Aristotle's Ethics
J. 0. URMSON
15 Nov 2002
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LACK WELeas
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‘ACIP catego fr his book inva fom Be
Siblopaab pica inde,
Contents
Pesce
Retraces
Pics
Bee it: Pinney Discusion
Beles Chancer
atranad Mins
Response Choice
Parva Elen of Chancer
‘The Excelences of Intelligence
Pleasure
3
4
3
‘
7 Strength and Weakness of Wil
8
9) Socal Relationships
0
k
Eudaeronia
Further Reading
Index
128
129108
Imatked of becaue hey
touch and not his setving ie
ff ting this ba inca
Fring eevee the we of he ar ace the
Philosophers have always beer,
between enjoying. -
and,
Plaatre
Y are cases of pleas
oF enoyee eT Of Proce sacs ese
oF enjoyment of actirny ro
Sanlea po Of Welng Se acta nici, ty
be mised by the won einer
‘sctiviey’, which is tho
discussion being used ata term of ee,
plese Ne tat Cat has to be active, cn tae
Plasane As the word sctiviyis bag
nace Oi thing is mach se sare
satualy 50 called. One does nor need ve
on lying there frit tobe pleasant: sex
do something, noe being rvtee,
ime and the like are enough aac poe
Bn ity lel an acivicy i the en
ea inns the bringing about of an ead pan
take time, though ie may lee free
beach one has i
a denying
ime, and if ne iy
the beach. Ie must alo be ony
she excellence of temperaace is contend oi
we the so ch and tate and sggening
Sensations that are produced By towrh
pot denied that these plearor
and almott, in fact, does, tod then
stitutes the exp. 2
D)
Social Relationships
4c the beginning ofthe Niomaben Eihis (10540 25+» 4)
Ara lo that ees a depactment ofthe thos of
polis bth ate conered with deicmining th gcd fr aa
Bat this consider only the good for man tstted oy ag
‘ommanisy, wher plitis proper wll ince te ey nf
Sil citi, which ao ext for the good for me, te te
sample socal coment. So ethics is the prokegeeroe ae
polis, andthe nal emtece ote wok in Serie ne one
Aico’ (1815 22-23). The ed ofthe eheal wah ote
eure he of pols,
Beh stesso Slats obs ocd
142i siden wor inthe Nema ise seo
18 she a usally tated) ‘Mant mace goes
‘eit Whac Ail meus hati aac esa
Nr age it thee wo books go beyond the bounds of
seem to be an editorial
hs dfned by Aisle, and cheeno Social Relaionsbipy
Saran heth broly genuine. Ths Book Vil en nat
Soares th th wend Ply we no
Sates (11545 34), while Bok IX ends act Pe
CrP wth the weds "We should nex snes a
(72s 19% his is surly clumsy stitching ogc
Pieces. Moreover there is no reference to apred
thse wo hale ote
te of he Nima Ey and tee ye
the oversight in these two
In Chapeer 2 of Book VIII Aristcle repeats his regula view
that there are generically three objects of love and dest, she
Pleasant, the good and the useful. In speaking of loving she
useful we are obviously talking traditional translations, ce
doube it would be better to say that we value it, On the
flistinction te bases in Chapeer 3 «second between theceeypesof
fiendship (in his wide sense). We have relationships with people
because such relationships are useful, such people as those whom
owadays we might call business asccates, with other people
such a8 bridge partners and witty conversatioalst, we form
‘sssociations for entertainment and pleasure. These two typet of
sociation, if they are no more than that, do noe, like true
BY Social Relationshaps my
18 their objece but che utility oF
oe epee patina eid
rele is rare, foritcan,
“The third typeof sociation, rue friendship,
‘both of whom are good and who wish
pee e ete ee
Sencar ee
ict wiy msc The hc pe of
‘ation may be berween two bad men or berween a good
Bee Atmel bake, er codhip can eric ly beween
good men and equals and must be reciprocal. eee
ee ress
‘benefit.
sa called
, bowee, scl elaionshis, sot naturally
ae aire scree ‘canibeeps ae
theo er sno, hsb al wi er a bce
ef he deci of Ari's views on thi pc ae unikely
tbemales to merc wees, who may deny the
‘seguir ad od the view that nach cae the soe
xg vt pene han ned ple, Bs,
Arora tence hat loving i mea the xsece
‘Bendy ha ingore (1159433039) help to mig is
aly cused
Cee een alse ng coahigs vik
fare pen mt He Singin he fd
forms of goveramen, ach having its own characteristic per
‘tion, making sin Schematic they are.
Goud Form Peveion
Monarchy yranny
‘Asitoracy Oligarchy
Tumecncy Democracy
(OF these the fis ewo are self-explanatory: timocracy isa form of
{orernment in which power is widely and evenly spread beeween
‘Al sho satisfy «property qualifcaton, its perversion democracy,
‘ing the sate where all are equal in authority, whatever ehete
‘ata = something Aristoce regards as not as bad as tyranny ofmz
Sail Ratoni
aligarchy, but key to be diorganied a illadvie, The wid
‘ens ofthe Athenian detail the ancien pilsose,
with a deep sapcion of exseme dint demesne
Aasote was noc shone to eas was Poe hogan aes
fave power withoe the rapomibiity tobe expel whos
with a stake in the country. “4 ln
‘Arise now fads the flowing prs
‘The good relation of father ro mi ike monarchy; es pervenion
‘a cyranny
‘The good relation of husband ro wile ike siccracy; but where.
the wife is oe allowed ber proper share of inlecnce and the
hab demic ia everyeing the reson become sn
ro oligarchy
‘The good relation of brothers like timocracy; but « household
there nobody holds sway is like « democracy.
How far chese parallels are accurate and illuminating in deal
tay be debated; bue hey form part of Aristotle's general view
that a household is a microcosm reflecting the more iaclusive
relationships holding wichin « state and exhibiting parallel
merits and defects,
‘The farther decails of Arittcl's account of the principles
governing vatious types of association, from crue friendship 10
Commercial relationships like that of the shoemaker and his
customer (1163b 38), need not be further examined here. They
tare readily comprehensible and vary from the wise and penet
rating to those relecting outdated and unfamiliar social scenes
and practices.
FRIENDSHIP AND EGOISM
‘There remains a crucial problem: in general, the tone of the
ethical writings is egocentric. All che ingrediens put forward as
elements in the good life seem to be advocated as promoting the
well being of the agent. This scems crue of the excellences of
inceligence and character at well as of less cencral maters suchas
ieee 1”
f eis po es ese
oo! birth ad mae oe
on Ae ent come i
Shh has declared tobe an exsential element in
Se Ha ren fs mil dn Capes 4
8 of Book IX
“Asal stars by saying tac the mai feacres of friendship —
disieeted ear fr welfare and ie, and sharing life, interests,
js and ric ~ are ss much tue of good man's cation
Fine a of his lations eo his friends. The good man does
tei the life e lens, dos not wish to be diferent and in
(Roca regads himself in the way that he s supposed to regard
steeds ofthe main excures of Fendship consitate love of
the fend, we most say that the good man loves hime
‘iste i, ofcourse, aware that sell-love 1s usually a term of
sae. People Blame those who love themselves mast and cll |
them vefselfas aterm shame, whereas the good man
‘cfr ens ake, aod sacries his own interest (11680
29-33) Bur Arstote says that this a misunderstanding. The
{pod maniss lover of self in the ood vente, and the wicked man
lore himself inthe bad sense “This line of thought is interes
inl ehed in he eighteenth century by Bahop Butler who, io
his mons preached in the Rolls Chapel, tld his fasionablen4 Social Relationships
‘and cynical audience that the trouble with true selflove was
that it was t00 rare, not that it was too common,
‘What Aristotle now has (1169s 18 ff) to say is crucial and
‘must be quoted at length:
ei rv of the good man tha he does much fr the sake o his
foods and hs foun. and wl defor tem ifocese
will surrender boch wealth and honows and. gescally he
‘ood men fight for, but gaining nobility for hits ox he
ecfers great pleasure for short time vo'cadurng igh
pleasure, and clive nobly fora year ater then er many ys
tn nondescript fashion, and one fe and gene acon te soay
stmall ones This presumably happens te thse ‘who de iy
athe, for they chose something grat and fe fr them
selves... Inall praiseworthy deeds the good min apps o
Alle to himself che grease share of noily. In thn way
then, one shouldbe a lover of sel, a has been iid, but na
the way most people are
This line of argument, ac least at frst sight, does not do
what is required of ic. There is a great difference berween a
sacrifice for the sake of another, which can be rightly described
438 fine or noble, and giving up something to another in order
to atcain the greater good of having achieved something fine
and noble, Ifone makes 2 sacrifice for another in order to attain
a greater good, then it is not true that one has made the
sacrifice for the sake of that ocher. If this line of argument is
correce, Aristotle has filed to reconcile his view oflicndship
2 involving disinterested care forthe friend's welfare with his
‘general view that men seek what they take co be thei highest
‘Rood.
Buc we must look carefully at this notion of acting in &
cereain way ‘because iti fine (noble) or Yor the sake of what is
fine (noble). Aristotle introduces his notion a aumber of
times in che Nicomacheen Ethia, particulatly in contexts which
Seem to involve a person in acing against his incerests. Thus,
he speaks in the presene context of scefice fora friend forthe
sake of what is fine and in his discussion of bravery he mote
than once speaks ofthe brave man as facing death because ss
P ws
: Sie Relations
deg, nn), he Mb 30-39 est he
Fe tie, ce wetland the esa
of
the base, the harmful and ee
Sal pew pe ese oma Se
ie ety ae
ews; i is ths wed fe ular word for
"base in ethical contexts, 8 also the
— Ariscocl defines the Aalor
up nce bri (13668 3) parane ecaute good
Scere ete toe
today coclsions om
he Be in ehial conten i opposed fo wha is
Saino may bebe tb stk ak
Dati mennnr be orb pon ed woman
fer pial and meagre sats. To eat moderately may be good,
frreminetselfsarifce wll be Bre. A good man will not be
‘Bietolive wth himself fhe behaves sorddly oc mean, ad 30
til nse athe to die. So the Be or oble should pethaps be
Tug ofa this special ype of the good cat the oppose of
the mean and base This interpretation seems ro harmonize best
trite defnitios othe Rte and ee Tops, since the notion
be fcng may well ave an acstheic ora chia cone. The
inintion berween what i simply wrong and what is mean,
Stabby oc bs one which nowadays can il gain sympaerc
ondeandig
‘So, now, if the situation is such chat one can save one's fried
only by sacrificing onc’ own life, and one makes this sacrifice
‘becuse one would despise oneselt forever ater if one did not, is
one loving one's fiend for his owe sake or being selfish? One
imighe reply that unless he were 4 true fiend, and aot a mere6 Sacial Reatonsips
business acquaintance or boon companion, there would be
Puthing sordid in noe making the scrifc, that iis poesae
because one values him for his own sake that it would beng)
Further discussions follow in Aristotle's text, including 1 mont
claborace chain of argument to show that one cannot lave mone
than afew rue friends, something one might accept intuitively
without che argument. Mose of thee are sel(-explanacory and
need no discussion here. Bue something should be aid abot the
‘notion of self-sufficiency. Ie willbe remembered thc in Book | of
the Nicomachan Exbics Aristotle had already said that one of the
‘riteria of the endaomon life was that ic was sef-suficient, in Book
X he is going roll us that one of the grounds for regarding fe
devoted co contemplation as the most eudacnon is that it
‘eminently satisfies that criterion (11776 21). Ie might sem, and
incautious commentators have often suggested, that this
‘emphasis on self-sufficiency fies in badly with the claims in the
discussions of friendship that iis an essential pat ofthe good ie
and chat nobody would choose to live withour friends
Ie should be nored that Aristocle explicitly discises these
doubts, in Book IX, Chapeer 9. What of the contention tha the
self-sufficient man has no need of fiends (11696 5)? Having
‘reiterated the importance and valve of friends, Aristotle makes
the distinction that he needs. The life ofthe contemplative man
‘ced few external goods, 20 such a man will have lite need of
‘iendships of uility’ of business associations; the life of such a
‘man is also intrinsically pleasant, so he will not aced companions
tokeep him amused. Thus, his rain acupaion in life can go on
withoue dependence on other people ro aud him. This is the wayFurther Reading
GENERAL INTRODUCTIONS To AnistoTiE
JU Ackil Ariat the Philaepber (Oxford, 1981)
J: Barnes Avisate (Oxford, 1982,
BOOKS ON ARISTOTLE’ ETHics
MER Hardie: Arias Ethical Thy: 2od e. (One, 1980)
J. Barnes, M. Schofield and R.Sorsh
it (eds) Articles on Avie
Ethie and Paltis; London, 97
8 (ed), Estat om Avista’: Ethic, (Berkeley, 1980)
sctviy 9-104, 108, 124-5
spate: goad 37
topic 39-40, 49-50, 52, 39,
os
lies 31
bravery 27, 63-7
Bate J. 113
ddoice 9-53, 56 91
es
leven 82-3,
‘ompalion 4-5
soi 112-16
fd 10, 11,92, 54-5, 101-3,
inch. | pas, 87-8, 90,
37.113. ch IO pate
Ende Bibs 6. $39
8
scl,
of body 3, 21
of chanete 3,21, ch. 2 pai,
ae
itligenc 3,21, ch. pain
Sa ead 1, 13
foe (noble) 114-15,
force 43-4
form of che good 22-4, 123
Aendhip ch 9 pate
Got 121-4
od 1, 22-4, 57
oi exctlence 31
Hume, D855
focention ch. 4 pain, 58
‘arornce
of ee 45-9
of picipe 47,
Kaoe 1.5, 36, 37
oowicige 92-5, 121
Magne Merl 13, 118
mean 28-35
‘mein wo end 1, 52