1924).
56 Cagayan de Oro Coliseum, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 55, at 523-524; Francisco,
The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 700 (1968), citing 33 C.J.S. 234; Del
Rosario v. Yatco, supra note 55.
57 Caja v. Nanquil, supra note 55.
58 CA rollo, pp. 191-207.
59 Espiridion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146933, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 273, 277; Codilla,
Sr. v. de Venecia, 442 Phil. 139, 189 (2002).
60 Supra note 21.
61 Supra note 22.

62 Supra note 21, at 380-381.
63 Revised Rules of Court, Rule 39, Section 28, provides:
SEC. 28. Time and manner of, and amounts payable on, successive redemptions; notice to be
given and filed. – The judgment obligor, or redemptioner, may redeem the property from the
purchaser, at any time within one (1) year from the date of the registration of the certificate of
sale, by paying the purchaser the amount of his purchase, with one per centum per month
interest thereon in addition, up to the time of redemption, together with the amount of any
assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after purchase, and interest
on such last named amount of the same rate; and if the purchaser be also a creditor having a
prior lien to that of the redemptioner, other than the judgment under which such purchase was
made, the amount of such other lien, with interest.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied).
64 Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 367 Phil. 508, 522 (1999); Sulit v. Court of
Appeals, 335 Phil. 914, 927 (1997); The Abaca Corporation of the Philippines v. Garcia, 338
Phil. 988, 993 (1997); Tiongco v. Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 82782, August 5, 1992,
212 SCRA 176, 189-190.
65 Suico Rattan & Buri Interiors, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138145, June 15, 2006, 490
SCRA 560, 579, citing Prudential Bank v. Martinez, G.R. No. 51768, September 14, 1990, 189
SCRA 612, 617; Development Bank of the Philippines v. Moll, 150 Phil. 101, 107 (1972).
66 Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 776, 800 (2000);
Valderrama v. National Labor Relations Commission, 326 Phil. 477, 484 (1996); Policarpio v.
Philippine Veterans Board and Associated Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., 106 Phil. 125, 131
(1959).
67 CA rollo, p. 210.
68 Cagayan de Oro Coliseum, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 55, at 524; Philippine Surety
& Insurance Company, Inc. v. Zabal, 128 Phil. 714, 718 (1967). See also Martin, Civil
Procedure, Vol. I, p. 806 (1989).
69 30 Am Jr 2d Executions and Enforcement of Judgments § 122.
70 Id.
71 Security Bank Corporation v. Gonzalbo, A.M. No. P-06-2139, March 23, 2006, 485 SCRA
136, 145-146; Zarate v. Untalan, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1584, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 206, 216;
Mendoza v. Tuquero, 412 Phil. 435, 442 (2001).
72 30 Am Jr 2d Executions and Enforcement of Judgments § 122.
73 Id. at § 123, citing French v. Snyder, 30 Ill 339.
74 CA rollo, p. 152.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124293. September 24, 2003]
JG SUMMIT HOLDINGS, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION, its Chairman and Members; ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST and
PHILYARDS HOLDINGS, INC., respondents.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
The core issue posed by the Motions for Reconsideration is whether a shipyard is a public utility
whose capitalization must be sixty percent (60%) owned by Filipinos. Our resolution of this issue
will determine the fate of the shipbuilding and ship repair industry. It can either spell the
industrys demise or breathe new life to the struggling but potentially healthy partner in the
countrys bid for economic growth. It can either kill an initiative yet in its infancy, or harness
creativity in the productive disposition of government assets.
The facts are undisputed and can be summarized briefly as follows:
On January 27, 1977, the National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a
government corporation, entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Kawasaki Heavy
Industries, Ltd. of Kobe, Japan (KAWASAKI) for the construction, operation and management of
the Subic National Shipyard, Inc. (SNS) which subsequently became the Philippine Shipyard
and Engineering Corporation (PHILSECO). Under the JVA, the NIDC and KAWASAKI will
contribute P330 million for the capitalization of PHILSECO in the proportion of 60%-40%
respectively.[1] One of its salient features is the grant to the parties of the right of first refusal
should either of them decide to sell, assign or transfer its interest in the joint venture, viz:
1.4 Neither party shall sell, transfer or assign all or any part of its interest in SNS [PHILSECO] to
any third party without giving the other under the same terms the right of first refusal. This
provision shall not apply if the transferee is a corporation owned or controlled by the
GOVERNMENT or by a KAWASAKI affiliate.[2]
On November 25, 1986, NIDC transferred all its rights, title and interest in PHILSECO to the
Philippine National Bank (PNB). Such interests were subsequently transferred to the National
Government pursuant to Administrative Order No. 14. On December 8, 1986, President Corazon
C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 50 establishing the Committee on Privatization (COP) and
the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) to take title to, and possession of, conserve, manage and
dispose of non-performing assets of the National Government. Thereafter, on February 27,
1987, a trust agreement was entered into between the National Government and the APT
wherein the latter was named the trustee of the National Governments share in PHILSECO. In
1989, as a result of a quasi-reorganization of PHILSECO to settle its huge obligations to PNB,
the National Governments shareholdings in PHILSECO increased to 97.41% thereby reducing
KAWASAKIs shareholdings to 2.59%.[3]
In the interest of the national economy and the government, the COP and the APT deemed it
best to sell the National Governments share in PHILSECO to private entities. After a series of
negotiations between the APT and KAWASAKI, they agreed that the latters right of first refusal
under the JVA be exchanged for the right to top by five percent (5%) the highest bid for the said
shares. They further agreed that KAWASAKI would be entitled to name a company in which it
was a stockholder, which could exercise the right to top. On September 7, 1990, KAWASAKI
informed APT that Philyards Holdings, Inc. (PHI) would exercise its right to top.[4]
At the pre-bidding conference held on September 18, 1993, interested bidders were given
copies of the JVA between NIDC and KAWASAKI, and of the Asset Specific Bidding Rules
(ASBR) drafted for the National Governments 87.6% equity share in PHILSECO.[5] The
provisions of the ASBR were explained to the interested bidders who were notified that the
bidding would be held on December 2, 1993. A portion of the ASBR reads:
1.0 The subject of this Asset Privatization Trust (APT) sale through public bidding is the National
Governments equity in PHILSECO consisting of 896,869,942 shares of stock (representing
87.67% of PHILSECOs outstanding capital stock), which will be sold as a whole block in
accordance with the rules herein enumerated.
...
2.0 The highest bid, as well as the buyer, shall be subject to the final approval of both the APT
Board of Trustees and the Committee on Privatization (COP).
2.1 APT reserves the right in its sole discretion, to reject any or all bids.
3.0 This public bidding shall be on an Indicative Price Bidding basis. The Indicative price set for
the National Governments 87.67% equity in PHILSECO is PESOS: ONE BILLION THREE
HUNDRED MILLION (P1,300,000,000.00).
...
6.0 The highest qualified bid will be submitted to the APT Board of Trustees at its regular
meeting following the bidding, for the purpose of determining whether or not it should be
endorsed by the APT Board of Trustees to the COP, and the latter approves the same. The APT
shall advise Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Inc. and/or its nominee, Philyards Holdings, Inc., that
the highest bid is acceptable to the National Government. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Inc.
and/or Philyards Holdings, Inc. shall then have a period of thirty (30) calendar days from the date
of receipt of such advice from APT within which to exercise their Option to Top the Highest Bid
by offering a bid equivalent to the highest bid plus five (5%) percent thereof.
6.1 Should Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Inc. and/or Philyards Holdings, Inc. exercise their Option
to Top the Highest Bid, they shall so notify the APT about such exercise of their option and
deposit with APT the amount equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the highest bid plus five percent
(5%) thereof within the thirty (30)-day period mentioned in paragraph 6.0 above. APT will then
serve notice upon Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Inc. and/or Philyards Holdings, Inc. declaring
them as the preferred bidder and they shall have a period of ninety (90) days from the receipt of
the APTs notice within which to pay the balance of their bid price.
6.2 Should Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Inc. and/or Philyards Holdings, Inc. fail to exercise their
Option to Top the Highest Bid within the thirty (30)-day period, APT will declare the highest
bidder as the winning bidder.
...
12.0 The bidder shall be solely responsible for examining with appropriate care these rules, the
official bid forms, including any addenda or amendments thereto issued during the bidding
period. The bidder shall likewise be responsible for informing itself with respect to any and all
conditions concerning the PHILSECO Shares which may, in any manner, affect the bidders
proposal. Failure on the part of the bidder to so examine and inform itself shall be its sole risk
and no relief for error or omission will be given by APT or COP. . ..[6]
At the public bidding on the said date, petitioner J.G. Summit Holdings, Inc. submitted a bid of
Two Billion and Thirty Million Pesos (P2,030,000,000.00) with an acknowledgement of
KAWASAKI/Philyards right to top, viz:
4. I/We understand that the Committee on Privatization (COP) has up to thirty (30) days to act
on APTs recommendation based on the result of this bidding. Should the COP approve the
highest bid, APT shall advise Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Inc. and/or its nominee, Philyards
Holdings, Inc. that the highest bid is acceptable to the National Government. Kawasaki Heavy
Industries, Inc. and/or Philyards Holdings, Inc. shall then have a period of thirty (30) calendar
days from the date of receipt of such advice from APT within which to exercise their Option to
Top the Highest Bid by offering a bid equivalent to the highest bid plus five (5%) percent
thereof.[7]
As petitioner was declared the highest bidder, the COP approved the sale on December 3, 1993
subject to the right of Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Inc./Philyards Holdings, Inc. to top JGSMIs bid
by 5% as specified in the bidding rules.[8]
On December 29, 1993, petitioner informed APT that it was protesting the offer of PHI to top its
bid on the grounds that: (a) the KAWASAKI/PHI consortium composed of Kawasaki, Philyards,
Mitsui, Keppel, SM Group, ICTSI and Insular Life violated the ASBR because the last four (4)
companies were the losing bidders thereby circumventing the law and prejudicing the weak
winning bidder; (b) only KAWASAKI could exercise the right to top; (c) giving the same option to
top to PHI constituted unwarranted benefit to a third party; (d) no right of first refusal can be
exercised in a public bidding or auction sale; and (e) the JG Summit consortium was not
estopped from questioning the proceedings.[9]
On February 2, 1994, petitioner was notified that PHI had fully paid the balance of the purchase
price of the subject bidding. On February 7, 1994, the APT notified petitioner that PHI had
exercised its option to top the highest bid and that the COP had approved the same on January
6, 1994. On February 24, 1994, the APT and PHI executed a Stock Purchase Agreement.[10]
Consequently, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Mandamus under G.R. No. 114057.
On May 11, 1994, said petition was referred to the Court of Appeals. On July 18, 1995, the Court
of Appeals denied the same for lack of merit. It ruled that the petition for mandamus was not the
proper remedy to question the constitutionality or legality of the right of first refusal and the right
to top that was exercised by KAWASAKI/PHI, and that the matter must be brought by the proper
party in the proper forum at the proper time and threshed out in a full blown trial. The Court of
Appeals further ruled that the right of first refusal and the right to top are prima facie legal and
that the petitioner, by participating in the public bidding, with full knowledge of the right to top
granted to KASAWASAKI/Philyards is . . .estopped from questioning the validity of the award
given to Philyards after the latter exercised the right to top and had paid in full the purchase price
of the subject shares, pursuant to the ASBR. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said
Decision which was denied on March 15, 1996. Petitioner thus filed a Petition for Certiorari with
this Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court.[11]
On November 20, 2000, this Court rendered the now assailed Decision ruling among others that
the Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed the petition on the sole ground of the impropriety of
the special civil action of mandamus because the petition was also one of certiorari.[12] It further
ruled that a shipyard like PHILSECO is a public utility whose capitalization must be sixty percent
(60%) Filipino-owned.[13] Consequently, the right to top granted to KAWASAKI under the Asset
Specific Bidding Rules (ASBR) drafted for the sale of the 87.67% equity of the National
Government in PHILSECO is illegal---not only because it violates the rules on competitive
bidding--- but more so, because it allows foreign corporations to own more than 40% equity in
the shipyard.[14] It also held that although the petitioner had the opportunity to examine the
ASBR before it participated in the bidding, it cannot be estopped from questioning the
unconstitutional, illegal and inequitable provisions thereof.[15] Thus, this Court voided the
transfer of the national governments 87.67% share in PHILSECO to Philyard Holdings, Inc., and
upheld the right of JG Summit, as the highest bidder, to take title to the said shares, viz:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ordered to
pay to APT its bid price of Two Billion Thirty Million Pesos (P2,030,000,000.00 ), less its bid
deposit plus interests upon the finality of this Decision. In turn, APT is ordered to:
(a) accept the said amount of P2,030,000,000.00 less bid deposit and interests from petitioner;
(b) execute a Stock Purchase Agreement with petitioner;
(c) cause the issuance in favor of petitioner of the certificates of stocks representing 87.6% of
PHILSECOs total capitalization;
(d) return to private respondent PHGI the amount of Two Billion One Hundred Thirty-One Million
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,131,500,000.00); and
(e) cause the cancellation of the stock certificates issued to PHI.
SO ORDERED.[16]
In separate Motions for Reconsideration,[17] respondents submit three basic issues for our
resolution: (1) Whether PHILSECO is a public utility; (2) Whether under the 1977 JVA,
KAWASAKI can exercise its right of first refusal only up to 40% of the total capitalization of
PHILSECO; and (3) Whether the right to top granted to KAWASAKI violates the principles of
competitive bidding.
I.
Whether PHILSECO is a Public Utility.
After carefully reviewing the applicable laws and jurisprudence, we hold that PHILSECO is not a
public utility for the following reasons:
First. By nature, a shipyard is not a public utility.
A public utility is a business or service engaged in regularly supplying the public with some
commodity or service of public consequence such as electricity, gas, water, transportation,
telephone or telegraph service.[18] To constitute a public utility, the facility must be necessary
for the maintenance of life and occupation of the residents. However, the fact that a business
offers services or goods that promote public good and serve the interest of the public does not
automatically make it a public utility. Public use is not synonymous with public interest. As its
name indicates, the term public utility implies public use and service to the public. The principal
determinative characteristic of a public utility is that of service to, or readiness to serve, an
indefinite public or portion of the public as such which has a legal right to demand and receive its
services or commodities. Stated otherwise, the owner or person in control of a public utility must
have devoted it to such use that the public generally or that part of the public which has been
served and has accepted the service, has the right to demand that use or service so long as it is
continued, with reasonable efficiency and under proper charges.[19] Unlike a private enterprise
which independently determines whom it will serve, a public utility holds out generally and may
not refuse legitimate demand for service.[20] Thus, in Iloilo Ice and Cold Storage Co. vs. Public
Utility Board,[21] this Court defined public use, viz:
Public use means the same as use by the public. The essential feature of the public use is that it
is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public. It is this indefinite or
unrestricted quality that gives it its public character. In determining whether a use is public, we
must look not only to the character of the business to be done, but also to the proposed mode of
doing it. If the use is merely optional with the owners, or the public benefit is merely incidental, it
is not a public use, authorizing the exercise of jurisdiction of the public utility commission. There
must be, in general, a right which the law compels the owner to give to the general public. It is
not enough that the general prosperity of the public is promoted. Public use is not synonymous
with public interest. The true criterion by which to judge the character of the use is whether the
public may enjoy it by right or only by permission.[22] (emphasis supplied)
Applying the criterion laid down in Iloilo to the case at bar, it is crystal clear that a shipyard
cannot be considered a public utility.
A shipyard is a place or enclosure where ships are built or repaired.[23] Its nature dictates that it
serves but a limited clientele whom it may choose to serve at its discretion. While it offers its
facilities to whoever may wish to avail of its services, a shipyard is not legally obliged to render
its services indiscriminately to the public. It has no legal obligation to render the services sought
by each and every client. The fact that it publicly offers its services does not give the public a
legal right to demand that such services be rendered.
There can be no disagreement that the shipbuilding and ship repair industry is imbued with
public interest as it involves the maintenance of the seaworthiness of vessels dedicated to the
transportation of either persons or goods. Nevertheless, the fact that a business is affected with
public interest does not imply that it is under a duty to serve the public. While the business may
be regulated for public good, the regulation cannot justify the classification of a purely private
enterprise as a public utility. The legislature cannot, by its mere declaration, make something a
public utility which is not in fact such; and a private business operated under private contracts
with selected customers and not devoted to public use cannot, by legislative fiat or by order of a
public service commission, be declared a public utility, since that would be taking private
property for public use without just compensation, which cannot be done consistently with the
due process clause.[24]
It is worthy to note that automobile and aircraft manufacturers, which are of similar nature to
shipyards, are not considered public utilities despite the fact that their operations greatly impact
on land and air transportation. The reason is simple. Unlike commodities or services traditionally
regarded as public utilities such as electricity, gas, water, transportation, telephone or telegraph
service, automobile and aircraft manufacturing---and for that matter ship building and ship repair-
-- serve the public only incidentally.
Second. There is no law declaring a shipyard as a public utility.
History provides us hindsight and hindsight ought to give us a better view of the intent of any
law. The succession of laws affecting the status of shipyards ought not to obliterate, but rather,
give us full picture of the intent of the legislature. The totality of the circumstances, including the
contemporaneous interpretation accorded by the administrative bodies tasked with the
enforcement of the law all lead to a singular conclusion: that shipyards are not public utilities.
Since the enactment of Act No. 2307 which created the Public Utility Commission (PUC) until its
repeal by Commonwealth Act No. 146, establishing the Public Service Commission (PSC), a
shipyard, by legislative declaration, has been considered a public utility.[25] A Certificate of
Public Convenience (CPC) from the PSC to the effect that the operation of the said service and
the authorization to do business will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner
is required before any person or corporation may operate a shipyard.[26] In addition, such
persons or corporations should abide by the citizenship requirement provided in Article XIII,
section 8 of the 1935 Constitution,[27] viz:
Sec. 8. No franchise, certificate, or any other form or authorization for the operation of a public
utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities
organized under the laws of the Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by
citizens of the Philippines, nor shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in
character or for a longer period than fifty years. No franchise or right shall be granted to any
individual, firm or corporation, except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment,
alteration, or repeal by the National Assembly when the public interest so requires. (emphasis
supplied)
To accelerate the development of shipbuilding and ship repair industry, former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 666 granting the following incentives:
SECTION 1. Shipbuilding and ship repair yards duly registered with the Maritime Industry
Authority shall be entitled to the following incentive benefits:
(a) Exemption from import duties and taxes.- The importation of machinery, equipment and
materials for shipbuilding, ship repair and/or alteration, including indirect import, as well as
replacement and spare parts for the repair and overhaul of vessels such as steel plates,
electrical machinery and electronic parts, shall be exempt from the payment of customs duty and
compensating tax: Provided, however, That the Maritime Industry Authority certifies that the item
or items imported are not produced locally in sufficient quantity and acceptable quality at
reasonable prices, and that the importation is directly and actually needed and will be used
exclusively for the construction, repair, alteration, or overhaul of merchant vessels, and other
watercrafts; Provided, further, That if the above machinery, equipment, materials and spare
parts are sold to non-tax exempt persons or entities, the corresponding duties and taxes shall be
paid by the original importer; Provided, finally, That local dealers and/or agents who sell
machinery, equipment, materials and accessories to shipyards for shipbuilding and ship repair
are entitled to tax credits, subject to approval by the total tariff duties and compensating tax paid
for said machinery, equipment, materials and accessories.
(b) Accelerated depreciation.- Industrial plant and equipment may, at the option of the
shipbuilder and ship repairer, be depreciated for any number of years between five years and
expected economic life.
(c) Exemption from contractors percentage tax.- The gross receipts derived by shipbuilders and
ship repairers from shipbuilding and ship repairing activities shall be exempt from the
Contractors Tax provided in Section 91 of the National Internal Revenue Code during the first
ten years from registration with the Maritime Industry Authority, provided that such registration is
effected not later than the year 1990; Provided, That any and all amounts which would otherwise
have been paid as contractors tax shall be set aside as a separate fund, to be known as
Shipyard Development Fund, by the contractor for the purpose of expansion, modernization
and/or improvement of the contractors own shipbuilding or ship repairing facilities; Provided,
That, for this purpose, the contractor shall submit an annual statement of its receipts to the
Maritime Industry Authority; and Provided, further, That any disbursement from such fund for any
of the purposes hereinabove stated shall be subject to approval by the Maritime Industry
Authority.
In addition, P.D. No. 666 removed the shipbuilding and ship repair industry from the list of public
utilities, thereby freeing the industry from the 60% citizenship requirement under the Constitution
and from the need to obtain Certificate of Public Convenience pursuant to section 15 of C.A No.
146. Section 1 (d) of P.D. 666 reads:
(d) Registration required but not as a Public Utility.- The business of constructing and repairing
vessels or parts thereof shall not be considered a public utility and no Certificate of Public
Convenience shall be required therefor. However, no shipyard, graving dock, marine railway or
marine repair shop and no person or enterprise shall engage in construction and/or repair of any
vessel, or any phase or part thereof, without a valid Certificate of Registration and license for this
purpose from the Maritime Industry Authority, except those owned or operated by the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or by foreign governments pursuant to a treaty or agreement.
(emphasis supplied)
Any law, decree, executive order, or rules and regulations inconsistent with P.D. No. 666 were
repealed or modified accordingly.[28] Consequently, sections 13 (b) and 15 of C.A. No. 146
were repealed in so far as the former law included shipyards in the list of public utilities and
required the certificate of public convenience for their operation. Simply stated, the repeal was
due to irreconcilable inconsistency, and by definition, this kind of repeal falls under the category
of an implied repeal.[29]
On April 28, 1983, Batas Pambansa Blg. 391, also known as the Investment Incentive Policy Act
of 1983, was enacted. It laid down the general policy of the government to encourage private
domestic and foreign investments in the various sectors of the economy, to wit:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Investment Policy.- It is the policy of the State to encourage private
domestic and foreign investments in industry, agriculture, mining and other sectors of the
economy which shall: provide significant employment opportunities relative to the amount of the
capital being invested; increase productivity of the land, minerals, forestry, aquatic and other
resources of the country, and improve utilization of the products thereof; improve technical skills
of the people employed in the enterprise; provide a foundation for the future development of the
economy; accelerate development of less developed regions of the country; and result in
increased volume and value of exports for the economy.
It is the policy of the State to extend to projects which will significantly contribute to the
attainment of these objectives, fiscal incentives without which said projects may not be
established in the locales, number and/or pace required for optimum national economic
development. Fiscal incentive systems shall be devised to compensate for market imperfections,
reward performance of making contributions to economic development, cost-efficient and be
simple to administer.
The fiscal incentives shall be extended to stimulate establishment and assist initial operations of
the enterprise, and shall terminate after a period of not more than 10 years from registration or
start-up of operation unless a special period is otherwise stated.
The foregoing declaration shall apply to all investment incentive schemes and in particular will
supersede article 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1789. (emphases supplied)
With the new investment incentive regime, Batas Pambansa Blg. 391 repealed the following
laws, viz:
Sec. 20. The following provisions are hereby repealed:
1) Section 53, P.D. 463 (Mineral Resources Development Decree);
2.) Section 1, P.D. 666 (Shipbuilding and Ship Repair Industry);
3) Section 6, P.D. 1101 (Radioactive Minerals);
4) LOI 508 extending P.D. 791 and P.D. 924 (Sugar); and

5) The following articles of Presidential Decree 1789: 2, 18, 19, 22, 28, 30, 39, 49 (d), 62, and
77. Articles 45, 46 and 48 are hereby amended only with respect to domestic and export
producers.
All other laws, decrees, executive orders, administrative orders, rules and regulations or parts
thereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended or
modified accordingly.
All other incentive systems which are not in any way affected by the provisions of this Act may
be restructured by the President so as to render them cost-efficient and to make them conform
with the other policy guidelines in the declaration of policy provided in Section 2 of this Act.
(emphasis supplied)
From the language of the afore-quoted provision, the whole of P.D. No. 666, section 1 was
expressly and categorically repealed. As a consequence, the provisions of C.A. No. 146, which
were impliedly repealed by P.D. No. 666, section 1 were revived.[30] In other words, with the
enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 391, a shipyard reverted back to its status as a public utility
and as such, requires a CPC for its operation.
The crux of the present controversy is the effect of the express repeal of Batas Pambansa Blg.
391 by Executive Order No. 226 issued by former President Corazon C. Aquino under her
emergency powers.
We rule that the express repeal of Batas Pambansa Blg. 391 by E.O. No. 226 did not revive
Section 1 of P.D. No. 666. But more importantly, it also put a period to the existence of sections
13 (b) and 15 of C.A. No. 146. It bears emphasis that sections 13 (b) and 15 of C.A. No. 146, as
originally written, owed their continued existence to Batas Pambansa Blg. 391. Had the latter not
repealed P.D. No. 666, the former should have been modified accordingly and shipyards
effectively removed from the list of public utilities. Ergo, with the express repeal of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 391 by E.O. No. 226, the revival of sections 13 (b) and 15 of C.A. No. 146 had
no more leg to stand on. A law that has been expressly repealed ceases to exist and becomes
inoperative from the moment the repealing law becomes effective.[31] Hence, there is simply no
basis in the conclusion that shipyards remain to be a public utility. A repealed statute cannot be
the basis for classifying shipyards as public utilities.
In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than to hold that a shipyard is not a
pubic utility. A shipyard has been considered a public utility merely by legislative declaration.
Absent this declaration, there is no more reason why it should continuously be regarded as
such. The fact that the legislature did not clearly and unambiguously express its intention to
include shipyards in the list of public utilities indicates that that it did not intend to do so. Thus, a
shipyard reverts back to its status as non-public utility prior to the enactment of the Public
Service Law.
This interpretation is in accord with the uniform interpretation placed upon it by the Board of
Investments (BOI), which was entrusted by the legislature with the preparation of annual
Investment Priorities Plan (IPPs). The BOI has consistently classified shipyards as part of the
manufacturing sector and not of the public utilities sector. The enactment of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 391 did not alter the treatment of the BOI on shipyards. It has been, as at present, classified
as part of the manufacturing and not of the public utilities sector.[32]
Furthermore, of the 441 Ship Building and Ship Repair (SBSR) entities registered with the
MARINA,[33] none appears to have an existing franchise. If we continue to hold that a shipyard
is a pubic utility, it is a necessary consequence that all these entities should have obtained a
franchise as was the rule prior to the enactment of P.D. No. 666. But MARINA remains without
authority, pursuant to P.D. No. 474[34] to issue franchises for the operation of shipyards. Surely,
the legislature did not intend to create a vacuum by continuously treating a shipyard as a public
utility without giving MARINA the power to issue a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) or a
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) as required by section 15 of C.A. No.
146.
II.
Whether under the 1977 Joint Venture Agreement,
KAWASAKI can purchase only a maximum of 40%
of PHILSECOs total capitalization.
A careful reading of the 1977 Joint Venture Agreement reveals that there is nothing that
prevents KAWASAKI from acquiring more than 40% of PHILSECOs total capitalization. Section
1 of the 1977 JVA states:
1.3 The authorized capital stock of Philseco shall be P330 million. The parties shall thereafter
increase their subscription in Philseco as may be necessary and as called by the Board of
Directors, maintaining a proportion of 60%-40% for NIDC and KAWASAKI respectively, up to a
total subscribed and paid-up capital stock of P312 million.
1.4 Neither party shall sell, transfer or assign all or any part of its interest in SNS [renamed
PHILSECO] to any third party without giving the other under the same terms the right of first
refusal. This provision shall not apply if the transferee is a corporation owned and controlled by
the GOVERMENT [of the Philippines] or by a Kawasaki affiliate.
1.5 The By-Laws of SNS [PHILSECO] shall grant the parties preemptive rights to unissued
shares of SNS [PHILSECO].[35]
Under section 1.3, the parties agreed to the amount of P330 million as the total capitalization of
their joint venture. There was no mention of the amount of their initial subscription. What is clear
is that they are to infuse the needed capital from time to time until the total subscribed and paid-
up capital reaches P312 million. The phrase maintaining a proportion of 60%-40% refers to their
respective share of the burden each time the Board of Directors decides to increase the
subscription to reach the target paid-up capital of P312 million. It does not bind the parties to
maintain the sharing scheme all throughout the existence of their partnership.
The parties likewise agreed to arm themselves with protective mechanisms to preserve their
respective interests in the partnership in the event that (a) one party decides to sell its shares to
third parties; and (b) new Philseco shares are issued. Anent the first situation, the non-selling
party is given the right of first refusal under section 1.4 to have a preferential right to buy or to
refuse the selling partys shares. The right of first refusal is meant to protect the original or
remaining joint venturer(s) or shareholder(s) from the entry of third persons who are not
acceptable to it as co-venturer(s) or co-shareholder(s). The joint venture between the Philippine
Government and KAWASAKI is in the nature of a partnership[36] which, unlike an ordinary
corporation, is based on delectus personae.[37] No one can become a member of the
partnership association without the consent of all the other associates. The right of first refusal
thus ensures that the parties are given control over who may become a new partner in
substitution of or in addition to the original partners. Should the selling partner decide to dispose
all its shares, the non-selling partner may acquire all these shares and terminate the partnership.
No person or corporation can be compelled to remain or to continue the partnership. Of course,
this presupposes that there are no other restrictions in the maximum allowable share that the
non-selling partner may acquire such as the constitutional restriction on foreign ownership in
public utility. The theory that KAWASAKI can acquire, as a maximum, only 40% of PHILSECOs
shares is correct only if a shipyard is a public utility. In such instance, the non-selling partner
who is an alien can acquire only a maximum of 40% of the total capitalization of a public utility
despite the grant of first refusal. The partners cannot, by mere agreement, avoid the
constitutional proscription. But as afore-discussed, PHILSECO is not a public utility and no other
restriction is present that would limit the right of KAWASAKI to purchase the Governments share
to 40% of Philsecos total capitalization.
Furthermore, the phrase under the same terms in section 1.4 cannot be given an interpretation
that would limit the right of KAWASAKI to purchase PHILSECO shares only to the extent of its
original proportionate contribution of 40% to the total capitalization of the PHILSECO. Taken
together with the whole of section 1.4, the phrase under the same terms means that a partner to
the joint venture that decides to sell its shares to a third party shall make a similar offer to the
non-selling partner. The selling partner cannot make a different or a more onerous offer to the
non-selling partner.
The exercise of first refusal presupposes that the non-selling partner is aware of the terms of the
conditions attendant to the sale for it to have a guided choice. While the right of first refusal
protects the non-selling partner from the entry of third persons, it cannot also deprive the other
partner the right to sell its shares to third persons if, under the same offer, it does not buy the
shares.
Apart from the right of first refusal, the parties also have preemptive rights under section 1.5 in
the unissued shares of Philseco. Unlike the former, this situation does not contemplate transfer
of a partners shares to third parties but the issuance of new Philseco shares. The grant of
preemptive rights preserves the proportionate shares of the original partners so as not to dilute
their respective interests with the issuance of the new shares. Unlike the right of first refusal, a
preemptive right gives a partner a preferential right over the newly issued shares only to the
extent that it retains its original proportionate share in the joint venture.
The case at bar does not concern the issuance of new shares but the transfer of a partners
share in the joint venture. Verily, the operative protective mechanism is the right of first refusal
which does not impose any limitation in the maximum shares that the non-selling partner may
acquire.
III.
Whether the right to top granted to KAWASAKI
in exchange for its right of first refusal violates
the principles of competitive bidding.
We also hold that the right to top granted to KAWASAKI and exercised by private respondent did
not violate the rules of competitive bidding.
The word bidding in its comprehensive sense means making an offer or an invitation to
prospective contractors whereby the government manifests its intention to make proposals for
the purpose of supplies, materials and equipment for official business or public use, or for public
works or repair.[38] The three principles of public bidding are: (1) the offer to the public; (2) an
opportunity for competition; and (3) a basis for comparison of bids.[39] As long as these three
principles are complied with, the public bidding can be considered valid and legal. It is not
necessary that the highest bid be automatically accepted. The bidding rules may specify other
conditions or the bidding process be subjected to certain reservation or qualification such as
when the owner reserves to himself openly at the time of the sale the right to bid upon the
property, or openly announces a price below which the property will not be sold. Hence, where
the seller reserves the right to refuse to accept any bid made, a binding sale is not
consummated between the seller and the bidder until the seller accepts the bid. Furthermore,
where a right is reserved in the seller to reject any and all bids received, the owner may exercise
the right even after the auctioneer has accepted a bid, and this applies to the auction of public
as well as private property. [40] Thus:
It is a settled rule that where the invitation to bid contains a reservation for the Government to
reject any or all bids, the lowest or the highest bidder, as the case may be, is not entitled to an
award as a matter of right for it does not become a ministerial duty of the Government to make
such an award. Thus, it has been held that where the right to reject is so reserved, the lowest bid
or any bid for that matter may be rejected on a mere technicality, that all bids may be rejected,
even if arbitrarily and unwisely, or under a mistake, and that in the exercise of a sound
discretion, the award may be made to another than the lowest bidder. And so, where the
Government as advertiser, availing itself of that right, makes its choice in rejecting any or all
bids, the losing bidder has no cause to complain nor right to dispute that choice, unless an
unfairness or injustice is shown. Accordingly, he has no ground of action to compel the
Government to award the contract in his favor, nor compel it to accept his bid.[41]
In the instant case, the sale of the Government shares in PHILSECO was publicly known. All
interested bidders were welcomed. The basis for comparing the bids were laid down. All bids
were accepted sealed and were opened and read in the presence of the COAs official
representative and before all interested bidders. The only question that remains is whether or
not the existence of KAWASAKIs right to top destroys the essence of competitive bidding so as
to say that the bidders did not have an opportunity for competition. We hold that it does not.
The essence of competition in public bidding is that the bidders are placed on equal footing. This
means that all qualified bidders have an equal chance of winning the auction through their bids.
In the case at bar, all of the bidders were exposed to the same risk and were subjected to the
same condition, i.e., the existence of KAWASAKIs right to top. Under the ASBR, the
Government expressly reserved the right to reject any or all bids, and manifested its intention not
to accept the highest bid should KAWASAKI decide to exercise its right to top under the ABSR.
This reservation or qualification was made known to the bidders in a pre-bidding conference held
on September 28, 1993. They all expressly accepted this condition in writing without any
qualification. Furthermore, when the Committee on Privatization notified petitioner of the
approval of the sale of the National Government shares of stock in PHILSECO, it specifically
stated that such approval was subject to the right of KAWASAKI Heavy Industries, Inc./Philyards
Holdings, Inc. to top JGSMIs bid by 5% as specified in the bidding rules. Clearly, the approval of
the sale was a conditional one. Since Philyards eventually exercised its right to top petitioners
bid by 5%, the sale was not consummated. Parenthetically, it cannot be argued that the
existence of the right to top set for naught the entire public bidding. Had Philyards Holdings, Inc.
failed or refused to exercise its right to top, the sale between the petitioner and the National
Government would have been consummated. In like manner, the existence of the right to top
cannot be likened to a second bidding, which is countenanced, except when there is failure to
bid as when there is only one bidder or none at all. A prohibited second bidding presupposes
that based on the terms and conditions of the sale, there is already a highest bidder with the
right to demand that the seller accept its bid. In the instant case, the highest bidder was well
aware that the acceptance of its bid was conditioned upon the non-exercise of the right to top.
To be sure, respondents did not circumvent the requirements for bidding by granting
KAWASAKI, a non-bidder, the right to top the highest bidder. The fact that KAWASAKIs
nominee to exercise the right to top has among its stockholders some losing bidders cannot also
be deemed unfair.
It must be emphasized that none of the parties questions the existence of KAWASAKIs right of
first refusal, which is concededly the basis for the grant of the right to top. Under KAWASAKIs
right of first refusal, the National Government is under the obligation to give preferential right to
KAWASAKI in the event it decides to sell its shares in PHILSECO. It has to offer to KAWASAKI
the shares and give it the option to buy or refuse under the same terms for which it is willing to
sell the said shares to third parties. KAWASAKI is not a mere non-bidder. It is a partner in the
joint venture; the incidents of which are governed by the law on contracts and on partnership.
It is true that properties of the National Government, as a rule, may be sold only after a public
bidding is held. Public bidding is the accepted method in arriving at a fair and reasonable price
and ensures that overpricing, favoritism and other anomalous practices are eliminated or
minimized.[42] But the requirement for public bidding does not negate the exercise of the right of
first refusal. In fact, public bidding is an essential first step in the exercise of the right of first
refusal because it is only after the public bidding that the terms upon which the Government may
be said to be willing to sell its shares to third parties may be known. It is only after the public
bidding that the Government will have a basis with which to offer KAWASAKI the option to buy
or forego the shares.
Assuming that the parties did not swap KAWASAKIs right of first refusal with the right to top,
KAWASAKI would have been able to buy the National Governments shares in PHILSECO under
the same terms as offered by the highest bidder. Stated otherwise, by exercising its right of first
refusal, KAWASAKI could have bought the shares for only P2.03 billion and not the higher
amount of P2.1315 billion. There is, thus, no basis in the submission that the right to top unfairly
favored KAWASAKI. In fact, with the right to top, KAWASAKI stands to pay higher than it should
had it settled with its right of first refusal. The obvious beneficiary of the scheme is the National
Government.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The
impugned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, and Corona, JJ., concur.
Tinga, J., please see separate opinion.
[1] JG Summit Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 345 SCRA 143, 145 (2000). The
Decision was penned by Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago and concurred in by Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and Associate Justices Reynato S. Puno, Santiago M. Kapunan
and Bernardo P. Pardo.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Id. at 146.
[4] Ibid.
[5] The heading of the ASBR states that the rules were specifically set up for 97.4 equity of the
national government in Philippine Shipyard & Engineering Corporation (PHILSECO), Rollo, p.
1146. However, only 87.67% of the shares were offered for sale since the remaining 9.73% of
the National Governments equity in PHILSECO will be offered separately to PHILSECOs
employees and to local small investors, Id. at par. 1.1.

If at all, the obvious consideration for the exchange of the right of first refusal with the right to top [6] Rollo, pp. 1146-1151.
is that KAWASAKI can name a nominee, which it is a shareholder, to exercise the right to top.
This is a valid contractual stipulation; the right to top is an assignable right and both parties are [7] Id. at 1144-1145. The bid, as well as the acknowledgement of its conformity with the ASBR
aware of the full legal consequences of its exercise. As aforesaid, all bidders were aware of the was signed by Johnson Robert I. Go, Executive Vice President of J.G. Summit Holdings, Inc.
existence of the right to top, and its possible effects on the result of the public bidding was fully
disclosed to them. The petitioner, thus, cannot feign ignorance nor can it be allowed to repudiate [8] Supra note 1 at 148.
its acts and question the proceedings it had fully adhered to.[43]
[9] Id. at 147-148.
The fact that the losing bidder, Keppel Consortium (composed of Keppel, SM Group, Insular Life
Assurance, Mitsui and ICTSI), has joined Philyards in the latters effort to raise P2.131 billion [10] Id. at 148.
necessary in exercising the right to top is not contrary to law, public policy or public morals.
There is nothing in the ASBR that bars the losing bidders from joining either the winning bidder [11] Id. at 148-149.
(should the right to top is not exercised) or KAWASAKI/PHI (should it exercise its right to top as
it did), to raise the purchase price. The petitioner did not allege, nor was it shown by competent [12] Id. at 153.
evidence, that the participation of the losing bidders in the public bidding was done with
fraudulent intent. Absent any proof of fraud, the formation by Philyards of a consortium is [13] Id. at 156.
legitimate in a free enterprise system. The appellate court is thus correct in holding the petitioner
estopped from questioning the validity of the transfer of the National Governments shares in [14] Id. at 157-158.
PHILSECO to respondent.
[15] Id. at 166.
Finally, no factual basis exists to support the view that the drafting of the ASBR was illegal
because no prior approval was given by the COA for it, specifically the provision on the right to [16] Ibid.
top the highest bidder and that the public auction on December 2, 1993 was not witnessed by a
COA representative. No evidence was proffered to prove these allegations and the Court cannot [17] Private respondent Philyard Holdings, Inc., through counsel filed its Motion for
make legal conclusions out of mere allegations. Regularity in the performance of official duties is Reconsideration on December 28, 2000, Rollo, pp. 936-980. On the other hand, public
presumed[44] and in the absence of competent evidence to rebut this presumption, this Court is respondents Committee on Privatization (COP) and Asset Privatization Trust (APT), represented
duty bound to uphold this presumption.
by the Office of the Solicitor General, jointly filed their Motions for Reconsideration on January 2,
2001, Rollo, pp. 1053-1068. [33] Industry Profile, Shipbuilding and Ship Repair Industry 2001, p. 3; Rollo, p. 1721.

[18] Almario, Generoso O., Transportation and the Public Service Law, 3rd ed. (1977), p. 267
citing 73 CJS 990-991; Albano v. Reyes, 175 SCRA 264 (1989) citing Am Jur. 2d v. 64, p. 549;
NAPOCOR v. Court of Appeals, 279 SCRA 506 (1997).
[19] Ibid.
[20] Commonwealth v. Lafferty, 426 Pa 541, 233 A2d 256.
[21] Iloilo Ice and Cold Storage Co. vs. Public Utility Board, 44 Phil. 551, 557 (1923).
[22] Id. at 557-558.
[23] Websters Third New International Dictionary (1993), p. 2098.
[24] Supra note 20 at 560.
[25] Act No. 2307 was amended by Act No. 2694. It was subsequently repealed by Act No.
3108. Later however, Act No. 3108 was also repealed by Commonwealth Act No. 146. The
series of amendments and repeals did not alter the character of shipyards as public utilities.
Section 13 (b) of C.A. No. 146 provides that:
[34] An Act for the Reorganization of Maritime functions in the Philippines, creating the Maritime
Industry Authority, and for other purposes, June 1, 1974.
[35] 1977 Joint Venture Agreement as amended by Addendum No. 2 dated December 8, 1983.
[36] Supra note 1 at 157-158. The assailed Decision reads: A joint venture is an association of
persons or companies jointly undertaking some commercial enterprise with all of them generally
contributing assets and risks. It requires a community of interest in the performance of the
subject matter, a right to direct and govern the policy in connection therewith, and duty, which
may be altered by agreement to share both in profit or losses. Persons and business enterprises
enter into a joint venture because it is exempt from corporate income tax. Considered more of a
partnership, a joint venture is governed by the laws on contracts and on partnership.
[37] Literally, choice of person(s).
[38] Supra note 1 at 162.
[39] Ibid.
[40] 7 Am Jur 2d 21, p. 238.

The term public service includes every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage, [41] B. Fernandez, Treatise on Government Contracts Under Philippine Law (1991), p. 26, citing
or control in the Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether Gutierrez v. Ins. Life Assurance Co., Ltd., 102 Phil. 524 (1957); C & C Commercial Corp. v.
permanent, occasional or accidental, and done for general business purposes, any common Menor, 120 SCRA 112 (1982); A.C. Esguerra & Sons v. Aytona, 4 SCRA 1245 (1962).
carrier, railroad, street railway, traction railway, subway motor vehicle, either for freight or
passenger, or both, with or without fixed route and whatever may be its classification, freight or [42] Fernandez, supra at 25.
carrier service of any class, express service, steamboat, or steamship, or steamship line,
pontines, ferries and water craft, engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight or both, [43] Medina v. Patcho, 132 SCRA 551 (1984).
shipyard, marine railway, marine repair shop, wharf or dock, ice plant, ice refrigeration plant,
canal, irrigation system, gas, electric light, heat and power, water supply and power petroleum, [44] Rules of Court, Rule 131, section 3(m).
sewerage system, wire or wireless communications systems, wire or wireless broadcasting
stations and other similar public services. x x x (Underscoring supplied).

[26] See C. A. No. 146, section 15. Today is Saturday, June 23, 2018

[27] This provision is substantially reproduced in Article XIV, section 5 of the 1973 Constitution Republic of the Philippines
and in Article XII, section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. SUPREME COURT
Manila
[28] See Section 4, P.D. No. 666.
EN BANC
[29] A declaration in the statute, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific law,
identified by its number of title, is repealed is an express repeal; all other repeals are implied
repeals. See Mecano v. Commission on Audit, 216 SCRA 500 (1992) citing Agpalo, Statutory
Construction, 289 (1986). G.R. No. 108998 August 24, 1994

[30] Book I, Chapter 5, section 22 provides: Revival of Law Impliedly Repealed. When a law REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
which impliedly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the prior law shall thereby be revived, vs.
unless the repealing law provides otherwise. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B. LAPIÑA AND FLOR DE VEGA,
respondents.
[31] Agpalo, Statutory Construction (1995), p. 330.
Byron V. Belarmino and Juan B. Belarmino for private respondents.
[32] Annexes 1-5 of the Motion for Reconsideration, Rollo, pp. 982-1043.

BIDIN, J.:
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by
purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the
requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
The Republic would have us rule on the negative and asks this Court to nullify the decision of
the appellate court which affirmed the judgment of the court a quo in granting the application of
respondent spouses for registration over the lots in question.
On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their
residence with a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo
Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the time of the purchase, respondent spouses where then natural-born
Filipino citizens.
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2)
parcels of land before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time,
however, they were no longer Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship
through naturalization.
An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have presented their respective
evidence, the court a quo rendered a decision confirming private respondents' title to the lots in
question, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby approves the said application and
confirms the title and possession of herein applicants over Lots 347 and 348, Ap-04-003755 in
the names of spouses Mario B. Lapiña and Flor de Vega, all of legal age, Filipino citizens by
birth but now Canadian citizens by naturalization and residing at 14 A. Mabini Street, San Pablo
City and/or 201-1170-124 Street, Edmonton, Alberta T5M-OK9, Canada.
Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued. In the
certificate of title to be issued, there shall be annotated an easement of .265 meters road right-
of-way.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 25)
On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial court based on the following
ratiocination:
In the present case, it is undisputed that both applicants were still Filipino citizens when they
bought the land in controversy from its former owner. For this reason, the prohibition against the
acquisition of private lands by aliens could not apply. In justice and equity, they are the rightful
owners of the subject realty considering also that they had paid for it quite a large sum of money.
Their purpose in initiating the instant action is merely to confirm their title over the land, for, as
has been passed upon, they had been the owners of the same since 1978. It ought to be
pointed out that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. The Torrens System was not
established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land. It is intended merely to confirm
and register the title which one may already have (Municipality of Victorias vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. L-31189, March 31, 1987). With particular reference to the main issue at bar, the High
Court has ruled that title and ownership over lands within the meaning and for the purposes of
the constitutional prohibition dates back to the time of their purchase, not later. The fact that the
applicants-appellees are not Filipino citizens now cannot be taken against them for they were
not disqualified from acquiring the land in question (Bollozos vs. Yu Tieng Su, G.R. No. L-29442,
November 11, 1987). (Rollo, pp. 27-28)
Expectedly, respondent court's disposition did not merit petitioner's approval, hence this present
recourse, which was belatedly filed.
Ordinarily, this petition would have been denied outright for having been filed out of time had it
not been for the constitutional issue presented therein.
At the outset, petitioner submits that private respondents have not acquired proprietary rights
over the subject properties before they acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization to
justify the registration thereof in their favor. It maintains that even privately owned unregistered
lands are presumed to be public lands under the principle that lands of whatever classification
belong to the State under the Regalian doctrine. Thus, before the issuance of the certificate of
title, the occupant is not in the jurisdical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to
the State. Petitioner further argued that it is only when the court adjudicates the land to the
applicant for confirmation of title would the land become privately owned land, for in the same
proceeding, the court may declare it public land, depending on the evidence.
As found by the trial court:
The evidence thus presented established that applicants, by themselves and their predecessors-
in-interest, had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the two adjacent parcels of land applied for registration of title under a bona-
fide claim of ownership long before June 12, 1945. Such being the case, it is conclusively
presumed that all the conditions essential to the confirmation of their title over the two adjacent
parcels of land are sought to be registered have been complied with thereby entitling them to the
issuance of the corresponding certificate of title pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. (Rollo, p. 26)
Respondent court echoed the court a quo's observation, thus:
The land sought to be registered has been declared to be within the alienable and disposable
zone established by the Bureau of Forest Development (Exhibit "P"). The investigation
conducted by the Bureau of Lands, Natural Resources District (IV-2) reveals that the disputed
realty had been occupied by the applicants "whose house of strong materials stands thereon";
that it had been declared for taxation purposes in the name of applicants-spouses since 1979;
that they acquired the same by means of a public instrument entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihang
Tuluyan" duly executed by the vendor, Cristeta Dazo Belen, on June 17, 1978 (Exhibits "I" and
"J"); and that applicants and their predecessors in interest had been in possession of the land for
more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application for registration. But what is of great
significance in the instant case is the circumstance that at the time the applicants purchased the
subject lot in 1978, both of them were Filipino citizens such that when they filed their application
for registration in 1987, ownership over the land in dispute had already passed to them. (Rollo,
p., 27)
The Republic disagrees with the appellate court's concept of possession and argues:
17. The Court of Appeals found that the land was declared for taxation purposes in the
name of respondent spouses only since 1979. However, tax declarations or reality tax payments
of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership. (citing cases)
18. Then again, the appellate court found that "applicants (respondents) and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than 30 years prior to the
filing of the application for registration." This is not, however, the same as saying that
respondents have been in possession "since June 12, 1945." (PD No. 1073, amending Sec. 48
[b], CA NO. 141; sec. also Sec. 14, PD No. 1529). So there is a void in respondents' possession.
They fall short of the required possession since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. And, even if they
needed only to prove thirty (30) years possession prior to the filing of their application (on
February 5, 1987), they would still be short of the required possession if the starting point is
1979 when, according to the Court of Appeals, the land was declared for taxation purposes in
their name. (Rollo, pp. 14-15)
The argument is myopic, to say the least. Following the logic of petitioner, any transferee is thus
foreclosed to apply for registration of title over a parcel of land notwithstanding the fact that the
transferor, or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open, notorious and exclusive possession
thereof for thirty (30) years or more. This is not, however, what the law provides.
As petitioner itself argues, Section 48 of the Public Land Act (CA 141) reads:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented
by wars or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
As amended by PD 1073:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the
Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his
predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12,
1945.
It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, the law employs the terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself or
through his predecessor-in-interest". Thus, it matters not whether the vendee/applicant has been
in possession of the subject property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal
requirements for confirmation of title has been complied with by his predecessor-in-interest, the
said period is tacked to his possession. In the case at bar, respondents' predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the disputed land not only
since June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937. Petitioner does not deny this except that
respondent spouses, in its perception, were in possession of the land sought to be registered
only in 1978 and therefore short of the required length of time. As aforesaid, the disputed parcels
of land were acquired by private respondents through their predecessors-in-interest, who, in
turn, have been in open and continued possession thereof since 1937. Private respondents
stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in-interest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the
legal rights necessary to confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title.
At this juncture, petitioner's reliance in Republic v. Villanueva (114 SCRA 875 [1982]) deserves
scant consideration. There, it was held that before the issuance of the certificate of title, the
occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.
Suffice it to state that the ruling in Republic v. Villanueva (supra), has already been abandoned
in the 1986 case of Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509; and
reiterated in Director of Lands v. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 [1991]) where the Court,
through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Narvasa, declared that:
(The weight of authority is) that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public
land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion
of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be
public land and becomes private property. . . .
Herico in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:
. . . Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the
latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by
his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the
land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land
Act as by free patent . . .
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are
complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant,
a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land,
therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to
dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect
the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be
issued upon the strength of said patent.
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public
land which is of the character and duration prescribed by the statute as the equivalent of an
express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself (Section 48 [b]) that the
possessor(s) ". . . shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title ..." No proof being admissible
to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more
than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claims is of the
required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but
simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land
from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of
law from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As was so well put in
Cariño, ". . .(There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to
show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier law. (Emphasis supplied)
Subsequent cases have hewed to the above pronouncement such that open, continuous and
exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure converts the same to
private property (Director of Lands v. IAC, 214 SCRA 604 [1992]; Pineda v. CA, 183 SCRA 602
[1990]). This means that occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and
his predecessors-in-interest, vest title on such applicant so as to segregate the land from the
mass of public and (National Power Corporation v. CA, 218 SCRA 41 [1993]).

The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public
land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial
or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act (Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78
[1992]). When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by
operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a
certificate of title being issued (National Power Corporation v. CA, supra). As such, the land
ceases to be a part of the public domain and goes beyond the authority of the Director of Lands
to dispose of.
In other words, the Torrens system was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to
private land (Municipality of Victorias v. CA, 149 SCRA 32 [1987]). It merely confirms, but does
not confer ownership. As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, private respondents
were able to establish the nature of possession of their predecessors-in-interest. Evidence was
offered to prove that their predecessors-in-interest had paid taxes on the subject land and
introduced improvements thereon (Exhibits "F" to "F9"). A certified true copy of the affidavit
executed by Cristeta Dazo and her sister Simplicia was also formally offered to prove that the
subject parcels of land were inherited by vendor Cristeta Dazo from her father Pedro Dazo with
the conformity of her only sister Simplicia (Exhibit "G"). Likewise, a report from the Bureau of
Lands was presented in evidence together with a letter from the Bureau of Forest Development,
to prove that the questioned lots were part of the alienable and disposable zone of the
government and that no forestry interest was affected (CA GR No. 28953, Records, p. 33).
In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application for registration of title on the
ground of foreign nationality. Accordingly, the ruling in Director of Lands v. Buyco (supra)
supports petitioner's thesis.
We disagree.
In Buyco, the applicants therein were likewise foreign nationals but were natural-born Filipino
citizens at the time of their supposed acquisition of the property. But this is where the similarity
ends. The applicants in Buyco sought to register a large tract of land under the provisions of the
Land Registration Act, and in the alternative, under the provisions of the Public Land Act. The
land registration court decided in favor of the applicants and was affirmed by the appellate court
on appeal. The Director of Lands brought the matter before us on review and we reversed.
This Court, speaking through Justice Davide, Jr., stated:
As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, the private respondents do not rely on fee
simple ownership based on a Spanish grant or possessory information title under Section 19 of
the Land Registration Act; the private respondents did not present any proof that they or their
predecessors-in-interest derived title from an old Spanish grant such as (a) the "titulo real" or
royal grant (b) the "concession especial" or especial grant; (c) the "composicion con el estado"
title or adjustment title; (d) the "titulo de compra" or title by purchase; and (e) the "informacion
posesoria" or possessory information title, which could become a "titulo gratuito" or a gratuitous
title (Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]). The primary basis of their claim is
possession, by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial.
If indeed private respondents and their predecessors have been in possession since time
immemorial, the rulings of both courts could be upheld for, as this Court stated in Oh Cho v.
Director of Lands (75 Phil. 890 [1946]):
. . . All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong
to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the
possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such
possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain
or that if had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest (Cariño v. Insular
Government, 41 Phil 935 [1909]; 212 U.S. 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594) The applicant does not come
under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest
began in 1880.
. . . alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under the
Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion
of said period, ipso jure. (Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra)
It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable
public land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time
immemorial, as ruled in both Cariño and Susi, or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act.
As to the latter, this Court, in Gutierrez Hermanos v. Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 37 [1989]),
adopted the rule enunciated by the Court of Appeals, per then Associate Justice Hugo R.
Gutierrez, Jr., . . ., that an applicant for registration under Section 48 of the Public Land Act must
secure a certification from the Government that the lands which he claims to have possessed as
owner for more than thirty (30) years are alienable and disposable. It is the burden of the
applicant to prove its positive averments.
In the instant case, private respondents offered no evidence at all to prove that the property
subject of the application is an alienable and disposable land. On the contrary, the entire
property . . . was pasture land (and therefore inalienable under the then 1973 Constitution).
. . . (P)rivate respondents' evidence miserably failed to establish their imperfect title to the
property in question. Their allegation of possession since time immemorial, . . ., is patently
baseless. . . . When referring to possession, specifically "immemorial possession," it means
possession of which no man living has seen the beginning, and the existence of which he has
learned from his elders (Susi v. Razon, supra). Such possession was never present in the case
of private respondents. . . .
. . ., there does not even exist a reasonable basis for the finding that the private respondents and
their predecessors-in-interest possessed the land for more than eighty (80) years, . . .
xxx xxx xxx
To this Court's mind, private respondents failed to prove that (their predecessor-in-interest) had
possessed the property allegedly covered by Tax Declaration No. 15853 and made the subject
of both his last will and testament and the project of partition of his estate among his heirs — in
such manner as to remove the same from the public domain under the Cariño and Susi
doctrines. Thus, (when the predecessor-in-interest) died on 31 May 1937, he transmitted no right
whatsoever, with respect to the said property, to his heirs. This being the case, his possession
cannot be tacked to that of the private respondents for the latter's benefit pursuant to Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, the alternative ground relied upon in their application . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that the private respondents became American citizens before such filing, it goes
without saying that they had acquired no vested right, consisting of an imperfect title, over the
property before they lost their Philippine citizenship. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the application in Buyco were denied registration of title not merely because they were
American citizens at the time of their application therefor. Respondents therein failed to prove
possession of their predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial or possession in such a
manner that the property has been segregated from public domain; such that at the time of their
application, as American citizens, they have acquired no vested rights over the parcel of land.
In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the
time of the acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon,
tacking in the process, the possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time
held by their predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act. In addition, private respondents
have constructed a house of strong materials on the contested property, now occupied by
respondent Lapiñas mother.
But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that the Constitution itself
allows private respondents to register the contested parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and
8 of Article XII of the Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to wit:
provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may
be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1)
hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence (BP 185).
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural-born
citizens of the Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential
land, it is not significant whether private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time
they purchased or registered the parcels of land in question. What is important is that private
respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a
private land, they could apply for registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8,
Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that private respondents wer

Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or

conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of SECOND DIVISION
the public domain.
GREGORIA MARTINEZ,[1] G.R. No. 170409
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject Petitioner,
to limitations provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
Present:
Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is similar to Section 15, Article XIV
of the then 1973 Constitution which reads:

Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a natural-born QUISUMBING, J.,
citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private land, for use
by him as his residence, as the Batasang Pambansa may provide. Chairperson,

Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant provision of which - versus - CARPIO,
provides:
CARPIO MORALES,
Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be TINGA, and
a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of one thousand square meters, in the case
of urban land, or one hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In the VELASCO, JR., JJ.
case of married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein granted; Provided, That if
both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes, he shall still be HEIRS OF MELANIO MEDINA,
entitled to be a transferee of an additional urban or rural lands for residential purposes which,
when added to those already owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas herein SR., MELANIO MEDINA, JR., Promulgated:
authorized.
NORBERTO MEDINA, ERMITANO
From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law has been passed by
the legislature on the same subject. Thus, what governs the disposition of private lands in favor MEDINA, ALBERTO MEDINA, January 28, 2008
of a natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185.
SENEN MEDINA, ANTONIO
Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for
registration of the properties in question, said properties as discussed above were already MEDINA, MANOLO MEDINA,
private lands; consequently, there could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by
respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered and ARTURO MEDINA,
no longer form part of the public domain. They are already private in character since private
respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession Respondents.
and occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The present petition originally stemmed from a Complaint[2] filed by private respondents against
petitioner,[3] seeking the cancellation of titles over the parcels of land involved.[4] Subject of the
complaint are three (3) parcels of land with areas of approximately 10,064; 48,000; and 5,784 sq
m, all situated in Bangkal, Carmona, Cavite and covered respectively by Original Certificates of
Title (OCT Nos.) No. P-5518, No. P-5519, and No. P-5482.[5]
Respondents are the heirs of the late Melanio Medina, Sr. who during his lifetime inherited the
properties from his mother, Rosa Martinez Emitao, who in turn inherited them from her own
mother, Celedonia Martinez (Celedonia). The complaint alleged that sometime in 1992,
petitioner, whose real name as appearing in her birth certificate is Gregoria Merquines,
represented herself as Gregoria Martinez and as thus one of the descendants of Celedonia, and
under that name applied for free patents over the properties with the Community Environmental
and Natural Resources Office of Bacoor, Cavite. Unbeknownst to private respondents, the
corresponding OCTs were thus issued in the name of Gregoria Martinez. When private
respondents later filed an application for land registration over the same properties, petitioner
opposed the same. This impelled private respondents to file the instant complaint.[6]
The complaint was heard by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20.[7] The
only issue raised at the trial was whether the free patents and land titles should be annulled due
to fraud and misrepresentation in their procurement.[8]
After weighing the evidence of both sides, the trial court rendered a Decision[9] ordering the
cancellation of petitioners titles. It found that the true surname of petitioner Gregoria is
Merquines and not Martinez, a surname which petitioner used for the first time when she applied
for the free patents. The RTC observed that no other document was presented to show that
petitioner used the surname Martinez in any of her previous transactions; that the surname
indicated in her birth certificate is Merquines; that she was born on 17 November 1924 to
spouses Pablo Merquines and Bartola Cardona; and that the records of marriage of the Local
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite recorded the marriage of Gregoria Merquines, daughter of
Pablo Merquines and Bartola Cardona, to Jose Restrivera on 13 July 1941.
The trial court further endeavored to trace the lineage of petitioner. The baptismal certificate of
her father, Pablo Merquines, showed that he was born on 26 June 1897 to the spouses Faustino
Merquines and Juana Sarmiento, while the baptismal certificate of her mother, Bartola Cardona,
showed that she was born on 28 August 1898 to spouses Gaspar Cardona and Antonia Realon.
Even the birth certificates of petitioners siblings, Crispina, born on 20 January 1920 and
Dominador, born on 4 October 1931, showed that they bore the surname Merquines. Moreover,
the birth certificates of the children of petitioner and her husband Jose Restrivera namely,
Norberto and Jaime Restrivera, showed that the surname of their mother is Merquines and not
Martinez.[10]
The trial court observed that notwithstanding the misrepresentations of petitioner in her free
patent applications, private respondents were not necessarily entitled to the automatic
reconveyance of the subject lots.[11] It simply disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the cancellation of
OCT Nos. P-5518, P-5519 and P-5482 issued in the name of defendant.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Only petitioner interposed an appeal from the trial courts decision to the Court of Appeals.
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner challenged the findings of fact of the trial court
concerning the fraud and misrepresentations which she committed. The appellate court made
short shrift of the challenge as follows:[13]
From the evidence extant on record, it is at once apparent that appellant committed fraud and
misrepresentation in her application for free patent which later became the basis for the
issuance of the certificates of title in her name. More than the issue of the use of the surname
Martinez, her fraudulent act consists essentially in misrepresenting before the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office of Bacoor, Cavite that she is the heir of Celedonia
Martinez whom she admitted in her Answer as the original absolute owner of the subject parcels
of land. She testified in open court that Celedonia Martinez is her grandmother, being the mother
of her father Pablo Merquines.
The documentary evidence adduced by appellles, however, particularly her fathers baptismal
certificate plainly shows that he is the son of spouses Faustino Merquines and Juana Sarmiento.
Her mother Bartola Cadona was also shown in her baptismal certificate to be the child of
spouses Gaspar Cardona and Antonia Realon. These documents indubitably show that neither
of appellants parents is the child of Celodonia Martinez and she is not in [anyway] related by
blood to the latter. Thus, not only was her application for patents tainted with fraud, she also
committed perjury in this case when she lied bold-faced about her lineage which was disproved
by the documentary evidence relative to her ancestors.[14]
Petitioner also assigned two other errors which, however, were neither raised in her answer as
defenses nor otherwise litigated during the trial. She argued in the main that the trial court erred
in adjudicating the case although an indispensable party in the person of the State through the
director of lands was not impleaded,[15] and that the titles secured were already indefeasible in
view of the lapse of one year from the issuance of the titles.[16]
Sustaining the jurisdiction of the lower court, the Court of Appeals remarked that the jurisdiction
of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In their complaint, private
respondents asserted private ownership over the subject lands as they had been in possession
of and had been cultivating the same for more than 60 years.[17]
The appellate court also noted that the issues were not raised in the petitioners answer and in
the subsequent proceedings.[18]
Concerning the alleged indefeasibility of the titles issued to petitioner, the Court of Appeals ruled
that the argument is untenable since petitioner employed fraud in the proceedings which led to
the issuance of the free patents and the titles.[19]
Before this Court, petitioner reiterates the same two issues previously raised for the first time
before the appellate court.
We sustain the Court of Appeals.
It is a well-settled principle that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately
brought to the attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a
reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal[20] because this would be
offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[21] On this point alone, the
petition could be denied outright. Nonetheless, like the Court of Appeals, we deign to decide the
case on the merits.
Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only by homestead patent,
sale, lease, judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and administrative legalization
or free patent.[22] One claiming private rights as basis of ownership must prove compliance with
the Public Land Act which prescribes the substantive
as well as the procedural requirements for acquisition of public lands.[23] Each mode of
disposition is appropriately covered by a separate chapter of the Public Land Act. There are
specific requirements and application procedures for every mode.[24]
The confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to alienable and disposable agricultural land of
the public domain may be done in two ways: judicial legalization or judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles under Chapter VIII, and administrative legalization or free patent
under Chapter VII of the Public Land Act.
Any citizen of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
with the RTC of the province where the land is located for confirmation of his/her claim and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor under the Property Registration Decree.[25] Such
applicants must by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain,[26]
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since 12 June 1945,[27] except when
prevented by war or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant.[28] At present, such applications for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles must be filed prior to 31 December 2020; and must
cover an area of up to 12 hectares only.[29]
When the conditions specified in Section 48(b)[30] of the Public Land Act are complied with, the
possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceased to be
of the public domain, and beyond the authority of the director of lands to dispose of. The
application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal
sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued
upon the strength of said patent.[31] For all legal intents and purposes, the land is segregated
from the public domain, because the beneficiary is
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

Section 44, Chapter VII of the Public Land Act provides that the applicant for administrative
confirmation of imperfect title must be a natural born citizen of the Philippines who is not the
owner of more than 12 hectares and who, for at least 30 years prior to the effectivity of Republic
Act No. 6940 amending the Public Land Act,[32] has continuously occupied and cultivated,
either by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public land
subject to disposition, who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has not
been occupied by any person shall be entitled to a free patent over such land/s not to exceed 12
hectares.
It is true that the trial court opined that the next step following the cancellation of petitioners titles
is an action for the reversion of the disputed lands back to the public domain.[36] Said
observation, found in the body only and not in the dispositive portion of the decision, does not
detract from, but in fact even bolsters, the real nature of the complaint as an action for
nullification of title.
Now, the second issue. Petitioner claims that her titles are already indefeasible and
incontrovertible following the lapse of one year following their issuance.

Turning again to the first issue raised by petitioner, it is apparent that her insistence that the
State through the director of lands is an indispensable party flows from her failure to recognize
that private respondents action is one for declaration of nullity of title which is different from an
action for reversion of title to the State. In the latter case the director of lands needs to be
impleaded, unlike in the first. Thus, we reiterated in Evangelista v. Santiago:[33]
In Apuyan v. Haldeman,[37] also cited by petitioner, it was held that a certificate of title issued on
the basis of a free patent procured through fraud or in violation of the law may be cancelled, as
such title is not cloaked with indefeasibility.

An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates of title is not the It was likewise held in Meneses v. Court of Appeals[38] that the principle of indefeasibility of title
same as an action for reversion. The difference between them lies in the allegations as to the is unavailing where fraud attended the issuance of the free patents and titles.
character of ownership of the realty whose title is sought to be nullified. In an action for
reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit State ownership of the disputed

land. Hence, in Gabila v. Barriga [41 SCRA 131], where the plaintiff in his complaint admits that
he has no right to demand the cancellation or amendment of the defendants title because even if
the title were canceled or amended the ownership of the land embraced therein or of the portion
affected by the amendment would revert to the public domain, we ruled that the action was for
reversion and that the only person or entity entitled to relief would be the Director of Lands.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No.
70458 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
On the other hand, a cause of action for declaration of nullity of free patent and certificate of title
would require allegations of the plaintiffs ownership of the contested lot prior to the issuance of
such free patent and certificate of title as well as the defendants fraud or mistake, as the case SO ORDERED.
may be, in successfully obtaining these documents of title over the parcel of land claimed by
plaintiff. In such a case, the nullity arises strictly not from the fraud or deceit but from the fact
that the land is beyond the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to bestow and whatever patent or
certificate of title obtained therefore is consequently void ab initio. The real party-in-interest is
not the State but the plaintiff who alleges a pre-existing right of ownership over the parcel of land DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
in question even before the grant of title to the defendant.[34]

In an earlier case,[35] in reversing the dismissal of the complaint by the trial court, this Court
stressed that the allegations of the complaint present an action for nullification of free patent and WE CONCUR:
title, not an action for reversion of title which has to be instituted by the Solicitor General.
 I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation,
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Chief Justice
Associate Justice

[1]Rollo, pp. 61-63.

[2]Id. at 27-33.

ATTESTATION
[3]Id. at 28. The Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite was impleaded as a nominal party-
defendant.

[17]Rollo, pp. 132-133.

[4]Id. at 33.

[18]Id.

[5]Id. at 54.

[19]Id. at 133.

[6]Id. at 125-126.

[7]Hon. Lucenito Tagle (now Court of Appeals Associate Justice), RTC, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite. [20]PAL v. NLRC, et. al., 328 Phil. 814, 823 (1996), citing Tay Chun Suy v. Court of Appeals,
229 SCRA 151 (1994); Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 145 SCRA 592 (1986); Berin v.
Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 508 (1991).

[8]Rollo, p. 56.

[21]Id., citing Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 301 (1994); National Power Corporation v.
Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991).
[9]Id. at 54-63.

[22]COMMONWEALTH WEALTH No. 141 (1936), Sec. 11.

[10]Supra note 1.

[23]Collado v. Court of Appeals, 439 Phil. 149, 173 (2002).

[11]Id. at 63.

[24]For example, Chapter IV of the Public Land Act governs the disposition of alienable public
[12]Id. lands through homestead. Sale or lease may be obtained under Chapters V and VI, respectively,
of the Public Land Act.

[13]Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga concurred by Associate Justices

Ruben T. Reyes (now Supreme Court Justice) and Fernanda Lampas Peralta. [25]COMMONWEALTH WEALTH No. 141 (1936), 50.

[14]Rollo, pp. 131-132. [26]1987 CONST., Art. XIII, Sec. 1.

[15]CA rollo, p. 43. [27]See Presidential Decree No. 1073 (1977) which amended Republic Act No. 1942 (1957).

[16]Id. at 45. [28]COMMONWEALTH WEALTH ACT No. 141 (1936), Sec. 48(b).

[29]See Republic Act No. 9176 (2002), Sec. 2.
[30]Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Regional Trial Court of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Property Registration Decree, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since 12 June
1945, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (As amended by P.D. No. 1073).
[31]Herico v. DAR, L-23265, 28 January 1980, 95 SCRA 437, 443-444.
[32]As amended by R.A. No. 782 and R.A. No. 6940, approved on 28 March 1990.
[33]G.R. No. 157447, 29 April 2005, 457 SCRA 744, 764.
[34]Id. at 164, citing Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala v. Heirs of Honorio Dacut, G.R. No. 147379, 27
February 2002, 378 SCRA 206, 214-215; Gabila v. Barriga, 148-B Phil. 615, 619 (1971).
[35]Heirs of Nagaňo v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 724, 729-732.
[36]Rollo, p. 63.
[37]G.R. No. 129980, 20 September 2004, 438 SCRA 402, 428-430.
[38]316 Phil. 210, 222 (1995). Cited in Cuizon v. Remoto, G.R. No. 143027, 11 October 2005,
472 SCRA 274, 283-284.
Today is Saturday, June 23, 2018
Custom Search
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 77770 December 15, 1988
ATTY. JOSE S. GOMEZ, DELFINA GOMEZ ESTRADA, ENRIQUITA GOMEZ OXCIANO,
BENITA GOMEZ GARLITOS, REYNALDO GOMEZ ESPEJO, ARMANDO GOMEZ, ERLINDA
GOMEZ GUICO, EUGENIA GOMEZ CALICDAN, AZUCENA GOMEZ ORENCIA, TEODORO S.
GOMEZ, JR., and ALEJO S. GOMEZ (now deceased) represented by his wife, LETICIA Y.
GOMEZ, and children, namely, MARGIE GOMEZ GOB, JACINTO Y. GOMEZ, ALEJO Y.
GOMEZ, JR., and MARY ANN Y. GOMEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PEDRO G. ADUCAYEN Judge Regional Trial Court, San
Carlos City (Pangasinan) Branch LVI, HON. CHIEF, LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION,
Quezon City, Metro Manila, and SILVERIO G. PEREZ, Chief, Division of Original Registration,
Land Registration Commission, Quezon City, Metro Manila, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
The present case originated with the filing by petitioners on 30 August 1968 in the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, of an application for
registration of several lots situated in Bayambang, Pangasinan.
The lots applied for were Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 1 0, 11 and 12 of Plan Psu-54792
Amd.-2. The lots were among those involved in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands
vs. Abran,1 wherein this Court declared Consolacion M. Gomez owner of certain lots in Sitio
Poponto Bayambang, Pangasinan. Petitioners are the heirs of Teodoro Y. Gomez (father of
Consolacion) who, together with Consolacion's son, Luis Lopez, inherited from her parcels of
land when Consolacion Gomez died intestate. Petitioners alleged that after the death of Teodoro
Y. Gomez, they became the absolute owners of the subject lots by virtue of a Quitclaim
executed in their favor by Luis Lopez. The lots (formerly portions of Lots 15,16, 34 and 41
covered by Plan Ipd-92) were subdivided into twelve lots—Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11 and 12. The subdivision plan was duly approved by the Bureau of Lands on 30 November
1963. Petitioners agreed to allocate the lots among themselves.
After notice and publication, and there being no opposition to the application, the trial court
issued an order of general default. On 5 August 1981, the court rendered its decision
adjudicating the subject lots in petitioners' favor. 2
On 6 October 1981, the trial court issued an order 3 expressly stating that the decision of 5
August 1981 had become final and directed the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to
issue the corresponding decrees of registration over the lots adjudicated in the decision of 5
August 1981.
On 11 July 1984, respondent Silverio G. Perez, Chief of the Division of Original Registration,
Land Registration Commission (now known as the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration), submitted a report to the court a quo stating that Lots 15, 16, 34 and 41 of Ipd-
92 were already covered by homestead patents issued in 1928 and 1929 and registered under
the Land Registration Act. He recommended that the decision of 5 August 1981, and the order of
6 October 1981 be set aside. Petitioners opposed the report, pointing out that no opposition was
raised by the Bureau of Lands during the registration proceedings and that the decision of 5
August 1981 should be implemented because it had long become final and executory.
After hearing, the lower court rendered a second decision on 25 March 1985 setting aside the
decision dated 5 August 1981 and the order dated 6 October 1981 for the issuance of decrees.4
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by respondent judge on 6
August 1985 for lack of merit. 5
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with this Court which in turn referred the
petition to the Court of Appeals. 6
On 17 September 1986, the appellate court rendered judgment, 7 dismissing the petition and
stating, among others, thus—
In resumé, prior to the issuance of the decree of registration, the respondent Judge has still the
power and control over the decision he rendered. The finality of an adjudication of land in a
registration or cadastral case takes place only after the expiration of the one-year period after
entry of the final decree of registration (Afalla vs. Rosauro, 60 Phil. 622; Valmonte vs. Nable, 85
Phil. 256; Capio vs. Capio, 94 Phil. 113). When the respondent Judge amended his decision
after the report of the respondent officials of the Land Registration office had shown that
homestead patents had already been issued on some of the lots, respondents cannot be faulted
because land already granted by homestead patent can no longer be the subject of another
registration (Manalo vs. Lukban, et al., 48 Phil. 973).
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, We resolve to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution dated
10 March 1987.8 Hence, this recourse.
Several issues are raised by petitioners in this petition. The more important issues before the
Court are: (a) whether or not respondent Judge had jurisdiction to issue the decision of 25 March
1985 which set aside the lower court's earlier decision of 5 August 1981 and the order of 6
October 1981; (b) whether or not the respondents Acting Land Registration Commissioner and
Engr. Silverio Perez, Chief, Division of Original Registration, Land Registration Commission,
have no alternative but to issue the decrees of registration pursuant to the decision of 5 August
1981 and the order for issuance of decrees, dated 6 October 1981, their duty to do so being
purely ministerial; (c) whether or not "the law of the case" is the decision in Government of the
Philippine Islands v. Abran, supra, which held that the lands adjudicated to Consolacion Gomez
were not public lands, and therefore they could not have been acquired by holders of homestead
titles as against petitioners herein.
It is not disputed that the decision dated 5 August 1981 had become final and executory.
Petitioners vigorously maintain that said decision having become final, it may no longer be
reopened, reviewed, much less, set aside. They anchor this claim on section 30 of P.D. No.
1529 (Property Registration Decree) which provides that, after judgment has become final and
executory, the court shall forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for
the issuance of the decree of registration and certificate of title. Petitioners contend that section
30 should be read in relation to section 32 of P.D. 1529 in that, once the judgment becomes final
and executory under section 30, the decree of registration must issue as a matter of course. This
being the law, petitioners assert, when respondent Judge set aside in his decision, dated 25
March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order of 6 October 1981, he clearly acted
without jurisdiction.
Petitioners' contention is not correct. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a
cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility
until after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration.9 This
Court, in several decisions, has held that as long as a final decree has not been entered by the
Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed
from date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the
registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court
rendering it.10
Petitioners contend that the report of respondent Silverio Perez should have been submitted to
the court a quo before its decision became final. But were we to sustain this argument, we would
be pressuring respondent land registration officials to submit a report or study even if
haphazardly prepared just to beat the reglementary deadline for the finality of the court decision.
As said by this Court in De los Reyes vs. de Villa: 11
Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of registration must be stated in convenient form
for transcription upon the certificate of title and must contain an accurate technical description of
the land. This requires technical men. Moreover, it frequently occurs that only portions of a
parcel of land included in an application are ordered registered and that the limits of such
portions can only be roughly indicated in the decision of the court. In such cases amendments of
the plans and sometimes additional surveys become necessary before the final decree can be
entered. That can hardly be done by the court itself; the law very wisely charges the Chief
Surveyor of the General Land Registration Office with such duties (Administrative Code, section
177).
Thus, the duty of respondent land registration officials to render reports is not limited to the
period before the court's decision becomes final, but may extend even after its finality but not
beyond the lapse of one (1) year from the entry of the decree.
Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the decree is
purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the
decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record,
and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in
relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the
court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and
their act is the act of the court. 12 They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance to
courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings ." 13
The foregoing observations resolve the first two (2) issues raised by petitioners.
 Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Petitioners next contend that "the law of the case" is found in Government of the Philippine
Islands vs. Abran, et al., supra, where it was decided by this Court that the lands of Consolacion
M. Gomez, from whom petitioners derive their ownership over the lots in question, were not
public lands. A reading of the pertinent and dispositive portions of the aforesaid decision will Footnotes
show, however, that the lots earlier covered by homestead patents were not included among the
lands adjudicated to Consolacion M. Gomez. The decision states: 1 56 Phil. 397.

With respect to the portions of land covered by homestead certificates of title, we are of opinion 2 Penned by Judge Felicidad Carandang Villalon, Branch X, CFI of Pangasinan, Third Judicial
that such certificates are sufficient to prevent the title to such portion from going to appellants District, San Carlos City, Rollo, pp. 102-108.
aforesaid, for they carry with them preponderating evidence that the respective homesteaders
held adverse possession of such portions, dating back to 1919 or 1920, accordingly to the 3 Rollo, p. l09.
evidence, and the said appellants failed to object to that possession in time. (Emphasis supplied)
4 Penned by Judge Pedro G. Aducayen, Branch LVI, RTC, First Judicial Region, San Carlos
Wherefore modifying the judgment appealed from, it is hereby ordered that the lots respectively City, Pangasinan.
claimed by Agustin V. Gomez, Consolacion M. Gomez, and Julian Macaraeg, be registered in
their name, with the exclusion of the portions covered by the homestead certificates ... . 5 Rollo, p. 130-136.
(Emphasis supplied.) 14
6 G.R. No. 71872, Rollo, pp. 31-46.
The report of respondent land registration officials states that the holders of the homestead
patents registered the lots in question in the years 1928 and 1929. The decision in Government 7 CA-G.R. Sp. No. 07621, Decision penned by Justice Esteban M. Lising with the concurrence
of the Philippine Islands vs. Abran was promulgated on 31 December 1931. Hence, the subject of Justices F.C. Bartolome and Felipe B. Kalalo, Rollo, pp. 149-159.
lots are specifically excluded from those adjudicated by the aforesaid decision to Consolacion M.
Gomez. 8 Rollo, pp. 180-181.

It is a settled rule that a homestead patent, once registered under the Land Registration Act, 9 Section 32, P.D. 1529.
becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible as a Torrens title, and may no longer be the subject
of an investigation for determination or judgment in cadastral proceeding. 15 10 Capio vs. Capio, 94 Phil. 113; Valmonte vs. Nable, 85 Phil. 256; Afalla and Pinanoc vs.
Rosauro, 60 Phil. 622; Roman Catholic Bishop of Cebu vs. Phil. Railway Co., 49 Phil. 540; De
The aforecited case of Government vs. Abran, therefore, is not "the law of the case", for the lots los Reyes vs. De Villa, 48 Phil. 227; Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558; Director of Lands
in question were not private lands of Consolacion M. Gomez when homestead patents were vs. Busuego, 12 SCRA 678.
issued over them in 1928-1929. There is sufficient proof to show that Lots 15, 16, 34 and 41 of
Ipd-92 were already titled lands way back in 1928 and 1929 as shown by Annexes "A", "B", "C", 11 48 Phil. 227.
and "D" of respondents' Memorandum. 16
12 De los Reyes vs. De Villa, supra.
Lastly, petitioners claim that if the decision of 5 August 1981 of the lower court is sustained, the
homestead title holders may still vindicate their rights by filing a separate civil action for 13 Section 6, (2) (6), P.D. No. 1529.
cancellation of titles and for reconveyance in a court of ordinary civil jurisdiction. Conversely, the
same recourse may be resorted to by petitioners. "(T)he true owner may bring an action to have 14 56 Phil. 397, 401.
the ownership or title to land judicially settled, and if the allegations of the plaintiff that he is the
true owner of the parcel of land granted as free patent and described in the Torrens title and that 15 El Hogar Filipino vs. Olviga, 60 Phil. 17; Aquino vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 850; Manalo
the defendant and his predecessor-in-interest were never in possession of the parcel of land and vs. Lukban and Liwanag, 48 Phil. 973; Pajomayo, et al. vs. Manipon, et al., 39 SCRA 676;
knew that the plaintiff and his predecessor-in-interest have been in possession thereof be Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. I, 123 SCRA 516.
established, then the court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, without ordering the
cancellation of the Torrens title issued upon the patent, may direct the defendant, the registered 16 Rollo, pp. 325-329.
owner, to reconvey the parcel of land to the plaintiff who has been found to be the true owner
thereof." 17 17 Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. I, 123 SCRA 516, citing Vital vs.
Anore, et al., 90 Phil. 858-859.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners-appellants.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Today is Saturday, June 23, 2018

Custom Search
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 118436 March 21, 1997
HEIRS OF MANUEL A. ROXAS and TRINIDAD DE LEON VDA. DE ROXAS (in substitution of
original petitioner), petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MAGUESUN MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas, substituted by her heirs,1 instituted this petition for review of
the Court of Appeals decision dated December 8, 1994 in "Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas v.
Maguesun Management and Development Corporation," (CA G.R. CV No. 38328), alleging
reversible error committed by respondent appellate court when it affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite. The issue presented before us is whether or not private
respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud in obtaining a decree of registration
over two unregistered parcels of land in Tagaytay City, actual fraud being the only ground to
reopen or review a decree of registration.
The facts of the case are narrated below:
On July 2, 1990, herein private respondent Maguesun Management and Development
Corporation (Maguesun Corporation) filed an Application for Registration of two parcels of
unregistered land located in Barangay Sungay, Tagaytay City (Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, Cad-
355, Tagaytay Cadastre) with an area of 3,641 and 10,674 square meters respectively. The
original registration case was docketed as Case No. TG-373 before the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite, Branch 18, presided over by Judge Julieto Tabiolo. In support of its application for
registration, Maguesun Corporation presented a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 10, 1990,
executed by Zenaida Melliza as vendor and indicating the purchase price to be P170,000.00.
Zenaida Melliza in turn, bought the property from the original petitioner herein, Trinidad de Leon
vda. de Roxas for P200,000.00 two and a half months earlier, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale
dated March 26, 1990 and an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication dated March 24, 1990.
Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land Registration Authority (the National Land
Titles and Deeds Registration Authority or NALTDRA) to Hilario Luna, Jose Gil and Leon Luna
on the basis of Maguesun Corporation's application for registration. Since Trinidad de Leon vda.
de Roxas was not named as an adjoining owner, occupant or adverse claimant, she was not
sent a notice of the proceedings. Publication was made in the Official Gazette and the Record
Newsweekly.2 After an Order of general default was issued, the trial court proceeded to hear the
land registration case. On October 4, 1990, the Land Registration Authority reported, among
other things, that the subject parcels of land had previously been applied for registration in Land
Registration Case No. 500, GLRO Record No. 55072 at the Court of First Instance of Cavite by
Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon but no decision has been rendered thereon.3 Eventually,
on February 13, 1991 the Regional Trial Court granted Maguesun Corporation's application for
registration (Land Registration Case No. TG-373) in a three-page decision with the following
dispositive portion:4
WHEREFORE, this Court gives imprimatur to the application for registration of said lands
described in plan As-04-000108, Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, one with an area of 3,641 and the
other with an area of 10,674 square meters, as supported and shown by the corresponding
technical descriptions now forming part of the records, in the name of Maguesun Management
and Development Corporation, with office address at 521 Edsa, Quezon City, free from all liens
and encumbrances and from any other adverse claims of any kind and nature.
Upon finality of this Decision, the same ipso facto becomes executory, upon which eventuality
the corresponding decree of registration may thus be issued.
SO ORDERED.
Consequently, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order for Issuance of the Decree on March
14, 1991, after the afore-mentioned Decision in LRC No. TG-373 became final5 but not before it
ordered, on February 14, 1991, Land Registration Case No. 500 (GLRO Record No. 55072)
applied for by Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon, dismissed.
It was only when the caretaker of the property was being asked to vacate the land that petitioner
Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas learned of its sale and the registration of the lots in Maguesun
Corporation's name.
Hence, on April 21, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for review before the Regional Trial Court,
docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1183 to set aside the decree of registration on the ground that
Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud. She alleged that the lots were among the
properties she inherited from her husband, former President Manuel A. Roxas, who died on April
15, 1946 and that her family had been in open, continuous, adverse and uninterrupted
possession of the subject property in the concept of owner for more than thirty years before they
applied for its registration under the Torrens System of land titling. Petitioner further denied that
she sold the lots to Zenaida Melliza whom she had never met before and that her signature was
forged in both the Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. In support of her claims,
she also listed a number of irregularities in the documents to prove actual fraud. In addition, and
perhaps more significantly, she claimed that Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted her
name as an adverse claimant, occupant or adjoining owner in the application for registration
submitted to the Land Registration Authority such that the latter could not send her a Notice of
Initial Hearing. As a result, an order of general default was issued and Maguesun Corporation's
application for registration was granted. She charged Maguesun Corporation's with knowledge
or authorship of the fraud owing to the fact that the Maguesun Corporation's president, Manolita
Guevarra Sunatay after whom the corporation was named, was her niece. Manolita Suntay is
the daughter of Lourdes Guevarra Suntay, a deceased cousin of petitioner Vda. de Roxas who
used to help with the lather's business affairs. Manolita Suntay used to take care of the
registration and insurance of the latter' s cars.6
The sole issue of the case, as laid down by the trial court after the pre-trial, was whether or not
Vda. de Roxas' signatures on the Deed of Absolute Sale and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication in
favor of Zenaida Melliza were forged.7 Petitioner, who was then already 92 years of age,
testified in open court on February 11, 1992 that she has never met Zenaida Melliza, that she
did not sell the subject lots and that her signatures on the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication were forged.8 A document examiner from the Philippine National Police (PNP)
concluded that there was no forgery.9 Upon petitioner's motion, the signatures were re-
examined by another expert from National Bureau of Investigation. The latter testified that the
signatures on the questioned and sample documents were not written by the same person. 10
Despite the foregoing testimonies and pronouncements, the trial court dismissed the petition for
review of decree of registration April 15, 1992. 11 Placing greater weight on the findings and
testimony of the PNP document examiner, it concluded that the questioned documents were not
forged and if they were, it was Zenaida Melliza, and not Maguesun Corporation, who was
responsible. Accordingly, Maguesun Corporation did not commit actual fraud. The court further
noted that petitioner Mrs. Trinidad Roxas had not been paying taxes for several years, which fact
"exhibited what appeared to be unmistakeable signs of not actually owning (the lots) any more,"
and that her application for registration was "previously dismissed and abandoned," thus
indicating that "petitioner herself is aware that she had already lost . . interest, if not actually her
rights, over the property in question. 12
In a decision dated December 8, 1994, 13 respondent court denied the petition for review and
affirmed the findings of the trial court. The Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to and
demonstrate that there was actual or extrinsic fraud, not merely constructive or intrinsic fraud, a
prerequisite for purposes of annuling a judgment or reviewing a decree of registration.
Additionally, respondent court stated that the discrepancies or irregularities in the Deed of Sale
and Affidavit of Self-Adjudication pointed out by petitioner are not patent or obvious, involve
matters that are too trivial, requiring knowledge of the intricacies of the law and are "not
necessarily and exclusively indicia of extrinsic fraud and/or bad faith — especially when
considered in the light of circumstances hereinafter discussed." The records also show,
according to the appellate court, that Maguesun Corporation had not concealed from the court
either the existence of petitioner or any interest she may have had in the registration
proceedings. Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that publication of the initial hearing in the
Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. 14
Hence, the instant petition for review where it is alleged that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that Maguesun Corporation had not commit actual fraud warranting the setting aside of the
registration decree and in resolving the appeal on the basis of Maguesun Corporation's good
faith. Petitioners pray that the registration of the subject lots in the name of Maguesun
Corporation be cancelled, that said property be adjudicated in favor of petitioners and that
respondent corporation pay moral damages not less than P100,000.00, exemplary damages not
less than P36,000.00 and attorney's fees of P60,000.00.
We find the petition for review impressed with merit.
1. Registration of untitled land under the Torrens System is done pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree which amended and codified laws relative to
registration of property. 15 Adjudication of land in a registration (or cadastral) case does not
become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of the final
decree. Before such time, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the
court rendering the decree, which court after hearing, may set aside the decision or decree and
adjudicate the land to another party. 16 Absence, minority or other disability of any person
affected, or any proceeding in court for reversing judgments, are not considered grounds to
reopen or revise said decree. However, the right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or
interest therein by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud is recognized by
law (Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529) as a valid and legal basis for reopening and
revising a decree of registration. 17 It is further required that a petition for reopening and review
of the decree of registration be filed within one year from the date of entry of said decree, that
the petitioner has a real and dominical right and the property has not yet been transferred to an
innocent purchaser. 18
Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an
intentional deception practiced by means of the misrepresentation or concealment of a material
fact. 19 Constructive fraud is construed as a fraud because of its detrimental effect upon public
interests and public or private confidence, even though the act is not done or committed with an
actual design to commit positive fraud or injury upon other persons. 20
Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded as intrinsic where the fraudulent
acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud
were or could have been litigated therein, and is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party
from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon
matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured, so that
there is not a fair submission of the controversy. 21 Extrinsic fraud is also actual fraud, but
collateral to the transaction sued upon. 22
The distinctions are significant because only actual fraud or extrinsic fraud has been accepted
as grounds for a judgment to be annulled or, as in this case, a decree of registration reopened
and reviewed. 23 In the oft-cited Macabingkil v. People's Homesite Housing Corporation case,
the Court drew from American jurisprudence stating that "relief has been granted on the ground
that, by some fraud practiced directly upon the party seeking relief against the judgment or
decree, (and) that party has been prevented from presenting all of his case to the court." 24 The
"fraud" contemplated by the law in this case (Section 32, P.D. No 1529) is actual and extrinsic,
which includes an intentional omission of fact required by law. 25 For fraud to justify a review of
a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral, and the facts upon which it is based have not been
controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.
26 Persons who were fraudulently deprived of their opportunity to be heard in the original
registration case are entitled to a review of a decree of registration.
In Ramirez v. CA, 27 this Court adopted the Court of Appeals' ruling that the suppression of the
fact that the applicant spouses possessed the subject ricefield merely as antichretic creditors
and the fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation in the application that no other persons
had any claim or interest in the said land, constitute specific allegations of extrinsic fraud
supported by competent proof. Failure and intentional omission of applicants to disclose the
facts of actual physical possession by another person constitutes an allegation of actual fraud.
28 Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the
prejudice of a third person. 29
The Court here finds that respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud in obtaining
the decree of registration sought to be reviewed by petitioner.
Petitioner Vda. de Roxas contended that Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted their
name, or that of the Roxas family, as having a claim to or as an occupant of the subject property.
In the corporation's application for registration filed with the trial court in LRC No. TG-373, the
following declaration appears:
6. That the names in full and addresses, as far as known to the undersigned, of the
owners of all adjoining properties; of the persons mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 5 (mortgagors,
encumbrancers, and occupants) and of the person shown on the plan as claimants are as
follows:
Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon Luna, Provincial Road
all at Tagaytay City (no house No.) 30
The highlighted words are typed in with a different typewriter, with the first five letters of the word
"provincial" typed over correction fluid. Maguesun Corporation, however, annexed a differently-
worded application for the petition to review case (Civil Case No. TG-1183, "Trinidad de Leon
Vda. de Roxas v. Maguesun Management and Development Corporation, et al."). In the copy
submitted to the trial court, the answer to the same number is as follows:

Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon Luna, Roxas. 31
The discrepancy which is unexplained appears intentional. If the word "Roxas" were indeed
erased and replaced with "Provincial Road all at Tagaytay City (no house No.)" in the original
application submitted in LRC No. TG-373 but the copy with the word "Roxas" was submitted to
the trial court in Civil Case No. TG-1183, it is reasonable to assume that the reason is to mislead
the court into thinking that "Roxas" was placed in the original application as an adjoining owner,
encumbrancer, occupant or claimant, the same application which formed the basis for the Land
Registration Authority in sending out notices of initial hearing. Section 15 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529 also requires the applicant for registration to state the full names and addresses of all
occupants of the land and those of adjoining owners, if known and if not known, the extent of the
search made to find them. Respondent corporation likewise failed to comply with this
requirement of law.
The truth is that the Roxas family had been in possession of the property uninterruptedly through
their caretaker, Jose Ramirez. 32 Respondent Maguesun Corporation also declared in number 5
of the same application that the subject land was unoccupied when in truth and in fact, the
Roxas family caretaker resided in the subject property. Respondent corporation is likewise
charged with the knowledge of such possession and occupancy, for its President, who signed
the Deed of Sale over the property, knew fully well that her grandaunt Trinidad de Leon vda. de
Roxas owned the property. It is reasonable to expect her as a buyer to have inspected the
property prior to the sale such that the ascertainment of the current possessors or occupants
could have been made facilely. Respondent corporation's intentional concealment and
representation of petitioner's interest in the subject lots as possessor, occupant and claimant
constitutes actual fraud justifying the reopening and review of the decree of registration. Through
such misfeasance, the Roxas family was kept ignorant of the registration proceedings involving
their property, thus effectively depriving them of their day in court.
2. Respondent Court of Appeals held that Maguesun Corporation had not concealed
from the court either the existence of Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas or any interest she may
have in the registration proceedings for the records are replete with references by Maguesun
Corporation itself to petitioner. 33 Mention of the late President's name as well as that of
petitioner was made principally in the Formal Offer of Exhibits for respondent corporation, in a
Copy of Plan of Lots 7231 and 7239, tax declarations and as predecessor-in-interest. However,
this is not sufficient compliance with what the law requires to be stated in the application for
registration. Disclosure of petitioner's adverse interest, occupation and possession should be
made at the appropriate time, i.e., at the time of the application for registration, otherwise, the
persons concerned will not be sent notices of the initial hearing and will, therefore, miss the
opportunity to present their opposition or claims.
3. Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing was made in the Official Gazette and in the
Record Newsweekly, admittedly not a newspaper of general circulation. The Court of Appeals
held that pursuant to Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, publication in the Official
Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Said provision of law expressly states that "the
Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in
the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Provided,
however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon
the court. . . ."
While publication of the notice in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the
court, publication in a newspaper of general circulation remains an indispensable procedural
requirement. Couched in mandatory terms, it is a component of procedural due process and
aimed at giving "as wide publicity as possible" so that all persons having an adverse interest in
the land subject of the registration proceedings may be notified thereof. 34 Although jurisdiction
of the court is not affected, the fact that publication was not made in a newspaper of general
circulation is material and relevant in assessing the applicant's right or title to the land.
4. The allegations of forgery and the discrepancies in the documentary, as well as in the
testimonial evidence regarding this issue which are all crucial to this case, compelled the Court
to undertake a careful review of the facts of the case. 35 A close scrutiny of the evidence on
record leads the Court to the irresistible conclusion that forgery was indeed attendant in the case
at bar. Although there is no proof of respondent Maguesun Corporation's direct participation in
the execution and preparation of the forged instruments, there are sufficient indicia which proves
that Maguesun Corporation is not the "innocent purchaser for value" who merits the protection of
the law.
In response to the questions fielded by the trial court and by counsel for petitioner, PNP
Document Examiner Zacarias Semacio sought to explain all the differences pointed out in the
questioned signatures and in the sample signatures as having been caused merely by "natural
variation." 36 He concluded that the questioned signatures were not forged. In contrast, Chief of
the Questioned Documents Division of the National Bureau of Investigation, Arcadio Ramos,
testified with more specificity as befits an expert that the questioned and sample signatures were
not written by one and the same person because of "(t)he manner of execution of strokes; the
personalized proportional characteristics of letters; the linking/connecting between letters; the
structural pattern of letters and other minute details . . . 37 Moreover, petitioner Trinidad de Leon
vda. de Roxas categorically declared that she has never met Zenaida Melliza and did not sell the
subject property. 38 Petitioner, then over ninety years old, has no motive to attest to a falsehood.
Petitioner and her family also own several other pieces of property, some of which are leased
out as restaurants, e.g. Leo's Restaurant and Ma Mon Luk Restaurant. 39 This is an indication
that petitioner is not unaware of the value of her properties. Hence, it is unlikely that indication
that she would sell over thirteen thousand square meters of prime property in Tagaytay City to a
stranger for a measly P200,000.00 Finally, even to a layman's eye, the documents, as well as
the enlarged photographic exhibit of the signatures, reveal forgery. The questioned signatures
taken from the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-Adjudication are starkly different from the
sample signatures in several documents executed by petitioner. The questioned signatures are
smooth and rounded and have none of the jagged and shaky character of petitioner's signatures
characteristic of the penmanship of elderly persons.
There are also added considerations reflective of the dubious character of the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication purportedly executed by petitioner. 40 In it she declares that she is a resident of 22
8th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, when she actually lives in 2 Park Road, North Forbes
Park, Makati. She also states that she is the "sole heir of the late Manuel De Roxas who died
sometime on the year 1944 at Manila." Petitioner's husband is President Manuel A. Roxas and
she refers to herself as Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas. President Roxas was survived by
petitioner and their two children, Ma. Rosario Roxas and Gerardo Roxas (who predeceased
petitioner). The fact that petitioner was not the sole heir was known to the general public, as well
as the demise of the late President on April 15, 1946 while delivering a speech at Clark Field,
Pampanga. The aforementioned irregularities are too glaring to have been ignored. If petitioner
did in fact execute said Affidavit, there is no reason why she should state facts other than the
unadulterated truth concerning herself and her family.
Additionally, Zenaida Melliza's non-appearance raises doubt as to her existence. Her given
address was Matina, Davao City. How was she related to petitioner and what led her to
purchase the subject? Respondent corporation could very well have presented her to prove the
legitimacy of their transaction. If petitioner were selling said property, would she not have offered
them first to interested relatives such as Manolita G. Suntay? Would an ordinary person sell
more than thirteen thousand square meters of prime property for P170,000.00 when it was
earlier purchased for P200,000.00? These questions highlight several implausibilities in the
alleged sale of the subject property by herein petitioner. As Maguesun Corporation's President
who is related to petitioner, Manolita G. Suntay should have verified the sale of the subject
property by Zenaida Melliza. Manolita G. Suntay's closeness to petitioner Vda. de Roxas, as one
who even registered the latter's car, suggests acquaintance with the late petitioner's properties
as well as the possibility that she took advantage of such knowledge.
From the foregoing, it is quite clear that respondent corporation cannot tack its possession to
that of petitioner as predecessor-in-interest. Zenaida Melliza conveyed not title over the subject
parcels of land to Maguesun Corporation as she was not the owner thereof. 41 Maguesun
Corporation is thus not entitled to the registration decree which the trial court granted in its
decision. Palpably, petitioner has not been interrupted in her more than thirty years of open,
uninterrupted, exclusive and notorious possession in the concept of an owner over the subject
lots by the irregular transaction to Zenaida Melliza. She therefore retains title proper and
sufficient for original registration over the two parcels of land in question pursuant to Section 14
of Presidential Decree No. 1529. 42
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
C.A. G.R. CV No. 38328 ("Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Maguesun Management &
Development Corporation, et al.") promulgated on December 8, 1994 is hereby REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, registration of title over the subject parcels of land, described in
Plan AS-04-000108, Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, with an area of 3,461 and 10,674 square meters,
respectively, as shown and supported by the corresponding technical descriptions now forming
part of the Records of LRC No. TG-373, is awarded to herein petitioner Trinidad de Leon vda. de
Roxas and her heirs, herein substituted as petitioners. Upon finality of this Decision, the Land
Registration Authority is hereby directed to ISSUE with reasonable dispatch the corresponding
decree of registration and certificate of title pursuant to Section 39 of Presidential Decree No.
1529.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 The motion to substitute Ruby Roxas-Roxas, Maria Lourdes Roxas-Ojeda and Manuel
A. Roxas, heirs of petitioner Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas who died on June 20, 1995, as
petitioners in this case was granted on September 13, 1995, Rollo, pp. 118 and 124.
2 The Record Newsweekly (Tinig ng Katagalugan) is a newspaper edited in Bacoor,
Cavite and of general circulation in the Provinces of Cavite, Aurora, Batangas, Laguna,
Marinduque, Occidental Mindoro, Oriental Mindoro, Palawan, Quezon, Romblon, Rizal and in
the Cities of Batangas, Lipa, Cavite, Tagaytay, Trece Martires, San Pablo and Lucena,
published every Saturday by the Daily Record, Inc. Records of LRC No. TG-373, p. 31.
3 Report of Silverio G. Perez, Chief, Department of Registration, Land Registration
Authority, dated October 4, 1990, Records of LRC No. TG-373, p. 35.
4 Records of LRC No. TG-373, pp. 126-128.
5 Records of LRC No. TG-373, p. 133.
6 Rollo, p. 15.
7 Decision, p. 3; Records of Civil Case No. TG-1183, p. 300.
8 TSN, February 11, 1992, pages 22-37.
9 Questioned Documents Report No. 007-92 issued by the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory Service, dated January 9, 1992, Records of Civil Case No. TG-1183, p. 212.
10 Questioned Documents Report No. 62-292 issued by the Questioned Documents
Division of the National Bureau of Investigation, dated February 10, 1992, Records of Civil Case
No. TG-1183, p. 220.
11 Decision in Civil Case No. TG-1183, Trinidad de Leon vda. Roxas v. Maguesun
Management Corporation et. al., penned by Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo; Records of said civil case,
pp. 298-311.
12 Records of Civil Case No. TG-1183, pp. 304-310.
13 Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Maguesun Management and Development
Corporation et. al., CA-G.R. No. CV No. 38328, Justice Hector L. Hofileña, ponente, Justices
Gloria C. Paras and Salome A, Montoya, concurring; Rollo, pp. 68-76.
14 Rollo, pp. 71-75.
15 Promulgated June 11, 1978.
16 Afable v. Rosario, 60 Phil. 622.
17 Presidential Decree No. 1529, Section 32 provides :
Sec. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. —The decree of
registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of
any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and the
branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or
confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance (now the
Regional Trial Court) a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later
than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case
shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has
acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. . . . (Emphasis and
words in parenthesis supplied.)
The section is similar to the provision it replaced, Section 38, Act No. 496 as amended by Sec.
3, Act 3621 and Sec. 1, Act 3630.
18 Director of Lands v. CFI Rizal, Branch XII, 152 SCRA 487.
19 Bell v. Henry, 28 Ohio Law Review 528, cited 17A WORDS AND PHRASES 28
(1958); Fraud and Deceit, 37 AM JUR 2d 22 citing Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 24 L ed. 586, and
other cases.
20 Ibid. at 23 citing Bank v. Board of Education, 305 N.Y. 119, 111 NE2d 238; also
Fraud, 37 CJS 208-215 and at 23 citing Bank v. Board of Education, 305 N.Y. 119, 111 NE2d
238.
21 Ibid. at 25.
22 Ibid. at 24 citing Flood v. Templeton, 152 Cal. 148, 92 P 78, Toledo Scale Co. v.
Computing Scale Co. 261 US 388, 67 L ed. 719, 43 s Ct. 458 and other cases.
23 Ybañez v. CA, 253 SCRA at 551. 40 Records of LRC No. TG-373, p. 105.

24 72 SCRA 344 citing U.S. v. Throckmorton, 25 L. ed. 93, 95. 41 Treasurer of the Phils. v. CA, 153 SCRA 359.

25 Republic v. Register of Deeds of Quezon, 244 SCRA 537 citing PENA, 42 Sec. 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 reads in part: "The following persons may file
REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 113 (1982). in the proper Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court) an application for registration
of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
26 Director of Lands v. CFI Rizal, 152 SCRA 487.
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
27 G.R. No. L-38185, September 24, 1986, 144 SCRA 292. open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
28 Nicolas v. Director of Lands, G.R. No. L-19147-48, December 28, 1963, 9 SCRA 934, 1945, or earlier. . . .
938.

29 Estiva v. Alvero, 37 Phil 498, cited in Nicolas v. Director of Lands, supra. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

30 Records of LRC No. TG-373, p. 2.

31 Records of Civil Case No. TG-1183, p. 49. Today is Saturday, June 23, 2018

32 Reply, p. 11. Rollo, p. 134. Custom Search

33 Decision of the Court of Appeals, p. 7, Rollo, p. 74.

Republic of the Philippines
34 Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982. SUPREME COURT
Manila
35 Reyes v. CA, G.R. No. 110207, July 11, 1996.
SECOND DIVISION
36 TSN, January 23, 1992 in Civil Case No. TG-1183, pp. 33-64.
G.R. No. L-29052 July 30, 1976
37 TSN, February 18, 1992 in Civil Case No. TG-1183, p. 30. He explained in part that
"(t)he first difference that I have mentioned here in this particular portion of combination of CARIDAD ARGUELLES, plaintiff-appellee,
capital letter "T" and "R" in the questioned signature, the initial stroke of letter "T" is much lower vs.
to the base line and the small letter "r" is much higher; whereas, in the series of standards, it is GUILLERMO TIMBANCAYA, defendant-appellant.
either reverse or a little bit farther from the base line. The second difference is the placement of
the "i" dot or the formation of the "i" dot is always starting to the right. This is the formation, and Restituto T. Bermejo for appellant.
the location is below or before the small letter "i" and the other one is just above the small letter
"I"; whereas, in the series of standards, the formation is either starting to the right or it is like a Iñigo R. Pena for appellee.
comma, and then stubbing straight, stubbing to the right, stubbing to the right, but very seldom,
but you can see the formation of the said "I" dot stubbing to the left as exhibited here in the
questioned signature. The next difference is the formation of the hump of small letter "m." The ANTONIO, J.:
hump, your Honor, here is rounded; whereas, in the series of standards, it is angular, which is
very much different, and that is significant in handwriting. The next difference is the small letter Direct appeal to this Court, on questions of law, by defendant appellant Guillermo Timbancaya,
"d." The small letter "d" in the questioned signature, the body is bigger and the stem is shorter, from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Palawan, in Civil Case No. 475, entitled
as well as in small letter "d"; whereas, in the series of standards, it is the reverse or the opposite. "Caridad Arguelles vs. Guillermo Timbancaya". In this action for reconveyance instituted by
The body is smaller and the stem is much longer. Then, the particular portion there, the terminal plaintiff appellee Caridad Arguelles, the trial court found that the property covered by Transfer
stroke of letter "d" in the first letter "d", it deviates or separates from the body on the base line Certificate of Title No. 1053 of the Office. of the Register of Deeds of Palawan was, by virtue of
which is a little bit or half way from the body of small letter "d", whereas, in the series of the Compromise Agreement and Judgment in Special Proceedings No. 211 of the Court of First
standards, this is not curving but going straight and even beyond the base line and it is angular Instance of Palawan, owned jointly one-half (½) "thereof by Caridad Arguelles and the other
in form. . . ." (pp. 12-14 of the same TSN). one-half (½) by Guillermo and Alberto Timbancaya — and consequently ordered the cancellation
of the afore-mentioned transfer certificate of title in the exclusive name of Guillermo Timbancaya
38 TSN of February 11, 1992, in Civil Case No. TG-1183, pp. 36-37. and Alberto Timbancaya, to pay appellee by way of attorney's fees the amount of P500.00 and
the costs of the proceedings.
39 Records of Civil Case No. TG-1183, pp. 238-259.
The relevant facts as found by the trial court in the aforementioned case are as follows.
On July 6, 1950, the plaintiff herein filed before this Court Special Proceedings No. 211, for
Intestate Estate of Jose Arguelles, under Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, Exhibit' A'.
After the issues have been joined, the parties to this said case filed an agreement with the court
and prayed that judgment be rendered in accordance with the said agreement. Thereupon, the
court in its decision dated September 11, 1950, rendered a decision in accordance with said
agreement, the dispositive part of which is as follows: 'WHEREFORE, this Court, in conformity
with the said agreement hereby renders decision declaring and adjudicating one half (½) of the
land in question to Mrs. Caridad Arguelles which one half (½) is the northern portion of the said
land, and the other half to Messrs. Guillermo Timbancaya and Alberto Timbancaya, which is the
southern portion of the said property, The common boundary to be a line of from east to west
direction. The actual number of coconut trees planted by each on the portion assigned to the
other shall be at P2.00 per tree for those already bearing fruits and P0.50 for those non-bearing
ones; and that actual set off shall be made between the parties, the Petitioner and Respondents,
with the payment of the balance to be made accordingly. The Respondents are hereby ordered
to pay to the Petitioner the value of the coconut trees planted in certain part of the northern
portion on the prices above-mentioned per coconut tree, which part the latter relinquishes unto
the former. The parties are hereby ordered likewise to pay the costs proportionately, ½ by the
Petitioner and the other half by the Respondents.' In compliance with the agreement of the
parties in the said case and the decision of the court, the defendant paid the plaintiff the number
of coconut trees planted by the plaintiff, Exhibits 'E', 'E-1', 'E-2', 'E-3', and 'E4' as well as the
plaintiff paid the defendant, Exhibits 4' and' 4-A'. They also divided the land in accordance with
the agreement and the decision of the court, Exhibit 'M-1' In order to distinguish the share of
each, a fence was constructed at the middle of the property separating the share of the plaintiff
and the defendant. On October 12, 1954, the land was surveyed and divided into two equal
parts which survey is PSD , Exhibit 'D', and approved by the Bureau of Lands on April 26, 1955.
The plaintiff declared for taxation purposes her share and paid the corresponding land taxes,
Exhibit 'B' Tax Declaration; Exhibits 'C', C1 to C7 receipts of payment of taxes. Contrary to the
agreement and to the decision of the Court, the defendant appropriated unto himself the whole
area covered by Original Certificate of title No. G-207, which was the subject of Special
Proceedings No. 211, and was able to have the said certificate of title cancelled and a new
Certificate of Title No. 1053 issued in his favor covering the whole land. Even before the filing of
Special Proceedings No. 211, the plaintiff has been in actual open and continuous possession of
one-half (½) of the property up to the present time without molestation from the defendant. Upon
knowing that the defendant was able to have the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1053 covering
the whole land issued in his favor dated June 5, 1961, she filed the instant case for the
reconveyance of one-half (½) of the property.
The defendant alleges that Caridad Arguelles, the plaintiff herein, has no right to the property in
question because she is not an heir to the estate of the late Jose Arguelles. Any question now
on that point has already been decided in Special Proceedings No. 211.
Appellant contends that the trial court should have dismissed appellee's complaint, since (a) the
decision in Special Proceedings No. 211 is already barred by the Statute of Limitations; (b) the
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1053 had already become indefeasible, since the title was issued
to appellant on June 5, 1961 and, therefore, almost four (4) years had elapsed before the action
was filed on April 30, 1965; and (c) the "non- enforcement of plaintiffs alleged claim after
fourteen (14) years is tantamount to waiver and abandonment."
On the basis of the afore-mentioned facts, We find no merit to the appeal.
1. Appellee and appellant, as parties in Special Proceedings No. 211, appear to have
already complied with the terms of the Judgment by compromise, rendered by the trial court. As
found by the court a quo, appellant and appellee have paid to each other the value of the
coconuts planted in the area relinquished by one to the other. Both parties have actually
occupied their respective portions of the property, appellees occupying the northern portion
while appellant occupied the southern portion thereof, which portions are separated by a fence
constructed by them at the middle of the property. On October 12, 1964, a survey was
conducted and the subdivision plans of the property dividing the property into two equal parts
and delineating the portions allotted to each other were made, which survey plans (PSD-43553,
Exhibit "D") were approved by the Bureau of Lands on April 26, 1955. Appellee's portion of the
property has been declared in her name for taxation purposes (Exhibit "13") and the annual
realty taxes corresponding thereon have been paid by her since 1952 (Exhibits "C", "C-1" to "C-
7"). Those facts must be deemed uncontroverted. Appellant, in appealing this case directly to
this Tribunal on purely questions of law, had foreclosed any review of the trial court's findings of
fact, for in a direct appeal to this Court on questions of law, appellant "must be deemed to have
accepted as conclusive all the lower court's findings as established by evidence, only questions
of law being brought to Us for review." 1
It is evident, therefore, that contrary to the claim of appellants, the Judgment in Special
Proceedings No. 211 had actually been enforced and executed by the actual occupancy by the
parties of their respective portions of the property and by the exercise by them of their rights of
ownership thereon. The action instituted by appellee is to annul the transfer certificate of title
secured by appellant from the Register of Deeds, on the basis of his affidavit adjudicating to
himself exclusively the Ownership of the property covered by Original Certificate of Title No G-
207 in the name of Jose Arguelles, notwithstanding the aforesaid Judgment by compromise and
the recognition by appellant of appellee's ownership and possession of one-half (½) of the
property.
2. The rule that a decree of registration once issued becomes final and incontrovertible
one (1) year after its issuance is not relevant to the case at bar. Appellee does not question the
validity of Original Certificate of Title No. G-207 which was issued to Jose Arguelles for, as a
matter of fact, the said title was the basis of the Judgment by compromise executed by appellant
and appellee in special Proceedings No. 211. What appellee sought in the action for
reconveyance was the annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1053, which was issued to
appellant long after the afore-mentioned Judgment by compromise had been implemented by
the parties, on the basis of his misrepresentation in his affidavit filed with the Register of Deeds
of Palawan that he and his brother, Alberto Timbancaya, are the exclusive owners of said
property because 'they are the only legitimate children and surviving heirs of our parents Jose
Arguelles and Rufina de los Reyes, all deceased" This representation is contrary to the
admissions by appellant himself that "they are not the legitimate children of the deceased
Spouses Jose Arguelles and Rufina de los Reyes, but the sons of Rufina de los Reyes with her
first husband, Joaquin Timbancaya" and inconsistent with his admissions in the Compromise
Agreement approved by the court a quo in Special Proceedings No. 211. In an earlier case 2
where a patent was issued by the Director of Lands covering the lot in question to one Obot
(Bagoba) and upon the death of the patentee, appellants, upon the claim that they were the only
heirs of the deceased, were able to obtain another title in their own name to the prejudice of
appellee, We held that the action filed by the appellee to "recover the ownership and
possession" of said Parcel was, in effect, one to annul the title issued to appellant on the ground
of fraud, and not a petition for review under Section 38 of Act 4w as amended.
The action to annul the title or the action for reconveyance has its basis in Section 55 of Act 496,
as amended which provides that "in all cases of registration procured by fraud the owner may
pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice,
however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title." This is a remedy
which is available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent third person for value. It
is independent and distinct from that authorized by Section .38 thereof, which has for its purpose
the reopening of the decree of title, on the ground of fraud, within one (1) year from its issuance.
In the case at bar, appellant having secured thru his misrepresentation a transfer certificate of
title in his exclusive name covering the whole property to the prejudice of appellee the trial court
did not commit any error in ordering the cancellation of the aforesaid title. As this Court observed
in various cases, 3 "public policy demands that a person guilty of fraud or at least, of breach of
trust, should not be allowed to use a Torrens title as a shield against the consequences of his
own wrong doing."
Having reached the foregoing conclusions, it appears unnecessary to discuss appellant's third
assignment of error, it being inconsistent with the aforecited facts.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED, with costs against the appellant.
Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.
Footnotes
1 Victorino v. Lao, 33 SCRA 53, 61; Lanzar v. Guerrero, 29 SCRA 107; Saludares v.
Martinez, 29. SCRA 745; Favis v. Municipality of Sabangan, 27 SCRA 92; Luna v. Plaza, 26
SCRA 310, Miguel v. Catalino, 26 SCRA 234; Perez v. Araneta, 24 SCRA 43; Abuyo v. De
Suazo, 18 SCRA 600.
2 Aring v. Original, 6 SCRA 1021.
3 Jacinto v. Jacinto, 115 Phil. 363, 370, Cabanas v. Register of Deeds, 40 Phil., 620;
Severino v. Severino, 41 Phil. 343.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
Today is Saturday, June 23, 2018
LAUREL, J.:
This is a petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated
on July 30, 1937 in CA-G. R. No. 43446.
Gregoria Pimentel was the owner of the two parcels of land which she sold and conveyed on
June 1, 1926, to Pedro Abena, the respondent-appellee herein. On January 27, 1927, Gregoria
Pimentel again sold and conveyed the same parcels to Tiburcio Mamuyac, the petitioner-
appellant herein. The document of sale, Exhibit 1, in favor of Abena was duly inscribed in the
registry of property of the province on January 31, 1927, and from April, 1927, said parcels of
land were declared for taxation in the name said Abena. The document executed in favor of the
petitioner on January 27, 1927, was neither inscribed in the registry of property nor were the
parcels of the land declared for taxation in the name of the latter.
To determine the conflict, petitioner-appellant instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of
La Union against the respondent-appellee for the recovery of the two controverted parcels of
land. After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, respondent-
appellee here. From this judgment, the petitioner-appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals.
This latter court, with one member dissenting, affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance
of La Union. The dispositive part of the majority decision of the appellate court is:
De cualquier modo que se considere la cuestion, ya bajo la teoria de la parte demandante sobre
la posesion, ya bajo el articulo 1473 del Codigo Civil que tiene exacta aplicacion al caso de
autos, el juzgado no incurrio en ningun error al dictar sentencia a favor del demandado, la cual
confirmamos en todas sus partes, con las costas en esta instancia al apelante.
Plaintiff, petitioner-appellant here, elevated the case to this court by writ of certiorari as adverted
to in the beginning of this opinion.
The first assignment of error of the petitioner-appellant challenges the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals. This cannot be done.
The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals
is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law incurred by the latter, the findings of fact of
said Court of Appeals being final as to the former. (Guico vs. Mayuga and Heirs of Mayuga
[1936], 35 Off. Gaz., 861.)

Custom Search Review of judgments and decrees of the Court of Appeals is limited to "cases in which only
errors or questions of law are involved." (Sec 2, Commonwealth Act No. 3, amending section
138 of the Administrative Code, in relation to sec. 2, Art. VIII, Constitution of the Philippines.)
Republic of the Philippines (Mateo vs. Collector of Customs and Court of Appeals [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., 915.)
SUPREME COURT
Manila The petitioner-appellant under his under his second and third assignments of error contends that
he has a better right over the two parcels of land involved because of possession claimed by him
EN BANC in virtue of an alleged private contract of mortgaged executed in his favor on January 4, 1935
(Exhibit B.) It is sufficient answer to this contention that "in order that a mortgage may be
G.R. No. L-45742 April 12, 1939 deemed to be legally constituted, it is undispensable that the instrument in which it appears be a
public document and be recorded in the property register. Therefore, a mortgage in legal form
TIBURCIO MAMUYAC, petitioner-appellant, was not constituted by said private document." (Tuason vs. Goduco, 23 Phil., 342, 347.) Even
vs. were we to accord validity to the mortgage, Exhibit B, article 1473 of the Civil Code, invoked by
PEDRO ABENA (alias Indong), respondent-appellee. him, applies only to the determination of presence between sale and sale:

Nicanor Tavora for petitioner. El precepto que acaba de consignarse viene a determinar los casos de preferencia cuando una
Pedro C. Quinto for respondent. misma cosa hubiere sido vendida a dos o mas personas, casos de los que ya se ocupo la ley
15, tit. 32, lib. 3.º del Codigo Romano, y la ley 50, tit. 5.º part. 5. a (4 Bonel, Codigo Civil, p 483)
and the same cannot be availed of in case of conflict between a sale and a mortgage.
¿Es aplicable el precepto del articulo 1473 del Codigo Civil para resolver el resolver el pleito
entre el comprador de un inmueble y el acreedor del vendedor, con hipoteca sobre el mismo
inmueble vendido?
El Tribunal Supremo declaro no haber lugar al recurso.
Considerando que es inaplicable al caso el articulo 1473 del Codigo Civil, que se supone
infringido en el primer motivo del recurso, porque no se ha tratado en este pleito del caso a que
se refiere dicho articulo, ni el recurrente tenia inscrita la propiedad de la finca de que se trata
cuando se instruyo el expediente posesorio, ni poseia con la buena fe que exige el ultimo
parrafo del articulo citado, siendo, como era, conocedor de que la Godinez y de los gravamenes
que sobre esta pesaban, lo cual le coloca en condiciones que n son las del tercero a que hace
referencia el articulo 606 del citado Codigo, cuya infraccion se invoca en el segundo motivo, por
no haberlo aplicado, cuando realmente no lo es este caso. (Sentencia de 7 de julio 1896, 15
Codigo Civil, Martinez Ruiz 2. a ed., 330, 332.)
Upon the other hand, even if we were to accept the contention of the petitioner-appellant that he
had been in possession of said properties by reason of the alleged contract of mortgage
executed in his favor, on January 4, 1925, and were to accord legal effect to the document of
sale of January 27, 1927, which was not recorded in the registry of property, still his right cannot
prevail over that of Abena who had duly registered his deed of sale. (Exhibit 1.)
The contention of the appellant that respondent's ownership and preference over the property
over the property in question is not complete because of lack of material delivery of the
possession to him by the vendor is not well taken, for the reason that the execution of the public
document of sale in favor of the respondent-appellee is equivalent to the delivery of the realty
sold. (Sanchez vs. Ramos, 40, Phil., 614, 616.).
The petitioner is hereby dismissed with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 100709. November 14, 1997]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JOSEFINA L. MORATO, SPOUSES NENITA CO and ANTONIO
QUILATAN AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON PROVINCE, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Will the lease and/or mortgage of a portion of a realty acquired through free patent constitute
sufficient ground for the nullification of such land grant? Should such property revert to the State
once it is invaded by the sea and thus becomes foreshore land?
The Case
These are the two questions raised in the petition before us assailing the Court of Appeals[1]
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 02667 promulgated on June 13, 1991 which answered the said
questions in the negative.[2] Respondent Courts Decision dismissed[3] petitioners appeal and
affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court[4] of Calauag, Quezon, dated December
28, 1983 in Civil Case No. C-608. In turn, the Regional Trial Courts decision dismissed
petitioners complaint for cancellation of the Torrens Certificate of Title of Respondent Morato
and for reversion of the parcel of land subject thereof to the public domain.
The Facts
The petition of the solicitor general, representing the Republic of the Philippines, recites the
following facts:[5]
Sometime in December, 1972, respondent Morato filed a Free Patent Application No. III-3-8186-
B on a parcel of land with an area of 1,265 square meters situated at Pinagtalleran, Calauag,
Quezon. On January 16, 1974, the patent was approved and the Register of Deeds of Quezon
at Lucena City issued on February 4, 1974 Original Certificate of Title No. P-17789. Both the
free patent and the title specifically mandate that the land shall not be alienated nor encumbered
within five (5) years from the date of the issuance of the patent (Sections 118 and 124 of CA No.
141, as amended).
Subsequently, the District Land Officer in Lucena City, acting upon reports that respondent
Morato had encumbered the land in violation of the condition of the patent, conducted an
investigation. Thereafter, it was established that the subject land is a portion of the Calauag Bay,
five (5) to six (6) feet deep under water during high tide and two (2) feet deep at low tide, and not
suitable to vegetation. Moreover, on October 24, 1974, a portion of the land was mortgaged by
respondent Morato to respondents Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan for P10,000.00 (pp. 2, 25,
Folder of Exhibits). The spouses Quilatan constructed a house on the land. Another portion of
the land was leased to Perfecto Advincula on February 2, 1976 at P100.00 a month, where a
warehouse was constructed.
On November 5, 1978, petitioner filed an amended complaint against respondents Morato,
spouses Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon for the
cancellation of title and reversion of a parcel of land to the public domain, subject of a free patent
in favor of respondent Morato, on the grounds that the land is a foreshore land and was
mortgaged and leased within the five-year prohibitory period (p. 46, Records).
After trial, the lower court, on December 28, 1983, rendered a decision dismissing petitioners
complaint. In finding for private respondents, the lower court ruled that there was no violation of
the 5-year period ban against alienating or encumbering the land, because the land was merely
leased and not alienated. It also found that the mortgage to Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan
covered only the improvement and not the land itself.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Thereafter, the Republic
of the Philippines filed the present petition.[6]
The Issues
Petitioner alleges that the following errors were committed by Respondent Court:[7]
I
Respondent Court erred in holding that the patent granted and certificate of title issued to
Respondent Morato cannot be cancelled and annulled since the certificate of title becomes
indefeasible after one year from the issuance of the title.
II
Respondent Court erred in holding that the questioned land is part of a disposable public land
and not a foreshore land.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
First Issue: Indefeasibility of a Free Patent Title
In resolving the first issue against petitioner, Respondent Court held:[8]
x x x. As ruled in Heirs of Gregorio Tengco vs. Heirs of Jose Alivalas, 168 SCRA 198. x x. The
rule is well-settled that an original certificate of title issued on the strength of a homestead patent
partakes of the nature of a certificate of title issued in a judicial proceeding, as long as the land
disposed of is really part of the disposable land of the public domain, and becomes indefeasible
and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of promulgation of the order of
the Director of Lands for the issuance of the patent. (Republic v. Heirs of Carle, 105 Phil. 1227
(1959); Ingaran v. Ramelo, 107 Phil. 498 (1960); Lopez v. Padilla, (G.R. No. L-27559, May 18,
1972, 45 SCRA 44). A homestead patent, one registered under the Land Registration Act,
becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens Title. (Pamintuan v. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558 (1982); El
Hogar Filipino v. Olviga, 60 Phil. 17 (1934); Duran v. Oliva, 113 Phil. 144 (1961); Pajomayo v.
Manipon, G.R. No. L-33676, June 30, 1971, 39 SCRA 676). (p. 203).
Again, in Lopez vs. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 271, citing Iglesia ni Cristo v. Hon. Judge, CFI
of Nueva Ecija, Branch I, (123 SCRA 516 (1983) and Pajomayo, et al. v. Manipon, et al. (39
SCRA 676 (1971) held that once a homestead patent granted in accordance with the Public
Land Act is registered pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496, the certificate of title issued in virtue
of said patent has the force and effect of a Torrens Title issued under the Land Registration Act.
Indefeasibility of the title, however, may not bar the State, thru the Solicitor General, from filing
an action for reversion, as ruled in Heirs of Gregorio Tengo v. Heirs of Jose Aliwalas, (supra), as
follows:
But, as correctly pointed out by the respondent Court of Appeals, Dr. Aliwalas title to the
property having become incontrovertible, such may no longer be collaterally attacked. If indeed
there had been any fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining the title, an action for reversion
instituted by the Solicitor General would be the proper remedy (Sec. 101, C.A. No. 141; Director
of Lands v. Jugado, G.R. No. L-14702, May 21, 1961, 2 SCRA 32; Lopez v. Padilla, supra). (p.
204).
Petitioner contends that the grant of Free Patent (IV-3) 275 and the subsequent issuance of
Original Certificate of Title No. P-17789 to Respondent Josefina L. Morato were subject to the
conditions provided for in Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141. It alleges that on October 24, 1974,
or nine (9) months and eight (8) days after the grant of the patent, Respondent Morato, in
violation of the terms of the patent, mortgaged a portion of the land to Respondent Nenita Co,
who thereafter constructed a house thereon. Likewise, on February 2, 1976 and within the five-
year prohibitory period, Respondent Morato leased a portion of the land to Perfecto Advincula at
a monthly rent of P100.00 who, shortly thereafter, constructed a house of concrete materials on
the subject land.[9] Further, petitioner argues that the defense of indefeasibility of title is
inaccurate. The original certificate of title issued to Respondent Morato contains the seeds of its
own cancellation: such certificate specifically states on its face that it is subject to the provisions
of Sections 118, 119, 121, 122, 124 of CA No. 141, as amended.[10]
Respondent Morato counters by stating that although a portion of the land was previously
leased, it resulted from the fact that Perfecto Advincula built a warehouse in the subject land
without [her] prior consent. The mortgage executed over the improvement cannot be considered
a violation of the said grant since it can never affect the ownership.[11] She states further:
x x x. the appeal of the petitioner was dismissed not because of the principle of indefeasibility of
title but mainly due to failure of the latter to support and prove the alleged violations of
respondent Morato. The records of this case will readily show that although petitioner was able
to establish that Morato committed some acts during the prohibitory period of 5 years, a perusal
thereof will also show that what petitioner was able to prove never constituted a violation of the
grant.[12]
Respondent-Spouses Quilatan, on the other hand, state that the mortgage contract they entered
into with Respondent Morato can never be considered as [an] alienation inasmuch as the
ownership over the property remains with the owner.[13] Besides, it is the director of lands and
not the Republic of the Philippines who is the real party in interest in this case, contrary to the
provision of the Public Land Act which states that actions for reversion should be instituted by
the solicitor general in the name of Republic of the Philippines.[14]
We find for petitioner.
Quoted below are relevant sections of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the
Public Land Act:
Sec. 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units or institutions, or
legally constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under free patent or homestead
provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the
application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant
nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of
said period; but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to
qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before twenty-five
years after issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, which approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal
grounds. (As amended by Com. Act No. 456, approved June 8, 1939.)
xxxxxxxxx
Sec. 121. Except with the consent of the grantee and the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, and solely for educational, religious, or charitable purposes or for a right
of way, no corporation, association, or partnership may acquire or have any right, title, interest,
or property right whatsoever to any land granted under the free patent, homestead, or individual
sale provisions of this Act or to any permanent improvement on such land. (As amended by
Com. Act No. 615, approved May 5, 1941)
Sec. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any
permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated or transferred, except to
persons, corporations, association, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain
under this Act or to corporations organized in the Philippines authorized therefore by their
charters.

Except in cases of hereditary successions, no land or any portion thereof originally acquired
under the free patent, homestead, or individual sale provisions of this Act, or any permanent
improvement on such land, shall be transferred or assigned to any individual, nor shall such land
or any permanent improvement thereon be leased to such individual, when the area of said land,
added to that of his own, shall exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares. Any transfer,
assignment, or lease made in violation hereto shall be null and void. (As amended by Com. Act
No. 615, Id.)
xxxxxxxxx
Sec. 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or executed
in violation of any of the provisions of sections one hundred and eighteen, one hundred and
twenty, one hundred and twenty-one, one hundred and twenty-two, and one hundred and
twenty-three of this Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its execution and shall produce
the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent, or permit originally issued,
recognized or confirmed, actually or presumptively, and cause the reversion of the property and
its improvements to the State. (Underscoring supplied.)
The foregoing legal provisions clearly proscribe the encumbrance of a parcel of land acquired
under a free patent or homestead within five years from the grant of such patent. Furthermore,
such encumbrance results in the cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the land to the
public domain. Encumbrance has been defined as [a]nything that impairs the use or transfer of
property; anything which constitutes a burden on the title; a burden or charge upon property; a
claim or lien upon property. It may be a legal claim on an estate for the discharge of which the
estate is liable; an embarrassment of the estate or property so that it cannot be disposed of
without being subject to it; an estate, interest, or right in lands, diminishing their value to the
general owner; a liability resting upon an estate.[15] Do the contracts of lease and mortgage
executed within five (5) years from the issuance of the patent constitute an encumbrance and
violate the terms and conditions of such patent? Respondent Court answered in the
negative:[16]
From the evidence adduced by both parties, it has been proved that the area of the portion of
the land, subject matter of the lease contract (Exh. B) executed by and between Perfecto
Advincula and Josefina L. Morato is only 10 x 12 square meters, whereas the total area of the
land granted to Morato is 1,265 square meters. It is clear from this that the portion of the land
leased by Advincula does not significantly affect Moratos ownership and possession. Above all,
the circumstances under which the lease was executed do not reflect a voluntary and blatant
intent to violate the conditions provided for in the patent issued in her favor. On the contrary,
Morato was compelled to enter into that contract of lease out of sympathy and the goodness of
her heart to accommodate a fellow man. x x x
It is indisputable, however, that Respondent Morato cannot fully use or enjoy the land during the
duration of the lease contract. This restriction on the enjoyment of her property sufficiently meets
the definition of an encumbrance under Section 118 of the Public Land Act, because such
contract impairs the use of the property by the grantee. In a contract of lease which is
consensual, bilateral, onerous and commutative, the owner temporarily grants the use of his or
her property to another who undertakes to pay rent therefor.[17] During the term of the lease, the
grantee of the patent cannot enjoy the beneficial use of the land leased. As already observed,
the Public Land Act does not permit a grantee of a free patent from encumbering any portion of
such land. Such encumbrance is a ground for the nullification of the award.
Moratos resort to equity, i.e. that the lease was executed allegedly out of the goodness of her
heart without any intention of violating the law, cannot help her. Equity, which has been aptly
described as justice outside legality, is applied only in the absence of, and never against,
statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. Positive rules prevail over all abstract arguments
based on equity contra legem.[18]
Respondents failed to justify their position that the mortgage should not be considered an
encumbrance. Indeed, we do not find any support for such contention. The questioned mortgage
falls squarely within the term encumbrance proscribed by Section 118 of the Public Land Act.[19]
Verily, a mortgage constitutes a legal limitation on the estate, and the foreclosure of such
mortgage would necessarily result in the auction of the property.[20]
Even if only part of the property has been sold or alienated within the prohibited period of five
years from the issuance of the patent, such alienation is a sufficient cause for the reversion of
the whole estate to the State. As a condition for the grant of a free patent to an applicant, the law
requires that the land should not be encumbered, sold or alienated within five years from the
issuance of the patent. The sale or the alienation of part of the homestead violates that
condition.[21]
The prohibition against the encumbrance -- lease and mortgage included -- of a homestead
which, by analogy applies to a free patent, is mandated by the rationale for the grant, viz.:[22]
It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to distribute disposable agricultural lots
of the State to land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation. Pursuant to such benevolent
intention the State prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the homestead (Section 116) within five
years after the grant of the patent. After that five-year period the law impliedly permits alienation
of the homestead; but in line with the primordial purpose to favor the homesteader and his family
the statute provides that such alienation or conveyance (Section 117) shall be subject to the
right of repurchase by the homesteader, his widow or heirs within five years. This section 117 is
undoubtedly a complement of section 116. It aims to preserve and keep in the family of the
homesteader that portion of public land which the State had gratuitously given to him. It would,
therefore, be in keeping with this fundamental idea to hold, as we hold, that the right to
repurchase exists not only when the original homesteader makes the conveyance, but also
when it is made by his widow or heirs. This construction is clearly deducible from the terms of
the statute.
By express provision of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act 141 and in conformity with the policy
of the law, any transfer or alienation of a free patent or homestead within five years from the
issuance of the patent is proscribed. Such transfer nullifies said alienation and constitutes a
cause for the reversion of the property to the State.
The prohibition against any alienation or encumbrance of the land grant is a proviso attached to
the approval of every application.[23] Prior to the fulfillment of the requirements of law,
Respondent Morato had only an inchoate right to the property; such property remained part of
the public domain and, therefore, not susceptible to alienation or encumbrance. Conversely,
when a homesteader has complied with all the terms and conditions which entitled him to a
patent for [a] particular tract of public land, he acquires a vested interest therein and has to be
regarded an equitable owner thereof.[24] However, for Respondent Moratos title of ownership
over the patented land to be perfected, she should have complied with the requirements of the
law, one of which was to keep the property for herself and her family within the prescribed period
of five (5) years. Prior to the fulfillment of all requirements of the law, Respondent Moratos title
over the property was incomplete. Accordingly, if the requirements are not complied with, the
State as the grantor could petition for the annulment of the patent and the cancellation of the
title.
Respondent Morato cannot use the doctrine of the indefeasibility of her Torrens title to bar the
state from questioning its transfer or encumbrance. The certificate of title issued to her clearly
stipulated that its award was subject to the conditions provided for in Sections 118, 119, 121,
122 and 124 of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141. Because she violated Section 118, the
reversion of the property to the public domain necessarily follows, pursuant to Section 124.
Second Issue: Foreshore Land Reverts to the Public Domain
There is yet another reason for granting this petition.
Although Respondent Court found that the subject land was foreshore land, it nevertheless
sustained the award thereof to Respondent Morato:[25]
First of all, the issue here is whether the land in question, is really part of the foreshore lands.
The Supreme Court defines foreshore land in the case of Republic vs. Alagad, 169 SCRA 455,
464, as follows:
Otherwise, where the rise in water level is due to, the extraordinary action of nature, rainful, for
instance, the portions inundated thereby are not considered part of the bed or basin of the body
of water in question. It cannot therefore be said to be foreshore land but land outside of the
public dominion, and land capable of registration as private property.
A foreshore land, on the other hand has been defined as follows:
... that part of (the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of
the tides x x x x (Republic vs. C.A., Nos. L-43105, L-43190, August 31, 1984, 131 SCRA 532;
Government vs. Colegio de San Jose, 53 Phil 423)
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternatively wet and
dry according to the flow of the tide. (Rep. vs. CA, supra, 539).
The factual findings of the lower court regarding the nature of the parcel of land in question
reads:
Evidence disclose that the marginal area of the land radically changed sometime in 1937 up to
1955 due to a strong earthquake followed by frequent storms eventually eroding the land. From
1955 to 1968, however, gradual reclamation was undertaken by the lumber company owned by
the Moratos. Having thus restored the land thru mostly human hands employed by the lumber
company, the area continued to be utilized by the owner of the sawmill up to the time of his
death in 1965. On or about March 17, 1973, there again was a strong earthquake unfortunately
causing destruction to hundreds of residential houses fronting the Calauag Bay including the
Santiago Building, a cinema house constructed of concrete materials. The catastrophe totally
caused the sinking of a concrete bridge at Sumulong river also in the municipality of Calauag,
Quezon.
On November 13, 1977 a typhoon code named Unding wrought havoc as it lashed the main land
of Calauag, Quezon causing again great erosion this time than that which the area suffered in
1937. The Court noted with the significance of the newspaper clipping entitled Baryo ng
Mangingisda Kinain ng Dagat (Exh. 11).
xxxxxxxxx
Evidently this was the condition of the land when on or about December 5, 1972 defendant
Josefina L. Morato filed with the Bureau of Lands her free patent application. The defendant
Josefina Morato having taken possession of the land after the demise of Don Tomas Morato,
she introduced improvement and continued developing the area, planted it to coconut trees.
Having applied for a free patent, defendant had the land area surveyed and an approved plan
(Exh. 9) based on the cadastral survey as early as 1927 (Exh. 10) was secured. The area was
declared for taxation purposes in the name of defendant Josefina Morato denominated as Tax
Declaration No. 4115 (Exh. 8) and the corresponding realty taxes religiously paid as shown by
Exh. 8-A). (pp. 12-14, DECISION).
Being supported by substantial evidence and for failure of the appellant to show cause which
would warrant disturbance, the afore-cited findings of the lower court, must be respected.
Petitioner correctly contends, however, that Private Respondent Morato cannot own foreshore
land:
Through the encroachment or erosion by the ebb and flow of the tide, a portion of the subject
land was invaded by the waves and sea advances. During high tide, at least half of the land
(632.5 square meters) is 6 feet deep under water and three (3) feet deep during low tide. The
Calauag Bay shore has extended up to a portion of the questioned land.
While at the time of the grant of free patent to respondent Morato, the land was not reached by
the water, however, due to gradual sinking of the land caused by natural calamities, the sea
advances had permanently invaded a portion of subject land. As disclosed at the trial, through
the testimony of the court-appointed commissioner, Engr. Abraham B. Pili, the land was under
water during high tide in the month of August 1978. The water margin covers half of the
property, but during low tide, the water is about a kilometer (TSN, July 19, 1979, p. 12). Also, in
1974, after the grant of the patent, the land was covered with vegetation, but it disappeared in
1978 when the land was reached by the tides (Exhs. E-1; E-14). In fact, in its decision dated
December 28, 1983, the lower court observed that the erosion of the land was caused by natural
calamities that struck the place in 1977 (Cf. Decision, pp. 17-18).[26]
Respondent-Spouses Quilatan argue, however, that it is unfair and unjust if Josefina Morato will
be deprived of the whole property just because a portion thereof was immersed in water for
reasons not her own doing.[27]
As a general rule, findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon this
Court, unless such factual findings are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or
unless the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts.[28] The application for a free
patent was made in 1972. From the undisputed factual findings of the Court of Appeals,
however, the land has since become foreshore. Accordingly, it can no longer be subject of a free
patent under the Public Land Act. Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Cabagis[29]
explained the rationale for this proscription:
Article 339, subsection 1, of the Civil Code, reads:
Art. 339. Property of public ownership is
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character.
********
Article 1, case 3, of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, provides as follows:
ARTICLE 1. The following are part of the national domain open to public use:
********
3. The Shores. By the shore is understood that space covered and uncovered by the movement
of the tide. Its interior or terrestrial limit is the line reached by the highest equinoctal tides. Where
the tides are not appreciable, the shore begins on the land side at the line reached by the sea
during ordinary storms or tempests.
In the case of Aragon vs. Insular Government (19 Phil. 223), with reference to article 339 of the
Civil Code just quoted, this Court said:
We should not be understood, by this decision, to hold that in a case of gradual encroachment or
erosion by the ebb and flow of the tide, private property may not become property of public
ownership. as defined in article 339 of the code, where it appear that the owner has to all intents
and purposes abandoned it and permitted it to be totally destroyed, so as to become a part of
the playa (shore of the sea), rada (roadstead), or the like. * * *
In the Enciclopedia Jurdica Espaola, volume XII, page 558, we read the following:
With relative frequency the opposite phenomenon occurs; that is, the sea advances and private
properties are permanently invaded by the waves, and in this case they become part of the
shore or beach. They then pass to the public domain, but the owner thus dispossessed does not
retain any right to the natural products resulting from their new nature; it is a de facto case of
eminent domain, and not subject to indemnity.
In comparison, Article 420 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth.
When the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property became
foreshore land and passed to the realm of the public domain. In fact, the Court in Government
vs. Cabangis[30] annulled the registration of land subject of cadastral proceedings when the
parcel subsequently became foreshore land.[31] In another case, the Court voided the
registration decree of a trial court and held that said court had no jurisdiction to award foreshore
land to any private person or entity.[32] The subject land in this case, being foreshore land,
should therefore be returned to the public domain.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. This Court hereby REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
assailed Decision of Respondent Court and ORDERS the CANCELLATION of Free Patent No.
(IV-3) 275 issued to Respondent Morato and the subsequent Original Certificate of Title No. P-
17789. The subject land therefore REVERTS to the State. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), on leave.
[1] First Division composed of J. Asaali S. Isnani, ponente; and JJ. Rodolfo A. Nocon and
Antonio M. Martinez, concurring.
[2] Rollo, pp. 25-32.
[3] Ibid., p. 32.
[4] Branch 63.
[5] Petition, pp. 3-5; Rollo, pp. 9-11.
[6] The case was deemed submitted for resolution upon receipt by the Court of Private
Respondent Quilatans Memorandum, dated July 19, 1996, on February 16, 1996. (Rollo, p.
143.)
[7] Ibid., p. 5; Rollo, p. 11.
[8] Decision, p. 3; Rollo, p. 27.
[9] Petition, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 12-13.
[10] Ibid., pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 17-18.
[11] Respondent Moratos Comment, p. 2; Rollo, p. 44.
[12] Ibid., pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 45-46.
[13] Respondents Quilatans Comment, p. 1; Rollo, p. 64.
[14] Ibid., p. 2; Rollo, p. 65.
[15] Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, second edition, 1972, pp. 207-208.
[16] CA Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 30.
[17] Lim Si vs. Lim, 98 Phil. 868, 870, April 25, 1956.
[18] Causapin vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 615, 625, July 4, 1994, citing Zabat vs. Court of
Appeals, No. L-36958, July 10, 1986, 142 SCRA 587.
[19] Siy vs. Tan Gun Ga, et al., 119 Phil. 676, February 29, 1964.
[20] Prudential Bank vs. Panis, 153 SCRA 390, 397, August 31, 1987.
[21] Republic of the Philippines vs. Garcia, et al., 105 Phil. 826, May 27, 1959.
[22] Pascua vs. Talens, 80 Phil 792, 793-794, April 30, 1948, per Bengzon, J.
[23] Republic vs. Ruiz, 23 SCRA 348, 353-354, April 29, 1968.
[24] Vda. de Delizo vs. Delizo, 69 SCRA 216, 229, January 30, 1976 citing Juanico vs. American
Land Commercial Company, Inc., 97 Phil. 221, Simmons vs. Wagner, 10 U.S. 260, 68 C.J.S.
875; Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498; Fiel, et al. vs. Wagas, 48 O.G., 195, January 9, 1950.
SEE Uy Un vs. Perez and Villaplana, 71 Phil. 508.
[25] CA Decision, pp. 4-5; Rollo, pp. 28-29.
[26] Petition, pp. 12-13; Rollo, pp. 18-19.
[27] Respondents Quilatans Comment, p. 2; Rollo, p. 65.
[28] Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 303, 313, February 7, 1996.
[29] 53 Phil. 112, 115-116, March 27, 1929, per Villa-Real, J.
[30] Supra.
[31] Ibid., p. 119.
[32] Republic vs. Lozada, 90 SCRA 503, 510, May 31, 1979.
Today is Saturday, June 23, 2018
Custom Search
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40399 February 6, 1990
MARCELINO C. AGNE, FELIX ORIANE, AGATON TAGANAS, HILARIO ESCORPIZO,
ISABELO MAURICIO, HEIRS OF ROMAN DAMASO, NAMELY: JORGE DAMASO and
ALEJANDRO DAMASO, HEIRS OF FRANCISCO RAMOS, NAMELY: ENCARNACION R.
LEANO and DOMINGA R. MEDRANO, HEIRS OF SABINA GELACIO AGAPITO, NAMELY:
SERAPIO AGAPITO, and NICOLASA AGAPITO, FELISA DICCION AGNE, ESTANISLAO
GOROSPE, LIBRADO BADUA, NICOLAS VILLANUEVA, HEIRS OF CARLOS PALADO,
NAMELY: FORTUNATA PALADO and ISABELITA PALADO, PRIMITIVO TAGANAS, PANFILO
SOINGCO, BERNARDO PALATTAO, MARCELINO S. SANTOS and PAULINO D. AGNE JR.
(Minor), represented by his mother FELISA DICCION AGNE, petitioners,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, PRESENTACION AGPOON GASCON, JOAQUIN GASCON and
HON. ROSALIO C. SEGUNDO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch
V, respondents.
G.R. No. L-72255 February 6,1990
MARCELINO C. AGNE, FELIX ORIANE, AGATON TAGANAS (deceased), represented by
FLORENTINO C. TAGANAS, FELISA DICCION AGNE, HILARIO ESCORPIZO, NICOLAS
VILLANUEVA, ISABELO MAURICIO, ESTANISLAO GOROSPE (deceased), represented by
ELIZABETH G. BADUA and SILVINA G. VALERIO, LIBRADO BADUA, JOSE ALSISTO,
SERAPIO AGAPITO, NICOLASA AGAPITO, JORGE DAMASO, ALEJANDRO DAMASO,
ENCARNACION RAMOS, DOMINGA RAMOS and CARLOS PALADO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, PRESENTACION AGPOON GASCON and
JOAQUIN GASCON, respondents.
Espiritu Taganas for petitioners.
Adriatico T. Bruno for private respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Before us are two separate petitions for review on certiorari of the order of the defunct Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, in Civil Case No. 2649, entitled "Marcelino Agne et al.
vs. The Director of Lands, et al.," dismissing the complaint filed by herein petitioners in said
case; 1 and the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. CV No. 60388-R,
entitled "Presentacion Agpoon Gascon vs. Marcelino C. Agne et al.," promulgated on January
30, 1985, affirming in toto the decision of the trial court in favor of herein private respondents 2
which cases are docketed herein as G.R. No. L-40399 and G.R. No. 72255, respectively.
These two petitions, arising from the same facts and involving the same parties and common
questions of law, were ordered consolidated in our resolution of August 9, 1989.
As found by respondent court and disclosed by the records, the land subject matter of this case
was originally covered by Free Patent No. 23263 issued on April 17, 1937 in the name of
Herminigildo Agpoon. On May 21, 1937, pursuant to the said patent, the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan issued to said Herminigildo Agpoon Original Certificate of Title No. 2370. 3
Presentacion Agpoon Gascon inherited the said parcel of land upon the death of her father,
Herminigildo, and was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 32209 on April 6,1960.
Respondent Presentacion declared the said land for taxation purposes in her name under Tax
Declaration No. 11506 and taxes were paid thereon in her name. 4
On April 13, 1971, private respondent spouses filed Civil Case No. U-2286 in the then Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan for recovery of possession and damages against petitioners. Their
complaint states that they are the registered owners under the aforesaid Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 32209 of the parcel of land situated in Barrio Bantog, Asingan, Pangasinan which is
now in the possession of petitioners; that during the Japanese occupation, petitioners, taking
advantage of the abnormal conditions then obtaining, took possession of said land by means of
fraud, stealth, strategy and intimidation; that private respondents repeatedly demanded the
surrender of the physical possession of said property but the latter refused. 5
Petitioners, in answer to said complaint, alleged that the land in question was formerly a part of
the river bed of the Agno-Chico River; that in the year 1920, a big flood occurred which caused
the said river to change its course and abandon its original bed; that by virtue of the provisions of
Article 370 of the Spanish Civil Code which was then the law in force, petitioners, by operation of
law, became the owners by accession or accretion of the respective aliquot parts of said river
bed bordering their properties; that since 1920, they and their predecessors in interest occupied
and exercised dominion openly and adversely over said portion of the abandoned river bed in
question abutting their respective riparian lands continuously up to the present to the exclusion
of all other persons, particularly Herminigildo Agpoon; that they have introduced improvements
thereon by constructing irrigation canals and planting trees and agricultural crops thereon 6 and
converted the land into a productive area.
In their joint stipulation of facts, the parties agreed as follows:
1. That the parties admit the identity and area of the land in question, which forms part of
the river bed of the Agno-Chico River, and further admit that the said river bed was abandoned
as a result of a flood in 1920 and opened a new bed. The location and course of the aforesaid
abandoned river bed as well as the relative position of the lands bordering the same can be
gleaned from Cadastral Survey Plan of Asingan, Pangasinan, Street No. 49 thereof, as
approved by the Director of Lands on October 12, 1912, a photostat copy of which is hereto
attached and made an integral part hereof a Annex "A".
2. That the parties admit that the defendants are the riparian owners of the area in
question and further admit that the defendants are in possession thereof but that each of them is
in possession only of an aliquot part of the said area proportionate to the length of their
respective lands. (As amended).
3. That the parties likewise admit that a Free Patent No. 23263 in the name of
Herminigildo Agpoon covering the area in question was issued on April 17, 1937 and that they
admit O.C.T. No. 2370 of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan covering the same parcel of land
was issued to the same Herminigildo Agpoon on May 21, 1937, a photostat copy of said O.C.T.
is hereto attached as Annex "B".
4. That the parties admit that the property in controversy is now covered by T.C.T. No.
32209 in the name of Presentacion Agpoon Gascon and by Tax Declaration No. 11506 in the
name of said Presentacion Agpoon Gascon, a photostat reproduction of said T.C.T. No. and Tax
Declaration are hereto attached and marked as Annexes "C" and "F", respectively. 7
On March 6, 1974, while the above-mentioned case was still pending, petitioners filed a
complaint against the respondents Director of Lands and spouses Agpoon with the former Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan for annulment of title, reconveyance of and/or action to clear title
to a parcel of land, which action was docketed as Civil Case No. U-2649. Petitioners alleged in
their said complaint that the land in question, which was formerly a portion of the bed of Agno-
Chico river which was abandoned as a result of the big flood in 1920, belongs to them pursuant
to the provision of Article 370 of the old Civil Code; that it was only on April 13, 1971, when
respondent spouses filed a complaint against them, that they found out that the said land was
granted by the Government to Herminigildo Agpoon under Free Patent No. 23263, pursuant to
which Original Certificate of Title No. 2370 was issued in the latter's name; and that the said
patent and subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto are null and void since the said land, an
abandoned river bed, is of private ownership and, therefore, cannot be the subject of a public
land grant. 8
On June 21, 1974, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. U-2286, the dispositive
part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment:
1. Ordering the defendants to surrender to the plaintiffs the physical possession of the
land in question described in paragraph 3 of the amended complaint;
2. Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff the produce of the
land in question in the total sum of P5,000.00 per year from the date of the filing of the present
action at the rate of 6% interest per annum until fully paid;
3. Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the amount of P800.00
representing attorney's fees;
4. And to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 9
Not satisfied with said decision, petitioners appealed to respondent court. As earlier stated, on
January 30, 1985 the former Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed in toto in AC-G.R. CV No.
60388-R the said decision of the court a quo, 10 and with the denial of petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, 11 the case came up to us as G.R. No. 72255.
On June 24, 1974, the aforesaid Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, acting on the motion to
dismiss filed by respondents Director of Lands and spouses Agpoon, issued an order dismissing
Civil Case No. U-2649 for annulment of title by merely citing the statement in the case of
Antonio, et al. vs. Barroga, et al. 12 that an action to annul a free patent many years after it had
become final and indefeasible states no cause of action . 13 Petitioners' motion for the
reconsideration of said order was denied on September 11, 1974, 14 hence the recourse to us in
G.R. No. L-40399.
In these petitions, petitioners raise the following issues:
1. Whether or not the lower court is justified in dismissing the complaint by simply
invoking the ruling in the aforestated case of Antonio although the facts and circumstances set
forth in the complaint show that the land in question was private land under Article 370 of the old
Civil Code and that the subsequent derivative certificates of title in question were null and void
ab initio because the said land was not within the authority of the government to dispose of in
favor of any party and must be ordered annulled, cancelled or rescinded; 15
2. Whether or not the trial court and the former Intermediate Appellate Court were
justified in not basing their judgments on the judicial admissions of private respondents in the
stipulation of facts of the parties, since such admissions have the legal force and effect of
precluding private respondents from disputing such admission;
3. Whether or not respondent court can presume that private respondents or their
predecessor had prior possession of the land in dispute in the light of provisions of law which
oblige them to prove such possession, as well as the stipulated facts and other facts and
circumstances on record showing that private respondents or their predecessor were not in
actual occupancy of the said land, and without appreciating the evidence put up by petitioners to
prove their prior possession thereof;
4. Whether or not respondent court was justified in its application of Section 41 of the
Code of Civil Procedure in favor of private respondents, although the private respondents did not
invoke said law in this case and did not adduce any evidence or proof that all the essential
requisites of acquisitive prescription under the said law were present in their favor;
5. Whether or not the Government had the right to convey by way of free patent to any
party the land in dispute which belonged to the riparian owners as decreed by Article 370 of the
old Civil Code, the law then in force, and despite the fact that the patentee herein never
occupied the said land during the period prescribed by Act No. 2874; and
6. Whether or not private respondents are guilty of laches for not having attempted to file
suit to recover the land in dispute during an interval of 50 or 30 years. 16
The issues and arguments raised by the proponents in these petitions are well taken.
We agree with petitioners that the lower court erred in ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No.
U-2649. The aforesaid case of Antonio relied upon by the lower court in its dismissal order is not
controlling. In that case, the complaint was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, not
only because of the delay in the filing of the complaint but specifically since the ground relied
upon by the plaintiff therein, that is, that the land was previously covered by a titulo real, even if
true, would not warrant the annulment of the free patent and the subsequent original certificate
of title issued to defendant. Thus:
It is true that by filing the application for a free patent Barroga impliedly admitted either the
invalidity or insufficiency of Titulo Real No. 12479 issued in the name of his predecessor in
interest on July 22, 1894, but neither the allegation made in his answer that his aforesaid
predecessor in interest was the absolute owner of the property covered by said Titulo Real nor
his implied admission of the latter's invalidity or insufficiency are grounds for the annulment of
the free patent and original certificate of title in question. Evidently, it was Barroga's privilege to
rely or not to rely upon his claim of private ownership in favor of his predecessor in interest and
of whatever the latter's Titulo Real was worth. He decided not to rely upon them and to consider
that the property covered by the Titulo Real was still part of the public domain. Acting
accordingly he applied for a free patent and was successful. It must be borne in mind that the
Titulo Real was not an indefeasible title and that its holder still had to prove that he had
possessed the land covered by it without interruption during a period of ten years by virtue of a
good title and in good faith (Royal Decree of June 25,1880). We may well presume that Barroga
felt that he had no sufficient evidence to prove this, for which reason he decided to acquire the
land as part of the public domain.
In the case at bar, the facts alleged in the complaint, which are deemed hypothetically admitted
upon the filing of the motion to dismiss, constitute a sufficient cause of action against private
respondents. Petitioners in their complaint in Civil Case No. U-2649 alleged, among others, that
the disputed area was formerly an abandoned river bed formed due to natural causes in 1920;
that the riparian owners of the lands abutting said abandoned river bed were the plaintiffs and/or
their predecessors in interest; that since then and up to the present, they have been occupying
and cultivating aliquot portions of the said land proportionate to the respective lengths of their
riparian lands; that they are the real and lawful owners of the said land as decreed by Article 370
of the old Civil Code, the law then in force; that since the said area was a private land, the same
could not have been the subject matter of an application for free patent; and that all these facts
were known to the private respondents and their predecessor in interest.
If the said averments are true, and the factual recitals thereon have been admitted in the
stipulation of facts hereinbefore quoted, then the land in question was and is of private
ownership and, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands. The free patent and
subsequent title issued pursuant thereto are null and void. The indefeasibility and
imprescriptibility of a Torrens title issued pursuant to a patent may be invoked only when the
land involved originally formed part of the public domain. If it was a private land, the patent and
certificate of title issued upon the patent are a nullity. 17
The rule on the incontrovertibility of a certificate of title upon the expiration of one year, after the
entry of the decree, pursuant to the provisions of the Land Registration Act, does not apply
where an action for the cancellation of a patent and a certificate of title issued pursuant thereto is
instituted on the ground that they are null and void because the Bureau of Lands had no
jurisdiction to issue them at all, the land in question having been withdrawn from the public
domain prior to the subsequent award of the patent and the grant of a certificate of title to
another person. Such an action is different from a review of the decree of title on the ground of
fraud. 18
Although a period of one year has already expired from the time a certificate of title was issued
pursuant to a public grant, said title does not become incontrovertible but is null and void if the
property covered thereby is originally of private ownership, and an action to annul the same
does not prescribe. 19 Moreover, since herein petitioners are in possession of the land in
dispute, an action to quiet title is imprescriptible. 20 Their action for reconveyance which, in
effect, seeks to quiet title to property in one's possession is imprescriptible. Their undisturbed
possession for a number of years gave them a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of
equity to determine the nature of the adverse claims of a third party and the effect on her title. 21
As held in Caragay-Layno vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 22 an adverse claimant of a registered
land, undisturbed in his possession thereof for a period of more than fifty years and not knowing
that the land he actually occupied had been registered in the name of another, is not precluded
from filing an action for reconveyance which, in effect, seeks to quiet title to property as against
the registered owner who was relying upon a Torrens title which could have been fraudulently
acquired. To such adverse claimant, the remedy of an action to quiet title is imprescriptible. In
actions for reconveyance of property predicated on the fact that the conveyance complained of
was void ab initio, a claim of prescription of the action would be unavailing. 23
The resolution of the other assigned errors hinges on the issue of who, as between the riparian
owner presently in possession and the registered owner by virtue of a free patent, has a better
right over the abandoned river bed in dispute.
We rule in favor of petitioners.
The claim of ownership of herein petitioners is based on the old Civil Code, the law then in force,
which provides:
The beds of rivers which remain abandoned because the course of the water has naturally
changed belong to the owners of the riparian lands throughout their respective lengths. If the
abandoned bed divided estates belonging to different owners, the new dividing line shall run at
equal distance therefrom. 24
It is thus clear under this provision that once the river bed has been abandoned, the riparian
owners become the owners of the abandoned bed to the extent provided by this article. The
acquisition of ownership is automatic. 25 There need be no act on the part of the riparian owners
to subject the accession to their ownership, as it is subject thereto ipso jure from the moment the
mode of acquisition becomes evident, without the need of any formal act of acquisition. 26 Such
abandoned river bed had fallen to the private ownership of the owner of the riparian land even
without any formal act of his will and any unauthorized occupant thereof will be considered as a
trespasser. The right in re to the principal is likewise a right in re to the accessory, as it is a
mode of acquisition provided by law, as the result of the right of accretion. Since the accessory
follows the nature of the principal, there need not be any tendency to the thing or manifestation
of the purpose to subject it to our ownership, as it is subject thereto ipso jure from the moment
the mode of acquisition becomes evident. 27
The right of the owner of land to additions thereto by accretion has been said to rest in the law of
nature, and to be analogous to the right of the owner of a tree to its fruits, and the owner of
flocks and herds to their natural increase. 28 Petitioners herein became owners of aliquot
portions of said abandoned river bed as early as 1920, when the Agno River changed its course,
without the necessity of any action or exercise of possession on their part, it being an admitted
fact that the land in dispute, prior to its registration, was an abandoned bed of the Agno River
and that petitioners are the riparian owners of the lands adjoining the said bed.
The failure of herein petitioners to register the accretion in their names and declare it for
purposes of taxation did not divest it of its character as a private property. Although we take
cognizance of the rule that an accretion to registered land is not automatically registered and
therefore not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered
property under the Torrens system. 29 The said rule is not applicable to this case since the title
claimed by private respondents is not based on acquisitive prescription but is anchored on a
public grant from the Government, which presupposes that it was inceptively a public land.
Ownership over the accession is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land
is a concern of the Land Registration Act.
Under the provisions of Act No. 2874 pursuant to which the title of private respondents'
predecessor in interest was issued, the President of the Philippines or his alter ego, the Director
of Lands, has no authority to grant a free patent for land that has ceased to be a public land and
has passed to private ownership, and a title so issued is null and void. 30 The nullity arises, not
from the fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Lands. 31 The jurisdiction of the Director of Lands is limited only to public lands and does not
cover lands privately owned. 32 The purpose of the Legislature in adopting the former Public
Land Act, Act No. 2874, was and is to limit its application to lands of the public domain, and
lands held in private ownership are not included therein and are not affected in any manner
whatsoever thereby. Land held in freehold or fee title, or of private ownership, constitute no part
of the public domain and cannot possibly come within the purview of said Act No. 2874,
inasmuch as the "subject" of such freehold or private land is not embraced in any manner in the
title of the Act 33 and the same are excluded from the provisions or text thereof.
We reiterate that private ownership of land is not affected by the issuance of a free patent over
the same land because the Public Land Act applies only to lands of the public domain. 34 Only
public land may be disposed of by the Director of Lands. 35 Since as early as 1920, the land in
dispute was already under the private ownership of herein petitioners and no longer a part of the
lands of the public domain, the same could not have been the subject matter of a free patent.
The patentee and his successors in interest acquired no right or title to the said land.
Necessarily, Free Patent No. 23263 issued to Herminigildo Agpoon is null and void and the
subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto cannot become final and indefeasible. Hence, we
ruled in Director of Lands vs. Sisican, et al. 36 that if at the time the free patents were issued in
1953 the land covered therein were already private property of another and, therefore, not part
of the disposable land of the public domain, then applicants patentees acquired no right or title
to the land.
Now, a certificate of title fraudulently secured is null and void ab initio if the fraud consisted in
misrepresenting that the land is part of the public domain, although it is not. As earlier stated, the
nullity arises, not from the fraud or deceit but, from the fact that the land is not under the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. 37 Being null and void, the free patent granted and the
subsequent titles produce no legal effects whatsoever. Quod nullum est, nullum producit
effectum. 38
A free patent which purports to convey land to which the Government did not have any title at
the time of its issuance does not vest any title in the patentee as against the true owner. 39 The
Court has previously held that the Land Registration Act and the Cadastral Act do not give
anybody who resorts to the provisions thereof a better title than what he really and lawfully has.
. . . The Land Registration Act as well as the Cadastral Act protects only the holders of a title in
good faith and does not permit its provisions to be used as a shield for the commission of fraud,
or that one should enrich himself at the expense of another (Gustilo vs. Maravilla, 48 Phil. 838).
The above-stated Acts do not give anybody, who resorts to the provisions thereof, a better title
than he really and lawfully has. If he happened to obtain it by mistake or to secure, to the
prejudice of his neighbor, more land than he really owns, with or without bad faith on his part, the
certificate of title, which may have been issued to him under the circumstances, may and should
be cancelled or corrected (Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil., 590). . . . 40
We have, therefore, to arrive at the unavoidable conclusion that the title of herein petitioners
over the land in dispute is superior to the title of the registered owner which is a total nullity. The
long and continued possession of petitioners under a valid claim of title cannot be defeated by
the claim of a registered owner whose title is defective from the beginning.
The quality of conclusiveness of a Torrens title is not available for use to perpetrate fraud and
chicanery. To paraphrase from Angeles vs. Samia, supra, the Land Registration Act does not
create or vest title. It only confirms and records title already existing and vested. It does not
protect a usurper from the true owner. It cannot be a shield for the commission of fraud. It does
not permit one to enrich himself at the expense of another. Stated elsewise, the Torrens system
was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land. It is intended merely to
confirm and register the title which one may already have on the land. Where the applicant
possesses no title or ownership over the parcel of land, he cannot acquire one under the
Torrens system of registration. 41 Resort to the provisions of the Land Registration Act does not
give one a better title than he really and lawfully has. 42 Registration does not vest title. It is not
a mode of acquiring property. It is merely evidence of such title over a particular property. It does
not give the holder any better title than what he actually has, especially if the registration was
done in bad faith. The effect is that it is as if no registration was made at all. 43
Moreover, the failure of herein private respondents to assert their claim over the disputed
property for almost thirty 30 years constitute laches 44 and bars an action to recover the same.
45 The registered owners' right to recover possession of the property and title thereto from
petitioners has, by long inaction or inexcusable neglect, been converted into a stale demand. 46
Considering that petitioners were well within their rights in taking possession of the lot in
question, the findings of respondent court that herein petitioners took advantage of the infirmities
and weakness of the preceding claimant, Herminigildo Agpoon, in taking possession of said land
during the Japanese occupation is neither tenable in law nor sustained by preponderant
evidence in fact.
Where the evidence show that the plaintiff is the true owner of the land subject of the free patent
and title granted to another and that the defendant and his predecessor in interest were never in
possession thereof, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction and without ordering the
cancellation of said title issued upon the patent, may direct the defendant registered owner to
reconvey the property to the plaintiff. 47 Further, if the determinative facts are before the Court
and it is in a position to finally resolve the dispute, the expeditious administration of justice will be
subserved by such a resolution and thereby obviate the needless protracted proceedings
consequent to the remand of the case of the trial court. 48 On these considerations, as well as
the fact that these cases have been pending for a long period of time, we see no need for
remanding Civil Case No. 2649 for further proceedings, and we hold that the facts and the ends
of justice in this case require the reconveyance by private respondents to petitioners of the
disputed lot.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of respondent court in its AC-G.R. CV No. 60388-R and
the questioned order of dismissal of the trial court in its Civil Case No. 2649 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and judgment is hereby rendered ORDERING private respondents
to reconvey the aforesaid parcel of land to petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Presided over by Judge Rosalio C. Segundo.
2 Penned by Justice Ma. Rosario Quetulio-Losa, with the concurrence of Justices
Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr., Eduardo P. Caguioa (in the result), and Leonor Ines-Luciano.
3 Folder of Exhibits for the Plaintiff, Original Record. Civil Case No. U-2286, 12.
4 Rollo, G.R. No. 72255. 6.
5 Record on Appeal, AC-G.R. CV No. 60388-Pt. 2-8; Rollo, G.R. No. 72255, 98.
31 Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 30 SCRA 297 (1969).
6 (Ibid)., id., 8-20; ibid., id., id.
32 De los Angeles, et al. vs. Santos, et al., 12 SCRA 622 (1964).
7 Rollo, G.R. No. 72255, 6-7.
33 Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883 (1920). The pertinent provisions of Act No.
8 Rollo, G.R. No. L-40399, 34-39. 2874 read: "Sec. 2. The provisions of this Act shall apply to the lands of the public domain; . . .
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been
9 Ibid., id., 117. officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed and which have not been
reserved for public or quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by the government, nor in any manner
10 Ibid., G.R. No. 72255, 5-14. become private property, nor on which a private right authorized or recognized by this Act or any
other valid law may be claimed, or which having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to
11 Ibid., id., 15. be so. . . ." These provisions are reproduced in Secs. 2 and 8 of the present Public Land Act,
C.A. No. 141, as amended.
12 23 SCRA 357 (1968).
34 De la Concha, et al. vs. Magtira, et al., 18 SCRA 398 (1966); Baladjay et al. vs.
13 Rollo., G.R. No. L-40399, 52. Castrillo, etc., et al., supra; Villanueva, et al., vs. Portigo, et al., supra.

14 Ibid., id., 59-60. 35 Cabonitalla et al. vs. Santiago, etc., et al, 27 SCRA 211 (1969).

15 Ibid., id. 18. 36 13 SCRA 516 (1965).

16 Rollo, G.R. 72255, 21-22. 37 Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, et al., supra.

17 Vital vs. Anore, et al., 90 Phil. 855 (1952); Heirs of Parco vs. Haw Pia, 45 SCRA 164 38 3 Castan, 7th Ed., 410.
(1972).
39 Vital vs. Anore, et al., supra; Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 69 Phil. 497; Ramoso vs.
18 Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 17 SCRA 71 (1966). Obligado, et al., 70 Phil. 86 (1940); Azarcon, et al. vs. Vallarta, et al., 100 SCRA 450 (1980).

19 Baladjay vs. Castrillo, etc., et al., 1 SCRA 1064 (1961); Villanueva, et al vs. Portigo, et 40 Angeles vs. Samia, 66 Phil. 444 (1938); Gabriel, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 159
al., 29 SCRA 99,(1969); Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 30 SCRA 297 (1969). SCRA 461 (1988).

20 Coronel vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 155 SCRA 270 (1987). 41 Municipality of Victorias vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 149 SCRA 32 (1987).

21 Almarza vs. Arguelles, et al., 156 SCRA 718 (1987). 42 Vda. de Recinto vs. Inciong, et al., 77 SCRA 196 (1977).

22 133 SCRA 718 (1984). 43 De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 156 SCRA 701 (1987).

23 Laguna vs. Lavantino 71 Phil 566 (1941); Corpus, et al. vs. Beltran, et al., 97 PMI. 722 44 Edralin vs. Edralin, et al.. 1 SCRA 222 (1961).
(1955).
45 Varsity Hills, Inc., et al. vs. Navarro, etc., et al., 43 SCRA 503 (1972).
24 As quoted in Pascual vs. Sarmiento, et al., 37 Phil. 170 (1917).
46 Wright, Jr., et al. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., et al., 11 SCRA 508 (1964);
25 Fitzsimmons vs. Cassity (La. App.) 172 So 824. Pabalate, et al. vs. Echarri, Jr.. et al., 37 SCRA 518 (1971).

26 Sanchez vs. Pascual, 11 Phil. 395 (1908); Pascual vs. Sarmiento et al., ante. 47 Vital vs. Anore, et al., supra; Gomez, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
77770, December 15,1988.
27 Villanueva, et al. vs. Claustro, 23 Phil. 54 (1912).
48 Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc., et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 157 SCRA 357
28 178 Am Jur. 2d, 860. (1988); Escudero vs. Dulay, 158 SCRA 69 (1988).

29 Grande vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 5 SCRA 524 (1962).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
30 Lizada vs. Omanan, et al., 59 Phil. 547 (1934); Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 63 Phil.
654 (1936); Garcia vs. Dinero, et al., 80 Phil. 474 (1948).

Today is Saturday, June 23, 2018
Custom Search
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-56694 July 2, 1990
HEIRS OF THE LATE PEDRO PINOTE, represented by his children, RUFINA PINOTE-AYING,
ANTONINA PINOTE-SILAWAN, RAMONA PINOTE VDA. DE GUOD, and JULIAN PINOTE,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE CEFERINO E. DULAY, as Presiding Judge of Branch XVI (Lapu-Lapu City) of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu & FRANCISCO P. OTTO, representing his mother, PETRA
PINOTE, respondents.
Jose B. Echaves for petitioner.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
This special civil action of certiorari and mandamus was filed by the heirs of Pedro Pinote to
compel respondent Judge Ceferino E. Dulay of the Court of First Instance of Cebu at Lapu-Lapu
City give due course to their appeal from his order dated June 7, 1979, granting the private
respondent's petition for reconstitution of the title of Lot 2381 of the Opon Cadastre.
On September 30, 1978, Francisco P. Otto, representing his mother Petra Pinote, filed in the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cebu, Branch XVI, at Lapu-Lapu City, a
verified petition for reconstitution of the original certificate of title to Lot 2381 of the Opon
Cadastre, which, as shown by a certified copy of the Municipal Index of Decrees (Annex A of the
petition), was supposedly adjudicated to Saturnino, Juana, Irineo, Pedro, and Petronilo, all
surnamed Pinote, under Decree No. 230607 dated May 7, 1934 in Cadastral Case No. 20, LRC
Rec. No. 1004. The petition alleged that the original, as well as owner's duplicate certificate of
title, were burned in the Opon municipal building during World War II, and the same could not be
located despite diligent search; that there were no annotations or liens and encumbrances on
the title affecting the same; that no deed or instrument affecting the property had been presented
for registration; and that, based on the plans and technical description marked as Annexes B
and C, the area, location, and boundaries of Lot 2381 are as follows:
On the SE., by Lot 2383-Vicente Tunacao; and by Lot 2382-Margarito Tunacao; and also by Lot
2377-Maximo Patalinjug and Lot 2377-Joaquin Patalingjug; on the SW, and NW., by Lot 2380-
General Milling Corporation; on the NE., by Lot 2386-Antonio Patalinghug; on the SE. E. and
NE., by Lot 2385-General Milling Corporation; and on the SE., by Lot 2384-Escolastico Tunacao,
all of Barrio Pusok, Lapu-Lapu City. (p. 9, Rollo.) *
By an order dated November 6, 1978, the court set the case for hearing on February 22, 1979 at
8:30 A.M. A copy of the notice of hearing was ordered to be published in the Official Gazette,
furnished to all the adjoining owners, and posted by the Sheriff at the main entrances of the
Provincial Capitol Building, the City Hall, and the Public Market of Lapu-Lapu City, at least 30
days prior to the date of hearing. The court also ordered copies of the notice and order to be
sent to the Registers of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City and Cebu, the Director of Lands, and the
Commissioner of Land Registration, directing them to show cause, if any, why the petition may
not be granted.
It does not appear, however, that notices were sent to each of the registered co-owners —
Saturnino, Juana, Irineo, Pedro and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, or their heirs, so that they
could have been heard on the petition.
As there was no opposition to the petition when it was called for hearing, the lower court
commissioned its Clerk of Court to receive the evidence.
Based on the Commissioner's Report, as well as the oral and documentary evidence submitted
by Francisco Otto in support of his petition, including a supposed abstract of the decision of the
cadastral court (Expediente Cat. No. 20, Record Cat. 1004) dated January 15, 1930, which
reads:
Lote No. 2381. — A favor de cada uno de los cinco hermanos Pinote, llamados Saturnino,
casado con Maria Igot, Juana, Irineo, Petra y Petronilo, solteros y de 20 y 17 años
respectivamente, los dos ultimos.
ASI SE ORDENA. (Emphasis supplied; p. 62, Rollo)
the Court issued an order on June 7, 1979, directing the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City to
reconstitute the original certificate of title of Lot 2381 of the Opon Cadastre, upon payment of the
corresponding fees, in the names of SATURNINO PINOTE, married to Maria Igot, JUANA,
IRINEO, PETRA (not Pedro) and PETRONILO, all surnamed Pinote (p.11, Rollo). The court
relied on the supposed abstract of the decision of the cadastral court (Exh. E), the technical
descriptions, plan and report of the Land Registration Commission (Exhs. F and G) which are
not found in the records before us.
Pursuant to the court's order, Original Certificate of Title No. RO-2355 of the Register of Deeds
of Lapu-Lapu City was issued in the names of the alleged brothers and sisters, Saturnino Pinote
married to Maria Igot, Juana, Irineo, Petra (not Pedro) and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote.
On October 1, 1979, Atty. Porfirio Ellescas, as alleged counsel for the heirs of Pedro, Juana and
Saturnino Pinote, supposedly all deceased, filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's
order, and sought the re-opening of the proceedings and the rectification of the June 7, 1979
order, for, while Otto's main petition for reconstitution based on the Municipal Index of Decrees,
alleged that Lot 2381 was decreed in the names of Irineo, Juana, Saturnino, Pedro, and
Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, the court's order of June 7, 1979 ordered the reconstitution of the
title in the names of Saturnino, Juana, Irineo, Petra (instead of Pedro) and Petronilo, all
surnamed Pinote. The heirs of Pedro Pinote claimed that they "learned of the error" only on
September 27, 1979 through their counsel, who made the inquiry and obtained a copy of the
court order.
A copy of the motion for reconsideration was received by Attorney Ramon Codilla, Otto's
counsel, on Oct. 5, 1979 (p. 17, Rollo).i•t•c-aüsl The hearing of the motion was set on Nov. 14,
1979 at 8:30 A.M. with notice to Otto and Atty. Cedilla (p. 18, Rollo). Because of a conflict in his
trial calendar, Atty. Ellescas informed the court that he would not be able to attend the hearing
(p. 19, Rollo). Only Atty. Codilla appeared at the hearing on Nov. 14, 1979. He was ordered by
the court to submit a photocopy of OCT No. RO-2355 which he complied with.
On December 2, 1979, the court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration on the
ground that:

. . . Annex "A" of the petition for reconstitution of title wherein Lot 2381 of the Opon Cadastre
was allegedly decreed in the names of Irineo, Juana, Saturnino, Pedro and Petronilo, all
surnamed Pinote. During the hearing of this petition, no opposition was registered thereto and
the evidence adduced by the petitioner shows clearly that an original certificate of title covering
subject lot was issued in favor of Saturnino, Juana, Irineo, Petra, and Petronilo, all surnamed
Pinote, co-owners and brothers and sisters; that the original, as well as the owners' duplicate,
was burned in the Opon municipal building during the last war; that there were no annotations on
this title affecting the same; that the so-called index of decree showing that Pedro Pinote is one
of the co-owners is erroneous and it should instead read as "Petra" since they are the brothers
and sisters; and that this fact is also reflected in the extract of the decision of the cadastral court
dated January 15, 1930 which reads:
Lot No. 2381. — A favor de cada uno de los cinco hermanos Pinote llamados Saturnino, casado
con Maria Igot, Juana, Irineo, Petra y Petronilo, solteros y de 20 y 17 años respectivamente, los
dos ultimos.
Under Republic Act No. 26, a petition for the reconstitution of a lost or destroyed original
certificate of title for registered land may be filed with the Court of First Instance "by the
registered owner, his assigns or any person having an interest in the property" from any of the
sources enumerated therein, and in accordance with the procedure outlined in the same law.
Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder
enumerated as may be available, in the following order: (1) owner's duplicate certificate; (2)
mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate certificate or co-owner's copy; (3) a certified copy of the
certificate of title previously issued by the Register of Deeds or by a legal custodian thereof, (4)
an authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to
which the original certificate of title was issued; (5) a document, on file in the registry of deeds,
by which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased
or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been
registered; and (6) any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and
proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title. The index of decree which
mentioned "Pedro Pinote" is neither controlling nor conclusive as it is not an "authenticated copy
of the decree of registration pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued."
Accordingly, the Court is justified in granting this petition on the bases of the decision of the
cadastral court which is accompanied by the duly approved plan and technical description of the
property (Emphasis supplied; pp. 21-23, Rollo.)
On January 2, 1980, the heirs of the late Pedro Pinote; namely, Rufina-Pinote-Aying, Antonina
Pinote-Silawan, Ramona Pinote Vda. de Guod and Julian Pinote, filed their notice of appeal (p.
24, Rollo). On January 4, 1980, they filed an urgent ex parte motion for extension of time to file
record on appeal (p. 25, Rollo). The record on appeal was filed on January 9, 1980, and a copy
was sent to the private respondent by registered mail on the same date (p. 26, Rollo).
On May 10, 1980, the court denied due course to the appeal on the ground of tardiness as the
petitioners' motion for reconsideration, which the court declared to be pro forma, did not suspend
the finality of the court's June 7, 1979 order.
The issue is: Has the appeal been perfected on time? We hold the contrary. Admittedly, they
received a copy of the Order dated June 7, 1979 on September 27, 1979; hence, they had until
October 27, 1979 within which to perfect their appeal. Instead, they opted to file a motion for
reconsideration on October 1, 1979 which is merely pro forma. The ground alleged in the motion
for reconsideration is the same ground for a new trial under Section 1 (c), Rule 37 of the new
Rules of Court. This being so, the Court finds and so holds that their motion for reconsideration
failed to point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the judgment which are not
supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making express reference to the
testimonial or documentary evidence or to the provisions of law alleged to be contrary to such
findings or conclusions: hence, it shall be treated as a motion pro forma intended merely to delay
the proceedings and it shall not interrupt or suspend the period of time for the perfection of an
appeal. And since the period to appeal had long expired, the parties herein have lost their right
to appeal from the Order of June 7, 1979. (Emphasis ours; pp. 29-30, Rollo.)
Hence, this petition for mandamus and/or certiorari filed by the heirs of Pedro Pinote praying that
respondent court be ordered to give due course to their appeal or to amend the order of June 7,
1979, by striking out Petra and putting in Pedro instead as one of the co-owners of Lot 2381.
The only issues in this case are:
(1) whether the petitioners' appeal is timely; and
(2) whether the reconstitution proceedings should be reopened and the order of
reconstitution dated June 7, 1979 should be rectified or amended.
After a careful examination of the sparse records before us, we find merit in the petition for
certiorari and mandamus. First, because the petitioners' appeal was not tardy. Their motion for
reconsideration of the order dated June 7, 1979 was not pro forma (Annex D, p. 14, Rollo). It
invited the court's attention to a substantial variance between the petition for reconstitution and
the court's order of reconstitution, for while the unopposed petition alleged that the registered co-
owners of Lot 2381 were Saturnino, Juana, Irineo, Pedro and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, as
evidenced by the entry in the Municipal Index of' Decrees, the Order of Reconstitution dated
June 7, 1979, on the other hand, identified the co-owners as "Saturnino Pinote, married to Maria
Igot, Juana, Irineo, Petra and Petronilo all surnamed Pinote . . ." The movants prayed that an
order be issued for the reopening of the reconstitution proceeding and that the court's order of
June 7, 1979 be rectified "to change the name of Petra to that of Pedro Pinote"' (p. 14, Rollo).
The error adverted to in the motion for reconsideration is substantial for it affects the
participation and interest of Pedro Pinote (or his heirs) in Lot No. 2381, an interest that appeared
in the petition for reconstitution and in the notice of hearing issued by the court, but which
disappeared from the court's order of reconstitution dated June 7, 1979, having been replaced
by "Petra Pinote" instead. The trial court issued a three page-single-spaced order, disposing of
the motion for reconsideration. That so much argument was lavished on the denial of the motion
proves that it was not pro forma or merely dilatory.
The motion for reconsideration was timely. The petitioners had not been separately notified of
the reconstitution proceedings except by constructive notice through the published notice of
hearing. They discovered the assailed order dated June 7, 1979 on September 27, 1979,
through Atty. Ellescas. They had up to October 27, 1979 to either file a motion for
reconsideration or appeal. They filed a motion for reconsideration on October 1, 1979 after only
four (4) days of the 30-day appeal period had elapsed, so, they had 26 days left to appeal. On
December 11, 1979, they received the court's order denying their motion for reconsideration (p.
23, Rollo). They filed a notice of appeal, cash appeal bond and a motion for extension of time to
file a record on appeal on January 4, 1980 or 24 days later, with two (2) or more days of the
appeal period to spare. Their record on appeal was actually filed on January 8, 1980, within the
10-day extension which they sought from the court (p. 29, Rollo).i•t•c-aüsl Clearly, their appeal
was seasonably filed.
But apart from the question of whether their appeal was timely or not, the more important issue
is the validity of the order of reconstitution. As the petition for reconstitution of title was a
proceeding in rem, compliance with the requirements of R.A. 26 is a condition sine qua non for
the conferment of jurisdiction on the court taking cognizance of the petition. Considering that
both the petition and the court's notice of hearing, referred to the reconstitution of the title of Lot
2381 in the names of the registered co-owners, Saturnino Pinote married to Maria Igot, Juana,
Irineo, Pedro and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, the cadastral court had jurisdiction only to
grant or deny the prayer of the petition as published in the notice of hearing. The court could not
receive evidence proving that Petra Pinote, instead of Pedro, is a registered co-owner of Lot
2381. The reconstitution or reconstruction of a certificate of title literally and within the meaning
of Republic Act No. 26 denotes restoration of the instrument which is supposed to have been
lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. The purpose of the reconstitution of any
document, book or record is to have the same reproduced, after observing the procedure
prescribed by law, in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred. Hence, in
Bunagan, et al. vs. CFI of Cebu, et al., 97 SCRA 72, where the certificate of title was decreed in
the names of "Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong," the reconstitution of the title in the names of
"spouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong" was held to be "a material change that cannot be
authorized."
The jurisdiction of the cadastral court is hedged in by the four walls of the petition and the
published notice of hearing which define the subject matter of the petition. If the court oversteps
those borders, it acts without or in excess of its jurisdiction in the case.
On the basis of the allegations of the petition and the published notice of hearing, the heirs of
Pedro Pinote had no reason to oppose the petition for reconstitution for the rights and interest in
Lot 2381 of their ancestor, Pedro Pinote, were not adversely affected by the petition. It was only
when Pedro's name (and in effect, his interest in Lot 2381) disappeared from the court's order of
reconstitution that his heirs had cause to rise in arms as it were, and ask for the reopening of the
case.
There is no gainsaying the need for courts to proceed with extreme caution in proceedings for
reconstitution of titles to land under R.A. 26. Experience has shown that this proceeding has
many times been misused as a means of divesting a property owner of the title to his property.
Through fraudulent reconstitution proceedings, he wakes up one day to discover that his
certificate of title has been cancelled and replaced by a reconstituted title in someone else's
name. Courts, therefore, should not only require strict compliance with the requirements of R.A.
26 but, in addition, should ascertain the identity of every person who files a petition for
reconstitution of title to land. If the petition is filed by someone other than the registered owner,
the court should spare no effort to assure itself of the authenticity and due execution of the
petitioner's authority to institute the proceeding.
It should avoid being unwittingly used as a tool of swindlers and impostors in robbing someone
of his title.
It does not appear that the above precautions had been taken in this case. We note that:
(1) The registered owners (or their heirs) had not been individually notified of the filing of
Otto's petition for reconstitution.
(2) His authority, if any, and that of Atty. Ramon Codilla, to represent all the registered co-
owners of Lot 2381 in the reconstitution proceeding, does not appear to have been investigated
by the court.
(3) It does not appear that the court verified Atty. Porfirio Ellescas' authority to appear as
counsel for the movants-intervenors, Pedro, Juana and Saturnino Pinote (who are also
supposed to be represented by Atty. Codilla), and their heirs.
(4) Neither did it ascertain the identities of the heirs of Pedro, Saturnino and Juana who
filed the motion to reopen the reconstitution proceedings.
(5) We are intrigued why the heirs of Juana and Saturnino Pinote, through Atty. Ellescas,
asked for reconsideration of the court's order dated June 7, 1979 since their interests in Lot
2381 were not adversely affected by the court's order dated June 7, 1979.
(6) It does not appear that the court carefully ascertained the genuineness of the abstract
of the decision of the cadastral court (which the petitioners alleged to be uncertified).
(7) Ascertaining which is correct or wrong: the abstract of the decree, or, the Municipal
Index of Decrees — calls for the reopening of the reconstitution proceeding and the careful
examination of all available evidence as to who are the true registered co-owners of Lot 2381,
for the Court may have unknowingly changed the ownership of Lot 2381 by vesting title in a
stranger or impostor.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The orders dated June 27, 1979, December
2, 1979 and May 10, 1980 in Cad. Case No. 20, LRC Rec. No. 1004, Lot No. 2381, Opon
Cadastre, are hereby annulled and set aside for having been issued without jurisdiction. The
respondent court is ordered to reopen the proceeding for reconstitution of the title of Lot 2381,
with due notice to each of the registered co-owners, the adjoining property owners, and others
who are required by law to be notified. They should be separately furnished by respondent
Francisco P. Otto, at their respective residential addresses, with copies of the petition and its
annexes. The petitioners herein should be allowed to intervene in the proceeding in order that
their or their predecessors' interest, if any, may be heard.
This decision is immediately executory. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
* There is no statement of the area of Lot 2381.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
Lawphil Main Menu
♦ Constitution
♦ Statutes
♦ Jurisprudence
♦ Judicial Issuances
♦ Executive Issuances
♦ Treatise
♦ Legal Link
Today is Saturday, June 23, 2018
Custom Search
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37995 August 31, 1987
BUREAU OF FORESTRY, BUREAU OF LANDS and PHILIPPINE FISHERIES COMMISSION,
petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FILOMENO GALLO, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari, which seeks to annul and set aside the Decision 1
(promulgated on April 11, 1973) of the respondent court in CA-G.R. No. 38163-R, affirming the
decision 2 (dated April 6, 1966) of the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo in Land Registration
Case No. N-506, G.L.R.O. Record No. N-20783 entitled "Filomeno Gallo, Applicant vs. Bureau
of Forestry, Bureau of Lands, and Philippine Fisheries Commission, oppositors. " The dispositive
portion of the trial court's decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the court Orders the registration of Lots Nos. 2, 3, and 4 and the bigger portion
of Lot No. 1 after excluding the portion Identified as Lot 1-A together with the improvements
thereon in the name of Filomeno Gallo, of legal age, widower, Filipino citizen, and resident of
155 Fuentes Street, Iloilo City, Philippines. Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are subject to the road right-of-
way of 15 meters wide which is presently known as Sto. Rosario Rizal Montpiller provincial Road
and Buenavista-Daraga provincial Road they being properties of the Province of Iloilo and
should be registered in the name of said province. The oppositions of the Director of Lands,
Director of Forestry and the Philippine Fisheries Commission are dismissed. Lot 1-A with an
area of 2.6864 hectares which is enclosed in red pencil and is found inside Lot No. 1 in the plan
Exhibit is hereby declared public land. After the decision has become final let the corresponding
decree be issued.
SO ORDERED. (p. 38, Joint Record on Appeal Annex "A." p. 25, Rollo)
This appeal also seeks to annul and set aside respondent court's resolution dated December 14,
1973 denying for lack of merit, herein petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The basic issue which petitioners raise in this appeal is —
Whether or not the classification of lands of the public domain by the Executive Branch of the
Government into agricultural, forest or mineral can be changed or varied by the court depending
upon the evidence adduced before it. (p. 9, Brief for the Petitioners, p. 105, Rollo)
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On July 11, 1961, four (4) parcels of land situated in Buenavista, Iloilo described in Plan Psu-
150727, containing an approximate area of 30.5943 hectares were the subject of an application
for registration by Mercedes Diago who alleged among others that she herself occupied said
parcels of land having bought them from the testate estate of the late Jose Ma. Nava who, in his
lifetime, had bought the lands in turn from Canuto Gustilo on June 21, 1934. The Director of
Lands opposed said application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-
in-interest have sufficient title over the lands applied for, which could be registered under the
Torrens systems, and that they have never been in open, continuous and exclusive possession
of the said lands for at least 30 years prior to the filing of the application. The Director of Forestry
on the other hand anchored his opposition principally on the ground that certain specific portions
of the lands subject matter of the application, with an area of approximately 194,080 square
meters are mangrove swamps and are within Timberland Block "B " L.C. Project No. 38, L.C.
Map No. 1971 of Buenavista, Iloilo.
On June 30, 1965, respondent Filomeno Gallo, having purchased the subject parcels of land
from Mercedes Diago on April 27, 1965, moved to be substituted in place of the latter, attaching
to his motion an Amended Application for Registration of Title substantially reproducing the
allegations in the application of Mercedes Diago. Petitioner Philippine Fisheries Commission
also moved on August 30, 1965 to be substituted in place of petitioner Bureau of Forestry as
oppositor over a portion of the land sought to be registered, supervision and control of said
portion having been transferred from the Bureau of Forestry to the Philippine Fisheries
Commission.
On April 6, 1966, the trial court rendered its decision ordering the registration of the four (4)
parcels of land in the name of respondent Filomeno Gallo after excluding a portion Identified as
Lot "1-A" which is the site of the municipal hall of Buenavista town, and subjecting Lots Nos. 1, 2
and 3 to the road-of-way of 15 meters width.
Petitioners appealed from said decision to the respondent Court of Appeals assigning the
following errors in their brief:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LAND
WHICH CONSISTS OF TIMBERLAND, FORESHORELAND AND LAND BELONGING TO THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN HENCE UNREGISTERABLE.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POSSESSION OF THE APPLICANT-
APPELLEE AND HIS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAD BEEN PEACEFUL, OPEN,
CONTINUOUS, UNINTERRUPTED AND ADVERSE TO CLAIMANTS AND IN THE CONCEPT
OF OWNER. (p. 6, Brief for the Petitioners, p. 105, Rollo)
Respondent court affirmed said decision and denied a motion for reconsideration of the same
hence the present petition with two (2) assigned errors, basically the same issues raised with the
respondent court:
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DETERMINATION OF
WHETHER A PUBLIC LAND IS AGRICULTURAL OR STILL A FOREST LAND RESTS
EXCLUSIVELY UPON THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY (NOW DIRECTOR OF FOREST
DEVELOPMENT), THE SECRETARY OF NATURAL RESOURCES) AND THE PRESIDENT OF
THE PHILIPPINES.
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE LAND IS PRESUMED TO
BELONG TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT HEREIN HAS NOT
CONVINCINGLY SHOWN THAT THE REMOTE PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST POSSESSED
THE LAND IN QUESTION SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL. (pp. 9 & 20, Brief for the Petitioners, p.
105, Rollo)
Out of the 30.5943 hectares applied for registration under the Torrens System, 11.1863 hectares
are coconut lands and admittedly within the disposable portion of the public domain. These are
more particularly Identified as parcels "B," B-1", "B-2" and "B-3" of the sketch plan Exh. "1-A."
The rest, consisting of 19.4080 hectares and Identified as parcels A, A-1, A-2 and A-3 of the
same plan Exh. "1-A," is now the center of controversy of the present appeal.
Petitioners contend that respondent court completely ignored the undisputed facts that 1) the
controverted area is within Timberland Block "B," L.C. Project No. 38, L.C. Map No. 1971 of
Buenavista, Iloilo and that 2) the certification of February 18, 1956 of the then Director of
Forestry to the effect that the area in question is needed for forest purposes. Respondent court
in affirming the decision of the Iloilo trial court ruled that although the controverted portion of
19.4080 hectares are mangrove and nipa swamps within Timberland Block "B," L.C. Project No.
38, same cannot be considered part of the public forest not susceptible of private ownership
since petitioners failed to submit convincing proof that these lands are more valuable for forestry
than for agricultural purposes, and the presumption is that these are agricultural lands.
Respondent court based its conclusion upon the premise that whether or not a controverted
parcel of land is forest land, is a question of fact which should be settled by competent proofs,
and if such a question be an issue in a land registration proceeding, it is incumbent upon the
Director of Forestry to submit to the court convincing proofs that the land in dispute is not more
valuable for agriculture than for forest purposes. It is the position of respondent that respondent
court did "not hesitate to apply this presumption with full force particularly where, as in the case
at bar, the lands applied for have been possessed and cultivated by the applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest for a long number of years without the government taking any positive
step to dislodge the occupants from their holdings which have passed from one to another by
inheritance or by purchase." (p. 9, Brief for private respondents) Otherwise stated, it is Our
impression that private respondents claim the rule of prescription against the government.
Such contentions of private respondents do not hold water. Admittedly the controversial area is
within a timberland block as classification of the municipality and certified to by the Director of
Forestry on February 18, 1956 as lands needed for forest purposes and hence they are portions
of the public domain which cannot be the subject of registration proceedings. Clearly therefore
the land is public land and there is no need for the Director of Forestry to submit to the court
convincing proofs that the land in dispute is not more valuable for agriculture than for forest
purposes, as there was no question of whether the land is forest land or not. Be it remembered
that said forest land had been declared and certified as such by the Director of the Bureau of
Forestry on February 18, 1956, several years before the original applicant of the lands for
registration Mercedes Diago, filed it on July 11, 1961. In the case of Government of the
Philippine Islands vs. Abella, 49 Phil. 49, cited by private respondents themselves in their brief,
We held —
Following the decision of Ankon vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 10), it is again
held, that whether a particular parcel of land is more valuable for forestry purposes than for
agricultural purposes, or vice versa, is a fact which must be established during the trial of the
case. Whether the particular land is agricultural, forestry or mineral is a question to be settled in
each particular case unless the Bureau of Forestry has, under the authority conferred upon it by
law, prior to the intervention of private interest, set aside said land for forestry or mineral
resources. (Italics for emphasis)
We also held in the case of Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499, 503 that-
... As a general rule, timber or forest lands are not alienable or disposable under either the
Constitution of 1935 or the Constitution of 1973.
... It is the Bureau of Forestry that has jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection,
management, reproduction, occupancy and use of all public forests and forest reservations and
over the granting of licenses for the taking of products therefrom, including stone and earth
(Section 1816 of the Revised Administrative Code). That the area in question is a forest or
timber land is clearly established by the certification made by the Bureau of Forest Development
that it is within the portion of the area which was reverted to the category of forest land,
approved by the President on March 7, 1958.
As provided for under Sec. 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, which was lifted from Act No. 2874,
the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest
lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government and not of the courts.
With these rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court which
determines the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but
the Executive Branch of the Government, through the Office of the President. Hence, it was
grave error and/or abuse of discretion for the respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts
that (1) the disputed area is within a timberland block and (2) as certified to by the then Director
of Forestry, the area is needed for forest purposes.
Furthermore, private respondents Cannot claim to have obtained their title by prescription
inasmuch as the application filed by them necessarily implied an admission that the portions
applied for are part of the public domain which cannot be acquired by prescription, unless the
law expressly permits it. It is a rule of law that possession of forest lands, however long, cannot
ripen into private ownership (Director of Forestry vs. Munoz, 23 SCRA 1184).
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the assailed decision is hereby SET ASIDE, and a
new one is hereby rendered, declaring that:
1) Parcels "B," "B-1," "B-2 and "B-3" of the sketch plan Exhibit "1-A" consisting of
11.1863 hectares of coconut land and admittedly within the disposable portion of the public
domain are hereby ordered registered in the name of the applicant Filomeno Gallo and/or his
successors-in-interest as provided for by the Public Land Law; and
2) Parcels "A," "A-1," and "A-2," and "A-3" of the same plan Exh. "1-A," consisting of
19.4080 hectares, are forest lands or lands of the public domain of the Republic of the
Philippines and are therefore inalienable.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and Gancayco, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Penned by Justice Jesus J. Perez with the concurring votes of Justices Jose N.
Leuterio and Luis B. Reyes.
2 Written by Judge Ramon Blanco.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation